# POLICY, OCCUPATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM: NEW ZEALANDERS LIVING IN AUSTRALIA

**MADELEINE ROSE MOREY**

BSc (Hons.), University of Auckland
MSc, University of Auckland

Department of Geography, Environment and Population
School of Social Sciences
Faculty of Arts
The University of Adelaide

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
September 2020

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**LIST OF TABLES**

**LIST OF FIGURES**

**ABSTRACT**

Drawing on the concept of transnationalism, this thesis explores the integration and transnational practices of New Zealand migrants in Australia. The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) that was implemented in 1973, allows New Zealand citizens to live, work and travel to Australia with few restrictions. Since then, the TTTA has only undergone one major change. In 2001, New Zealanders' access to social security services was revoked, requiring those who have moved since then to obtain permanent residency. Before 2017, pathways to permanent residency required New Zealanders to meet the same requirements applied to migrants from other countries, which included having a job on the Skilled Occupation List. Yet the open nature of the TTTA means any New Zealander regardless of their occupation can move to Australia, leaving many unable to apply through the pathways available. In 2017, an income-tested permanent residency pathway specifically for New Zealanders came into effect with this pathway drawing criticism for excluding those in low-income jobs, those who work part-time or have taken time off work.

This mixed-methods study was conducted through an online survey (n=2040) distributed through social media platforms and 21 semi-structured interviews. The survey and interviews allowed New Zealanders in Australia to detail how they maintained ties to New Zealand, their integration into Australia, and their views on obtaining Australian citizenship. Analysis of secondary data, including census data and immigration statistics, provides the context for the research.

The results show respondents maintained strong socio-cultural ties to New Zealand but weak political and economic ties. Unlike migrants from other countries, respondents primarily moved to Australia to better their financial circumstances rather than to send remittances. Existing social ties in Australia also contributed to their decision to migrate. Respondents were generally well integrated at the micro- and meso- scales and experienced similar challenges to migrants from other countries, despite the language and cultural similarities between the two countries. Structural changes in Australia over the last thirty years affected their economic, social, and political integration. In particular, the casualisation of labour and the occupations respondents worked in affected their ability to apply for permanent residency and citizenship. The results found many respondents worked in occupations that were not on the Skilled Occupation List and/or had unpredictable work hours meaning their yearly income was not consistent, preventing them from applying for the Skilled Independent visa (subclass

189) New Zealand stream and the other permanent residency visas available. This structural exclusion has affected the political integration of respondents as being ineligible for these visas leaves them feeling disenfranchised as they cannot secure their status in Australia. Security of status has become increasingly important amid the deportations of New Zealanders from Australia since 2014.

Theoretically, this thesis contributes to our knowledge of how transnationalism operates between two Global-North countries that have the same national language and are culturally similar. It shows how the country and cultural contexts play a role in shaping transnationalism and integration. As even though there are similarities between New Zealand and Australia, policies and structures not aimed directly at migrants affect the degree of integration possible. From a policy perspective, it highlights the limitations of open migration pathways amid changing immigration policies as it disadvantages those who cannot change their status in response to policy changes as going 'home' is not always a feasible or realistic option.

**DECLARATION**

Part of this thesis is published in Morey, M. (2020). Identifying barriers to New Zealanders obtaining Australian citizenship. *New Zealand Geographer, 76(2)*, 117–126.

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University's digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

Signed:                                                              Date: 08/09/2020

**DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This thesis is dedicated to my grandparents, who migrated to Australia seeking a better life. Diego (dec.) and Rosa (dec.) who migrated from Italy after the war, and Bill and Sally who migrated with my father from England.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors for being a part of this journey with me.

I would also like to thank the New Zealanders living in Australia who took the time to complete the survey and participate in an interview. The stories and experiences shared made this thesis possible. Kia kaha.

My parents, Virginia and Michael, and sister Alison, your support has been unbelievable. Mum, you will be relieved that this is no more proofreading for you to do, now that I have finally finished university. Dianne thank you for answering all my questions and providing insightful feedback.

To my fellow GEP PhDs, Rahwa, Masud and Bridie what a crazy journey this has been as we have supported each other through whatever life outside of PhD has thrown at us. Justin and Hana, our regular dinner and boardgame nights have been a lifesaver. Hayley and Alex's Posse, you know who you are; I am glad to still have our friendships after all this time. Annette and Michael, UNO.

Henry, I love you and thank you for making the move across the Tasman and being there through all the laughter, tears, stress, and frustration. I definitely could not have done this without all your support and dinner making.

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

189 Visa    Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand Stream

ABS    Australian Bureau of Statistics

ACT    Australian Capital Territory

AFL    Australian Football League

ANZAC    Australia New Zealand Army Corps

ANZSCO    Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations

CEDA    Committee for Economic Development of Australia

DHA    Department of Home Affairs (2017-current)

DIAC    Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia, 2007-2013)

DIBP    Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Australia, 2013-2017)

DIMA    DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Australia, 1996-2001 and 2006-2007)

DIMIA    DIMIA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs (Australia, 2001-2006)

EU    European Union

HTAs    Hometown associations

MODL    Migration Occupations in Demand List

nec    Not elsewhere classified

NELM    New Economics of Labour Migration

NT    Northern Territory

NUMAS    Numerical Multifactor Assessment System

NSW    New South Wales

NZ    New Zealand

OECD    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PR    Permanent Resident

PSCV    Protected Special Category Visa

QLD    Queensland

RRV    Returning Resident Visa

SA    South Australia

SCV 444    Special Category visa Subclass 444

| | |
|---|---|
| SOL | Skilled Occupation List |
| TAS | Tasmania |
| TSS | Temporary Skill Shortage |
| TTTA | Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| USA | United States of America |
| VIC | Victoria |
| WA | Western Australia |
| WHM | Working Holiday Maker |

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Introduction

The year 2021 will mark twenty years since the rights New Zealand citizens have in Australia changed. During these twenty years, the New-Zealand-born population in Australia grew from 355,765 in 2001 to 518,462 in 2016, yet it is estimated that the number is closer to 570,000 (ABS, 2001, 2016; Love & Klapdor, 2020). The migration of New Zealanders[1] to Australia is unique in the Australian migration context as it is facilitated by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement (TTTA) rather than Australia's Migration Program. Before 2001, New Zealanders who moved to Australia were granted automatic permanent residency, which was revoked in 2001 over concerns too many New Zealanders were moving to Australia to claim social security benefits. This has meant any New Zealander who has moved to Australia since 2001 has no access to social security benefits, is denoted with an 'indefinitely temporary' status, and granted a New Zealand Special Category (subclass 444) visa (SCV 444) on arrival.

In 2017, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream (189 visa) was introduced, which is an income rather than occupation-based permanent residency pathway. This visa has provided some New Zealanders the opportunity to get permanent residency, but the income threshold of AUD$53,900 for the previous four tax years, has been criticised for being too high, excluding those in low-income and part-time jobs leaving them unable to secure their status in Australia. For New Zealanders, the need to obtain permanent residency and citizenship has become more pertinent since amendments were made to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014. These amendments expanded the grounds for the deportation of non-citizens from Australia and have resulted in the deportation of 1,909 New Zealanders from Australia (DHA, 2019c). The implications of this policy change has meant New Zealanders who moved to Australia in 2001 and did not meet the eligibility requirements for permanent residency are not entitled to any additional rights in Australia, based on their length of residence.

During this twenty-year period, the nature of migration has changed in response to advances in technology and the expansion of visa categories in a range of countries across the globe,

---

[1] In this thesis New Zealanders refers to those who hold New Zealand citizenship

including Australia. As a result, how migrants maintain ties to their home country and become integrated into the destination country has been of interest to researchers. Although first theorised in the 1990s, the concept of transnationalism is of relevance to this research as it considers how migrants maintain social, political, economic, and cultural ties to their home country (Basch et al., 1994). The second concept, integration, consider how migrants become socially, politically, economically, and culturally integrated into the destination country and how integration is influenced by micro-, meso-, and macro-scale factors (Erdal, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Together these two theoretical concepts are used to examine how the policy changes mentioned above affect the integration of New Zealanders into Australia and their transnational practices.

In focussing on New Zealanders, this thesis will provide more insight into a migrant group whose experiences in Australia have remained absent in political and media discussion about immigration to Australia. This is because many New Zealanders are invisible migrants as they are not necessarily discernible based on their skin colour, language, or cultural stereotypes like the Italians and Greeks who migrated after World War II or more recent migrants, including those from India, China, and the Philippines (Nolan, 2015). Three-quarters (74.6 per cent) of the New Zealand-born population in Australia are of British, Irish, or New Zealand European ancestry with 9.2 per cent identifying as Māori, 5.8 per cent Polynesian, and 1.4 per cent Chinese (ABS, 2016). The open and relatively unrestricted nature of the TTTA compared to Australia's Migration Program has meant it has not received the same degree of media and political scrutiny as the conditions of the TTTA are not constantly changing. However, since 2014, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has received media and political attention on both sides of the Tasman. This has raised questions regarding the rights New Zealanders have in Australia and revealed how at the macro-scale the historical ties as Anzacs, and the 'mateship'[2] it symbolises, no longer bears the same weight in Australia.

This thesis will explore the role policy changes have on the integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. This study looks at the motivations for moving

---

[2] Mateship broadly refers to the bonds of loyalty, and feelings of solidarity and fraternity that men typically exhibit. The notion of mateship in the trans-Tasman context was established during World War I when Australia and New Zealand fought together as ANZACs. An extensive discussion of the masculinist conceptualisation of this relationship falls outside the scope of this thesis (see Dyrenfurth, 2015).

to Australia and their return migration intentions and considers how integration and transnational practices are multi-layered and multi-scalar. It also pays particular attention to occupation and views of obtaining Australian citizenship, given the permanent residency pathways available. The findings presented in this thesis contribute to the transnationalism and integration literature and deepen our understanding of the migration experiences of middling migrants in a North-North migration context. The next sections detail the global migration rhetoric and how this has influenced research and Australia's response to migration. This chapter ends with an overview of New Zealand-Australia relations and the existing research on New Zealanders living in Australia.

## 1.2   Shifting global attitude towards migration

Migration is a global phenomenon, with an estimated 272 million people or 3.5 per cent of the global population living outside their country of origin (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Of these migrants, two-thirds can be classified as labour migrants of which 68 per cent live in high-income level countries which include countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), Canada, Japan, and Singapore (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Australia, in particular, has become a destination country for migrants with 29.7 per cent of the population born overseas (ABS, 2020a). Migration to Australia has become highly regulated and controlled, with prospective migrants needing to get a visa before being able to enter. This control and regulation of migration are not unique to Australia, with many countries such as those listed above, implementing a range of visa schemes that dictate the condition of entry and residence.

Arguably, the categorisation of migrants has resulted from the neoliberal restructuring of many nation-states, including Australia, and as a response to globalisation. In Australia, this neoliberal restructuring began in the 1980s, where large parts of the economy were privatised, and significant financial cuts made to government-funded social services (Walsh, 2011). At the same time, nation-states were becoming increasingly linked by international trade and finance and sought alternative ways to maximise their profits and global competitiveness, with migration viewed as a strategy to achieving this goal (Hollifield, 2004; Smith, 2019). To do so, immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand implemented points-based immigration systems in the late 1970s and early 1980s in which

prospective skilled migrants were granted entry if they achieved a certain number of points (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Ongley & Pearson, 1995). Migrants who were exempt from this system included family migrants and refugees.

The points-based system meant nation-states could select individuals they believed had the skills to help facilitate market expansion and capital accumulation while limiting the social costs of migration (Walsh, 2011). In doing so, this has allowed nation-states to categorise migrants based on their perceived economic contributions and exclude or limit the migration of those who are deemed to be a financial burden on the nation-state, including family migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Hugo, 2014; Khoo et al., 2008).

This categorisation of migrants into Economic, Family, and Humanitarian has resulted in the increasing control and regulation of migration by nation-states. Non-economic migrants who are viewed as unproductive, dependent, and a fiscal liability undermine the efforts made by nation-states to ensure only those who enter the country are autonomous (Walsh, 2011). Nation-states have therefore implemented a range of different measures to deter or prevent the migration of those who are not economically desirable or threaten these carefully curated migration systems. Measures taken by nation-states to deter undesirable migrants occurred at the beginning of the 21$^{st}$ century in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the persecution of Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Syrian refugee crisis, and a series of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks.

In Australia, the events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka led to a surge in the number of people coming to Australia by boat to seek asylum. In 2008-2009, 23 boats (1033 people) arrived in Australia increasing to 110 boats (7983 people) in 2011-2012 before peaking at 402 boats (25,173 people) in 2012-2013 (Janet Phillips & Spinks, 2013). Before these boats arrived, Australia had implemented a series of policies during the 1990s, and early 2000s that meant any asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat would be put in mandatory detention and processed offshore on neighbouring islands, including Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean and Nauru in the Pacific Ocean (Phillips & Spinks, 2013). During this same period, Australia had become increasingly concerned about the threat non-citizens posed to Australia's national security (Hon. S. Morrison, 2014). In 2014, changes made to Sections 501 and 116 of the *Migration Act 1958,* have meant non-citizens associated with a criminal group, involved in people smuggling, been imprisoned for an accumulated time of 12 months, or deemed of bad

character can have their visa cancelled and deported from Australia (Coombs, 2014). The amendments also meant the Minister in charge of the Department for Home Affairs has the power to cancel an individual's visa.

Around the same time, continental Europe began experiencing an increase in the number of refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea from countries such as Eritrea, Syria, and Libya. The scale of this refugee crisis increased dramatically from 225,455 refugees in 2014 to over 1 million in 2015 before decreasing to 375,652 in 2016 (UNHCR, 2020). This increase in the number of refugees arriving in continental Europe was a concern amongst right-wing politicians in the UK, which led to a referendum on whether the UK should withdraw from the European Union (EU), referred to as Brexit. Those campaigning for the UK to leave leveraged the anti-immigrant populist sentiment that had been growing within the country. It capitalised on the underlying xenophobia and racism towards Muslims and black others, using images of the migrant crisis in continental Europe to exacerbate fears (Isakjee & Lorne, 2019). Some migrants of South Asian descent also campaigned to 'leave' as they argued it would increase migration from South Asia and facilitate family reunification (Pickard, 2016). The referendum took place on 23 June 2016, with 52 per cent voting to leave the EU.

During this same period, Donald Trump announced he was running for President of the USA in the 2016 election. Like the pro-Brexit campaigners, Trump used immigration to attract voters, particularly middle-class and working-class whites in rural and semi-rural counties, who had been affected by a decline in manufacturing jobs because to offshore processing and technological changes (Nagel, 2019). Trump's views and claims legitimised and amplified existing attitudes towards minority groups, particularly Mexicans, claiming that Mexico exported criminals, rapists, and drug dealers to the USA (Gravelle, 2018). To address these fears and attract voters, Trump said he would continue to build the wall along the Mexico-USA border. Construction of the wall began in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush in 1990 (Grandin, 2019). Following his election in 2016, Trump implemented an Executive Order that placed a 90-day suspension on people entering the USA from seven predominately Muslim countries and a 120-day suspension on all refugee settlements (Nagel, 2019). These decisions were in response to terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016) by a Muslim extremist group and the growing refugee crisis in Europe.

To address the implications of these migrant crises and the growing anti-immigration rhetoric, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the *New York Declaration for Refugees and*

*Migrants* on 19 September 2016. All 193 member states reaffirmed their obligation to respect the human rights of refugees and migrants and that protecting refugees was a shared international responsibility (UNHCR, 2018). The adoption of this compact provided the groundwork for two new non-binding compacts in 2018. First, a global compact on refugees and second, a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. In December 2018, 164 of the 193 member states signed the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* (GCM) (Sherrell, 2019). States who did not sign this compact included the USA and Australia. Australia's stance on this compact was made known in August that year with Peter Dutton, head of the Department of Home Affairs, saying Australia signing the compact would involve sacrificing our border protection policies and impact our sovereignty (Sherrell, 2019). Prime Minister Scott Morrison, on 21 November 2018, formally announced Australia would not sign the compact saying it would 'compromise our successful way of doing things' (Sherrell, 2019).

## 1.3   Permanent to temporary migration in Australia

Before the Federation of Australia in 1901, each colony managed the entry of overseas migrants. This saw some colonies enact policies that restricted the entry of Chinese migrants, while other colonies introduced a written test to limit non-white migration (Cooper, 2012). Following Federation, Australia's first migration policy, the *Immigration Restriction Act of 1901* was passed. Referred to as the White Australia policy, it sought to restrict the entry of all non-European migrants into Australia (DIBP, 2017a). During this time, New Zealanders, including Māori, could enter Australia because they were classified as British subjects (Hamer, 2014). Following World War II, the economic and population growth of Australia had become a concern because of significant labour shortages and a declining fertility rate (Hugo, 2006). To address this, the Assisted Passage Migration Scheme was implemented in 1945, which facilitated large-scale migration from Britain to Australia. Under this scheme, over 460,000 British migrated to Australia between 1947 and 1971 (Jupp, 1998). While migrants primarily came from Britain during this period, the impact of World War II saw the assisted passage scheme expanded to include countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and Turkey, migrants whose first language was not English (Colic-Peisker, 2011a, DIMA, 2001). The Assisted Passage Migration Scheme formally ended in 1981.

During the 1970s, three major immigration policy changes were made. First was the abolition of the *White Australia Policy* in 1973, which put an end to race-based migration (Hugo et al.,

2016). Second, the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA) was signed between Australia and New Zealand. Third, was the implementation of the 'Numerical Multifactor Assessment System' (NUMAS), a points-based system in 1979 (DIBP, 2017a). The introduction of NUMAS signified a shift in the government's attitude towards immigration. Migration was no longer about nation-building but the targeted filling of labour shortages to meet labour market demands.

By the 1990s, Australia was facing another demographic transition with an ageing population, declining fertility rates, and rural-to-urban migration affecting economic development. To address the growing labour shortages, two migration pathways were introduced. First was the State Specific Regional Migration scheme in 1995-1996, which sought to address the labour market shortages created by youth migration from rural and regional areas to cities (Hugo, 2008b). Second was the Skilled Temporary visa in 1996, which allowed business owners to bring skilled workers to Australia for up to four years. Introducing this visa signalled a shift from migration being viewed as permanent to temporary. In 2017, the Skilled Temporary visa was overhauled and renamed the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa (TSS). This visa aimed to fill short- and medium-term occupation shortages in order to build a suitable skills base and ensure Australian workers are put first (CEDA, 2019).

Alongside the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa (TSS), there is a range of temporary visas which include the Student Visa, Temporary Graduate Work Visa, and the Working Holiday Maker (WHM). Since 1985, international students have made up a large proportion of the temporary migrants in Australia, contributing to university funding and the Australian economy. In 2018 there were over 398,563 international students enrolled in higher education, contributing AUD$32.4 billion to the Australian economy in 2017-2018 (Ferguson & Sherrell, 2019). The retention of these international students has become increasingly important for Australia to remain globally economically competitive. In 2007, the Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) visa was introduced, which allows those who have completed a bachelor's degree with a minimum of two years of study, to work in Australia between two and four years depending on their level of qualification. Whereas the WHM allows those aged 18-30 from 42 countries regardless of their skill or education level to live, work, and travel in Australia for one to three years (CEDA, 2019).

Currently, Australia's Migration Program is composed of permanent and temporary migration. Permanent migration includes those who migrate to Australia either through the Skilled,

Family, or Refugee-Humanitarian Streams with caps placed on the number of people granted each visa. Those applying to stay in Australia through the Skilled Stream need to achieve a certain number of points, based on a range of attributes, including recognised skills, occupation, and English competency. Whereas the temporary visas, which include WHM, Student Visas, and the Temporary Graduate, are all uncapped, meaning there is no limit on the number of people who hold these visas. Figure 1.1 displays the number of visas approved under each of these different visa streams. The Skilled Stream remained relatively constant from 2009-2010 to 2017-2018, while in the same period, the number of Student Visas approved increased significantly from 250,483 to 378,292.



**Figure 1.1: Number of visas granted by visa stream**

*Source: DHA (2019a)*

The immigration policy changes discussed in this section have resulted in a shift in the source country of migrants. Figure 1.2 shows that during this time, the number of post-war migrants from Italy and Greece has steadily declined as these populations age. Since 1996, the number of migrants born in India, China, and the Philippines has continued to increase. The increase in these populations has resulted from rapid population growth in each of these countries, the introduction of the TSS, and the growth of the international student market.

**Figure 1.2: Top countries of birth, overseas-born population in Australia**

*Source: compiled using ABS data*

## 1.4   Trans-Tasman migration and relations

Figure 1.2 above shows that since 1996 New Zealand has been the second major source country of migrants. The migration of New Zealanders, as mentioned above, is facilitated by the TTTA, which is not a part of Australia's Migration Program. Unlike Australia's Migration Program, which has continued to evolve over the last fifty years in response to labour market demands and demographic changes, the TTTA has remained largely unchanged. Since its implementation, there has only been one significant change that occurred in 2001. Explained in more detail in Chapter 2, during the 1980s and 1990s, Australia had become increasingly concerned about the number of New Zealanders claiming welfare in Australia (Nolan, 2015). The Australian government wanted the New Zealand government to cover the cost of the welfare that was being claimed but refused to do so. New Zealanders migrating to Australia before 2001 were granted automatic permanent residency and had access to all social security services, with these privileges revoked in 2001.

From 26 February 2001, New Zealanders moving to Australia would no longer have access to social security services, including unemployment benefits but kept the right to live, work and travel to Australia as per the TTTA. To access social security, New Zealanders who have moved to Australia since 2001 need to apply for permanent residency through one of the visas a part of Australia's Migration Program, which requires meeting the eligibility requirements based on occupation, education, age, and skill. However, as many New Zealanders do not meet these

9

requirements because of the open nature of the TTTA, the Australian government introduced a visa pathway specifically for New Zealanders in 2017, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream (189 visa). From 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2018, 12,817 applications were lodged, with 2,467 visas granted to primary applicants and 3,043 visas granted to secondary applicants (DHA, 2018a). This income rather than occupation-based visa has made permanent residency and hence citizenship a possibility for many New Zealanders, but the income threshold has been criticised for excluding those in low-income jobs, those who work part-time, women who have taken time off work to raise children, and retirees (Mares, 2016).

Any New Zealander who has not obtained Australian citizenship is classed as a non-citizen by the Australian government, which leaves them vulnerable to policy changes that affect non-citizens. The changes to Sections 501 and 116 to the *Migration Act 1958* mentioned above has resulted in the deportation of 1,909 New Zealanders between 2014-2015 and 2018-2019 (DHA, 2019c). In 2018-2019, 435 New Zealanders had their visa cancelled under Section 501 compared to 93 from the UK, 44 from Vietnam, 29 from China, and 342 from all other countries (DHA, 2019e). This disproportionate number of New Zealanders being deported compared to those from other countries has affected the relationship between the two countries. A relationship that has been shaped by the shared British colonial histories and fighting together in World War I as ANZACS, which came to symbolise mateship and having each other's back.

The New Zealand government has readily criticised the deportation of New Zealanders. In the year following the changes, then New Zealand Prime Minister John Key said that the deportations challenged the special relationship between New Zealand and Australia, the Anzac bond, and the Anzac spirit as this policy allowed Australia to pick and choose which New Zealanders can stay (Conifer, 2015). Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop responded by saying that there is no closer relationship than Australia and New Zealand and that his comments would be considered (Conifer, 2015). In the same year, the Green Parties of New Zealand and Australia jointly called on the Australian government to stop the indiscriminate deportation of New Zealanders as the deportations do not consider individual circumstances (The Greens, 2015).

The election of New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in 2017 has seen the deportation of New Zealanders become a political issue, with it continually brought up during meetings with the Australian Prime Minister. Ardern has continued to argue those who had genuine links to New Zealand should be deported as without an established support network, and deportees were likely to re-offend (Williams, 2017). In Ardern's most recent meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison at the beginning of 2020, she continued to reinforce her concerns about the impact the deportations were having not only on individuals and their family but on New Zealand:

> *'Australia is well within its rights to deport individuals who break your laws. New Zealand does the same. But we have a simple request. Send back kiwis, genuine kiwis - do not deport your people, and your problems.*
>
> *I have heard countless cases of individuals who, on any common sense test, identify as Australians.*
>
> *Just a few weeks ago I met a women [sic] who moved to Australia not much older than 1 year old. She told me that she had no connection to our country, but she had three children in Australia. She was in a crisis centre, having returned to a country she did not feel was her own. I have heard from those who work in our judiciary that they are seeing cases before our courts of individuals who are failing attempts to reintegrate and rehabilitate because the success of these programs is reliant on at least some network. These deportees have none.' (Ardern, 2020)*

Morrison responded saying,

> *'The Australian government's policy is very clear. We deport non-citizens who have committed crimes in Australia against our community. This policy is applied not specific to one country, but to any country whose citizens are here. You commit a crime here, if convicted, once you have done your time, we send you home.' (Remeikis, 2020)*

In response, Ardern said,

> *'The prime minister used a keyword in his reference just now – he said that after they have served their time he sends them 'home.' The example I used demonstrates that we have countless who have no home in New Zealand, they have no network, they have grown up in Australia. That is their home. And that is where they should stay.' (Ardern, 2020)*

## 1.5   Theorising migration

As migration is a global phenomenon, scholars have sought to theorise and understand the impact visa categorisation and the non-citizen/citizen dichotomy has on the nation-state, communities, and individuals in both the origin and destination country (Basch et al., 1994; Bloemraad, 2004; Brubaker, 2010; Erdal, 2013; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Massey et al., 1993; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Research at the beginning of the twentieth century viewed migration as a one-way linear process where, over time, migrants would lose their culture and assimilate into the host society. This view of migration was based on the migration of Europeans to the USA and their assimilation into Anglo-American society (Park et al., 1925). Following World War II, increasing globalisation and advances in technology saw migration channels open-up, and the origin countries of migrants shifted from Europe to this Global-South (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). This new flow of migrants from the Global-South to the Global-North meant earlier theories such as assimilation no longer adequately explained these migration patterns. Portes and colleagues (Portes & Jensen, 1989; Portes & Stepick, 1985; Portes & Zhou, 1993) adapted assimilation to explain the settlement experiences of Latin American migrants in the USA. Researchers also theorised the drivers of migration in terms of macroeconomics where wage differentials between countries influence migration (Massey et al., 1993) or, microeconomic and the new economics of labour migration (NELM) where migration is an individual or familial decision and in specific contexts used as a risk diversification strategy to send remittances (Sjaastad, 1962; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Todaro, 1969; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987).

Towards the end of the twentieth century, with the rise of temporary visas and increasing global connectivity, the concept of transnationalism was introduced to explain the changing migration patterns and migrant experiences in the destination country. Basch et al. (1994, p. 6) first introduced the concept of transnationalism, defining it 'as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.' This concept recognised migrants maintained social, political, economic, and cultural ties with their home country while becoming integrated into the destination country (Erdal, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). As migrants became integrated into the destination country, they sought to affirm their sense of belonging and legal status through the attainment of citizenship. This challenged how nation-states conceived citizenship as it has traditionally represented the exclusive connection between an individual

and the nation-state (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Brubaker, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 1999). Increasing trade and global connectivity have meant many nation-states have permitted dual-citizenship as it allows them to not only remain economically competitive but benefit from the transnational ties migrants have.

While research in the USA focussed on the assimilation of migrants in Europe, research has focussed on the integration of migrants into the destination country. Integration has been theorised into two broad categories, socio-cultural and structural, which seeks to understand the experiences of migrants in the destination country (Erdal, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Snel et al., 2006). To assess how migrants become integrated, a range of indicators such as education level, occupation, labour force participation, naturalisation rates, language ability, engagement with host-society, and sense of belonging have been used (Favell, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010). However, the integration of migrants is affected by three things: 1) the immigration policies in place and the visa conditions; 2) the strength of a migrant's transnational ties, and 3) how receptive the destination country is to migrants.

Theorising migration from a transnational perspective and examining the ways a migrant becomes integrated into the destination country has revealed the complexity of the migrant process. A limitation of this research is that it focuses on South-North migration, where often the migration systems in countries such as Australia, Singapore, and the USA dictate the conditions of entry and facilitate seasonal, temporary migration. As a result, these policies have categorised migrants into low and high-skilled, which consequently has been the focus of much of the migration research (Parrenas, 2005; Rajendran et al., 2017; Ryan & Mulholland, 2014b). This has meant little attention has been paid to North-North migration and the transnational practices and integration of 'middling migrants' who disrupt this dichotomy and will be addressed in this thesis.

### 1.5.1 Migration research in Australia

The proliferation of temporary visas and the diversification of the source countries of migrants has influenced and shaped how migration has been researched in Australia. Before 2000, research looked at European migrants such as Greeks and Germans (Seitz & Foster, 1985; Smolicz, 1985), refugee labour market experiences (Wooden, 1991), occupational mobility and employment success of migrants (Hawthorne, 1997; Miller, 1987), migrants from the Pacific Islands (Ahlburg & Brown, 1998; Morton, 1998), and Asian international students (Gao

& Liu, 1998; Shu & Hawthorne, 1996). Since 2000, research on migration has continued to reflect the changing nature of migration to Australia and the increasing complexity of Australia's Migration Program. This body of research has included a focus on skilled migrants (Hawthorne, 2005; Hugo, 2008c, 2014; Rajendran et al., 2020; Weller, 2017), refugees and their settlement and labour market experiences ((Colic-Peisker, 2005; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2007; Fozdar, 2012), migrants' settlement experiences and integration into Australia (Hugo, 2008a; McMillan, 2017; Osbaldiston et al., 2020). Research has also examined the transnational practices of Filipino migrants (Siar, 2014), Indian migrants (Voigt-Graf, 2004, 2005), and Italian migrants (Baldassar, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).

The increased number of temporary visas available and the changing immigration policies have continued to be an area of focus with authors such as Hawthorne (Hawthorne, 2005, 2010, 2014) examining the nexus between student migration and immigration and Khoo (2002, 2014) and Khoo et al. (2008, 2009) looking at the increase of temporary migration and which temporary migrants transition to permanent residency. Research has also continued to analyse the impact temporary migration has on the labour market (Birrell et al., 2007; Tan & Lester, 2012). Other authors have looked at the impact immigration policy changes have on international students, temporary graduate visa holders, and WHMs and their experiences living in Australia (Clarke, 2005; Robertson, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Robertson & Runganaikaloo, 2014). The increased number of Chinese and Indian international students and skilled migrants has also been a focus (Baas, 2014, 2017; Dunn et al., 2011; Hugo, 2008c; Sardana et al., 2016; Tan & Hugo, 2017).

While the research discussed above has evolved in response to the changing immigration policies, visas, and source countries of migrants, one group of migrants that has been under-researched is New Zealanders. As mentioned above, New Zealanders are the second largest migrant group in Australia whose entry and work rights are not governed by Australia's Migration Program. This unique visa arrangement in the context of Australian migration and the cultural and political similarities between the two countries may explain the lack of interest in New Zealand migrants compared to migrants from other countries with more precarious visa statuses.

### 1.5.2   Research on New Zealand migrants in Australia

The existing research on New Zealand migrants in Australia has primarily utilised secondary data sources. Using census data and immigration arrivals and departures data, the research has examined the demographic characteristics of the New Zealand population in Australia and the migration flows between the two countries (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Forrest et al., 2009; Hamer, 2008, 2017, 2019; Hugo, 2004b; Poot, 2010; Poot & Sanderson, 2007; Sanderson, 2009). Carmichael's (ed.) (1993) book comprehensively detailed and analysed migration between New Zealand and Australia from the 1800s to the late 1980s. In response to the 2001 policy change, researchers used arrivals and departures data and Australian citizenship attainment data to see what impact this policy change had (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Hugo, 2004b, 2004b). Birrell and Rapson (2001) examined the migration flows data to ascertain the scale of third-country migration from New Zealand to Australia, as this has been one argument used by the Australian government for changing New Zealanders' access to social security. While Hugo (2004a, 2004b) found there was an increase in the number of New Zealanders who obtained Australian citizenship because of this policy change, increasing from 11,007 in 2000-2001 to 17,334 in 2001-2002. Sanderson (2009) and Poot (2010) utilised Australian arrivals and departures data of New Zealanders who arrived in Australia between 1 August 1999 and 31 July 2002 and their moves in and out of Australia until July 2005. Poot (2010) found that one-third re-migrated within four years, but the proportion was similar to those from the UK. In contrast, Sanderson (2009) revealed that after the 2001 policy change, New Zealand-born migrants were more likely to return to New Zealand compared to non-native-born New Zealand citizens.

Census data has also been used to provide a richer understanding of the New Zealand population in Australia. For example, Hamer (2008) used responses to the ancestry question to determine the size of the Māori population in Australia. He found that those who identified as Māori went from one in 17 in 1986 to one in six in 2006. Hamer (2017) also used census data to discuss the electoral participation of Māori in Australia in relation to their uptake of Australian citizenship. He found that many are politically disenfranchised because they have a low uptake of citizenship because of the eligibility requirements for permanent residency. Forrest et al. (2009) used census data to examine the economic and spatial assimilation of Māori in Sydney. They found that Māori in blue-collar, manual occupations are in general only temporarily resident in Australia and do not form large ethnic enclaves in Sydney.

Nolan (2015) provides a comprehensive overview of the growing tensions between Australia and New Zealand since the implementation of the TTTA and the events and policy changes that occurred in the lead up to the 2001 policy change. Other researchers have situated New Zealand to Australia migration in the global migration context. Hamer (2014) has argued that immigration policy changes since 1901 that have affected New Zealanders were done to reduce third-country Pacific migration to Australia. Whereas McMillan (2014) compares the TTTA to EU citizenship looking at the political and social rights second country nationals have in each of these contexts. Hugo (2015) discusses the features of migration corridors globally before discussing trans-Tasman migration in the context of escalator migration theory and relay migration. Hugo et al. (2016) compared key immigration policy changes in Australia and New Zealand and how these have affected migration flows within and between each country.

There have only been a few empirical studies conducted over the last twenty years. Green and Power (2006) and Green et al. (2008) conducted 31 interviews and got 633 written survey responses in South East Queensland and Northern New South Wales to explore in the previous paper how New Zealanders construct their transnational identity. While Green et al. (2008) looked at New Zealanders' motivations for moving to Australia and the effect, factors such as age and length of residence had on transnational practices. Hamer (2007), using data collected through an online and postal survey targeting Māori living in Australia it explored their iwi affiliations, reasons for moving to Australia, employment experiences and views on Australian citizenship, and identity. The most recent study by McMillan (2017) examined the 'affective integration' of New Zealanders who moved post-2001 living in Australia. She found that although respondents had a high degree of structural, social, and cultural integration, they felt discriminated against and excluded by the Australian government as they could not access social security. Both Hamer (2007) and McMillan (2017) discuss the low-uptake of Australian citizenship by New Zealanders, but neither author provides an extensive discussion on why New Zealanders do not obtain it. Hamer (2007), for example, found that 48.3 per cent did not want Australian citizenship with 29.7 per cent feeling no need to naturalise. McMillan (2017) mentioned briefly that respondents in her research would be keen to take out Australian citizenship, with reasons given ranging from patriotic to instrumental.

In the last couple of years, in response to the amendments of Sections 501 and 116 of the *Migration Act 1958*, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has been explored. In the last couple of years, in response to the amendments made to Sections 501 and 116 of the

*Migration Act 1958*, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has been explored. Stanley (2018) found that many of those who had been deported on character grounds had never committed a crime. This they argue, sees New Zealanders shift from 'mate' to precarious 'other' as the border become present in everyday interactions as fears of deportation are exacerbated (Stanley, 2018). Billings (2019) examines the motivation for these amendments and how New Zealanders have been disproportionately affected compared to migrants from other countries.

A few gaps emerge from the empirical studies conducted. First, these studies were primarily conducted in South East Queensland, Northern New South Wales, and Sydney, where there is a high proportion of New Zealanders (Green et al., 2008; Green & Power, 2006; Hamer, 2007; McMillan, 2017). This thesis includes Melbourne and Adelaide in addition to the Brisbane-Gold Coast area as study sites, as each of these locations may attract New Zealanders for different reasons. Second, the low uptake of Australian citizenship mentioned by Hamer (2007) and McMillan (2017) is not explored in depth by either author. This thesis will expand on this by exploring why New Zealanders do not obtain Australian citizenship, especially as the need for citizenship has become more important because of the deportation of New Zealanders since 2014 and the pathway to permanent residency introduced in 2017. Third, while transnationalism has been a focus on the literature of migrants from other countries in Australia, Green and Power (2006) and Green et al. (2008) loosely engage with this theory. The previous article focuses on how New Zealanders maintain their national identity and how they develop a transnational identity. The latter article primarily used push and pull theory to explore the motivations for moving to Australia and how links are maintained with New Zealand. The authors found New Zealanders exhibit a form of transnationalism as they feel at home in both countries. Green et al. (2008) suggest that further study should look at the contributions New Zealanders make to Australian society. Through engaging with the transnationalism literature, this thesis will explore how New Zealanders maintain social, political, economic, and cultural ties with New Zealand. This thesis will also expand on the existing research on the integration of New Zealanders through exploring challenges they face gaining employment and forming social networks in Australia.

## 1.6   Research aim and objectives

The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the role immigration policy changes have on the integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. Using the theoretical conceptions of transnationalism and integration, this thesis seeks to consider how micro-, meso- and macro-scale factors intersect with and affect their socio-cultural and structural integration and transnational practices. The aim of the thesis will be met by the following objectives:

1. To examine migrants motivations for moving to Australia and the strength of their social, political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand
2. To investigate the settlement experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia through examining their socio-cultural and structural integration into Australia
3. To examine how immigration policy changes intersect with the socio-cultural and structural integration of migrants and their return migration intentions
4. To explore the implications for policy and theory and put forward recommendations for future research based on the findings of the study

## 1.7   Thesis outline

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The present chapter details the research topic situates it within the current global migration rhetoric. It outlines previous research on New Zealanders in Australia and the knowledge gaps that exist. The aim and objectives of the research are detailed.

Chapter Two begins by discussing New Zealand migration in the global context, then detailing migration flows between New Zealand and Australia since each country was colonised. The evolution of Australia's immigration and citizenship policies and how they relate to trans-Tasman migration is then discussed. It finishes by providing a demographic overview of the New Zealand-born population using the 2016 Australian census data.

Chapter Three reviews the relevant migration literature, detailing how the concepts of transnationalism and integration emerged and how they have been applied in migration studies. It also examines how migrant occupation has been researched in relation to these two theoretical concepts. This chapter provides the theoretical framework for this research outlining how the integration and transnational practices of migrants are multi-scalar and

multi-layered. The framework takes into account how micro-scale factors intersect with actors at the meso- and macro-scales and the language, culture, and political, economic, and social structures in the origin and destination country. Existing research on New Zealanders in Australia concerning transnationalism and integration is also outlined. The chapter concludes by outlining the gaps this research aims to fill.

Chapter Four details the methodology and methods used in this study. The chapter explains the rationale for using a sequential mixed-methods design and details how the online survey and semi-structured interviews were implemented and conducted. It discusses the limitations of the data collection methods used with the final section providing a demographic overview of the 2040 survey responses and the 21 interviewees.

Chapters Five to Seven present and discuss the results of the primary data collected for this research. Chapter Five addresses objectives 1 and 3 and begins by detailing respondents' motivation to move to Australia. Using transnationalism as the theoretical framework, respondents' economic, political, cultural, and social transnational practices are explored, revealing how these practices differ from migrants from other countries. Respondents' return intentions are also discussed. Chapters Six and Seven address objectives 2 and 3. Chapter Six examines the economic, social, and overall integration of respondents into Australia, paying particular attention to the occupation of respondents. At the micro-scale, respondents felt well-integrated, yet at the macro-scale felt disenfranchised because of how they felt New Zealanders have been treated by the Australian government. Chapter Seven looks into the political integration of respondents and their ability to obtain permanent residency and citizenship. The results presented show that for those who arrived after the 2001 policy change, the introduction of the 189 visa in 2017 made them feel taken advantage of by the Australian government as they could not secure their status in Australia. Respondents wanted to secure their status in Australia in response to the deportation of New Zealanders.

Chapter Eight concludes this thesis by summarising the key findings in relation to the aim and objectives of the research. It discusses the implications and contributions of these findings to theory and policy and proposes areas of future research, addressing objective 4.

# CHAPTER 2: TRENDS IN THE MIGRATION OF NEW ZEALANDERS TO AUSTRALIA

## 2.1   Introduction

This chapter begins with an overview of New Zealand and a discussion of the migration of New Zealanders globally and to Australia. This is followed by a summary of Australia's Migration Program, Australian citizenship, and changes to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014. The immigration policy changes that affect New Zealanders are then discussed. The last section provides an overview of the New Zealand population in Australia using the 2016 Australian census data.

## 2.2   Overview of New Zealand

New Zealand is a small nation of islands between the Tasman Sea and the South Pacific Ocean and was named Aotearoa by Polynesian voyagers, who first settled the islands from approximately 1300. These people came to be known as Māori and are recognised as the indigenous people or *tangata whenua*; they met European voyagers following the arrival of James Cook in 1769. The early arrivals to New Zealand from Europe and the USA in the early 1800s were missionaries, traders, sealers, and whalers, followed by French Catholic missionaries in 1838. By the 1830s, some Māori and British missionaries sought formal intervention from the British government to offset the impact European contact was having on Māori. Ultimately, the British used a treaty to assume formal control of the nation as a colony of their empire. The first signings of the Treaty of Waitangi began on 6 February 1840 by the British Crown and about 540 Māori *rangatira* (chiefs) (Orange, 2012). The British declared sovereignty over New Zealand, and waves of migrants mostly from Britain began arriving, which saw the Māori population decline both in real and proportional terms. In 1840 the European population was around 2000, rapidly growing to 488,000 in 1881, and by 1901 it reached 770,000 (Orange, 2012). Whereas the Māori population steadily declined from 80,000 in 1840 to 46,000 in 1901 (Orange, 2012).

In the 180 years since the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, New Zealand's population has grown to 4.7 million (Stats NZ, 2019a). While those of European descent make up nearly three-quarters (73.8) of the resident population, in 2018, there were more Asians (14.9 per cent)

than Māori (13.9 per cent) (Stats NZ, 2019a). Just over three-quarters (76.5 per cent) of the resident population live in North Island, concentrated in the cities of Auckland, Wellington, and Hamilton, which have populations of 1,590,261, 163,440, and 209,172 respectively (Stats NZ, 2019a), Figure 2.1. In the South Island, Christchurch (378,480) and Dunedin (130,194) are the largest cities (Stats NZ, 2019a).

The main exports are milk powder, butter, and cheese (NZD$16.15 billion), meat and edible offal (NZD$8.3 billion), wood products (NZD$4.68 billion), fruit (NZD$3.52 billion), and wine (NZD$1.91 billion) (Stats NZ, 2020d). While dairy is the biggest export industry, only 1.3 per cent (31,845) of employed persons work in dairy cattle farming (Stats NZ, 2019b). The top five industries of employment are: cafes and restaurants (67,608); supermarkets and grocery stores (57,609); primary education (55,779); hospitals (52,887); and house construction (51,804) (Stats NZ, 2019b). Amongst those who are employed, Sales Assistant is the top occupation (108,702) followed by Office Managers (65,907), Chief Executives or Managing Director (54,480), Sales Representative not elsewhere classified (nec) (51,747) and Labourers nec (43,971) (Stats NZ, 2019b). In September 2019, the national unemployment rate was 4.2 per cent, with Taranaki (6.0 per cent), Gisborne/Hawke's Bay (5.2 per cent), Manawatu-Wanganui (5.2 per cent), and Northland (5.0 per cent) the regions with the highest unemployment rates (MBIE, 2019). From 2009 to 2019, the median weekly income increased from NZD$760 to NZD$1016 (before tax) (Stats NZ, 2020b).

In New Zealand, the main societal issues are housing affordability, child poverty, and the cost of living. Housing affordability and the number of houses available have become one of the most significant issues, particularly in Auckland, where there is a shortage of 45,000 houses (Johnson et al., 2018). In the last five years, house price inflation increased 30 per cent while incomes rose about half this, with house prices in Auckland increasing 60 per cent (Johnson et al., 2018). This increase has seen the waitlist for public housing increase from 5,844 in September 2017 to 13,966 in September 2019 (MSD, 2020). In 2020, house prices were seven times the median income, with the UN calling it a human rights crisis (Roy, 2020a, 2020b).

**Figure 2.1: Map of New Zealand showing the main cities and regions**

*Source: adapted from Wilson (2016)*

The high cost of housing has seen child poverty become a significant issue. Currently, 254,000 children live in low-income households, with over 30 per cent of the lowest income households spending more than half their income on housing costs (Child Poverty, 2019). Access to healthy food is also an issue as 56 per cent of children whose parents receive government benefits do not eat enough healthy food (Child Poverty, 2019). Living costs are also an issue. In 2019 house rental prices increased 3.1 per cent, the largest increase since 2008, with meat, poultry, and fish prices increasing 6 per cent and fruit and vegetables increased by 2.7 per cent (Stats NZ, 2020a, 2020c). A survey by Consumer NZ found that in 2018 respondents were primarily concerned about the cost of petrol, which had increased 19 per cent during the year and also food and groceries (Consumer NZ, 2019).

## 2.3   Migration of New Zealanders in the global context

New Zealand is a country with high levels of immigration and emigration. While the resident New Zealand population reached 4,699,755 in 2018 (Stats NZ, 2019a) it is estimated that an additional 777,300 thousand were living abroad in 2019 (Migration Data Portal, 2020). In 2018, 27.4 per cent of the New Zealand population was born outside New Zealand (Stats NZ, 2019a).

For many New Zealanders, moving abroad for an overseas experience 'OE' is part of the national psyche. The primary destinations are Australia because of its geographic proximity and the UK because of the historical ties. To move to the UK, New Zealanders aged 18-30 are eligible for a two-year working holiday visa or, for others, an Ancestry visa with 6,000 to 12,000 moving each year (OECD, 2020). In 2018, it was estimated that around 72,000 New Zealanders were living in the UK, with about 80 per cent indicating they had British ancestry (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2010; OECD, 2020). Flows to Australia are much larger, peaking at 44,656 in 2011-2012 (see Figure 2.4), and will be discussed in more detail in the following section. The migration of New Zealanders to the next top eight destinations is significantly smaller than those to Australia and the UK, with Figure 2.2 showing a peak of 1,293 moving to the USA in 2005 (OECD, 2020).

**Figure 2.2: Flows of New Zealand migrants to the next eight destinations after Australia and the UK**

*Source: OECD (2020)*

To understand New Zealanders motivations for moving abroad, KEA, a New Zealand expatriate network association, conducted three surveys on New Zealand expatriates in 2011, 2013, and 2015 (Kea New Zealand, 2011, 2013, 2015). The results from these surveys provide insight into where New Zealanders migrate, how much they earn, and how expatriates differ from resident New Zealanders, with a summary given in Table 2.1. In each of the surveys, Australia has remained the primary country of residence of expatriate New Zealanders, with the percentage increasing from 35 per cent in 2011 to 43 per cent in 2015. Interestingly, the percentage living in the UK decreased from 27 per cent to 10 per cent while the percentage living in Europe increased from 7 per cent to 25 per cent. The main reasons for moving abroad in 2013 were for job opportunities (32 per cent) followed by family connections (25 per cent). The surveys also showed that nearly half earned over NZD$100k per year, whereas only 5.9 per cent of those over the age of 15 earned over NZD$100k in New Zealand in 2013 (Stats NZ, 2013). Respondents were also highly educated, with 35 per cent holding postgraduate level qualifications in 2011 and 2013. In 2015, over half (55 per cent) had a university education, which was a decrease in the previous years. This high level of education amongst expatriates

was also noted in an OECD report, which found that 44.6 per cent have a tertiary qualification, while 22.5 per cent have an upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (Dumont & Lemaître, 2005). However, when compared to the resident New Zealand population, only 20.0 per cent have a bachelor's degree or higher (Stats NZ, 2013).

**Table 2.1: Summary of KEA expatriate surveys 2011, 2013 and 2015**

|  |  | 2011 | 2013 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Number of respondents** |  | 15,297 | 12,433 | 13,729 |
| **Country of residence (%)** | Australia | 35 | 37 | 43 |
|  | The UK | 27 | 23 | 10 |
|  | North America | 18 | 20 | 15 |
|  | Europe | 7 | 8 | 25 |
| **Ethnic identity (%)** | NZ European | 89.7 | 89 | 88 |
|  | Māori | 8.6 | 13 | 9 |
|  | Chinese | 2.4 | 2 | 3 |
|  | Samoan | 0.9 | 1 | 1 |
| **Why they moved abroad? (%)** | Job/economic reasons | 33 | 32 | - |
|  | Family connections/obligations | 23 | 25 | - |
|  | Different lifestyle/overseas experience | 19 | 17 | - |
| **Highest level of education (%)** | Postgraduate | 35 | 35 | 55 |
|  | Bachelors | 31 | 28 |  |
|  | Other tertiary diploma or certificate | 19 | 21 | - |
|  | Secondary School | 15 | 16 | - |
| **Income (%)** | Earn above NZD$100k | 47 | 50 | 42 |
| **Return to NZ (%)** | Returned in the last 12 months | 61 | 55 | - |

*Source: KEA Every Kiwi Counts report (2011, 2013, 2015)*

## 2.4   Migration between New Zealand and Australia

The movement of people between Australia and New Zealand began in the late 1700s, soon after Europeans and Americans came to investigate the opportunities. This included Māori who were travellers, short-term residents, and traders. Before this, it is believed that Australian Aborigines and New Zealand Māori were unaware of each other. Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Europeans and Māori migrated between the two countries based on where the economic prospects were, with the establishment of trade routes and gold rushes in Otago, New Zealand (1861-1864) and Victoria, Australia (1851- the late 1860s) influential (Phillips & Hearn, 2008). The gold rush in Victoria resulted in higher wages and more job opportunities attracting migrants from New Zealand. In 1887, assisted migration from Britain to New Zealand had ceased, and in 1888 during an economic depression, over 9000

people left New Zealand (Phillips & Hearn, 2008). Between 1891 and 1915, many migrants moved from Australia to New Zealand as Australia experienced its first economic depression in the 1890s and drought. New Zealand reintroduced assisted migration in 1904, resulting in large numbers of migrants arriving from the UK.

Migration sped up between the 1920s and 1980s. One of the main factors was that sea travel was replaced by air travel with the formation of *Tasman Empire Airways* in 1940, which was a joint venture between the Australian, New Zealand, and British governments and *Union Airways of New Zealand* (Carmichael, 1993). In the 1960s, the New Zealand economy depended on access to the British market and their demand for New Zealand wool. By 1967 the export price of wool fell by 30 per cent leading to unemployment and inflation (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2018), and Britain was about to join the European Economic Community. This led to a recession in New Zealand and saw long-term arrivals in Australia increase from 13,000 in 1966-1967 to an average of 21,000 each of the subsequent four years. By the 1970s, Australia's average real wage had risen from 30-40 per cent above New Zealand's in 1972-1974 to 60 per cent in 1979 (Wood, 1980 as cited in Carmichael, 1993). This period of substantial wage growth saw the annual permanent long-term arrivals from New Zealand increase from 13,200 in 1975 to 35,900 in 1979 (Carmichael, 1993). Many of the New Zealanders who moved to Australia during this period did so with a 'let's test the waters' attitude (Carmichael, 1993). During this decade, the New Zealand population in Australia more than doubled from 80,466 in 1971 to 176,713 in 1981 (ABS, 1971, 1981) see Figure 2.3.

Between 1980 and 1989, 83 per cent of settler arrivals from New Zealand into Australia were New Zealand-born, with just under half of the rest born in the British Isles (Carmichael, 1993, p.73). As migration flows continued to grow between the two countries and economic trade expanded, the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) was signed in 1983, facilitating the free trade of goods between the two countries (Carmichael, 1993). In 1983 recession hit Australia leading to high unemployment, and permanent arrivals to Australia had fallen to a low of 2,900 in the September quarter of 1983, remaining depressed for the next 15 months (Carmichael, 1993). In New Zealand, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon introduced a 20-month price and wage freeze in June 1982 in an effort to stop inflation.

**Figure 2.3: Growth of New Zealand born population in Australia**

*Source: Australian census 1947-2016*

Towards the end of the 1980s, the number of New Zealanders moving to Australia had increased as unemployment and home loan rates rose in New Zealand. Each quarter between January 1988 and March 1989, there were over 10,000 permanent long-term arrivals from New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993). By the late 1980s, approximately 1 in 7 New Zealand residents were travelling to Australia each year compared to 1 in 55 Australian residents visiting New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993). Many of those who migrated to Australia in the 1970s and 1980s were post-war baby boomers going on their overseas experience (Poot, 2010). Australia was a convenient destination for many because it was affordable and did not require applying for a visa before arrival or permanent residence (Baird & Smith, 2016).

Overall, during the 1990s, the New Zealand population in Australia continued to grow. In the early 1990s, Australia suffered its worst recession since the Great Depression, and this saw the number of New Zealanders who moved to Australia drop to just over 8,000 in 1991-1992. By 1995-1996, for the first time, more New Zealanders were migrating permanently to Australia (12,300) than those from the UK (11,300), accounting for 12 per cent of permanent arrivals in that year (DIBP, 2016). In 1996 the New Zealand population in Australia reached 291,388, with the Australian population in New Zealand just over 54,700 (ABS, 1996; Birrell & Rapson, 2001). 1999-2000 saw 31,610 New Zealanders move to Australia permanently, an increase of 28 per cent on the previous year (Khoo, 2002). This represented 34.3 per cent of the permanent arrivals in Australia that year (Birrell & Rapson, 2001).

In the twenty-first century, the flow of New Zealanders to Australia has continued. Favourable economic conditions in Australia during the 2000s saw the number of settler arrivals into Australia increase from 22,379 in 2004-2005 to a peak of 44,656 in 2011-2012 (DIBP, 2014a, 2014b). The mining boom in Australia during this period contributed to some of this increase, with the number employed in the mining industry increasing from 5,417 in 2006 to 10,340 in 2011 (ABS, 2006, 2011). Also, a major earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand on 22 February 2011 saw 4,320 people move from Christchurch to Australia in the year to March 2012, up from 1,892 in the year ending March 2010 (Stuff, 2012). Since the peak in 2011-2012, the number of settler arrivals to Australia has steadily declined, reaching a low of 12,555 in 2016-2017 (DIBP, 2017b). In 2015, New Zealand had its first net gain of migrants from Australia for the first time since 1991, with 800 moving to New Zealand (Stats NZ, 2016). This change in flows may have been influenced by the end of the mining boom in Australia, economic growth in New Zealand, the stability of the New Zealand government compared to Australia and the New Zealand and Australian dollars reaching near parity (Hunter, 2016; Stewart, 2015). From 2001 to 2016, the New Zealand population in Australia grew from 355,765 to 518,462 (ABS, 2001, 2016). While the Australia population in New Zealand was 56,259 in 2001, increasing to 75,696 in 2018, currently accounting for 1.6 per cent of the population (Stats NZ, 2002, 2019a).

Besides migration, economic trade and tourism are also important dimensions of the flows between the two countries. Since the signing of the CER in 1983, trade has increased between the two countries resulting in the development of a Single Economic Market, which has enhanced economic integration. In 2018 two-way merchandise totalled AUD$17.6 billion, with two-way services trade totalling AUD$11.7 billion (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). In the same year, Australian investment in New Zealand was AUD$96.7 billion, while New Zealand invested AUD$47 billion in Australia in the same period (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). Regarding tourism, in the year ending March 2020, there were 1,372,100 arrivals into Australia, while this number includes those intending to settle permanently, it equates to a visitor spend of AUD$2.5 billion (Tourism Australia, 2020). The availability of flights contributes to the mobility between the two countries, with 446 flights per week compared to 132 flights per week between Australia and China and seven flights per week to the UK (Tourism Australia, 2020).

Because of the geographic proximity and economic, familial, and cultural ties, Hugo (2004b, 2015) has said this migration corridor is more reflective of long-distance internal migration. Bell and Hugo (2000) found New Zealanders settle in locations that are also the main destinations for internal migrants within Australia. New Zealanders also have a high rate of internal migration in Australia compared to Australian born and migrants from the UK, India, China, Philippines, and Vietnam (Raymer & Baffour, 2018). Amongst these migrant groups, New Zealanders primarily went to Brisbane, whereas those from the UK moved to Perth (Raymer & Baffour, 2018). Hugo (2004b) notes that another characteristic of the flows from New Zealand to Australia is its circularity. The flexibility the TTTA provides means an individual's length of residence in Australia can range from a working holiday of a year, a work assignment for a couple of years, or spending their whole working life in Australia before returning to New Zealand to retire (Hugo, 2004b). An individual may have several periods of residence in Australia throughout their lives.

Figure 2.4 displays the number of New Zealand citizens who indicated they intended to settle permanently in Australia, with the long-term resident departures also displayed. The number of New Zealanders departing Australia permanently remained relatively constant from 2007-2008 to 2012-2013 and has since gradually increased, going from 4,679 in 2012-2013 to 7,054 in 2017-2018.

Figure 2.5 shows the number of Australian citizens who have moved permanently to New Zealand. Between 2004 and 2012, there was a gradual decline in the number of Australians moving to New Zealand, going from 5,274 to 3,470. From 2012 to 2018, the number of arrivals nearly doubled, reaching a peak of 6,566. While the number of Australians moving to New Zealand increased, Figure 2.4 above shows that there was a significant decrease in the number of New Zealanders moving to Australia during the same period.

**Figure 2.4: Settler arrivals and long-term resident departures Australia by New Zealand citizens**

*Source: DHA, various years, Arrivals and Departures data*



**Figure 2.5: Permanent arrivals into New Zealand by Australian citizens (annual-June)**

*Source: Stats NZ (2020e)*

30

To gain a nuanced understanding of the flows between the two countries, Figure 2.6 displays the permanent arrivals into New Zealand by looking at those who are Australian born and living in Australia but have New Zealand citizenship. Although this data cannot be analysed by age, many of these individuals are likely to be children of New Zealand citizens. This is because even if you are born in Australia, having parents who are migrant's means you are not automatically granted Australian citizenship and can only apply once you reach the age of 10. The child has to obtain citizenship by descent, in this context, New Zealand citizenship, to travel out of Australia.



**Figure 2.6: Permanent arrivals into New Zealand by those who were previously resident in Australia, are Australian-born and have New Zealand citizenship**

*Source: Stats NZ (2020f)*

## 2.5   Australia's immigration policy

Australia's immigration policy has evolved over the last century. As a British colony, migrants who came to Australia during the late 1700s and 1800s were primarily from the UK and Ireland. Migration during this period aimed to build and establish the new colony and was viewed as permanent given the vast distances individuals needed to travel (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Khoo et al., 2008). While most migrants came from the UK and Ireland, and other European countries, gold rushes in Victoria and New South Wales in the 1850s and 1850 attracted international migrants from China. There was a strong public anti-Chinese sentiment, which led to restrictions being placed on Chinese immigration.

Soon after the Federation of Australia, 1 January 1901, they passed the *Immigration Restriction Act of 1901*. Commonly referred to as the White Australia policy, this Act slowed down non-European migration to Australia. Indigenous Australians were also expected to adopt British culture and practices in order to assimilate. Following the bombing of Darwin in 1942 and the end of World War II, the Chifley government believed that Australia urgently needed a larger population for defence and development, which could be achieved through immigration. In addition, there were significant labour shortages, and the fertility rate had declined (Hugo, 2006). This led to the establishment of the Department of Immigration in 1945 to facilitate migration to Australia, with the slogan 'populate or perish.' The Assisted Passage Migration Scheme was established in 1945, which enabled British who were under the age of 45 and in good health to migrate to Australia for ten pounds, with their children getting free passage (Jupp, 1998). In the early years of the scheme, preference was given to skilled tradesmen, and in 1957 and anyone who could pass the medical exam could migrate (Jupp, 1998). Between 1947 and 1971, over 460,000 British had migrated to Australia with the scheme ending in 1981(Jupp, 1998).

During the post-war period, Australia experienced rapid economic growth due to industrialisation and expansion and intensification of primary industries. Following this sustained growth, the 1970s saw a decrease in manufacturing employment due to increased automation and offshore processing. Baby boomers were also entering the labour market, reducing the labour shortages in primary and secondary industries (Hugo et al., 2016). As mentioned in Chapter 1, during the 1970s, three significant changes were made to Australia's immigration policy. First, was the abolition of the White Australia Policy in 1973 by Gough Whitlam. This ended race-based immigration and resulted in increased migration from non-European countries. Second, the TTTA was signed with New Zealand, facilitating the migration of New Zealanders to Australia. The third change was the implementation of the NUMAS in 1979, a points-based system, similar to the 'Norms of Assessment' that had been introduced in Canada in 1967. Individual migrants wishing to come to Australia could apply through NUMAS, scoring points based on 'recognised skills, occupational demand, economic viability, transferable assets, English competence, sponsorship within Australia, preparedness, initiative, and adaptability and personal appearance' (Walsh, 2011, p. 876). To be granted entry, they needed a score of at least 50 out of the possible 100 points (Walsh, 2011). Shortly after the NUMAS was implemented, in 1981 the Business Migration Program was created to

attract those who wanted to start a business in Australia, provided they had at least AUD$500,000 in assets (Walsh, 2011).

