



JAPAN'S NON-NUCLEAR POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT

by

Felicity Rai

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis has been to examine how Japan's non-nuclear policy evolved over time, in order to assess the likelihood of Japan "going nuclear" in the foreseeable future. Evidence has been gathered from several diverse sources, including academic publications and media reports as they have appeared over time in both print and electronic form. The information thus gathered has been presented in the form of a chronological report of the various events and circumstances which have occurred both within and external to Japan, over the decades between World War II and the present day, and which have impacted on the evolution of Japan's so-called "nuclear allergy" and caused much debate from both "hawks" and "doves" in Japan. The possibility that such an allergy may soon be coming to an end is consequently considered by listening carefully to comparative Japanese voices. It is contended as a result of this investigation that Japan's "nuclear allergy" arose as the result of its particular set of historical circumstances - that is, its status as the only nation to have suffered nuclear attack on its home soil - and is thus somewhat ideological in nature. It is further argued that North-East Asian events and circumstances over the last several years have led to a situation wherein it is likely that Japan will, at some point within the next few years, lessen its sphere of extreme American influence and finally divest itself of its longstanding "nuclear allergy" and develop a nuclear defensive capability.

DISCLAIMER

I hereby declare that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made within the text of this thesis.

Felicity Rai

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I lovingly dedicate this masters' thesis to my dearest "Mummy" ("Nanny" to Richard and Rachel), the late Mrs M. Stapley, who was a great inspiration in my life and will remain in my heart forever; also to Jhalakman who helped behind the scenes in so many ways!

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to provide evidence that Japan's post-war non-nuclear policy had evolved because of events of the past 58 years that were peculiar to its unique situation. I argue that Japan's anti-nuclear movement was somewhat ideological in essence and originated from Japan's experience as the only nation ever to experience nuclear attack on sovereign soil.

In 1945, defeat came primarily because the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by nuclear weapons dropped from US planes, thus Japan developed a fierce "nuclear allergy" towards atomic weapons. With the brutal end of World War II, the Japanese belief system was shaken to its very foundations, and for more than half a century Japan appeared to have struggled incrementally to come to terms with a sudden and imposed loss of identity. A large number of Japanese have since become extremely pacifistic by nature even though the military was trying to achieve nuclear capacity before and during the war.

For some years there existed a rigorous nuclear taboo in Japan that mutely disallowed public debate on the subject. And, while the Japanese distaste of the subject of nuclear weapons still remains in place today, Japan's

guiding non-nuclear principles have since been subjected to high-level domestic debate by both pro-defense members of the Diet, and some pro-nuclear commentators in Japan, while being vigorously upheld by the Japanese anti-nuclear lobby.

It is contended that the Japanese people's extreme pacifistic sentiments have ensured the LDP's long-standing non-nuclear stance, and cemented a learned interdependence with the United States through the "nuclear umbrella" defence mechanism. Furthermore, the Japanese Constitution, which was originally understood to ban any type of military force rather than to only outlaw offensive not defensive military power, has served to further complicate this issue amidst heightened Japanese concerns of being left to fend against an unbalanced nuclear power share in North-East Asia.

I will argue that Japan's civilian nuclear power program and massive stockpiles of plutonium have left it well-placed to embark on an effective nuclear armament agenda in a very short space of time should the situation in North-East Asia deteriorate and demand such action. It is noted that Japan has always been slow to move and in need of total consensus from the Japanese people but once a decision is taken the masses can move very quickly to an opposing stance.

Thus, it will be proposed that, should the majority of Japanese people be moved by an act of aggression from China, Russia, or more likely from North Korea, or be faced with fear through decreased support from the United States; in such a situation they may well conclude that deterrent nuclear armament is the safest course open to protect themselves from further attack or invasion. Should this occur, the hawks in the ruling coalition will waste no time in moving towards becoming a nuclear state, which will decrease America's influence on Japan.

This argument will be put forward by way of a discussion of events taking place after the Second World War, and up until the present day, and an examination of the manner in which these occurrences - both within and external to Japan - have impacted on Japanese attitudes to nuclear armaments and Japanese nuclear policy.

In Chapter One, episodes during and immediately following World War II will be observed. I will outline how the unleashing of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in 1945, led Japan to develop a strong "nuclear allergy" within the space of a few short years. It will then be suggested that the destruction caused by this nuclear attack, and the subsequent Japanese unconditional surrender, led inevitably to reliance on and close partnership with the American military.

Such a strategic partnership was perceived as essential to Japanese security and defence, particularly in view of the prohibition of Japanese rearmament that was a central element of the post-war Japanese Constitution. Thus within this chapter, I make mention of specific articles concerning enforced non aggression, and argue that such imposed reform opened a new chapter of extreme American influence within Japan which persists, although to a much lesser extent, up to the present day.

The chapter will then examine how the Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, essentially caused by the US nuclear attack on Japan, was thus ironically counter-balanced by Japan's subsequent regional role in American nuclear defense policy. An analysis of events both external to and within the Japanese polity from 1946 until the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 will illustrate how Japan gradually became further entrenched in this paradoxical position - with, on the one hand, a declared domestic anti-nuclear stance, and on the other, a firm position under the international protection of the American strategic "nuclear umbrella".

Chapter Two will continue to illustrate how this paradoxical position influenced the Japanese domestic and international nuclear policy debate over the ensuing decades. Conflicting attitudes, which often existed within various Japanese governments, will be outlined with a particular analysis of the manner in which the nuclear issue became fodder for

political debate between opposing forces in domestic politics. Of special interest in this discussion is the degree of divergence which existed between the two main conservative factions in regard to rearmament and defence, and which was largely kept hidden from the public. It will be argued in this chapter that, with the signing of the 1952 Japan-US Peace Treaty, and with the concurrent unfolding of the Cold War, a new sphere of friendly American influence presented in Japan, keeping it firmly within the peace agenda.

It will then be expressed how the nuclear accident of 1954, when radioactive fallout from US nuclear testing poisoned the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel, led to the inception of the anti-nuclear *Gensuikyo* movement.¹ This movement involved a widespread public expression of abhorrence for nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945, and is credited for providing a forum for public debate on the nuclear issue in Japan. The effect of this public manifestation of the Japanese “nuclear allergy” on domestic political affairs will be examined as will the concurrent emergence of a period of two-party political stability (between the newly-formed Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party) known as the “1955 system”,² which lasted until 1993.

¹ ‘Gensuikyo, Together For A Nuclear-Free 21st Century’, *NucNews*, [sourced on November 18, 2002] @ <http://www.nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0008nn/000803nn.htm>.

² Purnendra Jain, ‘Party politics at the Crossroads’, in *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy*, Purnendra Jain and Takashi Inoguchi, (eds), (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia Pty Ltd, 1997), p. 16.

Then further issues, which impacted on the nuclear debate in Japan, will be discussed including the development of a civil nuclear program; the employment of Okinawa as a nuclear base for American defense; large-scale civil unrest concerning the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960 and negotiations on the proposal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1966; plus controversy surrounding Nobel Peace Prize winner Eisaku Sato's three non-nuclear principles pledge in 1967. It will be argued that during this period two main factors contributed significantly to the emerging nuclear debate in Japan: first; the growing realisation (highlighted in particular by then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa 1991-93) that nuclear armaments would dangerously be the most economical means of providing Japan with a form of solid defense; and second; the availability of fuel for a nuclear defense program in the form of uranium stockpiles accumulated as a result of Japan's burgeoning civil nuclear industry.

To conclude Chapter Two, it will be argued that these factors, which throughout the decades up until the end of the Cold War were having a substantial impact on the nuclear issue in Japan; and were in turn accompanied by an emergence of growing support for the possibility of nuclear defence within the ranks of Japan's political leaders. It will be

demonstrated that this support has increased in recent years, particularly with the recent changing of global circumstances - that is, since the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, senior Japanese politicians have been more willing to voice a changing attitude towards non-nuclear policy.

Chapter Three will contain a summary of more recent events that have occurred both within Japan and internationally, and examine how these have further led to a lessening of Japan's "nuclear allergy". It will be argued that the end of the Cold War did not, as may have been expected, produce any significant lessening of the Japanese reliance on its strategic partnership with the US, indeed it is has since increased.

However, regional instability and territorial disputes, such as that existing between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories, have led to an increased likelihood of Japan having to take a firm defence stand in times of crisis, and some change has inevitably crept into the Japanese understanding of its own position, and its cooperation with America, especially under the revised Japan-US Defence Guidelines of 1997. It is put forward in this chapter that, despite a continued popular concern regarding nuclear armaments, a growing sense of insecurity in the region has led gradually to alterations occurring in the Japanese position *vis-à-vis* its own defence capabilities.

There have recently been further public statements in support of nuclear armament in Japan from prominent political and media figures (for example leading politicians Ichiro Ozawa and Yasuo Fukuda; and popular commentator Nisohachi Hyodo), and it will be argued that such statements reflect a growing acceptance of this possibility within the general populace, especially when issued within the context of contemporary tensions and aggressive developments in the region.

The perceived threat posed to Japan by the current North Korean nuclear crisis will be explored within Chapter Three, and it will be contended that these developments will force Japan to actively pursue one of three courses of action: to engage in continued strategic alliance with US; to declare its own nuclear program; or, as is most likely, to pursue an unhurried combination of both these courses of action. However, any Japanese Government, which chooses to follow a path towards nuclear armament, will still be forced to pay at least pacifistic lip service to the forces that remain active within the powerful anti-nuclear movement.

Finally, Japan's current regional concerns will be more closely examined, including the degree to which North Korean nuclear expansion provides a threat to Japanese security, and the role that Japan may expect or be likely to play in any negotiations occurring between the US, China, Russia, and

North and South Korea regarding North Korean nuclear posturing. Similarly, it will be argued that the current dispute between China and Taiwan also has the potential to draw Japan into a role requiring an increased degree of both defensive and support capability.

This analysis will present various scenarios that could influence Japan's non-nuclear policy and induce it to undertake a course of martial action, which would ultimately result in a Japanese declaration of nuclear intent. I seek to prove that such action would be undertaken only if it was deemed necessary to protect Japan from aggressive moves on the part of North Korea, China or to a lesser degree, Russia, but it would also increase greatly Japan's strategic importance within the region. Thus, I contend, it is highly likely that within a few short years the total demise of Japan's "nuclear allergy" will occur.

Chapter One

Background to Japan's Nuclear Position: Banzai to Strategic Partner in Six and a Half Years

Some commentators have described Japan's stance on nuclear proliferation as a "nuclear allergy".¹ It is suggested in this chapter that the "allergy" is the result of Japan's unique history, specifically Japan's position of having been the only nation ever to suffer nuclear attack and a subsequent Allied occupation. The deep-seated effects of enduring a nuclear attack on home territory were compounded when, in 1946, the Japanese suffered the further dishonour of having their Constitution rewritten by a former foe, and of being arbitrarily forbidden to bear arms outside Japan. This grouping of events, combined with the influence of Japan's highly traditional and warrior-caste social structure, resulted in the development of an attitude of conscientious objection to nuclear proliferation on the part of the Japanese population – a "nuclear allergy". The pacifist and placatory political demeanour developed within a few years of the nuclear attack on Japan has influenced a long-standing public, and internal party, debate concerning how to reconcile Japan's constitutional renunciation of war with the increasing obligations of national defence.

¹ Richard Halloran, 'Japan's Aversion to Nuclear Weapons Stronger than Ever', *Star Bulletin*, [sourced on August 22, 2002] @ starbulletin.com/2002/06/23/editorial/halloran.html.

