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**Exposure to Violence, War-Related Losses and Attitudes
Towards Transitional Justice: Evidence from Post-Dayton
Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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Exposure to Violence, War-Related Losses and Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice: Evidence from Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

Transitional justice has emerged in an effort to address victims' needs as a means of restoring social relations broken by mass violence. Yet so far we know surprisingly little about the attitudes of victims towards different transitional justice mechanisms. Why do certain victims groups prioritize retributive justice, while others favor other forms of dealing with the violent past? What determines victims' attitudes towards transitional justice policies? To answer these questions, we rely on a 2013 representative sample survey of 1,007 respondents focusing on general population attitudes towards transitional justice in Bosnia two decades after the implementation of the Dayton Accords. We specifically compare non-victims with victims including those who have been displaced, tortured, lost a relative or have experienced a missing person in their family. Our findings confirm our main hypotheses that responses of victimhood are shaped by conflict experience as well as we demonstrate how the local post-war context in which people find themselves has an important influence on transitional justice preferences. Our findings also suggest that compared to those that remain displaced after the 1992-5 war, those never displaced are more likely to accept amnesty for war criminals, however, returnees are also more likely to embrace amnesty overall. Taking into consideration the multiplicity of victimhood and transitional justice mechanisms in Bosnia, the article demonstrates that these findings are relevant for transitional justice and conflict resolution studies more broadly.

Introduction

What makes an appropriate post-conflict response to the needs of victims? Despite being central in the study of transitional justice, the concept of 'victimhood' remains largely unexplored in the relevant literature (Breen-Smyth 2007). Even established scholars have not eschewed the tendency to treat victims as a uniform group; in the academic literature and popular media is not uncommon to read that 'victims demand truth' or 'justice'. Hence, most analyses take a homogenous approach to victims, seen as having similar attitudes towards transitional justice policies (Sitas et al 2007). However, our findings demonstrate that this is not the case. The picture is much more complicated as different

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victim groups have distinctive conflict experiences and attitudes towards transitional justice polices. What transitional justice means for individuals largely depends on their needs, usually shaped by their exposure to violence, such as whether they have been displaced, tortured, lost a relative or their loved ones have gone missing during the conflict. Therefore, current approaches assuming a homogeneous approach among victims might distort the analytical picture and narrow the explanatory value of justice-driven responses to peace processes.

Most importantly, the lion share of the literature is devoted exclusively on measuring the ‘success’ of specific transitional justice mechanisms, or their ‘impact’ on the quality of the emerging democracy or the human rights. This is measured against exogenous variables; the point of reference for most analyses remains the society (at large), without accounting for any deviation in transitional justice priorities among different victims groups. So far existing studies have provided little evidence as to what distinctive categories of victims broadly defined aspire from transitional justice. For example, do relatives of the missing have the same or even similar transitional justice preferences as internally displaced persons or refugees who are more interested in material forms of reparation? So far, little effort has been made to account for the variation in the transitional justice preferences of distinct victims (and non-victims) groups. Likewise, few studies have given a voice to victims themselves; this also raises the question of representative sampling in related studies, as victims are hard to identify among the general population.

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This article makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the attitudes of different victims (and non-victims) groups towards alternative transitional justice

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3 policies. This is important not only because it is one of the first efforts to shed analytical
4 light on the this unexplored relationship, but also because of its potential to improve the
5 architecture of transitional justice by designing transitional justice measures tailored to
6 the needs of specific victims groups, rather than the society at large. Based on a 2013
7 representative sample survey of 1,007 respondents in Bosnia, it focuses on attitudes
8 towards transitional justice two decades after the Dayton Accords.¹ Moreover, the article
9 aims to redefine the concept of ‘positive peace’ by focusing on victim groups and their
10 needs in peace process bridging refugee and displacement studies with the literature on
11 transitional justice and missing persons. Finally, it aims to contribute to the growing
12 literature in the social sciences focusing on the effects of exposure to war violence on
13 political and social attitudes and behavior.
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32 *The neglected role of victims in the study of transitional justice*

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34 Transitional justice has emerged in an effort to address victims’ needs by means of
35 restoring social, ethnic and community relations fractured by mass violence (Breen-
36 Smyth 2007). Closer attention to civilians in peace processes and/or democratic
37 transitions has been necessitated by the changing perception of that civilian victimization
38 is increasing. Over the past decades greater attention is placed on civilian victimization as
39 opposed to the past, largely due to the emergence of new transnational actors who
40 scrutinize and document patterns of crimes coupled with the development of a robust
41 international normative framework (Méndez and Wentworth 2011; Hopgood 2013). This
42 changing reality (or perception) marks an attempt in the academic and policy literature to
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58 ¹ Survey funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, Canada
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3 move from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ forms of peace-building (Galtung 2001). The
4
5 emergence of transitional justice as a distinctive field of inquiry reflects precisely this
6
7 growing emphasis in addressing victims’ needs in post-conflict settings. Despite this
8
9 integral relationship, the existing literature has shed little analytical light to explore
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11 victims’ attitudes towards different transitional justice mechanisms. There are three
12
13 fundamental gaps in the literature that inhibit scholarly efforts to sketch a comprehensive
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15 picture of the nexus between victims and transitional justice: the analytical dearth in the
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17 concept of victimhood, the exclusive focus in the period of transition in an effort to
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19 explain the specific transitional justice policies adopted, and finally the evaluation of the
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21 ‘aftermath’ of transition in determining the success/impact of this policies.
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28 Probably the most fundamental flaw in the study of transitional justice is the
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30 absence of systematic analysis of the concepts of ‘victims’ and ‘victimhood’. Despite the
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32 fact that policymakers, academics and international media often justify peace-building
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34 initiatives on the need to address victims’ needs, our understanding of victimhood
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36 remains very limited. In the academic literature little effort has been made to define who
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38 is a victim in a society emerging from conflict, as well whether there are degrees of
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40 victimhood (Breen-Smyth 2007). The literature frames the concept of victimhood in
41
42 Manichean terms, as victims are defined often not by their personal suffering but in
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44 juxtaposition to perpetrators (i.e. good v. bad; innocent v. guilty; powerless victims v.
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46 powerful elite actors) (Bouris 2007).
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51 The literature has failed not only to appreciate the political role of victims in
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53 transitions, but most importantly has often treated victims’ groups as a homogenous
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55 group with singular preferences in the policies of dealing with the past. We often read,
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3 for instance, that victims demand the ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, but we have surprisingly little
4 empirical evidence on victims’ attitudes towards justice, memory, and forgiveness. Do all
5 victims groups have uniform preferences? How do victims formulate their attitudes
6 towards transitional justice? Do different forms of exposure to violence affect
7 individuals’ preferences to transitional justice? How does post-conflict experience
8 matter? Is it logical to expect relatives of missing persons, for example, guided by an
9 existential need to find the whereabouts of their loved ones, to have the same or even
10 comparable attitudes with refugees? This tendency to adopt a generic transitional justice
11 lens to study victimhood has sidelined or silenced specific victims’ groups (Lawther
12 2014).