The points test has since become the basis for Australia's permanent migration scheme, bringing with it a shift from family to targeted skills-based migration. Permanent migration is capped, with the quotas changing each year in response to labour shortages. Skilled migrants wanting to remain permanently in Australia need to have an occupation on the Skilled Occupation List (SOL) and obtain the requisite number of points. The first iteration of the SOL was introduced in 1999, with occupations added or removed based on labour shortages. In 2019-20, 160,000 permanent visas were available, with 108,682 available under the Skill Stream, 47,732 in the Family Stream, 236 special eligibility, and at least 3,350 child visas (DHA, 2019d). The Skill Stream is composed of: Points Tested Skilled Migration, Employer-Sponsored, Business Innovation and Investment, and Distinguished Talent. While the Family Stream, which is a sponsored stream, allows the immediate family members of an Australian citizen, permanent resident, or eligible New Zealand citizen to migrate to Australia. Immediate family members include partners or fiancés, dependent children, parents, orphan relatives, aged dependent relatives, and carers. Those applying through the Family Stream do not need to have an occupation on the SOL or meet the language requirements. Permanent residency grants individuals access to all social security services after a four-year stand-down period, with some services accessible one or two years after obtaining permanent residency. Table 2.2 summarises some of the permanent visas available under the Skilled and Family Streams with the associated general eligibility requirements. Applicants also need to be of good health and pass the general character test.

**Table 2.2: Summary of selected permanent residency visas, Australia 2019**

| | | | General eligibility requirements | Application fee (AUD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Skilled Stream** | Employer Nomination Scheme Visa | Subclass 186 | Nominated by an Employer<br>Have eligible occupation and at least 3 years of relevant work experience<br>Under the age of 45 | From $4,045 |
| | Skilled Independent Visa | Subclass 189 Points-tested stream | Have an occupation on SOL<br>Score at least 65 points<br>Under the age of 45 | From $4,045 |
| | Skill Nominated | Subclass 190 | Nominated by an Australian state or territory government agency<br>Score at least 65 points<br>Under the age of 45 | From $4,045 |
| | Skilled Regional visa | Subclass 887 | Must apply online<br>Have been living and working in a specified regional area<br>Hold a subclass 489, 495, 496,475 visa | From $415 |
| | Distinguished Talent visa | Subclass 124 (be outside Australia when visa granted) | You must have been prominent in your field during the past 2 years.<br>You must be nominated by an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident, eligible NZ citizen, or Australian organisation with a national reputation in your field | From $4,110 |
| | | Subclass 858 (be in Australia when you apply and visa is granted) | | From $4,110 |
| **Family Stream** | Partner Visa | Temporary Subclass 820 | Apply for the temporary and permanent visa at the same time<br>Must be in Australia when you apply<br>Partner or spouse of Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen | From $7,715 for most applicants |
| | | Permanent Subclass 801 | | |
| | Age-Dependent Relative Visa | Subclass 114 (Be outside Australia when you apply) | Sponsored by an eligible relative or relative's partner<br>Be dependent on a relative in Australia for basic needs for at least 3 years before you apply<br>Have no partner and old enough to receive the aged pension | From $415 |
| | | Subclass 838 (Be inside Australia but not in immigration clearance when you apply) | | From $6,415 |

*Source: compiled from DHA 2019*

Australia's current permanent migration program emphasises skilled migration, in part to ensure migrants who are granted permanent residency will not be a financial burden on the nation-state. As individuals on the SOL are required to have a job or an employer sponsoring them, it ensures they will have ongoing employment in Australia and will be self-reliant. The purpose of the SOL is to mitigate migrants needing to claim social security, such as unemployment benefits. While at the same time, by portraying a controlled immigration regime, the government has been able to address concerns the domestic population has in relation to immigration, such as the ethnocultural structure being altered and labour market displacement (Walsh, 2011).

As discussed in Chapter 1, another component of Australia's immigration system is temporary migration. Temporary migration to Australia includes visitors, International Students, WHMs, Temporary Resident (skilled) visa holders, New Zealand citizens (SCV 444), and a range of other temporary visas. Between 2008-2009 and 2017-2018, the number of people entering Australia temporarily increased from 5,705,148 to 8,694,048 (DHA, 2019a). In 2017-2018, of these temporary entrants, 68.8 per cent were visitors, 21.4 per cent SCV 444 holders, 4.4 per cent International students, 2.4 per cent WHMs and the rest on other temporary visas (DHA, 2019a). Temporary migrants who have work rights in Australia are presented in Figure 2.7. The numbers for SCV 444 holders include those entering Australia as a tourist and those intending to settle permanently.

The WHM allows those aged 18-30 from 42 countries regardless of their skill or education level to live, work, and travel in Australia for one to three years (CEDA, 2019). This visa has allowed the government to fill regional labour shortages by requiring those wanting to extend their visa from 12 to 24 months to complete three months of regional work. Those who complete an additional six months of regional work during their second year are eligible for a third-year visa (DHA, 2018b).

**Figure 2.7: Numbers of temporary entrants in selected categories**

*Source: DHA (2019a)*

International students have not only become an important component of Australia's temporary migration program but have become vital to university funding. Before 1985, international students primarily from South and Southeast-Asia came to Australia under the Colombo plan, where education was used as aid development. Following a review of the Australian Overseas Aid Program in 1984, it was argued that education should become an export industry so that students not accommodated by the aid program could be enrolled provided they met the entry requirements and paid the full cost of fees (Adams et al., 2011). Following this change, universities actively recruited international students because of the income they could provide. Between 1989 and 1998-1999, the number of international students grew from 21,000 to 110,894 (Adams et al., 2011; Spinks, 2016).

To encourage international students to stay in Australia post-study, the Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) visa was introduced in 2007. Before the introduction of this visa, graduates had to apply under the General Skilled Migration points system, which required having a job on the SOL (previously Migration Occupations in Demand List). Prospective migrants were awarded extra points for having an occupation on the list or had received an Australian qualification for an occupation on the list (Hawthorne, 2010). The introduction of the Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) visa meant graduates who had completed a bachelor's

degree with a minimum of two years of study were granted a work visa between two and four years depending on their level of qualification without needing to get a job on the SOL or employer sponsorship.

For WHMs, Temporary Residents (skilled) visa holders, and Temporary Graduate visa holders, their visa allows them to stay in Australia for a set period. If they want to stay in Australia longer, they need to switch between visas provided they have an occupation on the SOL or find an employer willing to sponsor them. For some of these migrants, applying for a partnership visa may also be an option. Through this visa switching, these temporary migrants may then be eligible to apply for permanent residency and citizenship.

### 2.5.1  Australian citizenship

The notion of Australian citizen was enacted in 1948 with the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948*. Before this, those born in Australia or who had migrated to Australia from the UK or New Zealand were British subjects. Under the *Naturalisation Act 1903*, 'aliens' could be naturalised by the Commonwealth and obtain the status of a British subject, with those from Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands prohibited from applying (Hamer, 2014). Amendments were made to the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948* in 1955 to make it easier for migrants to obtain citizenship. Applicants no longer had to declare their intention to apply two years before they submitted the application and instead could make the declaration six months before the end of the five-year residency qualifying period (Klapdor et al., 2009). The *Citizenship Act 1969* made it easier for non-British migrants to obtain Australian citizenship, and the residency requirement was reduced to two years provided they had a proficient level of English. During this period, the term British subject also referred to an Australian citizen. Under the *Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984*, the definition of British subject was removed, so the Act would reflect the national identity of all Australians with applicants no longer discriminated based on their sex, marital status, and present or past nationality (Klapdor et al., 2009).

Before 1986, Australian-born children automatically obtained Australian citizenship. The Australian *Citizenship Amendment Act 1986* revoked this right so children born to illegal immigrants, visitors, or others temporarily in Australia would not automatically get citizenship (Rubenstein, 2002). One parent had to be an Australian citizen or permanent resident when the child was born. Children born to temporary migrants have to be ordinarily resident in

Australia for 10 years after their birth before being granted citizenship (Hurford, 1986). The *Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1993* introduced a *Pledge of Commitment,* which replaced the old oath, so those naturalising pledged commitment to Australia instead of the Monarch (Rubenstein, 2002). In 2002, Australians could now get dual-citizenship. Citizenship by descent provisions were also extended, so those born overseas to Australian parents had until the age of 25 to apply for Australian citizenship by descent. The *Australian Citizenship Act 2007* completely overhauled the 1948 Act. First, the period of residence increased from two to four years, with applicants required to be a permanent resident for the 12 months before application. Second, a citizenship test was introduced to assess the applicant's English language ability and knowledge of Australian history, culture, and values. The argument for introducing the test was that it would equip migrants with the knowledge necessary to integrate into Australia successfully (Klapdor et al., 2009).

In 2017, the *Australian Citizenship Legislation Amendment (Strengthening the Requirements for Australian Citizenship and Other Measures) Bill 2017* was proposed. This Bill sought to tighten the eligibility requirements for citizenship, including a more stringent English language threshold, extending the minimum permanent residency period from 12 months to four years, and that applicants have integrated into the Australian community (Petrie, n.d.). The Australian government argued these changes would promote integration and enhance national security but were criticised by the opposition and multicultural groups for undermining integration and making it harder for individuals to apply for citizenship (Askola, 2020; Petrie, n.d.). In 2018, the government introduced the *Australian Citizenship Amendment (Strengthening the Citizenship Loss Provisions) Bill 2018*. This Bill was proposed as a counter-terrorism tool to protect the Australian community as it would have allowed the Minister to strip those who have been convicted of terrorism of their Australian citizenship, provided the person would not become stateless (Petrie, n.d.). The Bill lapsed at the 2019 Federal election.

Naturalising to become an Australian citizen provides instrumental benefits as it offers security from deportation, an Australian passport, and the ability to apply for permanent government employment, including the armed services. Being an Australian citizen has certain responsibilities, including obeying Australian laws, enrolling to vote federally and at a state/territory level, vote in elections, and do jury service if required (Klapdor et al., 2009). Alongside the instrumental benefits, citizenship is symbolic, as it formally establishes membership in the national community.

Since 1948, over 5 million individuals have naturalised (DHA, 2020a). In the last 15 years, there has been a shift amongst the migrants who choose to naturalise. Figure 2.8 presents the uptake of citizenship by the top four migrant populations in Australia. Citizens of the UK and New Zealand can hold dual-citizenship, while those from China need to renounce their Chinese citizenship. Indians cannot hold dual-citizenship but can hold Overseas Citizenship of India, which allows them to live and work indefinitely in India, but they are unable to vote in Indian elections. Those from the UK have traditionally had the highest naturalisation rates. However, since 2012-2013 more Indians have naturalised with 27,827 Indians obtaining citizenship in 2013-2014 compared to those from the UK (25,883). In 2003-2004, 13,052 New Zealand citizens obtained Australian citizenship, whereas in 2017-2018 only 1,842 naturalised. The 2016 census shows that only 30.7 per cent of the New Zealand-born population have naturalised compared to 48.0 per cent of the Indian-born population and 36.3 per cent of the Chinese-born population.



**Figure 2.8: Attainment of Australian citizenship by various migrant groups**

*Source: DIMIA, DIAC, DIBP, DHA annual reports various years*

### 2.5.2   Changes to Section 501 and Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958

In 2014, the *Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014* was passed, changing Sections 501 and 166 of the *Migration Act 1958*. These amendments were made as the Minister sought to strengthen the integrity of Australia's Migration Program and address the risks posed to the community by non-citizens of possible character concern. This meant non-citizens who do not pass the character test can be deported from Australia. Non-citizens include those who have permanent residency, including PSCV and SCV 444 holders.

The following changes were made to Section 501 Character test:

- 'Provide mandatory cancellation of the visa of a person who is serving a prison sentence
- Amend the definition of 'substantial criminal record' so that a person sentenced to terms of imprisonment totalling 12 months or more (rather than the current two years) will not pass the character test
- Allow the Minister to set aside decisions by a delegate or a Tribunal and cancel a visa if the Minister thinks it is in the national interest and
- Enable the Minister to require heads of state or territory agencies to disclose personal information' (Coombs, 2014, p. 3).

Section 116 General visa cancellations to:

- 'Expand the grounds on which a visa may be cancelled under the general visa cancellation power
- Expand the Minister's personal powers to cancel a visa on Section 109 or 116 grounds
- Allow the Minister to substitute their own decision for a decision of a Tribunal or a delegate' (Coombs, 2014, p. 3).

In addition, 'if the Minister reasonably suspects that a visa applicant or holder has been or is a member of a group or organisation, or has an association with a group, organisation or person, that the Minister reasonably suspects has been involved in criminal conduct, then the visa applicant or holder will not pass the character test' (Coombs, 2014, p. 8). Scott Morrison, then the Immigration and Border Protection Minister, argued that the rationale for these changes was that the character provisions had been in place since 1999, and the general visa cancellation provisions had remained unchanged since 1994. Since then, there had been an increase in temporary visa holders, and that the integrity of Australia's Migration Program needed to be strengthened to protect Australians from harm by non-citizens (Hon. S. Morrison, 2014).

Concerns were raised about the severity of these amendments, as it would now be easier for non-citizens to fail the character test. Some argued that these changes would affect the lives of hundreds of long-term resident non-citizens and would impact not only an individual's immediate family but the broader community they were a part of (ANU College of Law, 2014; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014). Many were also worried about the expanded powers of the Minister under this bill, given they could overrule decisions made by a Tribunal or delegate (Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, 2014; Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014).

Since these changes were made between 2014-2015 and 2018-2019, 4,690 visas have been cancelled under Section 501 (DHA, 2019e). As previously noted in Chapter 1, during this same period, 1,909 New Zealand nationals had their visa cancelled under Section 116 or Section 501 (DHA, 2019c). From 1 July 2018 to 20 June 2019, 435 New Zealanders had their visa cancelled under Section 501, followed by 93 from the UK, 44 from Vietnam, 29 from China, and 342 from all other countries (DHA, 2019e). Many of those who have their visa cancelled are sent to an immigration detention facility while they wait for the decision to be reviewed or travel documents to be arranged. In 2017 and 2018, there were 160 New Zealanders detained on Christmas Island (DHA, 2019b), Australia's offshore detention processing centre, which closed in October 2018.

### 2.5.3 Policy changes affecting New Zealanders

The TTTA has facilitated the movement of people between Australia and New Zealand. This arrangement allows citizens of the respective countries and Australian permanent residents to travel, live, and work in the other country without needing to apply for a visa. In the years following the implementation of the TTTA, Australian media and unions made claims that New Zealanders were moving to Australia to abuse the social security system (Carmichael, 1993). Following these claims, a reciprocal trans-Tasman agreement was signed in 1987 that stated migrants now faced a six-month stand-down period before they could receive unemployment benefits upon moving from New Zealand to Australia or vice versa (Carmichael, 1993). In 1994 Australia introduced a compulsory visa system, where a temporary Special Category Visa (SCV) was introduced for New Zealand citizens, which was granted on arrival in Australia.

The most significant change affecting New Zealanders in Australia occurred in 2001. During the 1990s, Australia was becoming increasingly concerned about the number of migrants

obtaining New Zealand citizenship to gain entry into Australia (Birrell & Rapson, 2001). This third-country migration was possible because New Zealand had less stringent immigration laws compared to Australia. Migrants who did not meet Australia's immigration requirements could move to New Zealand, get citizenship, and move to Australia because of the TTTA. The Australian government was still worried about the number of New Zealanders claiming welfare benefits in Australia (Birrell & Rapson, 2001). This led to talks between the two governments to renegotiate the existing Social Security Agreement where Australia wanted the New Zealand government to shoulder the welfare costs that were being paid to New Zealanders in Australia, with the amount close to AUD$1 billion (Nolan, 2015). New Zealand refused, citing that Australia failed to recognise the economic contributions the New Zealanders were making to Australia (Nolan, 2015). Growing tensions between the two countries resulted in the Australian government announcing that from the 26 February 2001 that New Zealanders would no longer be granted automatic permanent residency in Australia and would have reduced access to a wide range of social security services (Birrell & Rapson, 2001).

Those who moved to Australia before this date were granted automatic permanent residency and are referred to as Protected Special Category Visa holders (PSCV). New Zealanders who moved after this date could no longer access unemployment benefits, youth allowance, and sickness benefits. However, they are eligible for a one-off payment for a maximum duration of six months after living in Australia for ten years. They still have access to child-related social security and family assistance payments, concession cards, and Medicare. New Zealanders are eligible for Medicare under the *Health Benefits (Reciprocity with Australia) Act 1999,* which allows them to receive the same health care services that are provided to Australian citizens. New Zealanders need to live in Australia for at least six months before applying for Medicare. Although not an immigration policy change, the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in 2013, which is taxpayer funded, excludes SCV 444 holders from accessing the services provided under this scheme. This means SCV 444 holders who have a disability are unable to receive funding for support services such as transport, mobility equipment, or help with household tasks. For SCV 444 holders to gain access to all social security and disability services, they need to apply to become a permanent resident.

Until 2007, New Zealanders who had moved to Australia post the 2001 policy change could obtain permanent residency through the Skilled (861)-Onshore Independent New Zealand

Citizen Visa, the Skilled (862)-Onshore Australian-sponsored New Zealand Citizen Visa, and the Skilled (863)-Onshore Designated Area-sponsored New Zealand Citizen which was not points tested. The 861 visa required applicants to have a pass mark of 120 points with the 862 visa at 110 points out of a possible 175. In 2002-2003 only 33 persons were approved under the 861 visa (Birrell et al., 2004). On 1 September 2007, these New Zealand specific visa streams were abolished and folded into the wider General Skilled Migration Program. These visas were replaced by the Skilled-Independent (subclass 175) Visa, Skilled-Sponsored (subclass 176) Visa, which were point-tested visas that allowed individuals to stay permanently in Australia. The 863 visa was replaced by the Skilled Regional-Sponsored (subclass 475) Visa, which was a temporary visa valid for three years. For the 175 and 176 visas, they remained point-tested with a national cap on the number of visas approved each year.

On 1 July 2012, the Skilled-Independent (subclass 175) Visa became the Skilled Independent Visa Subclass (189). As noted above in Table 2.2, this is a point-based visa for those not sponsored by an employer, state or territory, or family member. Individuals need to have an occupation on Australia's SOL and be aged between 18 and 50. The Skilled-Sponsored (subclass 176) visa became the Skilled-Nominated (subclass 190) visa. To apply for this visa, skilled workers are nominated by an Australian state or territory, have an occupation on Australia's SOL, score at least 60 points, and are 18-50 years of age (DHA, 2020d). For both visas, before completing the application, individuals are required to submit an Expression of Interest and are then invited to apply for the visa. However, for New Zealanders, one of the barriers to applying for these visas is being required to have a job on the SOL.

In 2016, the Australian government announced a pathway for permanent residency specifically for New Zealanders, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream, which came into effect 1 July 2017. To apply for this visa, applicants need to hold an SCV 444 visa, have lived in Australia between 26 February 2001 and 19 February 2016, been resident in Australia for five years, and have earned a taxable income of at least AUD$53,900 for each of those years and be of good character (Love & Klapdor, 2020). Unlike the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) points-tested stream, applicants do not need to submit an Expression of Interest nor have an occupation on the SOL and can apply if they are over the age of 45. As noted in Chapter 1, from 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2018, 12,817 applications were lodged, with 2,467 visas granted to primary applicants and 3,043 visas granted to secondary applicants (DHA, 2018a).

## 2.6   Data on New Zealanders from the 2016 Australian census

In the 2016 Australian census, the New-Zealand born population in Australia was 518,462 (2.2 per cent of the population), making them the second-largest migrant group in Australia, behind those born in the UK (1,087,759) and ahead of those from China (509,558) and India (455,385) (ABS, 2016). Just under half (42.6) arrived in Australia between 2002 and 2016. Table 2.3 shows the state of residence of the New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations. Between 2006 and 2016, there was an increase in the proportion of New Zealanders living in Western Australia from 12.1 per cent to 15.3 per cent and a decrease in the proportion living in New South Wales from 27.4 per cent to 22.6 per cent (ABS, 2006, 2016). In 2016 a higher proportion (38.8 per cent) of the New Zealand population lived in Queensland compared to the Australian-born population (21.4 per cent).

**Table 2.3: Residence of New Zealand-born, Australian-born, by state**

| State | New Zealand-born 2006 (%) | New Zealand-born 2016 (%) | Australian born-2016 (%) |
|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| NSW   | 27.4 | 22.6 | 31.4% |
| VIC   | 16.4 | 18.0 | 24.6% |
| QLD   | 38.2 | 38.8 | 21.4% |
| SA    | 2.9  | 2.5  | 7.6%  |
| WA    | 12.1 | 15.3 | 9.6%  |
| TAS   | 1.1  | 1.0  | 2.6%  |
| NT    | 0.9  | 0.9  | 1.0%  |
| ACT   | 1.0  | 0.9  | 1.7%  |

*Source: ABS (2006, 2016)*

Table 2.4 summarises the demographic characteristics of the New Zealand and Australian born populations. The median age is 41.7 years, which is higher than the Australian median age of 33.3 years. In terms of gender balance, the percentages are reversed with more New Zealand males than females. New Zealanders are also more likely to be married, with a higher percentage of women having had four or more children.

**Table 2.4: Demographic characteristics of New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations, 2016 Australian census**

| | | New Zealand-born | Australian-born |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Sex (%)** | Male | 50.4 | 49.5 |
| | Female | 49.6 | 50.5 |
| **Age** | Median age (years) | 41.7 | 33.3 |
| **Marital status** | Percentage of population over 15 never married | 35.6 | 30.2 |
| | Percentage married | 39.6 | 33.0 |
| **Religious affiliation (%)** | Christianity | 47.0 | 58.0 |
| | Secular Beliefs and Other Spiritual Beliefs and No Religious Affiliation | 44.0 | 33.8 |
| **Number of children ever born (%)** | No children | 13.8 | 13.0 |
| | One child | 5.8 | 4.1 |
| | Two children | 11.8 | 10.2 |
| | Three children | 7.2 | 6.4 |
| | Four or more children | 5.4 | 3.9 |

*Source: ABS (2016)*

Amongst New Zealanders who are employed, 39.5 per cent had a highest level of education of secondary, at year 10 or above, with 19.8 per cent having obtained Certificate III & IV Level. 47.4 per cent work full-time and 18.5 per cent part-time, see Table 2.5. The main occupations of those who work full-time are Professionals (17.9 per cent), Managers (15.8 per cent) and Technicians and Trade Workers (15.4 per cent) whereas those employed part-time were primarily Community and Personal Service Workers (17.6 per cent), Professionals (16.6 per cent) and Labourers (16.1 per cent). Fewer New Zealanders are not in the labour force compared to Australians, 24.5 per cent versus 33.1 per cent. This lower percentage may be because New Zealanders who arrived after 2001 are not entitled to unemployment benefits. New Zealanders also have a higher median weekly income than the Australian-born population.

The main industry of employment for New Zealanders and Australians was Health Care and Social Assistance, 11.4 per cent and 11.8 per cent, respectively. Compared to Australians, more New Zealanders worked in Manufacturing (7.5 per cent) and Transport, Postal and Warehousing (7.0 per cent). Amongst Australians, Education and Training is one of the main industries of employment (9.4 per cent) while only 5.7 per cent of New Zealanders are employed in this industry.

**Table 2.5: Employment characteristics New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations 2016 Australian census**

| | | New Zealand-born | Australian-born |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Income (AUD$)** | Median weekly income | 840 | 688 |
| **Education level (%)** | Postgraduate Degree Level | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| | Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| | Bachelor Degree Level | 12.3 | 14.0 |
| | Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level | 10.0 | 9.1 |
| | Certificate III & IV Level | 19.8 | 19.1 |
| | Secondary Education - Years 10 and above | 39.5 | 35.6 |
| | Certificate I & II Level | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| | Secondary Education - Years 9 and below | 4.0 | 8.7 |
| **Employment status (%)** | Employed, worked full-time | 47.4 | 37.9 |
| | Employed, worked part-time | 18.5 | 20.5 |
| | Unemployed | 5.0 | 4.2 |
| | Not in the labour force | 24.5 | 33.1 |
| **Occupation (%)** | Professionals | 17.4 | 21.0 |
| | Clerical and Administrative Workers | 13.9 | 14.2 |
| | Technicians and Trades Workers | 13.3 | 14.0 |
| | Managers | 12.6 | 13.3 |
| | Labourers | 11.7 | 8.7 |
| | Machinery Operators and Drivers | 11.5 | 6.1 |
| | Community and Personal Service Workers | 10.0 | 10.8 |
| | Sales Workers | 8.0 | 10.2 |
| **Industry of employment (%)** | Health Care and Social Assistance | 11.4 | 11.8 |
| | Construction | 10.6 | 9.3 |
| | Retail Trade | 8.5 | 10.6 |
| | Manufacturing | 7.5 | 5.9 |
| | Transport, Postal and Warehousing | 7.0 | 4.4 |

*Source: ABS (2016)*

## 2.7  Conclusion

This chapter has detailed how the implementation of the TTTA and favourable economic conditions in Australia has contributed to the growth of the New Zealand population in Australia. The open nature of the TTTA has provided New Zealanders with unrestricted access to Australia, provided they have no criminal history and has seen the population grow from 80,640 in 1971 to 518,462 in 2016 (ABS, 1971, 2016). This is despite the Australian government revoking New Zealanders' access to social security services, including unemployment, disability, and injury benefits in 2001. As any New Zealander, regardless of their occupation,

can move to Australia, the 2016 census data showed more New Zealanders worked as Labourers, and Machinery Operators and Drivers compared to Australians. This chapter also detailed the pathways to permanent residency available to New Zealanders who arrived after 2001 and their ability to get Australian citizenship given New Zealanders had the lowest uptake of Australian citizenship compared to those from the UK, India, and China. Having provided the context for this research, the following chapter situates this research in the theoretical literature.

# CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

## 3.1   Introduction

The movement of people across the globe has changed rapidly over the last century, and with this, so has migration scholarship. Scholars have sought to explain why people migrate and what affect migration has on the home and destination countries. Early scholarship focused on the effect migrants had on the host society where to common assumption being that migrants would assimilate. From this viewpoint migration was assumed to be permanent and that migrants would not return to their home country. By the mid-1900s, scholars became interested in finding out why people choose to migrate and what the key drivers of migration were. A common strategy was through examining labour migration, leading to the dominant migration theory of the time, neoclassical economics. Towards the latter half of the 1900s, as countries continued to develop, and technology advanced migration began to shift from a permanent to temporary phenomena. With this came the recognition that for migrants maintaining ties with their home country was increasingly important with Basch et al. (1994) introducing the concept of transnationalism in the 1990s. This concept examines the social, political, economic, and cultural ties migrants maintain with their home country and how these ties affect the integration of people into the destination country.

## 3.2   Evolution of migration theory

In the early 1900s, migration scholarship sought to explain what impact migration would have on the destination society and/or country. Park et al. (1925) from the Chicago School introduced the concentric zone model that explained how migrants adapted to a city over time. First-generation migrants lived closest to the central business district (CBD), with second-generation migrants living further away from the city (Park et al., 1925). Here it was assumed that over subsequent generations, migrants would live further away from the CBD and have assimilated into the host society (Park et al., 1925). Through assimilation, migrants would experience a reduction in their own identity and become indistinguishable from mainstream society (Hoernig & Walton-Roberts, 2009; Waters, 2009). A key dimension of migration during this period was that it was permanent, making assimilation into the destination society and/or country possible.

During the post-World War II period, scholars began to conceptualise migration informed by neoclassical economics. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, migration is driven by economics where wage differentials between the country of origin and the destination country cause individuals to migrate (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). Once wages are equal, migration will cease. Massey et al. (1993) note the influence the government has on the labour market affects labour flows between countries. Conversely, microeconomics views migration as a result of individual decision making where the perceived costs, benefits and investments are weighed up (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). Sjaastad (1962) points out these investments are the private costs of migration, which can be monetary or non-monetary. Financial costs are the expenses incurred while moving, such as transportation, while the non-monetary costs are the loss of social networks, the time taken to find a new job, and adapting to a new country or culture (Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, 1962). The government here controls migration through policies that affect the wages in the home or destination country (Massey et al., 1993). Both perspectives attribute migration to changes in economic conditions; however, in doing so, it neglects other factors such as social networks or politics that contribute to migration and suggests the need for a more holistic way of explaining migration.

Challenging neoclassical economics, Stark and Bloom (1985) introduced the new economics of labour migration (NELM). Like neoclassical theory, NELM recognises that migrants often move to a country that is seen to have an economic advantage. The advancement that Stark and Bloom (1985) made was identifying the role families have on migration decisions, rather than migration being an individual decision. Here families use migration as a diversification strategy. The migrant sends remittances, which act as a safeguard against changes to the economic conditions in the home country and poverty because of natural disasters, unemployment, or low crop yield (Massey et al., 1993). While remittances are primarily used to support the family, they can contribute to the development of the home country through the starting of businesses or the building of schools or hospitals in the local community (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004).

A limitation of neoclassical economics and NELM is that they are based on migration flows from the Global-South to the Global-North. In this context, migration is driven by the prospect of sending remittances back to the origin country to aid economic development. While these conceptualisations have contributed to our understanding of the drivers of migration in this

context, the drivers of migration between two Global-North countries need to be considered, such as between New Zealand and Australia. Migration, in this instance, does not neatly fit neoclassical economics or NELM as development is not the main goal, yet some elements apply. Green et al. (2008) found that migrants weigh up the potential costs and benefits of migrating, with favourable economic conditions contributing to migration decisions. However, pre-existing social ties and similar cultures also influenced the decision to move (Green et al., 2008). Thus, economics is not the only driver of migration, and other factors, therefore, need to be considered.

Towards the end of the 1900s, there had been a shift from permanent migration to temporary forms of migration. This brought a change in how people lived across the globe, as migration was becoming increasingly circular, and economics were not the primary reason to migrate. To capture the changing migration patterns, Basch et al. (1994, p. 6) introduced the concept of transnationalism, which is defined 'as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.' The concept drew criticism from scholars such as Portes et al. (1999), who argued that the definition needed to be refined, as not all practices made a migrant transnational. For Portes et al. (1999), migrants considered as transnational made regular trips to their home country, whether it for business multiple times a year or delivering supplies to their family monthly. Whereas occasionally gifting money or purchasing a property in the home country was not indicative of being transnational because of the irregularity of these actions (Portes et al., 1999). While they called for the definition to be refined, they also argued that the strength of transnationalism was it could capture the economic, political, and socio-cultural activities that took place (Portes et al., 1999).

Drawing on Guarnizo's (1997) refinement of transnationalism as either from above (global capital, transnational companies, and states) and from below (grassroots activity and individuals), Portes et al. (1999) demonstrated how examining transnationalism from these two perspectives reveals different types of cross-border activities. Grassroots transnational activities include fundraising for political candidates in the home country, folk musicians playing at cultural centres and informal trade (Portes et al., 1999). Whereas at the level of the nation-state or a transnational company, activities include large-scale cultural events, home countries granting dual citizenship, and the expansion of home country banks into destination countries (Portes et al., 1999). Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) observed that research before

this had not acknowledged the interconnections between different scales nor the complexity of the economic, political, or socio-cultural transnational activities that took place.

Although scholars such as Portes et al. (1999), Itzigsohn et al. (1999), and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) embraced the concept of transnationalism, others were more critical. Foner (1997) questioned the originality of the concept as she argued that the processes being claimed as transnational had occurred in the past, as migrants have always maintained ties with their home country. She did, however, acknowledge that what was distinctive about contemporary transnationalism was the intensity of cross-border ties (Foner, 1997). Technology advancements have made regular contact with those abroad more accessible and altered how business, trade, and politics is conducted (Foner, 1997). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) offered harsher critiques of the concept. An issue they had with the research conducted was they viewed it as translocal rather than transnational, as it focused on looking at the connections between a village in one country and communities in another, findings they did not see as novel (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004, p. 1183, emphasis in original) also argued that 'population movements across state boundaries is inherently a *political* matter', as nation-states dictate who can enter a country, who can become a citizen of the nation-state and which migrants can, therefore, be transnational. While the nation-state influences the conditions of migration and residence in the destination country, their assertion it is the only factor influencing migration has been criticised by Glick Schiller and Levitt (2006). Glick Schiller and Levitt (2006) found Waldinger and Fitzgerald's (2004) claims problematic as they ignored the foundation of transnationalism, which acknowledges that economic and socio-cultural networks, in addition to the political, affect transnational practices.

## 3.3 Transnational practices

Even though the concept of transnationalism has been criticised over its novelty, it is a useful framework for examining how migrants maintain ties between their origin and destination countries. While Portes et al. (1999) have been critical of transnationalism, they proposed a framework for distinguishing between the different forms of transnationalism and what activities can be considered as being transnational. As mentioned above, for Portes et al. (1999) for practices to be transnational they need to be regular and sustained, with Table 3.1 detailing the economic, political, and socio-cultural activities they viewed to be transnational

and the level of institutionalisation. Portes et al. (1999) pay particular attention to the transnational practices at the meso- and macro-scales with an emphasis on political and socio-cultural activities that offer transnational economic opportunities such as amateur sports matches or major home country artists performing abroad.

**Table 3.1: Transnationalism and its types**

| | | Sector | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Economic** | **Political** | **Socio-cultural** |
| Level of institutionalisation | Low | -Informal cross-country traders<br>-Small business created by returned migrants in the home country<br>-Long-distance circular labour migration | -Home town civic committees created by immigrants<br>-Alliances of immigrant committee with home country political association<br>-Fundraisers for home country electoral candidates | -Amature cross-country sport matches<br>-Folk music groups making presentations in immigrant centres<br>-Priests from home town visit and organise their parishioners abroad |
| | High | -Multinational investment in Third World countries<br>-Development of tourist market of locations abroad<br>-Agencies of home country banks in immigrant centres | -Consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad<br>-Dual nationality granted by home country governments<br>-Immigrants elected to home country legislatures | -International expositions of national arts<br>-Home country major artists perform abroad<br>-Regular cultural events organised by foreign embassies |

*Source: adapted from Portes et al. (1999, p. 222)*

Faist (2000) expands on Portes et al.'s (1999) framework by distinguishing between three types of transnational social spaces that represent the different scales of transnationalism. Faist (2000) focuses on the socio-cultural dimension of transnationalism and the role this plays in building and sustaining transnational kinship groups, circuits, and communities, Table 3.2. Primary resources refer to the economic, human, and social capital used by migrants to sustain and form transnational ties. For example, migrants can use their social capital to find work through established migrants in the destination country, or there may be solidarity amongst migrants who are all tied to a particular homeland, such as the Jews.

**Table 3.2: Three types of transnational social spaces arising from international migration and flight**

| Types of transnational social spaces | Primary resource in ties | Main characteristic | Typical examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transnational kinship groups | *Reciprocity:* what one party received from the other requires some return | Upholding the *social norm* of equivalence | *Remittances* |
| Transnational circuits | *Exchange*: mutual obligations and expectations of the actors; the outcome of the instrumental activity | Exploitation of *insiders advantages*: language; strong and weak social ties in peer networks | *Trading networks* |
| Transnational communities | *Solidarity:* shared ideas, beliefs, evaluations and symbols; expressed in some sort of collective identity | Mobilisation of *collective representations* within (abstract) symbolic ties: religion, nationality, ethnicity | *Diasporas:* e.g. Jews, Kurds; *frontier regions* e.g. Mexico-US |

*Source: adapted from Faist (2000, p. 195)*

Rather than looking at transnational networks or practices as economic, political, or socio-cultural, Erdal and Oeppen (2013) propose that practices can be grouped under the broad categories of structural and socio-cultural. Socio-cultural transnationalism encompasses the emotional, cultural, religious, and social dimensions of transnational networks (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). The emotional dimension of transnational migration looks at the attachments people have to particular places, their sense of belonging, and the meanings attached to citizenship (Blunt, 2007). Justyna Bell's (2016) findings show for Polish migrants in Northern Ireland, being transnational took an emotional and social toll. Migrants found they had to choose how they split their time, either forging new friendships in Ireland or maintaining those at home (J. Bell, 2016). They were also selective with the information they shared with family or friends in Poland as they did not want to worry them, such as neglecting to discuss the difficulties of finding a job or running out of money (J. Bell, 2016). Therefore, even though individuals have support networks in the home country, they are not always utilised as they cannot actively help the individual when issues arise in the destination country. Meaning individuals select when they choose to use their transnational networks for support.

Structural transnationalism covers the economic, political, and legal dimensions (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) observes that political transnationalism includes a wide range of practices such as transnational election campaigns, cross-border voting, lobbying on behalf of the home country, and involvement in hometown associations (HTAs). The governments in the home and destination country influence what political practices are

possible. Some nation-states seek to engage with their overseas populations by encouraging them to contribute to the economic, social, and political development of the country (Ho & Boyle, 2015; Koh, 2015; Margheritis, 2007; Smith, 2003). Smith's (2003) research on Mexico found it was advantageous for the Mexican government to engage with migrants in the USA, as there are an estimated 22 million Mexican's living there. Many of these migrants send remittances, which led the nation-state to implement policies that sought to educate women on the potential community benefits of saving and investing their remittances rather than spending them (Smith, 2003). Similarly, the Argentinian government implemented policies to encourage return migration from Spain (Margheritis, 2007). This included subsidies to promote return migration and the establishment of tax exemptions for those who send their personal belongings home (Margheritis, 2007). These incentives seek to promote return migration and the subsequent development of the home country, yet they may not produce the desired effects. This is because initiatives put in place may not be what is best for the individuals and disregard the conditions in the home and destination countries that contribute to migration decisions.

Collyer (2014) examines the countries that allow extra-territorial voting. He found some countries allow migrants to vote only if they return to the country to do so, whereas others implemented legislative barriers to prevent migrants from voting (Collyer, 2014). Turkey and Malaysia represent examples where individuals have to return to vote, while New Zealanders can vote while overseas. Mügge (2012) observed that for Turkish in the Netherlands, less than half the respondents indicated they would return home to vote, while others may vote if they happened to be visiting Turkey. Even though the cost of returning home can act as a barrier to engaging with homeland politics, public demonstrations can lead to policy changes. Koh (2015) found this was the case for Malaysian migrants who felt as citizens it was their right to vote yet were not allowed to do so. To have their political voices heard, public protests were held globally, which forced the Malaysian government to allow those overseas to register as absentee voters (Koh, 2015). Those who vote overseas can affect election results. Gamlen's (2015) analysis of New Zealand elections from 1914 to 2011 found extra-territorial voting can cause a swing in election results, affect coalition discussions, or have feedback effects, which result from overseas campaigns encouraging people to vote. For example, in the 2011 election, the Green Party implemented an online campaign to encourage those overseas to vote, under the pretence that those overseas were more likely to vote Green (Gamlen, 2015;

Levy, 2011). The New Zealand example highlights the effect extra-territorial voting can have on country politics, especially when there is a large overseas population. Yet even if individuals cannot vote themselves, in an age of transnationalism, they can influence how family and friends in the home country vote. This demonstrates that despite a country's best efforts, migrants can still play a role in home country politics.

The economic dimension of transnationalism primarily focuses on the sending of remittances and the ability to invest overseas (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). This dimension of transnationalism is linked to the neoclassical and NELM explanations for migration, where migration contributes to the development of the home country. Remittances are primarily sent to countries in the Global-South, with US$450 billion sent in 2018 (The World Bank, 2020) with this money used by a migrant's immediate family and the wider community. Zontini's (2004) research highlighted earning higher wages abroad provides individuals with the opportunity to provide and care for their families in a way that would not have been possible if they had not migrated. For example, being able to improve living standards through building a new house or being able to pay off unexpected medical bills (Zontini, 2004). Faist (2008) observed that HTAs contribute to the development of the wider community through allocating resources to the improvement of infrastructure and education and health services. Many migrants also invest in businesses in the home country (de Haas et al., 2015). Portes et al.'s (1999) research on economic entrepreneurs showed the establishment of transnational enterprises by migrants with higher qualifications and more experience helped them to adapt to the destination country. Through remittances and investments, migrants can contribute to the economic and socio-cultural development of the home country as the money is used at the micro- and meso-scales.

The socio-cultural and structural dimensions of transnationalism have been used to examine transnational practices globally. Studies on transnationalism have been dominated by research conducted in the Global-North. This body of research focuses on the transnational practices of those who have moved from countries in the Global-South to those in the Global-North. For example, Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadorian migrants in the USA (Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2002; Portes et al., 2002), Pakistani's in Norway (Erdal, 2013), Chinese in Canada (Hiebert & Ley, 2003; Ho, 2014), Moroccan and Filipino migrants in Spain (Zontini, 2004) and Polish in England and Ireland (J. Bell, 2016; Ryan et al., 2008). Similarly, research in Australia has focused on the transnational practices of migrants from India (Baas, 2017; Voigt-Graf,

2004, 2005), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China (Dunn & Ip, 2008), China (Colic-Peisker & Deng, 2019; Tan & Hugo, 2017), Vietnam (Baldassar et al., 2017) and the Philippines (Siar, 2014). Less research has looked at migration between countries in the Global North; examples include Irish in England (Ryan, 2015), English in France (Scott, 2004), Australian's in the USA (Parker, 2012) and New Zealanders in Australia and England (Conradson & Latham, 2005; Green et al., 2008; McMillan, 2017; Wiles, 2008). This study seeks to provide a novel perspective on the migration of New Zealanders to Australia through focussing on how macro-scale structural and socio-cultural factors affect the decisions and behaviour of the migrants–their practices at the micro-scale.

## 3.4  Transnationalism and integration

The assimilation and/or integration of migrants into the destination country has interested researchers and the government over the last century. The concept of assimilation was developed by the Chicago School in 1925 to explain how minorities became a part of mainstream society (Park et al., 1925). Over time migrants would lose their language and culture and become indistinguishable from the host society. This concept was particularly applicable to European migrants who came to the USA as they were considered to be culturally and racially similar to the dominant White-Anglo population at the time (Alba & Nee, 1997). While assimilation became the dominant concept in the USA, in Western Europe, integration was the primary way through which the settlement experiences of migrants were researched. The concept of integration originated as a policy discourse, where governments detailed a set of measures migrants needed to meet to maintain a minimum degree of cultural homogeneity (Schneider & Crul, 2010). These measures include and are not limited to: minimum language requirements; basic legal and social protection; policies and laws tolerating social practices; formal naturalisation and citizenship or residency-based rights; and cultural funding for ethnic associations (Favell, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010). Both concepts have evolved in each geographic area in response to changes in the immigration rhetoric and to how the migration process and settlement experiences have been conceptualised.

Since introduced by the Chicago School, how assimilation has been theorised has evolved in response to changes in the source countries of migrants. Milton Gordon (1964) was one of the first scholars to expand on the work by the Chicago School in which he detailed the seven stages of assimilation: acculturation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation,

identification assimilation, attitude, behaviour, and civic assimilation. Like the Chicago School, Gordon's work also emphasised that assimilation is a one-way process with the expectation migrants conform to the White-Anglo majority. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the source countries of migrants began to change, leading Alejandro Portes and colleagues to look at how Cuban and Haitians assimilated into the USA. Portes and Jensen (1989) argued that for Cuban Mariel refugees, unilinear assimilation was not possible and that instead, different adaptation strategies were utilised. For these migrants, existing migrant communities helped them to become assimilated into the city in different ways (Portes & Jensen, 1989). Through studying these migrant groups, Portes and Zhou (1993) questioned what assimilation meant for second-generation migrants and observed that there were several paths to assimilation, which they called segmented assimilation. The segmented assimilation framework consists of three paths: 1) growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class; 2) permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass, and 3) rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity. Portes and Zhou (1993) point out that the path an immigrant group takes is influenced by the policies of the host government, the values and prejudices of the receiving society, and the characteristics of the co-ethnic community.

The use of assimilation to study migrants in the USA drew criticism towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Alba and Nee (1997) argued that while assimilation had become an overused theory in the social sciences as it imposed and reinforced ethnocentrism, it still provided the best way for examining and explaining the integration of migrants. While they recognised the usefulness of the concept, they proposed a new definition of assimilation which instead of assimilation being viewed as the end-state of migration they defined assimilation as a 'social process that occurs spontaneously and often unintendedly in the course of interaction between majority and minority groups' (Alba & Nee, 1997, p. 827). This shift from viewing assimilation as an end-state to a process, Brubaker (2001) explained, related to how the word assimilation had been interpreted by different researchers. He explains that assimilation has two meanings: 1) to become similar when used intransitively; 2) to make similar when used transitively. The first interpretation views assimilation as a process, whereas in meaning two, assimilation is an end-state and implies complete absorption (Brubaker, 2001). These two interpretations hence reflect how assimilation was initially conceptualised by the Chicago School and later interpreted by Portes

and Zhou (1993) and Alba and Nee (1997). Crul (2016) argues that although the work by Portes and Zhou (1993), and Alba and Nee (1993) has made significant contributions to understanding how ethnic groups adapted to the mainstream and the patterns of social mobility of ethnic groups compared to other ethnic groups and the mainstream, they still viewed assimilation as a linear process at the group level and into a white majority population.

While these debates around assimilation dominated migration research between the 1970s and 1990s, Berry (1980) in the 1980s introduced a four-state model of acculturation to understand how different groups and individuals live together. The processes of acculturation could result in assimilation (relinquishment of one's cultural identity), integration (engaging with both cultures), segregation or separation (no substantial ties with the larger society) or marginalisation (engagement with neither culture). Berry (1980) notes that for an individual, acculturation is not a linear process as it is influenced by micro (individuals initial health, age, education, and social support) and macro factors (political context, the society of origin, economic situation, and broader demographic factors) and changes over time. While Berry's acculturation model is not the focus of this thesis, it shows that assimilation and integration are not the only acculturation strategies and that the process of acculturation is shaped by different factors that contribute to and shape how migrants experience the destination country.

Integration with its origins in public policy has shaped how the integration of migrants into Western Europe has been researched. Joppke and Morawska (2003) explain that integration's grounding in policy has meant that although nation-states set the parameters for integration, the integration of migrants is not guaranteed as migrants are viewed as subjects who have the free will to integrate. Integration then, as Favell (2003) discusses, focuses on how the government seeks to unify the nation-state amid growing cultural diversity. These measures of integration mentioned above (see Favell, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010), have subsequently been used to research and analyse the integration of migrants into the destination country. Engbersen (2003) argues when researching integration, there has been the tendency to emphasise the dichotomy of structural and socio-cultural integration. He instead uses three dimensions of social integration, which are inherently linked: the functional dimension (extent migrants can participate in work and education), moral dimension (participate fully and equally in society, citizenship), and the expressive dimension (develop their individual and shared identities). However, despite Engbersen (2003) proposing an alternative to the

structural/socio-cultural integration dichotomy, this has continued to be the dominant way in which the integration of migrants has been researched.

Snel et al.'s (2006) paper on transnationalism and social integration provides definitions of structural and socio-cultural integration, which have been widely adopted by researchers in this area (see Becker, 2019; de Haas et al., 2015; Erdal, 2013; Fokkema & de Haas, 2015). *Structural integration* is defined as the social position of migrants in the host society in relation to their education level and labour market position, and *social-cultural integration* as the engagement with the host society and the embracing of cultural practices and values (Snel et al., 2006). While this distinction between structural and socio-cultural integration has provided a useful framework for researching the integration of migrants, its simplistic categorisation ignores the complexity of the integration process. Table 3.3 draws together the integration frameworks developed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013). In their conceptualisation of integration, Ager and Strang (2008) consider how structures and relationships at the micro-, meso-, and macro-scales can facilitate or impede integration. This includes different types of social connections, cultural practices, language ability, and the migration and citizenship policies implemented in the nation-state that affect the degree of integration possible. Erdal and Oeppen (2013), on the other hand, focus on integration at the micro-scale detailing different markers that can be used when examining the structural and socio-cultural integration of migrants. They argue that by examining the micro-scale, it allows researchers to acknowledge the agency migrants have and how they negotiate the integration process.

**Table 3.3: Dimensions, markers and, structures that facilitate or impede integration**

| Dimensions of integration | | Markers of integration | Structures facilitating or impeding integration |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Socio-cultural** | Emotional | Degree of belonging | Social bridges, bonds, and links<br><br>Language and cultural knowledge<br><br>Visa status, rights, and citizenship |
| | Cultural and religious | Practice of culture and religion | |
| | Social | Ability to develop new social networks/capital | |
| **Structural** | Economic | Access to appropriate employment/income | |
| | | Housing | |
| | | Education | |
| | Political | Opportunities for political participation | |
| | Legal | Possibility of (dual) citizenship and regularised status | |
| | | Perceived measures taken again discrimination | |

*Source: adapted from Ager and Strang (2008, p. 170) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013, p. 876)*

Erdal's (2013) research on Pakistani migrants in Norway found these migrants viewed structural integration as a requirement of living in society and as something they adapted to overtime. In contrast, socio-cultural integration was viewed as a choice and would not impede on their ability to continue living in Norway (Erdal, 2013). Justyna Bell (2016) found that for Polish migrants in Belfast, even though they had gained employment, they struggled to make friends outside the workplace, limiting their degree of socio-cultural integration. In the Australian context, Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) and Rajendran et al. (2017) have looked at the workplace integration of migrants. Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) examined the language proficiency, the experience of discrimination, and education in relation to the employment success of refugees. They found that lack of Australian work experience and inability to provide Australian work references were the most significant barriers to economic integration. While a study by Rajendran et al. (2017) on highly skilled migrants found that learning about Australian culture helped to facilitate workplace integration, yet engagement with work colleagues did not happen outside the workplace.

Research on integration at the meso-scale has looked at the role of employers and/or companies, and community groups play in facilitating integration. In the USA, the role of hometown associations (HTAs) or ethnic associations play in facilitating integration has been readily examined (King & Skeldon, 2010; Lamba-Nieves, 2018; Smyth, 2017; Strunk, 2014). King and Skeldon (2010) explain that these associations provide a setting through which

migrants can speak their native language, exchange news of home, and maintain ties to their home country. Strunk (2014) finds that Bolivian HTAs in Washington DC help to keep Bolivian folklore and cultural traditions alive through performing folkloric dances at religious festivals and local civic parades. This helps foster a sense of solidarity amongst this migrant group and simultaneously aid integration into the destination city (Strunk, 2014). While HTAs or ethnic associations are based on a shared ethnic identity, integration facilitated by the employer seeks to facilitate a migrant's integration into the workplace. van Riemsdijk et al. (2016) found that for managers in Norway, the interview process allowed them to see if potential employees would be a good cultural fit. HR companies also offered Norwegian language lessons to help migrants improve their language ability, which would enable them to communicate more easily with colleagues. Föbker et al.'s (2016) research on transnational companies found that lower language barriers helped to facilitate integration into the company. However, for migrants on a short-term contract, this hindered their broader integration as they did not have time to establish themselves in the host society (Föbker et al., 2016).

While the concepts of assimilation and integration have been useful for understanding how migrants adapt to and become integrated into the destination country, they have been critiqued for their tendency to re-emphasise the nation-state and overlook structural barriers that can impede integration (Erdal, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) have been critical of the tendency of researchers to use the nation-state or macro-scale and, by extension ethnicity, as the natural unit of analysis, which they call methodological nationalism. Under this assumption, migrants are viewed as a threat to the nation-state which is frequently conceptualised as a bounded and nationally distinct social unit, which is the principal organising unit of society (Favell, 2003; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). Dahiden (2016) expands on the critique by Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003), arguing that a focus on ethnicity is not always the most practical unit of analysis as it cannot explain how social process and peoples social practices intersect with other categories such as gender, class, and age. The focus on ethnicity also ignores how pre-existing political, social, and economic issues in the destination country affect the integration of migrants (Korteweg, 2017). Mügge (2016) and Schinkel (2018) have also argued that integration is framed as a matter of individual responsibility and hence viewed as a one-way process. This ignores how actors at the micro-, meso-, and macro-scales interact to shape the integration of migrants

(Mügge, 2016). Föbker et al. (2016) point out that immigration policies dictate the characteristics of a migrant, such as the age, language, education, and skill requirements, to ensure they can integrate economically into the destination country.

To address the shortcoming of these concepts, researchers have proposed alternative ways in which the integration of migrants can be examined. For example, Dahinden (2016) suggests using theories that have been developed outside of migration studies can reduce the emphasis on ethnicity such as 'mobility studies' (see Urry, 2007), which views mobility as a fundamental part of everyday life and considers how mobility is facilitated or constrained by material and immaterial infrastructure. Alternatively, social network analysis considers whole networks, rather than just kinship and family networks, and the role migration and ethnicity play within these networks (Dahinden, 2016). Korteweg (2017) points out that public and policy discourses need to recognise the fact that immigrants are already full members of society in terms of their participation and belonging, and that hence do not need to 'integrate' into society. In moving away from this end-state view of integration, Klarenbeek (2019) and Penninx (2019) both argue that integration needs to be viewed as a two-way process as societies change in response to the integration of immigrants and reduce the emphasis on the nation-state as being homogenous and already integrated. Viewing integration as a two-way process reduces the previous emphasis on using socioeconomic indicators to assess the position of migrants in relation to the host population and whether 'equality' and hence integration had been achieved (Klarenbeek, 2019). Considering these critiques and the proposed alternative ways of research integration, by using the theoretical framework detailed in Section 3.8, this research seeks to consider how the structural and socio-cultural integration of New Zealanders into Australia is influenced and shaped by actors at the micro-, meso-, and macro-scales and the intersections that exist between these.

## 3.5   Transnationalism and citizenship

The migration of people across the globe has challenged how nation-states view and conceptualise citizenship. Citizenship in its most fundamental understanding is viewed as the exclusive connection between an individual and the nation-state, corresponding to legal status, rights, and belonging (Bauböck, 2006; Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad et al., 2008). Before World War I, the movement of people was relatively fluid, and nation-state borders were not clearly controlled or demarcated. Post-World War I nation-states sought to redefine

their borders, population, and national identity at the macro-scale, requiring migrants to get entry permits (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). During this period, it was also assumed that the nation-state was internally homogenous, and a bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and economic space (Brubaker, 2010). This re-defining of the nation-state led to theorists such as Marshall (1950), who conceptualised what a citizen of a nation-state meant. Marshall defined being a citizen as 'a claim to be accepted as a full member of society' in which everyone has equal rights regardless of their social class. For Marshall, equality was important for facilitating a sense of belonging and social cohesion.

While Marshall's theorisation of citizenship has provided a useful starting point for being able to understand what being a citizen of a nation-state should mean, Yuval-Davis (1999) argues that his conceptualisation of citizenship is too simplistic as it ignores how individual subjective and cultural differences intersect with citizenship. Instead, Yuval-Davis (1999) proposes the concept of the 'multi-layered' citizen in which one's citizenship is the collective of different layers and that in addition to class differences, citizenship is gendered, racialised, and heterosexualised, which affects how people participate within a nation-state. Bauböck (2001) also points out that by basing his claims on the British native-born working-class population, Marshall ignores the cultural dimension of citizenship. For Bauböck (2001), this dimension includes the rights of indigenous minorities who have not always received equal rights, and the role language plays in establishing and maintaining a cohesive society. These omissions identified by Yuval-Davis (1999) and Bauböck (2001) highlight how on the one hand, citizenship represents the relationship between an individual and the nation-state, and how markers of difference can constrain full-citizenship.

Despite the limitations of Marshall's theorisation of citizenship if using his interpretation as citizenship as being equal rights, this notion of equal rights becomes disrupted through migration. Brubaker (2010) notes that migration has challenged the assumption that the nation-states internally homogenous and externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and economic space. This disruption has forced nation-states to think about not only how citizenship is constructed and framed but who can obtain citizenship and its associated rights (Bloemraad, 2018; Joppke, 2007). Bloemraad et al. (2008) explain this is shaped by how nation-states view the attainment of citizenship and hence the requirements migrants need to meet to get citizenship. Ethnicity-based citizenship, *jus sanguinis*, is based on obtaining citizenship by descent from parents or grandparents and includes countries such as Austria,

Greece, and Switzerland (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Civic citizenship, *jus soli*, is gained through birth right and includes countries such as Australia, USA, Canada, and France (Bloemraad et al., 2008).

For migrants, obtaining citizenship in the destination country is through the process of naturalisation in which migrants apply to become a citizen. Bloemraad and Sheares (2017) detail that the naturalisation process involves paying the associated fee, providing proof of residence, criminal background check, and in many countries, completing a test to prove they are familiar with the local language, government, history, and social norms. This process allows nation-states to demarcate belongs while simultaneously seeking to ensure the social cohesion of society through language and residency requirements (Joppke, 2007). Ellermann (2020) points out that these naturalisation requirements reflect the shift towards neoliberalism by nation-states since the 1970s in which citizens are viewed as bearers of human capital. This has, therefore, shaped how nation-states view and categorise migrants as those with the most human capital, high-skilled migrants, who can meet the language requirements (Ellermann, 2020). Leaving low-skilled migrants unable to meet these requirements despite contributing economically in addition to socially and culturally to the destination country.

Through demarcating between high- and low-skilled migrants, nation-states can dictate who is eligible to obtain citizenship. For migrants, in addition to their skill and the other markers of difference identified by Yuval-Davis (1999) that intersect with citizenship, their country of origin can influence their ability and decision to naturalise. Castles (2005) explains that there is a disparity between the relative power and rights individuals from particular countries have, which he refers to as the hierarchies of citizenship. In high-tier countries such as the USA, Australia, and countries in the EU, citizens in these countries have a high level of formal rights and international mobility (Castles, 2005; Harpaz, 2019). Whereas those from low-tier countries such as those in Asia, citizens often have less legal and social protections and greater political instability and corruption (Castles, 2005; Harpaz, 2019). Hence for migrants who move from a low-tier to a high-tier country, citizenship from a high-tier country may provide them with increased social security and enhance their mobility internationally (Conway et al., 2008; Erdal, 2016). Leuchter (2014), for example, found that for Israeli migrants, the decision to get a European passport was for enhanced international mobility. Whereas for some migrants, even if naturalisation can offer increased social security and international mobility,

they may be unable to do so because of the citizenship rules in their origin country (Spiro, 2019; Yanasmayan, 2015). Countries such as China, Iran, and Austria do not permit dual-citizenship. They require individuals to renounce their citizenship if they choose to naturalise while countries such as Spain, Pakistan, and Chile only allow the attainment of dual-citizenship with certain countries (Sejersen, 2008).

The decision by many nation-states towards the end of the twentieth-century to permit dual-citizenship was in response to the increasing number of migrants who wanted to affirm their commitment to the destination country while maintaining ties to their origin countries. As discussed above, citizenship has been understood as the exclusive connection between an individual and the nation-state, with migration challenging this (Bloemraad, 2004; Spiro, 2016). The concern for many nation-states, as Leuchter (2014) explains, was that by allowing migrants to be members of two nation-states, it would erode national borders and impact the control the nation-state had over its citizens. However, Bloemraad (2004) and Faist et al. (2004) point out that before the introduction of dual-citizenship, those who renounced their original citizenship demonstrated to their new nation-state that they no longer had ties to their home country and were willing to adapt to a new political environment and be committed and loyal to their new nation-state. While dual-citizenship provides advantages for migrants, Sejersen (2008) observes that some nation-states have permitted dual-citizenship to allow them to better engage with their diaspora. This engagement includes extra-territorial voting rights, government subsidies to encourage return migration, development of quasi-citizenship schemes and policies to facilitate business investments to aid in the country of origins development (Gamlen, 2015; Hickey, 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Margheritis, 2007).

For migrants, the decision to naturalise is influenced by what being a citizen of a country means. Being a migrant denotes an individual with a non-citizen status in which the nation-state dictates what rights that individual has. Brubaker (2010) explains that for migrants, the longer they spend living in the destination country, the more embedded they become, which increases their desire for full membership. Citizenship not only provides them with the security of legal status but recognises the contributions they have made to society and allows individuals to view themselves as equal members of society (Birkvad, 2019; Erdal et al., 2018). However, Leitner and Erkhamp (2006) argue while migrants may conceive citizenship as a prerequisite for economic, social, and political participation, citizenship does not guarantee being treated as an equal member of society. An individual's age, sex, ethnicity, and class can

still act as a marker of difference. Dunn and Ip (2008) found this was the case for Hong-Kong Chinese migrants in Australia who still experienced racism and cultural exclusion despite naturalising, and affected their sense of belonging in Australia.

