RIDICULE AND HUMILIATION

IN GREEK LITERATURE

FROM HOMER TO THE FOURTH CENTURY B C

Judith Maitland

The Department of Classics

The University of Adelaide

December 1986

Awarded August 31, 1987.

Contents.

Thesis Abstract.

The thesis will show that Homer's concepts of aggressive laughter, inappropriate laughter, and laughter before and after the event endure, and are developed by those who wrote after him. The *Iliad* establishes the principle that laughter is an earned privilege; the *Odyssey* goes further in these matters, taking great interest in misplaced confidence and the thwarting of carefully laid plans. It is in this work that laughter and *hybris* are associated for the first time, and that *hybris* itself begins to take on the importance ascribed to it in the work of Hesiod, Aeschylus, Pindar, Theognis, and Solon.

The subject of *hybris* leads to that of *kataphronesis*, a concept linked with behaviour and its consequences. *Kataphronesis* is treated in two ways: either it is a privilege that is earned in specific ways, or it is a hybristic error, which is shown to be so by subsequent events.

The term "results-culture" is well suited to the background against which Herodotus develops the notion of *kataphronesis*, and Thucydides, developing writing after the event into an art form, adds the term *sphallein* to express the humiliating consequences of a lapse in judgement.

The tragic writers have a tendency to reproduce the heroic values found in Homer, perhaps owing more to the *Iliad* than to

the *Odyssey*. For this reason they may not have as much to tell as we would wish about ridicule and humiliation in their own time. However, fifth century comedy and fourth century oratory show beyond any doubt that ridicule and the response it generated retained their significance for study of Greek thought and character.

There are signs that such questions were a matter for scrutiny for the Greeks themselves; Aristotle, Plato, and even the orators are interested in the difference between the friendly jest and aggressive laughter. Plato's Socrates shows Homeric subtlety in inducing laughter for his own purposes, and is no more afraid of hiding his true nature than is Odysseus himself.

The thesis will conclude that Homer's observations of the Greek character are borne out in the work of his successors. Even when an author is not consciously setting out to reproduce Homeric ideals, the image appears of a character that is sensitive to affront, highly aggressive, and preoccupied with honour. These qualities appear in the interplay of characters in epic and drama and in the outbursts, whether naive or calculated, of poet or orator, and are exploited, with varying degrees of accomplishment, by the historians.

Notes on usage.

I have adopted Latin spelling for all names in frequent use. Important terms are written in Greek the first time they appear, and thereafter generally transliterated, rendering y for υ as in *hybris*. I have rendered in English the titles of works cited, except where it seemed unnecessary. All works are referred to by the Latin abbreviations, for convenience. The titles of periodicals are referred to by the abbreviations used in *L'Année Philologique*. All translations are my own except for that of Rieu on p 11. I have used the Oxford Classical Texts unless I have stated otherwise.

The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University; to the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis. I consent to the thesis being made available for photocopying and loan if applicable if accepted for the award of the degree.

My appreciation and thanks are due to my supervisors, Dr J R Melville Jones of the Department of Classics and Ancient History, the University of Western Australia, and Dr C I Young, of the Department of Classics, the University of Adelaide, and to numerous friends, colleagues, and students, without whose various contributions the task would have been longer and more arduous.

INTRODUCTION

Ajax, in the play by Sophocles bearing his name, cries that he has been insulted and made a laughing stock. Euripides' Medea tells the Corinthian women that it is unbearable to be laughed at by one's enemies. In *Iliad* XXII Hector, alone outside the walls of Troy as the terrifying figure of Achilles approaches, wonders how he can avoid this fight. One of his first considerations is what his countrymen and the Trojan ladies in their trailing gowns will think of him and worse, what they will say. These characters dread the ridicule of others. Ajax kills himself rather than face it, Medea kills her children in order to put a stop to it, and Hector's only choice is to remain alone outside the walls of Troy. It can be seen that this fear is strong motivation for desperate action; in my view the ancient Greek writers were aware of this and made great use of it in their work. The importance of these considerations in so many forms of expression has suggested the present line of inquiry.

The subject of ridicule has attracted attention in other fields of enquiry; Paul Radin[1] states that "The fear of ridicule is thus a great positive factor in the lives of primitive peoples. It is the preserver of the established order of things and more potent and tyrannous that the most restrictive and coercive of positive injunctions possibly could be". Radin's thesis in this work is that the term 'primitive' does not necessarily imply elementary or naive social structures or philosophy, and his

point is well supported by the ancient Greek writers, whose attitudes are in general neither elementary nor naive.

To return from Anthropology to Classics, J N Bremmer, [2] remarks, "Laughter is still a highly underresearched subject from an anthropological and historical point of view, but recently scholars have noted the significance of laughter for constituting a group identity, and its relevance for the establishment of the level of bodily control in a particular group or culture..."

This will be a historical rather than anthropological study, and will show among other things that the Greeks were aware of the aspects of laughter mentioned above, including the apparent level of bodily control in groups they encountered.

Perhaps because it was such a pervasive term, laughter is seldom explained. Concepts such as *hybris* or *dike* are used antithetically, discussed, or explained by means of metaphors. Laughter is used incidentally, and its significance must be understood from the context in which it appears. Study of these contexts soon shows that laughter is a more complex matter than a mere physical response to a stimulus. Furthermore, it is obvious that this was observed, if not understood, by the time the Homeric epics were composed. This study will begin by surveying the many aspects of laughter that appear in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; each aspect will be identified in

order to show that these concepts that appear in Homer recur in the work of later authors. Sometimes a concept develops into something different from that which may appear in Homer; these concepts are the subjects of separate chapters.

Notes to Introduction.

1. Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, Dover, 1957, p. 51.

2. J N Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*, Princeton U.P., 1983, p. 86

Smiles, Laughter, and Other Pleasures in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

The *Iliad* is a work that is largely concerned with the formalities of war. Emily Vermeule[1] puts it poetically when she says, "In Greek poetry and art the climaxes of war are expressed as a formal and elaborate ballet lightened with constant humour and decorative effects." It is the infringement of one of these formalities, the right of a warrior to his battle spoils, that brings about the events that form the theme of the poem. The question quickly arises as to whether it is the war that is a matter of formality or the poem itself[2], but in matters such as the question of self-esteem the importance of the formalities becomes clear. Ridicule plays a part in these formalities, and it is convenient to turn first to the descriptions of single combat.

Two occasions arise for single combat, both attended by great pomp and formality, and described in terms that contain much formulaic material. In book III, Paris springs forth from the Trojan ranks and issues his challenge. Menelaus is only too happy to accept, but at the sight of him Paris regrets his offer and effaces himself among his comrades. This calls forth a diatribe of contempt from Hector, to which Paris responds without rancour, just as he does to Helen's reproaches a little later on (III 428ff). He says that Hector has not reproached him

beyond what is fair: *kat' aisan eneikesas oud' hyper aisan* (III 59). These words are repeated under similar circumstances in VI 333; I suggest that the repetition implies a familiar notion. Hector likewise reproaches Paris twice in the same words (III 39, XIII 769): *Dyspari, eidos ariste, gynaimanes, eperopeuta*, but in the first instance he goes on to wish him unborn and dead unmarried at the same time, and to reproach him bitterly for incurring the contempt of others - making himself *hypopsion*[3]. Paris rejects none of this, though in book XIII he will take a different view, as we shall see. Now he consents to fight, and appeases Hector with a compliment. Pledges are made, heralds are summoned, the spectators gather, and the sacrifices are carried out. Then the arena is measured, and lots are drawn to determine who will first cast his spear. After the formality of the first two spear casts, the fighting is free and inventive until Paris begins to get the worst of it and Aphrodite spirits him away.

In book VII, we have a chance to observe a single combat that is not interrupted by a divinity. General fighting has already begun when Hector grasps his spear halfway along and forces back the Trojans, while Agamemnon immediately does the same with his own forces. Hector makes his challenge and is rewarded by silence. Finally Menelaus, who we remember has proved himself and seems thereby to have earned some privileges in the matter, stands up and denounces his fellows in terms of contempt. He calls them braggarts and ladies, rather than men, of Achaea, and

threatens them with the very depths of shame: *lobe ..essetai ainothen ainos* (97). Nestor contributes an exemplary tale, and their combined contempt brings out nine volunteers, of whom Ajax, who happens to be the best, is chosen by lot. Hector and Ajax exchange taunts in a formal manner, and without further arrangements they cast their spears in turn. It seems likely, though Homer does not say so, that the challenger was entitled to the first throw. Part of the description of the two spear casts repeat that already encountered. III 355-60, VII 249-54 are identical except for the first half of the first lines, and there are echoes of the first two lines in III 346-7. Fenik's comment[4] is worth noting at this point: "This kind of type scene is therefore a recurring combination of certain independently typical details. Most battle scenes in the *Iliad* belong in this category." These formalities over, the fighting again becomes free and inventive until the heralds call for a stop due to bad light. The participants consent, though Ajax insists on Hector's right as challenger to make the decision. They exchange gifts, and part.

Fighting in the general melee, though less formal, is not without its courtesies. Before the fighting actually starts, it is normal for the commander to rally his troops. In book IV, if Agamemnon finds his warriors looking keen, he compliments them and urges them to keep it up. If on the other hand he finds them hesitating, his attitude becomes quite offensive. He compares one group to timid deer - νεβροί (243) - and heaps ridicule on

Odysseus, who is waiting with Menestheus for action to come his way. Agamemnon calls Odysseus an expert in evil tricks with an eye open for profit, and accuses them both of cowardice, laziness, and self indulgence. Odysseus will have none of this and makes a spirited retort. He reminds Agamemnon who it is that he is speaking to, and ends: *su de taut' anemolia bazeis* (355). Unlike Paris in book III he does not consider either that the remarks are justified or that Agamemnon has the right to make them. We should note that Paris' elaborate compliment to Hector (III 59ff), which is not without parallel, made it quite clear that Hector had the right to speak in this way. Seth L Schein[5] has some difficulty at this point: "Even Paris' apparent acceptance of Hektor's reproaches is superficial...Paris' praise is in fact no praise...his lack of concern to honour the terms of the duel shows how little he cares for Hektor and the values for which he stands." This view fails to take into account the importance of this exchange to the relative standing of the brothers. There is no need to impute any irony to Paris at this point; it is in accordance with Homeric standards for him to respond as he does. However, when in book XIII Hector blames Paris for disasters not of his making and calls him the selection of names we have already heard, Paris resolutely rejects the charge and, as Homer notes, pacifies his brother (XIII 788): *parepeisen adelpheiou phrenas.*

In the present case, however, Agamemnon is put out of

countenance. With a smile - ἐπιμειδήσας (IV 356) - he takes back his words and removes himself from the scene. Homer takes care to explain his motive - *hos gno choomenoio* (357). Agamemnon's smile, and others like it, will receive further discussion in due course. No whit deterred, Agamemnon then proceeds to treat in the same way Diomedes, who is notable for his redoubtable efforts in battle. Agamemnon tells a story about Diomedes' father and compares the son unfavourably to the father - obvious and effective ridicule. Diomedes not only makes no retort but vigorously rebukes the impetuous Sthenelus, who protests on his behalf. He makes it clear that in his view Agamemnon has the right to speak as he wishes, since he bears the responsibility alike for the success or failure of the expedition (IV 412-18). To settle the matter, Diomedes makes a great terrifying leap from his chariot, so that his armour crashes about his chest. There is no doubt that ridiculing insults are an effective way to stir the blood; Diomedes' response is dramatic enough to make the point.