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15 For all these reasons, we need to spend more time to accurately define
16 ‘victimhood’, and psychology literature might be a good starting point (Bar-Tal 2007).
17 While conventional wisdom in the transitional justice literature focuses on ‘victims’
18 groups’, psychology research puts the focus on the traumatic experience (or loss) of the
19 individual rather than solely the group that shares this experience. While the theoretical
20 framework is sketched below, we argue that this framework is analytically more
21 intelligible precisely because it avoids the simplistic representation of ‘victims’ as a
22 generic group. Essentially, by deploying this approach we can both measure individual
23 attitudes towards transitional justice while simultaneously explore the construction of
24 shared sets of beliefs among those exposed to specific forms of traumatic experiences;
25 what Daniel Bar-Tal calls the ‘Ethos of Conflict’ (Bar-Tal 2007). Shedding light on the
26 different types of exposure to violence benefits our effort to understand whether and how
27 these differing experiences affect perceptions towards dealing with the past. Most
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3 importantly, it is a more comprehensive analytical framework which paved the way to
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5 other researchers, including legal scholars and historians, to trace the relationship
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7 between these different types of exposure to traumatic events and major transitional
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9 justice outcomes (i.e. the development of legal norms and the construction of shared
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11 beliefs by specific victims groups).
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15 Analyzing the attitudes of those exposed to traumatic experiences towards
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17 transitional justice policies is crucial. First, the very *raison d'être* of transitional justice is
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19 to restore relations ruptured by violence; as such we need to understand whether and how
20
21 the legacy of violence affects individuals' attitudes towards dealing with the past.
22
23 Second, any meaningful and sustainable peace can be established only if policies that
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25 would take a step further from the simplistic/generic view of victims and design policies
26
27 tailored to accommodate the needs of different groups of victims. To this end, it is
28
29 important to have a robust empirical picture of how individuals exposed to difference
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31 forms of violence perceive policies of transitional justice. Besides, as an established body
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33 of literature has shown 'wounds that are left unattended tend to fester' (Minow 2002).
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35 Hence, a transitional justice policy that fails to incorporate victims' needs into account
36
37 increases the risk of perpetuating the vicious cycle of the past. A growing trend in the
38
39 literature is to call for 'transformative' justice, one which would be focusing on the
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41 social, economic and cultural needs of victims (Gready and Robins 2014); such an
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43 approach can only be based on systematic empirical data that would help us understand
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45 the demands of victims.
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53 Apart from conceptual limitations, there are also methodological obstacles. The
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55 lion's share of the literature, particularly early scholarship, has focused exclusively on
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3 determining the ‘decision to adopt’ specific transitional justice mechanisms over others
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5 (Olsen et al 2010a). By late 1980s and early 1990s novel transitional justice mechanisms
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7 were set up, like truth commissions and international criminal tribunals, and the attention
8
9 of this early literature was primarily reserved for explaining this puzzling variation in
10
11 transitional justice outcomes (Kritz 1995; Huntington 1993). In determining why certain
12
13 societies emerging from violence were able to prosecute perpetrators while others
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15 refrained and issued amnesties, scholars shed much analytical light on institutional and
16
17 structural factors such as the type of the transition (negotiated v. ruptured), the balance of
18
19 power, period of violence/repression, regional experience and economic wealth as well as
20
21 external influences (Zalaquett 1990; Huntington 1993; Higley and Burton 1989). Still, the
22
23 common denominator is that in this strand of the literature the role of the victims and
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25 their attitudes towards transitional justice remains marginal with the exception of few
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27 paradigmatic cases such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (Bonner,
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29 2007).
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36 This is slightly paradoxical, especially if someone takes into account that it is in
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38 the early stages in the emergence of the transitional justice that victims groups had
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40 assumed the most political role with direct impact in shaping transitional justice policies,
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42 as evident in the struggle of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo which led to the first truth
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44 commission in Argentina in 1983. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that this early
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46 literature was dominated by state-centric analyses adopted by political scientists and as
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48 such the quest for exploring victims’ attitudes towards these policies was marginal.
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52 Social movement theorists originally analyzed the struggle of victims but their objective
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3 was to understand their repertoire of mobilization that shed little light on the concept of
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5 victimhood and its impact on transitional justice (Brysk 1994; Navarro 1989).
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8 Another hurdle in understanding victims' attitudes towards transitional justice is
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10 the exclusive focus of the literature on assessing the 'success' or 'impact' of different
11
12 transitional justice mechanisms. The growing use of novel policies of transitional justice
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14 increased the need to determine which of the available tools are more effective. In this
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16 way, a significant proportion of existing research in the field has shed light on the
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18 strengths and/or limitations of truth commissions, trials and amnesties (Hayner 2010;
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20 Orentlicher 1991). Yet, the vast majority of scholarly studies are geared towards
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22 justifying a (pre-given) normative assumption on the merits or pitfalls of particular
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24 mechanisms of dealing with the past (Mendeloff 2004; Thoms et al 2010). Most
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26 significantly, these analyses are often based on the study of a single or two cases studies,
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28 which inhibited further effort to generalize from their findings be generalizable about the
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30 merits and pitfalls of different mechanisms (Backer 2009). In essence, the success of
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32 these ventures was based on an abstract conceptualization of victims' needs, which most
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34 often was not supported by empirical evidence involving victims themselves. This should
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36 partly be attributed to the fact that legal scholars who dominated the field in the second
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38 period, set a normative objective in the pursuit of accountability and placed primary
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40 emphasis on victims' 'rights', rather than understanding their 'needs' or determining their
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42 attitudes (McEvoy 2007; Gready and Robins 2014).
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50 For all these reasons, a number of scholars have called for research driven by
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52 robust data. This prompted the growing use of quantitative and advanced statistical tools
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54 to determine the long-term 'impact' of transitional justice policies (trials, truth
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3 commissions, amnesties) on the quality of the emerging democracy and the improvement
4 of human rights (Kim and Sikkink 2010; Binningsbo et al 2012; Olsen et al 2010a; Olsen
5 et al 2010b; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Gibson 2006). Usually the impact (or success) of
6 these policies is measured against exogenous variables and the point of reference for
7 most of these analyses remains the society at large, not the needs of individuals' who
8 have been exposed to violence. Despite collecting and analyzing robust (quantitative)
9 data, this approach has spent surprisingly little time to shed light on the attitudes of
10 victims towards transitional justice policies. Essentially, both qualitative and quantitative
11 approaches are often based on the unsubstantiated premise that victims constitute a
12 uniform group with shared transitional justice preferences.
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27 So far we have only limited academic research focusing on attitudes of victims
28 towards transitional justice. Aguilar-Fernandez and her colleagues shed light on public
29 attitudes towards transitional justice in the fascinating case of Spain (2011).² Despite
30 being one of the few rigorous analyses, the primary focus of the article is restricted to
31 measuring public attitudes and the legacy of exposure to violence/victimization was only
32 one of the dependent variables. Similarly Robins (2013) has published the findings from
33 a systematic (qualitative) survey on the needs of families of the disappeared in Nepal
34 (2013); although these constitute the first efforts to explore the needs of this specific
35 group, and a very welcome development, the absence of a comparative group of victim
36 categories (as well as absence of representative sample data) makes it difficult to
37 generalize from the findings.
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57 ² Another indicative poll showed that 66% of Afghans would favor amnesty if that lead to
58 sustainable peace (cited in Vinjamuri and Snyder 2015:308).
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Moreover, there is growing trend in the broader conflict literature to examine the effects of violence on intergroup attitudes like altruistic behavior (Voors et al. 2012), ethnic bias (Habyarimana et al. 2008), and hostility towards outgroups (Hobfoll et al. 2007), but limited effort has been placed on explaining how exposure to violence affects transitional justice attitudes.³ So far, there have been a number of publications focusing on the attitudes towards justice and reconciliation in Bosnia and Croatia (Biro et al 2004), Rwanda (Longman et al 2004). A relevant study by Pham et al (2005) focused on the exposure to violence and the attitudes towards transitional justice in Rwanda (Pham et al 2004). Despite these efforts our understanding of how victims (and non-victims') groups perceive transitional justice is very limited. To this end, the article is one of the first efforts to shed light on this complex and neglected relationship, drawing on a novel survey in Bosnia.