Citizenship is used by migrants to enhance their sense of belonging in the destination country. This dimension of citizenship, Ho (2009, p. 801) refers to 'emotional citizenship' which can be used as an 'adjective that describes features of citizenship and as a tool of analysis for studying the emotional representations and subjectivities that give rise to the politics of citizenship.' The emotional representations and subjectivities refer to how individuals experience the social world, in particular the meaning they attach to citizenship and the nation-state at the micro-scale including home, belonging, fear, and aversion (Ho, 2009; Jackson, 2016). For migrants developing a sense of belonging in the destination country is established through the micro-scale everyday practices such as knowing where to go shopping or being able to invite friends over, which help to embed a migrant into a particular locale (Erdal et al., 2018; Jackson, 2016; Ralph & Staeheli, 2011). Through this process, migrants form an attachment to the destination country through the social networks they have developed. Liu (2014), for example, found that for Chinese migrants in New Zealand, feelings of home were intrinsically linked to where family and social networks were located as they helped migrants to develop an emotional attachment to a specific place. These emotional attachments contribute to a migrant's decision to naturalise as citizenship can help strengthen feelings of home and belonging (Aptekar, 2016; Erdal et al., 2018). However, Erdal et al. (2018) also note that migrants can still experience feelings of home and belonging without obtaining citizenship.

The legal status and rights citizenship offer also motivates migrants to obtain citizenship. Being a non-citizen means migrants do not have the same rights or protection of legal status as citizens. This difference in rights and legal status contributes to a migrant's decision to naturalise as being a citizen protects them from future-policy changes and deportation (Aptekar, 2016). Seeking citizenship for the rights and legal status it offers Joppke (Joppke, 2019) refers to as instrumental citizenship. Joppke (2019) identifies three forms of instrumental citizenship: 1) citizenship by investment where wealth allows migrants to circumvent the normal residency requirements; 2) obtaining citizenship of an external country through ethnic ties or previous renouncing of citizenship, and 3) EU citizenship which grants holders free mobility across the EU. This instrumental turn, Harpaz and Mateos (2019) also refer to as strategic citizenship where the hierarchies of citizenship Castles (2005) details have

reinforced global inequalities. For those who can pursue a second citizenship, this citizenship has the potential to provide them with economic advantages, increased mobility, and in some instances a higher social status (Harpaz & Mateos, 2019). In nation-states, allowing migrants to gain citizenship through these means shows how citizenship has shifted from representing the exclusive connection between an individual and the nation-states to nation-states actively seeking migrants who have the human capital they desire to remain globally economically competitive (Ellermann, 2020).

This research into citizenship and dual-citizenship has provided useful insights into why migrants choose to naturalise however, a dimension that has been overlooked is why migrants decided not to take up dual-citizenship. This gap in the literature was first highlighted by Bloemraad et al. (2008, p. 168), who stated, 'we need to know more about who choose or reject dual citizenship to understand better the reasons for their choices.' As those who are transnational should embrace dual citizenship (Bloemraad, 2004). Green's (2006) research found that for New Zealanders in Australia, there was ambivalence towards gaining citizenship and that gaining citizenship would make them feel as though they were being disloyal to New Zealand. While Green (2006) provided some insight into this aspect of dual-citizenship, her research did not explicitly examine what factors prevented people from getting dual-citizenship. Aptekar (2016, p. 1160, emphasis in original) observed that this gap remained in the literature, stating further research should look at 'those who are eligible for citizenship but do *not* naturalise.'

## 3.6 Transnationalism and occupation

Inherent to the discussions of transnationalism and migration is the skill or occupation a migrant has. The 'skill' a migrant has is used by the nation-state to regulate who may enter the country and under what conditions. Post-World War II, there were widespread labour shortages, an ageing population, and low fertility rates, which meant many countries, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand altered their immigration policies to address these issues (Hugo, 2006). This meant policies such as White Australia (see Chapter 2) and New Zealand's preference for 'traditional source countries' was abolished, leading to an increase in ethnic diversity as migrants were now coming from Asia (Khoo et al., 2009; Walsh, 2011). By the end of the twentieth-century, many nation-states had implemented various visa categories such as temporary business entry visas, temporary foreign workers programs, and

working holiday maker visas to address growing labour shortages (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Foster, 2012; Khoo et al., 2008). Hugo (2006) suggests that in addition to governments implementing temporary visas categories, cheapening international travel and increased accessibility to technology and information services has made the prospect of working overseas more attainable for many individuals.

While working overseas is now an option for many individuals, the visa categories implemented attract specific types of migrants. Research on transnationalism and occupation has focussed on low-skilled (Elsheshtawy, 2008; Yeoh & Huang, 1998, 1999, 2000; Zontini, 2004; Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012) and high-skilled migrants (Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; Moore, 2016; Portes et al., 2002; Ren & Liu, 2015) and the experiences and opportunities they have in the destination country. Kobayashi (2015) observes that high-skilled migrants are viewed as desirable migrants as they contribute to the knowledge economy and the competitiveness of the country. Immigration policies seek to retain these high-skilled by making it easier for them to become permanent residents or citizens (Ho, 2011; Reilly, 2015; Robertson, 2014). This contrasts with low-skilled workers where becoming a permanent resident is generally not possible, as from the nation-state's view, they do not have skills that contribute to the knowledge economy of the country. Khoo et al. (2009) observe that in Australia, a minimum salary is used to exclude low or unskilled workers, with these individuals often from Asia. Similarly, Kobayashi (2015) found in Singapore, domestic work is classified as 'non-proper' informal work, meaning the Employment Act does not protect these workers. This differing treatment of low and high-skilled workers by the nation-state has implications on how migrants integrate into the destination country and how they live transnationally.

For low-skilled workers, visa policies dictate which occupations are in demand. This has meant across the globe, there has been an increase in the number of migrants employed as health or care workers, domestic workers, hotel or hospitality workers, and construction workers (Elsheshtawy, 2008; Yeoh & Huang, 1998, 1999, 2000; Zontini, 2004). The nature of these jobs has gendered low-skilled migration. Large numbers of women migrate as care or domestic workers hoping to provide a better life for themselves and their children (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). However, these visas are often temporary with restrictive conditions, forcing women to leave their children and husband in the home country (Parreñas, 2001). Being separated from their children can make these women feel like bad mothers and question why they have moved overseas (Zontini, 2004). As often, it can be years before they see their children and

families again (Zontini, 2004). Parreñas (2001) and Yeoh and Huang (2000) point out technology allows these women to mother from a distance and maintain contact with their families. These visa policies, therefore, force low-skilled workers to become transnational as they cannot bring their families with them and have to adapt to raising a family transnationally.

Having a low-skilled occupation can affect the integration of migrants. Migrants often work long and irregular hours, and the temporality of their visa can make forming social networks challenging. This means migrants can become reliant on their transnational networks to provide support (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005). In addition to this, even though migrants earn high wages, they often experience occupational downgrading, which can affect their self-worth (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). For example, Ponds et al. (2016) found that in cities across Europe it was common for taxi drivers to have a Ph.D. as this was the only form of employment they could get. Even though individuals may want to gain a higher-skilled job, their lack of English language proficiency acts as a barrier alongside not having time to retrain to learn new skills (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). These factors work against low-skilled migrants as, without a high-skilled job, these individuals are unable to stay in the destination country permanently as visa requirements stipulate language and skill requirements, therefore actively excluding these workers.

The migration of high-skilled migrants primarily occurs between developed countries. Research has focussed on movements between Europe, North America, and Asian countries such as Singapore (Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; Moore, 2016; Portes et al., 2002; Ren & Liu, 2015), differing from the country flows of low-skilled migrants. In this body of research, economic entrepreneurs have been of particular focus, looking at cities such as New York (Portes et al., 2002) and Singapore (Ren & Liu, 2015). Portes et al. (2002) and Ren and Liu (2015) both emphasise the importance of transnational networks in strengthening business ties between the destination and home country. These ties were maintained through trips home, which involved seeing business contact and family and friends (Ren & Liu, 2015). Föbker et al. (2016) note that for high-skilled migrants trips home are made possible through higher incomes and increased mobility, which is contrary to the experiences of low-skilled migrants.

The mobility of high-skilled migrants is facilitated by their ability to get a different visa once living in the destination country. This visa switching is possible in countries such as England (Ho, 2011) and Australia (Khoo et al., 2008; Robertson, 2011a) who seek to retain high-skilled

migrants. Ho's (2011) research on Singaporeans in London found individuals can capitalise on the opportunities provided by different visas. For example, one individual could transfer from a tourist to a work visa while another individual transferred from a student visa to a WHM and then a work visa (Ho, 2011). These two strategies show how high-skilled migrants can navigate the visa system to their advantage to extend their stay in the destination country. Providing these individuals with opportunities that are not available to low-skilled migrants.

The mobility afforded to high-skilled migrants can affect their integration into the destination country. Föbker et al. (2016) found that for high-skilled migrants in Germany lack of proficiency in the local language made it difficult becoming friends with co-workers. In addition, many felt that they only integrated into a specific part of the city they were living in rather that the wider city and country (Föbker et al., 2016). To address language proficiency concerns, van Riemsdijk et al.'s (2016) research in Norway found some companies offered language classes to help migrants integrate into the work environment and the wider community. However, Föbker et al. (2016) found that even if an individual could speak the local language, many high-skilled migrants felt more comfortable becoming friends with other internationals or those of the same ethnic background. Beaverstock (2011) discusses how expatriate clubs can facilitate the integration of high-skilled migrants into the destination country by looking at British migrants in Singapore. These clubs not only offer reminders of British culture such as food and drink but provide social and recreational support and a setting where social networks with other internationals can be formed (Beaverstock, 2011). These examples demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the integration of high-skilled migrants into the destination country and how actors at the meso-level can play a role in facilitating this integration.

Some scholars have questioned what is meant by high-skilled and who qualifies as high-skilled (Koser & Salt, 1997; Parutis, 2014). Parutis (2014, p. 37) argues that a short-coming of this field of research is 'there is no unanimous and clear definition of what constitutes a highly skilled migrant worker.' A commonly used definition is an individual who holds a university degree or has extensive/equivalent experience in a given field (Iredale, 2001). Koser and Salt (1997), however, contend that defining who is a highly skilled migrant is not as simple as using skill, qualification, or experience. Even though an individual may have a degree, they may be employed in 'low' skilled jobs (Koser & Salt, 1997). This broadness and ambiguity is clear in the *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)* definition of

skill where: 'Skill level is measured operationally by 1) the level or amount of formal education and training; 2) the amount of previous experience in a related occupation; and 3) the amount of on-the-job training required to competently perform the set of tasks required for that occupation' (ABS, 2019). How skill is used in research is therefore subjective and changes between researchers. For example, Ryan et al.'s (2015) research participants happened to hold senior positions in financial institutions, which led her to classify them as high-skilled. In contrast, Föbker et al. (2016) looked at those who held a master's degree, which reflects the European visa regulations. These two interpretations show how the term high-skilled needs to be used with caution, as it does not provide a robust way of examining the skills migrants have.

Those with skilled or semi-skilled jobs have received little attention in migration research. Conradson and Latham (2005) refer to these individuals as 'middling' transnationals, those who are from a middle-class background, tertiary educated, and often work in lower-skilled jobs. This category addresses the shortcomings of using either low or high-skilled, as it acknowledges that not all migrants with degrees are high-skilled migrants. Conradson and Latham (2005) found that New Zealanders in the UK use migration not only to gain work experience but travel around Europe. The desire for career advancement is not the primary migration motive, like that of many high-skilled migrants, but to increase their cultural capital and life experiences (Parutis, 2014). This means individuals are willing to work in hospitality or as a skilled tradesman (Parutis, 2014). Ho and Ley (2014) found that for Chinese returnees from Canada, they were no longer viewed as high-skilled migrants, despite having the initial skills to migrate and the ability to navigate the visa regime. This meant these individuals were excluded from any state or company-sponsored entitlements (Ho & Ley, 2014), despite having a degree, which, as discussed above, is used as a marker of being highly skilled. Ryan et al. (2015) observed that within this group of people, there are considerable differences in disposable income, lifestyle, and life stage, and using the term 'middling' struggles to capture the diversity. Despite this limitation, looking at middling migrants acknowledges that migrants do not neatly fall into the binaries of low- and high-skilled and that new ways of researching migrants in relation to skill need to be considered.

## 3.7   Return migration

Changing circumstances in the home and destination country can facilitate return migration. Cerase (1974) introduced the first typology of return migration, which was based on the observation that large numbers of European migrants who had intended to settle permanently in the USA were returning to their home countries. He identified four types of return migration. 1) Return of failure: migrants return because they cannot adapt to life in the destination country, often because they have families at home. 2) Return of conservatism: once migrants have earned enough money, they return home to buy land or build a house and increase their social standing. 3) Return of innovation: the exposure to new ideas in the destination country causes migrants to return with the belief they will cause social change. 4) Return of retirement: retirement reminds migrants of their emotional attachment to their home country and returning can provide them with greater social security. Expanding on Cerase's (1974) work, King (1978) and Gmelch (1980) recognised migration was temporal and subject to the influence of outside factors that contributed to return migration. King (1978) pointed out that return migration could be forced, planned, or spontaneous. For example, migration may have intended to be permanent, but because of outside factors such as family illness or changes in economic conditions, migrants were forced to return home (Gmelch, 1980). While this initial body of research explained why people returned home, it did not acknowledge the interactions between individuals and the wider conditions of the nation-state and how this can influence return migration. Paparusso and Ambrosetti (2017) suggest that through looking at micro- and macro-scale influences can provide a holistic view of return migration and how an individual's decisions can be viewed in relation to economic, social, and political conditions in the destination and home country.

Views of return migration differ between migration theories. NELM views return migration as an indicator of successful migration (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017). Constant and Massey (2002) point out that from this perspective, migration is generally temporary as migrants return once they have remitted enough earnings or gained sufficient capital. This differs from neoclassical micro- and macro-economic conceptualisations, which view migration as permanent with return migration as a failure to adapt to the destination country. From a microeconomic perspective, the decision to return is based on the migration experience, not producing the initial perceived benefits. (Constant & Massey, 2002). Here the inability to earn a higher wage, lack of proficiency in the local language, discrimination, and limited social

networks contribute to the decision to return home as life in the destination country did not turn out how the individual expected it to (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017). Alternatively, macroeconomics considers return migration to be a result of changes in the GDP or economic conditions in the destination country (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017), which Gmelch (1980) refers to as forced return migration. Unlike NELM and neoclassical economics, transnationalism views return migration as neither a success nor a failure but as part of an individual's migration journey (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005), with friends, family, and transnational networks contributing to the decisions that individuals make.

Using transnationalism to look at return migration highlights how micro- and macro-scale factors contribute to migration decisions. Research has looked at return migration intentions (Carling & Pettersen, 2014; de Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Flahaux, 2017) and the experiences of those who have returned (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Examining return intentions involves looking at what motivations may or may not result in actual return migration (de Haas & Fokkema, 2011). de Haas and Fokkema (2011) found that those who migrated to improve their living conditions or for relational reasons had a higher intention to return. Flahaux (2017) similarly observed those with family in the home country had higher return intentions. Using age to measure return intentions has had differing results. de Haas and Fokkema's (2011) results showed that age had no effect, whereas Paparusso and Ambrosetti (2017) identified that older migrants were more likely to indicate an intention to return. Carling and Pettersen (2014) found there was an inverse relationship between integration and transnationalism on return intentions. Those who were weakly integrated with strong transnational ties had the highest return intention (Carling & Pettersen, 2014; de Haas & Fokkema, 2011). Flahaux (2017) looked at the effect immigration policies in the destination country have on return intentions. Restrictive policies that impeded future entry into the destination country discouraged return migration (Flahaux, 2017). Re-entry would only be possible if the individual became a permanent resident or citizen (Flahaux, 2017). These micro- and macro- factors show the complexity of looking at return intentions, as the possibility of return is influenced by an individual's socio-cultural characteristics and the broader economic and political structures.

Structural factors contribute to a migrant's decision to return home. Challenges gaining employment in the destination country influence the decision to return home (Lee, 2011; Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Ley and Kobayashi (2005) explain more employment opportunities, higher wages, and the prospect of better promotions act as incentives to return home.

However, return work experiences do not always live up to expectations. Lee (2011) points out that having international experience can be an advantage or disadvantage for individuals. Being fluent in English and Korean aided those who work for international companies as it gave them an advantage over other co-workers (Lee, 2011). Whereas for others, being overseas meant they were out of touch with Korean cultural norms or were actively excluded in the workplace because they had not served in the Korean army (Lee, 2011). Visa policies in the destination country also contribute to return decisions. For many individuals, their time in the destination country is dictated by the length of their visa. Lidagrd's (1994, 2001) research on New Zealand returnees from the UK highlighted that visa policies had a direct effect on return migration as the visa only granted them a two-year stay. Many individuals stated that if they had the opportunity to stay longer in the UK they would have (Lidgard, 1994, 2001). These structural factors leave migrants with limited options in the destination country, therefore in effect forcing the migrant to return home.

Socio-cultural factors influence return decisions and experiences. Gmelch (1980) points out that previous trips home, the presence of family members, and a love for the home country contribute to the decision to return home. Being closer to family and not missing out on important events such as marriages, births, and deaths is one of the primary reasons individuals return (Lee, 2011; Lidgard, 1994, 2001; Ní Laoire, 2007). Ní Laoire's (2007) research showed that for individuals realising their parents are getting older and wanting to see younger family members acted as powerful motivators to return. Associated with this was a desire to raise children in the home country as the culture and way of life was perceived to be better for children (Lidgard, 1994, 2001; Ní Laoire, 2007). While the family contributes to the decision to come home, some individuals can struggle to reintegrate. Ní Laoire's (2007) observed that for Irish returnees, some had difficulty making friends and fitting into the community. In contrast, others found it overwhelming as people knew who you were, but you did not know who they were (Ní Laoire, 2007). Lidgard's (1994, 2001) research also found that individuals had to come to terms with there being a disjuncture between the memories they had of New Zealand and what it was like now, which made reintegration harder than anticipated. These socio-cultural factors demonstrate the personal nature of return migration decisions and struggles faced upon return.

As touched on above, immigration policies play a role in return migration. Lidgard (1994, 2001) pointed out for New Zealanders in the UK, once their two-year work visa expired, they had to return home. Similarly, Flahaux (2017) highlighted that the restrictiveness of immigration policies affected return migration decisions. Bedford et al.'s (2003) research on the migration flows between Australia and New Zealand after the 2001 Australian policy found that after this policy change, there was an increase in the number of New Zealand citizens returning from Australia. Those born in the Pacific, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East may have been affected to a greater extent (Bedford et al., 2003). While looking at migration data provides insight into the number of individuals who return, research has not used qualitative data to examine the extent to which policy changes influenced return intentions or decisions, highlighting a gap in the return migration literature.

## 3.8 Theoretical framework for research

Drawing together the existing literature on transnationalism and integration that has been detailed in the previous sections, this research uses the proposed theoretical framework set out in Figure 3.1. To date, none of the existing research has proposed a framework that holistically examines the interlinkages between transnationalism and integration and the different scales and degrees with which they occur. Portes et al. (1999) and Faist (2000) provided frameworks for classifying transnational activities from an economic, political and/or sociocultural lens (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Table 3.3 drew together the conceptual models proposed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013). Ager and Strang (2008) detailed how each marker and means of integration is influenced by citizenship and rights, language and cultural knowledge, and nation-state structures and shapes the degree of integration possible. While Erdal and Oeppen (2013) look specifically at an individual's integration through the socio-cultural and structural dimensions. The theoretical framework used here draws together elements of each of these frameworks to visualise the interlinkages that exist between the structural and socio-cultural dimensions of integration and transnationalism and how integration and transnationalism at the micro-scale are affected by policies and structures at the meso- and macro-scales.

**Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework detailing the multi-scalar and multi-layered inter-relationship between integration and transnationalism**



*Source: constructed by author*

In Figure 3.1, the smaller circles within the destination country and origin country represent the micro-scale. Each of these circles signifies the social, political, economic, and cultural factors that influence the integration of an individual into the destination country, with these same factors in the origin country influencing how transnational ties are maintained. The larger circles represent the destination and origin country in which meso- and macro-factors influence a migrant's integration and transnational practices. In the destination country, aspects such as the language, culture, and dominant ethnic identity influence the degree to which a migrant can become integrated into the destination country. The language, culture, and dominant ethnic identity of the origin country simultaneously influences integration experiences. Alongside these socio-cultural aspects are the social structures in place in the destination country. These include workplace practices and expectations that can differ between the origin and destination country, housing policies, schooling systems, and cultural norms. Overarching these social structures and socio-cultural norms are the immigration policies in place in the destination country. This is represented by the outer circle where at the macro-scale immigration policies and immigration rhetoric are shaped by politics in the

destination and origin countries, global events, and how other countries approach immigration. These broader influences shape the relationships that exist between countries, whether that be due to shared colonial histories or trade deals designed to improve the economies of each country. The arrow shows how integration and transnationalism influence each other.

## 3.9   New Zealanders in Australia

During the 1990s and early 2000s, research primarily focussed on the inflows and outflows of New Zealanders to and from Australia (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Carmichael, 1993; Hugo, 2004a, 2004b, 2015). Of particular focus was the effect of the 2001 policy changes, in which the rights to social security services, disability, sickness, and unemployment benefits, and automatic permanent residency were revoked (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Faulkner, 2013). Hugo (2004a, 2004b) examined the effect this change had on the number of New Zealanders who gained Australian citizenship, as dual-citizenship is available, with 11,007 granted 2000-2001 increasing to 17,334 in 2001-2002. This indicating that the policy change had a direct effect on people's behaviour. However, while there was an increase in the year after the policy changes, McMillan (2014) has argued that at least 60 per cent of New Zealanders who have arrived in Australia after 2001 are unlikely to meet permanent residency requirements. While citizenship may not be possible for many New Zealanders in Australia, Green (2006) and McMillan (2017) have found that New Zealanders have an ambivalence towards gaining Australian citizenship. This ambivalence has meant that New Zealanders have the lowest rate of citizenship applications of any non-Australian born group (Nolan, 2015), despite having reduced rights.

Empirical studies have taken different approaches. Green et al. (2008) examined the transnational practices of New Zealanders, looking specifically at their motivations for moving to Australia and how the length of residence affected transnationalism. Forrest et al. (2009) looked at the residential behaviour of Māori in Sydney to see if they formed ethnic enclaves and also looked at intergenerational changes in occupation. McMillan (2017) has more recently examined the affective integration of New Zealanders into Australia and how even though they felt structurally integrated, they still felt excluded and exploited, wanting to be viewed as valued members of society.

Research on the occupations of New Zealanders depends primarily on secondary data. Birrell and Rapson (2001) and Sanderson (2009) examined the Australian Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) data. Birrell and Rapson (2001) provide an overview of the occupations of New Zealanders who intend to settle permanently in Australia from 1997 to 2000; however, this is not the focus of the research. Sanderson (2009) looked to see if there was a link between occupation and onward mobility, finding that those who were highly skilled made frequent trips. Haig (2010) provides an overview of the occupations of New Zealanders based on 2006 census data, with New Zealanders being overrepresented as Machinery Operators and Drivers, Technicians and Trade Workers, and underrepresented as Managers and Professionals. Empirical research on occupation has been scarce, Forrest et al. (2009) found evidence of an upward shift in occupational status between generations, with there being more skilled and white-collar workers. Green (2006) only used occupation as a way of ensuring that interview-participants came from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds.

## 3.10 Conclusion

Migration theory over the last century has evolved to explain changing migration patterns. These theories based on the migration of individuals from the Global-South to the Global-North have sought to explain a migrant's integration into the destination country and how ties to the origin country are maintained. As discussed, integration is multifaceted and can be examined from an economic, political, or socio-cultural perspective and at different scales. While a migrant's transnational practices are influenced by their visa, economic status, social ties, and political situation in the destination and origin countries. Research on integration and transnationalism has tended to focus on low-skilled, and high-skilled migrants as their ability to migrate are dictated by the visas available due to labour shortages in the destination country. This has meant that those who are considered middling migrants have often been overlooked in migration research. To address this gap, this research will use New Zealanders living in Australia as an example of middling migrants to explore their integration into Australia and transnational practices. It will also build on the existing literature on New Zealanders living in Australia through an examination of how visa status affects citizenship attainment and hence political integration.

# CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

## 4.1   Introduction

This chapter details the research design and methods used in this research. To understand the migration experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia, a sequential mixed-methods approach is adopted through the implementation of an online survey and semi-structured interviews. The chapter begins by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of mixed-methodology and what data collection methods have been used in migration research. Following this, the research methods and research design and sampling strategy are explained. The chapter then details how the survey and interviews were implemented and the data analysed. The last section provides a demographic overview of the survey respondents.

## 4.2   Theoretical framework and mixed-methodology

The production of knowledge and our understanding of reality can be understood from a positivist or realist perspective. Keat and Urry (1975, p. 3) explain that a positivist attempts to:

> *'Gain predictive and explanatory knowledge of the external world. To do this, one must construct theories which consist of highly general statements, expressing the regular relationships that are found to exist in the world.'*

This means empirical research is conducted to test, verify, or falsify established principles and theories (Danermark et al., 2001). Whereas for a realist:

> *'A scientific theory is a description of structures and mechanisms which causally generate the observable phenomena, a description which enables us to explain them.' (Keat & Urry, 1975, p. 3)*

From this perspective, questions are asked about the underlying structures and mechanisms and involves questioning why something occurs in order to explain social events (Keat & Urry, 1975). Extending the realist perspective is critical realism, which views reality as stratified into three levels: the empirical, actual, and real (Fletcher, 2017). The empirical is the everyday lived experience; the actual is the non-filtered human experience, while the real is the causal structures and mechanisms that construct the experiences at the empirical level (Fletcher, 2017). For social scientists, the questions or problems being examined are guided by theory, which differs from the positivist perspective, which is determined by theory. In this research,

a critical realist view is adopted as it utilises the theories detailed in Chapter 3 to understand the interactions between the structures in place and individuals' lived experiences.

This research uses a mixed-methods research design which:

> *'Involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research.' (Creswell et al., 2003, p. 213)*

Mixed-methods research approaches are being encouraged by researchers as they 'minimise the risk of generating erroneous findings… and allow a broader range of issues to be addressed' (Philip, 1998, p. 271). Quantitative data seeks to obtain results that are reliable, valid, and generalisable if using accepted collection and analysis methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This data is often collected through questionnaires that commonly use close-ended questions and ranking scales that can classify people and gather information on their behaviours, attitudes, and beliefs (Parfitt, 2005). Valentine (2005) argues that the rigid nature of questionnaires forces individuals to tick the box they feel best applies to them, meaning results obtained may not be truly representative of an individual's beliefs. Qualitative data, on the other hand, seeks to gain insight into an individual's feelings and attitudes (Flowerdew & Martin, 2005). Interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic studies allow researchers to consider the 'meanings people attribute to their lives and the processes which operate in particular social contexts' (Valentine, 2005, p. 111), providing detailed information on the topic of interest. Mixed-methods bridges the gap between research being exclusively viewed as quantitative or qualitative.

Taking a mixed-methods approach addresses the limitations associated with qualitative and quantitative research methods (Greene & Caracelli, 1997). It allows the researcher to use different data sources and draw on diverse perspectives throughout the research (Valentine, 2005). In population geography, McKendrick (1999) identified eight goals of multi-method research. Of particular relevance to this research are two goals that relate to the triangulation of data (McKendrick, 1999). Here mixed-methods are used to address different parts of the same research question and strengthen conclusions made (McKendrick, 1999). Denzin (1989) contends triangulation can occur with data, investigators, theories, and methods. Data triangulation through the use of different sources (Denzin, 1989) validates the findings by identifying any potential biases in the data (Horvath, 2012). In this research, triangulation is

achieved using secondary data sources (quantitative) which provide the contextual understanding through which the primary data are investigated. Using multiple data sources facilitates the cross-referencing of data, which aids in ensuring the validity and quality of the primary data collected, which cannot be used to make generalisations about the wider population.

Denzin (1989) identified that triangulation could occur 'within-methods' and 'between-methods.' Within-method triangulation involves using one method and using multiple strategies to examine the data (Denzin, 1989). For example, including open-ended questions in a questionnaire (Creswell et al., 2003). Alternatively, between-method is the use of dissimilar research methods to overcome the limitations associated with using only one method (Denzin, 1989), producing comparable and in-depth data (Castles, 2012). The McKendrick (1999) multi-method models apply to this research use 'between-data' methods of triangulation. The first model uses multiple methods to, 'strengthen a research conclusion with supporting evidence derived from an independent and different approach' (McKendrick, 1999, pp. 42–43).

While the second model uses multiple methods to 'address different aspects of the same research question' (McKendrick, 1999, p. 43), for example conducting follow-up in-depth interviews after a questionnaire to gain a deeper insight into the experiences being addressed. In this research, within and between-methods of data triangulation are used to address the research aim and objectives. Using qualitative and quantitative primary data sources highlight the complex nature of migration experiences, which cannot be uncovered through the analysis of secondary data sources alone (Graham, 1999). Triangulating the data in this manner strengthens the conclusions that can be made in the research as per McKendrick's (1999) first model. Within the current research, triangulation occurred in the survey where a mixture of closed and open-ended questionnaires was used. This was followed up by in-depth interviews reflecting McKendrick's (1999) second model, which provided a setting through which a comprehensive insight into the themes being addressed by the survey was explored.

## 4.3   Methods in migration research

Research on transnationalism, integration, and migration has primarily been conducted using quantitative data. Quantitative data collection has dominated this area of research through the use of large-scale surveys, including national censuses (Castles, 2012). However, Boccagni (2012) indicates that amongst surveys by Portes (2003), Snel et al. (2006), and Waldinger (2008), there is no consensus on appropriate indicators of transnationalism nor on how to operationalise them. For example, to examine socio-cultural transnationalism, Snel et al. (2006) ask questions relating to return visits to the home country, frequency of contact with family, and membership of social organisations in hometown, whereas Portes et al. (2002) ask questions on whether individuals give money to community organisations in their hometown or are members of hometown associations. The differences between what is asked in relation to not only socio-cultural but also economic and political transnational practices produce a vast array of findings that are not readily comparable. Similarly, the use of national data such as censuses or arrivals and departures data can be problematic because of different definitions and categories (Castles, 2012). Such as the Australian census categorising people by country of birth while arrivals and departures data use both citizenship and country of birth.

Qualitative data collection through interviews and ethnographic research has increasingly been used in migration studies (Aptekar, 2016; J. Bell, 2016; Erdal, 2013; Koh, 2015). It provides insight into the processes of identity construction through understanding the relevance of connections to the home country for an individual (Boccagni, 2012). This dominance of single method studies in migration research has led to a call by researchers to employ mixed-methodology and methods (Boccagni, 2012; Castles, 2012; Philip, 1998). Castles (2012, p. 87) argues that:

> *'Quantitative research is important for obtaining comparative data to describe macro-social changes linked to migration. At the same time, 'qualitative approaches' are needed to provide understanding both of individual and community- level social action, and of the history and cultures of sending, transit and receiving societies.'*

Using mixed-methods allows researchers to place migration within the context of macro structures that shape the mobility that is possible across socio-spatial levels (Castles, 2012).

## 4.4 Research methods

Traditionally surveys were completed over the phone, by mail, or face-to-face. Changes in technology have increasingly seen surveys become administered online. Online surveys are cost effective as they do not need to be mailed, nor does the researcher have to spend time on the street going from door to door to get responses (Wright, 2005). This makes them time-efficient, as they can be easily administered and provides real-time responses. Using a platform such as SurveyMonkey means the data can be easily exported into Excel or SPSS with the responses pre-coded, which reduces the time spent cleaning and coding the data. Online surveys also provide potential respondents with the opportunity to complete the survey at a time convenient for them and in the privacy of their own homes (Rea & Parker, 2005).

Another advantage of online surveys is that they provide the researcher with flexibility, especially when a non-probability sampling strategy is employed. As the survey is URL based, it means it can be easily distributed through a range of platforms and allows respondents to share it with their networks easily. This increases the potential reach of the survey and the diversity of survey respondents. Online surveys also provide flexibility as they allow for multiple-question formats, including multiple-choice, dichotomous 'Yes/No' questions, rank order, and open-ended questions. Functions such as skip-logic can also be employed where the response to one question will dictate which questions respondents should answer next. For example, if they indicate they are an Australian citizen, they then do not need to answer questions on their visa status in Australia. This provides respondents with a smoother user experience and ensures they only answer questions that apply to their situation and can reduce the time taken to complete the survey.

A drawback of online surveys is that they rely on potential respondents having access to the internet. Access to the internet requires having a computer or, more recently a smartphone. In Australia, 91 per cent of Australians have a smartphone, with more people now using a smartphone to shop online than a desktop computer (Deloitte, 2019). This introduces bias as it privileges those who can afford a computer or smartphone and the internet. It also assumes that respondents have a minimum level of computer or smartphone literacy and hence are comfortable using it and completing a survey online. Social media has also changed how people engage and share information with an estimated 17.1 million Facebook users over the age of 14 in Australia in 2019, increasing from 12.9 million in 2015 (Roy Morgan, 2019). While

amongst the New Zealand born population in Australia, 86 per cent have access to the internet at home (ABS, 2016).

Other disadvantages of online research include sampling and representativeness, impersonal contact, and, as mentioned, bias towards those who are computer literate. As the survey was distributed and shared through different social media platforms and pages targeting New Zealanders living in Australia, the researcher had limited control over who completed the survey and the response rate. This means respondents completed the survey based on their self-assessment on whether they met the eligibility requirements. The impersonal nature of an online survey meant respondents could not ask questions or have unclear questions explained to them (Rea & Parker, 2005). To minimise this, the researcher provided their email address, so respondents had the opportunity to ask questions they had, or in one instance, to seek clarification on the eligibility requirements. The last section of the survey asked those wanting to take part in a face-to-face interview to provide their contact details and provide respondents with the opportunity to put a face to the researcher.

Semi-structured interviews provide qualitative data that complement the quantitative data collected in the questionnaires. This method of data collection involves having a list of questions or themes that will be covered throughout the interview. The interview is conducted in a conversational manner, which allows the researcher to listen to and respond to what the interview participants have said (Longhurst, 2009). It also allows interviewees to ask the researcher questions they may have (Philipp & Ho, 2010). Through this back-and-forth dialogue, it allows the researcher to maximise the information gained from the interview (Cloke, 2004). Valentine (2005) suggests a limitation of this conversational style is the order themes are discussed has the potential to change, meaning the researcher needs to ensure themes are not missed while maintaining the conversational nature of the interview.

## 4.5   Research design

As explained, to understand the migration experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia, a sequential mixed-methods approach was employed. This involved the quantitative data collection occurring first in the form of an online survey followed by qualitative semi-structured interviews (Creswell et al., 2003; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).

The sections and questions in the New Zealanders living in Australia survey (attached as Appendix 1) were developed based on the theoretical framework detailed in Figure 3.1 and the literature reviewed in Chapter 3. Using this framework, the survey was structured into two sections to reflect the theoretical concepts of transnationalism and integration that underpin the thesis. The survey comprised of 22 sections and asked 103 questions. Respondents did not necessarily answer all questions as skip-logic functions were used, as detailed in Section 4.4. Alternatively, some questions may not have been relevant to their situation.

The survey began by asking questions about where they lived in Australia and internal migration. Sections two to nine focussed on their social, cultural, political, and economic transnational practices, and their motivations for moving to Australia. Sections ten to 20 asked questions in relation to respondents socio-cultural and structural integration into Australia with questions relating to their labour market experiences, changes in housing status and situation since living in Australia, the formation of social networks, and visa status and citizenship. Section 21 focussed on return migration intentions with section 22 ending the survey with a series of demographic questions and the opportunity for respondents to provide any additional comments. Respondents wanting to participate in an interview were asked to provide their contact details. By structuring the survey in this way, it meant questions that were easy to answer were placed towards the beginning with more sensitive topics such as income placed towards the middle. Ending the survey with demographic questions meant respondents could quickly answer these questions, as they did not have to put too much thought into their responses.

The interview guide for the semi-structured interviews was again based on the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 3.1 and the questions included in the survey (attached as Appendix 6). As this stage of the research occurred after the survey, it provided the researcher with the opportunity to discuss in-depth some issues that were raised in the open-ended questions in the survey.

## 4.6   Sampling

Given the geographic spread and the unavailability of public lists of where New Zealanders in Australia live, it was not possible to use a probability sampling strategy, and so non-probability strategies were used to conduct the questionnaire and interviews. Purposive sampling is when the researcher knows the characteristics of the population they wish to research and seeks to

find people with those characteristics (Hibberts et al., 2012; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). These people have information that will aid the researcher in answering the research aim and objectives. A second sampling technique was employed to gain research participants: Snowballing. Snowballing is a standard method used extensively in geographic and migration research (Green et al., 2008; Ho, 2009; McMillan, 2017; Ryan et al., 2015; Yeoh & Willis, 2005). It involves researchers asking research participants to pass on information about the research to other individuals who are in the same category of interest (Cloke, 2004). In doing so, it can overcome one of the biggest barriers to participant recruitment, which is gaining the trust of the interview participants (Valentine, 2005). In this research, participants were asked to forward the survey to people they knew who met the selection criteria, which aided in gaining respondents who would not have found out about the research through the other recruitment strategies. Scott (2004) points out that snowballing needs to be used with some caution, as it can lead to an over-representation of certain groups of people. Using personal networks and informal gateways or targeting people based on age or gender can aid in trying to achieve a representative and diverse sample (Ryan et al., 2015; Scott, 2004).

The nature of non-probability sampling means the sample is not representative of all New Zealanders in Australia, meaning generalisations cannot be made about this population. Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005, p. 906) point out:

> 'There is no known universe of transnational immigrants from which to draw a representative sample. Hence we cannot generalize the results of our analysis. Yet what we lose in generalisability we gain in an in-depth exploration of the relationship between incorporation, transnationalism, and gender.'

The strength of the information gained from the sample is from the depth of the information provided, allowing insight into the experiences of New Zealanders in Australia to be achieved.

As survey distribution was uncontrolled, it is difficult to address the issue of response rate. This is because the survey was not sent to a specified number of people, as this was not possible. Instead, gaining responses was based on distribution, which was not controlled by the researcher. The reach of the Facebook advertisements discussed in the next section provides an indication of how many people were targeted and the number who subsequently clicked on the link.

## 4.7   Data collection

### 4.7.1   Online survey

The survey was conducted online and created using SurveyMonkey. Weblinks generated by the software were used to disseminate the survey. Multiple strategies were used to distribute the survey. First, organisations aimed at New Zealanders living in Australia were emailed, messaged through Facebook, or enquiries lodged on their website, asking them to distribute the survey on their social media pages (see attached Appendix 2). These organisations and Facebook groups were contacted based on their reach through the number of 'likes,' see Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1: Details of groups and pages contacted**

| Group | | Number of 'likes' on Facebook |
|---|---|---|
| OzKiwi | National advocacy group for New Zealanders in Australia | 47,000 |
| Māori Wardens Victoria | An organisation that helps Māori living in Victoria | 5,400 |
| Iwi n Aus | Have Facebook page and website, focussed on highlighting issues faced by New Zealanders | 14,700 |
| Kiwis in Australia | Online Facebook page | 22,390 |

The second strategy used was paid for Facebook advertisements. A *Facebook* page was created, which provided information about the research and a link to the survey. Three advertisements were run to target those who had not 'liked' any of the groups listed in Table 4.1. The first advertisement ran from 25 July 2018 to 1 August 2018, targeting those who indicated they now lived in Australia, were aged 18-65+, and previously lived in New Zealand, and had 'liked' *the All Blacks*, www.*nzherald.co.nz* and www.*stuff.co.nz*. This ad reached 5,644 people, with 730 people clicking on the link. A second advertisement ran from 6 August 2018 to 12 August 2018 with this advertisement only targeting those who had indicated they had lived in New Zealand and were now living in Australia, reaching 6,114 individuals and resulting in 718 link clicks. A final ad ran from 11 October 2018 to 16 October 2018 with the same target criteria as advertisement two, reaching 3,015 and had 438 link clicks.

The final strategies used to disseminate the survey were personal networks and snowballing. Survey participants were asked to share and forward the survey link to any other New Zealanders they knew living in Australia.

From using these different strategies, 2040 survey responses were obtained, however, because completion of the survey was based on self-selection, each question did not have a response rate of 100 per cent. Item nonresponse was due to several factors. First, the design of the survey included skip-logic functions and questions that only required answering based on their answer to a previous question meaning not every question applied to each respondent. Second, respondents may choose not to answer questions based on the topics they feel uncomfortable answering. Gallagher (2004) note that this is common for questions on income and can be mitigated using income ranges to help increase the item response rate. In the New Zealanders living in Australia survey, the income question has a response rate of 84 per cent (n=1713). The final factor affecting item nonresponse were respondents who began the survey but stopped partway through or skipped sections of the survey. For example, the question 'Had you previously travelled to Australia before moving here' which was toward the beginning of the survey, had a response rate of 96.2 per cent (n=1963), while the question 'Do you think you will return permanently to New Zealand in the future?' in section 21 of the survey had a response rate of 80.1 per cent (n=1634). Based on the item response rates, the results of the survey are reliable and as a non-probability sampling strategy was used, the results are not generalisable to the broader New Zealand population in Australia.

Over the period the survey was live, Australia was in the process of leadership change, having another leadership spill. At the beginning of 2018, Malcolm Turnball was Prime Minister. By August, current Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Peter Dutton were both vying to be the leader of the Liberal Party. While Scott Morrison defeated Peter Dutton 45-40 points to become the leader (Madden, 2020), the prospect of Peter Dutton as Prime Minister was cause for concern for New Zealanders living in Australia. This was because shortly after the amendments were made to Sections 501 and 116 of the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014, then Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott replaced Scott Morrison, who was the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection with Peter Dutton taking over the portfolio in December 2014. Consequently, Peter Dutton was viewed as being responsible for the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia. As detailed in Chapters 1 and 2, this has adversely affected New Zealanders living in Australia and the political relationship between the two countries. This political turmoil at the time the data was being collected may have influenced the responses given by respondents.

### 4.7.2 Face-to-face interviews

Twenty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with New Zealanders in cities across Australia. Interview participants were primarily recruited through the questionnaire on New Zealanders in Australia and were conducted in the researcher's home state of South Australia, and the cities of Melbourne in Victoria and the Gold Coast and Brisbane in Queensland. The rationale for selecting Melbourne was it had the most significant increase in the New Zealand-born population among all capital cities between the 2011 and 2016 census, increasing 15 per cent from 67,042 to 78,904 (ABS, 2011, 2016). The Gold Coast and Brisbane were selected as another fieldwork site, as this is the state with the largest number of New Zealanders. The 2016 census identified that a typical migrant in Queensland is a 44-year-old female New Zealander (ABS, 2016). This differs from all other states where the typical migrant is from England (ABS, 2016).

Potential participants were selected based on their occupation, visa status, if they had obtained Australian citizenship or whether they were considering getting it. These criteria were used to capture a range of migrant experiences. Potential participants were then emailed to see if they were still interested in participating in a face-to-face interview along with a participant information sheet, which provided more information about the research (see attached Appendix 3 and Appendix 5). The interviews occurred in a public place such as a library, meeting room, or café to ensure that the interviewee was at ease and also the safety of the researcher. (see attached Appendix 4). Interviews generally began with respondents discussing their background- where they grew up, what life was like for them growing up, and what led to their decision to move to Australia. This was followed by a discussion on their experience of life in Australia - how they found settling here, their experience of making friends and gaining employment, visa status, citizenship, and treatment of New Zealanders living in Australia. Their maintenance of ties to New Zealand was also discussed, return migration intentions, and how they would describe their overall experience of living in Australia. Before the interview, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form, which asked for their permission for the interview to be audio-recorded (see attached Appendix 4). The interviews ranged from 30 to 90 minutes and were transcribed as soon as possible.

### 4.7.3   Secondary data

Secondary data sources are used to complement the primary data collected. In this research, a range of secondary data sources were used. The Australian population census provides a stock of the population in relation to a wide range of characteristics. These characteristics include occupation, income, housing, education, and country of birth, which can be used to provide a comprehensive insight into migrant groups in Australia. This study includes data from the 2016 census. Overseas arrivals and departures information collected by the Department of Home Affairs (previously Department of Immigration and Border Protection) provides information on the movement of people to Australia from different countries and the movement of people from Australia to different countries. Accompanying the secondary data sources from Australia are those from New Zealand. Statistics New Zealand provides data on the arrivals and departures of New Zealanders, including those who have returned to New Zealand after living permanently in Australia. The statistical data used from both countries is critical for indicating the scale of migration between the two countries. Importantly it provides a profile of New Zealanders in Australia through which specific aspects can be researched further through primary data collection.

### 4.8   Data analysis

Data analysis and treatment occurred over several stages. As survey data was collected using SurveyMonkey responses were automatically numerically coded, which is the advantage of using this software. The data was downloaded to Excel for cleaning and then uploaded into SPSS Statistics 25 for analysis. Once working with the data in SPSS, some variables were recoded to aid data analysis. For example, respondents were asked what year they arrived in Australia, and this was recoded into year groups to see if any differences emerged based on when they arrived in Australia. Descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations were the primary forms of statistical analysis used.

The open-ended questions in the survey were analysed using Nvivo 11 through manual text analysis. Here each response was coded into the corresponding theme. These themes emerged as responses were being coded with some responses falling into multiple themes. For example, some of the themes that emerged from the analysis of the reasons why respondents had not obtained Australian citizenship were cost, eligibility requirements, time and difficulty of application process, New Zealand identity. The themes generated through

this process were then used to structure Chapters 5,6, and 7. The interviews were used to expand on the themes discussed in these chapters.

## 4.9   Overview of the interview participants and the survey population

The characteristics of the twenty-one interview participants are detailed in Table 4.2. Interview participants had moved to Australia since the 2001 policy change, with 2003 being the earliest arrival and 2017 the most recent arrival. Three of the interviewees had obtained Australian citizenship, three held permanent residency, one was on a New Zealand Citizen Family Relationship Visa Subclass 461 and the rest were SCV 444 visa holders. Interviewees worked in occupations with different ANZSCO occupation skill levels which revealed different experiences of gaining employment in Australia.

**Table 4.2: Characteristics of interview participants**

| Gender | Location | Occupation | Year of arrival | Visa held | View on becoming an Australian citizen | Age |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M | Gold Coast | Land Use Investigation Officer | 2005 | Australian citizen | | 60-64 |
| Couple | Gold Coast | Retired | 2005 | SCV 444 | No intention of applying | 65+ |
| F | Gold Coast | Teacher | 2006 | SCV 444 | Ineligible | 55-60 |
| M | Gold Coast | Mechanic | 2005 | SCV 444 | Told ineligible | 55-59 |
| F | Gold Coast | Security Guard | 2004 | SCV 444 | No pathway available | 45-49 |
| F | Marsden | Youth Support Worker | 2012 | SCV 444 | No intention of applying | 50-54 |
| F | Brisbane | Business Manager | 2004 | 189 visa | Will apply once eligible | 45-49 |
| M | Brisbane | Business Development Manger | 2006 | Australian citizen | | 50-54 |
| M | Alexandra Hills | Dozer Miner | 2010 | SCV 444 | Considering applying | 45-49 |
| F | Melbourne | Student Engagement Coordinator | 2014 | SCV 444 | Has not lived here long enough | 40-44 |
| M | Melbourne | Cardiologist | unknown | PR | In process of applying | 35-39 |
| M | Melbourne | Teaching/ Research Associate | 2012 | SCV 444 | Income too low | 30-34 |
| M | Melbourne | Procurement Director. | 2010 | SCV 444 | Cost prohibitive | 45-49 |
| M | Melbourne | Commissioning Editor | 2002 | SCV 444 | In PR process | 40-44 |
| Couple | Melbourne | Sessional lecturer/ Tutor and Librarian | 2011 | Subclass 461 visa/SCV 444 | No pathway available | 40-44 |
| F | Melbourne | Communications Manager | 2004 | SCV 444 | No pathway available | 40-44 |
| M | Melbourne | Software Developer | 2003 | RRV | In process of applying | 40-44 |
| F | Adelaide | Psychologist | 2011 | SCV 444 | Do not meet criteria | 35-39 |
| F | Adelaide | Nurse | 2015 | SCV 444 | Has not lived here long enough | 40-44 |
| F | Port Noarlunga South | Cleaner | 2017 | SCV 444 | Has not lived here long enough | 45-49 |
| F | Adelaide | Remedial Massage Therapist/student | 2013 | Australian citizen | | 25-29 |

Table 4.3 shows that between the survey population and the New Zealand-born census population aged 18 years and over, there was a similar population distribution across states. Amongst the survey population, a higher proportion was living in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria compared to the 2016 Australian census.

**Table 4.3: Survey and 2016 New Zealand-born census population 18 years and over, by the state of residence**

|  | QLD | NSW | VIC | SA | TAS | WA | NT | ACT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey (%)** | 37.5 | 19.2 | 21.3 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 14.0 | 1.4 | 2.2 |
| **Census (%)** | 38.7 | 23.0 | 17.4 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 15.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 |

*Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=2016*

Table 4.4 details the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents and compares some of these characteristics to the New Zealand-born census population aged 18 years and over. The median age of survey respondents was 46.6 years, which was slightly higher than the census population, which was 44.4 years. This higher median age can be attributed to the over-representation of those aged 50-59 and underrepresentation of those aged 20-29. There was a gender bias, with just under three-quarters of the survey respondents identifying as female. Just under half were married (49.8 per cent), which was slightly higher than the census population (45.0 per cent), but the same proportion was separated. The higher proportion of females completing the survey could be attributed to self-selection bias as they may have more time available to complete the survey because of their employment status and/or caregiving responsibilities.

Most respondents were born in New Zealand (90.1 per cent), with 3.5 per cent born in the UK. Other countries of birth included India, Canada, Philippines, South Africa, China, Germany, and Malaysia and accounted for those who indicated they identified as an 'other' ethnicity. From the first ancestry response in the 2016 census, 1.4 per cent of the New Zealand-born population identified as Chinese, 1.0 per cent as German, 0.85 per cent as Indian, 0.2 per cent as Filipino, 0.13 per cent South Africa, and 0.02 per cent identifying as Canadian or Malay (ABS, 2016). Three-quarters of female respondents had children. Of these respondents, 10.5 per cent had children born in both New Zealand and Australia. Two-thirds of the survey population arrived in Australia post-2001, while amongst the census population, just over half had arrived in Australia pre-2001.

**Table 4.4: Demographic characteristics of survey respondents and 2016 New Zealand-born census population 18 years and over**

| | | Male | Female | Total | Census |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Gender** | Male | | | 27.4 | 50.3 |
| | Female | | | 72.6 | 49.7 |
| **Age (%)** | 18-19 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 2.7 |
| | 20-29 | 8.0 | 5.5 | 6.2 | 16.9 |
| | 30-39 | 21.1 | 22.3 | 22.0 | 19.8 |
| | 40-49 | 29.1 | 28.5 | 28.8 | 21.7 |
| | 50-59 | 22.0 | 26.5 | 25.2 | 9.62 |
| | 60-64 | 9.8 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 7.7 |
| | 65+ | 8.9 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 13.67 |
| **Country of birth (%)** | New Zealand | 86.1 | 91.6 | 90.1 | |
| | Australia | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | |
| | UK | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.7 | |
| | Pacific Islands | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | |
| | Europe | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 | |
| | North America | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.5 | |
| | SE and NE Asia | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.3 | |
| | Southern Asia | 2.5 | 0.4 | 1.0 | |
| | South Africa | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | |
| | Other | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.4 | |
| **Ethnicity (%)** | Pākehā/NZ European | 81.0 | 75.6 | 77.1 | |
| | Māori | 7.1 | 15.0 | 12.9 | 9.2 |
| | Pacific Islander | 0.9 | 2.9 | 2.4 | |
| | Māori/ Pākehā | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.7 | |
| | Other | 10.3 | 4.4 | 6.0 | |
| **Marital status (%)** | Never married | 18.1 | 13.8 | 14.9 | 37.0 |
| | De facto relationship | 20.0 | 18.7 | 19.0 | 17.6 |
| | Married | 52.1 | 48.9 | 49.8 | 45.0 |
| | Separated | 2.5 | 4.8 | 4.2 | 4.2 |
| | Divorced | 5.5 | 10.7 | 9.3 | 10.4 |
| | Widowed | 1.8 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| **Children (%)** | Yes | 63.9 | 75.0 | 72.0 | |
| | No | 36.1 | 25.0 | 28.0 | |
| **Country children were born in (%)** | New Zealand | 46.3 | 56.5 | 53.9 | |
| | Australia | 39.0 | 26.8 | 29.8 | |
| | Both | 6.6 | 10.5 | 9.5 | |
| | Other | 8.0 | 6.3 | 6.8 | |
| **Year of arrival (%)** | Pre-2000 | 24.3 | 23.3 | 23.5 | 51.0 |
| | 2001-2015 | 70.4 | 71.3 | 71.1 | 43.7.0 |
| | 2016-2018 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 1.3* |

*Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Age n1 male=440, n1 female=1164, n1 total=1606; Country of birth n2 male= 432, n2 female=1131, n2 total=1565; Ethnicity n3 male=437, n3 female= 1164, n3 total= 1603; Marital status n4 male= 436, n4 female= 1161, n4 total= 1599; Children n5 male=432, n5 female= 1153, n5 total=1587; Country child born n6 male=432, n6 female= 1153, n6 total= 1587; Year of arrival n7 male=425, n7 female=1153; n7 total=1580*

*\*arrived between 1 January and 9 August 2016*

## Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the methodological and research strategies that will be used to collect data on New Zealanders living in Australia. A sequential mixed-methods approach addresses the limitations associated with quantitative and qualitative data collection. Using multiple data collection strategies provides different perspectives and strengthens the conclusions made. The data collected in the survey and interviews provide insight into the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. As a non-probability sampling strategy was used, these results are not generalisable to the broader New Zealand population in Australia. Secondary statistical data from Australia and New Zealand is used for context and comparison. The following three chapters detail the results obtained from the survey and interviews.

# CHAPTER 5: MIGRATION MOTIVATION, LINKAGES, AND RETURN INTENTIONS TO NEW ZEALAND

## 5.1   Introduction

This chapter explores respondents' motivations for moving to Australia, their transnational practices, and return intentions. The first section looks at the factors that contributed to respondents' decision to migrate and who they migrated with. Using the concept of transnationalism defined as 'the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' (Basch et al., 1994, p. 6), section two examines how respondents maintain social, political, economic, and cultural ties with New Zealand. The last section explores respondents' return intentions, highlighting the factors that keep them in Australia and the factors that would make them return to New Zealand.

The results show that respondents' motivations to migrate to Australia are linked to why they would not return to New Zealand. The low wages and high cost of living in New Zealand made Australia an attractive destination, as respondents perceived there to be more employment opportunities available in Australia. The results also show that respondents have weak economic and political ties and strong social and cultural ties to New Zealand. However, while respondents' ties can be classified as being transnational because of the crossing of national borders, their social and economic ties are more reflective of long-distance internal migration. This is because geographic proximity, visa conditions, and cultural and familial expectations play a role in how respondents maintain ties to New Zealand.

## 5.2   Motivations to move to Australia

The decision to migrate is complex, influenced by economic opportunities, social networks, politics, visa requirements, geographic proximity, and previous travel experiences. Table 5.1 summarises respondents' motivation to move to Australia with employment opportunities, higher income, lifestyle, and the weather as the main driving forces.

**Table 5.1 Respondents' motivation to move to Australia, ties to Australia, and whom they migrated with**

| | | Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Motivation to migrate* (%)** | Employment opportunities | 55.7 | 47.3 | 47.4 |
| | Higher income | 48.0 | 37.7 | 38.3 |
| | Lifestyle | 40.2 | 39.3 | 37.2 |
| | Weather | 35.0 | 34.7 | 31.9 |
| | Friends and/or family living in Australia | 17.7 | 26.2 | 22.4 |
| | Job offer | 27.3 | 21.1 | 21.3 |
| | Desire to go abroad | 24.1 | 19.5 | 20.2 |
| | Spouse partner | 14.1 | 19.2 | 16.8 |
| | Move with family | 12.3 | 15.3 | 15.1 |
| | No visa application | 21.1 | 14.0 | 14.8 |
| | Similar to New Zealand | 19.5 | 13.8 | 14.0 |
| | Education | 8.2 | 7.6 | 7.1 |
| | Reunion with parents and/or children | 3.4 | 5.0 | 4.2 |
| **Who respondents knew living in Australia* (%)** | Knew no one | 21.1 | 16.0 | 17.5 |
| | Spouse/partner | 2.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| | Child/ren | 2.7 | 7.7 | 6.0 |
| | Parent(s) | 7.7 | 10.6 | 9.4 |
| | Sibling(s) | 16.8 | 22.9 | 21.2 |
| | Cousin(s) | 20.0 | 22.0 | 21.0 |
| | Other relative(s) | 23.9 | 28.0 | 27.8 |
| | Colleagues(s) | 9.1 | 5.7 | 5.8 |
| | Friend(s) | 51.4 | 41.9 | 42.6 |
| | Other | 3.6 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| **Who respondents migrated with (%)** | On their own | 40.0 | 29.4 | 31.3 |
| | Family | 30.2 | 38.7 | 37.7 |
| | Partner/spouse | 25.9 | 26.1 | 25.9 |
| | Single parent with child/ren | 3.0 | 4.1 | 3.6 |
| | Other | 1.0 | 1.8 | 1.5 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Who migrated with n male=440, n female=1163, n total=1605*

*\*multiple responses selected*

Amongst respondents who moved for better employment opportunities, 47.2 per cent were in an occupation with a skill level of one, and 20.4 per cent had an occupation skill level of four. A skill level of one is commensurate with a bachelor's degree or higher, while skill level four is equal to a Certificate II or III or one year of relevant work experience. A higher percentage (26.2 per cent) of female respondents indicated they moved to Australia because of friends and/or family living there, compared to only 17.7 per cent of males. Interestingly,

21.1 per cent of male respondents said they moved to Australia because there was no visa application required, compared to just 14.0 per cent of female respondents.

Even though only 22.4 per cent of respondents indicated they moved because friends and/or family were living in Australia, the majority of respondents knew a New Zealander who was living there. For 17.5 per cent of respondents, they knew no one living in Australia before moving, while 42.6 per cent had friends living in Australia. A higher percentage of female respondents had children living in Australia; of these respondents, just under half (46.7 per cent) were over the age of 60, suggesting they may have moved to Australia after the birth of grandchildren. Amongst respondents who knew someone already living in Australia, 45.4 per cent lived in the same location they had migrated to. Most respondents migrated to Australia with their partner/spouse or family. Nearly one-third (31.3 per cent) of respondents moved by themselves, with 40.0 per cent of males moving on their own.

Over three-quarters (78 per cent) of respondents had travelled to Australia before moving, with 18.5 per cent of these respondents having been to Australia more than six times and 18.2 per cent just once. Amongst respondents who had not previously travelled to Australia, 35.4 per cent had moved before 1994, and 48.6 per cent had moved between 2001 and 2015. Just over a third of survey respondents had lived in a third country before moving to Australia, with 16.5 per cent considering moving elsewhere before they migrated to Australia.

A few respondents highlighted the cyclical nature of migration between New Zealand and Australia. Some had moved to Australia for a few years after finishing high school and then returned to New Zealand before moving to Australia again once they had established their career. While for others, they had moved to Australia to see what it was like, and upon returning to New Zealand they were reminded why they had left and subsequently returned to Australia.

Respondents were asked to explain which of the motivations to migrate listed in Table 5.1 had the greatest impact on their decision to move to Australia. Unsurprisingly, out of the 1,856 responses given, 18 per cent said employment opportunities were why they moved to Australia, followed by higher income (14.4 per cent). The small labour market in New Zealand meant many respondents struggled to gain employment or had limited opportunities for career progression, as these survey respondents explained:

*'Job opportunities/income - I reached the ceiling in NZ, and further opportunities were not going to be available due to the specialised nature of my work.' (Respondent 93: Female, unknown age, Health Service Coordinator, arrived 1998, Australian citizen)*

*'Job opportunities, I was struggling to find work in NZ fresh out of high school.' (Respondent 79: Female, 30-34, Store Manager, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

The low wages, coupled with the limited employment opportunities, meant many respondents struggled financially in New Zealand, and as these respondents explained, having a higher income would improve their quality of life:

*'Higher income. Thought it would make [it] easier as I was a single parent.' (Respondent 86: Female, 55-59, Nurse Aide, arrived 1996, PSCV)*

*'Sick of slogging our guts out for [NZD]$22 p/hr and no penalty rates, making [NZD]$1100 per week max for 6 days. Currently earning [AUD]$3300 for 6 days.' (Respondent 152: Female, 40-44, Parts Sales Representative, arrived 2012, Australian citizen)*

*'Money, we were finding things tough in NZ despite both of us working. We were living pay check to pay check and never getting ahead.' (Respondent 739: Female, 50-54, Early Childhood Centre Director, arrived 2010, SCV444)*

Moving to Australia provided 13.5 per cent of respondents with the opportunity for a fresh start and the ability to experience a different way of life. Changes in family circumstances and relationships were a motivating factor, as respondents wanted to be close to family who had already moved to Australia:

*'I was the last of my immediate family to move here. After the breakdown of my marriage, I felt I needed to have myself and my children in a place that we could be safe and supported.' (Respondent 1079: Female, 35-39, Print and Copy Specialist, arrived 2006, SCV 444)*

*'My husband's mother was unwell, so we moved to be closer to her. My husband was made redundant, so we had the funds to move our household. We were looking for new experiences.' (Respondent 928: Female, 40-44, Project Manager, arrived 2002, Australian citizen)*

For one survey respondent, living in rural New Zealand had become stifling:

*'We lived in a very small farming community in NZ. Did the same things each week, saw the same people. Had also seen most of NZ. Wanted to have more opportunities to have new experiences.' (Respondent 1454: Unknown gender, age and occupation, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

Benson and O'Reilly (2009) refer to this as lifestyle migration, where an individual in response to events such as job redundancy or a relationship breakdown use migration as a way of taking

control of their lives by choosing the lifestyle they want to have. Lifestyle migration is facilitated by the structural conditions, ethnicity, class, gender, and race in the origin and destination country that together grant certain individuals the opportunity to migrate (Benson & Osbaldiston, 2016). In the context of trans-Tasman migration, the TTTA provides the policy structure that makes migrating to Australia an option available to these respondents.