An awareness of Japanese history since World War II is thus necessary in order to understand political behaviour and attitudes towards nuclear proliferation. This chapter first outlines the background to the Japanese people's attitude to nuclear armament immediately after the 1939-1945 war, and the effect of this attitude on the government's actions in relation to nuclear armament. The chapter then examines how Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment has been counter-balanced by Japan's regional role in American nuclear defence policy.

The Origins of Japan's Anti-Nuclear Sentiment

Japan's anti-nuclear sentiment began, understandably, with the execution of an American Presidential order to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, on 6 August 1945, and three days later to detonate a second atomic device over Nagasaki. Both bombings produced mental and physical casualties of immense proportions, and left a reeling Japan nursing a devastating sense of loss. This cost was calculated not merely in terms of lives lost or ruined, but also in a resulting loss of Japanese face and traditional ideals. The largest blow to Japan's dignity was the Emperor Showa Hirohito's strong recommendation to the Japanese government and to his resolute military that Japan surrender immediately without further struggle to the Allied forces,² thus ending World War II in disgrace as a vanquished state. Although this act ensured the continuance of the Emperor's position and

² Akira Iriye, *Japan and the Wider World*, (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1997), p. 62.

personal safety, and probably save many millions of lives on both sides, it also was publicly interpreted as a flag of compliance with the Americans, and was followed since as a matter of 'form' by his atom-shocked subjects. However, it is difficult to accept that the enforced occupation resulted in His Majesty's nationalistic views actually changing as radically as his actions would indicate. Indeed, there has been an ongoing and generalised line of thought that Japanese nationalism is dormant, not defeated, and that it could be resurrected from smouldering militaristic ideals

In the months following Japan's unconditional surrender, the combined actions of the Allies, supplicant Japanese politicians, and an apprehensive Emperor Hirohito had a dramatic effect on the psyche of the Japanese people, but in reality, the fate of Japan had been sealed months earlier at Yalta,³ where the post-1945 political map was redrawn and the world divided between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁴ The new balance of power was to be "based on the understanding that the Soviet Union would enjoy positions of special influence in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and North-East Asia, while the United States would retain its superior power in the Western hemisphere

³ The Yalta Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was held in the Crimea in February 1945, see *The Avalon Project at Yale Law School*, 1996, [sourced on October 22, 2002] @, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

and most of the Pacific”.⁵ Both superpowers negotiated with post-war strategic defence in mind, and each knew that with the development of nuclear weapons as a tactical and a strategic force, the paradigm of strategic defence in the post-war environment would be significantly changed. The former USSR had seen America’s nuclear capability demonstrated, and the US suspected the USSR of having a nuclear capability. Thus, both powers were aware of the need to cooperate to bring the war to a secure conclusion by setting boundaries, and of the need to avert a third World War, of even more devastating dimensions. The Yalta conference was the precursor to the Cold War, and to the creation of a strategically dependent Japan – for decades a non-political entity engaged mainly in global economic considerations.

Imposed Constitutional Reform: Renunciation of War

Although the Yalta conference was an important consideration in shaping the future of Japan, the Allied occupation and the enforced political amendments enacted by the American administration also played a major role in shaping the Japanese nuclear position. The most important of these reforms was the 1946 revision of the Japanese Constitution.⁶ Under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied powers imposed a Constitution which ensured the demilitarisation and transformation (to

⁵ *Ibid.*

pacifism) of post-war Japan at most levels of society and government, thereby opening a new chapter of extreme American influence that still exists, though to a lesser extent. These amendments were presented by the Allies as having been attempted with concern for Japan, although all were implemented after polite but meaningless consultation with a committee under the Shidehara Cabinet, a committee that included Shigeru Yoshida, future Prime Minister of Japan and mentor of the Yoshida Doctrine.⁷

This affectation of concern extended to the Emperor, who retained his position. His stature and significance, however, were diminished in that the Emperor no longer wielded executive power, but reigned instead only as the symbol of the State. MacArthur's stated intention was to "safeguard the position of the Throne" against those in the Far Eastern Commission (particularly the former Soviet Union and Australia) who mooted "unwonted severity ... towards Japan",⁸ and this leverage was used to rapidly push through the final draft of the revised Constitution as approved by MacArthur and his staff at GHQ.⁹ It seems clear that the continuity of the Japanese Throne also offered continued stability in a potentially unpredictable post-war Japan, and the United States' fear that communism could spread to Japan might well have informed MacArthur's tactics in his

⁶ Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, translated by Kenichi Yoshida, (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, Reprinted 1973, c1961), p. 143.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

negotiations with the Japanese government. However, recognising how precarious his position was, and convinced that he owed much to MacArthur, it was the Emperor in the end who let it be known that he entirely supported the revised Japanese Constitution, recommending it be ratified without delay or dissension.¹⁰

While the new Constitution was pluralistic in essence, and gave wide-ranging human and political rights to the Japanese people, it was also blatantly designed to inhibit any resurgence in Japan of officially sanctioned belligerence. The text of the much debated 'Chapter II, Article 9: Renunciation of War' may now be examined, before a closer analysis of its implications for Japanese political behaviour and national identity is undertaken:

Chapter II, Renunciation of War
Article 9

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of aggression of the state will not be recognised.¹¹

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹¹ 'Chapter II, Renunciation of War', *The Japanese Constitution*, [sourced on August 30, 2002] @ <http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/hst/asian/TheConstitutionofJapan1946/chap2.html>

In 1947 the newly inducted Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, began a long-standing deliberation on what the appurtenances of the newly defined Constitution meant for both the Japanese people and the government. Yoshida initiated this debate by pointing out to the House of Representatives, that “the right of self-defence was not specifically denied in the draft of the new Constitution” but, “since both the right of belligerency and the maintenance of all forms of war potential were renounced in [Article] 9 of the new Constitution as drafted, it followed that war as a means of self-defence was also renounced”.¹² He also remonstrated that self-defence had been the “excuse advanced by both sides in most wars waged in recent years”, and he therefore supported the clause as a means by which to avoid any justification for armed conflict. However, when pressed Yoshida argued “that distinction should be made between wars of self-defence and the fundamental right to defend one’s country”, although he acknowledged that the distinction should not “extend to embarking on war in the name of that right”.¹³

Yoshida’s interpretation of Article 9 signalled the onset of a public debate about its implications, a deliberation that seemed to be fashioned into the form of a Japanese-styled conundrum. The significance of this ‘conundrum’ debate was that no single answer could clarify the apparent paradox set by the limitations of the two paragraphs within Article 9,

¹² Yoshida, *op cit.*, p. 140.

cleverly established by the Americans who appear to have recognised the Japanese style of enduring debate and little action.¹⁴ Indeed, resolution of the Article 9 enigma remains elusive, despite the fact that a multiplicity of “interpretations”¹⁵ have been suggested by the Japanese themselves, and that many generations of Diet (*Kokkai*)¹⁶ members have worked towards the impossible goal of overcoming the limitations set by Paragraph 2, without compromising the high ideals of Paragraph 1. This was a political puzzle that resulted in a new form of self-definition, and which shackled the Japanese to their own deprivation of the sovereign right to militarily defend themselves against external aggressors and to bear arms outside their own territory. Its contribution to Japan’s contemporary nuclear allergy may be gauged by turning to the matter of American distrust of Japanese regional aspirations, before examining Japan’s role in America’s post-WWII strategic aims.

American Post-War Distrust of Japan’s Regional Aspirations

By 1947, two years into the occupation, General MacArthur considered his work complete, and advocated to the United States an early peace treaty

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁴ Notes taken at Professor Lee Lai To’s Honours Politics seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, September 22, 2000.

¹⁵ Iriye, *op cit.*, p. 96.

¹⁶ ‘Japanese Government’, *Misawa Japan*, [sourced on August 31, 2002] @ <http://www.misawajapan.com/aj/ajgvmt.htm>.

with Japan and the subsequent withdrawal of American forces from Japanese territory.¹⁷ However, MacArthur's views were not shared by American officials in the United States, and especially by policy-makers in Washington's Defence Department (who were particularly distrustful).¹⁸ Indeed, the Americans were openly loath to let Japan have a free reign so soon after the end of the Pacific War. A major fear was that the Japanese might eventually seek to regain part of their former Empire, which, had previously stretched from "Korea, Taiwan, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, Manchuria and most of China, to South East Asia".¹⁹

Another aspect of this distrust centred on the incomplete nuclear program of the Japanese, which had been initiated before the Pacific War and continued throughout its duration. Japan's fledgling nuclear armament research began in 1940 by physicist Yoshio Nishina at the behest of the Japanese military.²⁰ Nishina had previously collaborated in Copenhagen, Denmark, with atomic pioneer Niels Bohr.²¹ Nishina was a senior scientist at the Riken Research Foundation in Tokyo for two decades. His A-bomb studies at Riken later came to be known internationally as the 'Ni' project

¹⁷ Iriye, *op cit.*, p. 96.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

²⁰ 'Nuclear Weapons Program', [sourced on August 31, 2002] @ <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/>.

²¹ Richard Benke, 'New Evidence Tracks Japan's Efforts to Create Atomic Bomb', [sourced on October 1, 2002] @ <http://vikingphoenix.com/public/JapanIncorporated/1895-1945/jp-abomb.htm>.

after the first two letters of its mentor's name.²² Shortly after Japan officially surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945, the Americans “found five Japanese cyclotrons, which could be used to separate fissionable material from ordinary uranium”²³ at the Riken Research Foundation.²⁴ This discovery was significant, as the cyclotron is a key element in nuclear fission research, its function being to “slam smaller nuclei into one another with such force that they fuse[d] together”.²⁵ The discovery proved that the Japanese had been actively involved in nuclear research. So the Americans disposed of the nuclear cyclotrons in Tokyo Harbour to ensure they could not be used again, and in 1946 the Riken Research Foundation was dissolved by order of the GHQ.²⁶

Scientists at the Riken Research Foundation were not the only group working on nuclear weaponry in Japan in the early 1940s. The Japanese Navy was involved in a separate nuclear project, supervised by Bunsaku Arakatsu and conducted in Kyoto from 1942. The Naval program “was known as ‘The F-Go program’ [or No. F, for fission]”.²⁷ However,

Masakatsu Ota, ‘Will Japan Keep Renouncing Nuclear Weapons in the Coming Century? Lessons from the 1960s To Deter the Decision to “Go Nuclear”’, August, 2000 Version, *Program on Global Security Disarmament*, Issue Brief 2 [sourced on September 28, 2002] @ <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/pgsd/publications/issbrief2PGSD.htm>

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Benke, ‘New Evidence Tracks Japan's Efforts to Create Atomic Bomb’.

²⁵ George Johnson, ‘At Lawrence Berkley: Physicists Say a Colleague Took Them For a Ride’, *New York Times*, [sourced on October 16, 2002] @ http://sanacacio.net/118_saga/story.html.

²⁶ ‘History’, [sourced on September 9, 2002] @ <http://www.rarf.riken.go.jp/riken/history/history.html>.