Main Hypotheses: Explaining Attitudes towards Transitional Justice

As noted above few studies have specifically pointed to the reasons why certain victim groups will support specific transitional justice policies. Our main hypotheses below draw on the existing literature on conflict experience, coupled with a set of novel hypotheses on the role of social capital and post-conflict peacekeeping environment. We distinguish past from post-conflict experiences. On the one hand, individual differences within any particular situation are shaped by personal or family experience during the war. As noted above, much previous research shows the impact of exposure to violence on individuals' political and social preferences in a number of settings. On the other,

³ For exceptions see: Bakke et al. 2009; Samii 2011

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3 post-conflict experience also matters including the current physical environment
4 surrounding victims and their social/community organizations. These post-conflict
5 variables could have an impact on whether the beliefs continue to be functional in
6 peoples' daily lives depending for instance on a respondent's post-conflict residence
7 (e.g., those still displaced reside in one type of environment while those who return are
8 influenced by a different type of environment).
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11 Our first hypothesis emphasizes the links between individual attitudes towards
12 transitional justice and *conflict experience* particularly drawing a distinction between
13 human and physical losses that cannot be recovered (e.g. loss of a loved one) and those
14 that could be partly addressed through post-conflict interventions (e.g. return of property)
15 in some cases leading to the restoration of one's pre-war community. Relatives of
16 missing persons could arguably form a third between category. While missing persons
17 are most often "presumed dead", the recovery of their bodies and truth surrounding
18 disappearances might in certain cases bring closure to a family's suffering. Attitudes
19 towards transitional justice policies are going to be related closely to what Bar-Tal has
20 termed the "ethos of conflict" or "conflict ideology". This ideology (an interrelated set of
21 shared beliefs held by your own group) develops under the specific conditions brought
22 about by the war and are functional in that specific context (helps individuals cope under
23 stressful war conditions and helps the group fight the war), and may persist after the war
24 under certain conditions (unresolved conflict, stressful economic conditions, and the
25 existence of an 'infrastructure' in the society that continually reproduces these shared
26 beliefs - e.g. through public statements, commemorations, public education and the
27 media, etc.) We hypothesize that on the individual and family level, people exposed to
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3 violence tend to adhere more strongly to share conflict-supporting beliefs. This has been
4 shown in previous research on North Caucasus, Burundi and post-Franco-Spain (Aguilar
5 et al. 2011, Samii 2011 and Bakke et al. 2011). We hypothesize that when it comes to
6 attitudes towards transitional justice this translates into greater preferences for retribution.
7 (Post-conflict interventions to support relatives of victim groups could arguably have a
8 positive effect towards their relatives' social and political attitudes towards peace.)
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11 Our second hypothesis looks at the post-conflict environment surrounding
12 displaced persons arguing that those victims now residing away from their original homes
13 (and ethnic 'others') are less likely to support amnesties. By way of contrast, those
14 returning home even under prohibitive conditions as in Bosnia are more likely to support
15 restorative justice and be less interested in trials for wrongdoers. Those individuals
16 successfully settling into a new environment, might be less dependent on compensations
17 and therefore more vocal for other types of transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. trials).
18 Related studies have claimed that diaspora groups are more likely to be radicalized while
19 abroad as the daily need for cooperation diminishes and negative memories of
20 victimization hold for longer (Zolberg, 1989:406; Zetter, 1999; Adelman and Barkan,
21 2011). However, not all victims might be well integrated in new environments in major
22 metropolitan centers. Displaced persons might be 'temporarily' accommodated into
23 designated refugee camps and face unbearable life conditions (Toal and Dahlman, 2005;
24 Celik, 2005; Belloni, 2006; Sert, 2008). At the same time, returnees exposed to such
25 conditions might become more pragmatic as to their priorities. Such post-displacement
26 conditions might influence the way they perceive justice vs. other pragmatic life priorities
27 (Başer & Çelik, 2014). Thus we hypothesize that post-conflict returnees will be open to
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3 restorative justice mechanisms involving compensations, amnesty and cross-community
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5 reconciliation.
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8 A related *community effort hypothesis* draws on social capital literature (Putnam,
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10 1993: 167; Varshney, 2001; Castles 2003; Çelik, 2005; Steele, 2011) to emphasize trust,
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12 norms, and networks. Our third hypothesis highlights the role of post-conflict formal
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14 associations, along with informal neighborhood and kinship networks, in shaping
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16 attitudes towards transitional justice. Mutual trust and communal ties enable, on the one
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18 hand, the creation of victims organizations and help, on the other, to foster coordination
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20 in advocating share concerns (Stefanovic & Loizides 2011). For instance, in the related
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22 case of diaspora groups it is not so much the status of being abroad that matters but
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24 membership in a specific organization with a pre-determined agenda. If this hypothesis is
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26 correct, we would assume that membership in victims associations will influence
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28 individual attitudes towards righting past injustices including punishing war criminals.
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37 **Case Study: The Bosnian Civil War Context**

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39 The war of 1992-1995 left deep wounds in Bosnian society. Out of the pre-war
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41 population of 4.37 million, about 110,000 were killed and 2.2 million driven from their
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43 homes in a war associated in the international media with genocide, missing persons and
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45 ethnic cleansing.⁴ The Bosnian case study is critical for transitional justice and
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51 ⁴ The most reliable fatality figures on the Bosnian war have been compiled by the
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53 Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo. In June 2007, the RDC recorded
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55 97,207 war fatalities and estimated that the count could rise by a maximum of another
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57 10,000 with ongoing research. The head of the ICTY estimates the number of dead at
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59 110,000. *Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced*, BBC NEWS, 21 June 2007, available at
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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm>. The current RDC data indicate that 40.82
per cent of the casualties were civilians; 83.33 percent of the civilian casualties were

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3 reconciliation studies, not only for the sheer numbers of victims and the variation in their
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6 respective conflict experience, but also for policies used by the international community
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8 to facilitate truth-seeking, punishment of perpetrators and reconciliation. We collected
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10 detailed data for both categories of victim groups and their conflict experience as well as
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12 support for appropriate justice mechanisms. Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia offer a
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14 unique case given the variation of victims' responses some of which have received
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16 prominence internationally. We assumed that respondents would have a minimum
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18 knowledge of such institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
19
20 Yugoslavia, the International Commission on Missing Persons and would be familiar
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22 with the role of the UNHCR in facilitating return of properties for the displaced.
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29 **Survey Data and Methods**