This incident is not forgotten; when Agamemnon in tears (IX 14) suggests that the expedition be abandoned, it is Diomedes (31ff) who speaks against the motion. He points out that he has the right to speak; it was he whom Agamemnon earlier called unwarlike and feeble. He says that everyone, young and old, knows it; this suggests not only that word of such things gets about but that this is now a matter of public humiliation. It seems that Agamemnon is prone to give offence in this manner. At

this point Nestor, who takes his own seniority and consequent status for granted, intervenes. He speaks in support of Diomedes and contrives to reinstate him at the same time. There is another such scene in book X when Agamemnon decides to send out a reconnaissance party. He goes to wake Nestor, but finds that the experienced old warrior has awakened at his approach (80-81). This puts Nestor in a position of advantage when he goes in his turn to wake Diomedes. He gives him a good kick in the ribs (158) and upbraids him for dozing off. Diomedes takes this in good part and compliments Nestor, even teasing him a little - "you are wicked, old friend ..you are impossible" (164-7).

If ridicule stirs the blood in a friend, what might it do to an enemy? One would imagine that it would be better to stir one's own blood than an enemy's, and this in fact seems to be the intention. First we should note that the formalities of confrontation can include courteous conversation, as in the charming interchange of family history, which incidentally renders confrontation out of the question, between Glaucus and Diomedes in book VI. More numerous, though, are the kind of exchanges that occur in book V between Sarpedon and Tlepolemus (627ff), and in book XX between Aeneas and Achilles. In the latter instance Aeneas cuts short the recriminations by remarking that there is no point in their screaming at each other like fishwives, since it is the fight that counts (251-5). Later on, Hector expresses equal impatience with the custom

(431ff) and suggests that Achilles stop trying to frighten him and get on with the fight. It is to be noted that in spite of these observations both these two make free use of contumely in battle. It seems that Homer has two concerns; to present the formalities of battle in a realistic way and at the same time to point up the individual qualities of his characters. The insults may be one-sided; in book VIII 145ff Nestor and Diomedes are about to make their escape from battle. There is no doubt that a firm friendship exists between them; at this critical moment, Nestor comforts Diomedes with the suggestion that he should not allow his fear of what Hector may say to prevent their escape. He points out that it does not matter what Hector says; no one will believe him, such is Diomedes' stature. Hector does indeed scream abuse as the pair retreat without offering a fight, so that Diomedes is sorely tempted to turn back and confront him. Hector screams abuse again in XIII 824, as he rushes to attack Ajax.

Ridicule appears to be a natural and acceptable way to express the joy of victory. In IV 148ff Agamemnon sees that Pandarus' arrow has struck his brother and his fears for his life are no stronger than the fear of failure and ridicule. Hohendahl-Zoetelief[6] shows an understanding of this: "Menelaus is aware that Agamemnon believes he is dying. He has a right to expect expression of concern from those about him, especially from his own brother. Yet it does not disturb him that Agamemnon's chief concern is not for him but for possible Trojan

ridicule". The author also notes that it is in fact in one's own interest to avoid ridicule. This is apparent in an episode in book XI. When Paris has shot Diomedes in the foot so as to pin it to the ground, he breaks into unrestrained laughter (378). Their conversation is worth quoting in full:

> "Paris, with a happy laugh, leapt out from his ambush and gloated over Diomedes. 'You are hit,' he cried; I did not shoot for nothing. I only wish I had hit you in the belly and shot you dead. Then the Trojans, who quake before you like bleating goats before a lion, would have had some respite from this blight.'
>
> Unperturbed, the mighty Diomedes answered him: 'Bowman and braggart, with your pretty lovelocks and your glad eye for the girls; if you faced me man to man with real weapons, you would find your bow and quiverful a poor defence; as it is, you flatter yourself. All you have done is to scratch the sole of my foot. And for that I care no more than if a woman or a naughty boy had hit me. A shot from a coward and milksop does no harm. But my weapons have a better edge. One touch from them, and a man is dead, his wife has lacerated cheeks, and his children have no father; the earth turns red with his blood, and there he rots, with fewer girls than vultures at his side.'"

(XI 378-395)

It is to be noticed that, although Diomedes is fluent and contemptuous in reply, Paris' laughter, like the arrow, seems to have hit the mark; pain racks Diomedes' flesh (398) and he leaves the battle field in chagrin (*echtheto gar ker* 400). In book XIV, Polydamas gloats over the remains of Prothoenor (453-457) and Penelaos shouts with excitement as he brandishes the head of Iliones, spitted through an eye (499-500). In book XVI, Patroclus reproves Meriones for wasting time exchanging insults with Aeneas (627ff), but makes no attempt to restrain his delight when he knocks out Cebriones' eyes (745-50). There is evidently no disgrace in expressing joyous triumph honourably won. On this subject Emily Vermeule[7]: " The hero who moves with mixed confidence and weakness through such scenes had a long training - from boyhood, Odysseus says, and part of the hero's training was in techniques to shake the enemy's self confidence...An infusion of anger was needed at the critical moment, and formal taunting mockery of the opponent to lower his self esteem at the moment he might hurt you." Leonard Woodbury[6] on the other hand: "Heroibus enim hostes devictos immaniter inridentibus nullo modo risus decorus esse potest." Woodbury suggests that only Paris laughs, but the other heroes utter *convicia*. It is true that of all the instances of contumely in battle, only XI 378ff, referring to Paris, and XXI 408ff, referring to Athena, actually contain the term γελάω. This does not, however, exclude the other examples; it merely renders Paris' mockery more effective, as is shown by Diomedes' reaction.

The concept that emerges from all these formalities is that of laughter. This laughter may be expressed by the verbs μειδάω or γελάω, and the more aggressive the laughter, the more likely it is to be expressed by γελάω. It is most aggressive, and presented as such, when one laughs in another's face. In such confrontations, the preposition ἐπί is commonly used, with the adverbial ἡδύ to express the pleasure derived from that laughter. This kind of ridicule need not only take place between mortals; it is possible, and appears to be acceptable, among gods. Athena and Ares provide an example in book XXI 403ff. Athena clouts Ares with a rock. Ares' humiliation is quite literal; he measures his length on the ground, his hair trails in the dust, and his armour, as seems to happen in every ignominious tumble, clatters upon him. Homer uses a unique expression, a variation of the usual formula, to distinguish this sound:

τευχέα τ' ἀμφαράβησε

from, for instance, the splendid and alarming crash:

δεινὸν δ' ἔβραχε χαλκός

that Diomedes makes when he leaps from his chariot in IV (420). Athena, seeing Ares' discomfiture, expresses her satisfaction by openly laughing in his face and addressing him in terms of contempt (408ff). Zeus laughs in delight (XXI 388) when he sits at his ease and watches the gods sally forth into battle. The

scholiast (T) compares with this Menander fr. 784 (Koe):

> ...but I didn't mention there was quarrelling inside among his household, a most useful thing.

and Hom. viii 78:

χαῖρε νόῳ, ὅτ' ἄριστοι Ἀχαιῶν δηριόωντο

suggesting that the principle of divide and rule is invoked here. There is no doubt that the gods have forgotten everything except their resentment of one another, and Zeus, who sees it all, laughs in sheer glee.

To pass from gods to mortals, there is some less aggressive laughter in book XXIII. After falling in the manure and losing the footrace in honour of Patroclus, Ajax acknowledges his defeat and Odysseus' god-given superiority (782). The Greeks laugh in pleasure at his unlucky defeat (784). Only Antilochus, who came last and therefore can afford to offer some sympathy, has anything to say on his behalf (785-792). Later, when Epeios makes a bad throw, all the troops laugh scornfully at him, and we note the aggressive ἔπι' (840). The scholiast (Ta') solemnly concludes that something must have been amiss with his style. Hewitt[3] finds this laughter difficult to understand: "Homeric laughter has other characteristics than heartiness and boisterousness and unquenchability...Neither *Iliad* nor *Odyssey* contain much of what we might call healthy, happy

laughter. The sinister elements predominate heavily...all the more spontaneous and better justified is the laughter if his misfortune could have been avoided by some ordinary foresight...I am becoming convinced, further, that the ancient Greek found something essentially comic in the athletic contest." H W Clark[10] fares little better: "In the case of Ajax, with the manure in his mouth, we must remind ourselves that the Greeks, unburdened by our hypocrisies, believed that it does not matter how one plays the game, it is whether he wins that really counts. But unless we make these massive adjustments in our responses, we shall probably not break out, certainly not spontaneously, with the same kind of 'happy laughter' that convulsed the Achaeans." It is important to understand that this laughter is described as though it were acceptable, even expected. There is no suggestion that it is at all out of place; it seems that ridicule has its place in the accepted norms of behaviour as Homer sees them, and is not necessarily offensive.

Not only does laughter have its place, but there are times when it is deliberately incurred. In the well-known scene in book I, Hera has attempted to confront Zeus and has been humiliated; the cloud-gatherer, as he is usually called when in this mood[11], has asserted his power. It seems inappropriate to consider this entirely as a comical domestic scene as does for example C R Beye[12]. Both Zeus and Hera possess real power and this, more than sex, is the basis of their conflict. When it comes to a confrontation between gods, sex is not always a factor, as

can be seen when Athena lays Ares low (XXI 405ff), helps Diomedes wound him (V 856), and twice subdues him by taking him and forcibly seating him on his chair (V 36, XV 121-42). In this instance Hera has been commpelled in fear and trembling to submit. As she does so, however, she smiles, because her son not only acts as peace-maker but reminds her of his own far greater humiliation at the hands of the Cloud-gatherer. Hephaestus then staggers up and down the hall playing the unlikely role of cup-bearer, puffing and blowing as he goes. Hera smiles, the tension is broken, and the assembly relieves its anxiety in a burst of laughter, γέλως ἄσβεστος, the unquenchable laughter that has always been called the laughter of the gods, even by those who have been puzzled by it. Hewitt, for example, suggests[13], "Especially typical of Homer is the mirth caused by physical deformity...It is intensely Greek...but such laughter is often cruel and gives intense pain to the unlucky object of the mirth." Not only is this in my view a mistaken assessment of this laughter, but it is questionable whether such mirth is "typical of Homer". Surprisingly, nearly sixty years later, Kirk in his commentary[14] makes the same assumption as Hewitt. The same phrase describes the laughter of the suitors in Od. xx 346, but with similar overtones; Vermeule, for instance[15] remarks that "Such laughter, the ἄσβεστος γέλως when it issues from mortal mouths, as from Penelope's suitors while the courtyard in Ithaka fills with ghosts, is regarded as insanity because the intelligence which ought to control the laughter has been knocked crooked." This remark of Vermeule's

will be noted again in another context; for the moment I will only add Woodbury's comment[16]: "...quo tamen risu homines mortales semel di adfecerunt"; indicating that this laughter is a divine prerogative.