Family reunification was the primary motivating factor for 13 per cent of respondents, with an additional 11.8 per cent moving to Australia because of their spouse/partner. Some respondents wanted to join family living in Australia as they felt they were missing out on building relationships with grandchildren or nieces/nephews that had been born in Australia. While for others, hearing about the employment and lifestyle opportunities from family members painted a picture of what life could be like in Australia. A female interviewee who had always planned on moving to Australia, discussed how her partner's family had influenced their decision to move:

> *'His family that were based here in Brisbane, kept calling almost weekly saying you know there were a couple of families here, come over there's heaps of money to be made, 50,000 jobs a week are advertised, you know we've got this we've got that, you know painted this amazing picture so when we decided that's it we're going to move, we're going to move over because the grass appears to greener over there…They kept saying you can stay with us, we can get settled you know you just need a little bit of money, by the time that came around, and we said look we're coming over...the excuses started to roll in like, ohh we can't have you here for very long, or you can't stay with us, we don't have the room, umm I'm like this is really strange we'd already committed ourselves to move over, he went 5 weeks before me, found a job um said to me that where his family were living was in really rough part of town, like a lower socio-economic part of town, what they told him they had they never had, in fact they basically talked themselves up, probably never thinking that we'd make the moved to go over…' (Female, 40-45, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa)*

Many of the respondents moved to Australia because their partner/spouse had got a job there:

> *'My husband was living and working in Queensland while I lived in New Zealand with our children. We moved to Australia to keep our family together.' (Respondent 1685: Unknown gender, age, and occupation, arrived 2014, SCV 444)*

Whereas for others, their partner/spouse was Australian or was living in Australia:

*'Married to an Australian. He wanted to return home. He had lived in New Zealand for four years.'* (Respondent 1066: Female, 65+, Enrolled Nurse, arrived 1980, PSCV)

*'I had reached the top of [my] career in NZ… was advised to seek experience in other organizations before I could be promoted further. Was in [a] long-distance relationship with [a] partner who lived in Melbourne who suggested rather than looking at other job opportunities in NZ I look[ed] in Melbourne.'* (Respondent 100: Female, 55-59, Nurse, arrived 2011, SCV 444)

A small proportion (7.0 per cent) of respondents were motivated to move to Australia because of the opportunities it would offer their children. Australia was viewed as a better country to raise children because of the educational and lifestyle opportunities:

*'Education and employment prospects, far better here than in NZ. Daughter's grades started failing because she was bored, but she excelled here, and hubby is happier with working conditions and pay.'* (Respondent 654: Female, 40-44, unemployed, arrived 2001, SCV 444)

The potential to receive a higher income would allow respondents to spend more time with their children:

*'Pay - the better pay meant that I did not have to go back to work at the end of my maternity leave while pregnant with [my] second child.'* (Respondent 85: Female, 40-44, Museum Registrar, arrived 2007, SCV 444)

While income, employment opportunities, social ties, and lifestyle factors were given as some of the primary reasons for migration, for a few respondents, societal issues in New Zealand and events such as the Christchurch earthquake in 2011, and proximity to New Zealand contributed to their decision to move. Societal issues discussed by respondents included the cost of living, housing affordability, gang violence, and limited opportunities in rural New Zealand to get out of poverty:

*'I came from a small town that's based on two gangs where it's normal to drink and smoke weed and have kids real young and not get anywhere in life, and there is only one main employer there, the meat works.'* (Respondent 1671: Female, 25-29, Kitchenhand, arrived 2010, SCV 444)

*'At the time, mortgage interest rates in NZ were 21%. They were lower in Australia and wages/job opportunities were better.'* (Respondent 2002: Male, 60-64, unemployed, arrived 1989, Australian citizen)

A couple of respondents discussed the disparity between Māori and Pākehā in New Zealand:

*'Move away from institutionalisation discrimination towards NZ Māori. To improve access and opportunities to progress my families [sic] outcomes in*

*life. Not just me, also my children.' (Respondent 1913: Female, 40-44, Community Mental Health Worker, arrived 2005, SCV 444)*

Respondents affected by the Christchurch earthquake felt the need to move because of the impact it had both on Christchurch and their mental health, with one respondent saying:

*'Needed to move out of Christchurch for our well-being. Made sense to move somewhere where we could get ahead with better income & work conditions.' (Respondent 1161: Female, 40-44, Midwife, arrived 2013, SCV 444)*

For another, their support network had subsequently moved to Australia:

*'Lots of my friends had moved to Australia immediately following the earthquakes in Christchurch, and I moved to join them.' (Respondent 1878: Male, 30-34, Teaching Associate/Research Assistant, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

Those who had lived in a third country moved to Australia because it allowed them to be close to friends and family in New Zealand while also providing more opportunities:

*'Lifestyle. I was 27, had lived in London, and New Zealand seemed too boring.' (Respondent 1218: Female, 30-39, Orthodontist, arrived 2009, SCV 444)*

*'Friends and lifestyle. I hadn't lived in NZ for five years anyway, so felt closer to my Aussie friends I'd met travelling.' (Respondent 67: Female, 60-64, retired, arrived 1981, Australian citizen)*

## 5.3   Transnational connections to New Zealand

A migrant's ties to their homeland are multifaceted, having political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions. The ability of a migrant to maintain these ties is influenced by their visa status, family structure, culture, beliefs, and economic status. Research on transnationalism has tended to focus on those who move from less-developed countries to the Global-North, where immigration policies prevent individuals from migrating with their families, subsequently forcing individuals to become transnational (Parreñas, 2001; Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). In this context, migration is often used as a family risk diversification strategy where one family member is sent overseas to increase their earning capacity so they can send money back to their family (Stark & Bloom, 1985). This has resulted in a focus on remittances and how they both provide economic support and demonstrate/represent a form of long-distance care (Parreñas, 2005). Other research has looked at the establishment of hometown associations (HTAs) as a way of maintaining not only cultural ties but economic and political ties (King & Skeldon, 2010; Strunk, 2014).

This section explores the characteristics, motivations, and structures that facilitate the transnational ties of New Zealanders living in Australia and how they differ from a South-North migration context. While they do not establish HTAs and the sending of remittances is not prevalent, the concept of transnationalism provides a useful framework for understanding the importance of political, economic, and socio-cultural ties and how respondents maintain them.

### 5.3.1   Social ties

Unlike most migrants who come to Australia, New Zealanders moving to Australia can bring their family under the TTTA. As Table 5.1 above showed, 67.2 per cent of respondents migrated with their family or partner/spouse, while one-third moved by themselves. A moving to Australia was an individual or familial decision; the majority of respondents still had siblings (62.2 per cent), parents (53.5 per cent), cousins (65.1 per cent), and grandparents (19.3 per cent) living in New Zealand. Some respondents had children (14.6 per cent) in New Zealand, while a small proportion (4.1 per cent) of respondents no longer had family living there. Staying in contact with these family members was facilitated by different forms of communication, including phone calls, emails, and social media. Vertovec (2004) observed that the proliferation of cheap phone cards at the turn of the millennium meant regular communication with family members was now possible without the need for regular travel between countries.

Respondents primarily communicated with family members weekly via phone calls and emails with social media and messaging applications used daily, see Figure 5.1. The post was the least used method of communication, followed by video calling. Figure 5.2 shows that respondents' contact with friends in New Zealand was less frequent than with family members, with social media, the main form of contact occurring on a daily or weekly basis. Communication to friends via phone calls and email was less frequent when compared to family members, 10.4 per cent of respondents called friends weekly compared to family members (36.7 per cent). The reduced use of post as a communication method reflects the technological changes that have occurred over the last 20 years as increased connectivity through the internet and cheap air travel has facilitated in-person and virtual communication.

**Figure 5.1: Regularity of use of various communication methods by respondents with family members**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected*



**Figure 5.2: Regularity of various communication methods by respondents with friends**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected*

While these advances in technology have reduced the need for face-to-face contact, just under one-quarter (24.6 per cent) of respondents travelled back to New Zealand yearly. One-fifth (21 per cent) had not travelled back in the last three years, just over one-quarter (28.2) went back every couple of years, 17.6 per cent went every six months, 1.4 per cent went monthly and a small proportion (7.2 per cent) had not travelled back. Amongst those who had travelled back, over three-quarters (77.3 per cent) went back to visit family and/or friends with an additional 9.5 per cent travelling for a specific family event such as a wedding or funeral. Many of the respondents who had travelled back for a family event had not travelled back for over three years. Other reasons for returning included for a holiday (7.9 per cent), business (2.7 per cent), or for a specific reason such as selling property or watching the *All Blacks*. Respondents who had most recently travelled back to New Zealand for business were mainly Business, HR and Marketing Professionals (19.0 per cent), Specialist Managers (14.3 per cent), and Chief Executive, GM, and Legislators (11.9 per cent). Amongst respondents who travelled back every couple of years, one-third (31.3 per cent) called family members weekly with 26.2 per cent calling monthly, indicating the role of technology in the maintenance of familial relationships.

Table 5.2 examines the frequency of travel back to New Zealand by occupation at the major group level. Managers and Professionals travelled back to New Zealand more frequently with 25.2 per cent, and 23.7 per cent respectively travelled back every six months. Whereas Machinery Operators and Drivers (36.9 per cent) and Labourers (35.2 per cent) were more likely to only travel back to New Zealand every couple of years

**Table 5.2: Frequency of travel back to New Zealand by occupation, at ANZSCO major group code**

| ANZSCO major group | How often do you travel back to New Zealand? | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Have not travelled back | Monthly | Every six months | Yearly | Every couple of years | 3 years+ | Total |
| 1 Managers (%) | 5.6 | 2.0 | 25.2 | 26.0 | 27.6 | 13.6 | 100.0 |
| 2 Professionals (%) | 5.4 | 2.6 | 23.7 | 30.3 | 21.3 | 16.7 | 100.0 |
| 3 Technicians and Trade Workers (%) | 9.7 | 0.0 | 6.8 | 23.3 | 34.0 | 26.2 | 100.0 |
| 4 Community and Personal Service Workers (%) | 7.4 | 0.6 | 14.8 | 29.0 | 26.1 | 22.2 | 100.0 |
| 5 Clerical and Administration Workers (%) | 4.0 | 1.3 | 15.9 | 21.6 | 33.5 | 23.8 | 100.0 |
| 6 Sales Workers (%) | 8.6 | 0.0 | 9.9 | 22.2 | 30.9 | 28.4 | 100.0 |
| 7 Machinery Operators and Drivers (%) | 6.2 | 1.5 | 12.3 | 21.5 | 36.9 | 21.5 | 100.0 |
| 8 Labourers (%) | 12.5 | 1.1 | 9.1 | 13.6 | 35.2 | 28.4 | 100.0 |
| Total (%) | 6.4 | 1.6 | 18.4 | 25.8 | 27.7 | 20.1 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018. Mangers n1=250, Professionals n2=498, Technicians and Trade Workers n3=103, Community and Personal Service Workers n4=176, Clerical and Administration Workers n5=227, Sales Workers n6=81, Machinery Operators and Driver n7=65, Labourers n8=88.*

von Koppenfels et al. (2015) discuss the role geographic proximity has on return visits amongst highly skilled migrants. They found that for French migrants in London, those from Paris could readily return because of the train between London and Paris, which only took two-and-a-half hours. Whereas for those from rural parts of France, regular return visits were not always possible, given the greater distance and time needed to get there. For this group, their experiences were similar to American's living in London, Paris, and Berlin, where the distance meant they could only return every year. The geographic distance between cities such as Perth and Auckland and the associated cost, frequency, and flight time may affect the frequency of return visits possible. For those living on the east coast of Australia, a flight takes approximately three hours, whereas it takes six hours to fly between Perth and Auckland. One-quarter of respondents living in New South Wales indicated they travelled back every six months compared to only 7.5 per cent of those living in Western Australia. When going back to New Zealand, those living in New South Wales typically stayed for 3-7 days (41.7 per cent), whereas, amongst those living in Western Australia, longer trips lasting 2-4 weeks (38.0 per cent) were more common.

The maintenance of social ties is a two-way process, as even though respondents may not regularly travel back, family and friends still visit them in Australia. Friends were less likely to have visited respondents in Australia compared to family members, with 30.5 per cent of respondents having had family members visit them in the last six months, see Table 5.3.

**Table 5.3: Frequency of visits by family and friends**

|  | Immediate family (%) | Friends (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Have not visited | 14.1 | 30.4 |
| Last 6-months | 30.5 | 18.7 |
| Last 6-12 months | 16.7 | 13.5 |
| 1-2 years ago | 19.2 | 18.9 |
| 3+ years | 19.4 | 18.5 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, immediate family n1=1840, friends n2=1853*

Communicating with family members in New Zealand had become part of the interviewees' daily and weekly routines. One female interviewee explained that:

> *'Everyone's back there um all my family, it's just myself, I'm here and my husband, and so I contact them all the time, I call my parents twice a day, I skype them I call the children, I talk to my grandsons, um I have a lot to do with NZ.' (Female,40-44, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa)*

While for a male interviewee, the geographic proximity and the nature of his relationships with different family members influenced the frequency of communication:

> *'[Parents] you know FaceTime, yeah like most weekends yeah ah so really well connected, know exactly what's going in their lives, you know mum got hearing aids last week, and you know so I'm pretty up to date, you know all that stuff so that's fine and my sister in Christchurch, speak to her maybe every 3 months, or so I guess, and it will be a messenger call I'll be in the car she'll be on speakerphone, and I've got a sort of 45-minute drive home, so I'll chat to her for 40 odd minutes, um, reasonably frequently so pretty well connected to family, yeah, and I got a sister in the UK in London so I don't speak to her as quite as often as I should really, to be honest, yeah um, but that's just by virtue of distance rather than anything else.' (Male, 45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Being in regular contact with his parents not only facilitated intergenerational communication with his children but allowed him to care for his parents at a distance by being able to see virtually how they were doing. He explained that as his father was getting older, travelling internationally was no longer feasible, whereas his mother could still visit. This frequent

communication had replaced the need for regular travel to New Zealand as priorities had changed:

> *'I haven't been back for 3 years because there's so much to do, I mean, leave is finite… I need to go back…we should because it's cheap and it's easy, but we just sort of don't…like this is home now, we're not going home anytime soon, in my head I'm retiring here.' (Male, 45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

For other interviewees, returning to New Zealand was now based on necessity:

> *'Yes, oh my father's died recently, but my mother's in a rest home, but she had dementia, ahh and my sister, she lives with her two daughters in Auckland. Well, finances restrict us, we find more and more we just going back when there's an emergency.' (Male, 60-64, Land Use Investigation Officer, arrived 2005, Australian citizen)*

> *'We only go home for funerals, we actually have to pick and choose when we go home, funeral um live in Palmerston North, we have to travel to Whangarei, 3 days, we're there we stay for a day or two, we come home here, we can't take three days, we got to take a whole week because if you take a whole week off to finish that process.' (Female,50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Interviewees who had children viewed trips to New Zealand as an opportunity to not only build intergenerational relationships but a connection to New Zealand. A male interviewee whose three children were born in New Zealand recognised that although they were born there and had family there, for them, Australia was home, as he explained:

> *'The kids are really happy here, my two older children they both flew out to NZ earlier this year, and we said right you're old enough to fly together on your own, and you can go and stay with your grandparents and your uncle on the farm and ahh they went out there and spent two weeks out there, and they're ohh it's going to be so long dad, they got out there, and they did enjoy it, but they're also glad to get back here and catch up with their mates so yeah, they did enjoy it, and they'd love to go back… but yeah all their friends are over here, they have no desire to live out there.' (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

One interviewee who moved to Australia after the Christchurch earthquake explained how visits by family and friends had changed over time:

> *'So my brother, my younger brother um he moved to Wellington after the earthquakes but a few years ago here as well so he lives here now too, and yep we've had cousins visit and stuff like that, so people definitely come and visit um friends come and visit ahh they used to visit more, friends used to*

*visit more in the first few years that I was here, not so much anymore.' (Male, 30-34, Teaching/research associate, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

While the results presented above indicate most respondents have strong familial ties to New Zealand and hence exhibit a high degree of transnationalism, the role of familial relationships, culture, and geographic proximity need to be considered. Because of the cultural similarities between New Zealand and Australia, it is often remarked that moving to Australia is like moving to another city within New Zealand. Hence, this thesis proposes that because of this familiarity and the ability of New Zealanders to travel with their family, these patterns of communication and engagement with New Zealand are more akin to long-distance internal migration. This is because, at the micro-scale, how an individual communicates and engages with their family does not inherently change upon migration. Whereas for migrants who are separated from their husband/wife and children and cannot migrate as a family, communicating remotely forms the basis of the primary family unit and becomes a form of caregiving that is vital in the maintenance of these relationships (Parreñas, 2001).

In Western culture, the family is understood to mean the nuclear family, a couple with dependent children, with adult siblings, parents, and other relatives making up the extended family. Research by Silverstein and Bengston (1997) on the structure of adult child-parent relationships in America identified five different types of intergenerational relationships: tight-knit, sociable, obligatory, intimate but distant, and detached. These relationships are composed of six dimensions: structure (proximity), associations (frequency of contact and shared activity), affect (emotional closeness), consensus (actual or perceived agreement in opinions, values), function (exchanges of instrumental or financial assistance and support), and norms (strength of obligation). Families who are tight-knit exhibit all these dimensions, whereas those that are obligatory only engage based on proximity and frequency of contact and are not emotionally close nor have consensus in values and lifestyle.

These familial relationships apply to many New Zealanders living in Australia; however, for those who are Māori, familial relationships are shaped by the concept of *whānau* and are central to Māori understanding of family. *Whānau* encompasses an individual's tribe and sub-tribe and includes physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions through which values, histories, and traditions are shared (Walker, 2017). *Whakapapa* is the foundation of *whānau*, and links people to all living things to the earth and sky and the origins of the universe, shaping an individual's sense of identity and belonging (Taonui, 2015). This extensive understanding

of family beyond the nuclear family results in stronger familial bonds that remain regardless of geographic proximity. Walker's (2013) research on the lived experience of *whānau* found that for those with family members in Australia, passing on knowledge on *whānau, hapu*, and *iwi* was important as it helped to maintain connections to the tribe. In this research, Māori respondents did not explicitly mention keeping connections to their tribe. Still, one interviewee discussed how she needed to teach children who had grown up in Australia, Māori funeral customs:

> *'One of the things I really miss is language, customs and protocols, we used to talk in New Zealand all the time, about dial a <u>koh matu</u>, or dial an old person or dial a <u>karanga</u>, ring an aunty, we [have a] body coming, can you come and call them, yeah sweet as, it happens naturally there… I think it was interesting to see that the kids were all supporting each other, which was great, but they were just sitting there, they, my family and my kids, you know get up get active, do the food and all of that these kids were just sitting around, you know hanging off each other, and they were, people were coming in filing in, and these kids were lying around, and I thought what the, anyway, I said okay guys, we're going to get a tray line up we need a tea station, someone to butter the bread, we need to pots cooking, cleared the room, (laughs), in New Zealand, <u>tangihanga</u> happened, whatever gathering they just happen, we take it for granted here, we have to find somebody oh, who does that, oh the <u>kohmatua</u> one elder.' (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

### 5.3.2   Political and cultural ties to New Zealand

Political engagement with the origin country occurs at varying degrees, ranging from political party membership to occasional participation in rallies or meetings (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The degree to which a migrant maintains political ties can be influenced by the time spent in the destination country and/or politics and policies in the destination or origin country. For New Zealanders who live abroad, they can vote in the New Zealand general election provided they have visited New Zealand within the last three years, if they have not visited within this time frame, they lose their voting rights (Electoral Commission New Zealand, n.d.). In New Zealand, individuals are required to be on the electoral roll but do not have to vote in the election. The 2017 general election had a voter turnout of 79.0 per cent with 61,524 votes were cast by New Zealanders living overseas (Electoral Commission New Zealand, 2017). Amongst survey respondents, 21.1 per cent voted in the 2017 general election. A minor proportion (2.3 per cent) of respondents had strong political ties to New Zealand as they were either a member of a political party/group or had donated money to one. Two-thirds (66.5 per cent) of respondents indicated they maintained no political ties to

New Zealand, with 2.6 per cent loosely following New Zealand politics online through social media and news websites.

Social media and news websites allowed respondents to find out what was happening in New Zealand more broadly, with these sources primarily keeping respondents informed daily, see Figure 5.3.



**Figure 5.3: Source of news about New Zealand and frequency of consumption.**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected*

In addition to these sources, interviewees mentioned being kept informed on what was happening in New Zealand through conversations with family members. Two interviewees who moved to Australia in 2010 had differing levels of engagement with New Zealand news. As the first interviewee explained:

> *'I read the paper online, in NZ especially the local paper, the Marlborough express, and um yeah read about what's going on and yeah follow what's happening with [the] earthquake and things, yeah pretty much up to speed with what's happening out there and there's pretty good communication with family and things and what's going on, what's hot and what's not.' (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

While for the other interviewee, knowing what was happening in New Zealand no longer had the same relevance as he continued to establish his life in Australia:

> *'Pretty loosely, to be honest, like I'm a pretty bad excuse for a kiwi, like I don't really know really know what's going on with the rugby apart from the Bledisloe cup result this year was [a] bit of a white wash... the NZ Herald is a*

*link on Outlook for me, so it's kind of there, but I click on The Age more often, the Australian newspapers rather than the New Zealand ones to read because it's more relevant to me, so whatever comes through as a headline, whatever comes through from conversations with mum or friends or whatever then yeah, but apart from that, I don't deliberately go looking for New Zealand yeah.' (Male,45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

For this interviewee, his connection to New Zealand had changed over time as he felt more integrated into Australia. Items in his home that said 'made in New Zealand' no longer had the same resonance as they had initially, with items saying 'made in Australia' now proving a sense of pride. While for some survey respondents, New Zealand made products such as clothing, skincare, and art allowed them to express their cultural connections to New Zealand. Figure 5.4 shows that cultural connections were maintained primarily through social media, sport, and the purchasing of New Zealand made food and beverages.



**Figure 5.4: Ways respondents maintain cultural ties to New Zealand**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected.*

Some respondents mentioned attending New Zealand specific cultural events such as Waitangi Day[3] or Matariki[4]. Incorporating te reo Māori into conversations or learning te reo

---

[3] Waitangi Day on the 6 February commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi which was discussed in Chapter 2.
[4] Matariki is the Māori New Year which is occurs midwinter when the Matariki cluster of stars rise. It is a time to remember the dead and celebrate new life (Meredith, 2006).

Māori was another way in which respondents maintained cultural ties. For one respondent, they maintained their cultural ties through their everyday practices, which did not change upon migration as being Māori was their identity,

> *'Being Māori and having an upbringing of Māori culture, language, our traditions etc.... It's as given... I sing, dance, speak, cook, teach my kids, live and breathe, and AM my beautiful culture, so maintaining it isn't hard for me.' (Respondent 774: Female, 40-44, Carer, arrived, 2001, SCV 444)*

One interviewee explained that although at the macro-scale New Zealand and Australia are culturally similar, living in Australia heightened his New Zealand identity:

> *'I mean New Zealand and Australia in the grand scheme of things the countries are very similar however I find for me the small points of difference become magnified, um... so often I guess I try to make the most of those small points of difference if that makes sense, so I'm keen to like I don't know I'll always do things like... um it's just stupid things like small things but, I'll like get a peanut slab at the supermarket or like um, make a point of talking to like my friends who follow AFL about rugby sometimes, or you know just kind of asserting these things that to me have become... strangely important, that I hadn't thought much about before.' (Male, 30-34, Teaching/research associate, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

### 5.3.3 Economic ties

Economic ties to the origin country include the sending of remittances at the micro-scale to government schemes that facilitate transnationalism at the macro-scale (Constant & Massey, 2002; Vertovec, 2004). The literature on economic transnationalism has focused on the sending of remittances. As explained earlier in this chapter, those from less developed countries will send a family member overseas to increase their earning capacity to support their family (Constant & Massey, 2002). In this South-North migration context, the sending of remittances is an integral part of an individual's migration journey and is influenced by cultural norms and expectations.

Interestingly just under one-fifth of survey respondents sent money abroad. Amongst these respondents, 96.6 per cent sent money back to New Zealand. Other destinations included the Philippines, South Africa, Serbia, Fiji, and the USA. Nearly 60 per cent sent money to family members, 28.5 per cent transferred money to their personal bank accounts, and 8.6 per cent transferred the money to the New Zealand government to pay off their student loan or pay for child support. Just over one-quarter (26.7 per cent) sent money every month, 15.9 per cent sent money twice a year, 13.8 per cent every three months. The majority of respondents sent

between AUD$101 and AUD$500, 16.6 per cent sent between AUD$501 and AUD$1000, and 13.6 per cent sent over AUD$1001. Over half (56.5 per cent) of the of respondents who sent over AUD$1001, sent this money to their bank accounts while 70.9 per cent of those who sent between AUD$101 and AUD$500 sent it to family members. Respondents who sent money to family members primarily did so for special occasions such as birthdays and Christmas, with a few respondents sending money on a more regular basis to support their elderly parents by paying for services such as *Meals on Wheels*.

Interestingly, although 37.7 per cent of respondents still had a bank account in New Zealand, only 28.9 per cent indicated they regularly transferred money into it. Just under ten per cent (9.8 per cent) of respondents still had a house/property in New Zealand, 5.9 per cent had financial investments, and only a very small proportion (0.3 per cent) had a business there. Amongst respondents with house/property, 69 per cent had moved between 2001 and 2015, and 18.5 per cent had moved before 2001.

In the migration literature, economic opportunities have been well documented as one of the key drivers of migration (de Haas et al., 2015; Smith, 2003; Zontini, 2004). These results show that for survey respondents, the ability to send remittances is not the main driver of migration, even though respondents indicated they moved to Australia for the economic and employment opportunities available. A key difference in this context is that the increased income earned in Australia is for personal economic gain rather than being able to maximise the amount of remittance that can be sent to the origin country. Morrison and Clark's (2011) analysis of internal migration in New Zealand found that those who moved for employment did not necessarily increase their income and instead noted that those seeking a larger economic return would move to Australia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ability of New Zealanders to gain employment in Australia is facilitated by the TTTA and the integrated labour markets of the two countries, which results in New Zealand migration to Australia resembling long-distance internal migration within Australia rather than international migration (Hugo, 2004b, 2015).

The internal nature of New Zealand to Australia migration is also reflected in the instances in which respondents send money back to New Zealand. Those who sent money back on a monthly or fortnightly basis primarily did so into their own bank accounts or to the New Zealand government rather than family. Those who sent money to family did so irregularly for birthdays or special occasions, suggesting that these practices are based on familial norms and

expectations and would occur regardless of whether respondents were living in New Zealand or Australia. The lack of remittances sent by respondents also reflects the fact that New Zealand is predominantly a Western country in their familial structure, and so adult children are not expected to support their parents financially. This differs from migrants from other cultures who are discussed in the remittances literature. For migrants from a patrilineal society such as India, sons are expected to support their parents as it is part of being 'a good son' (Singh et al., 2012). While for migrants from matrilineal societies such as Poland and Vietnam, women send money as a way of fulfilling their familial care obligations and to uphold norms associated with being a 'filial daughter' (Krzyżowski & Mucha, 2014; Yeoh et al., 2013).

## 5.4  A possible return to New Zealand

A migrant's desire or intention to return to their home country is influenced by a combination of socio-cultural, economic, and political factors. The decision to return can be affected by life stage such as the birth of children or retirement, where returning home can provide greater social support (Cerase, 1974). Alternatively, individuals may be forced to return because of a change in circumstances beyond their control, such as family illness or changes to immigration policies (Gmelch, 1980). Yet despite intending to return, return migration may not happen because of factors keeping them in the destination country and/or negative aspects of life in the home country that are still persistent, such as high unemployment or violence.

One-fifth of respondents indicated they would return to New Zealand, with 41.2 per cent unsure and 38.7 per cent saying they would not return. From the thirteen factors displayed in Table 5.4, respondents were asked to rank the top three factors that would influence their decision to return to New Zealand. A desire to be closer to friends and family was given as the top two reasons for wanting to return to New Zealand. Amongst respondents who provided this as their first factor (35.7 per cent), a desire to retire in New Zealand (24.9 per cent) and the New Zealand environment (24.5 per cent) were given as factors two and three. Whereas respondents who ranked friends and family second (25.7 per cent), said the lack of access to government services in Australia would be the main reason for returning (29.8 per cent), with the New Zealand environment (14.5 per cent) as the third factor.

**Table 5.4: Ranking of the top three reasons fro wanting to return to New Zealand**

|  | Rank 1 (%) | Rank 2 (%) | Rank 3 (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| To be closer to friends and family | 35.7 | 17.4 | 11.9 |
| Lack of access to government services in Australia | 14.5 | 14.5 | 12.7 |
| Employment | 12.6 | 7.7 | 5 |
| Desire to retire in New Zealand | 10.4 | 16.8 | 14.7 |
| Wanting to bring children up in New Zealand | 5.2 | 6.1 | 4.3 |
| Dislike way of life in Australia | 4 | 2.7 | 3.3 |
| New Zealand environment | 4 | 11.4 | 19.2 |
| Spouse/partner | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.4 |
| Home sickness | 3.4 | 6.3 | 6.7 |
| Cost of living in Australia | 2.2 | 3.7 | 5.9 |
| New Zealand superannuation | 2 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
| Education | 1.1 | 1.9 | 3.4 |
| Healthcare system | 0.9 | 3.7 | 5.7 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Rank 1 n1=1477, Rank 2 n2=1390, Rank 3 n3=1327*

Respondents were also asked whether the introduction of the 189 visa or the potential changing of the citizenship requirements which were occurring at the time of the survey would influence their decision to return to New Zealand. One third (32.5 per cent) indicated it had no impact at all, just under one-fifth (18.6 per cent) said 'very little,' 22.5 per cent indicated 'somewhat,' 6.9 per cent 'to a great extent' with the rest indicating it did not apply to them. Just under half of those who had selected 'not applicable' had already become an Australian citizen.

Respondents were asked to elaborate on why they would or would not return to New Zealand. Reasons given fell into three categories: factors that kept them in Australia and the positive and negative aspects of life in New Zealand. The familial and social ties respondents had built in Australia were the primary reason for not wanting to return to New Zealand. Because of these relationships and respondents establishing their lives in Australia, Australia was now viewed and thought of as home:

> *'My children both live here. I have friends here. I own a unit here. I would only return to NZ if I became unemployed, and my savings ran out & my mother had died.' (Respondent 210: Female, 55-59, Teacher, arrived, 2006, SCV 444)*

> *'This is my home. My partner is Australian; we have a dog together and intend to buy a home here.'* (Respondent 281: Female, 35-39, Operations Administrator, arrived 2004, SCV 444)

The economic and employment opportunities available were other reasons why respondents wanted to stay as they provided respondents with the ability to have the lifestyle they wanted, such as being able to buy a house or go on holiday. For some respondents, the economic opportunities in Australia had provided them with the ability to start their own business and hence would not return to New Zealand in the foreseeable future. Together these social, economic, and cultural factors contributed to why respondents wanted to stay in Australia and why they said they loved living here.

Respondents indicated they would return to New Zealand if there were a change in circumstances that prevented them from living in Australia. Frequently mentioned was the Australian government's treatment of New Zealanders and the difficulty of obtaining permanent residency and citizenship, leaving many questioning what impact future policy changes would have:

> *'I enjoy living in Australia. I hope it will be my home for the rest of my life. But anything could change, especially if the new path to citizenship was suddenly rescinded before I could apply.'* (Respondent 183: Female, 40-44, Executive Assistant, arrived 2011, SCV 444)

For SCV 444 holders, being ineligible for government services meant if they lost their job or were injured, they could not support themselves in Australia and would have to consider returning:

> *'We would be forced to return if we fell on hardship or if any of our family became disabled.'* (Respondent 1916: Female, 35-39, unemployed, arrived 2017, SCV 444)

Other respondents mentioned that if there was a severe change in their health, they would return:

> *'If it became impossible for us to live here, then we would return to NZ. But as I have found when I was UNABLE to legally leave Australia (Hague Convention), I am capable to make it work here. If my health deteriorated suddenly, I would have to go back to NZ.'* (Respondent 519: Female, 30-34, Accounts Clerk, arrived 2012, SCV 444)

Even though the majority of respondents would return because of family in New Zealand, many mentioned they would only return if there was a serious change in health conditions, as one respondent explained:

> *'We have built our life here in Perth. The only reason we would consider moving back to NZ is if our parents are very ill.' (Respondent 1503: Female, 40-44, unemployed, arrived 1980, PSCV)*

Having family in New Zealand contributed to respondents viewing New Zealand as 'home.' Life events such as the birth of children increased respondents desire to be closer to family while also wanting to recreate the upbringing they had:

> *'Although I do want to travel more after finishing my study ultimately, I feel NZ is my home, and it's such a beautiful place. My family lives there, and if I have children in the future, I would love to bring them up in NZ.' (Respondent 22: Female, 20-24, Student, arrived 2018, SCV 444)*

For other respondents, this emotional connection to New Zealand was why they wanted to retire there or be their final resting place.

The limited employment opportunities, low wages, high cost of living, and property were some of the main reasons preventing respondents from returning to New Zealand. The low wages and high cost of living meant respondents would struggle, as moving back would result in a significant pay cut:

> *'Life in NZ is too hard financially. I absolutely love it there, but I have honestly only ever felt prosperous living outside of New Zealand. The wages and conditions are terrible, plus the cost of food, utilities, and petrol is insane. Medicare is so much better than anything I experienced in NZ. Everything is easier in Australia once you are established. I miss the landscape and NZ/Māori culture, but I doubt I would ever seriously consider returning to live.' (Respondent 835: Female, 45-49, Senior Community Engagement Officer, arrived 2002, Australian citizen)*

The disparity in wages between the two countries made one interviewee feel like an economic refugee:

> *'Although we enjoy living here, we enjoy the lifestyle, we enjoy the climate, we enjoy the people, we enjoy going to the bush and things like that, we actually miss NZ, there are certain things we miss, but we're economic refugees, we can't afford to move back to New Zealand, so you know, a house like this here, probably [AUD$]850,000, what's [AUD$]850,000 going to buy you in Auckland…and my wife's a nurse so she'd half her salary, wouldn't be half now but ah, she would lose about 30% of her salary now moving back to NZ, super because she's state employee she gets the super,*

*so there are certain things here, so in a way, we're kind of stuck.' (Male, 50-54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

Because of the low wages and high cost of living, during return trips back to New Zealand, respondents were shocked at the prevalence of homelessness and poverty in cities such as Auckland and in rural New Zealand. Seeing this made respondents appreciate the opportunities they had in Australia to improve their economic situation and lifestyle, as this female interviewee explained:

> *'You see a lot of ice [methamphetamine] use, and how bad it's become and a lot of poverty a lot of homelessness and when I was in Hamilton, I drove to Napier then I drove back to Tolaga Bay, Gisborne, around that area so I could see a lot of homelessness, I could see a lot of poverty I could see, I'm no snob, don't get me wrong but it was freezing, and people were generally doing it tough there, and yeah I couldn't see myself living there and for once in my life, well for the first time in 14 years I thought you know what Australia is my home now.' (Female, 40-44, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa)*

For her, the increased income in Australia provided her with the opportunity to regularly travel back and to help her daughters financially who were living in New Zealand, something she would not have been able to do in New Zealand. However, she was one of the few interviewees who mentioned financially supporting family members back in New Zealand. Another female interviewee said how family members in New Zealand had the perception that because she was living in Australia, she was financially well off. But for her, returning to New Zealand was a high financial cost and involved a lot of planning to get cheap flights:

> *'We have to pick and choose when and what funerals we go back to, huge occasions and if we go back it's going to be for more than blimming 3 days….that can cost for all of us probably [AUD]$2000, to go back to NZ, that's just the flights…I couldn't believe it, I went home, and I had [NZD]$40, and I bought two boxes of booze, and shared them around, and everyone's just going wow wow, geeh your rich aunty, aren't you aunty, I said no I'm not, I had to save 3x as much money to come home and enjoy this time here.' (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

Other reasons mentioned by respondents as to why they would not return included the practical aspects associated with moving countries, the low pension in New Zealand, potentially moving to a third country, and a preference for living in a larger city.

## 5.5  Conclusion

This chapter discussed respondents' motivations for moving to Australia, how they maintain ties to New Zealand, and their return migration intentions. The first section found that like other international migrants, the economic opportunities available in Australia were the main drivers of migration. Many respondents also moved because they wanted a change of lifestyle, to join family or were escaping societal issues in New Zealand. Section two found respondents had strong familial and cultural ties to New Zealand, with respondents calling or emailing every week and one quarter travelling back every year. Social media allowed respondents to keep in touch with family and friends and to find out what was happening in New Zealand. Two-thirds of respondents had no political ties and only one-fifth of respondents had economic ties to New Zealand. The last section discussed respondents' return intentions and found that family kept them in Australia and would also be why they returned to New Zealand. Yet societal issues in New Zealand such as low wages, lack of employment, and high cost of living prevented them from returning.

The findings in this chapter demonstrate how, although respondents' migration to Australia is transnational at the macro-scale, at the micro-scale, it is more reflective of long-distance internal migration. This is because, unlike other migrants who move to Australia with specific visa conditions, the open nature of the TTTA facilitates family and circular migration. While New Zealanders, like other migrants, are motivated to migrate because of the economic prospects in the destination country, a key difference is how that economic gain is utilised. For New Zealanders, the lack of remittances sent indicates that the increased income allows individuals to improve their own and/or family's economic position in Australia. Whereas for other migrants, the income generated through migration is used to improve the lives of those in the origin country. However, while these differences exist, it is important to recognise the interplay between how visa conditions and cultural and familial norms influence and shape migrants' economic practices transnationally.

This chapter also found that the social and economic disparities between Australia and New Zealand contributed to why respondents moved and why they would not return. Respondents discussed how the low wages, limited employment opportunities, and high cost of living contributed to their decision to move to Australia. In particular, those from outside the major cities mentioned that there were limited job prospects in areas dominated by unskilled labour

and gangs. These were the same reasons given by respondents for why they would not return. Return visits home reminded respondents of what life was like in New Zealand and the struggle faced to get ahead. In addition, the wage disparity meant returning would not be economically feasible. Yet, many would have to consider returning if they could not secure their status in Australia through the attainment of permanent residency and citizenship.

# CHAPTER 6: LIFE IN AUSTRALIA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

## 6.1 Introduction

A migrant's transnational practices can affect their integration into the destination country. This chapter details the economic, community, social, and overall integration of respondents into Australia. Political integration will be discussed in the following chapter. Each of these dimensions of integration is influenced and shaped by different actors at the micro-, meso- and macro-scales. The integration of migrants into the destination country has commonly been examined by looking at their structural and socio-cultural integration (J. Bell, 2016; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). *Structural* indicators include their education level and labour market position in relation to the host society, access to employment opportunities and their ability to get citizenship (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006). Whereas *socio-cultural* indicators relate to engagement with the host society, adoption of cultural practices, sense of belonging, and the building of social networks (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006). Using data from the New Zealanders living in Australia survey and the semi-structured interviews, this chapter begins by detailing their economic integration, focussing on occupation and workplace integration. Following this, respondents' housing status and their situation will be examined. Section three discusses respondents' experiences making friends in Australia with section four, highlighting the impact cultural stereotypes have had on integration. The last section looks at how respondents viewed their overall experience of living in Australia.

The findings presented in this chapter show that each dimension of integration is highly interlinked and affected by the structures in place in the destination country. While respondents generally felt they had integrated into Australia, this was primarily at the micro- and meso-scales as the government's stance on immigrants and treatment of New Zealanders left them feeling unsettled and disenfranchised. Structural barriers such as the casualisation of employment affected their experience of their workplace, the formation of social networks, their ability to rent a house, and what visa options were available to them. The lived experiences of respondents also highlight how even though an individual may meet all the 'markers' of integration-employment, strong social network, home-ownership, and obtained citizenship- they can still call New Zealand home. This demonstrates how integration is not a

linear process and is continually evolving in response to the dimensions and scales of integration and transnational practices.

## 6.2 Economic integration

In Australia, participation and success in the labour market are tied to the national psyche of a 'fair go.' A 'fair go' is the notion that an individual's effort and hard work are more important than status and family background (Côté et al., 2019). For migrants, having a 'fair go' means having the same employment opportunities as the domestic-born population, their overseas qualifications and employment experience recognised, and not being discriminated against based on their race, ethnicity, or religion (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Structural indicators of employment status, education, and occupational class are commonly used to assess the economic integration of migrants into the destination country (Becker, 2019). However, it has been acknowledged that even though skilled-migrants are granted entry based on their occupational skills, language ability, and education, there are still employment disparities between the overseas-born and Australian-born population (Colic-Peisker, 2011; Hawthorne, 1997). Employment is crucial for migrants as it provides them with an income that dictates the type of accommodation they live in and the lifestyle they can have (OECD & European Union, 2018). While the workplace allows them to interact with others, practice the dominant language, and learn more about the host society (OECD & European Union, 2018).

This section uses occupation and employment experiences to examine the economic integration of New Zealand migrants. The occupation of New Zealanders is discussed because under the TTTA they are not required to have an occupation on the SOL nor need to complete regional work to extend their visa. Migrants who enter through the skilled permanent and temporary streams are considered highly skilled as the occupations on the SOL typically have an occupational skill level of one. Requiring a relevant tertiary qualification and at least five years' work experience. Among Temporary Work (skilled) visa holders and permanent skilled visa holders, 10.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively are employed as Business, Human Resource and Marketing Professionals. This broad category includes Accountants, Management Consultants and Marketing Specialists, occupations that are on the SOL. Whereas, WHMs whose time in Australia is a mix of work and travel are often employed in low-skilled jobs, even if they have a tertiary qualification. The requirement of three- or six-months regional work has meant WHMs are primarily employed as Hospitality Workers (15.2

per cent), Factory Process Workers (12.6 per cent), and Farm Forestry and Garden Workers (11.4 per cent). This polarisation between the occupations and skill levels of different visa holders indicates how the Australian government utilises migrants to fill occupational shortages in urban, regional, and rural Australia.

### 6.2.1 Occupation and employment experiences

Section 5.2 found that employment opportunities and higher income were why many of the survey respondents moved to Australia. Given the importance of the employment opportunities available in Australia, this section discusses the respondent's employment experiences. Income was cited as one of the main motivating factors for moving to Australia. The median income amongst respondents was AUD$1,216 per week (AUD$63,264 per year), which was higher than the New Zealand-born census population, which had a median income of AUD$840 (ABS, 2016). Just under two-thirds (64.3 per cent) of respondents indicated that their current income was higher than the income they had received in New Zealand. Similar percentages said their income was comparable (9 per cent) or less (8.4 per cent) than what they received in New Zealand. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present a comparison of the income received in Australia versus New Zealand for female and male respondents in the top five occupations for each gender. Respondents across all occupations predominantly indicated that they currently earned a higher income in Australia, with 80.5 per cent of Midwifery and Nursing Professionals, indicating they made more than they did in New Zealand.

**Table 6.1: Comparison of income received in Australia versus New Zealand for female respondents in the top five occupations, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level**

| How does your current income compare to the income you received in New Zealand? | 132 Business Administration Managers (%) | 225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals (%) | 254 Midwifery and Nursing Professionals (%) | 411 Health and Welfare Support Workers (%) | 531 General Clerks (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| More | 72.5 | 64.7 | 80.5 | 75.4 | 65.2 | 72.6 |
| Comparable | 13.7 | 11.8 | 7.8 | 7.7 | 13.0 | 10.5 |
| Less | 5.9 | 2.9 | 5.2 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 7.1 |
| Prefer not to answer | | 5.9 | | | 2.9 | 1.4 |
| Not applicable | 7.8 | 14.7 | 6.5 | 7.7 | 8.7 | 8.4 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=296*

**Table 6.2: Comparison of income received in Australia versus New Zealand for male respondents in the top five occupations, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level**

| How does your current income compare to the income you received in New Zealand? | 111 Chief Executives, GM and Legislators (%) | 132 Business Administration Managers (%) | 133 Construction, Distribution and Production Managers (%) | 733 Truck Drivers (%) | 821 Construction and Mining Labourers (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| More | 63.3 | 72.5 | 72.2 | 75.0 | 61.9 | 69.3 |
| Comparable | 10.0 | 13.7 | 13.9 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 12.0 |
| Less | 13.3 | 5.9 | 8.3 | | 4.8 | 7.3 |
| Prefer not to answer | - | - | 2.8 | 8.3 | - | 1.3 |
| Not applicable | 13.3 | 7.8 | 2.8 | 8.3 | 23.8 | 10.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=150*

Respondents had a range of educational backgrounds with secondary school year 10 or above being the highest level of education achieved by 19.9 per cent of respondents followed by certificate III and IV level (18.4 per cent), as apparent in Table 6.3. Professionals, Managers, and Clerical and Administration workers were the primary occupations, with Health Care and Social Assistance, the top industry of employment amongst all respondents. Amongst Professionals, for one-third (34.9 per cent) their highest qualification was a postgraduate degree with 31.7 per cent holding a bachelor's degree. Whereas only a small percentage (3.5 per cent) of Clerical and Administration workers held a postgraduate degree, with the majority (27.9 per cent) having achieved secondary education at year 10 or higher. Based on the highest level of educational attainment, respondents can be classified as middling migrants given the proportion of respondents who have a bachelors degree or below. This is also reflected in the top ten occupations for female and male respondents, presented in Table 6.4 and 6.5, where these occupations reflect the spectrum of ANZSCO occupation skill levels and associated educational levels.

**Table 6.3: Occupation, industry of employment and education of respondents**

| | | Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Occupation, ANZSCO major group code (%)** | 1 Managers | 20.70 | 14.5 | 16.3 |
| | 2 Professionals | 29.3 | 33.9 | 32.6 |
| | 3 Technicians and Trade Workers | 14.60 | 3.6 | 6.7 |
| | 4 Community and Personal Service | 7.6 | 12.8 | 11.4 |
| | 5 Clerical and Administration | 4.0 | 18.9 | 14.7 |
| | 6 Sales Worker | 3.8 | 5.8 | 5.3 |
| | 7 Machinery Operators and Drivers | 10.1 | 1.7 | 4.0 |
| | 8 Labourers | 6.6 | 5.4 | 5.7 |
| | Other nfd* and Self-employed | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| **Top five industries of employment (%)** | Health Care and Social Assistance | 6.9 | 24.8 | 19.7 |
| | Education and Training | 8.1 | 13.2 | 11.7 |
| | Retail Trade | 3.4 | 7.7 | 6.5 |
| | Professional, Scientific and Technical Services | 7.4 | 5.9 | 6.3 |
| | Construction | 12.3 | 3.0 | 5.6 |
| **Highest level of education (%)** | Postgraduate Degree Level | 16.5 | 15.9 | 15.2 |
| | Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level | 6.0 | 7.5 | 7.2 |
| | Bachelor Degree Level | 16.1 | 18.6 | 17.4 |
| | Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level | 14.9 | 15.0 | 14.8 |
| | Certificate III & IV Level | 19.0 | 17.3 | 18.4 |
| | Secondary Education - Years 10 and above | 20.2 | 19.3 | 19.9 |
| | Certificate I & II Level | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| | Secondary Education - Years 9 and below | 5.3 | 4.1 | 4.9 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Occupation n1 male=396, n1 female=1028, n1 total=1425, Education n2 male=436, n2 female= 1159, n2 total=1597*

*\*nfd=not further defined*

While Table 6.3 summarises of the occupations held by respondents, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 display the top ten occupations for female and male respondents at the ANZSCO 3-digit level compared to the 2016 Australian census. Table 6.4 shows there was an overrepresentation of Midwifery and Nursing Professionals and an underrepresentation of Sales Assistants and Salespersons when comparing the female survey population to the census data. The underrepresentation of Sales Assistants and Salespersons may be related to the age of the survey respondents, who were primarily aged between 40 and 54. From the census data, only 4.8 per cent of 40-44-year-olds were employed as Sales Assistants and Salespersons compared to 14.1 per cent of 20-24-year-olds (ABS, 2016). The top occupations amongst the census population also included Personal Carers and Assistants (4.7 per cent), Account Clerks and Bookkeepers (3.7 per cent), and School Teachers (2.9 per cent).

**Table 6.4: Top ten occupations for female respondents compared to female New Zealand-born population Australian census 2016, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level**

| ANZSCO minor group code | Survey (%) | Census (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 254 Midwifery and Nursing Professionals | 7.6 | 4.5 |
| 531 General Clerks | 6.4 | 3.6 |
| 411 Health and Welfare Support Workers | 5.1 | 1.9 |
| 132 Business Administration Managers | 3.7 | 1.5 |
| 225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals | 3.6 | 1.4 |
| 621 Sales Assistants and Salespersons | 3.3 | 6.9 |
| 272 Social and Welfare Professionals | 2.6 | 1.3 |
| 134 Education, Health and Welfare Services Manager | 2.5 | 0.8 |
| 224 Information and Organisation Professionals | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| 811 Cleaners and Laundry Workers | 2.5 | 3.8 |

*Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=952*

Table 6.5 shows that male respondents were primarily employed as Managers, in particular, Construction, Distribution and Production Managers (4.8 per cent), Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators (3.6 per cent), and Business Administration Managers (3.4 per cent). The overrepresentation of respondents in these roles compared to the census data meant there was an underrepresentation of respondents in occupations such as Storepersons, Sales Assistants and Salespersons, and Stationary Plant Operators. In the 2016 census, 3.1 per cent, 3.0 per cent and 2.9 per cent were employed in these occupations respectively, while among survey respondents 0.7 per cent were employed as Storepersons, 1.6 per cent as Sales Assistants and Salespersons, and 1.3 per cent as Stationary Plant Operators (ABS, 2016). Again, given that 29.1 per cent male survey respondents were aged 40-49, and only 8.0 per cent were aged 20-29, it would explain the number of respondents in management positions.

**Table 6.5: Top ten occupations for male respondents compared to male New Zealand-born population Australian census 2016, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level**

| ANZSCO minor group code | Survey (%) | Census (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 133 Construction, Distribution and Production Managers | 4.8 | 3.7 |
| 821 Construction and Mining Labourers | 4.3 | 5.2 |
| 111 Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators | 3.6 | 1.5 |
| 132 Business Administration Managers | 3.4 | 1.0 |
| 733 Truck Drivers | 2.7 | 4.5 |
| 261 Business and Systems Analysts, and Programmers | 2.5 | 1.1 |
| 411 Health and Welfare Support Workers | 2.5 | 0.6 |
| 225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals | 2.3 | 1.2 |
| 331 Bricklayers, and Carpenters and Joiners | 2.0 | 2.3 |
| 341 Electricians | 2.0 | 1.4 |

*Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=373*

Coding respondents' occupations to this level provide a more nuanced understanding of the occupations held and filled by respondents as many of the occupations, held by respondents are not on the SOL. These include General Clerks, Sales Assistants and Salespersons, Cleaners and Laundry Workers, Sales, Marketing and Public Professionals, Health and Welfare Support Workers, Truck Drivers, Construction and Mining Labourers, and Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators. Bricklayers, Electricians and Midwifery and Nursing Professionals are included on the SOL, meaning respondents can, in theory, apply for permanent residency through the skilled points-tested stream or with employer sponsorship. Whereas for respondents who do not have an occupation on the SOL, the only permanent visa pathway available to them is the 189 visa, which is based on income.

Table 6.6 provides insight into respondents' current employment status, how long it took for them to gain employment, the number of jobs held, and length of employment with their current employer. For nearly three-quarters of respondents, they either had a job offer before moving or were employed within the first month of living in Australia. Respondents who indicated 'other' for how long it took them to gain employment had often moved to Australia while still at secondary school, so they had not entered the labour force. While for some female respondents, moving to Australia allowed them to initially stay home and look after their children. Respondents who were not in the labour force included retirees, women caring for young children, or who were the primary carer of family members who had a disability or illness. Other respondents in this group were not working because they had been injured or were ill.

The employment status of respondents is an important indicator of the employment rights they have access to. Respondents were predominantly employed permanently, with 17.3 per cent employed on a contract basis. Those on a contract are employed for a fixed-term generally on a full-time or part-time basis and have the same leave and sick leave entitlements as permanent employees. Whereas those on a casual contract, 7.6 per cent of respondents, are not entitled to paid annual or sick leave and often do not know in advance how many hours they will work each week. Hence, for those employed on a casual or contract basis, there is no guarantee of what their income will be yearly, which can have implications for their ability to meet the income requirements for the 189 visa, which is discussed more in Chapter 7.

**Table 6.6: Current employment status and employment experiences of respondents**

| | | Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Current employment status (%)** | Self-employed/business owner | 10.0 | 7.9 | 8.5 |
| | Employed, working full-time | 65.4 | 50.4 | 54.5 |
| | Employed, working part-time | 5.0 | 17.4 | 14.0 |
| | Employed, casual | 6.4 | 8.1 | 7.6 |
| | Unemployed, looking for full-time work | 3.0 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| | Unemployed, looking for part-time work | 0.9 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| | Not in the labour force | 9.3 | 12.3 | 11.5 |
| **How long did it take you to get employment in Australia? (%)** | Job offer before moving | 32.8 | 20.4 | 23.9 |
| | Less than a month | 39.6 | 41.7 | 41.2 |
| | Longer than a month | 19.7 | 27.0 | 24.9 |
| | Still looking | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.9 |
| | Other | 7.8 | 9.6 | 9.1 |
| **How many jobs have you had while living in Australia? (%)** | 1 | 20.0 | 17.9 | 18.5 |
| | 2 | 20.3 | 21.2 | 20.9 |
| | 3 | 16.3 | 20.0 | 19.1 |
| | 4 | 12.9 | 12.3 | 12.4 |
| | 5 | 8.9 | 10.4 | 10.0 |
| | 6+ | 21.5 | 18.2 | 19.1 |
| **How long have you been in your current job? (%)** | Less than 6 months | 10.1 | 9.5 | 9.7 |
| | 6-12 months | 11.4 | 11.2 | 11.3 |
| | 1-5 years | 40.5 | 43.3 | 42.5 |
| | 6-10 years | 20.5 | 20.8 | 20.7 |
| | 10 years + | 17.4 | 15.1 | 15.8 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018. Employment status n1 male=439, n1 female= 1165, n1 total=1606; Time taken to gain employment n2 male= 414, n2 female= 1068, n2 total=1484; Number jobs n3 male= 418, n3 female= 1089, n3 total=1509; Length in current job n4 male=398, n4 female=1009, n4 total=1409*

While Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 provide an overview of the occupation, education, employment status, and length of employment of respondents, the rest of this section discusses respondents' experiences of gaining employment. Even though one-fifth of respondents had a job offer before moving to Australia and 40 per cent were employed within a month of moving, respondents discussed how employers did not always recognise prior work experience, qualifications, and referees. This made gaining employment in Australia harder than they had expected, as they had thought the strong economic ties, cultural similarities, and shared language would make finding a job in Australia easy. Respondents found that even though they had New Zealand work experience, they were overlooked by employers because they did not have 'Australian' work experience. One respondent even mentioned how an employer accepted their work experience in London, but not their New Zealand experience.

For this respondent, the privileging of their British work experience over their New Zealand experience suggests that for employers, there is a hierarchy in relation to the colonial ties that exist between Australia and Britain, and Australia and New Zealand, and the value they place on the education and work experience gained in each of these countries (Carangio et al., 2020).

In combination with the lack of 'Australian' work experience, respondents mentioned having non-Australian referees as a barrier to gaining employment. The absence of an Australian social network and work connections meant gaining employment took longer than expected. For these respondents, the connections they had helped them gain employment:

> *'I only gained employment because of connections. Not because of my actual individual merits. It makes me feel like my achievements are overlooked.'*
> *(Respondent 1869: Male, 25-29, Retail Assistant, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

> *'Initially, having no Australian work history. Took 6mths to gain employment after I was recommended by a family member at my current workplace.'*
> *(Respondent 750: Female, 40-44, Purchasing Administrator, arrived 2013, SCV 444)*

While for other respondents, they utilised the connections they already had in Australia to gain employment as they recognised the importance of social networks. As this interviewee explained, neither he nor his wife, who was a nurse, had any issues obtaining employment:

> *'We moved over here in 2006, um back then things were going gangbusters, and the best example is, I moved over a month before, I was working same day; basically, someone heard I was over there gave me a call, can you come in, I've pretty much been working ever since if I've taken time off it's because I've wanted to, my wife turned up on Friday morning arranged an interview at the hospital, she was working the Monday morning, she doubled her salary, doubled it, and that was at the lowest pay grade.'* *(Male, 50-54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

For female respondents who had not initially entered the workforce when they moved to Australia because of child-caring responsibilities, they struggled to gain employment when they re-entered the workforce. A female interviewee who was able to be a stay-at-home mum when she moved to Australia due to her husband's increased salary explained that after her marriage broke down, she needed to find employment:

> *'All of my work experience is in NZ, and I haven't been in paid employment since 2000 due to my ex-husband insisting I stay home with our kids. None of my references are contactable any longer. My age also works against me, as does my single-parent status.'* *(Female, 40-49, Security Guard, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

The lack of recognition for qualifications obtained in New Zealand was a surprise for many respondents. Respondents found they needed to get their New Zealand qualification assessed by the relevant accreditation council to work in their chosen field. Yet gaining the accreditation was not something they could afford to do, so they had to get a job in a different field. Other respondents found employers were biased towards those who had obtained a bachelor's degree, meaning employers overlooked those who had obtained a Diploma or Advanced Diploma level education. The lack of recognition of their qualifications became an unanticipated cost for this female interviewee and her husband, who moved to Australia to be with their grandchildren but wanted to continue working in their chosen fields:

> 'It wasn't until we got here that we realised how much of a difference it was, but we came with the mindset that we were going to make things work here, and we did… um I had a lot of skills, I guess um, I didn't know what the job scene was like it was a real shock when we came here, our New Zealand qualifications aren't recognised, it was a bit of a kick in the guts actually… I have a diploma in adult teaching, my husband's a qualified nurse in mental health, but we weren't allowed to use those um credentials here; we actually had to get Australian credentials, so rather than fight the system, we just had to suck it up and do it.' (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444)

Some respondents also mentioned that their visa status and what working rights they had in Australia affected their ability to apply for a job and caused confusion for employers. Respondents said that when applying for jobs online, the automated nature of the application process often omitted New Zealand citizen as an option for residency status. This left the respondents confused as to whether they could apply for the job despite having working rights. While other respondents found employers were unaware of the SCV 444 and asked for evidence of their visa, as this interviewee explained:

> 'Even for me to get that job at [company X] um subclass visa we had to show evidence of our visa and of course our visa never gets stamped, our passport never gets stamped going through customs so um cuz they're all electronically done now days so yeah that was a nightmare…' (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444)

Career progression was also constrained, as being a permanent resident or SCV 444 holder meant they could not apply for jobs that required Australian citizenship. However, many respondents were unable to obtain citizenship because of the permanent residency requirements. This exclusion made respondents reconsider their employment options:

*'Couldn't work for the govt as a NZer, would have done wonders for Disability S[outh]A[ustralia]! So instead [I] started my own business.' (Respondent 332: Female, 35-39, Psychologist, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

These challenges faced by respondents have also been cited as issues by migrants from other countries (ABS, 2020b; Carangio et al., 2020; Colic-Peisker, 2011; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2007; Côté et al., 2019). Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) examined the labour market integration of four refugee groups in Australia. They found that a lack of Australian work experience and Australian referees affected their ability to gain employment. This has also been cited as an issue by high-skilled workers as even though they have an in-demand occupation, often employers still privilege local work experience (Carangio et al., 2020). The building of social networks, therefore, becomes crucial for a migrant's ability to gain employment, yet English language ability can act as a barrier to them doing so (Côté et al., 2019). Hence for respondents, their English language ability and for the majority, identifying as 'white' New Zealand European gives them an advantage because of the ethno-racial prejudices that exist in workplaces (Colic-Peisker, 2011). This ethno-racial advantage is also experienced by migrants from the UK, Ireland, and South Africa who achieve an income that is higher than migrants from other countries and is comparable to the Australian-born population (Colic-Peisker, 2011). Suggesting that at the meso- and macro-levels migrants who have an ethno-racial advantage achieve a higher degree of structural integration.