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31 We examine the impact of wartime experiences and war-related losses on attitudes
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33 transitional justice. Using regression analysis, we relate respondents' attitudes to six
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35 different measures aimed at capturing war experiences and losses: displacement status
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37 (never displaced, still displaced, and return to pre-war homes), loss of property, loss of a
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39 loved one, physical injury, imprisonment and torture. Attitudes related to transitional
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41 justice are captured by seven different indicators aimed at providing a comprehensive
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43 perspective on respondents' preferences for retributive as opposed to restorative justice.
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46 These include the extent to which individuals support amnesty for war criminals if that
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51 ethnic Bosniacs [Bosnian Muslims] Research and Documentation Center [RDC],
52 *Research Results and Data Base Evaluation* (2007), available at
53 <http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/index.htm>. 'Bosniac' is the self-selected ethnic
54 identifier for the Bosnian Muslim community. UNHCR, *Update on Condition for Return*
55 *to Bosnia and Herzegovina 2* (Jan. 2005), available at
56 <http://www.unhcr.ba/publications/B&HRET0105.pdf>.
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3 would help to ensure a lasting peace, support for forgiveness of perpetrators, the desire
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5 for war criminals to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial, support for
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7 criminals paying compensation to their victims, support for the state paying
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9 compensation to victims, support for a formal state apology for past atrocities, and the
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11 extent to which individuals believe that it is necessary to right the injustices of the past in
12
13 order to ensure a lasting peace. In each regression, we control for a rich set of individual
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15 background characteristics. These include education, ethnicity, economic situation prior
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17 to war, residency status (urban or rural), age and gender.
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22 The data used in our analysis were collected in a survey we conducted in Bosnia
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24 in June and July 2013.⁵ We used multi-stage sampling and included data across different
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26 victim categories. IPSOS conducted the survey using a four stage stratified sample. In the
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28 first stage, it selected municipalities using simple random sampling,⁶ in the second stage
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30 it selected a polling station proportional to its size within selected municipalities, in the
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32 third stage it selected household using random route technique selection from a given
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34 address, and finally in the fourth stage, it selected individuals within the household to be
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42 ⁵ The data collection was done by Sarajevo-based Ipsos BH, with funding provided by
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44 the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as a part of the project
45
46 on The Way Home: Peaceful Voluntary Return Project (REB: # 12 – 224).

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48 ⁶ The sampling frame was stratified on the basis of two stratification variables. First
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50 stratification variable was based on Bosnia's two entities: Federation and Republika
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52 Srpska. Second stratification variable was based on the coefficient of return (CR) for
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54 each municipality. The CR combined the 1991 pre-war Census data with the 2005
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56 estimates of return (provided by the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees
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58 (Nenadic et al: 2005)) to express the estimated per cent of the pre-war minority
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60 population which returned to the given municipality in the post-war period. The median
value of the CR for the Federation was 12.49% and the median value for the RS was
14.74%. In the Federation we randomly selected 12 municipalities where the CR was less
than median and 11 municipalities where the CR was greater than the median. Similarly,
in Republika Srpska we randomly selected 7 municipalities where the CR is less than the
median and 5 municipalities where CR is greater than the median.)

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3 interviewed using a Kish table. If respondents consented to be interviewed, the field
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5 interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews in the homes of the participants. The
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7 senior staff of the survey agency conducted the day-to-day monitoring of the data
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9 collection process and provided daily updates to the PI. The response rate was 63.53%,
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11 with a total of 1,007 interviews completed. After data collection, the results were entered
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13 into an SPSS file, and original copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. IPSOS
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15 survey statistician calculated weights on the basis of inclusion probabilities and
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17 demographic data available. The analysis was conducted using the statistical software
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19 package Stata 13.
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27 **Displacement and Return to Pre-War Homes**

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29 As discussed in the theoretical section, attitudes towards transitional justice are shaped by
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31 both present experience and past experiences: i.e., the situation in which individuals
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33 currently live as well as the past experiences that individuals bring to their current
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35 situation. Regarding displaced persons' present experiences, we investigate whether
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37 differences in attitudes towards transitional justice are accounted for by differences in the
38
39 particular context in which those displaced during the war must conduct their daily lives
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41 after the war. Specifically, we compare those that remain displaced from their pre-war
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43 homes to those that were never displaced and those that returned to their pre-war homes.
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45 We hypothesized that, in comparison to those that remain displaced or were never
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47 displaced (living largely in ethnic majority areas), returnees will express greater support
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49 for restorative justice since such beliefs would be more functional in their daily lives
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51 (living in more mixed areas in closer proximity to perpetrators and members of other
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3 ethnic groups with whom they must negotiate their daily existence).

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5 The findings indicate that compared to those that remain displaced, *returnees* are
6 more likely to embrace amnesty and as well as the forgiveness of perpetrators whom they
7 must, presumably, live beside (see Table 1). In addition, they are less likely to wish for
8 perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. Instead, they express
9 more support for the view that perpetrators should pay compensations to their victims.
10 Compared to those that remain displaced, those who return to their pre-war homes thus
11 express greater preferences for restorative justice measures aimed financial compensation
12 and leaving the past behind as opposed to achieving retribution for past wrongdoings.
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27 **[Table 1 about here]**

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31 By contrast, compared to those that remain displaced those *never displaced* are more
32 likely to accept amnesty for war criminals if that ensured a lasting peace and are more
33 likely to want the state to apologize for past atrocities (see Table 1). Thus in comparison
34 to those still displaced, those that were never displaced are more in favor of symbolic acts
35 aimed at collective acknowledgement of past wrongdoings coupled with blanket amnesty
36 for perpetrators. This is most likely explained by their less intimate experience with
37 violence and war losses in comparison to those that remain displaced. Despite these
38 differences between those that remain displaced and those never displaced, however, both
39 express stronger preferences for retributive justice measures in comparison to returnees.⁷
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55 ⁷ It is also interesting to compare returnees to those *never displaced* (not shown in table).
56 Compared to those never displaced, returnees express more support for amnesty
57 (b=0.482, p=0.010), less support for criminal prosecutions (b=-0.268, p=0.007), more
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3 Overall, these findings support our proposition that the local post-war context in
4 which people find themselves has an important influence on transitional justice
5 preferences. In the case of displaced persons, return to pre-war homes results in greater
6 preference for restorative justice. On the other hand, those that remain displaced express
7 more similar attitudes to those never displaced – both living in more ethnically
8 homogenous areas less affected by the conflict.
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20 **Direct Exposure to Violence and War-Related Losses**