The point to be noted about this laughter is that it is invited. Hephaestus makes a deliberate gesture in order to distract attention from Hera and thus reduce the extent of her humiliation. He takes upon himself the role of buffoon. Enid Welsford[17] refers to the buffoon type as having "little conscience and no shame...The buffoon...resembles other comic fools in that he earns his living by an openly acknowledged failure to attain to the normal standard of human dignity." Welsford perceives and explains a connection between the buffoon and the scapegoat; certainly this episode (which Welsford does not mention) appears to lend support to the notion, but there are differences in Homer's approach. Hephaestus is by no means devoid of conscience or shame, but chooses to sacrifice his dignity for a particular purpose.

This incident has a parallel in human affairs, which accords more closely with Welsford's idea. In book II Thersites has decided to make trouble. He capitalises on his unattractive appearance in order to draw laughter at the expense of his superiors. Like Hephaestus, he volunteers for the role of buffoon, but because he is a mortal Homer can derive more ridicule from his manner and appearance. At the moment when the

troops are on the brink of mutiny he shrills abuse at Agamemnon and suggests that they all go home. Odysseus makes the most of his opportunity and thoroughly humiliates him. Angry though they are, the troops enjoy his discomfiture (II 270)

οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν.

This is aggressive laughter; the troops feel that they can enjoy Odysseus' approval in the light of his treatment of Thersites. Once more, the tension is broken, and the danger is past. The only question is what Thersites is actually trying to do. Homer is at some pains to describe his behaviour, but is sparing in his description of the incident itself. Certain implications seem to be taken for granted, with the result that a variety of attempts have been made to explain the passage. Rankin[18], for instance, says, "Their mirth is not entirely unmixed...the laughter is 'displacement' and the *Iliad*'s crowd psychology is nice at this point". E R Lowry[19] suggests that Thersites is not the ugliest but the most shame-causing man in the Greek army. This shame "is created when a person's status is diminished by others' laughter at his person or at his actions". K J Latham[20] says that Thersites "contradicts the theme of the entire epic and this error discredits him...the error strikes a note of irony immediately transformed to the cruel laughter of the warriors at Thersites' punishment". The first two have difficulty with the phrase ἀχνύμενοί περ, and the third suggests that Homer includes in his narrative his own commentary on that narrative - a complicated approach. Eustathius, on the other hand, sees in the laughter a distinction between what

Thersites and the troops take seriously. This makes sense as long as it is understood that what a buffoon takes seriously must vary from one occasion to another. At all events, if Thersites is not acting as a peacemaker, he seems a dangerous man to tolerate around the place, and it is all the more to Odysseus' credit that he deals with him as he does. I am inclined to think that he is indeed a buffoon, a γελωτοποιός of the kind that we find in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* or wearing cap and bells in more recent times, but that his buffoonery, in calculated contrast to that of Hephaestus, is singularly ill-judged. In the case of Hephaestus, the phrase "comic relief" is entirely apt, and Eustathius himself notes that ἄσβεστος implies a relief of tension.

Zeus' laughter in XXI 389 bears out the notion that laughter at another is a privilege that must be earned. Zeus, secure in his power, laughs with delight to see the gods abandon restraint and make earth and heaven ring with their contest. As the gods cannot die, there is no more terror in this encounter than in that between Ares and Aphrodite. Zeus' laughter on Olympus is repeated in Βατραχομυομαχία 172, as he takes pleasure in the entirely foolish war between the frogs and the mice.

It should be noted that in the Homeric epics the gods laugh at each other but never at mortals or any other living creature. This is entirely to be expected, as for Homer the superiority of gods to mortals is never in question. The nearest Homer comes to

expressing such a notion is ἄνδράσι τερπόμενοι (VII 61) referring to Apollo and Athena as they prepare to watch Hector and Ajax fight in single combat. This phrase, however, expresses nothing more than the pleasure the gods derive from observing the courage and strength of men, qualities that are all the more admirable because they are maintained in the face of untimely death or feeble old age. The poignancy of the plight of mortals, and the sorrow of the gods as they behold it, are Homeric themes so familiar that they need no elaboration here, save to emphasise that Homer's gods find nothing laughable in mankind. At the beginning of book IV they certainly sit at their ease and toast one another as they look down at the fighting, but there is no suggestion that they are merely amusing themselves. The passionate nature of their concern for the combatants is sufficient indication that they take the war very seriously indeed.

Jasper Griffin[21] says of this passsage and XXI 389: "This mirth proceeds from a delighted sense of one's own superiority; at ease oneself, one enjoys the spectacle of others struggling or humiliated for one's own pleasure...We have quoted the beginning of *Iliad* IV; the gods drinking toasts to each other from golden cups and gazing at the city of Troy. On this scene one comment reads: 'People say it is unseemly that the spectacle of war should delight the gods.' Rather touchingly, its author has a solution to offer to the difficulty: 'It is brave actions which delight them.'" Griffin is discussing the grief of the

ancient commentator (T in 4.4) as he contemplates such laughter, but neither seems to realise that this passage and XXI 389 refer to quite separate pleasures. In the latter Zeus is laughing at the other gods and Griffin's observations are quite appropriate, but the former does not even contain the word γελάω, or any other expression of mockery. A god laughs at mankind for the first time in Hesiod, *Op.* 47-59, when Zeus, thwarted by Prometheus, plans his revenge and cackles in triumph, as West[22] notes. This is vindictive glee, which constitutes a significant departure from the notion of the gods that appears in the Homeric epics.

In the *Odyssey*, another picture appears. All the examples of aggressive laughter refer to the suitors except four. The most notable may be dealt with first.

In viii 307, Hephaestus brings ridicule on Ares and Aphrodite. He not only makes sure that their adultery has witnesses; he invites the gods to vindicate him by laughing at his victims. Aphrodite has humiliated him by bedding, as he says, with a more attractive lover who is not lame (310-11). His only recourse is to humiliate the lovers in return. This is why ἔργα γέλαστα is more acceptable than ἔργ' ἀγέλαστα in 307. Hewitt[23] shows his misunderstanding of the passage when he suggests: "What Hephaestus thought of the matter is not so clear. In the manuscript reading he recognises the ridiculousness of the situation, which he describes as

ἔργα γέλαστα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικτά.

An easy emendation detaches the α from ἔργα and negatives the first adjective into ἀγέλαστα. In the former case he would be thinking of the effect of the incident on the other gods, in the latter, he would be emphasising the patent fact that for him it was no laughing matter." Eustathius, however, notes that γέλαστα is correct, and it should be noted that the gods must come and laugh at the lovers in order to restore Hephaestus' self-esteem. They are quick to oblige (326), though Homer stresses that this is not an occasion for the ladies to be present, and the line describing their glee is identical to I 599, where the gods

laugh at Hephaestus. Hermes and Apollo indulge in further wit at his victims' expense, and the laughter breaks out anew (343). Poseidon, however, will not join in (344). He will not humiliate Ares by taking pleasure in his predicament, which seems to be in keeping with his general behaviour as in XX 133-5. Instead he offers recompense on his behalf; the lovers are freed, and Aphrodite, given her customary epithet despite the context[24], returns to her haunts.

The next example of aggressive laughter concerns Odysseus who, in one of his moments of thoughtlessness, laughs at Polyphemus in triumph and delight (ix 413). He follows this by refusing Polyphemus' offer of a prayer to Poseidon for safe passage home. In both instances his attitude is treated as highly offensive, confirming Poseidon in his resentment and entirely justifying his subsequent treatment of Odysseus. In the light of what we have found in the *Iliad*, it is hard to see Odysseus' crime; but further study of laughter in the *Odyssey* will show that there are times when it is certainly not acceptable. Overlooking the significance of Odysseus' laughter, Stanford[25] remarks:"Odysseus is unusually boastful in this incident, ..presumably because it was the greatest triumph of his skill over tremendous physical force." Bradley offers a more useful comment[26]: "What more natural point of departure for our own quest than the fateful encounter with Polyphemus; on the basis of both the testimony of the poem and our own arguments this episode leads directly into Odysseus' nightmare of

suffering. More precisely we must look to the final exchange between the parting hero and the raging giant, for herein is fixed an example of that kind of proleptic signal which Homer employs so effectively to focus our attention upon, and determine our reaction to, significant events ..The fatal step ..is marked by Odysseus' final boast (523-525). Herein we encounter a distinctive Homeric formula for *hybris*. Hereby Odysseus condemns himself to the dire prayer of Polyphemus, the hostility of Poseidon, and his own grievous atonement."

The other two examples of this laughter refer to the maidservants in Odysseus' home. By collaborating with the suitors, giggling and exchanging knowing looks (xviii 320, xx 8), they join in their attitude and behaviour.

Every other example of ridiculing laughter in the *Odyssey* describes the behaviour of the suitors. The very first example concerns Antinous' reaction to Telemachus' first attempt to assert himself. He is not taunting Telemachus so much as belittling him in the hope of retaining his own ascendancy. He comes up to him ἰθὺς γελάσας, laughing in his face, treating him not with familiarity but with contempt. Lattimore translates[27], "Smiling, he came right up to him" (ii 301). I feel this does not do justice to the situation here implied. Stanford[28] does better: "..not in friendship but more the patronising laugh of an adult towards a naughty child, in keeping with the tone of his words". Eustathius notes that this

laughter is ἄκαιρον γελάω is not used again in this sense until the Polyphemus episode already discussed, and then not again until its repeated use in xviii and xx, and the last occurrence in xxi.

When Odysseus takes up the position of a mendicant in his own household, he is not simply assuming an unlikely disguise. He is making himself vulnerable to the suitors, open to ridicule, in order to test their characters to the limit. This, after all, is no greater test than has already been imposed upon him in the course of his wanderings. As can quickly be seen, the suitors fall into the trap. When a quarrel breaks out between Odysseus and Irus, who does not fancy anyone trespassing on his patch, the suitors seize upon the incident in order to amuse themselves. They thoroughly enjoy feeling superior to the beggars; it is a measure of their folly that they fail to see the important difference between Odysseus and Irus: Odysseus is impervious to their ridicule whereas Irus is not. He is full of courage when the suitors laugh (xviii40) at the prospect of the unknown old beggar receiving a drubbing, but when they show signs of supporting Odysseus:

οἵην ἐκ βακέων ὁ γέρων ἐπιγουνίδα φαίνει.