²⁷ ‘Nuclear Weapons Program’, [sourced on August 31, 2002], <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/>.

according to the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists, Japanese efforts to build a feasible nuclear bomb had made little progress by the end of the war.²⁸

Democracy, Militancy and Loss of Self

American distrust was not the only reason for Japan's continued adherence to the re-written Constitution. Another reason for the longevity of the post-war Constitution was a deep-seated Japanese aversion to being thought capable, by neighbours and former adversaries, of returning to a nationalistic past imposed at home and abroad by fervent right-wing militants.²⁹ According to Yoshida, former United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, upon leaving his Tokyo post after the unexpected bombing of Pearl Harbour "maintained a sharp distinction ... between the Army extremists and the Japanese people as a whole".³⁰ Yoshida wrote that Grew believed that the general Japanese populace was different in nature from the militarists who controlled them. Yoshida also believed Grew to be largely responsible for "the drafting of Occupation policies" in the closing phases of the severely "miscalculated" war,³¹ which may account for Yoshida's willingness, thinly veiled in his memoirs, to accede

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Notes taken at Professor Lee Lai To's Honours Politics Seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, September, 2000.

³⁰ Yoshida, *op cit.*, p. 20.

³¹ *Ibid.*, *Preface*.

to and even justify Allied occupation policies.³² Allied policies were aimed at eradicating any power bases that had held sway during the war, as it was evident that the Japanese Army had controlled key civilian areas and personnel, and had wielded enough power to indoctrinate the masses with its own xenophobia. For this reason, the political, social and economic conditions of the newly imposed Constitution were designed to humanely introduce American-style democracy to Japan, ensuring that right-wing militancy would never again find a place in mainstream Japanese society.

Fifty-eight years after the end of World War II, a *faux* Western-style democratic government continues to be entrenched, in direct contrast to the previous Nippon Meiji ideology, which demanded absolute loyalty to the Emperor, even at the cost of one's life. Examining the schism between traditional and modern Japanese political culture, authors Toshihiko Abe and Jeanne Rajaunier argue that, while Japan is legally bound to be a member state of the community of democracies, psychologically the bond is not strong:

Democracy is not our nation's supreme value; rather our Emperor institution, which is built on a feudal concept, is more important. Unfortunately, the two values are opposed and intrinsically incompatible. Yet, in our [the Japanese] Constitution, we are unconcerned about this incongruous marriage.³³

³² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³³ Toshihiko Abe with Jeanne Rajaunier, *Japan's Hidden Face*, 1st Edition, (Philadelphia: BainBridge Books, , 1998), p. xii.

Abe claims that the Japanese people exhibit an “idealistic pacifism to suit an age of peace”, and he reasons that “it is ironic that the undemocratic social order contained in the Emperor institution became the main driving force to cause unprecedented success uniting our people to work hard for the recovery of a devastated Japan. But it should not be overlooked that two exactly opposite values have ripped the Japanese mind, all too often causing impotence”.³⁴ This ‘impotence’ is actually a loss of self; an apathetic blandness, which replaced the proud nationalistic spirit so clearly displayed in the hierarchical Emperor worship in Japan before and during the Pacific War. Abe also asserts that the Japanese psyche has been torn apart by conflicting political values enforced by the occupation force. A resulting compounded deficit at the end of the 1939-1945 war caused a vast spiritual vacuum, and produced an underdeveloped political consciousness among the Japanese populace. Despite this, and partly, as a response to it, the Japanese people exhibited anti-nuclear, pacifist tendencies that inhibited the Japanese government of the day from moving towards a pro-nuclear policy

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

Rebuilding a Fettered Defence Force

Even though pacifist tendencies were being incubated at all levels, the Japanese still felt a sense of insecurity and rationalised a need to augment their sparse police force, especially as some American servicemen were soon moved from ‘occupation duty’ in Japan to the battle fields of the Korean Peninsula.³⁵ Yoshida documented in his memoirs that he himself had “long felt grave concern over the inefficient state of our [Japanese] police under the post-war reform set-up”.³⁶ By mid-1950, the Americans clearly felt the same misgivings because General MacArthur issued a directive for Yoshida and his cabinet to inaugurate an armed paramilitary force of 75,000 to defend the Japanese islands. This was to be supplemented by a further 8000 men to augment the Maritime Safety Force.³⁷ Concerned Diet members asked questions about the logistics of the proposed National Police Reserve (later to become the Self Defence Force (SDF)). They wondered whether the establishment of such a force could be construed as a move towards rearmament, and thus a contravention of the peace Constitution, but critics of the plan were

³⁵ Yoshida, *op cit.*, p. 182.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

assured that the new force was purely for internal stability and security.³⁸ Thus, the newfound Japanese sense of righteous pacifism was publicly preserved, and the armed National Police Reserve became operational within a month.³⁹

Cold War Ally of the United States: Treaties of 1951

By the early 1950s, the framework of the Cold War was becoming more firmly entrenched. The Chinese Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, had fled the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, and Communist China had become an anomalous, or 'rogue', state. In alliance with the Soviet Union, China fell out of step with the "free world", as defined by America and the United Nations General Assembly with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴⁰

With American hegemony on the rise, the US increasingly came to see Japan as a prodigal child that had been re-educated; a nation-state that could responsibly promote the growth of a healthy internationalism. These were hard times psychologically for the Japanese people as they struggled to find a post-war path towards excellence and supremacy, and were also

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

hampered by an inability to define a clear sense of national purpose in the emerging bi-polar world. Gradually, however, with the support of the United States, Japan found national purpose through economic recovery and fiscal rather than military expansionism.

US policy-makers recognised the strategic value of using Japanese territory as an additional power base in their escalating game of brinkmanship with the Soviet Union. Hence, they negotiated a peace treaty with the Japanese to be signed in San Francisco. The Japanese again contemplated whether the proposed peace should be a 'total' or a 'partial' peace;⁴¹ that is, whether all former warring parties should be signatories or whether it would be sufficient for just the United States, her allies and Japan to sign. The latter option would represent a partial peace, and Japan would remain technically at war with Russia; as such a partial peace treaty risked alienating the Soviet Block and the People's Republic of China. In 1950, the general consensus in Japan was that the Cold War did not represent simply a contest of ideological or political ideals, but in fact proposed real regional insecurities. It was believed that this should dictate the Japanese government's policy on the question of total or partial

⁴⁰ 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights', [sourced on September 25, 2002] @ <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.

⁴¹ Iriye, *op cit.*, p. 111.

peace.⁴² In effect, this meant settling for a partial peace and declaring a preference for the ideology of Western capitalism.

The Japanese and the Americans also discussed the spirit of the new Constitution and, while the US hoped Japan would re-arm, and perhaps even lend military assistance when needed,⁴³ the Japanese response demonstrated that Japanese policy-makers had not only come to accept the terms of Article 9 of the Constitution, but that they had also adopted its principles as their own. A partial peace was agreed upon, and ongoing security arrangements were negotiated with the United States. In effect, Japan exchanged strategic assistance and the ongoing presence of an American military force within Japanese territory for US-backed protection from communist-led aggression. The Japanese government had made its choice, and with it a tacit acceptance of nuclear protection by the US.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference began on 4 September 1951, almost six and a half years after the end of the Pacific War, with 52 countries in attendance. US President Harry Truman and his advisors had

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

made clear the US's belief that the following three points were of the utmost importance to the Japanese peace agenda:⁴⁴

1. Peace with Japan would bring further reconciliation with her former enemies.
2. The treaty would ensure that Japan would never resort to aggression, but rather would choose a protective, defensive attitude towards international relations; and that Japan would refrain from disturbing the security of other countries.
3. In the event that Japan established its own self-defence force, this force should be linked integrally to the forces of other, [A]llied nations.

Point 1 appeared straightforward, but points 2 and 3 taken together suggested that the Americans anticipated that a partially-armed Japan, kept in line by the US administration, would eventually act as a useful addition to its own forces in the war in Korea. As an adjunct to American military forces, a Japanese presence would be less likely to lead the People's Republic of China to conclude that Japan was an active participant. Indeed, the PRC was not invited to the Conference.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by President Truman, Prime Minister Yoshida and the leaders of 47 other nation states: the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia attended the Conference but did not sign the treaty. Four days later, the Japan–United States Security Treaty

⁴⁴ 'Treaty of Peace with Japan', [sourced on October 5, 2002] @ <http://www.vcn.bc.ca/alpha/sfpt/SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty1951.htm>.

was ratified by the new strategic partners.⁴⁵ This established ongoing military ties between Japan and the US, which proved to be of mutual benefit to both states in the Cold War environment.

As a result of the treaty, the Japanese were further entrenched in a position which would augment their increasingly paradoxical attitude of conscientious objection to nuclear weapons – on the one side was their declared anti-nuclear stance and the denial of re-armament imposed by the post-war Constitution, and on the other, the Security Treaty effectively placed Japan under the strategic protection of the American “nuclear umbrella”. And, as shall be seen in the subsequent chapter, such a paradoxical position set the stage for controlling the Japanese domestic and international nuclear policy debate that proceeded to occur over the following decades.

⁴⁵ ‘Japan–United States Relations, 1945–1997’, [sourced on October 5, 2002] @ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/relation.html>.

Chapter Two

Nuclear Debate in Japan: A Prelude To Non-Nuclear Proliferation

As noted in the previous chapter, the 1952 San Francisco Security Treaty signified the beginning of independent Japan's reliance on US nuclear protection in the Cold War environment. This being so, the Japanese populace also discovered a growing opposition to the development and use of nuclear weaponry, and the LDP government not only responded by acquiescing to public pressure, but also initiating a civil nuclear power agenda that the people accepted for domestic purposes. Such a course put Japan in the realms of nuclear possibility, but encouraged suspicion from friend and foe alike.

Still reeling from the devastation of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, post-war Japanese political culture manifested itself generally with a continued desire for pacifistic conformity and regulation. Traditionally, group thinking has more often than not come before the individual in Japan and has proved to be doctrinaire in essence, as well as all encompassing and cyclical.¹ In the words of breakaway Liberal Democratic Party strongman, and current president of the opposition Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa, "Japanese society [was and] is based on its particular history and traditions, and the Japanese people seek regulation

because of these peculiarities". Therefore, according to Ozawa, it has been "unanimous consensus" and not "majority rule" that Japanese society as a whole respects:²

If even one person opposes a decision, it can't be made. If anyone persists in pressing his own opinion, nothing can be decided. The result is disarray. To prevent confusion, individual opinions are suppressed; everyone has to confirm to the general consensus. Those who do not are quelled or ostracized. Conversely, though, in this consensus-based, village-type society, individual life and safety are protected by the entire community. Society regulates, and the individual who obeys the rules is guaranteed security and a relatively normal life.

Japanese-style democracy might be defined as a system in which the group in exchange for burying themselves in the group assures individuals a secure life. There is no room in this system for the concept of individual responsibility to develop. This relationship between the individual and society has endured because, with very few exceptions, Japan has historically been a homogeneous society.... [Before and during World War II] with the failure of party politics and the ascendancy of the militarists, Japan once again fell into the dogmatic thinking peculiar to a homogeneous society. Dogmatic thought did not disappear with our defeat.... We do so even today.³

This single mindedness and tendency towards dogma has added weight to Japan's nuclear allergy. At the same time the group consensus, formulated through being a victim of nuclear attack, added to a growing if reticent nuclear debate, and has resulted in the emphatic anti-nuclear stance which shaped Japan's past nuclear policy. As recent history has shown, Japanese lawmakers have discussed this matter endlessly, while

¹ Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan*, 1st Edition, (London: Kodansha Europe Ltd, 1994), p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

agonising over the slightest incremental change.⁴ However, political change in Japan is like the sands in an hourglass: initially the particles move very gradually through to the other end, but then, as the pressure for change continues to build over time, the ensuing political change of direction can occur (and often has occurred) suddenly, with results that are total and even completely oppositional to the previous stance.