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22 In the theoretical section we drew a distinction between current and past experiences in
23 shaping individuals' transitional justice preferences. It is important to understand that not
24 all displaced persons were exposed to the same set of past experiences or losses during
25 the war. Thus within any particular situation (e.g., return to pre-war residences versus
26 remaining in the areas to which one was displaced during the war), individuals'
27 transitional justice preferences will differ due to variation in their personal experiences
28 during the war.
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39 The findings indicate that when it comes to the transitional justice preferences of
40 those displaced during the war (both those that remain displaced and those that returned
41 to their pre-war homes), individuals directly exposed to war violence and war-related
42 losses tend to express greater preferences for retributive justice. This is in line with
43 previous literature, which suggests that exposure to violence and losses results in greater
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51 support for perpetrators paying compensation to victims ($b=0.317$, $p=0.004$), more
52 support for the state paying compensation to victims ($b=0.258$, $p=0.011$), and less support
53 for a state apology ($b=-0.242$, $p=0.054$). Returnees thus tend to have stronger preferences
54 for restorative justice compared to those never displaced from their homes, although they
55 are less supportive of symbolic gestures made by the state.
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3 adherence to the ‘ethos of conflict’: a situation that may persist long after wars end.
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5 However, there are several nuances with regard to previous experience of displaced
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7 persons that we are able to explore with our unique data.
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11 In societies affected by protracted conflict, individuals directly exposed to
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13 violence and losses tend to adhere more strongly to the conflict-supporting shared beliefs
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15 of the society – also termed the ‘ethos of conflict’ or ‘conflict ideology’ (Canetti et al.
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17 2015; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Lavi et al. 2014). As illustrated in
18
19 previous research, exposure to violence and war-losses that cannot be recovered (i.e., the
20
21 loss of loved ones) exert a negative impact on intergroup attitudes in wartime and post-
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23 war situations (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Dyrstad 2012; Besser and Neria 2009; Hayes
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25 and McAllister 2001; Punamaki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997; Pham, Weinstein, and
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27 Longman 2004; Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2009; Samii 2011; Dyrstad et al. 2011;
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29 Gould and Klor 2010; Halperin et al. 2009; Lavi et al. 2014). We contribute to this
30
31 literature in novel ways by examining how exposure to violence and war-related losses
32
33 impact individuals’ *transitional justice* preferences, which are closely linked to the ‘ethos
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35 of conflict’ that tends to persist long after wars end (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011; Bar-Tal
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37 et al. 2012). In addition, we go beyond existing research by providing a more nuanced
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39 understanding of the impact of exposure to violence by employing multiple indicators of
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41 exposure and loss.
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49 In the theoretical section, we made a distinction between war-related losses that
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51 can be recovered (e.g., physical property and financial losses) and those that cannot be
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53 recovered (e.g., the loss of a loved one). Our theoretical expectation is that losses that
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55 cannot be recovered will drive individuals to pursue retributive justice, while losses that
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3 can be recovered will motivate efforts to seek financial compensation. The findings
4 demonstrate that those who lost their property during the war (house, apartment or land)
5 do not want forgiveness for perpetrators and want them to pay compensation to their
6 victims (see Table 1). They are also less interested in a state apology. On the other hand,
7 those that suffered irrecoverable losses as a result of the war (i.e., lost a loved one) do not
8 want amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators and instead wish them to be harshly
9 punished if found guilty by a fair trial. In addition, these respondents also tend to feel that
10 it is necessary to right the injustices that happened in the past in order to resolve conflicts.
11 They are also less interested in the state apologizing for past atrocities or compensating
12 victims. The data thus support our theoretical conjecture that the type of loss (recoverable
13 or non-recoverable) individuals experience affects their transitional justice preferences
14 (financial compensation versus retribution). Our findings with regard to irrecoverable
15 losses are also in line with previous research in Burundi, which showed that loss of an
16 immediate family member resulted in less willingness to forgive perpetrators (Samii
17 2011). In line with our theoretical expectations, irrecoverable losses thus appear to
18 translate into greater preferences for retributive justice among those displaced during the
19 war.
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43 Turning to direct exposure to violence, the findings suggest that those *imprisoned*
44 express more support for the view that perpetrators should be harshly punished if found
45 guilty by a fair trial. Those exposed to *physical injury* also wish perpetrators to be harshly
46 punished if found guilty by a fair trial, however they also express less support for
47 amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators. This finding is especially interesting when
48 contrasted with the findings presented earlier regarding the effects of return to pre-war
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3 homes where individuals must live in closer proximity to members of other groups and
4 those that perpetrated violence against them or members of their community during the
5 war (in comparison to those that remain displaced or were never displaced, returnees
6 express more support for forgiveness of perpetrators). These findings are both in line with
7 our view that both present experiences (living in pre-war homes versus remaining
8 displaced) and previous experiences (personal exposure to violence and losses during the
9 war) shape transitional justice preferences. This finding also helps to explain the puzzling
10 findings of previous research: In the North Caucasus of Russia, personal exposure to
11 violence was associated with less willingness to forgive perpetrators, but living closer to
12 the actual fighting was associated with more forgiveness (Bakke et al. 2009).
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27 Those exposed to *torture* also express more support for the view that perpetrators
28 should be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. In addition, these respondents
29 also tend to feel that it is necessary to right the injustices that happened in the past in
30 order to resolve conflicts. They also express less interest in the state apologizing for past
31 atrocities and in either the state or perpetrators paying financial compensation to victims.
32 Thus, like those imprisoned or physically injured, those tortured during the war express
33 greater preferences for retributive justice in general (harsh punishments for perpetrators if
34 found guilty by a fair trial and the belief that to create a lasting peace it is necessary to
35 right past injustices). At the same time, however, it is interesting to note that those
36 exposed to torture also express more support for amnesty for perpetrators if that would
37 lead to lasting peace. This seems to suggest that the experience of torture encourages
38 individuals to prioritize preventing the recurrence of war by any means necessary,
39 including non-retributive transitional justice measures such as amnesty for war criminals.
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3 On the whole, these findings suggest that exposure to violence is associated with
4 retributive justice, and the more extensive the exposure, the more extensive the impact on
5 one's attitudes, with the caveat that those tortured during the war also would accept
6 amnesty if that would help to ensure lasting peace.
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12 13 14 15 **Social Capital and Community Organizations**

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17 In the theoretical section we hypothesized that an additional feature of one's local
18 environment that may shape transitional justice preferences is involvement in social
19 organizations such as displaced persons associations. Our findings suggest that those that
20 were members in associations (mainly displaced persons associations) during their
21 displacement express more support for both war criminals ($b=0.476$, $p=0.000$) and the
22 state ($b=0.382$, $p=0.006$) paying compensation to victims. This may be because
23 membership in associations increased their willingness to seek redress, but it may also be
24 the result of those most willing to seek compensation joining associations in order to
25 work collectively towards their goals. The results are compatible with either
26 interpretation.
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41 The survey item capturing participation in displaced persons organizations during
42 the last 12 months suffers from a lot of non-response. However, based on the responses
43 we have, those that participated at least once in such organizations express more support
44 for amnesty ($b= 0.793$, $p=0.041$), a state apology ($b=0.527$, $p=0.070$) and the view that
45 past injustices should be addressed to resolve conflicts ($b=0.184$, $p=0.055$). However, the
46 first two results (amnesty and a state apology) are driven by displacement status.
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Returnees are more likely to participate than those still displaced; controlling for

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3 displacement status renders the effect of participation insignificant. After controlling for
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5 displacement status, however, those who participate in displaced persons associations still
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7 express more interest in righting past injustices. Although more research will be required
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9 in order to fully examine this hypothesis, particularly in other cases such as Cyprus or
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11 Georgia where return has not been an option yet, the findings regarding membership and
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13 participation in organizations do suggest that social capital may contribute to shaping
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15 transitional justice preferences among those displaced during the war.
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20 21 22 ***Conclusion: Return Influences Reconciliation Attitudes among Victims*** 23