That was what they said, and Irus' heart sank (xviii 75).

...ὑπὸ τρόμος ἔλλαβε γυῖα

Having betrayed his fear (77), Irus becomes the victim before a blow is struck, and is further demoralised (88-9) by Antinous' awful threats. In no time, he lies in the dust[25] and the

suitors laugh till they can laugh no more (100). Odysseus is no more impressed by their laughter than before, when he and not Irus was its butt. He removes Irus, returns, and sits down while the suitors are still laughing (100-11). He takes notice only of the favourable omen that Antinous unconsciously utters (117).

It can be seen that the poet means by the suitors' laughter here something quite different from what is meant in *Iliad* XXIII 784. In the latter passage the poet clearly implies that the Greeks are entitled to laugh at Ajax's mishap, but the inappropriate laughter of the suitors is equally clearly a sign that their behaviour is unacceptable. The poet's method here marks a significant departure from the approach found in the *Iliad*.

As the story proceeds, the suitors become more deluded and offensive. There is to be no escape for them. It is interesting that every important decision or change of mood is ascribed to the contrivance of Athena, as though the motivating force she personifies is the thread of purpose that runs through the story[36]. Now she makes sure that the suitors maintain their attitude and that there is no chance that Odysseus will forget his vengeful anger (xviii 346-8). In this mood, Eurymachus breaks into offensive laughter and encourages his peers to mock Odysseus. This is grossly insulting and in no way mitigated by the fact that he has no idea that he is addressing his host. The folly of the suitors is very similar to the folly of Euripides'

Pentheus, whose failure to recognise the god only compounds the felony (Eur. *Bacch.* 491ff), and whom indeed the god calls:

...the one who pokes fun at you, me, and our ceremonies (ibid. 1081).

Athena moves the suitors to laughter again in xx 346. One can see by now how they have degenerated; they laugh in mindless complacency - παρέπλαγξεν δὲ νόημα - at Telemachus' expense. Athena causes their minds to wander; they grin among themselves but fail to find reassurance in that or in their freshly killed meal. The grin is expressed by the phrase: γελώων..γναθμοῖσι (xx 347); it is an empty grin, like the smile Hera wears under her angry eyebrows in XV 102-3. Theoclymenes alone expresses their despondency (xx 351-357), whereupon they shake off this mood and the effect of his words by breakng into aggressive laughter (xx 358) - *pantes ep' auto hedy gelassan.*

In no time at all, exchanging glances to encourage one another, they deliberately provoke Telemachus, laughing ἐπὶ ξείνοις (373). Theoclymenes, meanwhile, has left, summing up their attitude: *aneras hybrizontes atasthala mechanaasthe* (370). The suitors' ignorance and folly, however, know no bounds; they continue their laughter and feasting while the trap closes around them. They laugh only once more; in xxi 376-8 Telemachus has just spoken in open hostility, but by now they are so sure

of themselves that they laugh him down, and cannot take him seriously enough to be indignant or alarmed. Odysseus receives the bow, and the suitors' fate is sealed.

It is clear that aggressive laughter is one aspect of the suitors' behaviour that should not be overlooked[31]. In books xviii and xx, their fate is approaching fast. Carried away by their folly, they lose all understanding of their situation and express nothing but mindless contempt and ridicule. Antinous (Witless?) in particular continually laughs and sneers in his bid to maintain his ascendancy in Odysseus' house. At the beginning of the tale there is no doubt that he has this ascendancy; since it is by no means his right, the only way he can maintain his position is by bringing psychological pressure to bear on Penelope, Telemachus, and other members of Odysseus' household. Among the other suitors his position is in no doubt; he is their acknowledged leader by virtue of his wealth, nobility and achievements. Even Odysseus pays him tribute; in any other context he would conform to the image of the Homeric hero. In Odysseus' house, however, he can only maintain his position by making those to whom he should defer feel at a disadvantage. All the suitors are implicated in his contemptuous behaviour and it is this which seals their fate. The sum of their wrongdoing lies in taking up a false position and maintaining it by deeply offensive means.

When it comes to the question of smiling, it should first be noted that there are contexts in which γελάω can convey the same meaning as the term μειδάω. In the scene that depicts Hector and his family, laughing and smiling express the same mood (*Iliad* VI 404,484). In the first instance Hector smiles at his son without speaking: μείδησεν .. σιωπῇ and in the second Andromache smiles through her tears: δακρυόεν γελάσασα.

Hector's smile of love and pride has its parallels; Achilles smiles with love and pleasure on Antilochus (XXIII 555) just as Odysseus smiles upon his circumspect wife (xxiii 111), and Zeus chuckles affectionately over Artemis: ἡδὺ γελασσας when she flees to his lap (XXI 508). The description of Zeus' gentle demeanour, and the absence of the preposition ἐπί, show that this is not aggressive laughter. It has the same quality as Odysseus' smile when the unhappy Medon crawls out from beneath the ox hide (xxii 371). This smile conveys amusement as much as reassurance; it is similar to Athena's smile as she pats Odysseus and praises him as one accomplished liar to another (xiii 287). In the latter instance, Eustathius seems to feel that Athena is showing signs of aggression towards Odysseus, perhaps because he has misunderstood her gesture (but see VI 485). Her words, however, make it clear that she enjoys the bent for trickery that they share.

Odysseus' smile in xxii 371 is expressed: *ton d' epimeidesas prosephe polymetis Odysseus*. This is an expression that is

repeated four times; another expression: *Hos phato; meidesen (de)* is more common, being repeated three times in the *Iliad* and five in the *Odyssey*. Other expressions of smiling are more flexible, as are those concerning laughter[32]; there are four instances of *..ep' auto hedy gelassan*, the only numerous occurrence. It is to be noted that all these expressions of smiling occur in conversation and preface a response of some kind. They are, however, greatly outnumbered by such convenient expressions as *ton d' emeibet' epeita, ton kai phonesas prosephe* or *ton d'aute proseeipen*. Clearly, variety is not the problem. It appears possible, then, to assume that the poet had a purpose of his own when he included these smiles in conversations.

μειδάω becomes most interesting from the point of view of this study when it signifies a smile that is either itself hidden or has a hidden meaning. It may be shared, as is the smile that passes between Odysseus and Telemachus as they keep their secret from Eumaeus (xvi 476). It can be a smile of appeasement, or it can be highly ominous. These smiles are equally interesting whether or not they appear in a repeated form.

In XV 101, γελάω seems to be the equivalent of μειδάω. Hera has lost a confrontation with Zeus, but she swallows her anger and humiliation and smiles to appease Zeus. She successfully arranges a smile, or perhaps a grin, upon her lips: *he de gelasse cheilesin* : but she cannot control her frown: *oude*

metopon ep' ophrusi kyaneesin ianthe (102-3). It is interesting to observe the manner in which Hera deals with her feelings of humiliation. She moves straight in to the attack, reminds the other gods that they are all feeble compared with Zeus, and proceeds to provoke Ares to useless anger. Athena in her turn forcibly subdues Ares, and while all this is going on (121-142) Zeus sits upon Mount Gargarus wrapped in a purple cloud, the picture of unruffled serenity.

In the episode from *Iliad* IV already alluded to, Agamemnon's behaviour (356-7) reflects that of the gods. When Odysseus objects strongly to his attitude, he perceives the necessity to give ground. His smile shows his willingness to defer to Odysseus in the matter; Eustathius notes that the king must appease: "This is what, in Homer's method, *gelos* also achieves in other contexts."

It is to be noted that the preposition ἐπί does not necessarily imply aggression in the case of μειδάω, though different qualities appear in each of the other three examples of ἐπιμειδάω. In xxii 371, despite his power over Medon, Odysseus smiles only in reassurance and amusement. In VIII 38, Zeus has just issued a terrifying ultimatum to the gods. There is obviously no chance of any of them getting the better of him, and Athena expresses their feelings in a capitulatory speech (31ff). Zeus, appropriately designated, νεφεληγερέτα smiles patronisingly and hastens to reassure his daughter. The last

example of ἐπιμειδάν appears in X 400. Dolon is pleading in terror: *hypo d'etreme guia* for his life. Odysseus listens, and then smiles. It is not a reassuring smile; as Eustathius says: *kata baryteta ethous*. It is, however, sufficiently ambivalent to lull Dolon's suspicions as well as ours and ensure that Dolon's death comes as suddenly for us as it does for him. These four examples show smiles that range from reassuring through patronising to ominous. All these qualities appear in other smiles.

A more rueful smile is shown in XXIII 786, as Antilochus accepts last place in the footrace and smiles to take any edge off his words. He must speak carefully, as the Achaeans are still laughing at Ajax's mishap, and he wishes to pay Odysseus a compliment without casting any slur on this laughter. It is evident that Antilochus has a knack for appeasement; earlier he won the chariot race by a foul and thoroughly humiliated Menelaus in the process. In this passage (XXIII 566ff), Menelaus is bitterly angry and challenges Antilochus to deny the foul. Antilochus' answer is an essay in self abnegation and tact; he finishes by giving up his prize and offering anything he possesses in recompense. Now it is Menelaus who is challenged, and he rises to the occasion. The prize is now his to bestow on Antilochus; this he does, thus winning the contest both in horsemanship and magnanimity.

Hohendahl-Zoetelief[33] remarks that here Menelaus has failed in

good manners by rejecting Antilochus' overture. The point surely must be that an order of precedence must be established in all respects. Menelaus is not refusing Antilochus' gift; he has accepted it and now bestows it ἐμήν περ ἐοῦσαν (XXIII 610). These words would be very bad manners indeed if this were not the case.

There is a private smile that can only be described as ominous. In IV 6ff Zeus could not resist taunting Hera and Athena; now Athena cautiously answers him back: She teases him about the absurdity of Aphrodite going to war; he only smiles in reply (V 426) before addressing Aphrodite. He knows he has the ascendancy; later on, when Hera and Athena decide to sally forth into battle, they first ask permission (V 755ff) of Zeus. The smile in V 426 is a most complacent smile; it is similar to that in VIII 38.

In XIV 223, Homer repeats the verb μείδησεν ..μειδήσασα as he describes Hera tucking Aphrodite's girdle into her bosom, already enjoying the prospect of revenge. This is a secret smile; Hera has been waiting for this moment. Inevitably, however, she must face Zeus' wrath and, shuddering, - ῥίγησεν - she capitulates. Once more comes the complacent smile from the father of men and gods (XV 34-47). Calypso, enjoying her power, smiles in rather the same way when Odysseus, fearing that she may not keep her word to let him go, shudders like Hera (v 170). She pats him, like Athena in xiii 28, and compliments him on his

trusting nature.