As noted in the preceding chapter, successive post-war Japanese governments were generally referred to as a single entity, with little mention of the different political parties that administrated during the six-and-a-half-year occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. Domestic politics appeared to matter little to outside observers in the post-war setting, as all pre-peace treaty Japanese lawmakers of the day were necessarily moderate, and basically functioned under the direction of General MacArthur and his allied staff at GHQ. However, the occupation era was a very interesting period of intense political maneuvering in Japan with “frequent changes to both party alliances and government coalitions” that set the scene for the establishment of two unified parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).⁵ This

⁴ Notes taken at Professor Lee Lai To’s Honours Politics Seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, September 22, 2000.

⁵ Purnendra Jain, ‘Party politics at the Crossroads’, in *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy*, Purnendra Jain and Takashi Inoguchi, (eds), (South Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia Pty Ltd, 1997), p. 16.

maneuvering heralded the emergence of the “1955 system”⁶ that clearly demarcated Japanese politics of the Left and the Right.

In his analysis of Japan’s early post-war national security policy, Purnendra Jain argues that although the main opposition parties (Prime Minister Yoshida’s conservative Liberal Party and the JSP) were of vastly differing political persuasions, their respective defence ideologies in 1949 were actually more similar to each other, than to that of the coalition conservative Progressive Party - particularly in regard to adherence to the new peace constitution. Jain has described the Progressive Party as “Gaullist-revisionists in favour of revising the new constitution”. Accordingly, numerous disagreements about potential Japanese “national rearmament and defense buildup” took place between the two main factions of the Conservatives.⁷ Any unsettling political divergence was usually kept well out of the public domain (demonstrated by a shortage of chronicled debate of the period other than in memoirs and scholarly publications later published), and the Japanese masses would have been largely unaware of these disagreements. In reality, though, the policies of the liberal-minded Yoshida and those of his ideological socialist adversaries of the left were actually more in line with the peace agenda than those of the right-wing coalition partner, the Democratic Party.⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Nonetheless, with the signing of the 1952 Japan-US peace treaty, and the consequent regaining of Japanese sovereignty, a different sphere of party orientation arose as the Cold War unfolded. Although retaining diametrically opposing political agendas, both the Left and the conservative Right sought to change the security treaty as a means of seeking understanding with the Communist governments of USSR and China, while the moderate Yoshida-led faction was content to remain securely encamped with the Americans under the protection of the US' "nuclear umbrella". As there was no underlying consensus between the differing Japanese political parties, the status quo was upheld.⁹ Escalating Cold War politics strengthened the strategic alliance between Japan and the US while the 1954 "domino theory" was expounded by President Eisenhower,¹⁰ and Japanese law-makers sided with Western capitalism. As Marius Jansen has stated, "public opinion was then, and would remain for some time, unalterably opposed to [Japanese] remilitarization".¹¹ However, any actual mention of Hiroshima and Nagasaki coupled with nuclear weapons continued to be an unspoken Japanese taboo, until a new nuclear disaster broke the silence and thus allowed for nuclear debate to surface in Japan.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Joseph Smith, *The Cold War: Second Edition 1945–1991*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), p. 67.

¹¹ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making Of Modern Japan*, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 702.

The *Gensuikyo* movement invokes the Japanese Public

Japanese nuclear reality hit home in 1954 when America exploded one of many “atmospheric atomic” test bombs on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.¹² On this occasion, radioactive ashes from the fallout descended on a Japanese fishing vessel, the *Fukuryu Maru*. As crewmembers fell ill with radiation poisoning (one dying within the year) the horror of the effects of nuclear weaponry again jolted the Japanese populace, and the silent denial dating from 1945 was replaced by a widespread indignation and abhorrence. Having witnessed the consequences of radiation sickness at close hand, Japanese law makers from the *Fukuryu Maru*’s home port of Yaizu passed a resolution reproving nuclear bombs,¹³ and on August 6, 1955, the tenth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, the grieving process for the Japanese people came to a head with the assembling in Hiroshima of the first meeting of the Japan Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Since its inception, *Gensuikyo* has publicly promoted “the prevention of nuclear war, [the] elimination of nuclear weapons and relief and solidarity with A & H Bomb victims in Japan and the world”,¹⁴ and is credited with providing an initial public forum for nuclear debate in Japan.

¹² ‘Bikini Facts’, [sourced on September 20, 2002] @ <http://www.bikiniatoll.com/facts.html>.

¹³ ‘Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) No. 5’, [sourced on November 15, 2002] @ http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/visit_e/est_e/panel/A4/4203_2.htm.

¹⁴ ‘Gensuikyo, Together For A Nuclear-Free 21st Century’, *NucNews*, [sourced on November 18, 2002]

The anti-nuclear sentiment that over-whelmed Japan in 1954 and 1955 amounted to nothing short of hysteria, as between 23 and 40 million signatures were obtained in a nationwide Japanese petition.¹⁵ This vast public backlash would necessarily have attracted the attention of those political parties who wanted to show support for the popular movement and gain the backing of the masses. The fledgling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had just been created through the merging of two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, and together with the newly consolidated Japan Socialist Party, provided Japan with a new period of two-party political stability known as the “1955 system”, which lasted until 1989. During this period, “the LDP mostly dominated both houses of the national parliament”.¹⁶ In order to retain this dominance, LDP politicians had to take account of the various voices involved in Japan’s early nuclear debate in the formulation of their nuclear policy.

The 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law

Although the Japanese public continued to express a continued and total abhorrence of nuclear weapons, the Atomic Energy Basic Law No. 186, of

@ <http://www.nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0008nn/000803nn.htm>.

¹⁵ John E. Endicott, *Japan’s Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc, 1975), p. 91.

¹⁶ Jain, *op cit.*, p. 17.

December 19, 1955, was ratified and advocated nuclear power for peaceful means in Japan with a declared objective of peacefully securing:

Resources in the future, to achieve the progress of science and technology and the promotion of industries by fostering the research, development and utilization of atomic energy and thereby to contribute to the welfare of mankind and to the elevation of the national living standard. The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management, the result therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation.¹⁷

Thus the Japanese public accepted nuclear power for peaceful means without much dissension because they felt safe with the assurance of democratic nuclear transparency under the basic policy as listed in Article Two of the Atomic Energy Basic Law No. 186. Atomic power was promoted in Japan as a means to lower domestic and commercial electricity costs and, following the 1956 Suez crisis,¹⁸ to reduce substantially the need to import fossil fuels to Japan. To this end, a self-sufficient program of fast breeder reactors (FBR), each able to “reproduce its plutonium core every 10 years”,¹⁹ was introduced. However, there was a suspicion held by many observers at the time (persisting still to this day) that ulterior motives were at play. That is, it was suspected that Article 2 was implemented to allow Japan the possibility of pursuing clandestine nuclear research, which easily could be turned to armament purposes,

¹⁷ ‘The Atomic Energy Basic Law’, *Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute*, [sourced on December 19, 2002] @ <http://www.jnc.go.jp/kaihatu/hukaku/english/atomiclaw.htm#C-1>.

¹⁸ Endicott, *op cit.*, p.114.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.115.

while still publicly proclaiming itself firmly non-nuclear, in order to avoid provoking a substantial public backlash. So worrying were external suspicions of Japan's clandestine nuclear weapons ambitions that, in 1957, US State Department analysts warned:

Contrary to the impression conveyed by the overwhelming popular sentiment in Japan against any association with nuclear weapons, there is mounting evidence that the Conservative government in Tokyo secretly contemplates the eventual manufacture of such weapons, unless international agreements intervene.²⁰

Of course, as legal restraints had been firmly entrenched two years earlier with the legislated Atomic Energy Basic Law, any minority Right-wing militaristic nuclear ambitions (of the period) could not have been more than a fleeting desire for the mandate to undertake such a risky venture, thus, while American suspicions were probably well founded, they were never proven.

Okinawa: A Base for American Nuclear Defense

Paradoxically, while US analysts were expressing their concern that Japan may be headed towards nuclear development, Okinawa served as a major North-East Asian center for American nuclear defence, even though the Japanese public was generally unaware of this, and believed Japan to be

²⁰ 'Outlook for Nuclear Weapons Production in Japan', *Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, US State Department*, August 2 1957; as quoted in Peter Hayes' Paper on 'Japan's Plutonium Overhang and Regional Security', 1993, Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, p. 13.

militarily nuclear free. Double understandings were necessarily the order of the day as Japanese politicians strove to appease their US strategic partner, while not wanting to alarm or upset the rank and file, as this would have been virtual political suicide for the LDP. According to research associate with the Nautilus Institute's Global Peace and Security Program, Hans M. Kristensen, Prime Minister Hatoyama was asked during a 1955 press conference if he would allow deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan. Hatoyama, possibly engaged in American duplicity over the US military nuclear holdings on Okinawa, responded: "I don't believe that 'peace sustained by force' can last, but if we were to sanction the present 'peace sustained by force' as justifiable, then I would have to allow such stockpiling".²¹ This admission understandably caused a political furor for the LDP, and fierce domestic debate ensued over the matter for some time.²²

To pacify critics, the Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu guaranteed to the Diet, in June 1955, "Japan would of course be consulted before such deployment could take place.... Japan had an "understanding" with the United States that there would be "prior

²¹ 'Unpublished draft', *Asahi Shimbun* (evening edition), March 14, 1955; as cited in Naoki Ohara, "Chronology of Nuclear Weapons Problems in Japan, 1951-1990," Greenpeace Japan, 1991, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Ohara 1991; quoted by Hans Kristensen, 'Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella Section 2, The Early Years', [sourced on @ September 20, 2002], <http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-2.html>

²² Notes taken at Professor Lee Lai To's Honours Politics Seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, September 22, 2000.

consultation" if nuclear weapons were ever introduced into Japan".²³ Of course this denial was, arguably, merely a public relations exercise on behalf of the LDP as it is hard to believe that the Japanese government of the day could have been completely unaware of American logistics that involved the deployment of nuclear armaments on Okinawa. Rather, this seems to have been a case of the government turning a blind eye in return for the nuclear protection that the US-Japan Security Treaty afforded against the combined communist military might of the former USSR, and China, and to some extent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) secluded to the north of the heavily-fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ), adjacent to the southern border village of Panmunjom, where the Korean armistice "temporarily"²⁴ ending the three-year war was signed on July 27, 1953.

Certainly, information later declassified provides no evidence of an "understanding", implicit or otherwise, that American commitments were made regarding "the storage of nuclear weapons in Japan". This is shown in a letter sent to the US Ambassador, shortly after Shigemitsu's nuclear Diet denial. The letter categorically assured that "discussions in the Diet in no way committed the US government to any particular course of

²³ Kristensen, 'Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, Section 2, The Early Years', [sourced on September 20, 2002] @ <http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-2.html>.

²⁴ Robert Marquand, 'This Weekend's 50th Anniversary of the Korean Armistice will be Quieter', *Christian Science Monitor* @ <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0725/p07s01-woap.html>, July 25, 2003.

action”.²⁵ This contradictory pose in regard to nuclear issues in Japan became a hallmark of the Liberal Democratic Party policy for decades,²⁶ and likely played a distinct role in keeping the LDP in government from 1955 to 1993, and again from 1996 to the present day.