24 Our survey of 1007 Bosnian returnees and non-returnees has investigated conflict and
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26 post-conflict variables explaining attitudes towards alternative transitional justice
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28 mechanisms following the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. We hypothesize that different victim
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30 or non-victim groups might opt for distinctive transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. state
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32 compensation, apologies, amnesties, punishment for perpetrators). Our findings suggest
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34 that compared to those that remain displaced, those never displaced are more likely to
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36 accept amnesty for war criminals if that ensured a lasting peace and would like the state
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38 to apologize for past atrocities. Returnees are also more likely to embrace amnesty but
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40 are also more likely that those who remain displaced to embrace the forgiveness of
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42 perpetrators whom they must, presumably, live beside. In addition, they are less likely to
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44 wish for perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. Instead, they
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46 would want them to pay compensations to their victims.
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52 Moreover, those directly exposed to physical violence are less likely to endorse
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54 amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators and instead wish them to be harshly punished if
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3 found guilty by a fair trial. Those who lost loved ones as a result of the war feel similarly.
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5 In addition, these respondents also express more support for the view that it is necessary
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7 to right the injustices that happened in the past in order to resolve conflicts. They are also
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9 less interested in the state apologizing for past atrocities or compensating victims.
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11 Moreover, the findings suggest that those *imprisoned* express more support for the view
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13 that perpetrators should be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. Those exposed
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15 to *physical injury* also wish perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair
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17 trial, however they also express less support for amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators.
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19 While those exposed to *torture* also express more support for the view that perpetrators
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21 should be harshly punished, if found guilty by a fair trial, our data suggest that the same
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23 category of victims also express more support for amnesty for perpetrators if that would
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25 lead to lasting peace. This finding suggests that experience of war could be further
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27 disaggregated in future surveys as certain experiences might encourage individuals to
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29 prioritize lasting peace by any means necessary. Admittedly, our survey did not include
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31 data on other victim categories (e.g. victims of rape) due to ethical concerns; such crimes
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33 tied to the conflict experience of certain population groups, in this case women, might
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35 also lead to different attitudes towards transitional justice.
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44 Those who lost their property during the war (house, apartment or land) express
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46 less support for forgiveness for perpetrators and instead want them to pay compensation
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48 to their victims. They are also less interested in a state apology. Interestingly, the findings
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50 demonstrate the interplay between return to pre-conflict homes and reduced support for
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52 retributive justice (e.g. support for amnesty as opposed to trials and forgiveness for
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54 perpetrators). Our findings thus demonstrate the critical importance of sustainable
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voluntary returns as a policy priority following contested partitions; an issue that still remains contested in the academic literature (Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Kaufmann 1998).

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Analysis

Table 1: Exposure to war violence, war-related losses and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
<i>Displacement status</i>							
(ref: Still displaced)							
Never displaced	0.393** (0.194)	0.126 (0.171)	0.005 (0.077)	-0.116 (0.133)	-0.063 (0.142)	0.426*** (0.146)	0.033 (0.059)
Returnee	0.876*** (0.185)	0.353** (0.160)	-0.264*** (0.101)	0.201* (0.117)	0.195 (0.119)	0.184 (0.138)	-0.053 (0.053)
Observations	887	902	915	903	908	907	823
R-squared	0.091	0.053	0.056	0.070	0.057	0.116	0.083
Lost property	-0.003 (0.188)	-0.304* (0.160)	0.132 (0.097)	0.293** (0.127)	0.081 (0.122)	-0.242* (0.129)	-0.015 (0.058)
Observations	652	658	670	664	668	664	605
R-squared	0.062	0.075	0.046	0.081	0.053	0.127	0.115
Lost loved one	-0.594*** (0.164)	-0.277* (0.145)	0.255*** (0.095)	-0.160 (0.099)	-0.184* (0.111)	-0.224* (0.130)	0.091* (0.051)
Observations	650	655	667	661	665	661	602
R-squared	0.103	0.085	0.059	0.075	0.060	0.124	0.118
Physical injury	-1.071*** (0.342)	-0.557* (0.317)	0.317*** (0.110)	-0.201 (0.396)	-0.429 (0.403)	-0.203 (0.390)	-0.024 (0.118)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.076	0.075	0.046	0.070	0.055	0.126	0.123
Imprisonment	-0.214 (0.427)	-0.453 (0.363)	0.349*** (0.112)	0.113 (0.259)	-0.114 (0.289)	0.309 (0.301)	0.108 (0.078)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.064	0.075	0.050	0.070	0.051	0.128	0.126
Torture	0.867** (0.385)	0.453 (0.517)	0.417*** (0.123)	-1.286*** (0.336)	-1.000** (0.437)	-0.262 (0.620)	0.197*** (0.067)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.069	0.072	0.047	0.098	0.068	0.126	0.127

All regressions include the same set of controls: Education, Ethnicity, Economic situation prior to war, Lives in urban area, Age and Gender (results shown in appendix). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 1: Displacement status and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
<i>Displacement status</i> (ref: Still displaced)							
Never displaced	0.393** (0.194)	0.126 (0.171)	0.005 (0.077)	-0.116 (0.133)	-0.063 (0.142)	0.426*** (0.146)	0.033 (0.059)
Returnee	0.876*** (0.185)	0.353** (0.160)	-0.264*** (0.101)	0.201* (0.117)	0.195 (0.119)	0.184 (0.138)	-0.053 (0.053)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.228 (0.229)	-0.123 (0.204)	-0.206* (0.120)	0.157 (0.151)	0.191 (0.185)	-0.215 (0.188)	-0.156** (0.072)
Secondary	-0.711*** (0.232)	-0.271 (0.212)	-0.232** (0.105)	0.317** (0.158)	0.200 (0.202)	-0.066 (0.188)	-0.164** (0.078)
University	-0.758** (0.299)	-0.795*** (0.291)	-0.007 (0.119)	0.460** (0.199)	0.347 (0.236)	-0.305 (0.251)	-0.231** (0.096)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-0.785** (0.347)	0.592* (0.308)	0.214** (0.104)	0.098 (0.288)	0.400** (0.191)	1.158*** (0.174)	0.161 (0.104)
Bosniak	-0.180 (0.156)	0.078 (0.144)	0.029 (0.076)	0.209** (0.103)	0.180 (0.113)	0.463*** (0.125)	0.184*** (0.051)
Croat	-0.759*** (0.209)	-0.021 (0.193)	0.109 (0.102)	0.064 (0.146)	0.310** (0.129)	0.784*** (0.150)	-0.018 (0.068)
Mixed	-0.246 (0.465)	0.239 (0.302)	0.162 (0.123)	0.269 (0.261)	0.483** (0.216)	1.055*** (0.225)	-0.170 (0.140)
Economic situation prior to war	0.070 (0.078)	0.020 (0.068)	-0.017 (0.042)	-0.134*** (0.048)	-0.131*** (0.050)	-0.015 (0.059)	0.027 (0.025)
Lives in urban area	0.052 (0.145)	-0.152 (0.123)	-0.008 (0.077)	0.296*** (0.086)	0.168* (0.093)	-0.237** (0.111)	0.051 (0.043)
Age	-0.025 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.000 (0.013)	0.000 (0.015)	0.031* (0.018)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.008)

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Age squared	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.164	0.108	0.096	0.266***	-0.028	0.063	0.049
	(0.144)	(0.127)	(0.075)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.044)
Constant	4.082***	3.930***	5.002***	3.804***	3.491***	3.348***	0.684***
	(0.749)	(0.616)	(0.346)	(0.432)	(0.474)	(0.496)	(0.215)
Observations	887	902	915	903	908	907	823
R-squared	0.091	0.053	0.056	0.070	0.057	0.116	0.083