Homer shows a delicate touch in xviii 163, when Athena decides to tease the suitors a little. She encourages Penelope to show herself to them. We can see that Penelope is doubtful about such a gesture when she smiles ἀχρεῖον , meaninglessly, to reassure Eurynome. She is clearly anxious not to be misunderstood by any member of her own household. She is, as she should be, obedient to the goddess, but her anxious smile reassures us of her modesty.

There are smiles of which the import is both ominous and obvious. Ajax smiles in ferocious joy and anticipation as he goes out to fight Hector (VII 212), and Hera smiles as she boxes Artemis' ears with her own arrows (XXI491). These smiles need no explanation by the poet; still less do the most alarming smiles of all, though the second is strictly for the benefit of the reader. The first is Odysseus' smile to Dolon already described, and the second is another smile by Odysseus. In xx 301 Ctesippus hurls an ox's foot at the old beggar, Odysseus. Odysseus ducks his head and smiles to himself: *sardonion mala toion.*

The great emphasis of this description ensures that we do not miss the point - Odysseus will by no means forget Ctesippus. These two examples show to what an extent this poetry was composed for its audience, and what an eye the poet had for interaction between people. The characterisation is dramatic and

visual; we are allowed to see the expression on the face of a character and draw our own conclusions. As in the case of Dolon, we may not be right; or as in the case of Hector and Andromache, we may understand immediately, and be intimately involved in the situation. This is narrative at its best, bringing to bear on the task in hand not only eloquence in argument but the power to create an image through words.

Smiles and laughter in Homer say a great deal about what characters are feeling within themselves as well as about one another. It is to be noted that ridicule has its place in social behaviour, so much so that the right to ridicule another must be earned, and furthermore acknowledged by the one ridiculed. Thus Diomedes acknowledges his leader's right to abuse him, but Achilles and Odysseus, who count themselves at least as Agamemnon's equals, do not.

Just what makes one laugh, and how it is related to the processes of maintaining or attacking self-esteem, seems to have been as interesting a question to Homer as it is to us now. He has depicted the outburst that comes from the release of tension, and shown that this possibility can be deliberately exploited. He has noticed that one may laugh or smile whether one is ill at ease or thoroughly at ease in any given situation, and that the right to indulge in ridicule must be established, sometimes with great difficulty, between individuals. An interesting study by de Romilly[34] shows that the Homeric

character is more explosive in temperament than, for instance, the tragic character. She notes that there are far more instances of anger, freely vented in word or deed, in the Homeric style than of the brooding hatred so often found in tragedy. "Par conséquent, le vocabulaire de la haine ne renvoie practiquement jamais à ce que nous appellerions de ce nom ..pourtant, *l'Iliade* n'a rien d'un poème serein mettant en scene des âmes tendres ..même entre chefs d'un même camp, on en vient pour un rien aux plus ardents conflits. N'est-ce point de la haine? Selon Homere, c'est de la colère." Homer's characters jostle openly for physical or moral supremacy, and when it is achieved they make no attempt to conceal their satisfaction. Those who have most cause for such satisfaction are, of course, the gods, and Zeus inevitably has the last laugh.

Woodbury[35] notes the complaints of the ancient commentators concerning the gods as depicted in the Homeric epics, and observes that it might be more fruitful to examine the reason for such portrayal rather than to deplore it - "non indignandum sed quaerendum..". He goes on to observe that the gods reflect the social attitudes in "illo saeclo". He points up the problems inherent in this view, noting in particular that the gods are often inferior to the heroes in their conduct, but that the heroes show genuine piety toward them. He also notes the view, with reference to Harrison and Nilsson, that the confusing portrayal of the gods may reflect changes in religious practice and attitudes.

These problems are reduced if laughter is treated as an earned privilege rather than bad behaviour. Achilles had the right to humiliate the Greeks as he did because he had proved that he was a peerless warrior in his own right. Every overture made to him in the course of the poem is made in the knowledge that no social strictures can be brought to bear on him; he will simply accept the overtures or not, as he chooses. Roberts[36] notes this imperviousness to social pressure and calls Achilles a "magnificent barbarian"; I think, however, that Achilles is not an alien of any kind; he simply has no equal. Adkins[37] discusses "the sanction employed by Homeric society to ensure that its *agathoi* display *arete*". He also remarks that "the *agathos* ..has himself the strongest of claims against society". Although he is speaking of Agamemnon and the consequences of his mistake, this applies equally well to Achilles' insistence on the treatment due to him. In the same way, the gods are free from the ordinary strictures that affect mankind. In the absence of the fear of death their contests for status and supremacy are waged in grim earnest. Their behaviour certainly reflects that of the heroes toward one another, but there is at once so much more and so much less at stake. It is beyond question who has the ascendancy over whom on Olympus, and in the light of immortality the gods can bring to bear on one another nothing more effective than ridicule. As Vermeule [38] observes: "The gods are insecure because they fear the future, which is long; they are afraid of being exiled from their social

group, of being lonely or hurt; of being mocked and taunted; they are in bondage to unfulfilled wishes and to lack of self-discipline." This, as I mentioned before, is why the gods do not laugh at mankind, and why the heroes appear more godlike than the gods. As Woodbury remarks: "Deinde, in societate quae in carminibus Homericis descripta est heroa saepe rideri non licuit ita ut hominum vitia atque res turpiculas deis tribui opus esset."

Life for mortals is a serious matter; for immortals it is not.

Daniel Levine[40] has made a useful study of the suitors' laughter in the *Odyssey*. He makes frequent reference to Woodbury's dissertation, and I find that I concur with a number of his objections. We have noted earlier in this chapter that Woodbury, on the basis that Paris is the only warrior to whom laughter is explicitly ascribed in battle, considers that laughter is permissible for the gods, but men must indulge sparingly and with caution. Levine finds as I do that laughter is acceptable so long as whoever is laughing has established his right to do so. This is why the laughter of the suitors is such an indictment; they have not shown that they are entitled to it.

In the case of the suitors, Levine makes the valuable point that "The poet uses laughter and smiling thematically to express knowledge and ignorance" (p 16). That is to say, as has been noted, the mention of laughter is part of the narrative method of the poet. Levine goes on to say that "laughter generally implies a real or imagined physical or moral superiority over another person" (p 18). In support of this notion he cites the observations of Hobbes, Bergson, Freud, Koestler, Rapp, and Leacock. He continues: "the suitors laugh in contexts where the poet contrasts their notions of security with the reality of their imminent demise" (p 22-3). Levine then makes a distinction which I do not think exists, and provides a contrast with the views of Hooker[41]. Levine finds that the suitors' laughter is purely derisive (p 24), showing *ate* rather than *hybris*, and suggests that "The poet does not use laughter moralistically; he

uses it thematically" (p 27). By contrast, Hooker finds that the frequently used term *atasthalos* "conveys the reproach" and that it is possible to regard the term *hybris* as morally colourless. I will have more to say concerning the latter statement in a subsequent chapter, and would only say of Levine's statement that the laughter of the suitors has two functions; to indicate thematically their ignorance of their situation and to justify in moral terms their untimely end.

Levine correctly notes that the suitors never smile; he wishes here to make a distinction, at least in thematic usage, between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but it seems to me to be equally true of both poems that "a smile is a true reflection of a character's position" (p 36). We may consider among the instances cited Odysseus' smile as Dolon begs for mercy, or as Ctesippus hurls the ox's foot. It is not smiling that is so different in the two poems, but the particular implications of laughter for the plot of the *Odyssey*. Homer takes advantage of the general implications in order to maintain the splendid irony of the suitors' situation. As Woodbury says (p 54) "in procorum risibus est indicium et caecitatis ipsorum et dementiae quae a deis iniecta est antequam perderentur". We have seen that γελάω can mean the same as μειδάω, and that the latter term carries many possibilities of intent. It is quite true that "the formula *cheiri te min katerexen* is never used with a smile in the *Iliad* but occurs exclusively with affectionate smiles in the *Odyssey*" (Levine p 33); however, it is not a satisfactory

procedure to separate usage from context[42]. Hector, for example, in the *Iliad* clearly caresses Andromache in a context of smiles and affection. In general, smiles and laughter are understood in the same way in both poems; what is different about the *Odyssey* is the sophisticated use to which its author puts this understanding.

Levine surveys the characters in the *Odyssey* to show that as each new piece of information is given to the audience, someone laughs to remind us of his ignorance. For example, Antinous laughs against the background of Athena's plan and Telemachus' first adult decision (ii 301), and Amphinomus laughs against the background of Telemachus' secret return and the reunion of father and son (xvi 354). Hewitt[43] sees this laugh as "puzzling" and suggests that Amphinomus has an interest in saving Telemachus' life. This is not what Homer says; the fact of the matter is that Telemachus has returned safely from his journey so unexpectedly that the suitors are not only taken by surprise but are at a loss because some of them are missing. Naturally, Amphinomus laughs with relief when he sees the missing suitors sail into the harbour. By contrast Telemachus' smile is one of knowledge; and Levine amusingly notes that "Argus comes as close to smiling as a dog can get" (p 129).

The last point to which I wish to refer is more complicated. Levine wishes to see collusion between Odysseus, Penelope, and Telemachus in book xxi. The difficulties in the narrative are

well summarised in the work of Page, Kirk, Fenik and others[44] and Levine adds his suggestions concerning the laughter of Penelope and Telemachus. Page objects to the unrealistic aspects of the narrative, mentioning in particular Odysseus' insistence on having his feet washed by an old family retainer, his apparently cruel treatment of his father, and Amphimedon's story (xxiv 167-9) that there was collusion between the king and queen in the archery contest. Kirk argues persuasively for a combination of different threads of narrative, while Fenik, particularly in the matter of Penelope's announcement of the archery contest and subsequent insistence that the tattered stranger be allowed to try, has some equally valuable points to offer on the subject of the poet's method of creating interest and suspense by delaying recognition. As Fenik himself points out (p 46), we have only to turn to Greek tragedy to see that this was an established and an enduring technique: "Another elementary consideration: irony demands that the audience know something the fictional characters do not; we can see, but they are blind. To argue that Penelope is obtuse for not recognising the beggar for who he is, or that Odysseus could ask for an old woman to wash his feet only if he wanted to be recognised, is no different from arguing that Sophocles' *Oedipus* is a bad play because the brilliant king of Thebes cannot perceive what every dullard in the audience already knows.." Levine, in arguing for collusion, finds complicity in the laughter of Penelope and Telemachus. The first two instances, both referring to Penelope, are her delighted laugh at Telemachus' auspicious sneeze and the

meaningless laugh, which I have already mentioned, with which she attempts to reassure Eurynome. These occur too early in the narrative for Penelope to have any knowledge to share with Telemachus, let alone Odysseus, and sufficient reason is given in the text for her laughter in each case. In the first case, Eumaeus has just told her that he has encountered a vagabond with news of Odyseus, and in the second Athena has put a notion into her head which is unlike her and which she is having difficulty in explaining to Eurynome (xvii 542, xviii 163). In the third instance, Telemachus is hiding behind a silly laugh (xxi 105) in undoubted collusion with his father. To support his suggestion, Levine sees "poetic sense" (p 153-4) in depicting a conspiracy without explanation, and quotes Bassett[45] in support: "In matters of slight importance what the listener knows, because the poet has told him in the preceding narrative, the character may be assumed to know". I fail to see why the poet should so discriminate in matters of slight importance, and I think it sufficiently established that it is absolutely essential to this kind of narrative technique that the listener should be in the know, and enjoy the fact that the characters are not.