It seems that Americans cooperated with this Japanese subterfuge. For example, when announcing in 1957 the “deployment of half-a-dozen nuclear artillery, and a number of long-range nuclear missiles to its forces in the Far East”, the US reduced the likelihood of controversy and political damage to the LDP government by adding, retrospectively, “atomic warheads were, however, not to be brought into Japan”.²⁷ The Honest Johns (as the nuclear weaponry was named) debate made the headlines in Japan, as Prime Minister Hatoyama insisted that nuclear bombs and nuclear artillery were “different things altogether”. An intelligence report produced by the State Department in 1957 noted that the US public statement “substantially” validated the “erroneous impression” given by Shigemitsu.²⁸

²⁵ ‘The Relationship of Japan to Nuclear Weapons and Warfare’, Top Secret, *US Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research*, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 8. Declassified and released under FOIA; quoted by Hans Kristensen, ‘Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, Section 2, The Early Years’, [sourced on September 20, 2002] @ <http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-2.html>

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ ‘Telegram, Control Number 14339’. Partially declassified and released under FOIA, No. 248, July 29, 1955, 1:23 AM, *US Tokyo Embassy to Secretary of State*; quoted by Hans Kristensen, ‘Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, Section 2, The Early Years’, [sourced on September 20, 2002] @ <http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-2.html>.

²⁸ ‘The Relationship of Japan to Nuclear Weapons and Warfare’, Top Secret, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 8, declassified and released under FOIA. *US Department of State, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research*, as cited in Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 37; quoted by Hans Kristensen, ‘Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, Section 2,

Repercussions from the Revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty

With the much-debated revision and re-signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty, in 1960, the Japanese people again responded en masse by way of a succession of large-scale street riots. Protestations came mainly from students and Leftist activists who opposed the treaty revision but these minority groups were encouraged by heavyweight ultra conservative Nationalists who vociferously abhorred what the right-wingers perceived as Japanese enslavement to the “foreign state camp”.²⁹ Against a backdrop of public unrest and dissatisfaction, the established anti-nuclear platform was also becoming a political hazard for the LDP as the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs progressively became aligned with the Japan Communist Party. Sensing Japan’s need for a partisan assemblage without communistic appendages to support the pacifist sentiments of the general society, and understandably not wanting to align with the Left at the height of the Cold War, the ruling party moved to find an answer. It thus “aligned itself with a new group, the Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons, and began to formulate its party’s opposition to nuclear weapons”.³⁰ This was indeed an adroit move by the LDP as people power in Japan was very much a collective voice to be

The Early Years’, [sourced on September 20, 2002] @
<http://www.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-2.html>.

²⁹ Kevin M. Doak, ‘Hiroshima as History: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, [sourced on January 6, 2003] @
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S&P_Sp-Su_1995_docs/japan.html.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

reckoned with by the political establishment, and that voice had spoken, loudly expressing a resounding “no” to nuclear weaponry on Japanese soil.

Proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Three Non-Nuclear Principles

In 1966, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was proposed. After much discussion with “US arms-control officers” the Japanese government’s initial reaction to the idea of signing the proposed treaty largely consisted of strong reservations regarding the NPT’s “big power-centered approach, implying as it does that the nuclear powers would not be required to reduce their capabilities or stockpile, while the non-nuclear powers would be barred in this treaty from having nuclear weapons”.³¹ This comment was made by then Vice Foreign Minister Takeso Shimoda, and reinforced popular opinion that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was unwilling to “foreclose its nuclear option”.³² Again domestic debate raged on this and on another concern close to the heart of the Japanese people, the issue of the return of Okinawa, and what weaponry would or would not be allowed with regard to the continued American military presence there. While it was not generally known at the time, another paradoxical issue was

³¹ ‘Press Conference’, *Foreign Ministry*, Tokyo, February 17, 1966; quoted by Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 233.

³² *Ibid.*

perplexing the negotiators; the US wanted the right to continue to have nuclear warheads on Okinawa, even after the island's return to Japan.

Then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was generally believed to have been in favour of accommodating the Americans on the Okinawan issue, but like his post-war predecessors faced strong public pressure to continue on a non-nuclear course. Even so, in 1967, Sato (who later received the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1974, for his "opposition to nuclear arms for Japan and [for] his bringing Japan into the pact on the nonproliferation of nuclear arms, signed in February 1970)"³³ actually commissioned a clandestine study from an advisory body of key government officials and scholars.

Their secret task was to:

Examine whether it was possible and desirable for Japan to develop independent nuclear forces. The study pointed out that there were 'no technical impediments' to such forces.... And that the plutonium stocks resulting from its civilian nuclear-power program would give Japan the option of making nuclear weapons. But it concluded that a nuclear-weapons program was undesirable because it would cost too much, would alarm neighbouring countries, and would not have the majority support of the Japanese public.³⁴

This report, revealed in 1994 (exactly 20 years after Sato accepted his Nobel Peace Prize in Stockholm), shows the extreme depth of the Machiavellian politics that went on in Japan at governmental level

³³ Irwin Abrams, 'The Nobel Peace Prize And The Laureates: An Illustrated Biographical History, 1901-1987', [sourced on November 5, 2002] @ http://www.unu.edu/hq/library/esmf_intro.htm.

³⁴ 'Nuclear Armament Possible But Unrealistic: Secret Reports', November 13th, 1994, *Asahi Shimbun*, p. 1; as quoted by Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification and US Disengagement*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 234.

regarding possible nuclear options without the tacit knowledge or approval of the Japanese people at large. In fact, another study was undertaken in Japan in 1968, just over a year after Sato made the sacrosanct three non-nuclear principles pledge, *Hikaku San Gensoku*: that Japan shall not possess nuclear weapons; manufacture nuclear weapons; or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.³⁵ In this same year the Diet ambiguously adopted these principles as policy but not law, thus leaving the option open for change at a later date if and when the Japanese public resolved their personal issues stemming from the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The results of the 1968 study, conducted by the Security Research Council (a research body established by the Japanese Defense Agency) showed “that Japan could make twenty to thirty nuclear weapons per year if its civilian reactors discontinued power generation and were devoted entirely to the production of [weapons grade] fissile plutonium239.”³⁶

Clandestine Nuclear Storage Locations on Okinawa

The secretly commissioned studies outlined above do not constitute the only evidence of Japanese government subterfuge over the issue of nuclear weapons. Selig Harrison writes of the existence of a “secret Agreed

³⁵ ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’, [cited November 8, 2002], <http://www.jnc.go.jp/kaihatsu/hukaku/english/library/1-3prin.htm>.

³⁶ Nuclearisation Possible Technically’, *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 12, 1968, p.1; as quoted by Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*

Minute” attached to the 1969 joint communiqué that officially returned Okinawa to Japanese governance. This Minute was disclosed only in 1994, by a Japanese scholar who had traveled to Washington with Sato as an advisor. The minute stated clearly that the US had the right to request “the re-entry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation”. This was apparently agreed to by Sato, and also included the additional proviso of tacit US permission to count on the “standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations”³⁷ [in Japan]. The use of the American wording “existing nuclear storage locations” constitutes indisputable evidence that the LDP government was very much less than honest about nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. As such, it could well be argued that if the situation had been different, for example, if the stark divisional politics of the Cold War not occurred, and if there had existed other, less demarcated strategic interrelations in North-East Asia than extreme dependency on the US - then Japan may well have seized its nuclear option at any time from this point onwards.

Certainly, there appeared to have been a policy struggle from without the LDP about nuclear issues, particularly in the years leading up to Japan’s 1970 signing of the NPT, which stipulated that “it is the obligation of the nuclear weapon States Parties to engage faithfully in nuclear disarmament

37 Agreed Minute to Joint Communique of United States President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Issued on November 21, 1969 (top secret); Washington DC; as quoted by Selig S.

efforts”.³⁸ Yet, contrary to this pacifist aim, in October of 1970 the then Defense Agency Director Yasuhiro Nakasone, a known nuclear hawk, published a ninety-eight page *White Paper* that argued somewhat convincingly that there was a case for ridding Japan of its “nuclear allergy” by recognising the distinct difference between the possession of nuclear weapons for offensive and for defensive means:

Japan should not acquire weapons that pose a threat to other countries, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers. As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the Constitution. In view of the danger of inviting adverse foreign relations and large-scale war, we will follow the policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons at present”.³⁹

The wording “at present” again caused a political uproar and instigated heated debate between anti and pro nuclear leaders, leaving open as it did the possibility of future nuclear policy revision. In 1973, while reaffirming somewhat reluctantly Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka continued the LDP’s position of fuelling the nuclear debate (which was possibly aimed at desensitising those bound by the emotional constraints of the “nuclear allergy”) by adding that even though fierce opposition clearly disallowed the holding of offensive nuclear weapons, and while the administration would firmly maintain the

Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*
 38 Statement by Mr. Akira Hayashi, Representative Of Japan On Nuclear Disarmament, At The Third Preparatory Committee’, 12 May. 1999, [sourced on September 3, 2002] @ <http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/JPstatem.htm>.

[Three Non-Nuclear Principles] policy, “we will not be able to hold offensive nuclear weapons, but it does not mean that we will not be permitted to hold nuclear weapons at all”.⁴⁰

Japan as a “Normal Country”: More Nuclear Debate

In a second *White Paper*, published in 1980, the Defense Agency bravely noted once again that the Japanese Constitution did not actually ban the possession of defensive nuclear weapons.⁴¹ As this much trumpeted contention was theoretically plausible, and as residual Article 9 issues had never been resolved, many ideological factional disagreements arose over the matter. But again, no single Japanese’ response could be agreed on by the majority. At this point, one right wing leader, Ichiro Ozawa, even suggested publicly that the answer lay in rewriting the constitution to allow Japan to become a “normal” country once again, by replacing the restricted three-pronged SDF (Ground Self Defense Force, Maritime Self Defense Force and Air Self Defense Force) with a legitimate Japanese military force (comprising army, navy and airforce).⁴² Ozawa recommended the creation of such a military force not only for defensive purposes at home, but also with the ability to be deployed overseas,

39 Preparatory Committee, [cited September 3, 2002], 12 May. 1999, <http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/JPstatem.htm>.

⁴⁰ Selig S. Harrison, “Japan To Be ‘Medium-Rank’ Power”, *International Herald Tribune*, October 21, 70, p.1. See also “Gist Of White Paper On Defense”, *Japan Times*, October 25, 1970, p.20, as quoted by Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*.

⁴¹ Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*, p. 237.

⁴² ‘Japan Defense Links’ [sourced on December 10, 2002], <http://www.nda.ac.jp/cc/info/boueilink->

initially for peacekeeping exercises. Others, including former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, warned that such radical proposals would have economic as well as legal and moral ramifications, and as such “would open a ‘Pandora’s box’”⁴³:

If... Japan has armed forces, before long the argument would definitely emerge that having nuclear weapons would be the most economical form of defense. Since conscription would be all but impossible in Japan, it would be necessary to rely on volunteers, but then the personnel costs would be quite high. Nuclear weapons armament would be much more economical, they would say. If there were problems about locating nuclear missiles on land, then pretty soon they would insist that Japan could deploy them on submarines.⁴⁴

Economic considerations were one aspect of the nuclear debate that had not yet been documented or fully considered in Japan, but as Japan’s economic miracle began to slow in the early 1990s, and discontent with politics became rife, Kiichi Miyazawa’s insight and ability were not given sufficient credit. In 1993, after a failure to pass reforms leading to the LDP’s first defeat in national elections since 1955, Miyazawa resigned. Nevertheless, his dire anti-nuclear warnings were noted, and added fuel to the Japanese peace agenda.⁴⁵

A second factor that impacted on the emerging nuclear debate in Japan was the growing awareness of just how much plutonium stock was being

e.html.