Even though visa status was mentioned as an issue for some respondents, the TTTA grants them indefinite work rights in Australia. This means respondents' experiences are not entirely comparable to migrants who entered Australia on a temporary work visa. Migrants from other countries often struggled to gain employment because employers would not hire them because of their visa status. Robertson (2014) notes that this leads to underemployment and affects their ability to obtain permanent residency if they cannot get work experience in a job on the SOL. Yet, even once citizenship is gained, migrants can still face discrimination by employers based on their phenotypic appearance (Carangio et al., 2020).

Through the job application process, respondents became aware of the structural differences between New Zealand and Australia. Respondents were surprised by the prevalence of casual contracts in Australia, whereas in New Zealand, they were used to being offered a permanent contract. A female interviewee who moved in 2012 worked as a youth support worker and was only ever offered a short-term casual contract:

*'I've had few, I've been working in the same sector, youth work, I've also noticed the jobs over here aren't secure, in New Zealand, you might be granted a permanent position, permanent is permanent, there's a lot of contract work over here, so we'll give you a job, but we'll give you a three-month contract see how you go extend three months, oh okay so the position doesn't work anymore, we've lost funding, they defund a lot over here, which means I have to jump from position to position which is great, but there's no security in regards to that.' (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

While she found the lack of job security a worry as there was no guarantee she would find another job, she recognised each job allowed her to gain new skills and knowledge.

Another female interviewee who was 55 found being on a casual contract stressful. As a trained primary school teacher, she moved with her then two school-aged daughters in 2006, with the belief that it would be easy to secure a full-time job in her profession. She had thought relief-teaching would lead to a full-time job, but after five years of only ever being offered short-term contracts, she needed a break and got a part-time position in a friend's shop. During this period, she explained:

*'When I had two girls with me, it caused me a lot of stress because trying to pay bills, and knowing sometimes you work every day for three weeks and then you wouldn't get any work for two weeks, so you just it was very hard juggling that and that did cause me a lot of stress, and there were times back then, where I'd say right we're not doing grocery shopping this week, we've got tins in the cupboard, and we're just, I'm not saying we were starving or poor, but I just felt I've got to make this stretch until I get some more work.'*
*(Female, 55-60, Teacher, arrived 2006, SCV 444)*

For the last two years, she had been teaching English to adults on a casual basis but again was becoming increasingly aware of the instability of the job as they could just cancel classes if no students were booked in. However, while she had employment at this stage, she knew her age would impede her ability to gain employment in the future. To mitigate this, she ensured all her bills were paid in advance and had saved up enough money to last her a year in the event she could not get another job. Especially given she is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Like this interviewee, other respondents knew their age had begun to affect their ability to change jobs. Respondents expressed that:

*'I now work in [the] corporate industry and now at middle age that I'm feeling opportunities may not be as abundant.' (Respondent 505: Unknown gender and age, Administration, arrived 1999, PSCV)*

*'Ageism - although I'm always told "a more qualified person won the position." (Respondent 2002: Male, 60-64, unemployed, arrived 1989, Australian citizen)*

Respondents also found that they were rejected from jobs because they did not have the requisite qualifications but had the relevant work experience. However, further study was not viewed as a feasible option given the cost to do so, and there being no guarantee of getting a job at the end.

Respondents' experiences with the ageism and casualisation of labour reflect existing issues in the Australian labour market. Gringart et al. (2005) found that amongst employers, there was systematic negative stereotyping towards older workers as they perceived older workers to be less adaptable, less creative, lacking interest in new technology and to be less healthy and less physically strong. This perception has meant that on average, those aged 55 and over are unemployed for 130 weeks and are unlikely to find continuous employment before retirement age. The inability of older people to find permanent employment is linked to the expansion of casual employment in Australia over the last thirty years. Currently, approximately 25 per cent of the workforce is employed casually (Gilfillan, 2018). Those on a casual contract are not entitled to sick and annual leave and are not guaranteed regular hours or future work (Campbell, 1996). Burgess et al. (2008) note that this has implications on individuals' ability to access loans, apply for rental properties, superannuation, and holidays. This situation differs from New Zealand, where those on casual contracts after six months are entitled to sick, and bereavement leave if they have worked at least 40 hours a month (Employment New Zealand, 2020). The example of the primary school teacher above highlighted how being on a casual contract adds extra stress for New Zealanders. In particular, those on an SCV 444 visa, as they are not entitled to any social security meaning if they lost their job or there was a long period of unemployment, they would have to rely on their savings to continue living in Australia or consider returning to New Zealand.

## 6.2.2 Workplace integration

For working migrants, most of their day and experiences in the destination country occur at work. Having a positive or negative experience in their place of employment or struggling to get work can affect their integration and sense of belonging (Jaskulowski, 2018; van Riemsdijk, 2014). Overall, survey respondents felt well integrated into their workplace. Feeling integrated was influenced by their work environment, length of employment, expertise, and

position within the workplace. Having a positive and welcoming work environment where the respondents knew their colleagues and boss valued their work and opinions made respondents feel a part of their workplace. One respondent said:

> *'My work is in a close-knit team, working together on a large, complex data analysis project, and my contribution is acknowledged and appreciated, both by my immediate team and the division and its managers we are nested within. I am fortunate to be with a very pleasant, well-managed entity.' (Respondent 257: Male, 55-59, Spatial Data Analyst, arrived 2006, PR)*

Many respondents also spoke of their work colleagues being like family:

> *'The group I work with have been amazing, they have welcomed me with open arms and have almost become like a second family to me, I am extremely lucky.' (Respondent 382: Male, 20-24, Station Agent, arrived 2015, SCV 444)*

Being recognised for their expertise and knowledge in their field contributed to respondents' workplace satisfaction:

> *'I'm a specialist in my team. I earned the double promotion for showing my commitment to the business through exceptional performance. Being a lead means my trusted advice is sought from other specialists and team leaders. I'm the go-to and 2IC for my team. Plus, in general, Kiwi's appear to be liked (for being different) in the workplaces I've been a part of.' (Respondent 1818: Unknown gender and age, Team Specialist, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Other respondents had been given training opportunities or, in some instances, had their university education paid for by their employer which provided promotion and career growth opportunities. Rajendran et al. (2020) discuss how employers are vital for facilitating the workplace integration of migrants. Being part of the decision-making process and information sharing allows migrants to feel like they belong and enhance their subjective career outcomes (Rajendran et al., 2020).

Numerous respondents were in senior positions within their workplace. Being a manager for the company they worked for meant they were often responsible for shaping the workplace environment to make it welcoming and inclusive:

> *'Senior manager in a large company. Social club member. Take part in events outside work hours.' (Respondent 2023: Male, 60-64, R&D Director, arrived 2011, PR)*

> *'My role is a support role to various directors, and I have gained a few awards for my hard work. We also make sure our team enjoys out of work*

*drinks/dinners etc.' (Respondent 335: Female 25-29, Valuations Administration Coordinator, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

*'I work for a new startup, [a] team of 17 people and a big part of the role is working to build culture.' (Respondent 1880: Female, 35-39, Head of Customer Success, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

Interestingly, while many respondents spoke of becoming friends with work colleagues when asked about their experience making friends, few respondents discussed this when asked about their integration into their workplace.

Respondents who felt less integrated into their workplace cited the reasons for this related to their employment status and workplace. Being employed on a casual or contract basis meant respondents were not fully included in their workplace. As one respondent explained:

*'Contractors are treated differently to perm staff. Not kept in [the] loop of communication and not invited to social events.' (Respondent 1675: Female 50-54, Change Analyst, arrived 2014, SCV 444)*

There was also uncertainty for those employed on a casual basis as they did not know how long they would have their job for:

*'I'm employed casually by a university, and I feel a part of my workplace for the moment, but I am uncertain whether I will have work next semester and my employers won't engage in conversation about my ongoing prospects, which makes me feel highly dispensable.'* (Respondent 1878: Male, 30-34, Teaching Associate/Research Assistant, arrived 2012, SCV 444)

While for another respondent:

*'It is a casual technician role, with no real challenges or room for promotion, so there is no real sense of being important in the workplace role.' (Respondent 1418: Male, 40-44, Technician, arrived 2008, SCV 444)*

As discussed in the above section, being employed casually is an issue nationally. The uncertainty of hours affects an individual's ability to become a part of their workplace and to be involved in the decision-making process. Casual employees do not receive or have access to the same level of work-related training as permanent employees, limiting career advancement (Markey & McIvor, 2018).

Working in an environment with a poor workplace culture affected workplace integration. Being employed for a large organisation meant many respondents felt they were just a number and therefore treated just like everyone else. For these respondents, it limited their engagement with people in the company to those in their immediate team. Other

136

respondents found that poor management and Australian workplace culture restricted the formation of a positive work environment:

> *'Some resentment from a few staff when I was made ongoing/permanent ahead of them and they had been there a few years. I don't see this as my issue, I see it as there [sic] problem.'* (Respondent 793: Female, 40-44, Teacher, arrived 2017, SCV 444)

While another respondent spoke of the bullying they received at work:

> *'It's a very disloyal industry (cosmedical). Meetings get held about you, in front of you. A lot of bullying and threatening tactics from head office. No trust or loyalty so I find it difficult to fit in when it's all fake.' (Respondent 1856: Female, 35-39, Laser Technician, arrived 2009, RRV)*

These workplace experiences are not unique to respondents. In Australia, nearly one-third of mental health workers' compensation claims are because of harassment/bullying, with female employees three times more likely to make a claim for harassment/bullying (safe work Australia, 2017). Reid et al.'s (2020) comparison of the workplace experiences of Australian-born and migrants from New Zealand, India, and the Philippines found there was no statistically significant difference in the prevalence of bullying by migrant status, with females from each group being more likely to report being bullied than males. Similar to the issues identified by respondents', Reid et al. (2020) also found that lack of support from supervisors and colleagues was the strongest predictor of workplace bullying.

Some respondents spoke of how not drinking, having children, or following the AFL[5] limited their ability to engage with their work colleagues. These differences in interests and/or life stage meant respondents struggled to find commonalities with colleagues that were not based on work. Discussions of sport, in particular AFL, highlighted cultural differences between Australia and New Zealand and how central it is to build friendships with colleagues. As one respondent explained:

> *'The workplace tries hard to encourage a collaborative workplace culture and environment. It relies heavily on AFL, which I try to get [into] but haven't managed to click with it, so I pretend to go along with it [to] get along with people.'* (Respondent 62: Female, 30-34, Claims Assessor, arrived 2013, SCV 444)

---

[5]Australian rules football is a played exclusively in Australia and is one of the main sports followed, whereas in New Zealand, rugby union and rugby league are the dominant sporting codes played and watched.

For another respondent, they struggled to fit in simply because they were not Australian. Needing to learn about sport, news, or politics was also cited by skilled migrants as important for facilitating workplace integration (Rajendran et al., 2017). These topics helped skilled migrants socialise with colleagues; however, this often did not translate to socialising outside the workplace (Rajendran et al., 2017).

## 6.3   Housing status and situation

Housing status can be an indicator of the economic success and integration of a migrant into the destination country (Constant et al., 2009; Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012). For migrants buying a house is viewed as putting roots down and not wanting to leave the destination country (Ryan, 2019; Ryan & Mulholland, 2014b; Steiner, 2019). However, the ability of a migrant to purchase a house is influenced by their visa status. Forrest et al. (2014) found that unsurprisingly, skilled permanent migrants were more likely to be homeowners compared to those on a temporary business visa. This is because permanent migrants are more likely to have employment security and plan on living in the destination country for the foreseeable future (Constant et al., 2009). The desire to buy a home can also be influenced by how homeownership is perceived in the origin and destination countries. In Australia and New Zealand, in addition to other countries such as the USA, Japan, and the UK, achieving homeownership symbolises an individual's economic success as they can provide a home for their family, which offers security and stability for the future (Dupuis & Thorns, 1998). It is also viewed as an important milestone as it symbolises having 'made it' as an adult.

Since living in Australia, just over three-quarters of respondents' housing status had changed. Upon moving to Australia 28.7 per cent of respondents could initially live with friends and/or family. Just over half (51.2 per cent) were renting, with 3 per cent initially living in a hotel/hostel, and interestingly 8.1 per cent were living in their own home. For one-third of respondents, their initial housing situation was as a couple-household with child/ren (34.2 per cent), with 10.5 per cent of these respondents with a child/ren under the age of five. One-fifth were a couple only household (22.2 per cent), 15.3 per cent were a single-person household, 7.8 per cent were living with other family members and 8.8 per cent were living in a shared house.

Respondents who could initially live with family and/or friends had differing experiences. A male interviewee in his thirties lived with friends who were already living in Melbourne before he moved:

> *Researcher: So, were you able to move in with friends, or did they help you get set up here?*
>
> *Interviewee: Yeah totally, um two of my good friends were living together in a sharehouse in Northcote, so I stayed with them, um I sublet let a room when the other housemates went away for three months, and that was like a really sort of soft introduction, and then through people I met through them I found a house to live in. (Male, 30-34, Teaching/research associate, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

The importance of social networks in facilitating migration and helping individuals adjust to living in a new country has been noted by researchers such as Conradson and Latham (2005), amongst others. Their research on New Zealanders living in London found that friendship groups were crucial in facilitating an individual's move to London. Friends already there could provide somewhere to stay, emotional support, and information about jobs and life in London more generally (Conradson & Latham, 2005).

Whereas for another male interviewee who moved to Australia with his wife and three young children, being able to live with his in-laws allowed them to find their feet:

> *We actually lived with our in-laws for 4 years, and um because we were financially struggling with the recession that occurred in NZ we ran a small business out there, and yeah so the in-laws kindly put us up for just shy of 4 years.'*

He later explained that:

> *'Ahhh, living with the in-laws, it caused, it created its own problems too, um we lived on our own and had our own independence and things and living under the roof of someone else's rule was challenging and it put a fair strain on the marriage I suppose.' (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

As this household situation affected his relationship with his wife and children, he decided to get a job in the mines. This allowed him to earn more money, which enabled them to afford to rent a place of their own before purchasing a house.

Needing to find somewhere to rent after living with family acted as a reminder that New Zealand and Australia were, in fact, different countries. A female interviewee who moved with her husband could initially live with one of their children. Despite having savings, without

secure employment and evidence of income, it made getting a rental challenging, as she explained:

> *'We were lucky enough to have a place to live, but then when we wanted to move out, um we couldn't get a house, so it took us two months to get a house, so we'd been here two months before we applied, we applied for one house, because of the area and the rent we could afford, only on one payment we were declined, I just got word that I had a job, they wanted to see my pay slip, hadn't started yet, it was only the fact that I talked to a um real-estate agent, that listed the property, her husband was kiwi, so she said I'll give you a chance, I said please please, we weren't on our knees when we did that, but basically, we were.. they were worried about whether or not we able to survive financially and pay the rent, very different lifestyle over here in regards to that, even though we had referees from New Zealand, no one was going to ring New Zealand they wanted a history here, hmm so that was a bit of a put-off.' (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

The experiences of the male interviewee above and this female interviewee show how Australian based family networks are utilised upon migration. This practice is not unique to respondents. For example, Ryan et al.'s (2008) research on Polish migrants in London found familial networks were used to provide housing while they set themselves up and looked for work.

Respondents were asked to indicate their current housing status and situation at the time of the survey. For just over three-quarters of respondents, their housing status and/or situation had changed since living in Australia. Over half were now living in their own home, with 7.6 per cent in the process of purchasing a house. One-third were renting, 1.8 per cent were living with family and/or friends, and for 2.1 per cent their housing status had not changed. For the majority of respondents, their household situation had changed since living in Australia. Only 2.5 per cent were currently living in a share house compared to 8.8 per cent when they initially moved to Australia. There were more respondents in couple only households (29.2 per cent), and the number in a single person household has decreased slightly to 11.9 per cent. Just under one-third of households were a couple with children. Amongst all respondents, 8.8 per cent had gone from being a couple with child/ren to a couple-only household.

These changes in housing status and situation provide insight into the life stage of respondents and how it has changed since living in Australia. The life stages associated with forming a relationship, getting married, having children often result in changes in household status and situation which are not related to their status as a migrant. It is important to recognise that

these results indicate respondents' housing situation and status at two specific points in time and do not adequately capture the housing career they have had while in Australia. Turner and Hedman (2014, p. 271, emphasis in original) define housing careers as 'a *sequence* of dwellings where each step is related to prior and potentially also future steps,' and is influenced by a range of socio-economic factors including income and life stage.

This male interviewee who moved to Melbourne with his wife and two children in 2010, explained the elements that needed to be considered when choosing where to live in Melbourne after initially living in a company-provided house:

> *'So when I came over [company x] put me in one of their houses, for a couple of months to give you time to find your own location and do all that stuff so that was um you know not without its stresses…so finding a school, you know that was our priority when we had that consultant we visited three or 4 different primary schools, we chose [primary school A]… In hindsight I wouldn't have done it that way, I would have looked at houses and suburbs rather than schools, cuz one primary school is pretty much as good as the next, but at the time we didn't really think of it that way. The first house we rented was in Glen Waverley, and actually looking back now, that was stressful trying to find rental accommodation, that was hard and [company x] wasn't really helping us with that…we landed a magnificent house, we really landed on our feet, and we stayed there for a couple of years, and we're still in the same area by that time we got to know the South Eastern suburbs a lot better, now own a house in Mount Waverley which we bought for the public school, for the zone, so my kids go to a really very good school, a high ranking school, which we bought the house for quite deliberately to be in that zone.' (Male, 45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Being able to provide a stable home life was important to him because, throughout his childhood, he always moved because of his parents' work. This meant he could never form a solid and stable friendship group and so wanted his children to move through primary, high school, and university with the same friendship group. The school zoning system also shaped what neighbourhood he wanted to purchase a house in, and hence the community he became a part of.

Another male interviewee who moved to Brisbane with his wife in 2006, initially lived with friends before renting an apartment which they lived in for six months. Before moving into the apartment, they had wanted to purchase a property but required proof of income get a mortgage. Because of this restriction, they built a townhouse that they lived in before finding out they were having twins. They then purchased a house '*more suitable for kids'* which was close to the local primary school and airport:

*'We've got a good cohort of friends, the kids have, the local primary schools just up there it's fantastic, so it's not like we're upset, but you know maybe this comes back to being a geographer is a sense of place, and even though we've lived in this house for 9 years, and lived here for 11 or 12 years, um, I'm not Australian, I'm a New Zealander.' (Male, 50-54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

Trying to purchase a house shortly after arriving in Australia demonstrates the structural barriers that exist in buying a home in Australia and how for migrants, they are made to delay buying a house. This interviewee's experience also suggests that even though he meets the indicators of integration discussed in this chapter and the academic literature - employment, the formation of a social network, homeownership, and Australian citizenship - the subjective understanding of integration is complex. Identifying as a New Zealander does not show how he has integrated into Australia but highlights the importance of his New Zealand identity and his connection to New Zealand as the place where he was born and grew up.

## 6.4   Social networks

Social integration refers to a migrant's ability to form new social networks and/or capital in the destination country (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Social capital, defined by Bourdieu (1986, p. 248) is 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.' For migrants, these networks are established through ties of kinship and friendship that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the destination country (Massey et al., 1993). While social capital may aid integration, de Haas (2010) notes that having a large amount of social capital does not indicate a higher degree of social integration, as those who are viewed as having less social capital may be highly integrated. Various factors shape the ability of a migrant to build their social capital and integrate. These include the age of migration, prior migration experiences, the extent of engagement with the native population, and the make-up of an individual's close circle of friends (Fokkema & de Haas, 2015). While these migrant characteristics and degree of engagement with the native population play a role in social network formation, Ryan and Mulholland (2014a) argue that the process of social network formation is based on commonalities that exist between people irrespective of where they were born. Work, common business interests, leisure activities, shared familial circumstances, or living in the same neighbourhood are all utilised to build relationships (Ryan & Mulholland, 2014a).

Chapter 5 found that most respondents had family, friends and/or colleagues already living in Australia before they migrated. For many, these relations contributed to their decision to move with 45.4 per cent knowing a New Zealander who lived in the same location as themselves. Over two-thirds (67.9 per cent) moved with their partner or family and 31.3 per cent moved by themselves. Amongst those who moved by themselves, the majority had friends already living in Australia, and only 18.2 per cent knew no one living there. The previous sections of this chapter have highlighted the importance of these existing social networks, as respondents could live with family/friends when they moved or gain employment through them. Moving with family or being able to live with family/friends provides migrants with a support network helping them to navigate and deal with the challenges associated with living in an unfamiliar place and the loneliness and isolation that can bring (Ryan et al., 2008; White & Ryan, 2008). Yet even with these existing support networks, the stressors associated with moving to a new country can cause the breakdown of relationships.

Figure 6.1 shows that respondents most often socialised with Australians or people from both countries.



**Figure 6.1: Composition of respondents' social networks**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1850*

Even though respondents socialised with Australians, they often found it difficult to break into existing social networks. These respondents explained that:

> *'It can be hard as a lot of Australians have their circle of friends that they grew up with and sometimes don't tend to venture outside that circle.' (Respondent 128: Male, 46-49, Videotape Editor, arrived 2003, SCV 444)*

> *'Sydney people are very clicky & tend to just stick in their group of friends that they made at school. Luckily most of my friends who are from Sydney I had met in London & we all moved back to Sydney together. The majority of other friends I have made in Sydney are Australian, but from out of Sydney or are English or Kiwis. Sydney people I generally find are quite pretentious & not genuine anyway.' (Respondent 180: Female, 30-34, Senior Skin Therapist, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Becoming friends with Australians who had moved interstate and/or with migrants from other countries was easier, as there was a shared understanding of what it was like to be a foreigner in a new city and/or country. Having this commonality allowed respondents to build deeper friendships, as many felt their friendships with Australians who had always lived in the same city were more surface level. For this respondent, the effort they put into forming friendships was not reciprocated by the friends they had made:

> *'Very difficult. We have work colleagues & people we have met on social occasions, but we have no close friends. We have invited numerous people to our house for dinner or drinks in an attempt to form a closer friendship, but it is never reciprocated. The same can be said for our children. Their friends spend a lot of time at our house, sometimes staying for days, but our children do not get invited for sleepovers & if they go to their friend's house, invariably, it is for a matter of minutes before they end up coming to our house. Friendship is probably the thing I miss most since moving to Australia.' (Respondent 2: Female, 55-59, Caregiver, arrived 2002, SCV 444)*

This left respondents' feeling lonely and isolated as they were could not build a strong social network in Australia and lead them to question whether this was because of cultural differences between Australia and New Zealand:

> *'They are not kiwis. They don't drop by, don't offer a cup of tea, they don't invite us to their homes they meet in parks, coffee shops.' (Respondent 137: Female, 50-54, Teacher, arrived, 2001, SCV 444)*

> *'Have some great friendships but have known some people for years and never been invited into their house - quite different from what I remember in NZ.' (Respondent 87: Female, 55-59, Personal Trainer, arrived 1998, PSCV)*

These experiences of making friends are similar to the challenges identified by respondents in Ryan and Mulholland's (2014a) research on French information and communication technology professionals living in London. Respondents in their research found it easier to make friends with other migrants, as they were more welcoming and had no roots or family in London. They also found that respondents expected to be invited to someone's house for dinner as they viewed this as a sign of friendship rather than socialising at the pub after work, despite this being an important aspect of British workplace culture.

As respondents were of working age when they moved to Australia, the workplace becomes an important place for friendship formation. Many of the respondents found forming friendships at work easy and viewed it as a positive experience. While for others, their employment status as a casual or shift worker made becoming friends with colleagues challenging as they did not have regular work hours. As this respondent explained:

> *'Tough. Have lived here for 6 years and have made one good friend. Have met others through jobs but only seemed to talk to them when I was working with them. Don't hear much from them now.' (Respondent 673: Female 25-29, Guest Services Agent, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

Respondents' position within their workplace and age was also a hindrance:

> *'It has been hard in Melbourne as my kids are older and not at school, and my role at work is as a Manager which limits social group. As an older person (45-50 years), I have found that this age group is already very settled and less open to new people.' (Respondent 785: Unknown gender and age, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

Again, these experiences are like those identified by Ryan and Mulholland (2014a). Rajendran et al. (2017) also found that highly skilled migrants in Australia rarely socialised with work colleagues and instead needed to form friendships outside the workplace.

Like the respondents in Ryan and Mulholland (2014a) and Rajendran et al.'s (2017) research, respondents in this research mentioned joining a sports team and attending church as a way of building friendships based on common interests and beliefs. This respondent discussed the importance of sport:

> *'In rural areas like Orange it was hard to make friends outside of work at first, but once I included myself into sports groups I was quickly making friends.' (Respondent 1971: Male, 25-29, Parts Interpreter, arrived 2014, SCV 444)*

While for some respondents, the birth of children or having primary school-aged children allowed them to make friends through parenting groups, school pick up/drop off and/or their children's extracurricular activities:

> *'It wasn't until we had our first child that I made some actual friends and not just neighbours or acquaintances.' (Respondent 418: Male, 40-44, Administration, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

The relationships formed through children, parenting groups, and sports clubs help to embed an individual into their local community and can enhance a sense of belonging (Ryan, 2019). However, other respondents cited balancing work and childcare left them little time to socialise and that some friendships formed were only based on convenience:

> *'More opportunity to make friends when you have kids, but nothing in common besides kids.' (Respondent 1928: Female, 45-49, Transcriptionist, arrived 1996, PSCV)*

Respondents, like those who have moved interstate or from another country, face challenges building their social networks and capital in Australia. Despite these challenges, respondents generally felt they had become socially integrated into Australia, as Figure 6.2 shows. Amongst those who did not feel integrated, they believed this was because of the racism they experienced, the cultural differences between the two countries, their age, and being unable to break into existing friendship networks.



**Figure 6.2: Whether or not respondents felt they had socially integrated**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1852*

While under ten per cent of respondents actively socialised with New Zealanders (see Figure 6.1), 40.3 per cent were a member of a New Zealand migrant group or organisation in Australia. This engagement was primarily through online groups or pages on *Facebook*. Respondents mainly followed pages aimed at New Zealanders living in Australia in addition to pages and groups set up for New Zealanders living in a specific area. For example, many said they followed pages such as *Kiwis in Australia* and *Iwi in Aus,* which shares relevant news stories from Australia and New Zealand. Others had joined closed *Facebook* groups, such as *Kiwis in Melbourne*, *Kiwis in the GC* (Gold Coast), and *Western Sydney Kiwis,* which provides a platform to connect with New Zealanders living in that area, allowing them to ask questions, search for housemates or ask for help when needed. In addition to these general and specific pages and groups, respondents also followed *OZ Kiwi,* which is the main advocacy group for New Zealanders living in Australia. *Oz Kiwi* shares relevant news articles, provides information about the pathways to permanent residency and citizenship available, and campaigns for the rights of New Zealanders. Other respondents followed professional organisations such as KEA, which connects ex-patriate New Zealanders across the globe and provides networking and business opportunities. Some respondents were a part of local community groups that included kapa haka[6] and te reo Māori language groups. Others were involved with *The Koha Shed*, a charity that assists those in need through the donation of food, money, and goods.

## 6.5 Racism

The majority of respondents had experienced racism and discrimination since living in Australia (Figure 6.3). In this context, racism is based on 'new' rather than 'old' racism. Old racism refers to discrimination based on the sociobiological understanding of race, while new racism is the intolerance of specific cultural groups shaped by historical constructions of national identity (Dunn et al., 2004). In Australia, national identity and belonging is defined as being white, allowing Anglo-Celtic Australians to make judgements about belongs (Dunn et al., 2004; Kamp, 2010). However, through this understanding of 'new' racism, even those who are 'white' can experience discrimination based on their accent, cultural practices, and/or stereotypes. Amongst respondents who identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European, just

---

[6] Kapa haka is the term for Māori performing arts which involves song, dance and chanting. The most famous example is the haka as performed by the New Zealand national rugby union team, the *All Blacks*.

under half (49 per cent) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that they had experienced racism and discrimination, while for those who identified as Māori it was 55 per cent.



**Figure 6.3: Whether respondents had experienced racism and discrimination since living in Australia**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1839*

Table 6.7 shows that just under one-quarter of respondents living in the Northern Territory 'strongly agreed' with the statement '*I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia*' compared to only 2.7 per cent of those living in the Australian Capital Territory. Those living in South Australia and Queensland were the most likely to select 'agree,' 42 per cent and 39.2 per cent, respectively. However, those from South Australia were also most likely to indicate they 'strongly disagreed' with this statement. Aggregating the 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' categories into one variable and the 'agree' and 'strongly agree' into another variable, found there was no statistically significant relationship between racism and state of residence ($\chi^2$(14, *N*=1825)=18.17, *p*=.199).

**Table 6.7: Experiences of racism and discrimination by state of residence**

| I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia | QLD (%) | NSW (%) | VIC (%) | SA (%) | TAS (%) | WA (%) | NT (%) | ACT (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 15.5 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 24.0 | 22.2 | 15.6 | 19.2 | 21.6 | 15.7 |
| Disagree | 15.5 | 21.4 | 19.0 | 14.0 | 22.2 | 15.3 | 19.2 | 27.0 | 17.7 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 17.3 | 16.3 | 21.3 | 12.0 | 22.2 | 16.0 | 11.5 | 10.8 | 17.5 |
| Agree | 39.2 | 31.8 | 32.1 | 42.0 | 22.2 | 36.3 | 26.9 | 37.8 | 35.5 |
| Strongly agree | 12.5 | 15.8 | 13.1 | 8.0 | 11.1 | 16.8 | 23.1 | 2.7 | 13.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1825*

Table 6.8 displays the results of a cross-tabulation between responses to experiences of racism and discrimination and the respondent's ethnicity. Respondents who identified as Pacific Islander or Māori were more likely to have indicated that they 'strongly agreed' to have experienced racism and discrimination. Just over one-third of Pākehā/New Zealand European respondents had either 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagree' with that statement. A chi-square test for independence revealed that there is no statistically significant relationship between experiences of racism and ethnicity ($\chi^2$(16, $N$=1620)=21.56, $p$=.158)

**Table 6.8: Experiences of racism and discrimination by primary ethnic identity**

| I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia | Pākehā/NZ European (%) | Māori (%) | Pacific Islander (%) | Māori/Pākehā (%) | Other (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly disagree | 16.4 | 12.9 | 7.5 | 17.9 | 18.8 | 15.9 |
| Disagree | 18.7 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 7.1 | 16.7 | 17.9 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 16.0 | 18.2 | 12.5 | 17.9 | 25.0 | 16.8 |
| Agree | 36.2 | 37.3 | 35.0 | 42.9 | 26.0 | 35.8 |
| Strongly agree | 12.8 | 17.7 | 20.0 | 14.3 | 13.5 | 13.6 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1620*

Respondents working as Labourers were the most likely to indicate they 'strongly agreed' to have experienced racism and discrimination followed by Community and Personal Service Workers, presented in Table 6.9. Roughly one-third of respondents across all occupations 'agreed' that they had experienced racism and discrimination. Amongst respondents who had selected 'agree,' just under half (48.9 per cent) indicated they felt a part of their workplace 'a great deal', and 43.6 per cent indicated they felt socially integrated 'a great deal.' The relationship between experiences of racism and discrimination and occupation was found to be statistically significant ($\chi^2$(28, $N$=1488)=60.59, $p$=.029).

**Table 6.9: Experiences of racism and discrimination by occupation, ANZSCO major group code**

| ANZSCO major group code | I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Agree | Strongly agree | Total |
| 1 Managers (%) | 20.1 | 16.1 | 16.1 | 32.1 | 15.7 | 100.0 |
| 2 Professionals (%) | 14.2 | 22.0 | 14.8 | 35.5 | 13.4 | 100.0 |
| 3 Technicians and Trade Workers (%) | 16.7 | 15.7 | 18.6 | 40.2 | 8.8 | 100.0 |
| 4 Community and Personal Service Workers (%) | 12.5 | 18.8 | 15.9 | 35.8 | 17.0 | 100.0 |
| 5 Clerical and Administration Workers (%) | 11.9 | 15.9 | 23.8 | 35.7 | 12.8 | 100.0 |
| 6 Sales Workers (%) | 13.6 | 25.9 | 11.1 | 38.3 | 11.1 | 100.0 |
| 7 Machinery Operators and Drivers (%) | 13.8 | 13.8 | 20.0 | 38.5 | 13.8 | 100.0 |
| 8 Labourers (%) | 16.9 | 6.7 | 22.5 | 32.6 | 21.3 | 100.0 |
| Total (%) | 14.9 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 35.4 | 14.2 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1488*

When respondents discussed racism, they frequently mentioned their accent being mocked, or jokes being made about sheep shagging or being a 'dole bludger.' These experiences occurred amongst respondents' social networks and in their workplace. Respondents found comments made by friends tiresome and often led to the ending of friendships:

> *'Can be quite hard as the majority of Australians I have met make fun of my Kiwi accent...even after 5 years of knowing me.'*

The mocking of their accent was an expected part of moving to Australia because of their pronunciation of words such as 'six,' 'fish and chips,' and 'deck.' While some respondents could brush off comments that were made and 'give it back' by making comments about how terrible the *Wallabies* were compared to the *All Blacks*, for others it affected their social and workplace integration and mental health. For a female interviewee who worked in security, her work colleagues made her feel like nothing she did was right or if something went wrong, she was blamed for it:

> *Researcher: Is that something you get a lot of at work, you know people telling you to just go home?*

> *Interviewee: I don't know they just make fun of us kiwis, they um, hmm bloody kiwis can't even say words right, they just repeatedly say that can't say bear and beer, to me like I don't have a different word for beer like beer*

*and bear same fricking thing, (sighs) it's just relentless the just disrespect maybe it's just where I am at the moment, but you know that particular boss but it's pretty relentless.' (Female, 40-49, Security Guard, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

However, even for those who held Australian citizenship, their accent was a marker of difference. When asked to explain what citizenship meant to them, this respondent expressed:

*'Inclusiveness into Australian society. If someone comments on my Kiwi accent I can say I am a citizen now.' (Respondent 203: Female, 55-59, Not in labour force, arrived 2003, Australian citizen)*

For some respondents, to limit the racism they experienced, they adjusted their accent so they would sound more Australian:

*'I found it hard to take the constant jabs at my accent, so learnt to change that quickly. I also stopped following sports as the competitive banter was a bit much.' (Respondent 346: Female, 40-44, Project Coordinator, arrived 2003, SCV 444)*

*'It's easy because I'm white, and I was able to quickly adopt an Australian accent. You never shed the feeling of being unwanted by the government, though.' (Respondent 1146: Male, 25-29, Not in labour force, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

These experiences suggest that even those who are 'white' feel they have to assimilate rather than integrate into Australia. Having an accent becomes a marker of difference and learning to sound Australian allows them to become indistinguishable from 'white' Australians.

## 6.6   Overall experience

Respondents' view of their overall integration into Australia is shaped by how the integration of migrants has been conceptualised at the national scale. As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a long history of migration between New Zealand and Australia, contributing to the establishment of transnational ties. Since World War II, migration has been used as nation-building and in more recent decades to fill labour market demands. Under the White Australia policy, migrants were granted entry based on their perceived ability to assimilate into Australia. Following the abolition of this policy in 1973, multiculturalism was adopted as national policy and to help build a national identity. This view acknowledged that migrants faced challenges settling into Australia and that they should be able to integrate socially, economically, politically, and culturally while maintaining their cultural identity without

disadvantage or prejudice (Koleth, 2010). However, Forrest and Dunn (2006) note in the context of the declining dominance of Anglo-Celtic Australians that there has been increasing tension between multiculturalism and the need for migrants to assimilate and adopt 'Australian values.'

While the previous sections of this chapter discussed each dimension of integration separately, with political integration to be discussed separately in Chapter 7, it is important to recognise that each dimension of integration is interlinked. For example, even though an individual participates in the labour market, they may feel disconnected from their work colleagues affecting their ability to build their social networks. Integration also occurs at varying scales, micro-, meso- and macro-, and at different degrees, as an individual can be well integrated at the micro-scale but feel marginalised at the macro-scale.

Over three-quarters (77.1 per cent) of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement, '*I feel I have integrated into Australia*,' with a small proportion (2.3 per cent) 'strongly disagreeing'. Just over half of the respondents felt they belonged in Australia, while 26.1 per cent felt like a foreigner in Australia. Figure 6.4 shows that even though respondents felt integrated into Australia, slightly more respondents viewed New Zealand as 'home.'



**Figure 6.4 Where respondents called home**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Australia home n1=1838, New Zealand home n2=1836*

While more respondents viewed New Zealand as home when reflecting on their overall experience of living in Australia, respondents spoke of how Australia had become home. The home had a range of different meanings. Some respondents discussed how even though they missed New Zealand, the opportunities available in Australia for themselves and their children helped make Australia home. While for others, Australia had become home over time as they reached different life stages, forming a relationship, buying a house, having children, and seeing their children settle into life in Australia. The life experiences and opportunities available while living in Australia contributed to respondents' sense of belonging and integration. In particular, respondents cited the opportunities available in Australia were why they would not return to New Zealand, even if they still had family there (see Sections 5.2 and 5.4). The employment opportunities, coupled with the lower cost of living, allowed respondents to improve their lifestyle, purchase a house, start their own business, and afford to travel to Asia. This respondent explained:

> *'After 6 years, our family is very settled. We have a better lifestyle, and for the first time in our working lives we get tax back rather then [sic] a tax bill as we did in NZ. It's much easier to eat healthier in Australia as the cost is so much cheaper. My sister struggles to feed her family in NZ and is often surprised at our food costs here in Australia.' (Respondent 425: Unknown gender and age, Not in labour force, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

While a male interviewee described how it was the everyday interactions with people that facilitated his integration:

> *'You know I feel welcome at work and you know I'm not dreading going to work and um I yeah feel as though we have I think we have integrated into Aus and um yeah it's nice to go to the local shops, and someone recognises you and says g'day and things so that's all part of it, yeah it is a good feeling, but you know often when I leave NZ and come back to Aus I'm like well it's nice to visit NZ but um yeah it's certainly nice to get back here, you know great climate and um yeah but not only the climate, it's a nice place to be yeah.' (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444)*

Everyday interactions such as this facilitated integration into specific locations and communities within Australia, as other respondents said they felt integrated into 'Brisbane' or 'Sydney' rather than Australia:

> *'I feel like I live in Canberra rather than in Australia. The rest of Australia feels a bit foreign.' (Respondent 1231: Female, 35-39, Town Planner, arrived 2009, PR)*

Many respondents mentioned how, although they loved living in Australia and had integrated into Australia, their New Zealand identity was still a part of them. As these respondents expressed:

> *'I arrived here in the early 70's Hitched Hiked around Aust Jobs as Nanny's, picking fruit finally arrived in Sydney and have enjoyed living here. My son is an Australian, Love Sydney has been my "home," but I still hold a NZ passport, can't let go…' (Respondent 1691: Female, 65+, Accountant, unknown arrival date, PR)*

> *'It has become my home. I have attended university here and have an Australian born child. I have lived here [for] many years but first and foremost identify as a New Zealander.' (Respondent 1040: Male, 60-64, Social researcher, arrived 1975, Australian citizen)*

Although Chapter 7 discusses the political integration of respondents explicitly, it will be touched on briefly here to highlight how it has affected how they view their overall experience of living in Australia. Those who have moved after 2001 have been given an 'indefinitely temporary' status and cannot access social security unless they obtain permanent residency. However, many respondents do not meet the eligibility requirements for permanent residency, leaving them vulnerable to future policy changes as non-citizens. The importance of permanent residency and citizenship has been demonstrated through the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia since 2014, which has left many respondents feeling unwelcome and unsettled in Australia. When describing their overall experience in Australia, responses such as this were common:

> *'Everything has been fine. Only real hiccup has been when you worry about your children and realise they had no pathway to citizenship in a country they identify as home.' (Respondent 795: Male, 35-39, Self-employed, arrived 2012, Australian citizen)*

Being unable to apply for permanent residency made planning for the future difficult and impeded integration at the micro-scale, as this respondent explained:

> *'I do like living here. My job is satisfying, and I earn a good wage. I have an active social life and enjoy exploring the city and finding new places to go to in Melbourne. I'm frustrated, however, that there is no way for me to become a permanent resident. So I feel slightly ill at ease. Should I buy property here? Should I continue to put down roots? What if legislation changes further? What if I become ill and can't work? This has been playing on my mind a bit of late.' (Respondent 144: Female 30-34, Registered Nurse, arrived 2016, SCV 444)*

For another respondent, although they had naturalised, they still struggled to feel like they belonged:

> *'I feel like I don't fully belong in NZ or Australia - I feel a bit lost. My kids were born in Australia, so Australia is their home. I haven't been to NZ in over a decade, so it doesn't feel like home to me. As a NZer I do not feel welcome in Australia - I feel the Government treats NZ very unfairly, so I feel I do not want to give my heart to Australia. I am now an Australian citizen, but my husband is not - so I fear him being deported even though he hasn't done anything wrong. We are both employed full time, I am the President of my kids sports Clubs, my husband coaches the kid's sports, we volunteer a lot, but it feels like none of that matters.' (Respondent 928: Female, 40-44, Project Manager, arrived 2002, Australian citizen)*

These respondents' experiences suggest that even though on paper, it would appear they are well integrated into Australia, in reality, feeling integrated is complex and shaped by the structural barriers in place.

In addition to the deportation of New Zealanders, many respondents had become increasingly concerned about the changing political climate in Australia and globally with the rise of conservative views. In particular, the growing anti-migrant rhetoric and Australia becoming increasingly aligned with the USA had made respondents question if this was a country they wanted to continue living in. Even though this respondent had made Australia their home and had obtained citizenship, the shift in government ideology impacted how they now viewed Australia:

> *'Up until the last 6-8 years, it has been very good. Even though I still barrack for the All Blacks and any team playing against Australia, I have been happy to be here and had made it my home. However, with the current government regulations on Asylum seekers and the way NZers are being treated, I feel that this is not the Australia that I decided to make my home 30+ years ago. I did become an Australian citizen but have begun making enquiries to see if I can get my NZ citizenship back. It may not happen, but I would be happy if it does.' (Respondent 711: Female, 65+, Teacher, arrived 1971, Australian citizen)*

Other respondents were appalled at how Indigenous Australians are treated:

> *'Really disapprove of govt policy regarding Indigenous Australians e.g. I feel pretty upset every year at the disrespect this country shows by celebrating 'Australia Day' on Jan 26th.'* (Respondent 1565: Male, 55-59, Director, arrived 2001, Australian citizen)

> *'I still find the treatment of aboriginal people really abhorrent. It makes me more proud of the Māori culture in NZ, even though I'm not Māori.'* (Respondent 1625: Female, 35-39, Senior Arts Policy Officer, arrived 2003, PR)

## 6.7   Conclusion

The findings presented and discussed in this chapter found that the economic, community, social, and overall integration of respondents into Australia is fraught. The aggregated results showed that in general, respondents felt they had integrated into Australia economically and socially. The majority of respondents had gained employment within four weeks of moving to Australia and faced few challenges in building their social networks. However, respondents' testimonies revealed that structural barriers often restricted integration. In particular, the increasing casualisation of employment in Australia over the last 30 years may not be explicitly aimed at migrants but has affected the degree of integration possible. This is an issue for New Zealanders, particularly those who arrived post-2001, as they do not have access to social security, in particular unemployment benefits. Being employed casually means they do not know how long they will be employed for or how much money they will earn weekly, or how long they could be out of work if they lost their job. The precariousness of being employed casually affected respondents' ability to rent a property, borrow money, meet the earning threshold required for permanent residency, build rapport with work colleagues, and establish social networks. This, in turn, influences the degree to which they can integrate into Australia.

The experiences of respondents highlight how even though New Zealand and Australia have the same national language and have similar cultures, easily integrating into Australia is not guaranteed. While many of the respondents benefitted from identifying as New Zealand European and avoiding ethnicity-based racism, they still met negative cultural stereotypes of New Zealanders that persisted, such as 'dole bludger' or 'sheep shagger.' These stereotypes affected respondents' ability to integrate into the workplace and form social networks. Integration was also affected by the realisation that despite New Zealand and Australia frequently being talked about by the media and politicians as being economically linked at the macro-scale, in reality, this was not the case. Respondents' New Zealand work experience and qualifications were not always recognised by employers, which hindered the ease at which they thought they would gain employment in Australia. This chapter briefly touched on how, at the macro-scale, respondents felt disenfranchised and unsettled because of the Australian government's treatment of New Zealanders. The following Chapter 7 will explore the political integration of respondents through examining pathways to permanent residency and citizenship available and meanings attached to citizenship.

# CHAPTER 7: POLITICAL INTEGRATION

## 7.1   Introduction

The previous chapter found that although respondents felt they had integrated into Australia at the micro-scale, they felt that the government's changing stance on immigration and the deportation of New Zealanders made them wary of future policy changes that could affect their ability to stay in Australia. It also made respondents feel unwelcome and taken advantage of by the Australian government. This chapter will explore the political integration of respondents into Australia. In this context, *political integration* refers specifically to the ability of migrants to obtain citizenship, which allows them to secure their status, have their voices heard, and feel their contributions are valued by the government, which contributes to their sense of belonging (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; OECD & European Union, 2018). Birkvad (2019) notes that for migrants, naturalising is important as it signifies they are equal members of society. Yet, the inability to secure full rights can make them feel like second-class citizens. Governments, therefore, use citizenship eligibility requirements to demarcate who belongs and hence who can fully integrate (Bloemraad, 2018; Brubaker, 2010; Rung, 2020). This chapter will begin by discussing the visa status of respondents and the pathways to permanent residency available. The motivations for seeking citizenship and the meanings attached to citizenship are then explored. The final section discusses how respondents feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia.

The findings presented in this chapter show that for many respondents becoming politically integrated into Australia is constrained by structural barriers. Being eligible to apply for Australian citizenship requires applicants to have held permanent residency for at least 12 months before applying, but as the first section of this chapter finds, for SCV 444 holders becoming a permanent resident is not an option for many, because of the eligibility requirements for permanent residency. This exclusion from permanent residency and the shifting migration rhetoric in Australia contributes to whether respondents want to obtain Australian citizenship and the meanings they attach to citizenship. Section two finds that for the majority of respondents, Australian citizenship is viewed in instrumental terms while also symbolising their belonging and integration into Australia. However, for some respondents, their view of Australian citizenship has been shaped by how they feel New Zealanders have been treated in Australia at the macro-scale. The final section finds that while at the micro-

scale respondents have had positive experiences in Australia, at the macro-scale, respondents feel that the historical ties between the two countries no longer carry the same weight in Australia, making respondents feel like second-class citizens.

## 7.2   Visa status and pathways to permanent residency

To become an Australian citizen all migrants first need to obtain permanent residency. As detailed in Chapter 2, for the majority of migrants seeking permanent residency, they need to have a job on the SOL, meet the age, education, language, and health requirements and/or have employer sponsorship. This categorisation of prospective migrants based on their occupation ensures they not only fill occupational shortages but can finally support themselves and contribute to the economy. Hence, migrants who do not have an occupation on the SOL cannot apply for permanent residency and therefore have to return to their home country. The migration of New Zealanders to Australia falls under the TTTA, which is outside Australia's Migration Program. New Zealanders who moved to Australia before the 2001 policy change are categorised as PSCV and have permanent residency. In contrast, those who moved after this change are referred to as SCV 444 holders who have different rights. SCV 444 holders are granted an 'indefinitely temporary' on arrival to Australia, which prevents them from accessing all social security services and requires them to apply for permanent residency to have access to social security. The need to obtain permanent residency has become pertinent over the last decade with the growing anti-migration rhetoric and the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia, which has illustrated the lack of security this visa provides. Before these changes, for many, getting permanent residency was not considered, given the relative ease with which they moved to Australia.

This section will focus on respondents who have moved to Australia since 2001 and discuss their ability to get permanent residency. Figure 7.1 displays the visas held by respondents with just under two-thirds SCV 444 holders. Respondents who have a Returning Resident Visa (RRV), permanent residency (obtained through occupation or employer sponsorship), or a 189 visa, arrived in Australia post-2001 and applied to become a permanent resident. Interestingly, a few respondents who have moved since 2001 were unaware of their visa status or thought they were automatically permanent residents. One respondent, who arrived in 2018 and had selected 'other' said, *'not sure, don't think I have a visa at all?'* While another who arrived in 2012 said, '*I don't know. I live here without a visa, so I just guess I'm a*

*permanent resident.'* This lack of awareness of their visa status suggests that arrangements such as the TTTA disconnects New Zealanders from the immigration and visa process in Australia. As the visa is automatically granted upon their arrival in Australia, they therefore do not necessarily know what their rights are beyond knowing they can live and work in Australia.



**Figure 7.1: Visa held by respondents'**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1368*

Respondents who had obtained an RRV were eligible for this visa because they had travelled to Australia before 1994, when at that stage, those who entered Australia were permanent residents. This pathway has been referred to as a 'loophole' for New Zealanders as those who are eligible do not have to meet occupation or income requirements and is significantly cheaper than the other pathways available, AUD$405 versus AUD$4,045 (DHA, 2020c, 2020e). Table 7.1 displays the top occupations of respondents who had obtained permanent residency through each of the pathways available. The 189 visa provided those who worked as Designer, Engineering, Science and Transport Professionals, Specialist Managers, and Office Managers and Program Administrators a pathway to permanent residency. Many of the occupations that fall under these broad categories are not on the SOL, and hence respondents had no path to permanent residency before the introduction of the 189 visa. A female interviewee who arrived in 2004 explained that before the introduction of this visa, getting permanent residency would not have been possible:

> *'There was no way that I could have, because of this type of job that I do, it's not something that's, yeah a skilled you know, like anyone, well not anyone but you know, but people can become managers um so I'd always wanted*

*to, but I knew I never could, and when this um [Malcolm] Turnball and John Key [New Zealand prime minister], um when that came in I just thought you know what here's an opportunity, my husband said because he's Australian he look I'll nominate you, and I'm like no, I don't want to go that way if I can't do it off my own merit then yeah.' (Female, 40-44, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa)*

Being able to obtain permanent residency would allow her to apply for citizenship. This was important, as she would be able to vote, and it also contributed to her sense of belonging as she planned on retiring in Australia. She also acknowledged that she was in a privileged position, as not all New Zealanders living in Australia would qualify for this visa.

**Table 7.1: Permanent residency visa obtained and top occupations, ANZSCO 2-digit level**

| ANZSCO sub-major group code | RRV (%) | PR (%) | 189 visa (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 Specialist Manager | 8.8 | 8.7 | 24.1 |
| 22 Business, HR and Marketing Professionals | 8.8 | 8.7 | 6.9 |
| 24 Education Professionals | 7.5 | 4.3 | - |
| 26 ICT Professionals | 7.5 | 6.1 | - |
| 73 Road and Rail Drivers | 6.3 | 3.5 | 6.9 |
| 41 Health and Welfare Support Workers | 5 | 2.6 | 3.4 |
| 59 Other Clerical and Administrative Workers | 5 | 1.7 | 3.4 |
| 11 Chief Executive, GM, Legislators | 3.8 | 2.6 | - |
| 25 Health Professionals | 3.8 | 12.2 | 10.3 |
| 27 Legal, Social and Welfare Professionals | 3.8 | 5.2 | - |
| 53 General Clerical Workers | 3.8 | 7 | 6.9 |
| 23 Design, Engineering, Science and Transport Professionals | 2.5 | 6.1 | 17.2 |
| 42 Carers and Aides | - | 4.3 | 3.4 |
| 51 Office Managers and Program Administrators | 1.3 | 0.9 | 6.9 |
| 32 Automotive, Engineering and Trade workers | - | 0.9 | 3.4 |
| 71 Machine and Stationary Plant Operators | 1.3 | 1.7 | 3.4 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, RRV n1=80, PR n2=115, 189 visa n3=29*

For these respondents, the motivations for obtaining permanent residency were so they could get Australian citizenship, which would give them security plus the ability to vote. Some respondents had become concerned about the rapidly changing immigration rhetoric in Australia:

*'Security didn't want to wake up one day and find out it was illegal for Kiwis to own property or something equally stupid, Peter Dutton and people like him scare me.' (Respondent 1892: Male, 45-49, IT Security Architect, arrived 2007, PR)*

Other respondents wanted to secure their children's futures in Australia as having permanent residency and/or citizenship would give them more education and employment opportunities:

> *'It was the fact that my kids would have a secured future without the possibility of having to go home and the fact that we could reside as Aussies and not have to worry about being foreigners in our country of choice.'*
> *(Respondent 697: Female, 40-44, Clinical Coder, arrived 2012, 189 Visa)*

As the 189 visa was introduced the year before data collection, SCV 444 holders were asked whether they had heard of the visa and whether they would apply for it. One-third of respondents had not heard of the 189 visa, and just over half (55.9 per cent) of the respondents met the three general eligibility requirements: length of residence, income, and started residency before 19 February 2016. Respondents who did not meet the criteria either did not earn enough, had not been resident in Australia for five years or had moved to Australia after the cut-off date. Figure 7.2 shows that amongst respondents who met all the eligibility requirements, 6.6 per cent had applied for the visa, with an additional 14.6 per cent in the process of applying for it. The motivation for applying was that this visa gave them a pathway to citizenship and would provide them not only with the security of legal status but access to social services. Under 10 per cent gave other reasons for not having applied, which included being eligible for the RRV instead and being uncertain what implications applying for the visa would have on their children's ability to apply for university. This is because as an SCV 444 holder, they can pay domestic fees upfront, but as a permanent resident, there is a two-year stand-down period before being eligible for domestic fees, meaning they would then have to pay international student fees.

**Figure 7.2: Whether or not eligible SCV 444 holders have applied for the 189 visa**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=410*

While 27.3 per cent of those who were eligible for the 189 visa indicated they did not intend to apply for the 189 visa, Figure 7.3 shows that if SCV 444 holders were hypothetically eligible, two-thirds would apply for the visa.



**Figure 7.3: If hypothetically eligible, would SCV 444 holders apply for the 189 visa**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=654*

Table 7.2 displays the occupations of SCV 444 holders who met all three general eligibility requirements and the occupations of those who, if they were hypothetically eligible, would apply. Those in occupations such as Sales Assistants and Salespersons, Cleaners and Laundry Workers, and General Clerks were least likely to have met the eligibility requirements for the 189 visa. Given this visa is based on income, for respondents in these occupations and middling migrants more broadly, achieving this income consistently could be affected by their length of employment with their current employer, employment status and/or time spent out of the labour force.

**Table 7.2 Top occupations of those who met all three 189 visa criteria and those who would apply if eligible, at ANZSCO 3-digit level**

| ANZSCO minor group code | Meet all 3 criteria (%) | Apply if eligible (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 254 Midwifery and Nursing Professionals | 7.7 | 4.7 |
| 132 Business Administration Managers | 6.5 | 3.3 |
| 134 Education, Health and Welfare Services Manager | 3.8 | 3 |
| 225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals | 3.8 | 2.8 |
| 133 Construction, Distribution and Production Managers | 3.5 | 1.1 |
| 411 Health and Welfare Support Workers | 3.5 | 5.3 |
| 111 Chief Executives, GM and Legislators | 2.9 | 1.7 |
| 224 Information and Organisation Professionals | 2.7 | 2.2 |
| 531 General Clerks | 2.7 | 5 |
| 149 Miscellaneous Hospitality, Retail and Service Managers | 2.1 | 1.4 |
| 621 Sales Assistants and Salespersons | 0.6 | 2.5 |
| 811 Cleaners and Laundry Workers | 0.6 | 2.5 |
| 272 Social and Welfare Professionals | 1.5 | 2.2 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, meet all 3 criteria n1=339, apply if eligible n2=339*

Regardless of whether or not SCV 444 holders were eligible for the 189 visa, the cost of the visa was cited as prohibitive. At the time of the survey, the cost for an individual to apply was AUD$3,755 (Kainth, 2018), with this increasing to AUD$4,045 in July 2019 (Grewal, 2020). This amount of money respondents felt was wrong, given the amount of tax New Zealanders paid without receiving any of the benefits. Other respondents could not justify spending that amount of money, especially when the cost for a family is around AUD$10,000. As this female interviewee explained:

> *Researcher: So, if you were eligible for that [189 visa] would you consider applying?*

*Interviewee: Well, how much is it? That's a big cost; the cost is a big factor*

*Researcher: At the moment it's nearly [AUD]$3,500*

*Interviewee: Yeah no, [AUD]$3,500 I could put that towards a deposit on a home; I have more chance of getting a home, even with all our debt, then I do with permanent residency, mainly because of her [niece] disability as well, yeah so you know we're paying into a system we can't access aye, and that hurts me. (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

Those who did not meet the eligibility requirements were critical of the income requirement, which they felt was too high and unattainable. Some respondents mentioned how their income had been stagnant since moving to Australia. For others, being employed on a casual basis meant they never knew what their yearly income would be and earning above the income threshold consistently for five years was not feasible. Female respondents who had taken time off work to care for their children were particularly frustrated as once they re-entered the workforce, they would have to wait even longer to meet the income requirement:

> *'For the 18 months, I worked after arriving I more than double the required income threshold however I have taken a career break to care for our children. We were advised by an immigration lawyer that the quickest route to citizenship would be a spousal visa as I would have to return to work and earn the income threshold for another 3 years to be eligible.' (Respondent 916: Female, 45-49, Not in labour force, arrived 2009, SCV 444)*

Being excluded based on income indicates how this visa reinforces class biases and the importance the Australian government places on a migrant's ability to contribute economically. This reflects how neoliberal governments have shifted welfare responsibilities from the nation-state to the individual and how permanent residency and citizenship requirements are based on labour market participation (Joppke, 2007; Rung, 2020). Tensions, therefore, exist between the TTTA and the Australian immigration system as the eligibility requirements for permanent residency privileges applicants' economic contributions rather than their social and civic contributions.

A few respondents who met the eligibility requirements were unable to apply on health grounds:

> *'We would if we could afford it, also our oldest child is ASD [Autism Spectrum Disorder] high functioning, and we have been told we may not be successful because of this.' (Respondent 615: Unknown gender, 35-39, Clerical Support, arrived 2008, SCV 444)*

For some respondents, they were excluded from all pathways to permanent residency:

> *'We don't currently qualify for the new pathway. We haven't earned enough for five consecutive years as I am the higher earner and I was made redundant while on parental leave, so [I] chose to become a stay at home parent for three years. We don't have enough points to apply outside the pathway as we are too old and not rich enough. Law has never been a desired occupation for immigration at a state or federal level. My husband is a carpenter, and niche aspects of carpentry have been desired occupations for NSW in some years (I would apply for partner PR if he was successful), but it was so complicated we couldn't get an answer on whether he qualified.'* (Respondent 275: Female, 35-39, Legal Counsel, arrived 2009, SCV 444)

Other reasons for not having or wanting to apply for the visa included being unsure of what the benefits of the visa were. Those who questioned the benefits wondered if it would make any difference to their lives, particularly for those over 55, and how it differed from the SCV 444 visa. A few did not realise this visa would grant them permanent residency. Respondents were also reluctant to apply because of the paperwork and the time-consuming nature of the application process. Applying for permanent residency is the first time they have to fill out a visa application form, collate all the supporting documents, and engage with the Department of Home Affairs. This means their migrant experience differs significantly from migrants from other countries, where meeting the visa eligibility requirements and filling out the required paperwork allows them to enter and continue to stay in Australia (Robertson, 2011a; Robertson & Runganaikaloo, 2014). A few respondents were wary of this visa pathway as the constantly changing immigration policies left them wondering if a better deal would be offered. Some felt it was yet another way for the Australian government to take money from New Zealanders given the tax paid.

Interestingly, for SCV 444 holders, the introduction of this visa had little impact on how long they planned to continue living in Australia (Figure 7.4). Respondents who indicated it had no impact at all mentioned how since living in Australia, Australia had become their home, having integrated through work, built their social networks, entered a relationship and/or had children:

> *'I was always staying permanently. I have no intention of returning to NZ.'*
> (Respondent 132: Female, 25-29, Secondary School Teacher, arrived 2007, SCV 444)

> *'My wife is Australian, so our Australian born children are protected here regardless of whether I'm a citizen.'* (Respondent 356: Male, 30-34, Software Engineer, arrived 2008, SCV 444)

Erdal et al. (2018) found that for some respondents, a change in visa status does not change the experiences already had in the destination country, as everyday practices contribute to a migrant becoming integrated and a part of the community they live in.