What is interesting is that Homer never feels it necessary to explain what any laughter means. It appears each time in its own context with its implications entirely taken for granted by poet and, presumably, audience. I have accordingly taken smiles and laughter in their separate contexts in an attempt to understand

just what is being taken for granted in each case. It can be seen that more often than not what is at issue is not humour but ridicule, and that this is related to questions of respect and self-esteem. It is remarkable how often one is entitled to such laughter, even when it is expressed by a forceful word such as καγχαλάω.

This term in fact only once refers to direct ridicule; in III 43 when Hector is reproving Paris and threatening him with the ridicule of the Greeks. There is no question, however, that the Greeks will be entitled to their glee. The other two instances in the *Iliad* occur in the repeated image of the stallion, when Paris and Hector in turn run joyfully to join the battle. In the *Odyssey*, xxiii 59, Eurycleia gives way to unrestrained delight; Penelope only suggests that she is rejoicing too soon. When Odysseus reproves her (xxii 407ff), his reason is that it is not seemly to exult over men who have died a shameful death. It is to be noted, however, that although she does not actually give vent to ὀλολυγή, she goes exulting to Penelope.

Another term which relates to this topic is χάρμα, with which are associated χάρις, χαίρω, and χάρμη. In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, χαίρω expresses pleasure and satisfaction and only rarely carries an overtone of triumph. There is one example in the *Iliad*, when Hector prays that Astyanax may grow up to be a great warrior and delight his mother by coming home to her bearing bloody spoils: *chareie de phrena meter* (VI 481).

χάρις, χαρίζομαι, and χαρίεις all express pleasure and satisfaction, but there is a difference in the use of χάρμα. There appears an overtone of humiliating pleasure; in X 193 Nestor urges that Sleep should not catch hold of anyone, "lest we should give pleasure to enemies". This is in complete contrast to XVII 636, in which Ajax and Menelaus, aware that Zeus is favouring the Trojans, imagine the relief and joy of their friends should they manage to rescue the body of Patroclus and return safely to their own lines: "So that we too may give pleasure to our friends as we return"

This contrast is made explicit in III 51 when Hector is reproving Paris for shrinking from single combat, and describes the horror of giving satisfaction to one's enemies: .."a delight to your enemies, but a reproach to yourself". A similar antithesis is drawn in XXIII 342, when Nestor advises Antilochus on driving tactics, and warns that failure will bring disaster and Antilochus will become "a delight to the others, but a reproach to yourself." Finally, in VI 82, Helenus calls on Hector and Aeneas to stand firm before the gates and stop the Trojans from fleeing, " ..before they rush away and fall into their women's arms, and delight the enemy".

In the *Odyssey*, there is one example of this kind of χάρμα; in vi 185 Odysseus is making elaborate address to Nausicaa, and includes in his wish that the gods be kind to her the notion

that a happy marriage is " ..much sorrow to enemies, but a delight to those who wish you well". The notion that the opposite would give joy to those hostile of intent is clear; this is the nearest the author of the *Odyssey* comes to expressing the kind of χάρμα found in the *Iliad*.

In summing up, it must first be noted that there is a distinct difference in emphasis on laughter in the two epic poems. In the *Iliad*, people seldom break into laughter unless they are invited or entitled to. There are a number of contexts where ridiculing or aggressive laughter is acceptable and it is an important part of *arete* to avoid incurring that laughter.

In the *Odyssey*, the question of inappropriate laughter first arises. In some cases it indicates an incorrect grasp of the situation, and in others culpable hostility and arrogance. This arrogance is described as hybristic, and the notion of *hybris* itself has more to do with wilful offence in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. Aggressive laughter is explicitly associated with the grossly insulting behaviour of the suitors. Nothing could be less godlike than their mindless mirth, and nothing more calculated by the poet to justify Odysseus' ruthless revenge.

In contrast to some laughter, smiling may show a correct grasp of the situation. It is seldom provocative and may well be a response to humiliation or an attempt at appeasement, if not

both. In both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, smiling is more likely to form part of an interchange between individuals, while laughter is more likely to relate to an individual's standing in a group.

In addition to γελάω and μειδάω, χάρμα, χάρις, or χαίρω may describe the pleasure derived from such humiliating laughter.

Notes to Chapter 1.

1. Emily Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry*, (University of California Press 1979), p 84.

2. For a full discussion of formulaic and repetitive elements in battle, see Bernard Fenik, 'Typical Battle Scenes in the *Iliad*', *Hermes* Einzelschriften Heft 21 (1968).

3. ὑπόψιος - note by contrast Aesch. *Ag.* 1637: ὕποπτος ἐχθρὸς ἦ παλαιγενής.
This implies that Aegisthus was not so much "overlooked" as "suspect".

4. Fenik, *op. cit.* p 20.

5. Seth L Schein, *The Mortal Hero*, (University of California Press 1984), p 22.

6. I M Hohendahl-Zoetelief, *Manners in the Homeric Epic*, *Mnemosyne* Supplement LXIII, (Leiden Brill 1980), p 144.

7. Vermeule, *op. cit.* p 99.

8. Leonard Woodbury, *Quo Modo Risu Ridiculoque Graeci Usi Sint*, Dissertation (Harvard 1944).

9. J W Hewitt, 'Homeric Laughter', *CJ* (1928), pp 436-9.

10. H W Clarke, 'The Humor of Homer', *CJ* LXIV (1969), p 246.

11. Walter Whallon, *Formula, Character, and Context*, (Centre for Hellenic Studies 1969), p 26, considers νεφεληγερέτα one of those epithets that are true to character but not necessarily to context. The ominous possibilities of ἐπιμειδάω, to be discussed shortly, make the epithet true to context in VIII 38.

12. C R Beye, 'Male and Female in the Homeric Poems', *Ramus* XIII (1974), pp 91-3.

13. Hewitt, *op. cit.* p 439.

14. G S Kirk, *The Iliad: a Commentary*, vol.1, (Cambridge University Press 1985), note to line 270, p 144.

15. Vermeule, *op. cit.* p 12.

16. Woodbury, *op. cit.* p 2.

17. Enid Welsford, *The Fool*, (Faber and Faber 1935), p 3.

18. H D Rankin, 'Thersites. The Malcontent. A Discussion.' *S.O.* XLVII (1972), p 43.

19. E R Lowry, *Thersites - a Study in Comic-Shame*, (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 1981), p 309.

20. K J Latham, 'Hysteria in History: Some *Topoi* in War Debates of Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides', *Mus. Phil. Lond.* V (1981), pp 54-67.

21. Jasper Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, (Clarendon Press 1980), pp 183-4.

22. M L West, *Hesiod - Works and Days: a commentary*, (Oxford University Press 1978), p 158.

23. Hewitt, *op. cit.* p 439.

24. Aphrodite's distinguishing epithet φιλομμειδής may well carry a suggestion of the possibilities of humiliation in matters of sex. In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, 49ff, the goddess has evidently been making great fools of the other gods by making them fall in love with mortals. This, according to the poet, is not to be borne, but the cure is simple. All that is necessary is to make as great a fool of Aphrodite, which Zeus proceeds to do.

In Sappho's first fragment (Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, (Oxford 1955)), Aphrodite is ποικιλόθρον' or ποικιλόφρον'. I prefer the latter; it is as Page says (pp 4-5) in accordance with her character, δολόπλοκε (2). We should note Sappho's fear that she will fill her heart with anguish. She has a "smile on her deathless face" (Page 1.14); it is an ominous smile, part of her terrible trap. Page (15) says that Aphrodite is amused, but does not say why. In my view this amusement is the same as Zeus' in XXI 389 or Odysseus' in X 400.

In Isaeus II 1 there is a curious reference to a law of Solon. No one could say that Menecles adopted his son while out of his mind or under the influence of a woman; this possibly refers to folly induced by Aphrodite.

25. L Stanford, *The Odyssey: a commentary*, (Macmillan 1947), p 362.

26. E M Bradley, 'The *Hybris* of Odysseus', *Soundings* 4 (1968), pp 38-9.

27. Richmond L Lattimore, *The Odyssey: a translation*, (Harper and Row 1965), ii 301.

28. Stanford, *op. cit.* p 244.

29. This is a rare, if not the only, example of dust away from the battlefield. There is far more dust in the *Iliad* than in the *Odyssey*. As might be expected, it is found on the battlefield, or arena. Dust swirls about everywhere as mud on

the rugby field. So it is quite to be expected that when men fall they fall in the dust and that in their last agony they grasp the earth. But its figurative possibilities are not lost on Homer. He repeatedly uses the image of "dowm in the dust" to convey a notion of pathos or even degradation. So Hector taunts Paris (III 55), imagining his brother's erotic beauty defiled in the dust. There is no doubt that it would give Hector much joy to see Paris thus humiliated. Many times Homer draws the contrast between a glorious hero and his ignominious downfall: "great as he was, he fell in the dust" (XIII 548, XV 434, XVI 289) and men fall not only in the dust but at another's feet (XIV 418).

Lastly, a man may humble himself or another with dust; the ritual gestures of grief need no elaboration, and when Achilles is desperately trying to comfort himself for the loss of Patroclus, he insults Hector's corpse by leaving it in the dust by Patroclus' bier (XXIII 24-6).

A fragment of Glycon (Anth. Pal. 10 24) is worth mentioning in this context:

Πάντα γέλως, καὶ πάντα κόνις, καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδέν.
πάντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀλόγων ἐστὶ τὰ γινόμενα.

30. On this subject see, among others, Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, (Harper and Row 1960), p 29ff.

31. H G Robertson, 'The *Hybristes* in Homer', *CJ* LI (1955), pp 81-3, gives an extensive list of words the author has found in Homer to express attitudes such as that of the suitors in the *Odyssey*. This list does not, however, include laughter.

32. Most of the controversy surrounding the criticism of orally composed poetry has concerned noun-epithet formulae, but Whallon, *op. cit.* p 65: "As a rule, an epithet refers to its noun and lacks a special association with any context, while other elements refer to their contexts and lack a special association with any noun. Everyone knows that Ajax is τελαμώνιος but no one recalls whether he ever speaks (δὲ) βαρὺ στεναχών.." This observation accords with my own conclusions on the matter. Similarly, J B Hainsworth, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula*, (Oxford 1968), restricts technical craftsmanship to the generic epithet, synonyms, the adaptation of existing material, and what he terms "minor and incidental devices" (p 128).