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Loss of property and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
Lost property	-0.003 (0.188)	-0.304* (0.160)	0.132 (0.097)	0.293** (0.127)	0.081 (0.122)	-0.242* (0.129)	-0.015 (0.058)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.288 (0.268)	-0.129 (0.230)	-0.237* (0.143)	0.169 (0.167)	0.240 (0.202)	-0.275 (0.200)	-0.222*** (0.075)
Secondary	-0.531* (0.272)	-0.161 (0.233)	-0.213 (0.131)	0.288 (0.180)	0.167 (0.230)	-0.052 (0.198)	-0.224*** (0.085)
University	-0.809** (0.345)	-0.675** (0.337)	0.108 (0.127)	0.573** (0.230)	0.339 (0.274)	-0.165 (0.283)	-0.350*** (0.103)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-0.925* (0.480)	0.919*** (0.298)	0.199 (0.161)	0.175 (0.394)	0.168 (0.405)	1.521*** (0.202)	0.223 (0.176)
Bosniak	-0.053 (0.186)	0.160 (0.170)	-0.007 (0.097)	0.318*** (0.116)	0.198 (0.132)	0.483*** (0.145)	0.173*** (0.058)
Croat	-0.340 (0.255)	-0.024 (0.228)	0.138 (0.112)	0.121 (0.163)	0.343** (0.139)	0.890*** (0.168)	-0.054 (0.078)
Mixed	1.005** (0.467)	0.350 (0.479)	0.037 (0.214)	0.008 (0.386)	0.366 (0.302)	0.974** (0.471)	-0.051 (0.206)
Economic situation prior to war	0.044 (0.099)	-0.008 (0.086)	-0.021 (0.053)	-0.192*** (0.056)	-0.199*** (0.060)	-0.096 (0.072)	0.053* (0.029)
Lives in urban area	-0.337* (0.180)	-0.449*** (0.162)	-0.029 (0.095)	0.164 (0.112)	0.093 (0.121)	-0.526*** (0.140)	0.105** (0.050)
Age	-0.045 (0.034)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.025 (0.023)	0.001 (0.024)	0.002 (0.009)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.302* (0.169)	0.171 (0.150)	0.107 (0.095)	0.169 (0.115)	-0.068 (0.113)	0.124 (0.133)	0.045 (0.052)

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Constant	5.108*** (0.944)	5.435*** (0.733)	4.991*** (0.392)	4.460*** (0.536)	3.997*** (0.600)	4.177*** (0.651)	0.558** (0.269)
Observations	652	658	670	664	668	664	605
R-squared	0.062	0.075	0.046	0.081	0.053	0.127	0.115

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For Peer Review

Table 3: Loss of loved ones and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
Lost loved one	-0.594*** (0.164)	-0.277* (0.145)	0.255*** (0.095)	-0.160 (0.099)	-0.184* (0.111)	-0.224* (0.130)	0.091* (0.051)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.315 (0.258)	-0.192 (0.228)	-0.211 (0.140)	0.148 (0.164)	0.214 (0.195)	-0.278 (0.199)	-0.200*** (0.075)
Secondary	-0.647** (0.263)	-0.252 (0.228)	-0.161 (0.124)	0.263 (0.172)	0.141 (0.219)	-0.095 (0.198)	-0.190** (0.083)
University	-0.799** (0.332)	-0.760** (0.325)	0.109 (0.124)	0.604** (0.235)	0.378 (0.274)	-0.197 (0.303)	-0.328*** (0.109)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-1.001** (0.492)	0.927*** (0.287)	0.224 (0.161)	0.151 (0.381)	0.169 (0.404)	1.503*** (0.198)	0.235 (0.168)
Bosniak	0.096 (0.182)	0.181 (0.171)	-0.057 (0.104)	0.361*** (0.117)	0.250* (0.135)	0.514*** (0.153)	0.170*** (0.060)
Croat	-0.381 (0.253)	-0.001 (0.227)	0.110 (0.120)	0.105 (0.164)	0.356*** (0.137)	0.912*** (0.168)	-0.020 (0.076)
Mixed	0.951*** (0.343)	0.229 (0.384)	-0.037 (0.208)	-0.031 (0.349)	0.220 (0.288)	0.840** (0.417)	-0.070 (0.164)
Economic situation prior to war	0.040 (0.093)	0.001 (0.085)	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.194*** (0.057)	-0.201*** (0.060)	-0.077 (0.072)	0.042 (0.029)
Lives in urban area	-0.309* (0.175)	-0.480*** (0.163)	-0.052 (0.098)	0.185* (0.110)	0.095 (0.118)	-0.485*** (0.142)	0.104** (0.051)
Age	-0.061* (0.032)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.032 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.000 (0.009)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.331** (0.163)	0.188 (0.148)	0.109 (0.092)	0.167 (0.115)	-0.062 (0.112)	0.154 (0.135)	0.046 (0.052)

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Constant	5.919*** (0.908)	5.375*** (0.745)	5.061*** (0.399)	4.499*** (0.559)	3.978*** (0.634)	4.085*** (0.645)	0.544** (0.268)
Observations	650	655	667	661	665	661	602
R-squared	0.103	0.085	0.059	0.075	0.060	0.124	0.118

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For Peer Review

Table 4: Exposure to physical injury and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
Physical injury	-1.071*** (0.342)	-0.557* (0.317)	0.317*** (0.110)	-0.201 (0.396)	-0.429 (0.403)	-0.203 (0.390)	-0.024 (0.118)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.296 (0.265)	-0.161 (0.226)	-0.233 (0.145)	0.130 (0.167)	0.200 (0.200)	-0.303 (0.200)	-0.223*** (0.075)
Secondary	-0.543** (0.268)	-0.204 (0.229)	-0.191 (0.133)	0.247 (0.173)	0.129 (0.223)	-0.055 (0.199)	-0.218*** (0.084)
University	-0.750** (0.337)	-0.779** (0.334)	0.138 (0.127)	0.558** (0.224)	0.306 (0.268)	-0.211 (0.289)	-0.346*** (0.103)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-0.798* (0.462)	0.988*** (0.313)	0.163 (0.173)	0.209 (0.396)	0.235 (0.426)	1.570*** (0.212)	0.230 (0.176)
Bosniak	-0.030 (0.183)	0.152 (0.171)	-0.005 (0.098)	0.338*** (0.117)	0.213 (0.132)	0.494*** (0.149)	0.176*** (0.058)
Croat	-0.362 (0.251)	-0.014 (0.229)	0.065 (0.121)	0.095 (0.164)	0.342** (0.141)	0.962*** (0.168)	-0.055 (0.077)
Mixed	0.986** (0.410)	0.223 (0.436)	-0.052 (0.215)	-0.076 (0.382)	0.228 (0.318)	0.877* (0.453)	-0.106 (0.180)
Economic situation prior to war	0.049 (0.098)	-0.005 (0.084)	-0.022 (0.053)	-0.187*** (0.056)	-0.193*** (0.060)	-0.097 (0.073)	0.053* (0.029)
Lives in urban area	-0.321* (0.180)	-0.418** (0.163)	-0.027 (0.095)	0.181 (0.111)	0.114 (0.120)	-0.502*** (0.141)	0.116** (0.051)
Age	-0.039 (0.034)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.028 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.003 (0.009)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.362** (0.168)	0.114 (0.151)	0.121 (0.096)	0.160 (0.109)	-0.093 (0.107)	0.116 (0.136)	0.043 (0.053)

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Constant	5.021*** (0.938)	5.292*** (0.717)	5.064*** (0.379)	4.629*** (0.532)	4.041*** (0.597)	4.042*** (0.641)	0.522** (0.263)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.076	0.075	0.046	0.070	0.055	0.126	0.123