Some respondents were planning on returning to New Zealand in the future, and so the introduction of this visa had no impact on their plans.



**Figure 7.4: Did the introduction of the 189 visa affect how long respondents planned to continue living in Australia?**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=758*

Those who indicated it had changed their plans to some extent, had previously considered returning to New Zealand or moving elsewhere as permanent residency has not been an option. This pathway now provided a path to citizenship, which was necessary for some respondents as citizenship represented finally being able to truly belong in Australia and make long-term decisions:

> *'Having the ability to become an Australian citizen makes us feel like we have a real place here, that this can be our home.' (Respondent 956: Female, 35-39, Not in labour force, arrived 2012, SCV 444)*

Whereas for others, while it did not directly affect their plans to live in Australia, the eligibility criteria made them feel alienated:

> *'I am hoping the income requirement will be removed so that eligibility is more focused on character and contribution, not income. I think the current income requirements discriminate [against] women from NZ.' (Respondent 171: Female, 55-59, Support Worker, arrived 2008, SCV 444)*

## 7.3 Motivation and meanings of citizenship

In Australia, citizenship has been framed in terms of civic nationalism where adherence to laws and procedures is more important than patriotism and loyalty (Betts & Birrell, 2007; Fozdar & Spittles, 2010). The absence of needing to ascribe to an 'Australian way of life' relates to the importance of multiculturalism in Australia in which migrants can maintain their cultural identity (Betts & Birrell, 2007; Levey, 2014). However, over the last twenty years, a vocal minority of Anglo-Celtic Australian's have become increasingly concerned about the number of migrants who they feel do not have Australian values. In particular, the rise of Islamic migration and Islamic militancy at the beginning of the century led to the introduction of the citizenship test in 2007 (Levey, 2014). The citizenship test asks questions on Australia's democratic beliefs, rights, government, and the law, with applicants required to score at least 75 per cent (DHA, 2020b). Potential applicants are required to have lived in Australia for the previous four years and have been a permanent resident for 12 months before the citizenship application is submitted, be of 'good character,' and intend to live or maintain close links to Australia (DHA, 2020b).

In 2017, the year before data was collected for this research, changes were proposed, which would increase the period of permanent residency to four years and require applicants to prove they had integrated into Australia. These proposed changes sought to mimic the integration policies that had been implemented in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria, which require more extended periods of residency and more stringent testing criteria (Askola, 2020). While these proposed changes were not enacted, they raised concerns about how citizenship could be used as a mechanism of control to ensure migrants had integrated and had adopted 'Australian values' (Askola, 2020). The low up-take of Australian citizenship has been discussed by Hamer (2008, 2017) and McMillan (2017), but neither author provides an extensive discussion on why New Zealanders do not obtain it. Hamer's (2007) research on Māori, found that 48.3 per cent did not want Australian citizenship with 29.7 per cent feeling no need to obtain it with many feeling politically disenfranchised because of the eligibility requirements for permanent residency. While McMillan (2017) briefly mentioned that respondents would get it for a range of reasons from patriotic to instrumental but does not expand on this.

Only 15.8 per cent of respondents had Australian citizenship. Amongst these respondents 59.4 per cent had moved to Australia before 2001, 78 per cent viewed Australia as home, 49.3 per cent considered New Zealand as home and 88.8 per cent felt they had integrated into Australia. Just over half (55.4) of all other respondents indicated they would consider naturalising, with nearly one quarter (24.7 per cent) undecided and 19.9 per cent, indicating they would not obtain Australian citizenship. While the majority stated they would consider obtaining Australian citizenship, the structural barriers were seen to be prohibitive. This was notably an issue for SCV 444 holders, given the permanent residency requirements, which meant getting citizenship would not be a possibility. Other structural barriers included the cost of becoming a citizen and the time-consuming nature of the application process.

Being a citizen of a nation-state corresponds to legal status, rights, integration, sense of belonging, and identity (Bauböck, 2006; Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad et al., 2008). Amongst respondents, citizenship was primarily associated with security. Security meant being protected from future policy changes, having a safety net, and being able to secure their children's future. The desire to be protected from future policy changes had become increasingly important because of the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia. Seeing media reports of New Zealanders who had been deported even though they had effectively lived their entire life in Australia reminded respondents of the precarious nature of being an SCV 444 holder or permanent resident. This increased respondents' desire to obtain citizenship as it would allow them to secure their status in Australia and protect themselves from future policy changes:

> *'Protect myself [me] from future detrimental changes. Ensure that I could never be kicked out of the country.' (Respondent 402: Female, 40-44, Finance, arrived 2003, SCV 444)*

However, some respondents were sceptical about the security citizenship provided, as this respondent who arrived in 2000 expressed:

> *'[citizenship] It should mean security, but the Australian government keeps changing the rules, so I doubt even if I did gain citizenship, I would be any more secure than the temporary visa status I currently have. If they can deport people who have committed no crimes, they obviously don't have a conscience.' (Respondent 562: Female, 35-39, Disability Support Worker, arrived 2005, Australian citizen)*

Respondents' desire to secure their legal status through citizenship has been cited as a common motivation for naturalising in the destination country. For example, Aptekar's (2016)

research on naturalised migrants in the USA found many obtained citizenship to protect their rights because of the growing anti-immigrant sentiment. Similarly, Erdal et al. (2018) found that for some migrants in Norway, they had an implicit view of citizenship in terms of citizenship as security of rights.

For SCV 444 holders being unable to access any government services contributed to why they viewed citizenship as security. Being a citizen would give them access to the government services they could not access, yet their taxes went towards. This exclusion from government services became increasingly frustrating the longer they lived in Australia and were concerned about what would happen if their circumstances changed. A respondent who wanted to become a citizen but was constrained by finances said that:

> *'I can relax a little knowing that if circumstances change, I will still be able to provide for my kids. I pay taxes just like any Australian and have done in my almost 16 years of being here, but have no support or security if my circumstances change.' (Respondent 66: Female, 40-44, Logistics Clerk, arrived 2002, SCV 444)*

For this respondent, like many others, security was viewed in relation to their children. Having children that had spent most of their lives in Australia increased respondents' desire to obtain Australian citizenship. Australian citizenship would provide their children with more opportunities and mean they would not be constrained in Australia by their New Zealand citizenship. Responses such as this were common when asked what citizenship meant to them:

> *'Security for my children. They will have more opportunities available to them when they leave school (e.g. university, TAFE, ADF).' (Respondent 445: Female, 35-39, Primary School Teacher, arrived 2013, SCV 444)*

University was often mentioned by respondents, as currently New Zealanders are eligible for domestic university fees but are required to pay fees upfront and cannot apply for HECS. HECS is the government-assisted loan scheme that allows a person to slowly pay back the cost of their university fees. Only SCV 444 holders who have lived in Australia for at least ten years can apply for HECS. This means for many, going to university is not an option given the significant upfront financial cost, limiting their post-school education and employment opportunities.

Respondents also discussed citizenship as belonging. For a respondent who had become an Australian citizen, citizenship meant:

> *'Australia is my home, my partner is Australian my children were born here. Being a citizen means I can't be deported and taken away from them. Citizenship's to me means I've fully embraced Australian culture, spirit and values.' (Respondent 1241: Male, 30-34, Brick Layer, arrived 2007, Australian citizen)*

At a pragmatic level, it represented the security of their legal status in Australia, but at an emotional level, it enhanced their sense of belonging and integration into Australia. Another respondent viewed it as the next logical step, as they had made Australia their home:

> *'Was able to get Permanent Residence via RRV, married a local Brisbane girl, bought a house here, not planning to leave, so thought I'd become part of the place.' (Respondent 400: Male, 50-54, IT Project Manager, arrived, 2001, Australian citizen)*

Similarly, Fozdar and Spittles (2010) and Aptekar (2016) found that migrants were motivated to naturalise because they had started a family in the destination country and viewed it as the next step to take.

For other respondents, viewing citizenship as belonging was connected to wanting to be recognised for the contributions they had already made to Australia, whether it be economically, socially or in their community:

> *'It means that I am part of the nation, I have a right to vote and am acknowledged as contributing. That my children are as valued as their Australian friends and teammates.' (Respondent 115: Male, 50-54, Technical Officer, arrived 2011, PR)*

> *'It would mean a great deal as I am now a single mother to five Australian children, and we struggle financially as I am not able to access financial assistance I could access as an Australian. I contribute a lot to my community through leadership roles, and as an educator and feel citizenship would complete the whole picture to a satisfying life in Australia.' (Respondent 39: Female, 45-49, Early Childhood Educator, arrived 2004, SCV 444)*

This desire for recognition through the attainment of citizenship relates to how citizenship has been conceptualised as equality. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, p. 370) explain that the orthodox view of citizenship is based on 'treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law,' where citizenship is understood as civic participation in society. Civic participation includes a wide range of activities, including voting, political party membership, volunteering, community gardening, and involvement in recreational sports teams (ABS, 2010). These activities help individuals build their social capital and become embedded in their local community. Hence, for respondents, despite engaging in these activities which contribute to

the development of Australia, the inability for many to obtain citizenship shows how the requirements for permanent residency privilege those who contribute to Australia economically. Rung (2020) argues that citizenship, therefore, becomes a tool used by neoliberal nation-states to maintain the non-citizen/citizen binary through only making citizenship available to those who are deemed by the nation-state as the most deserving.

Given respondents already participated economically, socially, and in the community, wanting to vote and have a say was also a strong motivating factor for wanting to naturalise. For some respondents, they had lost their ability to vote in New Zealand and felt politically disenfranchised as they could not vote in either country. For this respondent, citizenship and having the right to vote symbolised full participation in society:

> *'I have completed my citizenship test and passed. I am now waiting on a date for the ceremony. As I now reside in Australia, I wish to be part of this society, a full citizen with the same rights as others and to be able to vote.' (Respondent 440: Female, 45-49, Community Development Officer and Coordinator, arrived 2007, RRV)*

While for another respondent, their reasons for gaining Australian citizenship were instrumental:

> *'To vote, to have immigration security, access to welfare/social security - absolutely no other reason - in my heart, I hate being "Aussie" because I have citizenship, but my brain says it makes sense.' (Respondent 1444: Female, 60-64, Not in labour force, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

With this the meaning they attached to citizenship:

> *'Loyalty & undying love of country for NZ citizenship   Practical reasons only for Australian citizenship.' (Respondent 1444: Female, 60-64, Retired, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

This distinction between how they viewed their Australian versus New Zealand citizenship was mentioned by other respondents, including those who had not yet obtained Australian citizenship. For some respondents, their New Zealand citizenship was intrinsically tied to their identity and connection to New Zealand:

> *'It means being one with the land "Aotearoa." I will never give up my citizenship. It's a sense of connectedness.' (Respondent 1670: Female, 40-44, Social Worker, arrived 2006, SCV 444)*

> *'I get the paperwork I fill it in, and then I just can't quite finish it and send. I think I have done this 3 times. One day I will. I have lived here [for] 35 years.'*
> *(Respondent 1369: Female, 55-59, Hospitality Assistant Manager, PSCV, 1983)*

Although respondents mentioned their New Zealand identity was why they would not naturalise, research indicates there are similarities between how New Zealand and Australian identities have been constructed. Gilbertson's (2008) research found that the New Zealand identity centred around being laid back, farmer, rugby, Kiwiana clothing (jandals, stubbies, and gumboots), beer, beach, and outdoors. While Australian identity is based on mateship and 'fair go,' sports, leisurely lifestyle, farmers, beer, BBQ, and clothing (Akubra) (Phillips & Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007). This overlap between how the identities of each country have been constructed suggests that identifying with a country goes beyond these cultural and/or national stereotypes. Avril Bell (2009) argues that while these identity markers are important, New Zealand's identity is also about a deep connection to place and the nation more broadly. For a couple of respondents, they viewed their Australian and New Zealand citizenship as equal:

> *'It's a commitment to your home. I consider both NZ and Australia my home. I often call myself Australasian.' (Respondent 479: Unknown gender and age, Music Teacher, arrived 2012, RRV)*

This demonstrates how, for migrants, the notion of home is experienced in specific locations with the relationships formed in each location, contributing to identity and sense of belonging (Ralph & Staeheli, 2011).

However, for a few respondents obtaining citizenship would allow them to prove to others that they belong in Australia. A respondent who identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European found that despite having lived in Australia for over 25 years, their accent was still a marker of difference, saying citizenship meant:

> *'That I belong. People still identify me as Kiwi because of my accent. I feel when this happens that to Aussies I will always be a foreigner.' (Respondent 364: Female, 55-59, Social Worker, arrived 1994, Australian citizen)*

Erdal et al. (2018) found that migrants in Norway used citizenship to prove they were Norwegian. This was important for those who did not look stereotypically Norwegian as it shows they belong. However, despite having citizenship, their claim to being Norwegian was still questioned based on how they look (Erdal et al., 2018). While for this respondent and the

majority of respondents being Pākehā/New Zealand European allows them to easily integrate into Australia with their accent an indicator that they are not 'Australian.'

Respondents who were undecided or did not want to become an Australian citizen questioned the benefits of citizenship. Some respondents felt that the SCV 444 visa provided enough access to opportunities available in Australia:

> *'The path to citizenship for NZers is difficult, and given I have no idea whether I will stay beyond study, and the ease of the Special Category Visa for NZers, there doesn't seem much point.' (Respondent 1062: Male, 25-29, Student, arrived 2018, SCV 444)*

> *'It is extremely expensive, and being a New Zealander in Australia hasn't stopped me [from] doing what I want to do.' (Respondent 1059: Female, 20-24, Retail Assistant, arrived 2001, SCV 444)*

PSCV holders felt citizenship would not offer them any additional benefits because of their status as permanent residents. Some PSCV holders already had voting rights because of when they moved to Australia. This ambivalence towards obtaining Australian citizenship contributed to the meanings attached to citizenship. Even though the question asked did not refer to Australian citizenship, respondents took this to mean what Australian citizenship means to them. Hence many respondents said it meant nothing or had not given it much thought. Some respondents emphasised how they would never want to give up their New Zealand citizenship. Whereas other respondents only associated citizenship with access to services which they did not feel were necessary:

> *'Because it's not necessary to enable me to work, and I don't plan on accessing pension payments.' (Respondent 17: Female, 45-49, Team Leader Social Work, arrived 2008, SCV 444)*

However, for a few PSCV holders, their view on obtaining Australian citizenship had changed in response to the deportation of New Zealanders and the growing anti-immigrant sentiment:

> *'Have not felt the need initially and recently due to political decisions and trends it is not the Australia which as a child I had come to respect.' (Respondent 1994: Male, 65+, Retired, arrived 1968, PSCV)*

> *'I always thought I had rights as a permanent resident, but worry lately as these rights have eroded. Feeling worried actually - my kids are citizens of Australia, but these days (an extreme thought... ), I feel [the] government could send me home as a worst-case scenario.' (Respondent 1928: Female, 45-49, Transcriptionist, arrived 1996, PSCV)*

Some respondents did not want to naturalise because of how the Australian government had treated not only New Zealanders but migrants more broadly:

> *'In part, because I do not consider myself in any way Australian. I may reside in Australia, but I am <u>tangata whenua</u> first and foremost. Also, due to the way the Australian government has chosen to treat New Zealanders and New Zealand in general. I feel it would be almost treasonous to become a citizen of a country that treats my own people so badly.' (Respondent 662: Male, 25-59, Not in labour force, arrived 2013, SCV 444)*

> *'I have a few more months before I become eligible to apply. I feel undecided because I strongly disagree with the Australian government's stance on refugee treatment.' (Respondent 1678: Female, 30-34, IT Application Administrator, arrived 2010, PR)*

A few respondents could not become an Australian citizen because they already held dual-citizenship with another country.

## 7.4   Treatment of New Zealanders

Respondents' desire to obtain permanent residency and citizenship, and hence the meanings they attach to citizenship, has been shaped by how they feel the Australian government has treated New Zealanders. New Zealand and Australia's shared history as British colonial settlements and as Anzacs has shaped the discourse around how the relationship between the two countries has been portrayed at the macro-scale and how individuals have subsequently perceived this relationship. Being Anzacs symbolises 'mateship' and having each other's back in difficult times. It is talked about as a brotherly, sibling-like relationship, where the belief is you put your family first and give each other a fair go. McMillan's (2017) research found that respondents viewed the 2001 policy change as a betrayal of this familial relationship, leaving them dissatisfied with how New Zealanders are treated in Australia. This dissatisfaction was expressed by respondents when discussing how they felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia.

Figure 7.5 shows how respondents felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia. Amongst respondents who had naturalised (n=320), 40.7 per cent indicated they felt New Zealanders were treated 'poorly' or 'very poorly' in Australia, with 36.6 per cent feeling New Zealanders were treated 'well' or 'very well.' The remaining felt New Zealanders were treated 'fairly.' Over half (55 per cent) of the respondents who had not obtained citizenship felt New

Zealanders were treated 'poorly' or 'very poorly,' 25 per cent indicated 'well' or 'very well' and 20 per cent 'fairly.'



**Figure 7.5 How respondents felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia**

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1655*

Looking at the state respondents lived in and how they felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia, Table 7.3 shows that those living in South Australia were more likely to indicate they felt New Zealanders were treated 'fairly' or 'well.' One-fifth of those living in the Northern Territory selected 'very well' with just under half selected 'poorly.' One-fifth of those living in the Australian Capital Territory felt New Zealanders were treated 'very poorly' which may be related to the fact that many of the jobs available in Canberra require Australian citizenship. A chi-squared test for independence by combing the 'very well' and 'well' categories into one variable and the 'poorly' and 'very poorly' categories into another variable found there was no statically significant relationship between view of hoe New Zealanders are treated in Australia and state of residence ($\chi^2$(14, *N*=1643)=16.76, *p*=.269)

**Table 7.3: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by state of residence**

| How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia? | QLD (%) | NSW (%) | VIC (%) | SA (%) | TAS (%) | WA (%) | NT (%) | ACT (%) | Total (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very well | 8.8 | 11.3 | 10.7 | 4.2 | 12.5 | 11.9 | 20.8 | 8.6 | 10.2 |
| Well | 14.7 | 19.5 | 17.3 | 31.3 | 16.7 | 16.2 | 16.7 | 25.7 | 17.2 |
| Fairly | 21.6 | 20.8 | 17.9 | 27.1 | 25.0 | 21.3 | 12.5 | 11.4 | 20.5 |
| Poorly | 39.4 | 33.6 | 39.8 | 31.3 | 29.2 | 36.6 | 45.8 | 34.3 | 37.6 |
| Very poorly | 15.5 | 14.8 | 14.4 | 6.3 | 16.7 | 14.0 | 4.2 | 20.0 | 14.6 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1417*

When examining the occupation of respondents, Table 7.4 shows that aside from those who were not in the labour force, those working as Technicians and Trade Workers were more likely to indicate they felt New Zealanders were treated 'very well' (16.8 per cent) compared to Machinery Operators and Drivers (6.8 per cent) and Labourers (7.1 per cent). Machinery Operators and Drivers were more likely to feel New Zealanders were treated 'very poorly' (27.1 per cent) compared to only 11.7 per cent of Managers. A chi-squared test for independence found that there is not a statistically significant relationship between view of how New Zealanders are treated in Australia and occupation ($\chi^2$(28, $N$=1426)=40.63, $p$=.058).

**Table 7.4: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by occupation, ANZSCO major group code**

| ANZSCO major group | How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia? | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Very well | Well | Fairly | Poorly | Very poorly | Total |
| 1 Managers (%) | 10.0 | 17.9 | 22.9 | 37.5 | 11.7 | 100.0 |
| 2 Professionals (%) | 7.9 | 16.4 | 20.3 | 42.5 | 12.9 | 100.0 |
| 3 Technicians and Trade Workers (%) | 16.8 | 17.8 | 21.8 | 33.7 | 9.9 | 100.0 |
| 4 Community and Personal Service Workers (%) | 10.2 | 17.4 | 19.8 | 30.5 | 22.2 | 100.0 |
| 5 Clerical and Administration Workers (%) | 8.3 | 19.4 | 20.4 | 38.9 | 13.0 | 100.0 |
| 6 Sales Workers (%) | 11.8 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 32.9 | 15.8 | 100.0 |
| 7 Machinery Operators and Drivers (%) | 6.8 | 10.2 | 22.0 | 33.9 | 27.1 | 100.0 |
| 8 Labourers (%) | 7.1 | 12.9 | 22.4 | 35.3 | 22.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 9.3 | 17.0 | 21.0 | 37.8 | 14.9 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1426*

Table 7.5 finds that respondents whose highest level of education is secondary school year 10 or above are more likely to feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia 'very well.' Interestingly, just under half (46 per cent) of those with a postgraduate degree felt New Zealanders were treated 'poorly' with those who have secondary school below year 10 most likely (17.1 per cent) to view the treatment of New Zealanders as 'very poorly.' This relationship was found not to be statistically significant ($\chi^2$(28, $N$=1643)=28.65, $p$=.43).

**Table 7.5: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by the highest level of education achieved**

| Highest qualification | How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia? | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Very well | Well | Fairly | Poorly | Very poorly | Total |
| Postgraduate Degree Level (%) | 10.0 | 14.9 | 17.2 | 46.0 | 11.9 | 100.0 |
| Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level (%) | 9.3 | 11.9 | 24.6 | 41.5 | 12.7 | 100.0 |
| Bachelor Degree Level (%) | 7.1 | 17.2 | 22.2 | 37.7 | 15.8 | 100.0 |
| Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level | 11.4 | 19.1 | 21.1 | 32.5 | 15.9 | 100.0 |
| Certificate III & IV Level (%) | 9.6 | 16.8 | 22.3 | 36.6 | 14.7 | 100.0 |
| Secondary Education - Years 10 and above (%) | 13.6 | 18.3 | 17.3 | 35.3 | 15.5 | 100.0 |
| Certificate I & II Level (% | 8.3 | 13.9 | 22.2 | 44.4 | 11.1 | 100.0 |
| Secondary Education - Years 9 and below (%) | 11.4 | 21.4 | 20.0 | 30.0 | 17.1 | 100.0 |
| Total (%) | 10.3 | 17.0 | 20.4 | 37.7 | 14.7 | 100.0 |

*Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1643*

Respondents who viewed the treatment of New Zealanders favourably discussed this in relation to their personal experiences. At the micro-scale, respondents mentioned how they had a positive experience living in Australia and found it easy to integrate into Australia:

> *'We are treated great here. There is support for families, the school system is great and free. I would never expect anything for nothing so we get out there and earn what we need. We are paid well and have no complaints.' (Respondent 594: Female, 40-44, Bookkeeper, arrived 2016, SCV 444)*

However, many respondents acknowledged that while their experiences had been positive, they felt that prevailing stereotypes of New Zealanders affected their treatment. The view that New Zealanders are 'dole bludgers' dates back to the 1980s, when there were claims made by the Australian media and unions that New Zealanders just moved to Australia to claim social welfare. As discussed in Chapter 2, this led to a series of amendments during the 1980s and 1990s which tightened New Zealanders' access to social welfare in Australia before the 2001 policy change was made. This stereotype has continued, with respondents believing it has continued to be the basis for how the Australian government views New Zealanders, with this respondent expressing:

> *'We contribute to Australian society and the economy but don't get the benefits. There's also a perception, perpetuated by politicians (i.e. Dutton and the like), that NZers are freeloaders that come to take Australian jobs. When I moved, the company was recruiting out of NZ because they simply*

*couldn't get enough people in Australia.' (Respondent 2040: Male, 25-29, Process Engineer, arrived 2013, SCV 444)*

The deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has also contributed to how respondents feel New Zealanders are treated at the macro-scale:

*'The Australian government has been chipping away at the rights of Kiwis in Australia since 1994. Some of the recent targeted incarcerations and deportations of long-term Australian resident Kiwis are horrifying and human rights violations. Summary - the average Australian treats us as well as any other person, the Australian Governments, Federal and State do not.' (Respondent 275: Female, 35-39, Legal Counsel, arrived 2009, SCV 444)*

Many respondents felt it was unjust that people who had lived in Australia since they were a baby and had no ties to New Zealand were being sent back, echoing the remarks that have been made by the New Zealand Prime Minister. As mentioned in the above section, the deportation of New Zealanders contributed to why respondents wanted to naturalise, but for many, obtaining citizenship is not a possibility because of the permanent residency requirements. Being excluded from pathways to permanent residency made many respondents feel like New Zealanders were treated as second-class citizens as the government took their taxes, yet they received none of the associated benefits. While many moved to Australia knowing they would not have access to social security, it was only once they had been living in Australia for an extended period that they realised the extent they were excluded particularly from emergency support services:

*'Most NZers are hardworking taxpayers. We can have a good life and contribute to society. It's when things go wrong that we are disadvantaged and limited support is available ie: domestic violence relationships, children arrangements after [a] marriage breakdown, children develop a disability etc. These situations all occur from having integrated in[to] the community.' (Respondent 647: Female, 40-44, Feedback Manager HR, arrived 2009, SCV 444)*

For a female interviewee who moved to Australia in 2004 with her then-husband and her 4-year-old son, ended up being a victim of domestic violence but could not access any of the services:

*'I was struggling to pay my bills when the child support stopped, and there's another issue if you have a partner here you can't go back home, you actually literally can't because you leave them with the violent domestic partner, you can't leave because you're physically restrained from doing that, you feel trapped, so you're trapped here unless you want to abandon your kid and put them in danger,'*

She went on to say:

> *'There's no support, no benefit, you can't even go to emergency accommodation because you're not in receipt of a Medicare or a Centrelink benefit, it's fucking ridiculous and they [government] need to change it, and it needs to be quite urgent.'* (Female, 40-49, Security Guard, arrived 2004, SCV 444)

This left her feeling trapped as becoming a permanent resident was not a possibility, as she did not meet the income or occupation requirements. In addition, she no longer had any ties in New Zealand and had only travelled back once since moving. Hence returning 'home' was not an option given her home was now Australia.

While for another respondent, their citizenship status prohibited them from accessing services for their Australian son:

> *'I have been in Australia for 14+ years and have paid tax every year. I am married to an Australian, and we have been together for 9+ years. We have three children, and one has a disability, and I cannot apply for any carers payments for him as I am a NZ citizen. So I need to work nights and weekends, so I miss out on family time with my kids and husband. Even though my son is an Australian.'* (Respondent 677: Female, 35-39, Restaurant and Bar Assistant, arrived 2004, SCV 444)

These experiences suggest that even though individuals are aware of the SCV 444 visa conditions before moving to Australia, it is not until living in Australia that they comprehend the degree to which they are excluded. Ottonelli and Torresi (2013) and Oberman (2017) discuss the concept of consent and how voluntary migrants migrate, knowing the terms of their visa and their subsequent status in the destination country. By agreeing to these terms, migrants cannot complain about unjust or unequal treatment but need to know they have an exit option that allows them to change their status to be able to fully consent to the restrictions placed on them (Oberman, 2017; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013). In this context, respondents can, therefore, not consent to the restrictions placed on them as they only realise they have no exit options once they have established their lives in Australia.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the historical ties between New Zealand and Australia have contributed to how respondents view the treatment of New Zealanders in Australia. Many respondents recognised New Zealanders had a privileged position compared to migrants from other countries, as they could to move to Australia with little restriction:

*'No other nationality can move here without jumping through hoops or costing a lot of money. I have friends here from different countries and when I here [sic]what they had to go through just to live and work here, us Kiwis are treated extremely favourably. It's something that many Kiwis do not realise how lucky we are in comparison. Many Kiwis here would probably not be successful in obtaining a work visa here.' (Respondent 222: Male, 35-39, Communications, arrived 2008, Australian citizen)*

This ease of migration plus cultural similarities between the two countries meant moving to Australia was often viewed as moving to another city in New Zealand. Seeing migration as akin to interstate rather than international, and the dominant national rhetoric that New Zealand and Australia have a sibling-like relationship meant some respondents forgot Australia was a separate country that made its own rules. Because of this, many respondents felt New Zealanders were treated poorly compared to how Australians are treated in New Zealand and that being Anzacs no longer mattered. Some thought that the Australian government should make it easier for New Zealanders to become citizens in Australia because of the shared history:

*'It would be great if we didn't have to go through the full process of Skilled migrant, NZ'ers are the same as Australians, we go to war together however we can't become citizens unless we meet certain requirements. This also restricts what I am able to do as I am not eligible to become a permanent resident.' (Respondent 301: Female, 35-39, Manager, arrived 2006, SCV 444)*

Other respondents felt it was unjust that migrants from other countries were treated better than New Zealanders:

*'Given the history of our nation's it is disappointing we are valued the same as most other immigrants.' (Respondent 1781: Male, 55-59, Office Administrator, arrived 2010, Australian citizen)*

*'We are Australia's Mexicans, expected to come here and work, be taxed, entitled to very little and f@!k off if we fall on hard times or difficulty. I could go on elaborating, but I won't bore you.' (Respondent 795: Male, 35-39, Self-employed, arrived 2012, Australian citizen)*

While others recognised that this change in the treatment had been part of a bigger shift in the rhetoric towards migrants in Australia:

*'NZers are treated like any other immigrant, which is on average poor. Australians tend to not like foreigners.' (Respondent 1901: Female, 45-49, Property Valuer, arrived 2007, PR)*

Respondent's views on the treatment of New Zealanders in Australia highlighted that there is a contestation between political integration at the micro- and macro-scales. The examples used in this section have demonstrated how the policy changes have elicited individual responses rather than resulted in community mobilisation. These personal responses have ranged from general frustration and disagreement with how the Australian government has treated New Zealanders to refusing to celebrate Anzac Day as a form of protest. While over half of the respondents felt New Zealanders were treated 'poorly' or 'very poorly' none of the respondents mentioned taking active steps to change the situation meaning political integration was weak at the meso-scale. Section 6.4 found that many respondents followed a group online called *Oz Kiwi,* who is the main advocacy group for New Zealanders living in Australia. *Oz Kiwi* has made several submissions to government inquiries, including the *Citizenship Amendment Bill (2017)* inquiry in June 2017, the *Citizenship Amendment Bill (2018)* inquiry in February 2018, and in March 2018 the review of the processes associated with visa cancellation (Oz Kiwi, 2019). This passive online engagement at the meso-scale differs from how migrants from other countries have sought to mobilise political change in Australia.

For example, attacks on Indian students in Melbourne and Sydney in 2009 led to protests organised by Indian community groups who were concerned that the Australian government nor the police were taking the attacks seriously as they had not condemned the attacks (Baas, 2014; Dunn et al., 2011). Adverse media reports in India and concerns raised by the Indian Prime Minister were cause for concern for the Australian government as international students from Indian had become an important contributor to the Australian economy and higher education (Dunn et al., 2011). The potential economic impacts of these attacks forced the Australian government to condemn the attacks. This led to a round-table discussion between the Australian government and 31 international students, which provided the students with a platform to voice their concerns but did not result in any tangible changes (Dunn et al., 2011). This example shows how micro-scale experiences lead to mobilisation at the meso-scale and macro-scale, which facilitated a broader political discussion about the experiences international students had in Australia and what could be done to improve their experiences. Whereas in this research, despite the critiques made by the New Zealand government in relation to the deportation of New Zealanders, see Chapter 1, this has not resulted in the Australian government making any changes. This lack of action by the Australian government on this issue suggests that regardless of what immigration policy

changes are made, migration and economic trade will still occur given the relative size of the Australian economy compared to the New Zealand economy.

## 7.5   How to make political integration possible

When discussing how they felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia, many respondents expressed changes needed to be made to make it easier for New Zealanders to obtain permanent residency and citizenship. The movement of middling migrants under the TTTA has become at odds with Australia's shift to skilled migration leaving many New Zealanders without a pathway to permanent residency. A respondent who had naturalised said:

> *'Their rights are being eroded (eg not being eligible for the NDIS even though they pay taxes) and new arrivals have little chance of getting permanent residency. In fairness, the Australian Government needs to spell out what sort of New Zealanders it wants here. If it is only the skilled then let's be honest about that, and everyone knows where they stand. Kiwis can make an informed decision whether to come over... and maybe see their time here as a working holiday only and have no expectation of building a life here. Don't hide the facts. Be honest. Also, give this [those] who have lived long term a better path to citizenship the new visa is costly.' (Respondent 213: Female, 50-54, Communications Manager, arrived, 2012, Australian citizen)*

This need for transparency was reiterated by one interviewee:

> *'If you have a NZ passport, and if the rules are such that you can live and work here under the SCV then that's great, but after a certain period, there needs to be an easy and transparent um transfer to PR, it's like having the guest workers in Germany … and generations not knowing when they're going to be kicked out, or left or anything like that, again I'm happy for there to be criteria, and you know if you're a criminal and you've been to prison for more than a few years but this stuff that someone went to prison 30 years ago for burglary is now being deported, its[sic] just no in the way they do it, but it needs to be a transparent pathway otherwise scrap it, do one or the other, just say right New Zealanders are just like English and anybody else now, if you want to work in Australia you need to get a 457 or work visa.' (Male, 50-54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)*

Whereas others suggested having a system similar to that in New Zealand, where Australian's are granted automatic permanent residency after two years:

> *'A clear pathway to citizenship should be a right after 5 or 10 years of law-abiding, tax-paying contributions.' (Respondent 970: Female, 65+, Retired, arrived 2011, SCV 444)*

> *'There should be a proper pathway to citizenship, say 10 years or something. My son came here when 1yo and could legally live his whole life here as a*

*second class citizen.' (Respondent 1087: Male, 45-49, Software Engineer, arrived 2007, RRV)*

One respondent pointed out that the 189 visa created more complexities,

> *'This is also like the problem in 2001 where there is another cut-off date, and everyone migrating after that date still have no pathway to citizenship.' (Respondent 680: Male, 20-24, Registered Nurse, arrived 2008, Australian citizen)*

## 7.6   Conclusion

This chapter has examined the political integration of respondents into Australia, looking at the pathways to citizenship available and the meanings attached to citizenship. This chapter found that for SCV 444 holders, their political integration is dictated by the eligibility requirements for permanent residency, as having permanent residency is required to apply for citizenship. The current permanent residency pathways are based on an individual's ability to contribute economically to Australia through their occupation or income. This focus on economic contribution reflects the shift in how Australia has viewed migrants over the last 30 years, where migrants are used to fill labour shortages. Yet as detailed in this chapter, under the TTTA, any New Zealander, regardless of their occupation, can move to Australia, while the SCV 444 visa conditions prevent New Zealanders from accessing social security. Hence for SCV 444 holders, staying in Australia is predicated on having employment without stipulating the need to have a job on the SOL. Therefore, this disjuncture between the TTTA and Australia's Migration Program and the minimum income requirement fails to acknowledge that all New Zealanders, regardless of their income or occupation, make economic contributions to Australia.

This chapter also found that the historical ties between New Zealand and Australia contributed to how respondents viewed the attainment of Australian citizenship and the treatment of New Zealanders in Australia. For respondents, the historical significance of being Anzacs shaped how they saw the paths to permanent residency available and attainment of citizenship. Being Anzacs has been constructed as a 'mateship' like relationship, yet the inability of many New Zealanders to obtain permanent residency because of the eligibility requirements made them question whether this relationship still meant anything. This exclusion contributed to respondents viewing citizenship as equality. Equality not only meant being treated the same as Australians who pay taxes but being treated the same as how Australians are treated in New Zealand and upholding the TTTA.

Interestingly, this chapter also showed that while immigration policy changes contributed to how respondents view Australian citizenship, policy changes have not necessarily affected respondents' plans to live in Australia. The deportation of New Zealanders from Australia and the changing immigration policies informed the reasons why respondents would want to get permanent residency and citizenship: security and legal status. However, the introduction of the 189 visa had little effect on respondents' plans to live in Australia. This was because the SCV 444 allows them to live in Australia indefinitely and so are not reliant on continually having a valid visa, unlike migrants from other countries. It also demonstrates how even though the majority of respondents had not become integrated at the macro-scales, their integration at the micro- and meso-scales kept them in Australia.

# CHAPTER 8: IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION POLICIES AND RESEARCH

## 8.1 Introduction

The historical ties and geographic proximity of New Zealand and Australia have facilitated the migration of New Zealanders to Australia. While currently the second largest migrant group in Australia, the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia have remained largely absent from Australia's migration rhetoric. This has changed over the last six years in response to the large numbers of New Zealanders who have been deported from Australia on character grounds, many who have few ties to New Zealand. This research has explored the role immigration policy changes have had on the integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which integration and transnational practices are multi-layered and multi-scalar to highlight the nuances of these migrants' settlement experiences. Using primary data collected from an online survey and semi-structured interviews, the findings of this research contribute to the knowledge of integration and transnationalism for middling migrants in a North-North migration context.

This final chapter reviews the key findings in relation to the stated research objectives and details the theoretical and policy implications of these findings. The chapter concludes by making recommendations for future avenues of research.

## 8.2 Summary and discussion of the main findings

The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the role immigration policy changes have on the integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. Using the theoretical framework detailed in Section 3.8, this considered how multi-scalar factors affected integration and transnational practices. Table 8.1 summarises the research objectives, key findings, and contributions and implications of these findings.

**Table 8.1: Summary of key findings and contributions and implications of these findings**

| Research objectives | Key findings | Contribution and implications |
|---|---|---|
| | | **4.To explore the implications for policy and theory and put forward recommendations for future research based on the findings of the study** |
| **1. To examine the motivations to move to Australia and the strength of the social, political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand.** | • Economic opportunities were the main driver of migration for personal rather than familial, economic gain<br><br>• Strong social and cultural ties facilitated by regular use of social media<br><br>• Weak political and economic ties | • Characteristics of integration and transnationalism different in North-North migration<br><br>• Found that these ties are more akin to long-distance internal migration<br><br>• Explore the impacts of COVID-19 on transnational practices |
| **2. To investigate the settlement experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia through examining their socio-cultural and structural integration into Australia** | • Micro-scale well integrated into Australia overall particularly socially and economically<br><br>• Structural integration impeded at macro-scale particular for SCV 444 holders due to eligibility requirements for permanent residency | • Demonstrated that integration is multi-scalar and multi-layered and not necessarily a two-way process<br><br>• Future research should include those who do not identify as Pākehā/New Zealand European to understand better the range of experiences had<br><br>• Research should consider how integration is viewed by different groups and at different scales to uncover how to make integration two-way |
| **3. To examine how immigration policy changes intersect with the socio-cultural and structural integration of migrants and their return migration intentions** | • 189 visa did not affect how long SCV 444 planned to continue living in Australia for as they had already integrated<br><br>• 189 visa and talk of changing citizenship requirements did not have a significant impact on return intentions<br><br>• Respondents would return if there was a significant change in circumstances and needed government assistance | • There needs to be a pathway to citizenship for all SCV 444 holders to enable them to secure their status in Australia<br><br>• Research should consider the impact the ten-year citizenship stand down period has on the integration of Australian-born children<br><br>• Look at Australians living in New Zealand and what role being granted automatic permanent residency has on their experiences |

### 8.2.1   Motivations to move to Australia and the strength of transnational ties

This study found that the economic opportunities available in Australia were the primary motivating factor to migrate, followed by lifestyle, weather, and friends and family. This supports the research by Green et al. (2008), who also found that economic factors were the main drivers of migration from New Zealand to Australia. The continued importance of economic factors in facilitating migration between these two countries, to some extent, can be conceptualised from a macroeconomic viewpoint where wage differences between two countries act as the primary driver of migration. Respondents frequently mentioned that the low income and limited employment opportunities were reasons for leaving New Zealand and were a barrier to returning to New Zealand. While economic reasons have been well documented as a driver of migration (see Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; Massey et al., 1993; Stark & Bloom, 1985), this context differs as unlike the NELM conceptualisation of migration, respondents here moved to Australia for individual economic gain or to improve their immediate (nuclear) family's economic position.

Respondents were asked a series of questions to ascertain how they maintained social, political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand and the strength of these ties. The results found respondents had strong social and cultural ties and weaker political and economic ties. Social media was primarily used to keep in contact with friends and family and used daily. In addition to social media, respondents primarily communicated with family more frequently than friends through email and phone calls. One-quarter of respondents travelled back to New Zealand every year, and 28.3 per cent travelled back every couple of years. For some respondents, regular virtual communication reduced the need for frequent travel, with many citing they now only travelled back for certain occasions such as graduations, weddings, or funerals. Social media was also the primary way through which respondents maintained cultural ties using it to keep up to date with what was happening in New Zealand. Cultural ties were also sustained through the following sports, watching movies or television shows, music, and the purchasing of New Zealand made products. A few respondents cited they participated in kapa haka groups or attended te reo Māori classes.

The results showed that only one-fifth of respondents maintained economic ties with New Zealand, with 60 per cent sending money to family and 28.5 per cent transferring money into personal bank accounts. Those who sent money to themselves typically sent over AUD$1001 per transaction, while money sent to family members was between AUD$101-500 and was

generally for special occasions such as birthdays and Christmas. Regarding political ties, two-thirds of respondents maintained no political ties with New Zealand. One-fifth of respondents had voted in the 2017 general election, with only 2.3 per cent actively engaged with New Zealand politics as a political party member and/or donor.

The relative strength of the social and cultural ties and the weakness of the economic and political ties indicated how, at the micro-scale, respondents' transnational practices were more indicative of long-distance internal migration. These findings provide support for Hugo's (2004b, 2015) long-standing argument that trans-Tasman migration is more akin to long-distance internal migration. This was because respondents' economic transnational practices were primarily based on familial obligations and were sporadic in frequency based on when birthdays and special events occurred. Similarly, the frequency of contact with family members again does not necessarily change upon migration, as communication is based on the nature of one's familial relationships. Hence, while at the macro-scale these practices can be viewed as being transnational; in this context, these practices would still occur regardless of whether migration had been domestic or international.

## 8.2.2 Analysis of New Zealanders settlement experiences through examining their social-cultural and structural integration into Australia

Data from the 2016 Australia census showed that when looking at the indicators of employment status, education, and income, the New Zealand-born population can be described as being well integrated into Australia. This is because, compared to the Australian-born population, New Zealanders have a higher median income and 47.4 per cent are employed full-time. The primary data collected as part of this research found that 54.5 per cent of respondents were employed full-time, with a further 8.5 per cent self-employed or a business owner. While the majority of respondents were employed within four weeks of moving to Australia, many cited that gaining employment in Australia had been more challenging than they had expected. This was because employers did not readily accept their qualifications, non-Australian work-experience, and/or international referees. This demonstrated how although New Zealand and Australia are economically linked at the macro- and meso-scales, this did not translate at the micro-scale and highlighted how migrants from all countries face similar challenges gaining employment in Australia.

Regarding the political integration of New Zealanders into Australia, this research found the eligibility requirements for permanent residency primarily constrained political integration. This was particularly an issue for those who had moved to Australia post-2001. Despite this, over half of the respondents indicated they would consider obtaining Australian citizenship for the security of legal status, access to social services, and the sense of belonging it would provide them. This desire by the majority of respondents to obtain citizenship is consistent with McMillan's (2017) research, which found that New Zealanders would take out Australian citizenship if available to them.

In general, respondents felt they had socially integrated into Australia. While many respondents knew other New Zealanders living in Australia before migrating, their social networks comprised of Australians or both Australians and New Zealanders. Respondents faced similar challenges to migrants from other countries, and in different country contexts in that, they found it difficult breaking into existing local friendship networks and utilised extra-curricular activities to form friendships based on common interests. The results found that there was an absence of engagement with organisations or community groups targeted at New Zealanders, which differs from migrants from other countries who utilise HTAs or ethnic-based groups to facilitate their integration. Instead, 40.3 per cent New Zealand migrants engaged with social media pages or groups targeted at New Zealanders living in Australia or a particular city. These platforms provided a setting to ask general questions about life in Australia, advertise employment opportunities and rooms for rent. Some respondents felt that despite the macro-view that New Zealand and Australia are culturally similar, cultural differences were highlighted upon migration. These differences included sporting preferences, AFL instead of rugby, expectations around how friendships were maintained, and national political alignments. Being subjected to jokes made about their accent or cultural stereotypes, respondents found impeded social network formation and workplace integration.

Respondents, overall, felt they had integrated into Australia at the micro and meso-scales and viewed both New Zealand and Australia as home. Many respondents had bought a house since living in Australia, allowing them to further their integration into their communities. However, the decision to purchase a house is facilitated not only by their ability to live and work in Australia indefinitely but also as a reflection of their life stage and economic stability. The

eligibility requirements for permanent residency and citizenship and the changing migration rhetoric in Australia hampered integration at the macro-scale.

### 8.2.3 The intersection of immigration policy changes with socio-cultural and structural integration and return intentions

This research found that immigration policy changes affected the structural integration of respondents. The 2001 policy change created a stratification of New Zealanders, those who arrived pre-2001 and were granted automatic permanent residency and those who have arrived since then, SCV 444 holders, who need to apply for permanent residency to access social security services. SCV 444 holders were further stratified following the introduction of the 189 visa as only those who moved to Australia between 26 February 2001 and 19 February 2016 were eligible. This research found for three-quarters of SCV 444 holders, the introduction of the 189 visa in 2017 had no impact on how long they planned to continue living in Australia. This was because even without obtaining the 189 visa, they could still continue living in Australia indefinitely as an SCV 444 holder and under the TTTA. Respondents explained that because of this arrangement, their ability to live and work in Australia had not been affected with the introduction of this visa and felt that they had already become integrated at the micro- and meso-scales. Their view of the implementation of this visa differs significantly from migrants from other countries whose ability to stay in Australia is dictated by visa policy changes and ensuring they meet the eligibility requirements.

While the introduction of the 189 visa did not affect SCV 444 holders' plan to live in Australia, the changes made to the Migration Act in 2014 concerning the deportation of non-citizens on character grounds has demonstrated the insecurity of being a non-citizen in Australia. Although not targeting New Zealanders, this policy change has disproportionately affected New Zealanders, which increased respondents' desire to obtain permanent residency and citizenship. Yet, the majority of SCV 444 holders indicated that despite wanting to get Australian citizenship, they could not do so because of the eligibility requirements of permanent residency. The exclusionary nature of the eligibility requirements for the 189 visa and the other permanent residency visas available made respondents feel like second-class citizens as they thought that their contributions and integration into Australia was not recognised. This exclusion left respondents feeling taken advantage of by the Australian government and questioning whether being Anzacs still meant anything to the Australian government. Whereas for other respondents, the broader anti-immigration rhetoric adopted

by the Australian government in recent years made them question if naturalising was something they wanted.

The eligibility requirements for permanent residency also overlook the unrestricted nature of the TTTA, as individuals are not required to have a job on the SOL and hence do not fall into the low/high-skilled dichotomy, which Australia's Migration Program reinforces. For respondents, particularly SCV 444 holders, their inability to change and secure their status in Australia affects not only their long-term integration but on their children's ability to integrate into Australia. SCV 444 holders were concerned about their children's futures, as without citizenship their post-school education and employment opportunities would be limited and impact their ability to apply for permanent residency and citizenship.

The impact of immigration policy changes was also discussed in relation to respondents' return intentions. The 189 visa was introduced the year before data collection, and there had been increasing discussions about changing the citizenship eligibility requirements, so respondents were asked whether impacted their intentions to return to New Zealand. Just over half the respondents indicated these changes had no or little effect on their intention to return, with 6.9 per cent indicating these changes had influenced their return intentions to a great extent. For other respondents, these changes had no impact on them as they had already become Australian citizens. Respondents ranked their top three reasons for wanting to return to New Zealand. Those who ranked friends and family as their second reason ranked lack of access to government services as the main reason they would return to New Zealand. Respondents mentioned they would be forced to return if there was a significant change in their circumstances, such as unemployment, disability, or health, as they would be ineligible for social security services. Respondents were also concerned about future policy changes and the impact they would have on their lives in Australia. Despite these concerns, family, the economic opportunities available, and their integration into the community kept them in Australia.

### 8.2.4   Implications for theory, policy, and recommendations for future research

#### 8.2.4.1   Theoretical implications

This study has found that the applicability of migration theories depends on the country and migration context. Contemporary migration between New Zealand and Australia has been shaped by their shared colonial histories and geographic proximity. Early theorisations of

migration argued that wage differential drives migration at the macro-scale and as a risk diversification strategy at the micro-scale (Massey et al., 1993; Stark & Bloom, 1985). From the results of this research and previous analysis on drivers of migration between the two countries, it could be argued that macroeconomics is the key driver of migration. But as this research has detailed, the drivers of migration cannot be reduced to the economy as it ignores how the economic drivers of migration intersect with the social, cultural, and political dimensions. In the context of trans-Tasman migration, being Anzacs has played an important role in framing how respondents have understood New Zealand's relationship with Australia. At the macro-scale, each government continues to reinforce the Anzac rhetoric of 'mateship' and having each other's back, which shapes many New Zealanders' expectations of how they will be treated in Australia. For respondents, moving to Australia revealed the disconnect that exists between how this relationship has been constructed at the trans-Tasman level and their subsequent lived experience in Australia.

This research contributes to our understanding of transnationalism in a North-North migration context. To date, much of the research on transnationalism and the typologies of migration developed have arisen from researching South-North migration, specifically in the European context. Research on North-North migration has looked at the social transnational practices of Polish in London (see Ryan et al., 2008; White & Ryan, 2008) or the lifestyle migration of British to Spain (see Oliver & O'Reilly, 2010), where in these contexts, language and cultural differences play a role in shaping transnational practices. In examining the transnational practices of New Zealanders in Australia, this research has found that the traditional indicators of transnationalism developed through observations of South-North migration are not necessarily applicable in this context. This was because many of the social, cultural, and economic ties exhibited by respondents were more akin to long-distance internal migration. While the methods of communication with family members changed upon migration, the nature of these relationships did not change because of their migrant status. Hence when theorising the transnational practices of migrants, researchers need to move beyond the migrant/non-migrant binary as individuals experience different pressures such as work, children, class, and life-stage which influence the engagement possible with those who live in a different neighbourhood or city regardless of the nation-state.

Examining the integration of respondents into Australia revealed that integration is multi-scalar and multi-layered. The findings showed how the integration of migrants into the

destination country is facilitated and contingent not only on immigration policies but the policies that structure society in the destination country. This intersection between immigration policies and non-immigration policies highlights how the integration of migrants is not only multi-layered (see Erdal, 2013) but also multi-scalar. The results also highlight how migrants are subjected to the limitations of the current systems in the nation-state as exemplified through the impact the casualisation of employment in Australia had on respondents and their ability to integrate not only economically but socially and at the community level as well. Future research is needed to recognise that each dimension of integration does not occur in a vacuum or in isolation and to tease out the interlinkages that exist to give a more holistic understanding of how migrants adapt to life in the destination country at different scales.

A critique of migration research has been the continued dominance of methodological nationalism; while this research focussed on New Zealanders living in Australia, it has demonstrated the pre-existing social inequalities that exist in Australia. This challenges Korteweg's (2017) claim that by focusing on ethnicity, it ignores how the existing social structures in the destination country affect the integration of migrants. This research has shown how through exploring the social, economic, political integration of New Zealanders into Australia with a focus on occupation, it has revealed how social structures in Australia reinforce inequalities. For example, while respondents faced many of the same challenges migrants from other countries experience when seeking a job, such as lack of recognition of qualifications and prior experience, this research has shown how national issues such as the casualisation of labour and age discrimination affect the economic and social integration of migrants.

Through analysis of respondents' settlement experiences, this research found that even though most respondents identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European, some struggled to integrate into Australia. While their experiences are not comparable to migrants of colour and those whose first language is not English, this research demonstrates how even 'White' migrants feel the need to assimilate into Australia. Respondents spoke of adjusting their accent to sound Australian or obtaining citizenship to prove they belonged in Australia. These conscious decisions taken by respondents indicate how, even in a multicultural society like Australia, migrants are still expected to assimilate or integrate. Despite the arguments by Klarenbeek (2019) and Penninx (2019) that integration should be viewed as a two-way process

in which host societies change in response to migration, this can only work if at the macro-scale the rhetoric towards migrants changes. As even though respondents felt highly integrated at the micro-scale, multi-scalar integration was not possible because of the current anti-migrant rhetoric.

To date, a significant proportion of research on integration and transnationalism has focussed on low- and high-skilled migrants. This dichotomy Conradson and Latham (2005) point out ignores a group they refer to as 'middling transnationals,' a group that has received more attention in recent years (Colic-Peisker & Deng, 2019; Ho & Ley, 2014; Parutis, 2014). This research has contributed to the research on 'middling' migrants as it showed how an open migration pathway such as the TTTA facilitates the migration of those with varying education levels and who work in a wide range of occupations. Many of whom would not have otherwise been able to migrate under Australia's Migration Program.

### 8.2.4.2   Policy implications

Over the last forty years, migration to Australia has become increasingly complex, with the Australian government seeking to ensure they continue to attract and retain the 'right' kind of migrant. One who will contribute economically to Australia without being a burden on the Australian government. This has meant prospective migrants need to meet a wide range of eligibility requirements, including age, health, occupation, education, and English language ability, while also being able to afford the high fee of entry. While Australia's migration system has become increasingly meticulous, the focus of this thesis has been on the migration of New Zealanders to Australia, which falls under the TTTA and is not considered part of Australia's Migration Program. This has meant New Zealanders, regardless of their age, education, health, and occupation, can move to Australia. However, since the 2001 policy change, New Zealanders seeking to obtain permanent residency and citizenship need to meet the same eligibility requirements applied to migrants from other countries. While the 189 visa, which was introduced specifically for New Zealanders in 2017, has provided some individuals with a pathway to citizenship, many respondents found the income requirement exclusionary as it does not reflect the occupations of New Zealanders nor the changing nature of employment in Australia. This was particularly an issue for female respondents, who made up three-quarters of the survey population. Many of those who were employed as General Clerks and Health and Welfare Support Workers wanted to apply for the 189 visa but did not meet the eligibility requirements as these jobs are often low-income, part-time, or casual. Therefore, to

provide more New Zealanders and women, in particular, with a pathway to permanent residency, this visa could be amended by 1) reducing the minimum taxable income by AUD$10,000 to include those who work part-time, in casual jobs, or low-income jobs; 2) decrease the number of consecutive tax years that need to be met to account for people changing jobs, taking time off work to raise children or periods of unemployment, and; 3) remove the eligibility dates to provide those who have moved after 2016 a pathway to permanent residency.

While these suggested changes offer one possible solution as they would make permanent residency available to a wider number of New Zealanders, the cost of the visa was cited by respondents as being prohibitive. Paying AUD$4000-$10,000 for a visa that was not guaranteed was something respondents could not justify, nor did they feel they should have to pay that amount of money because of the economic contributions they had made through taxes. Wanting to be exempt from paying for a visa stemmed from two things: 1) many respondents felt that being Anzacs meant New Zealanders should be treated differently to migrants from other countries; 2) how Australians are treated in New Zealand as they get automatic permanent residency after two years. Hence respondents felt that being Anzacs no longer carried the same meaning because of how they were treated in Australia compared to Australian's living in New Zealand and believed migrants from other countries were treated better. These views held by respondents reflect how each country's government continues to reinforce the Anzac 'mateship' rhetoric, yet in reality, particularly in the context of Australian migration, this rhetoric does not count for much. Mainly because the TTTA benefits Australia by providing an unlimited pool of labour migrants who have the right to live in Australia without being able to access the services, their taxes pay for. Viewing this pathway in terms of its economic benefit to Australia while granting SCV 444 holders an 'indefinitely temporary' status ignores the reality that many can now be considered long-term resident non-citizens who have economically, socially, and culturally integrated into Australia but receive no additional rights or entitlements based on their length of residence.

The lack of a clear pathway to permanent residency and citizenship left many of the respondents frustrated with the current system and felt the system needed to change, so New Zealanders were fully aware of what their options were when moving to Australia. Particularly as the only actual change since the 2001 policy change had been the introduction of the 189 visa. Suggestions put forward in Chapter 7 included having a system similar to how Australians

are treated in New Zealand, where New Zealanders could automatically get permanent residency after a defined period of residence, whether that be two, five, or ten years. Alternatively, a more drastic approach could involve scrapping the TTTA. This would mean New Zealanders wanting to work in Australia would have to apply for a visa like migrants from other countries, so they are not left in limbo as 'indefinitely temporary' non-citizens.

For respondents, the deportation of New Zealanders on character grounds has demonstrated the insecurity of their visa status in Australia and the irrelevance of length of residence. This research found that deportations increased respondents' desire to obtain permanent residency and citizenship as they wanted to secure their future in Australia. The fear of being deported for an arbitrary reason and the constantly changing immigration policies made respondents concerned about what would happen in the future. Yet, many could not obtain permanent residency and citizenship because of the eligibility requirements. It is therefore important that migrants can change their status in response to changing immigration policies; without it, they will always be second-class citizens.

A final policy implication highlighted in this thesis is regarding the attainment of citizenship by children born in Australia to New Zealand parents. Currently, those born in Australia to non-Australian citizen parents have to wait ten years before they are eligible to apply for Australian citizenship. Respondents noted this had implications on their children's sense of belonging, as they could not call themselves Australian, despite being born here. Rather than waiting until the age of ten, children should be able to gain Australian citizenship once they begin primary school to enable integration into their school community and to help develop their national identity.

In addition to the practical policy implications detailed in this section, the results also contribute to broader policy debates concerning more open and freer general migration pathways. While open migration pathways such as the TTTA and within the EU facilitate the movement of people, it is the policies in place in each country that affect mobility and security of legal status. For example, Australians moving to New Zealand automatically get permanent residency after two years and can apply for citizenship after five years of residence, whereas, in the EU although permanent residency is automatic, applying for citizenship in the destination country is not straightforward with each country having different eligibility requirements. As this thesis showed, for many SCV 444 holders obtaining permanent residency is not possible because of the eligibility requirements and therefore citizenship is

not attainable. For an open migration pathway to work, it should benefit not only the receiving country but also the migrant by making obtaining permanent residency and citizenship possible. This could be achieved by granting automatic permanent residency after a certain period of residence or by application but should be available to everyone who migrates under an open migration pathway. Through doing so it would enhance a migrants integration and facilitate wider social cohesion as it would provide migrants with a more secure legal status in the country they call home and allow them to travel home in a COVID-19 era.

### 8.2.4.3 Recommendations for future research

This research has contributed to a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural and structural integration of New Zealanders into Australia and the strength of their social, political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand. Based on the findings discussed, several avenues for research are proposed.

First, this research found that integration is multi-layered and multi-scalar yet was conceived as a one-way process. Given that integration is multi-layered and scalar, future research should examine integration as a two-way process. In viewing integration in this way and expanding the groups included in the research, it would provide a more holistic understanding of how different groups conceive migration and the integration of migrants into Australia. This would involve including Australian-born, naturalised Australian-citizens, those who acquired Australian citizenship after turning 10, and other migrant groups to see how they conceive integration and view migrants. Actors in different organisational settings such as schools, employers, community groups would also need to be included as it would provide insight into how the barriers to integration identified in this research could be overcome. Taking a holistic approach by incorporating a range of groups and actors would, therefore, highlight steps that can be taken by all groups and across multiple scales to reduce the barriers to integration.

Second, research should consider the circularity of trans-Tasman migration and reverse migration flows. Noted in previous research is the circularity of this migration pathway (see Hugo, 2004). Some respondents had mentioned they have previously lived in Australia but had returned to New Zealand before moving back. Looking at why individuals moved the first time, returned, and then moved back would provide an interesting insight into the drivers of migration at different life stages and how they adjusted to moving and returning to each country. Another dimension that would add value would be to examine the views of New

Zealanders who do not migrate to ascertain why they choose to stay, how they view the trans-Tasman relationship, and the transnational ties they have to Australia. The reverse flows of Australians to New Zealand and returnees should also be examined as to date, there has been no research on these counter flows. This would provide an interesting comparison to what the divers of Australia to New Zealand migration are and what their experiences of living in New Zealand are like given they automatically become a permanent resident after two years and have voting rights. Looking at returnees would supplement the results obtained in this research and uncover the reasons why they left Australia.

Third, research should seek to understand better the experiences of New Zealand citizens who do not identify as Pākehā/New Zealand European. Including those who identify as Māori, Pacific Islander, and a range of ethnic backgrounds would highlight how these individuals experience life in Australia and the role different cultural backgrounds play in integration and the maintenance of transnational ties. Researching the experiences of these individuals is important, as while the results discussed in this thesis make important contributions to our understanding of trans-Tasman migration, they cannot be used to make generalisations about all New Zealanders living in Australia.

Finally, the events of 2020 in response to COVID-19 have seen border and travel restrictions implemented in both Australia and New Zealand, severely restricting trans-Tasman movement. As this research found, frequent return trips were common amongst respondents, and so future research should consider the impact COVID-19 has on the strength of transnational ties and the impact not being able to return has on individuals. These restrictions also have implications on New Zealanders' extra-territorial voting rights, as the inability to travel back would mean many New Zealanders would lose their voting rights. This has significant consequences as the next New Zealand election is in October 2020, and many New Zealanders will, therefore, cannot their say on who runs the country.