⁴³ Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*, p. 238.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁵ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making Of Modern Japan*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press Of

accumulated through Japan's established domestic nuclear program. Some of this stock was stored in Japan, while the bulk was at reprocessing facilities in Europe. Independent expert assessments in 2000 indicated that there was enough material contained in these stockpiles to make "650 nuclear weapons" should the Japanese government choose to.⁴⁶ The same expert reports estimated that Japan's accumulated stockpile of spent fuel, if it were to be reprocessed, could enable the creation of a staggering "11,250 nuclear weapons".⁴⁷

A third consideration that should be taken into account when assessing Japanese nuclear options was their developing space program, which could eventually be used for offensive as well as defensive means. Substantial technical expertise had been gleaned from the Japan-US space co-operation agreement that continued from 1969 to 1984.⁴⁸ Thus when, in 1999, in response to North Korea's surprise 1998 test firing of the long range Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over the Sea of Japan,⁴⁹ Japan resolved to independently develop four reconnaissance satellites, the technical expertise required to carry out this program was already in the possession of its government and industry.

Harvard University Press), 2000, p. 724.

⁴⁶ Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*, p. 238.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁴⁹ 'New North Korean Missile Could Reach Alaska, Hawaii, Experts Say', *Fox News*, [sourced on January 14, 2003] @ <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,75454,00.html>.

Generally, the Japanese public and opposition lawmakers have accepted the LDP's space and domestic nuclear programs with perfunctory dissent (apart from occasional cycles of outrage because of well-reported cases of "accidents, cover-ups, cost overruns, and serious delays")⁵⁰ while community assent had been further encouraged by the promise of future fiscal and technological benefits. However, as a safeguard against unconstitutional abuse both programs were strictly "governed by legislative restrictions barring their use for military purposes".⁵¹ In spite of the factors outlined above, which point towards the possibility of Japan developing nuclear armaments, the Japanese public's profound rejection of nuclear weapons continues, and the memories and legacies of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain, for the moment, powerful domestic forces to be reckoned with.

Changing Parameters: Possibility of Nuclear Defence Voiced

Notwithstanding this persistent public manifestation of nuclear allergy, there does appear over time to have been an increasing willingness on the part of Japanese leaders to speak out over the possibility of contravening the principle of Japanese non-possession of nuclear armaments. This willingness has apparently further increased with a recent changing of circumstances, both in Japan and globally. Since the September 11, 2001,

⁵⁰ Shaun Burnie and Aileen Mioko Smith, *Japan's nuclear twilight zone*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2001 v57 i3 p. 58, Expanded Academic Index, Electronic Collection: A74981728.

⁵¹ Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy For Reunification And US Disengagement*, p. 243.

terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, senior politicians seem to be more able to make pro-nuclear pronouncements without fear of virulent backlashes and retribution. This was not previously the case.

For example, in October 1999, Japanese Vice Defense Minister Shingo Nishimura was forced to step down after he startled East-Asian neighbours and induced indignant domestic protestations from the Japanese anti-nuclear lobby, including the Democratic, Social Democratic and Communist parties of Japan, by giving his counter opinions on the nuclear issue in a magazine interview. In this interview, Nishimura urged the Diet to consider arming Japan with nuclear weapons in response to China's growing military might (which includes a formidable nuclear arsenal).⁵²

In 2002, other pro-nuclear remarks were made in the same vein, and again caused a furor outside of Japan, but apart from a few obligatory statements of the Diet's continued intention to adhere to its official nuclear policy stance, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the perpetrators appeared not to have been sanctioned in any way. In April, Liberal Party leader Ichiro Ozawa was quoted as saying: "If China gets too inflated, Japanese people will get hysterical. It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear

⁵² 'Japanese Minister Resigns Over Nuclear Remarks', *Arms Control Today Briefs*, US Arms Control Association, [sourced on February 20, 2003], November, 1999, @

warheads; we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads". However, Ozawa later lessened the ensuing political fallout by adding that it would be tragic if this were allowed to occur.⁵³

Ozawa's pronouncement, providing as it did an insight into the level of Japanese security fears with regard to China (which will be further examined in Chapter Three) was followed by another signal that Japan's nuclear allergy was very slowly fading in the new millennium, despite LDP protestations to the contrary. This time, senior LDP leader, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda spoke publicly, in June 2002, of a changing "world situation, circumstance and public opinion [that] could require Japan to possess nuclear weapons". Again a follow-up statement by Fukuda, and another by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, reiterated Japan's commitment to existing nuclear policy, thus assuring the international community that Japan would continue to support its self-imposed ban on the manufacture, possession and introduction of nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister surprisingly said he had "no problem" with Fukuda's remarks. But both men promised that Japan would continue to uphold the values incurred as a signatory to the United Nations Nuclear

⁵³ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_11/brfno99.asp.
Shane Green, 'Outspoken Leader Utters Taboo N-Word', [sourced on June 10, 2003], SMH, @ <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/04/08/1017206314695.html> April 9 2002.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁵⁴ Fukuda also added that he intended the remarks to mean “there was the possibility of diverse opinions existing concerning national security policy in accordance with changes in international’ circumstances”.⁵⁵

Thus it can be seen that, although Japanese leaders continue to exercise a measure of caution in their public statements regarding Japan’s nuclear development, there has been a marked change in the general leadership attitude towards the issue. But is Japan finally divesting itself of its persistent nuclear allergy in the face of contemporary global developments? In the next chapter it will be argued there is indeed a case for this premise.

⁵⁴ ‘Japan's Nuclear Policy: Fukuda's ‘Background’ Remarks Were Out Of Line’, *Asahi Shimbun*, [sourced on June 12, 2003, www.dsis.org.tw/newsbase/others/2002_06.ht, June 4, 2002.

⁵⁵ ‘Fukuda Says Japan Maintains Non-Nuclear Principles’, *Xinhua News Agency*, June 5, 2002 p1008156h3048. Expanded Academic Index, Electronic Collection: A87002280.

Chapter Three

Japan in an Ever-Changing Nuclear Environment

As noted in the preceding chapters, it took just two nuclear bombs for America to annihilate Hiroshima and Nagasaki; to defeat Japan in 1945; and induce an almost six-decade-long “nuclear allergy” that remains entrenched in Japan today. It is astounding to think that only two nuclear bombs did so much damage, and had such a profound effect on the psyche of the Japanese people; yet at the height of the Cold War (1945 –1991), the US was estimated to have accumulated between 27,000 and 32,000 primed nuclear warheads, while the former Soviet Union possessed an amount in the region of 18,000. The result of that frigid standoff was a terrifying situation of nuclear deterrence described as ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD).¹

Thankfully, the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers ended not in actual war but in sanity, with meaningful dialogue and the propagation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was initially signed by only the United States, the former Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which were three of the five named nuclear countries styled as existing Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). The other two NWSs, France and China, did not sign the treaty until 1992 but still gave assurances on their absolute compliance with the declared aims of the NPT. The main premise of this

Treaty was that nuclear aggression or threats against any Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) would result in immediate punitive action by the United Nations Security Council.² Japan had earlier ratified the NPT agreement, in 1976, as a NNWS, which most likely occurred as a result of assurances that Japan's civilian nuclear power program would not be affected in anyway by membership of the international body.

By the early 1990s, the old geopolitical world order had ended and a new era begun that was globally presented as a combined effort by the US and the United Nations to establish a "new world order" marked by international agreements and peaceful co-operation. Certainly, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, in 1991, was viewed by Japan as being of the utmost importance to security issues relating to the entire Asia-Pacific region, although there was also official acknowledgment of the fact "that the end of the Cold War had not appreciably changed Japan's immediate strategic circumstances."³ Following a 1992 meeting, in Japan, of the Round Table on Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century, chaired by then prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa, it was "recognised" by a Japanese governmental spokesperson that there were "still many unresolved tensions and uncertain situations in the Asian-

¹ Akira Irye, *Japan And The Wider World*, (New York: Addison, Wesley Ltd, Longman, 1997), p. 139.

² 'History', NPT, *Monterey Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies*, @ http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/npt_3/history.htm

³ *Ibid.*

Pacific region”.⁴ These led to an obvious continued regional uneasiness on the part of the Japanese government, and an unchanged strategic reliance on the nuclear protection of the US in the post Cold-War environment.

The general premise, stemming from early US occupational policies, that a demilitarised Japan would be vulnerable and entirely reliant on America for protection and therefore be more malleable, had been so enduring that even when the US wanted Japan to take more responsibility for its sovereign strategic protection both during and shortly after the end of the Cold War, Japan had been loathe to do so. As previously stated, this was because there was and continued to be a lack of total consensus existing within the Japanese populace as a whole. It would appear that there had been only a partial adjustment by the Japanese to the ever-changing, post Cold War security scenario in Asia Pacific. Until now, the Japanese had displayed an unwillingness to loosen the ties that strategic partnership with America has brought and therefore openly postured towards a US-led alignment, especially construed as being in total opposition to Japan’s geographic communist neighbours China and North Korea.

Japan’s Northern Territories

America’s continued logistical support also precludes any forceful incursion on the part of the Russian Federation over the ongoing Far East

⁴ *Ibid.*

territorial dispute (the fish and mineral rich South Kuriles islands)⁵ with Japan. The area could, theoretically, become a regional flashpoint because technically Russia and Japan still have not signed a formal peace treaty since WWII (although a joint declaration ending the war between the former USSR and Japan was signed in 1956). I contend that Japan would never voluntarily give up sovereignty over its cherished Northern Territories and Russia - an impoverished nuclear power with ageing arsenals of mass destruction - is similarly not inclined to settle the dispute in Japan's favour.

Therefore, the ongoing Northern Territory security issue is just one more reason for Japan to take a firm martial stand and certainly, under the revised Japan-US Defense Guidelines of 1997, some change has crept into the Japanese understanding of the peace clause initially with regard to "logistical support for US military operations in 'areas surrounding Japan' that are relevant to Japan's own security."⁶ That is, since the revision, even if Japan is not under direct attack, the 1997 guidelines permit it to offer logistical support to the US military in the region, and lawfully allow American forces to use Japanese facilities even if the US deployment has nuclear capability.

⁵ Otto Latsis, 'A Costly Territorial Dispute', *The Russia Journal Online*, [sourced on March 1, 2003] @ <http://therussiajournal.com/index.htm?obj=3512>, September 9, 2000.

⁶ Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Pacific Fraud: The New US - Japan Guidelines', October 16, 1997 @ <http://www.cato.org/dailys/10-16-97.html>.

One Step at a Time

This change is only slight and still keeps Japan firmly under the American “nuclear umbrella” for strategic defense, but nevertheless it is a small step towards Japan becoming once again an independent nation that is constitutionally responsible for its own defense, and not only financially and logistically, but in terms of armed manpower and with nuclear potential within grasp. Should this occur, it should be generally accepted by the world at large that Japan can no longer be viewed as a potential xenophobic military state but as a respected and responsible East Asian power in its own right and on a more equitable footing with the US. However, some neighbouring nation states (namely China and North Korea) will more than likely find this a difficult scenario to accept.