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For Peer Review

Table 5: Imprisonment and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
Imprisonment	-0.214 (0.427)	-0.453 (0.363)	0.349*** (0.112)	0.113 (0.259)	-0.114 (0.289)	0.309 (0.301)	0.108 (0.078)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.302 (0.266)	-0.176 (0.224)	-0.220 (0.143)	0.138 (0.167)	0.200 (0.201)	-0.287 (0.200)	-0.216*** (0.075)
Secondary	-0.529* (0.270)	-0.202 (0.227)	-0.190 (0.132)	0.255 (0.175)	0.136 (0.225)	-0.043 (0.198)	-0.215** (0.084)
University	-0.744** (0.341)	-0.769** (0.331)	0.132 (0.126)	0.558** (0.225)	0.309 (0.270)	-0.212 (0.288)	-0.346*** (0.104)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-0.890* (0.483)	0.940*** (0.301)	0.187 (0.165)	0.180 (0.381)	0.188 (0.407)	1.534*** (0.212)	0.222 (0.176)
Bosniak	-0.020 (0.186)	0.178 (0.171)	-0.025 (0.099)	0.329*** (0.118)	0.217 (0.133)	0.474*** (0.152)	0.168*** (0.060)
Croat	-0.345 (0.252)	-0.010 (0.228)	0.065 (0.121)	0.100 (0.165)	0.348** (0.141)	0.970*** (0.169)	-0.053 (0.077)
Mixed	1.033** (0.415)	0.232 (0.435)	-0.053 (0.215)	-0.062 (0.386)	0.243 (0.320)	0.900* (0.459)	-0.100 (0.179)
Economic situation prior to war	0.051 (0.099)	0.001 (0.084)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.189*** (0.056)	-0.192*** (0.060)	-0.101 (0.072)	0.051* (0.029)
Lives in urban area	-0.343* (0.180)	-0.415** (0.163)	-0.033 (0.096)	0.172 (0.112)	0.108 (0.121)	-0.520*** (0.141)	0.112** (0.051)
Age	-0.042 (0.033)	-0.049* (0.025)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.019)	0.027 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.002 (0.009)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.320* (0.172)	0.116 (0.151)	0.125 (0.094)	0.177 (0.111)	-0.078 (0.109)	0.143 (0.134)	0.052 (0.052)

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Constant	5.025*** (0.928)	5.202*** (0.716)	5.138*** (0.382)	4.668*** (0.560)	4.035*** (0.622)	4.130*** (0.637)	0.557** (0.264)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.064	0.075	0.050	0.070	0.051	0.128	0.126

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For Peer Review

Table 6: Exposure to torture and attitudes towards transitional justice

VARIABLES	(1) Amnesty	(2) Forgiveness	(3) Trial	(4) Criminal pays	(5) State pays	(6) State apology	(7) Right injustices
Torture	0.867** (0.385)	0.453 (0.517)	0.417*** (0.123)	-1.286*** (0.336)	-1.000** (0.437)	-0.262 (0.620)	0.197*** (0.067)
<i>Education</i> (ref: <Primary)							
Primary	-0.288 (0.261)	-0.148 (0.223)	-0.231 (0.144)	0.114 (0.153)	0.191 (0.193)	-0.304 (0.197)	-0.219*** (0.074)
Secondary	-0.484* (0.266)	-0.166 (0.227)	-0.177 (0.133)	0.182 (0.159)	0.086 (0.216)	-0.064 (0.192)	-0.206** (0.084)
University	-0.704** (0.338)	-0.748** (0.336)	0.157 (0.127)	0.492** (0.212)	0.258 (0.261)	-0.223 (0.285)	-0.337*** (0.103)
<i>Ethnicity</i> (ref: Serb)							
Bosnian	-0.906* (0.485)	0.899*** (0.312)	0.180 (0.164)	0.252 (0.390)	0.236 (0.412)	1.559*** (0.205)	0.216 (0.177)
Bosniak	-0.059 (0.186)	0.136 (0.171)	-0.016 (0.099)	0.378*** (0.115)	0.242* (0.131)	0.501*** (0.148)	0.170*** (0.059)
Croat	-0.340 (0.252)	-0.004 (0.230)	0.059 (0.121)	0.101 (0.163)	0.351** (0.141)	0.966*** (0.168)	-0.056 (0.077)
Mixed	1.060** (0.416)	0.253 (0.440)	-0.060 (0.215)	-0.081 (0.381)	0.237 (0.317)	0.882* (0.455)	-0.100 (0.180)
Economic situation prior to war	0.052 (0.097)	-0.004 (0.083)	-0.020 (0.053)	-0.193*** (0.051)	-0.198*** (0.057)	-0.098 (0.071)	0.054* (0.029)
Lives in urban area	-0.380** (0.181)	-0.446*** (0.162)	-0.030 (0.096)	0.210** (0.106)	0.129 (0.118)	-0.500*** (0.140)	0.111** (0.051)
Age	-0.047 (0.033)	-0.056** (0.025)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.029 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.002 (0.009)
Age squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.291* (0.171)	0.150 (0.150)	0.114 (0.095)	0.141 (0.105)	-0.093 (0.104)	0.120 (0.137)	0.050 (0.052)

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Constant	5.082*** (0.929)	5.321*** (0.715)	5.049*** (0.377)	4.634*** (0.487)	4.058*** (0.587)	4.053*** (0.645)	0.525** (0.261)
Observations	647	652	664	658	662	658	599
R-squared	0.069	0.072	0.047	0.098	0.068	0.126	0.127

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For Peer Review

Table 7: Variables Used

Variable	Description
<i>Dependent Variables - Attitudes towards Transitional Justice</i>	
<i>Amnesty</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace.
<i>Forgiveness</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families and then they should be forgiven.
<i>Trial</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished.
<i>Criminal pays</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims
<i>State pays</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) The state should pay financial compensation to victims.
<i>State apology</i>	What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your ethnic group during the conflict? (Scale: 1- Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR) The state should publicly ask the victims for forgiveness for the crimes and injustices they suffered.
<i>Right Injustices</i>	Please tell me, which one of the following statements do you agree with? 1 – In order to resolve the conflicts, we should leave injustices that happened in the past alone. 2 – In order to resolve the conflicts, we should right the injustices that happened in the past

Variable	Description
Independent Variables - War Time Experiences	
<i>Displacement status</i>	Whether the respondent has returned to the pre-displacement location.
<i>Lost property</i>	Did you or your parents or your spouse lose any of the following property? (Please list all that apply) 1-house 2-apartment 3-land (hectares) 4-commercial property 5-farm animals (which and numbers) 6-summer or secondary house 7 other _____ 8--we did not have any significant property 9 – No, we did not lose any property
<i>Lost loved one</i>	Did anyone close to you lose his/her life during the conflict? (Yes/No)
<i>Physical injury</i>	Did you personally experience physical injury during the conflict? (Yes/No)
<i>Imprisonment</i>	Did you personally experience imprisonment during the conflict? (Yes/No)
<i>Torture</i>	Did you personally experience torture during the conflict? (Yes/No)
Control Variables	
<i>Education</i>	Self-reported
<i>Ethnicity</i>	Self-reported
<i>Economic situation prior to war</i>	How would you describe your family's overall economic situation before the conflict, compared to other people who lived in the same city/village? 1- extremely poor 2 – poor 3- average 4 – good 5 - very good
<i>Lives in Urban Area</i>	Interviewer-reported.
<i>Age</i>	Self-reported
<i>Female</i>	Interviewer-reported.

Source: 2013 Bosnian Returns Survey