## 8.3   Conclusion

As next year marks twenty years since the 2001 policy changes, this study has examined the role immigration policy changes have on the integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. This chapter has detailed the key research findings and their theoretical and policy implications. This thesis found that the integration of New Zealanders into Australia is multi-scalar and multi-layered. Integration was possible economically, socially,

and culturally at the micro- and meso-scales, but political and macro-scale integration was hampered by the eligibility requirements for permanent residency and changing immigration policies. However, despite the inability of many to naturalise it did not affect their plans to continue living in Australia as they had already integrated at the micro-scale and could continue living here indefinitely under the TTTA. The thesis found that the transnational ties at the micro-scale were more akin to long-distance internal migration. The future research recommendations should be considered as it will enhance our understanding of trans-Tasman migration flows in a post-COVID-19 era.

## APPENDIX 1: SURVEY ON NEW ZEALANDERS LIVING IN AUSTRALIA

Hello, my name is Madeleine Morey and I am a PhD student in the department of Geography, Environment and Population at the University of Adelaide.

I am currently undertaking research (funded by the University) into the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. The aim of my research is to understand what effect the 2017 policy changes has had on the integration of New Zealanders in Australia and how they maintain ties to New Zealand.

The questionnaire includes questions that cover the following topics, some of which are personal in nature:
· What motivated you to move to Australia
· Your experiences living in Australia
· How you maintain links with New Zealand
· Your employment in Australia
· Whether or not you have applied for Australian citizenship
· If you're considering returning to New Zealand

Kindly help me learn more about these issues by answering this on-line survey. You are eligible to participate if you are employed or seeking employment, aged 18 years and over and a New Zealand citizen.

Participation in this research is voluntary and completion of this survey will be considered your consent to be part of the study. Responses are anonymous. The survey takes approximately 20-25 minutes to complete. Please take time to consider the questions and answer them as best as you can. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering. The information provided will be analysed using statistical software and published in my thesis and any future publications. All data collected will be aggregated.

Your input will contribute to enhancing the limited understanding we have of the experiences New Zealanders have in Australia. Should you have any questions about this study or would like a summary of the results, feel free to contact me at madeleine.morey@adelaide.edu.au.

Any concerns you wish to raise about this research should be directed to my supervisor, Associate Professor Yan Tan at yan.tan@adelaide.edu.au or phone (08) 8313 3976.

I will also be conducting interviews. If you would like to participate further in the research, please provide your contact details at the end of the questionnaire, alternatively email me. All contact information you provide will be confidential and only accessible to the researcher.

The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2018-061). This research project will be conducted according to the NHMRC National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). If you wish to speak with an independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the Human

**Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on:**
**Phone: +61 8 8313 6028**
**Email:    hrec@adelaide.edu.au**
**Post:      Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000**
**Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome.**

**\*\*In order to progress through this survey, please use the following navigation buttons\*\***
**Click the Next button to continue to the next page**
**Click the Previous button to return to the previous page**
**Click the Exit the Survey Early button if you need to exit the survey**
**Click the Done button to submit your survey participating in our survey. Your feedback is important.**

This section asks about where you live in Australia.

1. What year did you move to Australia?

2. Where in Australia do you currently live?

City/town

State

3. Have you always lived in this location since moving to Australia?

○ Yes (Go to 5)

○ No (Go to 4)

4. Where else in Australia have you lived?

City/town

State

5. Why did you move to your current location?

This section asks about who you moved to Australia with and who you knew in Australia.

1. Did you move to Australia on your own or with others?

- ○ On my own
- ○ Partner/spouse
- ○ Family
- ○ Friend/s
- ○ Other (please specify)

2. Did you know any New Zealanders already living in Australia before moving here? (You may select more than one).

- ☐ Knew no New Zealanders living in Australia
- ☐ Cousin/s
- ☐ Spouse/partner
- ☐ Other relative/s
- ☐ Child/ren
- ☐ Colleague/s
- ☐ Parent/s
- ☐ Friend/s
- ☐ Sibling/s
- ☐ Other (please specify)

3. Do the New Zealanders you know live in the same location as you?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No (please specify where)

## Previous travel and motivation for moving to Australia.

1. Had you previously travelled to Australia before moving here?

○ Yes

○ No

2. How many times?

☐ 1                          ☐ 5

☐ 2                          ☐ 6+

☐ 3                          ☐ Not applicable

☐ 4

3. What motivated you to move to Australia? (You may select more than one)

☐ Job offer                                    ☐ Education

☐ Better employment opportunities              ☐ Desire to go abroad

☐ Higher income                                ☐ Lifestyle

☐ Moved with family                            ☐ Weather

☐ Friends and/or family living in Australia    ☐ No visa application required

☐ Spouse/partner                               ☐ Similar to New Zealand

☐ Reunion with parents/children

☐ Other (please specify)

4. Of the above factors, which had the greatest impact on your decision to move to Australia? Please provide a brief explanation for your reasons.

## Why Australia?

1. Have you lived in any other countries aside from Australia and New Zealand?

◯ Yes

◯ No

2. If YES, which countries have you lived in and what were your reasons for leaving?

3. Did you consider moving to another country before moving to Australia?

◯ Yes

◯ No

4. If YES, where did you consider moving to and why did you eventually decide against moving there?

## Economic ties to New Zealand.

1. Which of the following do you still own in New Zealand? (Select all that apply)

☐ House/apartment                    ☐ Bank account

☐ Property                           ☐ Financial investment

☐ Business

☐ Other (please specify)

[                                        ]

2. How often do you make work business trips back to New Zealand?

◯ Do not make business trips back     ◯ Every couple of months

◯ Weekly                              ◯ Every 6 months

◯ Fortnightly                        ◯ Yearly

◯ Monthly

◯ Other (please specify)

[                                        ]

3. Do you send money home?

◯ Yes

◯ No

4. If YES, please specify:

| | |
|---|---|
| Where (country) | |
| To whom (just state children, cousin etc) | |
| How frequently do you send money home? | |
| How much money do you send per transfer? | |

## Political links with New Zealand.

1. How do you maintain political links with New Zealand? (You may select more than one)

☐ Member of a political party/group    ☐ Voted in the 2017 general election

☐ Donated money to a political party/group    ☐ I don't maintain any political links with New Zealand

☐ Other (please specify)

[                                        ]

2. How often do you consume different forms of media to find out what is happening in New Zealand?

| | Daily | Weekly | Monthly | Every couple of months | Never | Not applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Read news sources (e.g NZ Herald, Stuff) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Watch news reports | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Listen to radio and/or podcasts | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Through social media pages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Other (please specify)

[                                        ]

## Social ties with New Zealand

1. Which of your family members still live in New Zealand? (You may select more than one).

- [ ] Spouse/partner
- [ ] Parent/s
- [ ] Child/ren
- [ ] Sibling/s
- [ ] Other (please specify)

- [ ] Grandparent/s
- [ ] Cousin/s
- [ ] None

2. How and how often do you keep in contact with your **immediate family?**

|  | Daily | Weekly | Monthly | Every couple of months | Few times a year | Yearly | Not applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Email | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Phone calls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Video calling (e.g. Skype) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Messaging app (e.g. Viber) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Social media accounts | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Post | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

3. How and how often do you keep in contact with **friends?**

|  | Daily | Weekly | Monthly | Every couple of months | Few times a year | Yearly | Not applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Email | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Phone calls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Video calling (e.g. Skype) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Messaging app (e.g. Viber) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Social media accounts | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Post | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

1. How often do you travel back to New Zealand?

○ Have not travelled back          ○ Yearly

○ Monthly                          ○ Every couple of years

○ Every six months                 ○ 3 years +

2. What was the primary reason for your**most recent trip?**

○ Visit family and/or friends      ○ Business

○ Holiday                          ○ Conference

○ Other (please specify)

[                                              ]

3. How long did you spend in New Zealand on your**most recent trip?**

○ Just for the weekend             ○ 2-4 weeks

○ 3-7 days                         ○ Longer than one month

○ 8-14 days

## Visits by family and friends.

1. When did your **immediate family** last visit you in Australia?

◯ Have not visited               ◯ 1-2 years ago

◯ Last 6 months                 ◯ 3+ years ago

◯ Last 6-12 months

2. When did **friends** last visit you in Australia?

◯ Have not visited               ◯ 1-2 years ago

◯ Last 6 months                 ◯ 3+ years ago

◯ Last 6-12 months

1. How do you maintain cultural links with New Zealand? (You may select more than one).

☐ Watch New Zealand film or television

☐ Purchase imported New Zealand food and/or beverages

☐ Have friends or family bring you New Zealand food and/or beverages

☐ Listen to music from New Zealand

☐ Other (please specify)

☐ Follow New Zealand sports teams

☐ Read/watch/listen to news reports

☐ Follow New Zealand themed/topic social media accounts

☐ None

## Social networks in Australia.

1. Are you a member of any New Zealand groups/clubs/ organisations (including online groups) in Australia?

◯ Yes

◯ No

2. If YES, please specify groups/clubs/organisations

3. Who do you most often socialise with?

◯ Australians                                    ◯ New Zealanders

◯ Approximately equal numbers of both            ◯ Neither

◯ Other (please specify)

4. Do you feel socially integrated into Australia?

◯ A great deal                                   ◯ A little

◯ A moderate amount                              ◯ None at all

◯ Occasionally

5. What has your experience of making friends in Australia been like?

## Sense of belonging.

1. Please indicate how you feel about the following statements

| | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Agree | Strongly agree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I feel like I belong in Australia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I am satisfied with life in Australia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I feel I have have integrated into Australian society | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I feel like a foreigner in Australia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Australia is my home | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| New Zealand is my home | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

1. Please describe your overall experience of living in Australia?

## Housing situation in Australia.

1. What was your housing status when you **first moved** to Australia?

( ) Home owner

( ) Purchasing home

( ) Renting

( ) Other (please specify)

( ) Living with friends and/or family

( ) Hotel/hostel accommodation

( ) Student accommodation

|  |
|--|

2. What was your family/household situation when you **first moved** to Australia?

( ) Single person household

( ) Couple only household

( ) Couple with child/ren under 5 years

( ) Couple with child/ren all ages

( ) One parent with child/ren under 5 years

( ) Other (please specify)

( ) One parent with child/ren all ages

( ) Some other group of family members

( ) Two or more unrelated individuals

( ) Not applicable

|  |
|--|

3. Has your housing status and/or situation changed since living in Australia?

( ) Yes

( ) No

1. What is your **current** housing status?

○ Has not changed

○ Home owner

○ Purchasing home

○ Renting

○ Other (please specify)

○ Living with friends and/or family

○ Hotel/hostel accommodation

○ Student accommodation

2. What is your **current** family/household situation?

○ Has not changed

○ Single person household

○ Couple only household

○ Couple with child/ren under 5 years

○ Couple with child/ren all ages

○ Other (please specify)

○ One parent with child/ren under 5 years

○ One parent with child/ren all ages

○ Some other group of family members

○ Two or more unrelated individuals

## Education.

1. Are you a student?

◯ No

◯ Yes (please specify current level of study)

| |
|---|

2. What is your highest level of education?

◯ Postgraduate Degree Level      ◯ Certificate III & IV Level

◯ Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level      ◯ Secondary Education - Years 10 and above

◯ Bachelor Degree Level      ◯ Certificate I & II Level

◯ Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level      ◯ Secondary Education - Years 9 and below

3. In which country did you gain this qualification?

◯ New Zealand      ◯ Australia

◯ Other (please specify)

| |
|---|

4. In what field did you train or study?

| |
|---|

## Employment in Australia.

**1. What is your current employment status?**

○ Self employed/ business owner      ○ Employed, casual

○ Employed, working full-time      ○ Unemployed, looking for full-time work

○ Employed, working part-time      ○ Unemployed, looking for part-time work

○ Not in labour force (please explain why)

If you are not in the labour force, please continue to next section

**2. What challenges have you faced gaining employment?**

**3. Is your job**

○ Permanent

○ Contract

**4. How long did it take you to get employment in Australia?**

○ Job offer before moving      ○ Longer than a month

○ Less than a month      ○ Still looking

○ Other (please specify)

**5. How long have you been in your current job?**

○ Less than 6 months      ○ 6-10 years

○ 6-12 months      ○ 10 years +

○ 1-5 years

6. How many jobs have you have while living in Australia?

○ 1                                    ○ 4

○ 2                                    ○ 5

○ 3                                    ○ 6+

○ Other (please specify)

[                                                              ]

7. Do you feel a part of your workplace?

○ A great deal                        ○ A little

○ A lot                                ○ None at all

○ A moderate amount

8. Please explain your above response.

[                                                              ]

## Occupation

1. What is your occupation?

2. In which industry do you work?

3. Are you in the same occupation as you were in New Zealand?

○ Yes

○ No

○ Not applicable

4. If NO, please specify what your job in New Zealand was.

## Income

1. What is your current weekly income before tax ($AUD)?

- ( ) Nil income
- ( ) $1-$149 ($1-$7,799)
- ( ) $150-$299 ($7,800-$15,599)
- ( ) $300-$399 ($15,600-$20,799)
- ( ) $400-$499 ($20,800-$25,999)
- ( ) $500-$649 ($26,000-$33,799)
- ( ) $650-$799 ($33,800-$41,599)
- ( ) $800-$999 ($41,600-$51,999)

- ( ) $1,000-$1,249 ($52,000-$64,999)
- ( ) $1,250-$1,499 ($65,000-$77,999)
- ( ) $1,500-$1,749 ($78,000-$90,999)
- ( ) $1,750-$1,999 ($91,000-$103,999)
- ( ) $2,000-$2,999 ($104,000-$155,999)
- ( ) $3,000 or more ($156,000 or more)
- ( ) Prefer not to answer

2. How does your current income compare to the income you received in New Zealand?

- ( ) More
- ( ) Comparable
- ( ) Less

- ( ) Prefer not to answer
- ( ) Not applicable

## Citizenship

1. Are you a New Zealand citizen?

( ) Yes

( ) No (please specify which country)

[                                                    ]

2. Which factors would shape your decision to become an Australian citizen? (You may select more than one)

[ ] Right to vote          [ ] Provide security

[ ] Passport            [ ] Marriage

[ ] Access to government services    [ ] Child/ren

[ ] Feel Australian

[ ] Other (please specify)

[                                                    ]

3. Are you considering becoming an Australian citizen?

( ) Yes

( ) Undecided

( ) No

( ) Have already become an Australian citizen

4. Why have you or have you not become an Australian citizen?

[                                                    ]

5. What does citizenship mean to you?

[                                                    ]

## Visas

1. Which visa do you hold?

○ Protected Special Category visa (arrived prior 2001)    ○ Special Category Visa (arrived after February 2001)

○ Returning Resident Visa    ○ Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) Visa

○ Permanent resident

○ Other (please specify)

[ ]

2. If you are a permanent resident, please explain why you became a permanent resident.

[ ]

1. Did the introduction of the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa change how long you plan to live in Australia?

◯ Yes

◯ Unsure

◯ No

2. Please explain your answer to the above question.

3. What motivated you to apply for the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa.

## Visa option for Special Category Visa holders

1. Have you heard of the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa?

◯ Yes

◯ No

2. To be eligible for the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa, have you? (select all that apply)

☐ Lived in Australia for 5 years

☐ Started residency before the 19 February 2016

☐ A taxable income over $53,900 for the four income years prior to application

3. If you meet all the eligibility requirements  (those above), have you applied for the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa?

◯ Yes                                        ◯ Have no intention of applying for it

◯ In the process of applying for it

◯ Other (please specify)

[                                    ]

4. Please explain why you would or would not apply for the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa?

[                                    ]

5. Would you apply for the visa if you were eligible?

[                                    ]

6. Has the introduction of the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) (New Zealand) visa changed how long you plan to live in Australia?

◯ A great deal                              ◯ A little

◯ A lot                                     ◯ None at all

◯ A moderate amount

7. Please explain why or why not

1. How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia?

○ Very well

○ Well

○ Fairly

○ Poorly

○ Very poorly

2. Please explain your answer

```
[                                        ]
[                                        ]
```

1. Do you view living in Australia as

◯ Permanent

◯ Temporary

## Return migration

1. Which factors would influence your decision to return to New Zealand? (Please select your top 3)

| | Top factors |
|---|---|
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |

2. Do you think you **will** return permanently to New Zealand in the future?

- ( ) Yes
- ( ) No
- ( ) Unsure

3. Please give reasons for why you would or would not return.

[                                                      ]

4. Would the introduction of the Skilled Independent (subclass 189) New Zealand visa and/or talks of tightening citizenship requirements have any influence on your decision to return to New Zealand?

- ( ) To a great extent
- ( ) Somewhat
- ( ) Very little
- ( ) Not at all
- ( ) Not applicable

5. Do you know any New Zealanders who have left Australia and returned permanently to New Zealand?

- ( ) Yes
- ( ) No

If YES it would be greatly appreciated if you directed them to the Facebook page for this research https://www.facebook.com/NZersinAUSandreturnessPhDresearch/, or forwarded them this link www.surveymonkey.com/r/R6PP985 in order for them to complete the survey on returnees

## This section asks questions about yourself

1. How old are you?

- ◯ 18-19
- ◯ 20-24
- ◯ 25-29
- ◯ 30-34
- ◯ 35-39
- ◯ 40-44

- ◯ 45-49
- ◯ 50-54
- ◯ 55-59
- ◯ 60-64
- ◯ 65+

2. Gender

- ◯ Male
- ◯ Female
- ◯ Other

3. How do you primarily identify yourself?

- ◯ Pakeha/ NZ European
- ◯ Maori
- ◯ Other (please specify)

- ◯ Pacific Islander

## Family.

1. Marital status

○ Never married                  ○ Separated

○ De facto relationship        ○ Divorced

○ Married                       ○ Widowed

2. If you are in a relationship, which country was your partner born in?

○ New Zealand             ○ Australia

○ Other (please specify)

> _____

3. Do you have a child or children?

○ Yes

○ No

4. In which country was your child/ren born?

○ New Zealand             ○ Australia

○ Other (please specify)

> _____

1. Which country were you born in?

[                                        ]

2. Were you living in New Zealand before moving to Australia?

◯ Yes

◯ No

3. If YES, which

City/town    [                                    ]

Region       [                                    ]

4. If NO, which

City/town    [                                    ]

Country      [                                    ]

# Thank you for participating in this research

1. Please provide any further comments or suggestions you feel may be useful for this study

If you know any other New Zealanders living in Australia it would be greatly appreciated if you could forward them the link or direct them to the Facebook page,
https://www.facebook.com/NZersinAUSandreturnessPhDresearch/.

Survey link https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/R6KMJJY

If you would like to participate further in the research I will be conducting interviews in the cities of Adelaide, Melbourne and the Gold Coast. Interviews can also be conducted on the phone/Skype.

2. Contact details

**Name**

**City/town**

**Email Address**

**APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF EMAIL TO ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED TO SHARE SURVEY**

Dear xxxxxx

My name is Madeleine Morey and I am a PhD student at the University of Adelaide. I am undertaking research that is looking at the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. My research seeks to find out the ways New Zealanders keep ties with New Zealand, the views New Zealanders have on Australian citizenship and how New Zealanders integrate into Australia. I am gathering information via an online questionnaire.

I am sending this email to you, to ask you to provide a link to the questionnaire on your website or through social media pages. Through distributing information about this research, it will contribute to the understanding we have of the experiences New Zealanders have of living in Australia

The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete and participation is completely voluntary. Participants will not be identifiable from the information they provide.

If you require any further information or have any questions do not hesitate to contact me at madeleine.morey@adelaide.edu.au.

If you have any other questions or concerns please contact my supervisor, Associate Professor Yan Tan, yan.tan@adelaide.edu.au.

Thank you for taking the time to read this email, and thank you in advance if you choose to share the link to the questionnaire.

Kind regards,
Madeleine Morey

## APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET- INTERVIEWS

THE UNIVERSITY
*of* ADELAIDE

### Participant Information Sheet- Interviews

Ethics approval number: H-2018-061

My name is Madeleine Morey and I am a PhD student in the department of Geography, Environment and Population at the University of Adelaide. This research is funded by the University of Adelaide.

I am currently undertaking research into the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. The aim of my research is to understand what effect the 2017 policy changes has had on the integration of New Zealanders in Australia and their transnational practices.

In particular, I would like to know:

- What motivated you to move to Australia.
- Your experiences living in Australia.
- How you maintain links with New Zealand.
- Your employment in Australia and any challenges you have faced gaining employment.
- Whether or not you have applied for Australian citizenship.
- If you're considering returning to New Zealand.

I am conducting interviews in the cities of Adelaide, Melbourne, the Gold Coast and Brisbane. To be eligible to participate you need to be a New Zealand citizen, employed or seeking employment and aged 18 years and over.

Participation in this research is completely voluntary. The interview will take approximately one hour and at a time and place that is convenient for yourself. The interview will be audio recoded, with recording only accessible to myself and supervisors. You may ask for the audio recorder to be turned off at any point. You can decline to answer any of the questions asked and you can withdraw your participation at any point during the interview.

Information collected in the interview will be kept confidential. Your name will be recorded separate from audio recordings and transcriptions in an encrypted file. Your name or any other identifiable information will not be used in any material arising from this study. Information obtained will only be accessed by myself and supervisors. Interview data will be used for a PhD thesis and may be used in presentations or publications arising from the research.

All information will be stored on the researcher's secure, password protected computer and will be kept for a period of 5 years. After this period of time, all data will be permanently destroyed.

Should you require more information or have any questions about this study, please contact me at madeleine.morey@adelaide .edu.au

At the completion of the study a summary of findings will be produced. You can indicate whether you would like to receive the summary of findings on the attached consent form.

Any concerns you wish to raise about this research should be directed to my supervisor Associate Professor Yan Tan at yan.tan@adelaide.edu.au or phone + 61 (08) 8313 3976

If you would like to participate please complete the attached consent form. A guide of topics covered during the interview is also attached.

The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2018-061). This research project will be conducted according to the NHMRC National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). If you wish to speak with an independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on:
Phone: +61 8 8313 6028
Email: hrec@adelaide.edu.au
Post: Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome.

Kind regards,

Madeleine Morey

## APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

THE UNIVERSITY
*of* ADELAIDE

**CONSENT FORM (interviews)**

1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research project:

| Title: | Policy, Occupation and Transnationalism: New Zealanders in Australia |
|---|---|
| Ethics Approval Number: | H-2018-061 |

2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is given freely.

3. I have been given the opportunity to have a member of my family or a friend present while the project was explained to me.

4. Although I understand the purpose of the research project it has also been explained that involvement may not be of any benefit to me.

5. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my personal results will not be divulged.

6. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time.

7. I agree to the interview being audio recorded.        Yes ☐        No ☐

8. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached Information Sheet.

**Participant to complete:**

Name: _____Signature: _____ Date:_____

**Researcher/Witness to complete:**

I have described the nature of the research to _____

*(print name of participant)*

and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation.

Signature: _____Position: _____ Date:_____

**APPENDIX 5: EXAMPLE OF EMAIL SENT TO PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS**

Good afternoon XXXXX,

Thank you for recently completing the survey on New Zealanders living in Australia.

I am getting in touch with you as you indicated that you would be interested in doing a follow up interview. The aim of the interview is to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia, expanding on the topics covered by the survey. I have attached a copy of the participant information sheet for more information.

I will be in Melbourne from the 9th-20th of September. Please let me know if you are still interested in being interviewed or have any other questions.

Kind regards,

Madeleine Morey

PhD Candidate
University of Adelaide

**APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

1. **Individual background**
   Where in New Zealand did you grow up?
   What were you doing in New Zealand before moving to Australia?
   Have you lived in any other country other than Australia or New Zealand?
   Had you travelled to Australia before moving here?
   How many times?

2. **Decision to move to Australia**
   What contributed to your decision to move to Australia?
   Who was involved in the decision making process?
   What kind of opportunities did you think it would provide you?
   Why did you chose Australia and not another country?
   What opportunities did you think Australia would give you that were not available in New Zealand?
   What expectations did you have?

3. **Life in Australia**
   How long have you been living in Australia?
   Have you always lived in this city? If not where else have you lived.
   Did you move to Australia with anyone else?

4. **Transnational connections**
   How do you maintain links with New Zealand?
   How often do you contact friends and family?
   When was the last time you went to New Zealand? Reason for trip?
   Have friends and family come to visit you in Australia? When was the last visit?
   Are the any barriers that prevent you from maintaining these connections?

5. **Integration**
   Who makes up your social network?
   Did you find it difficult making friends?
   Do you feel as though you belong in Australia?
   Are you part of any groups aimed at New Zealanders in Australia? Such as social media or sports groups.

6. **Occupation**
   What is your occupation?
   How long have you been in this job?
   Did you have a job offer before moving to Australia? How long did it take you to find a job?
   What has your work experience in Australia been like?
   Have you faced any challenges?

7. **Policy and citizenship**
   When you first moved over what did you know about policies that affected New Zealanders, in relation to the services you have access to?
   Which visa do you hold?
   Are you eligible for the subclass 189 visa? Why have you/have you not applied for it?
   Are you able to apply for Australian citizenship?
   What contributed to your decision to apply or not apply?
   What does citizenship mean to you?
   How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia?
   What changes would you like to see made

8. **Future plans**
   In the time you have lived in Australia as your attitude to life in Australia changed?
   Do you intend to move back New Zealand? What time frame? For what reason?

**APPENDIX 7: IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO NEW ZEALANDERS OBTAINING AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP**

Morey, M. (2020). Identifying barriers to New Zealanders obtaining Australian citizenship. New Zealand Geographer, 76(2), 117–126. https://doi.org/10.1111/nzg.12257

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

NEW ZEALAND GEOGRAPHER | WILEY

# Identifying barriers to New Zealanders obtaining Australian citizenship

**Madeleine Morey** ⓘ

Department of Geography, Environment and Population, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia

**Correspondence**

Madeleine Morey, Department of Geography, Environment and Population, School of Social Sciences, University of Adelaide, G37B, Napier Building, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia.
Email: madeleine.morey@adelaide.edu.au

**Abstract**

Increasing migration regulation affects long-term resident non-citizen populations. Using New Zealanders living in Australia as an example, this paper explores the effect increasing migration regulation has had on this population and their ability to obtain Australian citizenship. Results from an online survey found that although 44.7% of respondents want to become a citizen, the eligibility requirements, cost and the application process were the main barriers to them doing so. Leaving them unable to secure their legal status in Australia.

**KEYWORDS**

Australia, barriers, citizenship, dual-citizenship, New Zealand, regulation

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Since World War II migrant-receiving countries have implemented highly regulated and controlled migration programs that dictate who can migrate and under what conditions (Czaika & de Haas, 2013; Walsh, 2011). This has resulted in the proliferation of migrants with different temporary statuses based on the conditions of their visa (Rajkumar, Berkowitz, Vosko, Preston, & Latham, 2012; Ruhs, 2002). While overseas migration to Australia has become highly managed to fill labour shortages, the migration of New Zealanders to Australia falls into its own category managed under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA). The TTTA allows New Zealand citizens regardless of their education, skill, occupation or age to migrate to Australia. This unregulated migration pathway has seen New Zealanders become the second largest migrant group in Australia, with a population of 518,462 (2.2% of the Australian population) (ABS, 2016). However, only 30.7% have obtained Australian citizenship, meaning

the majority are long-term resident non-citizens (ABS, 2016), who are vulnerable to policy changes that affect non-citizens living in Australia.

In Australia, permanent residency allows an individual to stay indefinitely with full access to social services. Citizenship is associated with voting rights and security of legal status. Changes to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014, expanded the grounds on which non-citizens living in Australia could be deported based on character, resulting in the deportation of over 1,909 New Zealand nationals from Australia since 2014 (Department of Home Affairs, 2019a). Additionally, the ability of New Zealanders to obtain citizenship depends on when they migrated to Australia. New Zealanders who migrated before the February 16, 2001 were granted automatic permanent residency whereas those who have migrated since this date are given an 'indefinitely temporary' status. For those who have migrated since 2001, in order to apply for permanent residency they need to meet the same occupation, skill and age requirements used to regulate the arrival of migrants from other countries. Individuals can only apply for Australian citizenship once they have been resident in Australia for at least four years and held permanent residency for 12 months,

---

Madeleine Morey is a PhD candidate at the University of Adelaide. This paper is based on results obtained as part of her research.

240

with New Zealanders who migrated pre-2001 able to apply at any stage.

This paper will explore the barriers to New Zealanders obtaining Australian citizenship amidst the increasing regulation of migration in Australia. The findings show that although the majority of survey respondents would consider becoming an Australian citizen, many are unable to do so because they initially need to become a permanent resident, which is not possible given the eligibility requirements and the cost to do so.

## 2 | MIGRATION REGULATION

Colonial countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada initially regulated migration by race, through policies such as the White Australia Policy and White Canada (Walsh, 2011). These policies were abolished during the post-war period and replaced by points-based systems that granted migrants entry based on their occupation, skill, age and education, instead of their country of origin (Betts, 1999; Walsh, 2011). By assessing migrants on their occupation and skill, governments have been able to address labour shortages as they arise (Betts, 1999). This has resulted in the proliferation of temporary work visas which dictate the conditions and rights that a migrant has in the receiving country (Rajkumar et al., 2012; Ruhs, 2002). Despite this regulation, destination countries over the last decade have become increasingly concerned about the impact of 'uncontrolled' migration, resulting in countries such as Britain and Australia tightening their immigration policies (Billings, 2019; Huber, 2019).

This regulation of migration comes from a government's need to remain economically competitive while ensuring the security of its territory and population (Hollifield, 2004). Anderson (2010) notes that in order for governments to remain in 'control' of migration, immigration policies are continually adjusted to ensure the filtering out of 'undesirable' migrants, those who do not have the necessary skills or have criminal convictions. Castles (2004) observes that this control and regulation reinforces the global hierarchies that exist between migrant-sending and receiving countries by dictating the conditions of migration.

Through regulation, migrants are granted different rights based on their skill, occupation and labour shortages. Rajkumar et al. (2012) refer to this as the temporary-permanent divide, where different visa categories grant migrants certain rights within the destination country. This includes the length of the visa, whether the visa is renewable and what their occupation can be. Migrants can be: (a) temporarily temporary, referring to those who enter on a temporary work visa but

have the ability to apply for permanent residency; (b) permanently temporary, which refers those whose visa has a fixed end date for when they have to leave the country or (c) temporarily permanent, permanent residents who can be deported if they violate the terms of their stay (Rajkumar et al., 2012). However, a migrant's status and rights once in the destination country can change as a result of switching visas and/or government changes to immigration policies. Migrants wanting to switch visas to extend their stay in the destination country need to meet a new range of eligibility requirements which may differ from the requirements needed to initially get into the country (Robertson, 2011). This means a migrant's future in the destination country is at the mercy of these policy changes.

While migration regulation often focuses on controlling the numbers of temporary migrants who enter a country, it can also impact long-term resident non-citizens. Within the European Union (EU), EU citizens are able to live and work within the EU without restrictions. This free mobility means even 'undesirable' migrants who would not meet the eligibility requirements imposed on non-EU migrants are able to migrate (Engbersen, Leerkes, Scholten, & Snel, 2017). The rights that EU citizens have when migrating within the EU allow them to live in their destination country without obtaining national citizenship. This is facilitated by the fact they can easily obtain permanent residency and access social security services, which reduces their need to seek national citizenship (Engbersen et al., 2017). But as seen with Britain's vote to leave the EU, their desire to control the immigration of non-EU citizens will have implications for resident EU citizens. Huber (2019) notes that for these EU citizens there is uncertainty surrounding their rights in the future especially as many risk losing EU citizenship if they obtain British citizenship in order to secure their status in Britain (Huber, 2019).

The impact that increased government regulation has on long-term resident non-citizen populations has also been seen in Australia. Amendments made to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014, saw an expansion of the grounds in which non-citizens could be deported from Australia. Mares (2016) argues this has adversely affected New Zealand citizens living in Australia, who under the TTTA are able to live and work in Australia indefinitely, making them one of the largest non-citizen populations in Australia.

## 3 | CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL-CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship allows migrants to secure their status in the destination country. Being a citizen of the state

corresponds to legal status, rights, participation and integration into society, as well as a sense of belonging (Bauböck, 2006; Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008). For the nation-state, citizenship symbolises national cohesion and enables control over individuals, as they are able to dictate which migrants can naturalise through the immigration regimes in place (Bloemraad, 2017; Castles, 2005; Desforges, Jones, & Woods, 2005). Migrants are often expected to embrace and have the same values and beliefs as the dominant national identity which may be assessed using a citizenship test (Chisari, 2015; Joppke, 2008). Chisari (2015) discusses how in Australia, the test is used to reinforce the values of the dominant white-Anglo, Christian population. She argues that these values ignore the multiculturalism of Australia and that learning these values to become a citizen grants them 'honorary whiteness'. Here, the government assumes that having citizenship makes an individual 'Australian'.

A migrant's decision to naturalise is influenced by the meanings they attach to citizenship. Citizenship acquisition can be for instrumental or strategic reasons as it allows a migrant to secure their position in the destination country, protect themselves from future policy changes/deportation and apply for a passport (Aptekar, 2016; Joppke, 2019; Leuchter, 2014; Nunn et al., 2016). Harpaz and Mateos (2019) point out that beyond gaining legal status and its associated rights, citizenship can provide migrants with more opportunities in relation to education, employment and family protection. Migrants may also obtain citizenship to symbolise their identity or enhance their sense of belonging and integration into the destination country (Dunn & Ip, 2008; Ho, 2009; Liu, 2014).

## 4 | PATHWAYS TO CITIZENSHIP FOR NEW ZEALANDERS LIVING IN AUSTRALIA

Migration to Australia is regulated by a range of temporary and permanent visas that dictate the conditions of migration. Parallel to this highly managed program sits the TTTA. Implemented in 1973, the TTTA allows New Zealand and Australian citizens and Australian permanent residents to live, work and travel in the respective country without any restriction, provided they are of good character and have no criminal convictions. This open pathway means any New Zealander, regardless of their occupation, education level or age can migrate to Australia, resulting in the rapid growth of the New Zealander population seen in Figure 1.

New Zealanders who migrated before 2001 were automatically granted permanent residency giving them

**FIGURE 1** Growth of the New Zealand population in Australia 1961–2016
*Source:* Australian Censuses 1961 to 2016

access to all social security services including unemployment benefits. In the late 1990s, the Australian government became increasingly concerned about the number of New Zealanders claiming social security benefits in Australia (see Birrell & Rapson, 2001; McMillan, 2014; Nolan, 2015). As a result, the Australian government revoked New Zealanders' access to social security. From the February 26, 2001, New Zealanders who migrate to Australia have reduced access to social security such as unemployment and disability benefits, and are granted a Special Category Visa 444 (SCV 444) on arrival, which gives them an 'indefinitely temporary' status (Birrell & Rapson, 2001). In order to get access to social security benefits, they need to become a permanent resident.

Between 2001 and 2017, New Zealanders wanting to obtain permanent residency had to meet the requirements applied to migrants from other countries: having a job on the Skills Occupation list; being under the age of 45; or have employer sponsorship (Department of Home Affairs, 2018a). As a result of the unregulated nature of the TTTA, the majority of New Zealanders who migrated during this period did not meet these requirements leaving them unable to apply for permanent residency and hence citizenship. In 2017, a pathway to permanent residency specifically for New Zealanders came into effect: the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream (hereafter 189 visa). Instead of being based on occupation those applying for a 189 visa need to: have earnt $53,900 for the previous four tax years, have been living in Australia before February 16, 2016, and be of good character (Department of Home Affairs, 2019b). The aim of this visa is to provide SCV 444 holders a clearer pathway to citizenship, but the income threshold has been criticised as it excludes, those in low-income jobs, those who work part-time, women who have taken time off to raise children and retirees (Mares, 2016).

While permanent residency provides access to social security, an individual's status in Australia is only secured through citizenship. To become a citizen individuals are required to have: lived in Australia for the past 4 years and have been away for no more than 12 months

in total over the past 4 years; be of good character; pass a citizenship test; and intend to live in Australia or maintain a continuing link to Australia. In comparison to migrants from the United Kingdom who make up 4.6% of the Australian population, from July 2017 to June 30, 2018, only 1,842 New Zealanders obtained citizenship compared to 13,874 from the United Kingdom (ABS, 2016; Department of Home Affairs, 2018b).

Previous research has discussed the low uptake of Australian citizenship by New Zealanders, even though they can obtain dual-citizenship (Green, 2006; Hamer, 2008, 2017; McMillan, 2017). Hamer (2017), found Maori had a lower uptake of Australian citizenship at 23.3% compared to all New Zealand-born migrants at 43.0%. Green (2006) found that Maori did not want to obtain Australian citizenship as it would be disrespectful to their New Zealand heritage. While McMillan's (2017) research showed that although New Zealanders were economically, socially and culturally integrated into Australia, their inability to become politically integrated through the acquisition of citizenship left them feeling marginalised. To expand on this research, this paper will discuss the effect that increased regulation of migration in Australia has had on New Zealander's views of obtaining Australian citizenship, and the barriers that exist for them to do so.

## 5 | DATA AND METHODS

The data used in this paper, come from an online survey of New Zealanders living in Australia. Eligible respondents needed to be a New Zealand citizen, over 18 years of age and either employed or seeking employment. These criteria were based on the pathways to permanent residency available. Data were collected between July 2018 and October 2018 and asked both closed and open-ended questions. A non-probability sampling strategy was used due to the geographic spread of New Zealanders living in Australia and the absence of a publicly available list of where they live, given that only New Zealanders with Australian citizenship are on the electoral roll. The survey was distributed through organisations such as *OzKiwi* and *Facebook* groups targeted at New Zealanders living in Australia. *Facebook* advertisements were also run to reach those not affiliated with New Zealand specific groups. This would have introduced some bias into the results as those with ongoing ties to New Zealand were targeted. Conducting the survey online, meant those who do not have access to the internet are under-sampled. Given that completion of the survey was based on self-selection, the results cannot be used to make generalisations about all New Zealanders living in Australia.

## 6 | RESULTS

A total of 2040 responses were obtained. The data discussed in the findings come from responses given to questions on decisions, views and motivations to become an Australian citizen. Table 1 presents a summary of the year respondents arrived in Australia, their visa status and their employment characteristics. As the income requirement for the 189 visa fell within the range of $52,000–$64,999 (a variable used in the Australian census), income was grouped by those who earnt below $64,999 and those who earned above $65,000.

Just under half (44.7%) of the respondents indicated they would consider becoming an Australian citizen, 20% were undecided, 16.5% indicated they would not apply and 18.9% had already obtained Australian citizenship. Amongst those who had obtained citizenship, 59.4% migrated to Australia before 2001. In open-ended questions, respondents were asked to explain why they had or had not become an Australian citizen with these responses analysed using thematic analysis in *NVivo*.

## 7 | REASONS FOR NOT HAVING OBTAINED AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP

### 7.1 | Respondents who were considering citizenship

Seven hundred thirty-five respondents provided reasons for why they had not obtained Australian citizenship even though they were considering doing so. The eligibility requirements were identified as the biggest barrier to obtaining citizenship mentioned by 28.0% of respondents, followed by the cost (27.3%) and the difficulty of the application process (17.8%). Amongst those who earned below $64,999 (n = 339), 34.5% said the eligibility requirements were the biggest barrier followed by the cost (28.6%). Similarly amongst respondents who earnt above $65,000 (n = 365) the eligibility requirements and cost were the main reasons mentioned by 27 and 26.3%, respectively; 23.8% of those who earned over $65,000 and 12.9% of those who earned below $64,999 were in the process of applying for citizenship. These respondents had either just obtained permanent residency and needed to wait 12 months before they could apply for citizenship or had applied for citizenship and were waiting for the application to be approved.

Many of the respondents who earned above $65,000 said they were not eligible because they had not been resident in Australia for 5 years. For others, even though they were currently earning over the minimum income

243

**TABLE 1** Characteristics of respondents

| | | Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year of arrival | Percentage who arrived pre-2001 | 24.3 | 23.3 | 23.5 |
| | Percentage who arrived 2001–2015 | 70.4 | 71.3 | 71.1 |
| | Percentage who arrived 2016–2018 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.4 |
| Visa held | Percentage SCV 444 holder | 60.8 | 65.4 | 64.2 |
| | Percentage protected SCV | 10.8 | 11.4 | 11.2 |
| | Percentage 189 visa | 3.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| Employment status | Self-employed/business owner | 10.0 | 7.9 | 8.5 |
| | Employed, working full-time | 65.4 | 50.4 | 54.5 |
| | Employed, working full-time | 5.0 | 17.4 | 14 |
| | Employed, casual | 6.4 | 8.1 | 7.6 |
| | Unemployed, looking for full-time | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| | Not in labour force | 9.3 | 12.3 | 11.5 |
| | Total (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Occupation | Managers | 20.7 | 14.5 | 16.3 |
| | Professionals | 29.3 | 33.9 | 32.6 |
| | Technicians and trade workers | 14.6 | 3.6 | 6.7 |
| | Technicians and personal service | 7.6 | 12.8 | 11.4 |
| | Clerical and admin | 4.0 | 18.9 | 14.7 |
| | Sales workers | 3.8 | 5.8 | 5.3 |
| | Machinery operators and drivers | 10.1 | 1.7 | 4.0 |
| | Labourers | 6.60 | 5.4 | 5.7 |
| | Other and self-employed | 3.30 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| | Total (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Income | $AUD 0–64,999 | 32.4 | 52.7 | 47.1 |
| | $AUD 65,000 or more | 59.5 | 38.2 | 44.1 |
| | Prefer not to answer | 8 | 9.0 | 8.7 |
| | Total (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 |

for the 189 visa, they had not done so for the previous four tax years, with one respondent explaining:

'I would have applied by now but I was unemployed for six months which means I don't qualify because I don't have five years continuous work earning over 50k'. [Respondent A]

Respondents who were now eligible for permanent residency through the 189 visa, felt the cost of the visa was too high, and could not justify spending thousands of dollars especially as there is no guarantee the application will be approved, with this respondent explaining:

'The foremost reason is the sheer expense of it. For our family of five, we will have to front up with $10,300. I can only envisage

this amount won't go down and if we don't do something soon the goalposts will be moved. Make it more difficult to become citizens'.[Respondent B]

Whereas, for those who earned below $64,999, eligibility was discussed in relation to income as they did not meet the income requirement for the 189 visa. One respondent mentioned being excluded from all available pathways to citizenship saying:

'We don't have the option!!!! We don't currently qualify for the new pathway. We haven't earned enough for five consecutive years as I am the higher earner and I was made redundant while on parental leave so chose to become a stay at home parent for three years. We don't have enough points to

apply outside the pathway as we are too old and not rich enough. Law has never been a desired occupation for immigration at a state or federal level. My husband is a carpenter and niche aspects of carpentry have been desired occupations for NSW in some years (I would apply for partner PR (permanent resident) if he was successful) but it was so complicated we couldn't get an answer on whether he qualified'. [Respondent C]

Regardless of income, some respondents mentioned they were ineligible to apply for permanent residency because they were too old and would not meet the health requirements, while for others having children with disabilities made them ineligible. The exclusion of such a wide range of respondents supports the concerns raised by Mares (2016) about the eligibility requirements of the 189 visa, as it indicates how the Australian government privileges those who have the desired income and hence skills and occupation.

### 7.2 | Respondents who were undecided

Respondents who earned below $64,999 ($n = 142$) identified the cost (47.9%), eligibility requirements (22.5%) and difficulty of the application process (19.7%) as the main barriers to citizenship attainment. Those who earned above $65,000 ($n = 115$), again mentioned the cost (35.6%) and difficulty of the application process (26.0%), with 23.4% saying they felt no need to obtain citizenship. Amongst these two groups, the cost was discussed in relation to needing to apply for permanent residency.

Those who felt there was no need to become an Australian citizen, mentioned that it was not something they had yet thought about doing as it would not change their circumstances. For this respondent citizenship was understood in relation to accessing government services rather than legal status:

'I feel it is unneeded at this point, I don't believe I will need government assistance in the immediate future which would be my main incentive to obtain citizenship'. [Respondent D]

### 7.3 | Respondents who were not considering citizenship

Two hundred and sixty-five respondents gave reasons as to why they did not want to become an Australian

citizen. Feeling no need to obtain citizenship was the main reason given by both income groups, mentioned by 27.3% of those who earned below $64,999 ($n = 161$) and 31.8% of those who earned above ($n = 91$). Respondents felt citizenship would not give them any immediate benefit; while for others because they had migrated pre-2001 citizenship was associated with the ability to vote rather than security. 17.6% of those who earned above $65,000 were intending to return to New Zealand and so citizenship was viewed as unnecessary.

This group of respondents also discussed the importance of their New Zealand identity (16.6%). Whereas, amongst those who were considering Australian citizenship only 2.2% mentioned this. For these respondents being a New Zealander was central to their identity, a source of pride and distinguished them from Australians:

'I'm proud of being a Kiwi and see few benefits becoming an Aussie citizen as the cost to apply is too high too. Aussies talk about the ANZAC spirit however I feel that Aussies are treated much better in NZ than Kiwis are here'.[Respondent E]

'Because there is no point at the moment and I have more pride in being a Kiwi'. [Respondent F]

The ANZAC spirit mentioned by Respondent E refers to the comradery or mateship that was established between the two countries while fighting together in World War I. Respondents feel this relationship has since been eroded as they believe it should be easier for New Zealanders to obtain permanent residency given the shared histories.

### 7.4 | Changing immigration policies

In the last 10 years, Australia has had five different prime-ministers (National Archives of Australia, 2020). With each new prime-minister there has been a new stance on migrants and immigration which has contributed to whether or not respondents want to obtain Australian citizenship. Amongst all respondents, 7.5% mentioned feeling frustrated with the Australian government, as they no longer know what the current immigration and citizenship policies are and whether or not they will change in the coming months. In particular, many felt that the changes made in relation to the deportation of non-citizens from Australia actively discriminated against New Zealanders. One respondent expressed that:

'Political parties that are elected into govt every 3yrs change the rules. I can never settled down knowing the presiding gvt will deport at any time for something as minor as an infringement...whatever suits their fancy. Yes it is real because that will go towards my character of good standing. Urban saying some of us kiwi say...oh man we should have come on a boat. Meaning refuge boat, would be treated better'.

While for others, these changing policies have made them feel unwelcome, as they realised becoming a citizen is not a possibility:

'I didn't feel the need before marriage. I always assumed Australia was home for me now. It's only as we look into our options as we plan for our future that we find we are not necessarily welcome here in Australia'. [Respondent H]

These constant changes left some respondents confused about whether they were even eligible to apply for permanent residency or citizenship, which contributed to why respondents felt becoming a citizen was too difficult. The changes also meant many respondents were unaware of which policy changes impact them, for example, 35% of SCV 444 holders had not heard of the 189 visa when the survey was conducted.

## 8 | REASONS TO CONSIDER OBTAINING AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP

### 8.1 | Security

The small number of respondents who indicated they were considering obtaining citizenship said they would do so for the security it would provide them. Citizenship would grant them the ability to access social security services and voting rights, which despite being long-term residents they are unable to do. It would also allow them to secure their position in Australia which, many felt was becoming increasingly uncertain amid the deportation of New Zealanders.

A few respondents discussed security in relation to their children. Those who had children born in New Zealand were concerned their status as a New Zealand citizen would impact the opportunities available to them. Some respondents wanted to obtain citizenship so their children would be able to go to university and receive a government student loan which would allow them to not have to pay university fees upfront or join the Police or Australian Defence Force.

### 8.2 | Belonging and participation

Less than 10 respondents mentioned they would consider becoming a citizen because they felt they belonged in Australia. Those who did mention this described how Australia was home and that citizenship would allow them to feel more integrated. As one participant stated:

'I had not seen the need until recently as I was happy in my work situation and felt secure, however now that I am feeling the strong pull to integrate more completely I will be pursuing citizenship'. [Respondent I]

Wanting to feel more integrated is linked to SCV444 holders' inability to vote which makes them feel marginalised and used given they are unable to have a say on how their taxes are spent. Citizenship would therefore, facilitate the respondent's political integration and wider engagement in the community.

## 9 | WHY RESPONDENTS BECAME AN AUSTRALIAN CITIZEN

Respondents who obtained Australian citizenship did so for the security, access to services, ability to vote and job opportunities. Many respondents were concerned about the frequency of policy changes and viewed citizenship as a way of securing their status in Australia. Also, given the limited access to social security services, these respondents felt that citizenship would provide peace of mind if anything were to happen in the future. As Respondent L stated:

'I became a citizen so my daughter and husband had a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship, primarily in the case of my daughter, who is in Year 7, so she will not have financial barriers to tertiary education here. I own a home so I want to vote in council elections. Also it's important for me to take part in the democratic process and vote at state and federal level. I also want to ensure that my long term security is protected in Australia from being able to access all health services to superannuation as this

does seem quite precarious for Kiwis on a 444 visa'. [Respondent J]

For this respondent, citizenship would allow them to secure their family's future and enhance their political integration through being granted voting rights at the local, state and national levels. Voting was important to many of the respondents given they had spent most of their working life in Australia and hence wanted to be able to have a say in how their taxes were spent and access the services they paid for.

Respondents also became an Australian citizen to strengthen their belonging and integration into Australia. Given that many respondents had been living in Australia for several years, citizenship was seen as a logical step given that they already called Australia home. As one respondent stated:

> 'Was able to get Permanent Residence via RRV [Returning Resident Visa], married a local Brisbane girl, bought a house here, not planning to leave, so thought I'd become part of the place'. [Respondent K]

Other respondents felt that citizenship helped them to feel more accepted into society as it facilitated full participation, such as being able to vote. Some viewed citizenship as a commitment to Australia as they had chosen to make it their home. For others, citizenship cemented their identification as an Australian.

## 10 | CONCLUSION

Increasing migrant regulation in destination countries such as Australia has implications for long-term resident non-citizen populations. This paper found that for New Zealanders living in Australia, the regulation of migration has implications on their ability to become citizens and secure their status as they have to meet the same requirements that are imposed on other migrants who come to Australia. The results showed that although the majority of respondents indicated they would consider becoming an Australian citizen, many did not meet the eligibility requirements to initially become a permanent resident. Respondents, including those who earned above $65,000, felt that the cost to become a permanent resident was unaffordable and hence attaining citizenship was not feasible. The Australian government and their changing stance on immigration left respondents worried about their future in Australia and policy changes that could affect their status. Those who were considering citizenship would do so for the security,

voting rights and to enhance their sense of belonging. Respondents who were dual-citizens gave the same reasons for why they obtained citizenship.

The findings presented here show how increasing government regulation further disenfranchises long-term resident non-citizen populations. For New Zealanders living in Australia, the 2001 policy change which removed their access to a range of social security services was viewed as a betrayal of the historical ties between the two countries as ANZACs, leaving New Zealanders feeling mistreated by the Australian government (McMillan, 2017). As discussed in this paper, this feeling of mistreatment has been exacerbated by changes made to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014, which expanded the grounds in which non-residents can be deported. Respondents were now worried they could be deported for a minor infringement and felt other migrants received better treatment than they did. For those who migrated after 2001, these changes have acted as a reminder that their status in Australia is 'indefinitely temporary' and that they could be deported from Australia at any time. Yet as these results found, the ability of New Zealanders to secure their status in Australia through the attainment of citizenship is constrained by the regulation of permanent residency, in which applicants need to meet the eligibility requirements. This leaves them vulnerable to future policy changes and increases the need for policy changes that address the social and political rights of New Zealanders in Australia (McMillan, 2014).

The government's desire to control future migration through increased regulation has implications for long-term resident non-citizen populations. As discussed, changes to the *Migration Act 1958* in 2014 which seeks to target migrants who enter Australia through its regulated migration program has primarily affected those coming through the TTTA. This is because the unregulated nature of the TTTA does not put a time limit on their residence in Australia, meaning unlike migrants from other countries they are not forced to acquire another visa to extend their stay in Australia. Hence, these changes to the *Migration Act 1958* have made New Zealanders explore the permanent residency options available to them, only to learn they are ineligible for the pathways available. This disconnect indicates that when policy changes are made, governments need to ensure that all migrants have the ability to change their status to secure their status and rights in the country they call home.

247

ORCID

*Madeleine Morey* https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7344-4698

## REFERENCES

Anderson, B. (2010). Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers. *Work, employment and society*, *24*(2), 300–317.

Aptekar, S. (2016). Making sense of naturalization: What citizenship means to naturalizing immigrants in Canada and the USA. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *17*(4), 1143–1161. doi.org/10.1007/s12134-015-0458-5

Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2016). *Australian citizenship and country of birth, TableBuilder*. Findings based on use of ABS TableBuilder data.

Bauböck, R. (2006). Citizenship and migration- concepts and controversies. In A. R. Bauböck (Ed.), *Migration and citizenship, legal status, rights and political participation* (pp. 15–32). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Betts, K. (1999). *The great divide: Immigration politics in Australia*. Sydney, NSW: Duffy and Snellgrove.

Billings, P. (2019). Regulating crimmigrants through the 'character test': Exploring the consequences of mandatory visa cancellation for the fundamental rights of non-citizens in Australia. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, *71*(1), 1–23.

Birrell, B., & Rapson, V. (2001). New Zealanders in Australia: The end of an era? *People and Place*, *9*(1), 61–74.

Bloemraad, I. (2017). *Does citizenship matter?* In A. Shachar, R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad, & M. Vink (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Bloemraad, I. (2004). Who claims dual citizenship? The limits of postnationalism, the possibilities of transnationalism, and the persistence of traditional citizenship. *International Migration Review*, *38*(2), 389–426.

Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2008). Citizenship and immigration: Multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the nation-state. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *34*, 153–179. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608

Castles, S. (2004). The factors that make and unmake migration policies 1. *International Migration Review*, *38*(3), 852–884.

Castles, S. (2005). Nation and empire: Hierarchies of citizenship in the new global order. *International Politics*, *42*(2), 203–224. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800107

Chisari, M. (2015). Testing citizen identities: Australian migrants and the Australian values debate. *Social Identities*, *21*(6), 573–589. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2015.1013931

Czaika, M., & De Haas, H. (2013). The effectiveness of immigration policies. *Population and Development Review*, *39*(3), 487–508.

Czaika, M., & De Haas, H. (2017). The effect of visas on migration processes. *International Migration Review*, *51*(4), 893–926.

Department of Home Affairs. (2018a). Subclass 186 Employer Nomination Scheme visa. Retrieved from https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/employer-nomination-scheme-186

Department of Home Affairs. (2018b). Australian citizenship statistics. Retrieved from https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/citizenship-statistics.

Department of Home Affairs. (2019a). Freedom of Information request: FA19/07/00537.

Department of Home Affairs. (2019b). Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream. Retrieved from https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/skilled-independent-189/new-zealand#Eligibility.

Desforges, L., Jones, R., & Woods, M. (2005). New geographies of citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, *9*(5), 439–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020500301213

Dunn, K. M., & Ip, D. (2008). Putting transnationalism in context: Comparing Hong Kong Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane. *Australian Geographer*, *39*(1), 81–98.

Engbersen, G., Leerkes, A., Scholten, P., & Snel, E. (2017). The intra-EU mobility regime: Differentiation, stratification and contradictions. *Migration Studies*, *5*(3), 337–355.

Green, A. E. (2006). *New Zealand migrants to Australia: Social construction of migrant identity* [Doctoral Dissertation]. Bond University. Retrieved from https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/New-Zealand-migrants-to-Australia:-Social-of-Green/3296355cec58f364151e6bab08eceb44f7efa501.

Hamer, P. (2008). One in six? The rapid growth of the Māori population in Australia. *New Zealand Population Review*, *33*(34), 153–176.

Hamer, P. (2017). The electoral participation of Māori in Australia. *Political Science*, *69*(2), 175–193.

Harpaz, Y., & Mateos, P. (2019). Strategic citizenship: Negotiating membership in the age of dual nationality. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 843–857.

Ho, E. L. E. (2009). Constituting citizenship through the emotions: Singaporean transmigrants in London. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *99*(4), 788–804.

Hollifield, J. (2004). The emerging migration state. *The International Migration Review*, *38*(3), 885–912.

Huber, J. (2019). EU citizens in post-Brexit UK: The case for automatic naturalisation. *Journal of European Integration*, *41*(6), 801–816.

Joppke, C. (2008). Immigration and the identity of citizenship: The paradox of universalism. *Citizenship Studies*, *12*(6), 533–546.

Joppke, C. (2019). The instrumental turn of citizenship. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 858–878.

Leuchter, N. (2014). Creating other options: Negotiating the meanings of citizenships. *Citizenship Studies*, *18*(6–7), 776–790.

Liu, L. S. (2014). A search for a place to call home: Negotiation of home, identity and senses of belonging among new migrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to New Zealand. *Emotion, Space and Society.*, *10*, 18–26.

Mares, P. (2016). *Not quite Australian: How temporary migration is changing the nation*. Melbourne, Australia: Text Publishing.

McMillan, K. (2014). Political and social rights for second country nationals: Freedom of movement and citizenship in Australasia. *Citizenship Studies*, *18*(3–4), 349–364.

McMillan, K. (2017). 'Affective integration' and access to the rights of permanent residency: New Zealanders resident in Australia post-2001. *Ethnicities*, *17*(1), 103–127.

National Archives of Australia. (2020). Australia's Prime Ministers. Retrieved from http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/

Nunn, C., McMichael, C., Gifford, S. M., & Correa-Velez, I. (2016). Mobility and security: The perceived benefits of citizenship for

resettled young people from refugee backgrounds. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(3), 382–399.

Nolan, M. (2015). Welfare limbo? Social welfare and citizenship debates about new Zealanders living in Australia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *53*(3), 253–273.

Rajkumar, D., Berkowitz, L., Vosko, L. F., Preston, V., & Latham, R. (2012). At the temporary–permanent divide: How Canada produces temporariness and makes citizens through its security, work, and settlement policies. *Citizenship Studies*, *16*(3–4), 483–510.

Robertson, S. (2011). Student switchers and the regulation of residency: The interface of the individual and Australia's immigration regime. *Population, Space and Place*, *17*(1), 103–115.

Ruhs, M. (2002). Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes: Policies, Adverse Consequences, and the Need to Make Them Work.

Walsh, J. P. (2011). Quantifying citizens: Neoliberal restructuring and immigrant selection in Canada and Australia. *Citizenship Studies*, *15*(6–7), 861–879.

## REFERENCES

ABS. (1971). *Bulletin 4 Birthplace, Census of Population and Housing*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (1981). CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 30 JUNE 1981 SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS AND DWELLINGS AUSTRALIA. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (1996). *1996 Census of Population and Housing- Birthplace by country*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3110124.NSF/4a3fed835c77efdd4a2564d4001de2e5/87bd8c1561992b644a2564d400286575!OpenDocument

ABS. (2001). *Census of Population and Housing Australia*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (2006). *Census of Population and Housing*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (2010). *1370.0—Measures of Australia's Progress, 2010*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1370.0~2010~Chapter~Civic%20participation%20%284.6.7.2%29

ABS. (2011). *Census of Population and Housing Australia*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (2016). *Census of Population and Housing Australia*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

ABS. (2019). *1220.0—ANZSCO - Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations, 2013, Version 1.3*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/20FC9C46D6C1676CCA2584A8000E7978?opendocument

ABS. (2020a). *3412.0  Migration Australia, 2018-19*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3412.0Main%20Features32018-19?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3412.0&issue=2018-19&num=&view=

ABS. (2020b). *6250.0—Characteristics of Recent Migrants, Australia, Nov 2019*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/6250.0Main%20Features3Nov%202019?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=6250.0&issue=Nov%202019&num=&view=

Adams, T., Banks, M., & Olsen, A. (2011). International Education in Australia: From Aid to Trade to Internationalization. In R. Bhandari & P. Blumenthal (Eds.), *International Students and Global Mobility in Higher Education: National Trends and New Directions* (pp. 107–128). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230117143_6

Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *21*(2), 166–191. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen016

Ahlburg, D. A., & Brown, R. P. C. (1998). Migrants' intentions to return home and capital transfers: A study of Tongans and Samoans in Australia. *Journal of Development Studies*, *35*(2), 125–151. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389808422567

Akbari, A. H., & MacDonald, M. (2014). Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States: An Overview of Recent Trends. *International Migration Review*, *48*(3), 801–822. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12128

Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, *31*(4), 826–874.

ANU College of Law. (2014). Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry into the Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014. Australian National University, Canberra.

Aptekar, S. (2016). Making Sense of Naturalization: What Citizenship Means to Naturalizing Immigrants in Canada and the USA. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *17*(4), 1143–1161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-015-0458-5

Ardern, J. (2020, February 28). *PM's remarks from joint stand-up with PM Morrison*. The Beehive. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pm%E2%80%99s-remarks-joint-stand-pm-morrison

Askola, H. (2020). Copying Europe? Integration as a Citizenship Requirement in Australia. *International Migration Review*, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918320902042

Asylum Seeker Resource Centre. (2014). *Submission- Character and General Visa Cancellation Bill 2014*. Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, Melbourne.