33. Hohendahl-Zoetelief, *op. cit.* p 143.

34. J de Romilly, 'La Haine et l'Inimitié dans Homère', *Ancient and Modern. Essays in Honour of G F Else*, ed. J H d'Arms and John W Edie (Ann Arbor 1977), pp 1-10.

35. Woodbury, *op. cit.* p 8.

36. J W Roberts, *The City of Sokrates*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1984), p 216.

37. A W H Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, (Clarendon Press 1960), pp 48-9.

38. Vermeule, *op. cit.* p 124.

39. Woodbury, *op. cit.* p 18.

40. Daniel Levine, *Laughter and the Demise of the Suitors*, Thesis, (University of Cincinnati 1981).

41. J T Hooker, 'The Original Meaning of *Hybris*, *Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte* XIX (1975), pp 24-7.

42. In making this assertion I separate noun-epithet formulae from formulae containing a participle. To quote Whallon again, *op. cit.* pp 61-2: "particles make participles metrically interchangeable.. Economy caused various men in similar situations to speak .. (δ') ἐπιμειδήσας .. but variety caused men in special situations to speak in a sharply defined manner.. "

J B Hainsworth, 'The Criticism of an Oral Homer', *JHS* XC (1970), pp 90-8, wishes to make a distinction between the routine oral elements, which it has been suggested will not bear orthodox literary criticism, and the essential structure of plot, to which I would add character and interplay of characters.

43. Hewitt, *op. cit.* p 442.

44. Denys Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, (Oxford University Press 1955), pp 111-2, 126; G S Kirk, *The Songs of Homer*, (Cambridge University Press 1962), pp 240-7; Bernard Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey*, *Hermes* Einzelschriften XXX (1974).

45. S. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, Berkeley 1938.

Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Lyric Poetry.

The two works bearing the name of Hesiod[1] are quite different in character, one being a narrative work describing the generations of the gods and the other being practical and didactic in nature. Neither work contains the kind of social interaction between characters that has been noted in the work of Homer; in *Works and Days*, apart from the opening myths, the author is concerned with the information he wishes to impart, and in the *Theogony* with names and events. There are, however, some references to laughter, of which one or two are interesting.

It has already been noted that Homer's gods do not laugh at man's expense. The Zeus who appears in the work of Hesiod is almost malevolent by contrast; he more resembles the figure that Aeschylus portrays in *Prometheus Bound*. Although it is Prometheus and not man who has stolen a march on him, Zeus takes his revenge upon man nonetheless and takes spiteful pleasure in the prospect:

ἐκ δ' ἐγέλασσε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (*Op.*59).

This line is similar to Hom. V 426 except that Homer uses μείδησεν to describe Zeus' smile, discussed in the foregoing chapter. It is to be noted that the laughter in *Op.*59 is not part of the corresponding episode in the *Theogony*. Either Hesiod changed his view of Zeus at some stage, or possibly the two poems were written by different authors. A difference of

this kind, however, hardly provides sufficient grounds by itself to argue for different authorship, nor is such an exercise the purpose of this study. Be that as it may, in spite of the Homeric language a very different view is expressed. In Homer's work, gods interact with men in a number of ways, including direct physical conflict, but they are not seen as holding humankind in any form of contempt. Hesiod, on the other hand, seems to see Zeus as bitterly resenting any impingement on his status. This, as we have seen in Homer's work, is a human attribute, here curiously ascribed to a deity. In the Homeric poems, the gods spar endlessly for supremacy, but never compete with man in this way.

Another example of γελάω in Hesiod is interesting because it conveys the notion of appeasement: *kai te kasigneto gelasas epi martura thesthai* (*Op.*371). The suggestion that one should smile nicely but obtain a witness to a deal, even with one's brother, is amusing and reminiscent of Homer. *Sc.*283 is a straightforward reference to gaiety: γελόωντες and *Th.*40, like Hom. XIX 362, describes radiance: ..*gela de te domata patros Zenos*..[1]

In short, Hesiod is not concerned with ridicule. The four references quoted are quite incidental to his work and his method. There is nothing to show that Hesiod, although in many ways a faithful practitioner in the Homeric tradition, shared Homer's interest in the particular kind of social interaction

that we have noted so far.

In the Homeric Hymns there is a reference to brightness that suggests a kinship to ἄγαλμα (*H.Cer.*14): *gaia te pas' egelasse.. Sc.*28, *H.Cer.*200, and *H.Merc.*29,420 all speak of gaiety; *H.Merc.*420 is similar in expression to Hom. xvii 542; in the former instance Apollo is thrilled by the vibrations of the newly invented lyre, and in the second Penelope is delighted by Telemachus' auspicious sneeze. Despite their narrative style, Homeric hymns contain no notion of ridicule, and the question of moral supremacy does not arise. In *H.Merc.*281, for instance, the laughter is like Athena's smile as she pats the lying Odysseus; it is appreciative, even complimentary, but above all it is the knowing laughter that comes from the discovery of a trick. Apollo is amused, ἀπαλὸν γελάσας but not deceived, by the attempts of Hermes to pretend that he knows nothing about the cattle he has stolen: Similarly, in 389, Zeus breaks into laughter when he hears the tale of Hermes' outrageousness. This nonsense story lightheartedly ascribes entirely childish behaviour to Hermes; he makes faces, refuses to meet Apollo's eyes, whistles, and affects boredom to avoid answering his questions (278-80); when Apollo carries him off by main force, he lets loose a *tlemona gastros erithon, atasthalon aggelioten* - quite a striking use of ἀτάσθαλος, to say the least.

Lyric poetry, being personal and seldom narrative in style,

brings a different approach. In narrative the writer manipulates his characters and deploys them one against another; in personal lyric the poet deploys his own resources in the direction of his audience. Some lyric poems, those that express feeling with which the poet is entirely preoccupied, could well fall on deaf ears and still be a source of personal satisfaction to the poet; others are directed outwards and are clearly designed to hit their mark and produce an effect. Some of these may be a plea for love, others are an expression of hostility, and in certain cases this hostility may be expressed in ridicule. In these cases ridicule is not described but directly expressed through the medium of the poem. While it is not necessary to examine every poem of this kind, a number of examples are worth discussing.

A fragment of Archilochus, 79a (Campbell), shows the satisfaction to be derived from the contemplation of another's physical discomfiture. With relish the poet imagines the sorry spectacle of his enemy, crouching on the shore covered in salt and seaweed, heaving up quantities of sea water. This is the kind of acute, unkind observation that makes for galling and effective ridicule. Another unkind image may appear in 196a (Page (1974) after Merkelbach and West), though the text has provided some difficulties in a section that may accordingly be either vicious or merely anxious (39-41). These difficulties are not altogether solved by Gronewald's attractive conjecture:

... ἐπειγομένη

τὼς ὥσπερ ἡ κ[ύων τέκνῳ.

Anne Pippin Burnet accepts Gronewald's conjecture with Slings and against Van Sickle. Campbell, however, accepts ἐπειγόμενος ...τέκνῳ[3]. The text itself is an extract from a longer poem, and interrupts a love scene with spiteful reflections upon the absent and maligned Neobule. In contemplating the beauty of his new love, Archilochus takes pleasure in the notion of Neobule having lost her maidenly bloom along with other attributes, and a more aggressive reading of the disputed lines seems appropriate.

Hipponax fr. 70 (Campbell) is composed of two lines that show interesting and aggressive use of rhythm, trochaic tetrameter catalectic scazon with a proliferation of short syllables in the first feet:

λάβετέ μευ θαίματια, κόψω Βουπάλου τὸν ὀφθαλμόν.
ἀμφιδέξιος γάρ εἰμι κοὐκ ἁμαρτάνω κόπτων.

Pratinas uses the same technique to ridiculing effect in 708 (Campbell). The rhythm is not only aggressive but gives an absurd impression of the chorus thus criticized. Lines 10-12 display ingenious invention of polysyllabic and derogatory terms:

φλόγε τὸν ὀλεσισιαλοκώλαμον
λαλοβαρύοπα παραμελορυθμοράταν..

When it comes to the question of laughter, these poets tend to say different things about it according to the nature of the

poem in hand. Archilochus, when he is not singing of love or wine, gives vent to feelings of personal animosity[4] and treats this expression as his right, as do Homer's heroes on the battlefield. There is a difference, though; not only must Homer's heroes work themselves up into the mood for battle, but their satisfaction is pure joy, as signified by the much repeated phrase μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης. Archilochus expresses a grimmer satisfaction. He repeatedly uses the verb ἀμείβομαι; his grievance is a debt that he will exact in full. In a sarcastic twist (Lassère and Bonnard 14) he describes the pleasure of giving grievous gifts to personal enemies: *xeinia dysmenesin lugra charizomenoi*. This idea will become familiar; Archilochus expresses it in P. Oxy.2310 (fr.1 Lobel) and in 66 (Campbell).

Archilochus knows how to love his friends and hate his enemies, and how to pay back those who do him harm. Another passage, 67a (Campbell), sounds a note of caution. Archilochus speaks to his *thymos* as Homer's characters do in XII 98-9, 122, and xx 18ff, and as later Euripides' Medea does to hers; it can be seen that all three writers ascribe strong impulses to the *thymos*. Archilochus wants to avoid too much exultation in victory and excessive grief in defeat; *gignoske d' hoios rhysmos anthropous echei* (7). There is an idealistic search here for rhythm and balance that seems quite uncharacteristic of the poet. The interesting word is ἀγαλλέο in the fourth line; in expressing exultation it has connections both with ἄγαλμα and γελάω[5].

ἀγάλλεται occurs similarly in 6 (Campbell), the famous poem about the lost shield. Someone else is taking delight in Archilochus' shield, but Archilochus is so impervious to his pleasure that he is not even interested in knowing his name: Σαΐων τις. The many Homeric words, ἀγάλλεται, ἔντος (rarely in singular as here), ἀμώμητον, κάλλιπον, ἐξεσάωσα, ἐρρέτω, show a conscious parody of Homeric ideals, as does the indifference to the name and thus the status of his opponent. Even less Homeric is 60 (Campbell), the little poem in praise of the bandy legged general:

οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν...

In general, Archilochus prefers invective to ridicule, as in 97a, though he does at one point assure Lycambes that he is a laughing stock in the community: ...*nyn de polys astoisi phaineai gelos.* (Campbell 88). This is a clear indication of the purpose of ridicule; whether or not it is true that Lycambes' three daughters hanged themselves, the very existence of such a tale bears witness to the acknowledged effectiveness of Archilochus' weapon.