Meanwhile, internally, it appears that if any significant constitutional changes are to be accepted by the Japanese masses, it will still be necessary for the ruling party (currently the LDP) to show a sympathetic understanding to the concerns of the people, and in particular those concerning any re-interpretation of the war-renouncing Article 9. A 706-page interim report of the House of Representatives Research Commission on the Japanese Constitution (issued in November 2002), reviewed after much deliberation what aspects of the Constitution, if any, should be amended. “Citing the fact that large parts of the report are devoted to

Article 9.... The war-renouncing clause will be the prime target of any [Japanese] constitutional revision.”⁷

Even after three years of intensive debate, a group of 2500 Japanese lawyers and legal scholars recently voiced their concerns, in a published booklet, by stating that the interim report contains comments by several lawmakers and expert witnesses show they do not understand the meaning of the Japanese Constitution, and that there exists a need to counter such moves in order to increase the debate and lessen the chance for imminent constitution change particularly to Article 9:

We are concerned that the report will increase momentum for amending the Constitution. We hope instead that the commission will contribute to ways we can apply the ideas contained in the Constitution to our lives.⁸

Such a pacifistic stance would make it difficult for the Japanese government to change popular thinking, but in spite of these inherent difficulties, some alterations are definitely occurring, most likely because of an increasing sense of insecurity in the region. One instance is the recent endorsement by a research panel of the ruling party, the LDP Research Commission on the Constitution, of a draft advocating the amendment of the Constitution “to empower the [Japanese] prime minister to issue certain orders to the public in cases of national emergencies —

⁷ Keiji Hirano, ‘Lawyers, Scholars Attack Report on Constitution’, *Japan Today*, [sourced on February 8, 2003] @ <http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=9&id=248755>.

namely war, disaster and a breakdown in public order". Apparently, according to a contemporary article in *Japan Today* Online, the draft "does not elaborate the contents of the prime ministerial orders, but [importantly] it stipulates that the Japanese people are obliged to protect the nation's independence and safety",⁹ which is a substantial step in the direction of Japanese military self-determination - at the same time earnestly attempting to bury the ghostly spectre of the past in order to allow Japan to take its expected place as a strong and respected independent nation.

However, East Asian fears of resurrected Japanese nationalistic ideals are not totally unfounded, as there are powerful hawks waiting on the sidelines in the hope of controlling the power share in the Diet or even of becoming Japan's future prime minister. One of these is Shintaro Ishihara, the outspoken, and equally anti-Chinese and anti-American re-elected governor of Tokyo, who has been described as a "fascist" in various media reports. Some Japanese polls have even suggested Ishihara would be a popular choice as leader,¹⁰ and one who would no doubt work to re-arm Japan to its maximum potential, including nuclear armaments, should he ever be elected to head the central government. A more realistic

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ 'Constitution should address emergencies: LDP panel', *Japan Today*, [sourced on June 25, 2003] @ <http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=9&id=267431>

¹⁰ 'Ezipangu's Shintaro Ishihara', [sourced on June 20, 2003], <http://www.ezipangu.org/english/contents/news/naname/ishihara/ishihara2.html>

possibility, however, is the increasing stature of Japanese “king maker” Ichiro Ozawa who, as previously mention in Chapter Two, made headlines in 2002 with his startling claim that Japan could “produce thousands of nuclear warheads overnight”.¹¹

Now that the September 2003 LDP elections are imminent, and likely to be followed by national polling, Ozawa’s breakaway Liberal Party (LP), has declared a merger of his party with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) headed by Naoto Kan.¹² Such a coalition could present something of a challenge to the ruling LDP. According to the conservative DPJ’s web-based policy page, Kan professes to believe in non-proliferation through respecting Japan’s adherence to the three non-nuclear principles.¹³ Nonetheless, this recent merger will put the DPJ and Kan under Ozawa’s influence, thus leaving the nuclear issue open for reinterpretation should either a DPJ or as generally expected a re-elected LDP-led Diet¹⁴ believe Japan is in mortal danger from outside the country, and react accordingly.

North Korea: a Renegade Nuclear Danger to Japan

The current North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when the DPRK blithely admitted to having a secret nuclear program in direct

¹¹ ‘FM Spokeswoman: Ozawa’s Remarks Irresponsible’, *People’s Daily*, [sourced on June 30, 2003] @ http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/09/eng20020409_93717.shtml

¹² ‘Two Opposition Parties Agree to Merge in Bid to Topple Koizumi’, *Japan Today*, [sourced on June 25, 2003] @ <http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=9&id=267291>

¹³ *Ibid.*

violation of the 1994 bilateral nuclear accord between Washington and Pyongyang and the US retaliated by suspending fuel relief to the energy-starved state. Then, in January 2003, North Korea followed doomsday rhetoric by escalating tensions further in the region and officially withdrawing from the international NPT citing “legitimate self-defense measure[s], taken against US moves to stifle our country.”¹⁵ A month later, in February 2003, hawkish Japanese Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba threatened to retaliate with a defensive “military strike” on the DPRK “if it [Japan] had firm evidence the reclusive Communist state was ready to attack it [Japan] with ballistic missiles”.¹⁶

The main fear in Japan is that small nuclear warheads could be attached to North Korean missiles with the capability of decimating Japanese cities without warning. Meanwhile, US intelligence sources have cautioned that 200 medium-range Rodong missiles (with a range of about 1300 kilometers) have been strategically placed [by North Korea] “to target Japan”.¹⁷ This is especially worrying since it has been confirmed by the ROK that the DPRK had reprocessed “all 8000 spent fuel rods”, and stored these since 1994, enabling North Korea to make any number of

¹⁴ ‘19 LDP Prefectural Chapters see Koizumi's reelection Probable’, *Japan Today*, [sourced on August 4, 2003] @ <http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&id=268472>.

¹⁵ ‘North Korea May Resume Missile Tests’, *Baku Today*, [sourced on January 11, 2003] @ <http://www.bakutoday.net/view.php?d=1954>,

¹⁶ Wiest, Nailene Chou, ‘Japan says it is ready to hit North Korea first’, *SCMP*, [sourced on February 2, 2003] @ <http://www.pacom.mil/articles/030214japan.htm>.

¹⁷ ‘US Warns 200 N Korean Missiles Aimed at Japan’, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, ABC Online News*, [sourced on July 13, 2003] @ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s901002.htm>.

nuclear weapons it wished,¹⁸ and had also “carried out at least 70 high-explosive tests which could be used to trigger nuclear explosions”.¹⁹

Therefore, rising tensions in the region and particularly on the Korean Peninsula actively require Japan either to engage in a continued military protection alliance with the US; or to declare its own nuclear intentions, and domestically suffer the political consequences if the timing is, as supposed, regarded as offensively premature by the Japanese people); or, as is probable in the long term, Japan will undertake a strategic combination of both courses of action and be in a state of preparedness for any eventuality while paying service to those who vehemently oppose nuclear arms. Two anti-nuclear groups, the Japan Congress Against A and H Bombs (*Gensuikin*) and the Japan Council Against A and H Bombs (*Gensuikyo*), still have a great deal of influence in Japan, and this people power has not dwindled in any great sense in 2003. Both hold separate and well-attended international conferences annually close to the anniversary of the dropping of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. – *Gensuikyo* in Hiroshima and *Gensuikin* in Yokohama. Even so, there are also increasing pro-nuclear voices in Japan, voices such as Nisohachi Hyodo, who has authored “a four-year plan for the nuclear armament of Japan”. Once Hyodo was only published in underground journals now, in 2003, he has his own radio show in Tokyo in mainstream

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ ‘Seoul says N Korea reprocessed nuclear rods’, *ABC Online News*, [sourced on July 9, 2003] @

radio, and is often found preaching his controversial beliefs on university campuses.²⁰

Development of Advanced Protection Systems

Nuclear proliferation concerns; escalating fears regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ballistic missile development and deployment apprehensions; to say nothing of alliance interactions and burden-sharing responsibilities coupled with issues of technology transfers all play a role in the delicate relationships between the major actors in the region. The very existence of Japanese vulnerability to communist China and North Korea respectively, is obviously an important issue in the minds of Japanese policy-makers because Japan currently does not have a system that can be used to defend itself against ballistic missiles, though it is commonly known to be working with the US and investing heavily on technologically advanced protection systems.

Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) is still some years away from reality. However, in March 2003, Japan took another tentative “star wars” military step forward by launching two spy satellites. The event happened without huge public retribution and was toted as a compromise between military and non military intelligence gathering. The satellites’ send-off was

²⁰ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/justin/nat/newsnat-9jul2003-73.htm>.
Howard French, ‘Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense’, *New York Times*, [sourced on July 22, 2003]

interpreted by *The Washington Post* as a sign that Japan was “moving its intelligence agencies away from dependence on the US”. The *Post* article quoted analysts as saying the spy satellites would focus on North Korea and China respectively and resulted from both “Japan's dissatisfaction with periodic restrictions the United States places on sharing satellite intelligence and delays in notifying Japan's top officials of a 1998 missile launch by the [DPRK] North Korea”.²¹

Regional Concerns about the DPRK's Illegitimate Nuclear Expansion

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is naturally of great concern to the ROK as well as Japan, but primary telephone research conducted myself has shown that a cross section of South Koreans asked generally don't believe the North will attack the South. The same, however, cannot be said of the Japanese. In a recent *Japan Today* poll, when asked if respondents thought North Korea was a real threat or just blustering? Just under 55% of the Japanese polled said they totally believed North Korea was a “real threat to Japan”.²² Clearly, the situation is also extremely worrying to the PRC, Russia and the US because of the extended military ramifications to all parties concerning irrational and provocative moves by North Korea, especially since the DPRK's substantial technical capacity in

@ <http://www.taiwansecurity.org/NYT/2003/NYT-072203.htm>.

²¹ Doug Stuck, ‘Satellite Launch to be a First for Japan’, *Washington Post*, [sourced on March 27, 2003]

@ http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/134663070_japansat27.html.

²² ‘Do you Consider North Korea a Real Threat or is it Just Blustering’? *Japan Today Online Poll*,

the field of ballistic missiles has been substantiated. Therefore, recognising the large scale and lethal potential of North Korea's nuclear capability and ballistic missile development has led to a flurry of severe public warnings by the Bush administration, including the branding of the despotic Kim government as one of the declared "axis of evil" regimes.

In order to achieve stronger multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral negotiations with the DPRK, according to various media reports, there has been ongoing gentle backroom pressure by the US on the PRC, a long time ally of North Korea to intervene and constrain Kim Jong Il's rogue nuclear ambitions. Additionally, diplomatic pressure has also been brought to bear by the US to elicit concessions and peace talks from the hermit kingdom via Russia. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea watch nervously pleased to be included in any future negotiations, as both were excluded in April 2003, when China "brokered talks in Beijing" between the two demilitarised foes (North Korea and America are still technically at war, and this situation has existed for 50 years since the Korean War).²³ A likely scenario, however, is that the US will purport to represent the interests of both Japan and the ROK, even if they attend, with the PRC standing slightly to the side of the DPRK and Russia emerging as an almost impartial negotiator at any six-way talks that should be held in the northern autumn of 2003. Also, as toothless Japan does not have normal

²³ [sourced on August 1, 2003] @ <http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&cat=1&id=268458>.
'China's Echoes Nth Korea's Opposition to Japan's Role', *Kyodo News and Northeast Asia Peace and*

diplomatic relations with North Korea it is clearly limited in what it can achieve in a nuclear sense other than the first-hand knowledge it will glean, and the self-satisfaction of being included²⁴.

China perceives the key to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis is for North Korea and the US to simply revert to the 1994 Agreed Framework where the America and its allies agreed to “supply North Korea with 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil annually and two light water reactors if Pyongyang shut down its heavy water nuclear reactor and scrapped efforts to build a nuclear bomb”,²⁵ but this would not give Japan any real peace of mind, as a covert nuclear program could still be conducted by North Korea in readiness for a future attack on Japan. Such a move could then instigate a retaliatory covert nuclear program by the Japanese government as a precautionary measure against North Korean aggression. The Bush administration, thus, has made it clear that it wishes to nudge all parties into a regional agreement “that would verify the dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program, possibly in return for international economic aid and an American promise not to attack North Korea militarily”.²⁶ This would strategically put the onus on China and Russia to

Security Network Daily Report, [sourced on July 18, 2003] @ <http://www.nautilus.org>.