Australian Human Rights Commission. (2014). *Inquiry into the Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014*. Australian Human Rights Commission, Sydney.

Baas, M. (2014). Victims or profiteers? Issues of migration, racism and violence among Indian students in Melbourne: Indian students in Melbourne. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, *55*(2), 212–225. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12046

Baas, M. (2017). The mobile middle: Indian skilled migrants in Singapore and the 'middling' space between migration categories. *Transitions: Journal of Transient Migration*, *1*(1), 47–63. https://doi.org/10.1386/tjtm.1.1.47_1

Baird, R., & Smith, P. M. (2016). Australia as New Zealand's western frontier, 1965-95. In *New Zealand's empire*. Manchester University Press.

Baldassar, L. (2007a). Transnational Families and Aged Care: The Mobility of Care and the Migrancy of Ageing. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *33*(2), 275–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830601154252

Baldassar, L. (2007b). TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES AND THE PROVISION OF MORAL AND EMOTIONAL SUPPORT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUTH AND DISTANCE. *Identities*, *14*(4), 385–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/10702890701578423

Baldassar, L. (2008). Missing Kin and Longing to be Together: Emotions and the Construction of Co-presence in Transnational Relationships. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *29*(3), 247–266. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256860802169196

Baldassar, L., Pyke, J., & Ben-Moshe, D. (2017). The Vietnamese in Australia: Diaspora identity, intra-group tensions, transnational ties and 'victim' status. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *43*(6), 937–955. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1274565

Basch, L. G., Schiller, N. G., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states. Gordon and Breach.

Bauböck, R. (2001). Cultural Citizenship, Minority Rights, and Self-Government. In D. Klusmeyer & T. A. Aleinikoff (Eds.), *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (pp. 319–348). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Bauböck, R. (Ed.). (2006). Migration and citizenship: Legal status, rights and political participation. Amsterdam University Press.

Beaverstock, J. V. (2011). Servicing British Expatriate 'Talent' in Singapore: Exploring Ordinary Transnationalism and the Role of the 'Expatriate' Club. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *37*(5), 709–728. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.559714

Becker, R. (2019). Occupational experiences of high-skilled intra-EU immigrants in a transnational space? How European physicians in Germany perceive their career prospects. *Population, Space and Place*, *25*(7). https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2245

Bedford, R., Ho, E., & Hugo, G. (2003). Trans-Tasman migration in context: Recent flows of New Zealanders revisited. *People and Place*, *11*(4), 53–62.

Bell, A. (2009). Dilemmas of Settler Belonging: Roots, Routes and Redemption in New Zealand National Identity Claims. *The Sociological Review*, *57*(1), 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2008.01808.x

Bell, J. (2016). Migrants: Keeping a foot in both worlds or losing the ground beneath them? Transnationalism and integration as experienced in the everyday lives of Polish migrants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. *Social Identities*, *22*(1), 80–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2015.1110359

Bell, M., & Hugo, G. (2000). *Internal Migration in Australia 1991-1996—Overview and the Overseas born*. Regional Australia Institute. http://inform.regionalaustralia.org.au/population-and-people/population-and-migration/item/internal-migration-in-australia-1991-1996-overview-and-the-overseas-born-4

Benson, M., & O'Reilly, K. (2009). Migration and the Search for a Better Way of Life: A Critical Exploration of Lifestyle Migration. *The Sociological Review*, *57*(4), 608–625. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2009.01864.x

Benson, M., & Osbaldiston, N. (2016). Toward a Critical Sociology of Lifestyle Migration: Reconceptualizing Migration and the Search for a Better Way of Life. *The Sociological Review*, *64*(3), 407–423. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12370

Berry, J.W. (1980). Acculturation as varieties of adaptation. In A. Padilla (Ed.), *Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings,* (pp. 9-25). Boulder: Westview.

Betts, K., & Birrell, B. (2007). MAKING AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP MEAN MORE. *People and Place*, *15*(1), 45–61.

Billings, P. (2019). Regulating crimmigrants through the 'character test': Exploring the consequences of mandatory visa cancellation for the fundamental rights of non-citizens in Australia. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, *71*(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-018-9786-7

Birkvad, S. R. (2019). Immigrant meanings of citizenship: Mobility, stability, and recognition. *Citizenship Studies*, *23*(8), 798–814. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2019.1664402

Birrell, B., Healy, E., & Kinnaird, B. (2007). Cooks Galore and Hairdressers Aplenty. *People and Place*, *15*(1), 30–44.

Birrell, B., & Rapson, V. (2001). New Zealanders in Australia: The end of an era? *People and Place*, *9*(1), 61–74.

Birrell, B., Rapson, V., Dobson, I. R., & Smith, T. F. (2004). *Skilled movement in the new century: Outcomes for Australia*. Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University. http://www.immi.gov.au/research/publications/skilled_movement.pdf

Bloemraad, I. (2004). Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits of Postnationalism, the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship. *The International Migration Review*, *38*(2), 389–426.

Bloemraad, I. (2018). Theorising the power of citizenship as claims-making. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *44*(1), 4–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1396108

Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., & Yurdakul, G. (2008). Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *34*(1), 153–179. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608

Bloemraad, I., & Sheares, A. (2017). Understanding Membership in a World of Global Migration: (How) Does Citizenship Matter? *International Migration Review*, *51*(4), 823–867. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12354

Blunt, A. (2007). Cultural geographies of migration: Mobility, transnationality and diaspora. *Progress in Human Geography*, *31*(5), 684–694. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507078945

Boccagni, P. (2012). Even a Transnational Social Field Must Have its Boundaries: Methodological Options, Potentials and Dilemmas for Researching Transnationalism. In C. Vargas-Silva (Ed.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration* (p. Chapter 14). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849803113.00022.xml

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. G. Richardson, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241–258). Greenwood Press.

Brubaker, R. (2001). The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *24*(4), 531–548. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870120049770

Brubaker, R. (2010). Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *41*(1), 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1162/jinh.2010.41.1.61

Burgess, J., Campbell, I., & May, R. (2008). Pathways from Casual Employment to Economic Security: The Australian Experience. *Social Indicators Research*, *88*(1), 161–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-007-9212-5

Campbell, I. (1996). Casual Employment, Labour Regulation and Australian Trade Unions. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, *38*(4), 571–599. https://doi.org/10.1177/002218569603800404

Carangio, V., Farquharson, K., Bertone, S., & Rajendran, D. (2020). Racism and White privilege: Highly skilled immigrant women workers in Australia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1722195

Carling, J., & Pettersen, S. V. (2014). Return Migration Intentions in the Integration-Transnationalism Matrix. *International Migration*, *52*(6), 13–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12161

Carmichael, G. A. (Ed.). (1993). *Trans-Tasman migration: Trends, causes and consequences*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Castles, S. (2005). Nation and Empire: Hierarchies of Citizenship in the New Global Order. *International Politics*, *42*(2), 203–224. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800107

Castles, S. (2012). Understanding the Relationship between Methodology and Methods. In C. Vargas-Silva (Ed.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Migration* (pp. 7–25). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/14062_1.html

CEDA. (2019). *Effects of temporary migration Shaping Australia's society and economy*. Committee for Economic Development of Australia, Melbourne.

Cerase, F. P. (1974). Expectations and Reality: A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy. *International Migration Review*, *8*(2), 245. https://doi.org/10.2307/3002783

Child Poverty. (2019). *Child Poverty Monitor*. Child Poverty Monitor. https://childpoverty.org.nz

Clarke, N. (2005). Detailing transnational lives of the middle: British working holiday makers in Australia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *31*(2), 307–322. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000339945

Cloke, P. J. (2004). *Practising human geography*. SAGE.

Colic-Peisker, V. (2005). 'At Least You're the Right Colour': Identity and Social Inclusion of Bosnian Refugees in Australia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *31*(4), 615–638. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830500109720

Colic-Peisker, V. (2011a). A New Era in Australian Multiculturalism? From Working-Class "Ethnics" to a "Multicultural Middle- Class". *International Migration Review*, *45*(3), 562–587. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2011.00858.x

Colic-Peisker, V. (2011b). 'Ethnics' and 'Anglos' in the Labour Force: Advancing Australia Fair? *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *32*(6), 637–654. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2011.618108

Colic-Peisker, V., & Deng, L. (2019). Chinese business migrants in Australia: Middle-class transnationalism and 'dual embeddedness'. *Journal of Sociology*, *55*(2), 234–251. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783319836281

Colic-Peisker, V., & Tilbury, F. (2007). Integration into the Australian Labour Market: The Experience of Three 'Visibly Different' Groups of Recently Arrived Refugees. *International Migration*, *45*(1), 59–85. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2007.00396.x

Collyer, M. (2014). A geography of extra-territorial citizenship: Explanations of external voting. *Migration Studies*, *2*(1), 55–72. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mns008

Conifer, D. (2015, September 30). *Australia detaining NZ citizens 'not in Anzac spirit'*. ABC. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-30/john-key-australia-detaining-nz-citizens-not-in-anzac-spirit/6816090

Conradson, D., & Latham, A. (2005). Friendship, networks and transnationality in a world city: Antipodean transmigrants in London. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *31*(2), 287–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000339936

Constant, A., & Massey, D. S. (2002). Return migration by German guestworkers: Neoclassical versus new economic theories. *International Migration*, *40*(4), 5–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00204

Constant, A., Roberts, R., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2009). Ethnic Identity and Immigrant Homeownership. *Urban Studies*, *46*(9), 1879–1898. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098009106022

Consumer NZ. (2019). *Cost of living survey*. Consumer NZ. https://www.consumer.org.nz/articles/cost-of-living-survey

Conway, D., Potter, R. B., & St Bernard, G. (2008). Dual citizenship or dual identity? Does 'transnationalism' supplant 'nationalism' among returning Trinidadians? *Global Networks*, *8*(4), 373–397. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2008.00230.x

Coombs, M. (2014). Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014. Parliament of Australia, Canberra.

Cooper, C. (2012). *The immigration debate in Australia: From Federation to World War One*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/ImmigrationDebate

Côté, R. R., Huang, X., Huang, Y., & Western, M. (2019). Immigrant network diversity in the land of the fair go. *Journal of Sociology*, *55*(2), 199–218. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783318817684

Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M. L., & Hanson, W. E. (2003). An Expanded Typology for Classifying Mixed Methods Research Into Designs. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie

(Eds.), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research* (pp. 209–240). Thousand Oaks; SAGE publications.

Crul, M. (2016). Super-diversity vs. assimilation: How complex diversity in majority–minority cities challenges the assumptions of assimilation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(1), 54–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1061425

Dahinden, J. (2016). A plea for the 'de-migranticization' of research on migration and integration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *39*(13), 2207–2225. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1124129

Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L., Karlsson, J. Ch., & Bhaskar, Prof. R. (2001). *Explaining Society: An Introduction to Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*. Taylor & Francis Group. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/adelaide/detail.action?docID=240636

de Haas, H. (2010). The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *36*(10), 1587–1617. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489361

de Haas, H., & Fokkema, T. (2011). The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions. *Demographic Research*, *25*, 755–782. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2011.25.24

de Haas, H., Fokkema, T., & Fihri, M. F. (2015). Return Migration as Failure or Success?: The Determinants of Return Migration Intentions Among Moroccan Migrants in Europe. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *16*(2), 415–429. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-014-0344-6

Deloitte. (2019). *Mobile Consumer Survey 2019*. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu.

Denzin, N. K. (1989). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). *New Zealand country brief*. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new-zealand/Pages/new-zealand-country-brief

DHA. (2018a). *Freedom of Information Request—FA18/10/00848*. Australian Government, Canberra.

DHA. (2018b). *Working Holiday Maker visa program*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/news-subsite/Pages/2018-Nov/working%20holiday%20maker%20visa%20program.aspx

DHA. (2019a). *Australian Migration Statistics, 2018-19*. Australian Government, Canberra.

DHA. (2019b). Freedom of Information request FA 19/09/00172 New Zealand detainees on Christmas Island. Australian Government, Canberra.

DHA. (2019c). *Freedom of Information request: FA19/07/00537*. Australian Government, Canberra.

DHA. (2019d). *Migration program planning levels*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/what-we-do/migration-program-planning-levels

DHA. (2019e). *Visa cancellation statistics*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/visa-statistics/visa-cancellation

DHA. (2020a). *Australian citizenship statistics*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/citizenship-statistics

DHA. (2020b). *Become an Australian citizen (by conferral) Permanent residents or New Zealand citizens*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/citizenship/become-a-citizen/permanent-resident#Overview

DHA. (2020c). *Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/skilled-independent-189/new-zealand

DHA. (2020d). *Subclass 190 Skilled Nominated visa*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/skilled-nominated-190#Overview

DHA. (2020e). *Subclasses 155 and 157 Resident Return visa*. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/resident-return-visa-155-157

DIBP. (2014a). *Overseas Arrivals and Departures 2004-05 to June 2005*. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra.

DIBP. (2014b). *Overseas Arrivals and Departures 2011-12 to 30 June 2012*. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra.

DIBP. (2016). *Historical Migration Statistics*. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra.

DIBP. (2017a). *A History of the Department of Immigration—Managing Migration to Australia*. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra.

DIBP. (2017b). *Overseas Arrivals and Departures 2016-17: 1 July to 31 March 2017*. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Canberra.

DIMA. (2001). *Immigration Federation to Century's End 1901-2000*. Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Canberra.

Dumont, J.-C., & Lemaître, G. (2005). COUNTING IMMIGRANTS AND EXPATRIATES IN OECD COUNTRIES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE. OECD, Paris.

Dunn, K. M., Forrest, J., Burnley, I., & McDonald, A. (2004). Constructing Racism in Australia. *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, *39*(4), 409–430. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2004.tb01191.x

Dunn, K. M., & Ip, D. (2008). Putting Transnationalism in Context: Comparing Hong Kong Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane. *Australian Geographer*, *39*(1), 81–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049180701877444

Dunn, K. M., Pelleri, D., & Maeder-Han, K. (2011). Attacks on Indian students: The commerce of denial in Australia. *Race & Class*, *52*(4), 71–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396810396603

Dupuis, A., & Thorns, D. C. (1998). Home, Home Ownership and the Search for Ontological Security. *The Sociological Review*, *46*(1), 24–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.00088

Dyrenfurth, N. (2015). *Mateship: A Very Australian History*. Scribe Publications. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/adelaide/detail.action?docID=1912275

Electoral Commission New Zealand. (n.d.). *Are you eligible to enrol and vote?* Electoral Commission New Zealand. https://vote.nz/enrolling/get-ready-to-enrol/are-you-eligible-to-enrol-and-vote/

Electoral Commission New Zealand. (2017). *New Zealand 2017 General Election—Official Results*. Electoral Commission New Zealand. https://elections.nz/media-and-news/2017/new-zealand-2017-general-election-official-results/

Ellermann, A. (2020). Human-capital citizenship and the changing logic of immigrant admissions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *46*(12), 2515–2532. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561062

Elsheshtawy, Y. (2008). Transitory Sites: Mapping Dubai's 'Forgotten' Urban Spaces. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *32*(4), 968–988. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00819.x

Employment New Zealand. (2020). *Types of employee*. Employment New Zealand. https://www.employment.govt.nz/starting-employment/who-is-an-employee/types-of-employee/

Engbersen, G. (2003). Spheres of Integration: Towards a Differentiated and Reflexive Ethnic Minority Policy. In R. Sackmann, B. Peters, & T. Faist, *Identity and Integration: Migrants in Western Europe* (pp. 59–76). Ashgate Publishing.

Erdal, M. B. (2013). Migrant Transnationalism and Multi-Layered Integration: Norwegian-Pakistani Migrants' Own Reflections. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *39*(6), 983–999. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.765665

Erdal, M. B. (2016). Juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora policy with migrants' transnational citizenship practices. *Geoforum*, *76*, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.08.005

Erdal, M. B., Doeland, E. M., & Tellander, E. (2018). How citizenship matters (or not): The citizenship–belonging nexus explored among residents in Oslo, Norway. *Citizenship Studies*, *22*(7), 705–724. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1508415

Erdal, M. B., & Oeppen, C. (2013). Migrant Balancing Acts: Understanding the Interactions Between Integration and Transnationalism. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *39*(6), 867–884. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.765647

Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: Implications for the study of citizenship and culture. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *23*(2), 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198700329024

Faist, T. (2008). Migrants as transnational development agents: An inquiry into the newest round of the migration–development nexus. *Population, Space and Place*, *14*(1), 21–42. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.471

Faist, T., Gerdes, J., & Rieple, B. (2004). Dual Citizenship as a Path-Dependent Process. *The International Migration Review*, *38*(3), 913–944.

Faulkner, D. (2013). The Unequal Treatment of New Zealanders in Australia. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2304476

Favell, A. (2003). INTEGRATION NATIONS: THE NATION-STATE AND RESEARCH ON IMMIGRANTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. In G. Brochmann (Ed.), *Multicultural Challenge* (Vol. 22, pp. 13–42). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0195-6310(03)22001-9

Ferguson, H., & Sherrell, H. (2019). *Overseas students in Australian higher education: A quick guide*. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/OverseasStudents

Flahaux, M.-L. (2017). The Role of Migration Policy Changes in Europe for Return Migration to Senegal. *International Migration Review*, *51*(4), 868–892. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12248

Fletcher, A. J. (2017). Applying critical realism in qualitative research: Methodology meets method. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, *20*(2), 181–194. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2016.1144401

Flowerdew, R., & Martin, D. (2005). Methods in human geography: A guide for students doing a research project (2nd ed.). Pearson Prentice Hall.

Föbker, S., Imani, D., Nipper, J., Otto, M., & Pfaffenbach, C. (2016). Translocal life and integration of highly-skilled migrants in Germany. *Erdkunde*, *70*(2), 109–124. https://doi.org/10.3112/erdkunde.2016.02.01

Fokkema, T., & de Haas, H. (2015). Pre- and Post-Migration Determinants of Socio-Cultural Integration of African Immigrants in Italy and Spain: *Determinants of socio-cultural integration*. *International Migration*, *53*(6), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2011.00687.x

Foner, N. (1997). What's New About Transnationalism?: New York Immigrants Today and at the Turn of the Century. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, *6*(3), 355–375. https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.1997.0013

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. (2010). *Country Profile: New Zealand*. https://web.archive.org/web/20110524131442/http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/asia-oceania/new-zealand?profile=intRelations&pg=4

Forrest, J., & Dunn, K. M. (2006). 'Core'Culture Hegemony and Multiculturalism: Perceptions of the Privileged Position of Australians with British Backgrounds. *Ethnicities*, *6*(2), 203–230. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796806063753

Forrest, J., Johnston, R., & Poulsen, M. (2014). Ethnic Capital and Assimilation to the Great Australian (Homeownership) Dream: The early housing experience of Australia's skilled immigrants. *Australian Geographer*, *45*(2), 109–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2014.899024

Forrest, J., Poulsen, M., & Johnston, R. (2009). Temporary and disadvantaged? The economic and spatial assimilation of New Zealand Maori in Sydney. *Population, Space and Place*, *15*(6), 475–492. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.525

Foster, J. (2012). Making Temporary Permanent: The Silent Transformation of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program. *Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society*, *19*, 22–46. https://doi.org/10.25071/1705-1436.24

Fozdar, F. (2012). Social cohesion and skilled Muslim refugees in Australia: Employment, social capital and discrimination. *Journal of Sociology*, *48*(2), 167–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783311413482

Fozdar, F., & Spittles, B. (2010). Patriotic vs. proceduralist citizenship: Australian representations. *Nations and Nationalism*, *16*(1), 127–147. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00396.x

Gallagher, P. (2004). Nonresponse. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, & T. F. Liao (Eds.),*The SAGE encyclopedia of social science research methods* (Vol. 1, pp. 741-741). SAGE Publications. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589.n634

Gamlen, A. (2015). The impacts of extra-territorial voting: Swings, interregnums and feedback effects in New Zealand elections from 1914 to 2011. *Political Geography*, *44*, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.005

Gao, M. C. F., & Liu, X. (1998). From Student to Citizen: A Survey of Students from the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Australia. *International Migration*, *36*(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00032

Gilbertson, A. (2008). Being New Zealanders Now: Intricacies of Identity in a Multicultural New Zealand. *The Journal of New Zealand Studies*, *[S.I.]*(6/7), 37–58. https://doi.org/10.26686/jnzs.v0i6/7.133

Gilfillan, G. (2018). *Characteristics and use of casual employees in Australia*. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/CasualEmployeesAustralia

Glick Schiller, N., & Levitt, P. (2006). Haven't We Heard This Somewhere Before? A Substantive View of Transnational Migration Studies by Way of a Reply to Waldinger and Fitzgerald. *The Center for Migration and Development*.

Gmelch, G. (1980). Return Migration. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *9*, 135–159.

Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life the role of race, religion, and national origins. Oxford University Press.

Graham, E. (1999). Breaking Out: The Opportunities and Challenges of Multi-Method Research inPopulation Geography. *The Professional Geographer*, *51*(1), 76–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-0124.00147

Grandin, G. (2019, January 17). *The Militarization of the Southern Border Is a Long-Standing American Tradition*. NACLA. https://nacla.org/blog/2019/01/17/militarization-southern-border-long-standing-american-tradition

Gravelle, T. B. (2018). Politics, time, space, and attitudes toward US–Mexico border security. *Political Geography*, *65*, 107–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.05.012

Green, A. (2006). New Zealand Migrants to Australia: Social Construction of Migrant Identity [Ph.D.]. Bond University, Gold Coast.

Green, A., & Power, M. R. (2006). Defining transnationalism boundaries: New Zealand migrants in Australia. *Australian Journal of Communication*, *33*(1), 35–52.

Green, A., Power, M. R., & Jang, D. M. (2008). Trans-Tasman migration: New Zealanders' explanations for their move. *New Zealand Geographer*, *64*(1), 34–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-7939.2008.00125.x

Greene, J. C., & Caracelli, V. J. (1997). Defining and describing the paradigm issue in mixed-method evaluation. *New Directions for Evaluation*, *1997*(74), 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1002/ev.1068

Grewal, P. (2020, August 26). *Australian visas: Important immigration changes that will impact migrants in 2020*. SBS. https://www.sbs.com.au/language/english/audio/australian-visas-important-immigration-changes-that-will-impact-migrants-in-2020

Gringart, E., Helmes, E., & Speelman, C. P. (2005). Exploring Attitudes Toward Older Workers Among Australian Employers: An Empirical Study. *Journal of Aging & Social Policy*, *17*(3), 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1300/J031v17n03_05

Guarnizo, L. E. (1997). The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and The Mirage of Return Migration Among Dominican Transmigrants. *Identities*, *4*(2), 281–322. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.1997.9962591

Haig, R. (2010). *WORKING ACROSS THE DITCH: NEW ZEALANDERS IN AUSTRALIA*. Department of Labour, Welligton, New Zealand.

Hamer, P. (2007). *Maori in Australia*. Te Puni Kokiri.

Hamer, P. (2008). One in Six? The Rapid Growth of the Māori Population in Australia. *New Zealand Population Review*, *33/34*, 153–176.

Hamer, P. (2014). 'Unsophisticated and unsuited': Australian barriers to Pacific Islander immigration from New Zealand. *Political Science*, *66*(2), 93–118. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032318714554495

Hamer, P. (2017). The electoral participation of Māori in Australia. *Political Science*, *69*(2), 175–193. https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2017.1346546

Hamer, P. A. (2019). From Federation to the '501s': Māori inclusion and exclusion in Australia since 1901 [Ph.D.]. Monash university, Melbourne.

Harpaz, Y. (2019). Compensatory citizenship: Dual nationality as a strategy of global upward mobility. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 897–916. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440486

Harpaz, Y., & Mateos, P. (2019). Strategic citizenship: Negotiating membership in the age of dual nationality. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 843–857. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440482

Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis. *The American Economic Review*, *60*(1), 126–142.

Hawthorne, L. (1997). The Question of Discrimination: Skilled Migrants' Access to Australian Employment. *International Migration*, *35*(3), 395–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00019

Hawthorne, L. (2005). "Picking Winners": The Recent Transformation of Australia's Skilled Migration Policy. *International Migration Review*, *39*(3), 663–696. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2005.tb00284.x

Hawthorne, L. (2010). How Valuable is "Two-Step Migration"? Labor Market Outcomes for International Student Migrants to Australia. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *19*(1), 5–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/011719681001900102

Hawthorne, L. (2014). Indian Students and the Evolution of the Study-Migration Pathway in Australia. *International Migration*, *52*(2), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12110

Hibberts, M., Burke Johnson, R., & Hudson, K. (2012). Common Survey Sampling Techniques. In L. Gideon (Ed.), *Handbook of Survey Methodology for the Social Sciences* (pp. 53–74). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3876-2_5

Hickey, M. (2015). Diaspora strategies in the sending states of Southeast Asia: Rights, skills and questions of value: Diaspora strategies in sending states. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, *36*(2), 147–163. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12102

Hiebert, D., & Ley, D. (2003). *Characteristics of Immigrant Transnationalism in Vancouver*. Vancouver Centre of Excellence.

Ho, E. L.-E. (2009). Constituting Citizenship Through the Emotions: Singaporean Transmigrants in London. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *99*(4), 788–804. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600903102857

Ho, E. L.-E. (2011). Migration trajectories of 'highly skilled' middling transnationals: Singaporean transmigrants in London. *Population, Space and Place*, *17*(1), 116–129. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.569

Ho, E. L.-E. (2014). The Emotional Economy of Migration Driving Mainland Chinese Transnational Sojourning across Migration Regimes. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *46*(9), 2212–2227. https://doi.org/10.1068/a130238p

Ho, E. L.-E., & Boyle, M. (2015). Migration-as-development repackaged? The globalizing imperative of the Singaporean state's diaspora strategies. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, *36*(2), 164–182. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12103

Ho, E. L.-E., Hickey, M., & Yeoh, B. S. A. (2015). Special issue introduction: New research directions and critical perspectives on diaspora strategies. *Geoforum*, *59*, 153–158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.12.006

Ho, E. L.-E., & Ley, D. (2014). "Middling" Chinese Returnees or Immigrants from Canada? The Ambiguity of Return Migration and Claims to Modernity. *Asian Studies Review*, *38*(1), 36–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2013.853167

Hoernig, H., & Walton-Roberts, M. (2009). Multicultural City. In R. Kitchin & N. J. Thrift (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography* (pp. 201–210). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.01063-4

Hollifield, J. F. (2004). The Emerging Migration State. *International Migration Review*, *38*(3), 885–912. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x

Horvath, K. (2012). National numbers for transnational relations? Challenges of integrating quantitative methods into research on transnational labour market relations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *35*(10), 1741–1757. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.659270

Hugo, G. (2004a). Future Immigration Policy Development in Australia and New Zealand. *New Zealand Population Review*, *30*(1), 23–42.

Hugo, G. (2004b). New Zealanders in Australia in 2001. *New Zealand Population Review*, *30*(1 & 2), 61–92.

Hugo, G. (2006). GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGES IN AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. *Journal of Population Research*, *23*(2), 107–134.

Hugo, G. (2008a). Immigrant settlement outside of Australia's capital cities. *Population, Space and Place*, *14*(6), 553–571. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.539

Hugo, G. (2008b). Australia's State-Specific and Regional Migration Scheme: An Assessment of its Impacts in South Australia. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *9*(2), 125–145. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-008-0055-y

Hugo, G. (2008c). IN AND OUT OF AUSTRALIA: Rethinking Chinese and Indian skilled migration to Australia. *Asian Population Studies*, *4*(3), 267–291. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441730802496508

Hugo, G. (2014). Skilled Migration in Australia: Policy and Practice. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *23*(4), 375–396. https://doi.org/10.1177/011719681402300404

Hugo, G. (2015). The New Zealand–Australia Migration Corridor. *New Zealand Population Review*, *41*, 21–44.

Hugo, G., Wall, J., & Young, M. (2016). Migration in Australia and New Zealand. In M. J. White (Ed.), *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution* (pp. 333–370). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7282-2_16

Hunter, F. (2016, February 1). Exodus to New Zealand: Kiwis fleeing back home, joined by Australians. *The Sydney Morning Herald*. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/exodus-to-new-zealand-kiwis-fleeing-back-home-joined-by-australians-20160201-gmj05i.html

Hurford, Hon. C. (1986). *Australian Citizenship Amendment Bill 1986*. Australian Government, Canberra.

International Organization for Migration. (2019). *World Migration Report 2020*. International Organization for Migration.

Iredale, R. (2001). The Migration of Professionals: Theories and Typologies. *International Migration*, *39*(5), 7–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00169

Isakjee, A., & Lorne, C. (2019). Bad news from nowhere: Race, class and the 'left behind'. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *37*(1), 7–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X18811923b

Itzigsohn, José, Cabral, C. D., Medina, E. H., & Vázquez, O. (1999). Mapping Dominican transnationalism: Narrow and broad transnational practices. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *22*(2), 316–339. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198799329503

Itzigsohn, José, & Giorguli-Saucedo, S. (2005). Incorporation, Transnationalism, and Gender: Immigrant Incorporation and Transnational Participation as Gendered Processes. *International Migration Review*, *39*(4), 895–920. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2005.tb00293.x

Itzigsohn, José, & Saucedo, S. G. (2002). Immigrant Incorporation and Sociocultural Transnationalism. *The International Migration Review*, *36*(3), 766–798.

Jackson, L. (2016). Intimate citizenship? Rethinking the politics and experience of citizenship as emotional in Wales and Singapore. *Gender, Place & Culture*, *23*(6), 817–833. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2015.1073695

Jaskulowski, K. (2018). A Study of Local Incorporation of Migrant Professionals in Wroclaw. *International Migration*, *56*(5), 123–136. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12387

Johnson, A., Howden-Chapman, P., & Eaqub, S. (2018). *A stocktake of New Zealand's housing*. New Zealand Government. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-02/A%20Stocktake%20Of%20New%20Zealand%27s%20Housing.pdf

Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity. *Citizenship Studies*, *11*(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020601099831

Joppke, C. (2019). The instrumental turn of citizenship. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 858–878. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440484

Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. T. (2003). Toward assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states. Palgrave Macmillan.

Jupp, J. (1998). *Immigration* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Kainth, S. (2018, June 25). *Australian visas to cost more from 1 July 2018*. SBS. https://www.sbs.com.au/language/english/australian-visas-to-cost-more-from-1-july-2018_2

Kamp, A. (2010). Formative Geographies of Belonging in White Australia: Constructing the National Self and Other in Parliamentary Debate, 1901. *Geographical Research*, *48*(4), 411–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-5871.2010.00647.x

Kea New Zealand. (2011). Every Kiwi Counts 2011: Research on New Zealanders living offshore.

Kea New Zealand. (2013). The Kea Every Kiwi Counts Survey 2013.

Kea New Zealand. (2015). Every Kiwi counts survey 2015.

Keat, R., & Urry, J. (1975). *Social theory as science*. Routledge revivals.

Khoo, S.-E. (2002). IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN AUSTRALIA. Joint Special Issue, Journal of Population Research and NZ Population Review, 67–78.

Khoo, S.-E. (2014). Attracting and Retaining Globally Mobile Skilled Migrants: Policy Challenges based on Australian Research. *International Migration*, *52*(2), 20–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12103

Khoo, S.-E., Hugo, G., & McDonald, P. (2008). Which Skilled Temporary Migrants Become Permanent Residents and Why? *International Migration Review*, *42*(1), 193–226. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00118.x

Khoo, S.-E., McDonald, P., & Hugo, G. (2009). Skilled Temporary Migration from Asia-Pacific Countries to Australia. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *18*(2), 255–281. https://doi.org/10.1177/011719680901800204

King, R. (1978). Return Migration: A Neglected Aspect of Population Geography. *Area*, *10*(3), 175–182.

King, R., & Skeldon, R. (2010). 'Mind the Gap!' Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *36*(10), 1619–1646. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489380

Klapdor, M., Coombs, M., & Bohm, C. (2009). *Australian citizenship: A chronology of major developments in policy and law*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/AustCitizenship

Klarenbeek, L. M. (2019). Reconceptualising 'integration as a two-way process'. *Migration Studies*, *mnz033*. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnz033

Kobayashi, Y. H. (2015). Renationalisation of space in everyday life in Singapore. *Social Identities*, *21*(4), 410–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2015.1071704

Koh, S. Y. (2015). Temporalities of citizenship: Malaysian-Chinese skilled migrants in Singapore and returnees to Malaysia. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *24*(1), 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196814565158

Koleth, E. (2010). *Multiculturalism: A review of Australian policy statements and recent debates in Australia and overseas*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1011/11rp06

Korteweg, A. C. (2017). The failures of 'immigrant integration': The gendered racialized production of non-belonging. *Migration Studies*, *5*(3), 428–444. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnx025

Koser, K., & Salt, J. (1997). The geography of highly skilled international migration. *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POPULATION GEOGRAPHY*, *3*, 285–303.

Krzyżowski, Ł., & Mucha, J. (2014). Transnational caregiving in turbulent times: Polish migrants in Iceland and their elderly parents in Poland. *International Sociology*, *29*(1), 22–37. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580913515287

Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (1994). Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. *Ethics*, *104*(2), 352–381.

Lamba-Nieves, D. (2018). Hometown associations and the micropolitics of transnational community development. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *44*(5), 754–772. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1366850

Lee, J. Y. (2011). A Trajectory Perspective Towards Return Migration and Development: The Case of Young Korean New Zealander Returnees. *Korea 2011*, 233–256. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004219359_013

Leitner, H., & Ehrkamp, P. (2006). Transnationalism and Migrants' Imaginings of Citizenship. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *38*(9), 1615–1632. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37409

Leuchter, N. (2014). Creating other options: Negotiating the meanings of citizenships. *Citizenship Studies*, *18*(6–7), 776–790. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2014.944780

Levey, G. B. (2014). Liberal nationalism and the Australian citizenship tests. *Citizenship Studies*, *18*(2), 175–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2014.886394

Levitt, P., & Glick Schiller, N. (2004). Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society. *International Migration Review*, *38*(145), 595–629. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00227.x

Levitt, P., & Jaworsky, B. N. (2007). Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *33*(1), 129–156. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131816

Levy, D. (2011, November 9). Greens' undercover mission. *Stuff*. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/5930923/Greens-undercover-mission

Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. *The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, *22*, 139–191.

Ley, D., & Kobayashi, A. (2005). Back to Hong Kong: Return migration or transnational sojourn? *Global Networks*, *5*(2), 111–127. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2005.00110.x

Lidgard, J. (2001). Return Migration of New Zealanders: A Profile of Returnees in 2000. *New Zealand Journal of Geography*, *112*(1), 10–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0028-8292.2001.tb00786.x

Lidgard, J. M. (1994). Return Migration of New Zealanders: A Profile of 1990 Returnees. *New Zealand Journal of Geography*, *97*(1), 3–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0028-8292.1994.tb00337.x

Liu, L. S. (2014). A search for a place to call home: Negotiation of home, identity and senses of belonging among new migrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to New

Zealand. *Emotion, Space and Society*, *10*, 18–26.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2013.01.002

Longhurst, R. (2009). Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured. In R. Kitchin & N. Thrift (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography* (pp. 580–584). Elsevier.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.00458-2

Love, S., & Klapdor, M. (2020). *New Zealanders in Australia: A quick guide*. Parliament of Australia.
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick_Guides/NewZealandersInAustralia

Madden, C. (2020). *Party leadership changes and challenges: A quick guide*. Parliament of Australia.
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick_Guides/PartyChangesChallenges

Magnusson Turner, L., & Hedman, L. (2014). Linking Integration and Housing Career: A Longitudinal Analysis of Immigrant Groups in Sweden. *Housing Studies*, *29*(2), 270–290.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2014.851177

Mares, P. (2016). Not Quite Australian: How Temporary Migration Is Changing the Nation. Text Publishing Melbourne Australia.

Margheritis, A. (2007). State-led transnationalism and migration: Reaching out to the Argentine community in Spain. *Global Networks*, *7*(1), 87–106.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00158.x

Markey, R., & McIvor, J. (2018). Regulating casual employment in Australia. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, *60*(5), 593–618. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185618778084

Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class, and other essays. University Press.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. *Population and Development Review*, *19*(3), 431. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938462

MBIE. (2019). *Labour Market Statistics Snapshot Sep 2019*. Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/10361-labour-market-statistics-snapshot-september-2019

McKendrick, J. H. (1999). Multi-Method Research: An Introduction to Its Application in PopulationGeography. *The Professional Geographer*, *51*(1), 40–50.
https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-0124.00143

McMillan, K. (2014). Political and social rights for second country nationals: Freedom of movement and citizenship in Australasia. *Citizenship Studies*, *18*(3–4), 349–364.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2014.905316

McMillan, K. (2017). 'Affective integration' and access to the rights of permanent residency: New Zealanders resident in Australia post-2001. *Ethnicities*, *17*(1), 103–127.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816656675

Meredith, P. (2006). *Matariki – Māori New Year*. Te Ara; Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga. https://teara.govt.nz/en/matariki-maori-new-year

Migration Data Portal. (2020). *Data*. Migration Data Portal. http://migrationdataportal.org/data

Miller, P. W. (1987). Aspects of Occupational Mobility and Attainment Among Immigrants in Australia. *The International Migration Review*, *21*(1), 96–113.

Ministry for Culture and Heritage. (2018). *Overview—The 1960s*. New Zealand History. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/the-1960s/overview

Moore, F. (2016). City of sojourners versus city of settlers: Transnationalism, location and identity among Taiwanese professionals in London and Toronto. *Global Networks*, *16*(3), 372–390. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12120

Morrison, Hon. S. (2014). *Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014*. Australian Government. http://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014B00191/Explanatory Memorandum/Text

Morrison, P. S., & Clark, W. A. V. (2011). Internal Migration and Employment: Macro Flows and Micro Motives. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *43*(8), 1948–1964. https://doi.org/10.1068/a43531

Morton, H. (1998). Creating Their Own Culture: Diasporic Tongans. *The Contemporary Pacific*, *10*(1), 1–30.

MSD. (2020). *Housing Register*. Ministry of Social Development. https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/statistics/housing/index.html#TheHousingRegistersinceMarch20182

Mügge, L. (2012). Dual Nationality and Transnational Politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *38*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2012.640003

Mügge, L. (2016). Transnationalism as a Research Paradigm and Its Relevance for Integration. In B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe* (pp. 109–125). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_7

Nagel, C. (2019). Populism, immigration and the Trump phenomenon in the U.S. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *37*(1), 12–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X18811923c

Ní Laoire, C. (2007). The 'green green grass of home'? Return migration to rural Ireland. *Journal of Rural Studies*, *23*(3), 332–344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2007.01.005

Nolan, M. (2015). Welfare limbo? Social welfare and citizenship debates about New Zealanders living in Australia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *53*(3), 253–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2015.1043689

Oberman, K. (2017). Immigration, Citizenship, and Consent: What is Wrong with Permanent Alienage? *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *25*(1), 91–107. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12093

OECD. (2020). *International Migration Database*. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG

OECD, & European Union. (2018). *Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration*. OECD Publishing, Paris/ European Union, Brussels. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en

Oliver, C., & O'Reilly, K. (2010). A Bourdieusian Analysis of Class and Migration: Habitus and the Individualizing Process. *Sociology*, *44*(1), 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038509351627

Ongley, P., & Pearson, D. (1995). Post-1945 International Migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada Compared. *International Migration Review*, *29*(3), 765–793. https://doi.org/10.2307/2547504

Orange, C. (2012). *Treaty of Waitangi*. Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga. https://teara.govt.nz/en/treaty-of-waitangi

Orozco, M., & Lapointe, M. (2004). Mexican Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities. *Journal of International Affairs*, *57*(2), 31–51.

Osbaldiston, N., Picken, F., & Denny, L. (2020). Exploring emotional reflexivity in British lifestyle migration to Australia. *Population, Space and Place*, *26*(5). https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2328

Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. *International Migration Review*, *37*(3), 760–786. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00157.x

Ottonelli, V., & Torresi, T. (2013). When is Migration Voluntary? *International Migration Review*, *47*(4), 783–813. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12048

Oz Kiwi. (2019). *Submissions to government inquiries*. Oz Kiwi. https://www.ozkiwi2001.org/2019/02/submissions-to-govt-inquiries/

Paparusso, A., & Ambrosetti, E. (2017). To stay or to return? Return migration intentions of Moroccans in Italy. *International Migration*, *55*(6), 137–155. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12375

Parfitt, J. (2005). Questionnaire design and sampling. In R. Flowerdew & D. Martin (Eds.), *Methods in Human Geography: A guide for students doing a research project* (pp. 76–109). Routledge.

Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W., & McKenzie, R. D. (1925). *The city*. University of Chicago Press.

Parker, K. L. (2012). Transnational Networks and Identifications of Australia's Diaspora in the USA. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *33*(1), 39–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2012.633314

Parrenas, R. (2005). Long distance intimacy: Class, gender and intergenerational relations between mothers and children in Filipino transnational families. *Global Networks*, *5*(4), 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2005.00122.x

Parreñas, R. S. (2001). Mothering from a Distance: Emotions, Gender, and Intergenerational Relations in Filipino Transnational Families. *Feminist Studies*, *27*(2), 361–390. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178765

Parutis, V. (2014). "Economic Migrants" or "Middling Transnationals"? East European Migrants' Experiences of Work in the UK: *East European migrants*. *International Migration*, *52*(1), 36–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00677.x

Penninx, R. (2019). Problems of and solutions for the study of immigrant integration. *Comparative Migration Studies*, *7*(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0122-x

Petrie, C. (n.d.). *Citizenship*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/Citizenship

Philip, L. J. (1998). Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Social Research in Human Geography—An Impossible Mixture? *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *30*(2), 261–276. https://doi.org/10.1068/a300261

Philipp, A., & Ho, E. (2010). Migration, Home and Belonging: South African Migrant Women in Hamilton, New Zealand. *New Zealand Population Review*, *36*, 81–101.

Phillips, Janet, & Spinks, H. (2013). *Boat arrivals in Australia since 1976*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/bn/2012-2013/boatarrivals#_Toc347230718

Phillips, Jock, & Hearn, T. J. (2008). Settlers: New Zealand immigrants from England, Ireland & Scotland, 1800-1945. Auckland University Press.

Phillips, T., & Smith, P. (2000). What is 'Australian'? Knowledge and Among a Gallery of Contemporary Australians. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, *35*(2), 203–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/713649336

Pickard, J. (2016, May 19). *Vote Leave woos British Asians with migration leaflets*. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/94adcefa-1dd5-11e6-a7bc-ee846770ec15

Ponds, R., Marlet, G., van Woerkens, C., & Garretsen, H. (2016). Taxi drivers with a PhD: Trickle down or crowding-out for lower educated workers in Dutch cities? *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, *9*(2), 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsw008

Poot, J. (2010). Trans-Tasman Migration, Transnationalism and Economic Development in Australasia. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *19*(3), 319–342.

Poot, J., & Sanderson, L. (2007). Return and onward migration, attachment and travel of New Zealand migrants to Australia. *Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia*, *41*, 61–90.

Portes, A. (2003). Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism. *The International Migration Review*, *37*(3,), 874–892.

Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. E., & Haller, W. J. (2002). Transnational Entrepreneurs: An Alternative Form of Immigrant Economic Adaptation. *American Sociological Review*, *67*(2), 278–298. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088896

Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. E., & Landolt, P. (1999). The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *22*(2), 217–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198799329468

Portes, A., & Jensen, L. (1989). The enclave and the entrants: Patterns of ethnic enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel. *American Sociological Review*, *54*(December), 929–949.

Portes, A., & Stepick, A. (1985). Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida. *American Sociological Review*, *50*(4), 493–514. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095435

Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *530*(1), 74–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716293530001006

Purdie, N., & Wilss, L. (2007). Australian National Identity: Young Peoples' Conceptions of What It Means to be Australian. *National Identities*, *9*(1), 67–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940601145695

Rajendran, D., Farquharson, K., & Hewege, C. (2017). Workplace integration: The lived experiences of highly skilled migrants in Australia. *Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal*, *36*(5), 437–456. https://doi.org/10.1108/EDI-11-2016-0094

Rajendran, D., Ng, E. S., Sears, G., & Ayub, N. (2020). Determinants of Migrant Career Success: A Study of Recent Skilled Migrants in Australia. *International Migration*, *58*(2), 30–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12586

Ralph, D., & Staeheli, L. A. (2011). Home and Migration: Mobilities, Belongings and Identities: Home and migration. *Geography Compass*, *5*(7), 517–530. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2011.00434.x

Raymer, J., & Baffour, B. (2018). Subsequent Migration of Immigrants Within Australia, 1981–2016. *Population Research and Policy Review*, *37*(6), 1053–1077. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-018-9482-4

Rea, L. M., & Parker, R. A. (2005). Designing and conducting survey research: A comprehensive guide (3rd ed.). Jossey-Bass.

Reid, A., Daly, A., LaMontagne, A. D., Milner, A., & Ronda Pérez, E. (2020). Descriptive study of workplace demand, control and bullying among migrant and Australian-born workers by gender: Does workplace support make a difference? *BMJ Open*, *10*(6), e033652. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2019-033652

Reilly, A. (2015). Low-cost labour or cultural exchange? Reforming the Working Holiday visa programme. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, *26*(3), 474–489. https://doi.org/10.1177/1035304615598160

Remeikis, A. (2020, February 28). Jacinda Ardern lashes Scott Morrison for 'testing' friendship over deportations to New Zealand. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/28/jacinda-ardern-lashes-scott-morrison-for-testing-friendship-over-deportations-to-new-zealand

Ren, N., & Liu, H. (2015). Traversing between transnationalism and integration: Dual embeddedness of new Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in Singapore. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *24*(3), 298–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196815594719

Robertson, S. (2011a). Student switchers and the regulation of residency: The interface of the individual and Australia's immigration regime. *Population, Space and Place*, *17*(1), 103–115. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.598

Robertson, S. (2011b). Cash cows, backdoor migrants, or activist citizens? International students, citizenship, and rights in Australia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *34*(12), 2192–2211. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.558590

Robertson, S. (2014). Time and Temporary Migration: The Case of Temporary Graduate Workers and Working Holiday Makers in Australia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *40*(12), 1915–1933. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.876896

Robertson, S., & Runganaikaloo, A. (2014). Lives in limbo: Migration experiences in Australia's education–migration nexus. *Ethnicities*, *14*(2), 208–226. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796813504552

Roy, E. A. (2020a, January 20). All sectors of New Zealand housing market 'severely' unaffordable: Survey. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/all-sectors-of-new-zealand-housing-market-severely-unaffordable-survey

Roy, E. A. (2020b, February 18). 'They allowed the perfect storm': UN expert damns New Zealand's housing crisis. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/19/they-allowed-the-perfect-storm-un-expert-damns-new-zealands-housing-crisis

Roy Morgan. (2019). Facebook on top but Instagram and Pinterest growing fastest. www.roymorgan.com

Rubenstein, K. (2002). Australian citizenship law in context. Lawbook Co.

Rung, D. L. (2020). Processes of Sub-Citizenship: Neoliberal Statecrafting 'Citizens,' 'Non-Citizens,' and Detainable 'Others'. *Social Sciences*, *9*(1), 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9010005

Ryan, L. (2015). Friendship-making: Exploring Network Formations through the Narratives of Irish Highly Qualified Migrants in Britain. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *41*(10), 1664–1683. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1015409

Ryan, L. (2019). Narratives of Settling in Contexts of Mobility: A Comparative Analysis of Irish and Polish Highly Qualified Women Migrants in London. *International Migration*, *57*(3), 177–191. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12493

Ryan, L., Klekowski Von Koppenfels, A., & Mulholland, J. (2015). 'The distance between us': A comparative examination of the technical, spatial and temporal dimensions of the transnational social relationships of highly skilled migrants. *Global Networks*, *15*(2), 198–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12054

Ryan, L., & Mulholland, J. (2014a). French connections: The networking strategies of French highly skilled migrants in London. *Global Networks*, *14*(2), 148–166. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12038

Ryan, L., & Mulholland, J. (2014b). Trading Places: French Highly Skilled Migrants Negotiating Mobility and Emplacement In London. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *40*(4), 584–600. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.787514

Ryan, L., Sales, R., Tilki, M., & Siara, B. (2008). Social Networks, Social Support and Social Capital: The Experiences of Recent Polish Migrants in London. *Sociology*, *42*(4), 672–690.

safe work Australia. (2017). Psychosocial health and safety and bullying in Australian workplaces. Safe Work Australia, Canberra.

Sanderson, L. (2009). International Mobility of New Migrants to Australia. *The International Migration Review*, *43*(2), 292–331.

Sardana, D., Zhu, Y., & van der Veen, R. (2016). Unlocking the Talents-in-Waiting: Case Study Analysis of Chinese and Indian High-Skilled Migrants in South Australia. *International Migration*, *54*(6), 74–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12294

Schinkel, W. (2018). Against 'immigrant integration': For an end to neocolonial knowledge production. *Comparative Migration Studies*, *6*(1), 31. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0095-1

Schneider, J., & Crul, M. (2010). New insights into assimilation and integration theory: Introduction to the special issue. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *33*(7), 1143–1148. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419871003777809

Scott, S. (2004). Transnational exchanges amongst skilled British migrants in Paris. *Population, Space and Place*, *10*(5), 391–410. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.345

Seitz, A., & Foster, L. (1985). Dilemmas of Immigration — Australian Expectations, Migrant Responses: Germans in Melbourne. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, *21*(3), 414–430. https://doi.org/10.1177/144078338502100306

Sejersen, T. B. (2008). 'I Vow to Thee My Countries': The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21st Century. *The International Migration Review*, *42*(3), 523–549.

Sherrell, H. (2019). *Australia and the Global Compact on Migration*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2019/March/Australia_and_the_Global_Compact_on_Migration

Shu, J., & Hawthorne, L. (1996). Asian Student Migration to Australia. *International Migration*, *34*(1), 65–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.1996.tb00180.x

Siar, S. (2014). Highly Skilled Migrants' Strong Ties with Their Home Country: Evidence from Filipinos in New Zealand and Australia. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *15*(4), 655–676. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-013-0285-5

Silverstein, M., & Bengtson, V. L. (1997). Intergenerational Solidarity and the Structure of Adult Child-Parent Relationships in American Families. *American Journal of Sociology*, *103*(2), 429–460. https://doi.org/10.1086/231213

Singh, S., Robertson, S., & Cabraal, A. (2012). Transnational Family Money: Remittances, Gifts and Inheritance. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *33*(5), 475–492. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2012.701606

Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. *Journal of Political Economy*, *70*(5), 80–93.

Smith, C. (2019). 'Authoritarian neoliberalism' and the Australian border-industrial complex. *Competition & Change*, *23*(2), 192–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529418807074

Smith, M. P. (2003). Transnationalism, the State, and the Extraterritorial Citizen. *Politics & Society*, *31*(4), 467–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329203256957

Smolicz, J. J. (1985). Greek-Australians: A question of survival in multicultural Australia. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, *6*(1), 17–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/01434632.1985.9994182

Smyth, A. (2017). Re-reading remittances through solidarity: Mexican hometown associations in New York City. *Geoforum*, *85*, 12–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.06.025

Snel, E., Engbersen, G., & Leerkes, A. (2006). Transnational involvement and social integration. *Global Networks*, *6*(3), 285–308. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00145.x

Spinks, H. (2016). *Overseas students: Immigration policy changes 1997–2015*. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/OverseasStudents

Spiro, P. J. (2016). Dual Citizenship as Human Right. In *At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship*. NYU Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1803zs2.10

Spiro, P. J. (2019). The equality paradox of dual citizenship. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*(6), 879–896. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440485

Stanley, E. (2018). Expanding crimmigration: The detention and deportation of New Zealanders from Australia. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, *51*(4), 519–536. https://doi.org/10.1177/0004865817730858

Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The New Economics of Labor Migration. *The American Economic Review*, *75*(2,), 173–178.

Stats NZ. (2002). *2001 Census: People Born Overseas*. Statistics New Zealand, Wellington.

Stats NZ. (2013). *2013 Census totals by topic*. Statistics New Zealand, Wellington.

Stats NZ. (2016). *Visitor arrivals continue to break records*. Stats NZ. http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/Migration/IntTravelAndMigration_MRDec15.aspx

Stats NZ. (2019a). *2018 Census population and dwelling counts*. Stats NZ, Wellington.

Stats NZ. (2019b). 2018 Census totals by topic- national highlights. Stats NZ, Wellington.

Stats NZ. (2020a). *Higher airfares and rents boost inflation*. Stats NZ. https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/higher-airfares-and-rents-boost-inflation

Stats NZ. (2020b). *Income*. Stats NZ. https://www.stats.govt.nz/topics/income

Stats NZ. (2020c). *Meaty increases push up annual food prices*. Stats NZ. https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/meaty-increases-push-up-annual-food-prices

Stats NZ. (2020d). *New Zealand Trade Dashboard*. Stats NZ. https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/

Stats NZ. (2020e). Permanent and long-term arrivals by country of citizenship and visa type (Annual-Jun). Stats NZ, Wellington.

Stats NZ. (2020f). Permanent and long-term migration by ctry of residence, citizenship and birthplace (Annual-Jun). Stats NZ, Wellington.

Steiner, I. (2019). Settlement or Mobility? Immigrants' Re-migration Decision-Making Process in a High-Income Country Setting. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *20*(1), 223–245. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0602-0

Stewart, C. (2015, April 3). Revenge of the Kiwis: The tide turns in New Zealand's favour. *The Australian*. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/revenge-of-the-kiwis-the-tide-turns-in-new-zealands-favour/news-story/cf7153aeafe6260bbe205f8cc84f0f3e

Strunk, C. (2014). 'We are Always Thinking of our Community': Bolivian Hometown Associations, Networks of Reciprocity, and Indigeneity in Washington D.C. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *40*(11), 1697–1715.

Stuff. (2012, June 13). *Thousands move to Australia after quakes*. Stuff. https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/7094009/Thousands-move-to-Australia-after-quakes

Tan, G., & Hugo, G. (2017). The Transnational Migration Strategies of Chinese and Indian Students in Australia. *Population, Space and Place*, *23*(6), e2038. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2038

Tan, Y., & Lester, L. H. (2012). Labour Market and Economic Impacts of International Working Holiday Temporary Migrants to Australia: Labour Market and Economic Impacts of WHMs to Australia. *Population, Space and Place*, *18*(3), 359–383. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.674

Taonui, R. (2015). *Whakapapa – genealogy*. Te Ara; Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga. https://teara.govt.nz/en/whakapapa-genealogy

Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sage.

Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2009). Foundations of mixed methods research: Integrating quantitative and qualitative techniques in the social and behavioral sciences. Sage Publications.

The Greens. (2015, September 29). *Australian and New Zealand Green parties call for deportation halt*. Greens SA. https://greens.org.au/sa/news/media-release/australian-and-new-zealand-green-parties-call-deportation-halt

The World Bank. (2020). *Remittances Data*. KNOMAD.
https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances

Todaro, M. P. (1969). A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries. *The American Economic Review*, *59*(1), 138–148.

Todaro, M. P., & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework. *Population and Development Review*, *13*(1), 101–114.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1972122

Tourism Australia. (2020). International Tourism Snapshot as at 31st March 2020.

UNHCR. (2018). *The New York Declaration FAQS*. https://www.unhcr.org/584689257.pdf

UNHCR. (2020). *Mediterranean Situation*. Operational Portal Refugee Situations.
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean

Urry, J. (2007). *Mobilities*. Polity.

Valentine, G. (2005). Tell me about...:using interviews as a research methodology. In R. Flowerdew & D. Martin (Eds.), *Methods in Human Geography: A guide for students doing a research project* (pp. 110–126). Prentice Hall.

van Riemsdijk, M. (2014). International Migration and Local Emplacement: Everyday Place-Making Practices of Skilled Migrants in Oslo, Norway. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *46*(4), 963–979. https://doi.org/10.1068/a46234

van Riemsdijk, M., Basford, S., & Burnham, A. (2016). Socio-Cultural Incorporation of Skilled Migrants at Work: Employer and Migrant Perspectives. *International Migration*, *54*(3), 20–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12221

Vertovec, S. (2004). Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation. *The International Migration Review*, *38*(3,), 970–1001.

Voigt-Graf, C. (2004). Towards a geography of transnational spaces: Indian transnational communities in Australia. *Global Networks*, *4*(1), 25–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2004.00079.x

Voigt-Graf, C. (2005). The construction of transnational spaces by Indian migrants in Australia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *31*(2), 365–384.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000339972

von Koppenfels, A. K., Mulholland, J., & Ryan, L. (2015). 'Gotta Go Visit Family': Reconsidering the Relationship Between Tourism and Transnationalism. *Population, Space and Place*, *21*(7), 612–624. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1916

Vono-de-Vilhena, D., & Bayona-Carrasco, J. (2012). Transition towards homeownership among foreign-born immigrants in Spain from a life-course approach. *Population, Space and Place*, *18*(1), 100–115. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.641

Waldinger, R. (2008). Between "Here" and "There": Immigrant Cross-Border Activities and Loyalties. *International Migration Review*, *42*(1), 3–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00112.x

Waldinger, R., & Fitzgerald, D. (2004). Transnationalism in Question. *American Journal of Sociology*, *109*(5), 1177–1195. https://doi.org/10.1086/381916

Walker, T. (2017). *Contemporary understandings of whānau*. Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga. https://teara.govt.nz/en/whanau-maori-and-family/page-1

Walker, T. W. (2013). *NGĀ PĀ HARAKEKE O NGATI POROU: A LIVED EXPERIENCE OF WHĀNAU* [Ph.D.]. Victoria University of Wellington.

Walsh, J. P. (2011). Quantifying citizens: Neoliberal restructuring and immigrant selection in Canada and Australia. *Citizenship Studies*, *15*(6–7), 861–879. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2011.600135

Waters, J. L. (2009). IMMIGRATION, TRANSNATIONALISM AND 'FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP' IN CANADA: AN EXAMINATION OF ONG'S THESIS TEN YEARS ON. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, *100*(5), 635–645.

Weller, S. A. (2017). Accounting for Skill Shortages? Migration and the Australian Labour Market: Accounting Skill Shortages? *Population, Space and Place*, *23*(2), e1997. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1997

White, A., & Ryan, L. (2008). Polish 'Temporary' Migration: The Formation and Significance of Social Networks. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *60*(9), 1467–1502. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802362227

Wiles, J. (2008). Sense of home in a transnational social space: New Zealanders in London. *Global Networks*, *8*(1), 116–137. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2008.00188.x

Williams, K. (2017, December 5). Only those with genuine NZ links should be deported from Australia, PM says. *Stuff*. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/99556127/only-those-with-genuine-nz-links-should-be-deported-from-australia-pm-says

Wilson, J. (2016). *Nation and government- Local government*. Te Ara; Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu Taonga. https://teara.govt.nz/en/map/2740/regional-council-boundaries

Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2003). Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology. *The International Migration Review*, *37*(3,), 576–610.

Wooden, M. (1991). The Experience of Refugees in the Australian Labor Market. *International Migration Review*, *25*(3), 514–535.

Wright, K. B. (2005). Researching Internet-Based Populations: Advantages and Disadvantages of Online Survey Research, Online Questionnaire Authoring Software Packages, and Web Survey Services. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *10*(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2005.tb00259.x

Yanasmayan, Z. (2015). Citizenship on paper or at heart? A closer look into the dual citizenship debate in Europe. *Citizenship Studies*, *19*(6–7), 785–801. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2015.1053793

Yeoh, B. S. A., & Huang, S. (1998). Negotiating Public Space: Strategies and Styles of Migrant Female Domestic Workers in Singapore. *Urban Studies*, *35*(3), 583–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098984925

Yeoh, B. S. A., & Huang, S. (1999). Spaces at the Margins: Migrant Domestic Workers and the Development of Civil Society in Singapore. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *31*(7), 1149–1167. https://doi.org/10.1068/a311149

Yeoh, B. S. A., & Huang, S. (2000). "HOME" AND "AWAY": FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS AND NEGOTIATIONS OF DIASPORIC IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE. *Women's Studies International Forum*, *23*(4), 413–429.

Yeoh, B. S. A., Leng, C. H., Dung, V. T. K., & Yi'En, C. (2013). Between two families: The social meaning of remittances for Vietnamese marriage migrants in Singapore. *Global Networks*, *13*(4), 441–458. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12032

Yeoh, B. S. A., & Willis, K. (2005). Singaporeans in China: Transnational women elites and the negotiation of gendered identities. *Geoforum*, *36*(2), 211–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2003.07.004

Yuval-Davis, N. (1999). The 'Multi-Layered Citizen'. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, *1*(1), 119–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/146167499360068

Zontini, E. (2004). Immigrant women in Barcelona: Coping with the consequences of transnational lives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *30*(6), 1113–1144. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000286278

Zuberi, D., & Ptashnick, M. (2012). In Search of a Better Life: The Experiences of Working Poor Immigrants in Vancouver, Canada: Working poor immigrants in Vancouver. *International Migration*, *50*, e60–e93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00659.x