²⁴ ‘China urges US, Nth Korea to Renew Framework’, *ABC News Online*, [sourced on July 17, 2003] @ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s904590.htm>.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ James Brooke, ‘US and North Korea Announce Accord on Wider Atom Talks’, *New York Times*, [sourced on August 2, 2003] @ <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/02/international/asia/02KOREA>.

police North Korea's nuclear activities rather than relying only on America, Japan and South Korea to do so.

Historical Enmity Between Japan and China

China and Japan are historically natural enemies, putting on a brave face while maintaining formal diplomatic relations and artistic exchanges. These exchanges are occasionally marred by loud outbursts of indignation whenever China perceives that Japan's latent nationalistic tendencies are on the rise and usually issued in response to the odd publicised Japanese statement of menacing rhetoric, after a direct threat has been made to Japan. Chinese ire has also always risen through visits by the Japanese prime minister and other important dignitaries to the Yasakuni Shrine to honour their War dead. The fact is that Japan has had to learn to accept that China, a declared nuclear power, is opening and growing in stature both fiscally and in a military sense, and thus seen as almost on a par with the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese suspicions and fears of its giant neighbour's future power ambitions, however, lie just below the surface, especially as the PRC increases its importance to the international community through a number of strategic moves including recent diplomatic maneuvers to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, a role that Japan would much like to play.

Notwithstanding the security alliances that China has formed with both Japan and the US, it is probable that if North Korea were to launch a much-threatened attack on Japan, and the Japanese retaliated without consensus, then the problems in the region would likely escalate to include China and the US. Also, as much as Japan would not like to become involved in Strait's politics, by virtue of its grouping with the US, any military action between China and Taiwan (unlikely as it would seem given the current political climate) would necessitate that Japan's stance change from one spelled out in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué of 1972 ("that it [Japan] hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue through discussions between the direct parties on the two sides of the straits"²⁷) to one dictated by the actions of Taiwan's psychological defender and Japan's tactical collaborator, the US.

Any one of these scenarios could be the catalyst to induce Japan to reverse its non-nuclear policy; loosen its reliance on the security pact with the US; cast off its mantle of shame worn since the closing days of WWII; and through necessity declare nuclear capability to strategically protect itself from aggressive moves on the part of either China or North Korea, or even a more militant Russia, while still acting in the interests of America and the international community at large. Such a course of action would be end-proof of Japan realising "normal" armed assertiveness as a key East

²⁷ 'Recent Developments in China and Japan-China Relations', *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, @ [sourced on June 20, 2003] @ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/relations.html>.

Asian player in the 21st century, and positive affirmation of the demise of Japan's long-standing "nuclear allergy".

Conclusion

It has been argued throughout this thesis that an awareness of Japan's past is necessary in order to understand Japan's evolving non-nuclear policy. The tumultuous events that took place both during and immediately after World War II are particularly important as the United States' nuclear attacks upon Japan, and subsequent occupation politics greatly informed the current nuclear debate in Japan. Prior to the cataclysmic end of WWII, the Japanese people were generally a proud, highly traditional and warrior-caste society, and the unforgettable nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki coupled with the knowledge that Emperor Hirohito had demanded his War Cabinet and Military surrender to the combined Allied forces forced a sense of instinctive shame. The nationalistic *Kamikaze* stance was thus rendered obsolete in post-war Japan, and the continual occupation of Japan by Allied forces challenged Japan's sense of military self-determination. These factors gave rise to an extreme pacifism in Japanese political culture. However, regional insecurity concerning the role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region has lingered as a result of its past militaristic form. These insecurities have manifested as suspicions, expressed by Japan's geographic neighbours, that extreme pacifism might be discarded in favour of a return to 'traditional' values of militarism.

Japan's post-war Constitution was drawn-up by US occupation forces in scant consultation with Japanese politicians. The US hoped to install democratic ideals in the Japanese polity, and rebuild the economy to avoid a recurrence of Japanese rearmament and warmongering. Still shocked by the sudden and apocalyptic end to WWII militancy, the Japanese embraced the new Constitution and made a special place in their psyche for Article 9 – a non-aggression clause insisted on by US policy makers. Perhaps initially conceived as a short-term measure the clause remains largely in place to this day – although it has spawned ongoing debate as Japan's political elite attempt to reconcile the principle of non-aggression with the pragmatic necessities of self-defence.

Early post-war Japanese internal politics shaped pacifistic policy to a large extent and, in 1949, the defense ideologies of the main opposition parties were more closely aligned than were the defense ideologies of factions within the conservative political parties. For instance, Prime Minister Yoshida's Democratic Liberal Party and the JSP, two parties of vastly differing political persuasions, shared a great deal in relation to adherence to the new peace constitution, in contrast to another faction of the conservative coalition, the Progressive Party. Consequently there were numerous internal party disagreements concerning "national rearmament and defense buildup" within the two main factions of the Conservatives.

It is likely that the Japanese public would not have known of these internal disagreements, as unsettling political divergences usually remained an internal matter only. This is demonstrated by the scarcity of chronicled debate originating from the period, with most material regarding the subject published later in memoirs and scholarly publications.

The presence of US forces on Japanese soil brought the two former foes into close alliance. Japan had a monetary need that could better be served by the US than by the Communist bloc during the Cold War. The Japanese feared retribution of past deeds from Asian neighbours, and so adhered to the peacetime Constitution, hoping also to avoid antagonising the former Soviet Union. However, some Japanese sociologists contend that Japan's democratic governance does not sit well with intrinsic feudal values and therefore an inner conflict occurring between two opposite poles has long been the catalyst for a Japanese-style of continued political helplessness.

This characteristic of the Japanese political culture was perhaps most clearly apparent in the debate which arose over the "conundrum" presented by Article 9 - or the ongoing attempt to resolve an apparently irreconcilable problem. By the time this debate had become firmly entrenched in domestic political life, Japan had adopted a deeply pacifistic consciousness. But as increasing numbers of American servicemen were

deployed to South Korea, it became apparent to both Japanese and US officials that Japan needed to be in a position to defend its own territory from any potential internal social unrest. Therefore, the Self Defence Force (a paramilitary force of 75,000) was inaugurated. The establishment of this force was a precursor to the 1951 US-Japan Peace Treaty, and the US-Japan Security Treaty, both signed within a week of the other in San Francisco. In this manner, the former foe became a strategic partner with reciprocal benefits – America gained a military foothold just off the Korean Peninsular, and Japan gained security by settling for protection under the American “nuclear umbrella”, while declaring itself pacifistic and non-nuclear.

Thus it has been argued in this thesis that post-war Japanese political culture manifested as a desire for pacifistic conformity and regulation. Group thinking had traditionally come before the individual in Japan, and according to Ichiro Ozawa, it was “unanimous consensus” and not “majority rule” that Japanese society as a whole respected. This single-minded adherence to an achieved group consensus has dogmatically reinforced Japan’s nuclear allergy. Historically, the group consensus of Japan’s emphatic anti-nuclear stance was arrived at as a result of the American nuclear attack on Japanese territory. Consequently, limited and reticent nuclear debate has reiterated the Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons, and shaped Japanese nuclear policy more generally. Recent

history demonstrates that the nuclear debate in Japan is characterised by the seemingly endless discussions of lawmakers who agonise over the slightest incremental change without necessarily challenging the status quo. Consequently, in matters concerning Japanese group consensus, it is asserted that the most acceptable change in ideology is often change that is total, and which arrives at an oppositional point of view.

Escalating Cold War politics strengthened the strategic alliance between Japan and the US. During this period Japanese lawmakers sided with Western capitalist ideology, as public opinion would for some time remain unalterably opposed to Japanese remilitarisation. Until then, any mention of the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki remained an unspoken Japanese taboo. However, in 1954, the Bikini Atoll atomic accident broke the silence, prompting intense nuclear debate to begin in Japan. This accident served as a reminder of the horror of the effects of nuclear weapons, and the Japanese populace reacted against nuclear weaponry with widespread indignation and abhorrence.

Perhaps the vocal public response indicated latent social dissatisfaction with the American influence in Japanese society; but certainly, the public silence concerning the subject of nuclear weapons, which had lasted since 1945, was now replaced by strident vocal anti-nuclear sentiment. The scope of this public backlash would not have escaped the attention of the

political parties whose demonstrations of support would have been choreographed to obtain the political support of the vocal majority. Opportunely, the fledgling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had just been created through the merging of two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party. Together with the newly consolidated Japan Socialist Party, these two parties provided Japan with a period of political stability known as the "1955 system", a system that would endure until 1993. During this time it was the LDP that wielded great influence in both houses of the national parliament. Thus the multiplicity of voices that informed Japan's early nuclear debates has been herein explored, as has the manner in which these prejudiced the policy considerations of the LDP. It is argued that such influences should not be underestimated.

In spite of Japan's early nuclear policy, and evidence which points towards the possibility of Japan developing nuclear armaments in the not-so-distant future, the Japanese public's profound rejection of nuclear weapons continues, and the memories and legacies of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain potent forces in Japanese political culture. Notwithstanding this persistent public manifestation of nuclear allergy, there does appear over time to have been an increasing willingness on the part of Japanese leaders to speak out over the possibility of contravening the principle of Japanese non-possession of nuclear armaments. This willingness has apparently further increased with

a recent changing of circumstances, both in Japan and globally. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, senior politicians seem to be more able to make pro-nuclear pronouncements without fear of virulent backlashes and retribution. This was not previously the case.

The increasing acceptance of nuclear weapons within Japan's political elite has been herein considered; and it has been noted that while such acceptance is not entirely shared by the Japanese public, increasingly, pro-nuclear voices are being heard. Thus, although Japanese policy-makers continue to exercise a measure of caution in their public statements regarding Japan's nuclear development, there has been a marked change in the general leadership attitude towards the issue of re-armament. But is Japan finally divesting itself of its persistent nuclear allergy in the face of contemporary global developments? And what are the strategic considerations in such a change?

I have proposed that there are three important players in Japan's regional security considerations. The nuclear ambitions of North Korea clearly present the most obvious threat to Japan in post-Cold War politics. Indeed, the brinkmanship of North Korea replicates the terrifying possibilities underlying all diplomatic maneuvering in the Cold War era: that nuclear holocaust is possible, if not imminent. China, as an

increasingly powerful state within the region, presents Japan with further uncertainty, particular as the US is diplomatically and militarily committed to the issue of the independence of Taiwan. Should China force the issue of Taiwan, Japan would be coerced into the dispute through its alliance with the US. Meanwhile, Russia presents Japan with a third uncertainty, its Northern Territories remain under dispute and no formal peace treaty exists between Japan and Russia to mark the end of their WWII hostilities.

Each of these scenarios on their own could be the catalyst for Japan to loosen its total reliance on the security pact with the US, cast off its mantle of shame worn since its defeat in WWII, and out of strategic necessity declare nuclear capability. Taken together they clearly represent a challenge to the pacifistic ideology of post-WWII Japan. Regional concerns are leading Japan's political elite to the conclusion that declared pacifistic intentions are not enough to ensure national security. Recent North-East Asian events have increased the likelihood that Japan will gradually become less reliant for its national defense on its strategic alliance with the US, and instigate the development of a Japanese nuclear capability.

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