In a passage of Philostratus Major, *Imag.* i.25, which may refer to a poem of Alcaeus[e], there is some familiar laughter. Apollo laughs when he finds that Hermes has capped the theft of his cattle by making off with his bow and arrows. Whatever the origin, the theft and the laughter have a precedent in

H. Merc., and are mentioned in the scholiast to Hom. XV 256 and in Horace, *Odes* I 10. Horace ascribes to Hermes the role of clown that he has in the Homeric hymn : *iocoso ...furto* - as though Hermes were hoping to disarm Apollo literally as well as figuratively. There is no doubt that Apollo's laughter shows that he has been appeased; the scholiast tells us that he gave Hermes his prophetic wand.

Pindar, writing as he does about success, is concerned not with humiliation but with envy. His work is permeated with anxiety; he will not go as far as to say that we are but creatures of a day, but he certainly says as much of our joys and ambitions: *ho ti terpnon epameron diokon...* (*Isthm.* VII 40). His references to laughter, though few, and subject to occasional difficulty, are nonetheless interesting.

In *Py.* VIII 85 he refers to simple joy, γέλως γλυκύς, which will not enliven the home coming of the four youths beaten by Aristomenes: In *Py.* IX 38 Chiron's laughter, or rather the manner of it , has caused much difficulty. E D Francis[7], I think successfully, defends χλαρόν in χλαρὸν γελάσσαις. However, the translation he offers, "laughing indulgently" belies his conclusions concerning the meaning of χλαρόν . He subsequently discusses the possible differences in meaning between χλιαρόν (NV) and χλαρόν (Σ). He concludes that "the connotation of γελάσσαις is perhaps more complex than can be implied by a distinction between 'smile' and 'laugh'". Woodbury[8] favours

χλαρόν as an alternative for χἀλἄρόν, signifying approval and indulgence. If indulgence is meant, then Chiron may be indulging not Apollo but himself. He is indulging in laughter with an unclouded brow, which at any rate must mean laughter that is not aggressive. The real problem of course is the nature of this laughter, and in the absence of any clear information concerning χλαρόν / χλιαρόν / χλοαρόν we should perhaps turn to the laughter itself.

Apollo has shown a lustful interest in Cyrene, and the Centaur's response is somewhere between a smile and a laugh. The only way to determine the nature of this response is to relate it to its context. In the absence of a certain text inferences tend to be made on the basis of the author's other work, but the same difficulty is found in the only passage that offers a comparison, *Py.* X 36. In this passage, Apollo, taking pleasure in the feasting and praises of the Hyperboreans, laughs at the upstanding lustfulness of the donkeys. The notion of a knowing laugh seems to fit very well, but γελᾷ is not certain; the variants γαλᾷ, γ'ἔλᾷ, and τελᾷ are offered. *Isth.* I 68, which describes the man who hides his wealth at home and smiles - γελᾷ - as he happens to meet others, is helpful.

This example brings out an important aspect of γελάω that applies equally well to μειδάω. It describes an attitude. It is important to remember this when considering Farnell's[9] and Bury's'[10] suggestion that ἐμπίπτων should be rendered "falling

in with" as "pouncing" is alien to the context. It is in fact γελᾷ that adds a sense of aggression to the context, so that something more should be inferred from this encounter. We have noted in the chapter on Homer that what is described as laughter is often an attitude which has the same effect on its victim as overt ridicule. It is, as we have seen, a knowing laugh. Pindar's work is not such as requires the mention of ridiculing laughter, but this is not to say that he was not aware of the force of ridicule; his rueful reference to the gibe of *Boeotian Pig* (*Ol.* VI 90 and elsewhere) is sufficient evidence of this. The examples of laughter in Pindar are few in number and liable to be evaluated in terms of what is assumed from the work of others, but they illustrate well the principle mentioned in the introduction to this study; the smile or laugh is mentioned in passing, with the obvious assumption that its significance is apparent to the reader. It is this very assumption that causes the difficulties encountered so far.

Theognis speaks of aggressive laughter, using the preposition ἐπί. In two instances, he speaks of those who deceive ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι γελῶντες (59-60, 1113-4). A similar passage describes a man who jokes at a party to keep himself aloof until he has judged the temper of his companions: (309-12) There is a similar notion in 213-4, in which the poet seems to advise himself to adapt himself to the temper of his company. It can be seen that the laughter is not derived from the pleasure of subterfuge; it is rather the means by which the subterfuge is achieved.

In the poem against Themistocles which Plutarch (*Them.* 21 8ff) quotes, Timocreon invokes savage laughter against Themistocles, who he suggests is rolling in ill-gotten gain, offering congealing meats to his favourites.

Simonides in one fragment (fr.134 (Page 224)) seems to say that a false impression: *peri ta prosopa sphalmata* may cause one to laugh at another. This brings to mind the inappropriate laughter of Penelope's suitors.

Having a different purpose, the lyric poets treat ridicule in an altogether different manner from Homer. Ridicule is very far from being the concern of choral lyric, and in the case of personal lyric it may become the entire object of the poem. Because their method is allusive rather than descriptive, the lyric and iambic poets write more subjectively than Homer, who stands back from his characters and observes them with a sharp eye. The same quality of observation appears in the work of the dramatic poets.

Notes to Chapter 2.

1. For a discussion of the authorship of these works, see West, *commentary*, pp 40ff.

2. G Zuntz, 'Theocritus 1 95f', *CQ* n.s. X (1960), p 37 note 2, suggests that Theocritus took ἡδεῖα as neuter, qualifying γελᾷ. His observations concerning Aphrodite seem to me to be correct, but I would not take them as a precedent for the present passage.

3. Anne Pippin Burnet, *Three Archaic Poets*, (Duckworth 1983), pp 84-97, Slings ('Archilochus. The Hasty Mind and the Hasty Bitch', *ZPE* 21 (1976), p 286ff), Van Sickle ('Archilochus: the Hasty Emendation', *BASP* 15 (1978) pp 171-3). David A Campbell, *The Golden Lyre*, (Duckworth 1983), p 7.

4. For discussion of this point see M L West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, (De Gruyter 1974), pp 26-7, 32.

5. The use of ἀγάλλομαι in Homer has a formulaic ring; characters "delight" in their wings, their horses, or their swift ships, as in II 462, XII 114, XVIII 132, XX 473, v 176, vi 272 etc.

6. See Page's remarks, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, (Oxford 1955), p 253ff.

7. E D Francis, 'Chiron's Laughter', *CPh* LXVII (1972), pp 288-91.

8. Francis, *op. cit.* p 289, note 7. L Woodbury, 'Apollo's First Love: Pindar, *Pyth.* 9-26ff', *TAPhA* 103 (1972), pp 561-73.

9. Farnell, *Pindar: commentary*, (London 1932).

10. J B Bury, *The Olympian and Nemean Odes of Pindar*, (Cambridge University Press 1890-2)

Laughter in Tragedy.

The three major tragic writers vary in their approach to laughter, and of the three Aeschylus provides the fewest examples.

ἀγέλαστος in *Cho.* 90 simply means unhappy. Cassandra, however, speaks of ridicule in *Ag.* 1264-5, 1269-72. Her prophecies have been met with laughter, rendered all the more painful because the robes of her office make her so conspicuous and self-conscious. Because of this laughter which is so unfair and meaningless - μάτην, her friends have become indistinguishable from enemies: *philon hyp' echthron ou dichorropos* (1272). I am aware of the difficulties in this line as outlined by Page[1] and Fraenkel[2], but without venturing to supply a verb after ἐποπτεύσας to replace μάτην, I feel that this sense might be derived from the line. I also feel that Fraenkel could have taken acount of the fact that laughter is regularly portrayed as a prerogative of one's enemies; this consideration lends the necessary irony to Cassandra's remark. Verrall[3], with much punctuation, says that "the mockery was borne in vain". This will not do; the mockery itself, as Fraenkel points out, was vain.

Electra expresses the same kind of feeling in *Cho.* 222. Thoroughly on the defensive, she expects any passing stranger to find her grief, prolonged as it has been, ridiculous.

The Erinyes (*Eum.* 789, 819) likewise cry out that they are being mocked when they fear that their reputation is being taken away from them. Here I choose to follow Page and Tyrwhitt, leaving δύσοιστ' as the object of ἔπαθον (cf. O.C.T.).

These are the only references to laughter in Aeschylus, but there are one or two other moments that are worth consideration. There is a flurry of abuse between Aegisthus and the chorus in *Ag.* 1612-1671, but it achieves little more than to remind the audience that Orestes is a force yet to be reckoned with. The chorus repeats Cassandra's famous reference to the *leont' analkin ..oikouron* (1225, 1626) and not only calls Aegisthus a woman but suggests that he needs to hide behind one. Clytaemestra is quick to respond. She simply puts an end to the squabble and says "That is a woman's opinion, if anyone wants to know" (1661). On the whole, she seems to think it a good thing to be a woman; certainly she takes no offence from the chorus' sneer any more than she is gratified by being told that she thinks like a man. This comment seems rather to have rankled, if 1661 is any indication. It also seems to be quite in order for Aegisthus to explain his lack of initiative by asserting "It was definitely a woman's job to work out the trap" (1636). His reaction in 1628f, by comparison, certainly shows that he is stung by being called "woman".

There is a hint of enjoying someome else's misfortune in a

fragment of Aeschylus (*P. Oxy.* 2256 9a: 36):]ἵν ἔχ[α]ρε κἀγέλα κακόν and there may be some unkind laughter in *P. Oxy.* 2161 1: 22, but this is subject to conjecture as the γε in the text may even be γδ, according to Lobel. γέλᾶι μον προσορῶν...

In general, however, Aeschylus does not turn his attention to the kind of human interaction that gives rise to mockery. His characters do not measure themselves against one another; they measure themselves in terms of their function and destiny in the sight of the gods. Even Clytaemestra, who of all his characters acts from the strongest personal motives, expresses only a desire for revenge on her daughter's behalf.

In Sophocles' work, γελάω is used frequently, and in some plays more than others. It occurs most in *Ajax*, then in *Electra*. This is no accident.

In *Ajax*, Athena's comment to Odysseus (79) points up one of the issues on which the drama is based: *oukoun gelos hedistos eis echthrous gelan*. Athena seems to take it for granted that the finest favour she can do Odysseus is to provide him with a chance to crow over Ajax. The ensuing scene shows her going to considerable trouble to ensure that the reluctant Odysseus does not miss the opportunity. Odysseus' reluctance, however, stems not from any compunction on his part but from an interest in his own safety. Later, when he has watched the deluded Ajax speaking as trustfully to the goddess as he does himself, he is

sufficiently shaken to make the observation in 121-6, that he pities Ajax no more than himself, since it is plain that men are creatures of no substance.

Two things are now plain; how much Sophocles' work owes to the Homeric tradition and how much he departs from it in this play. Homer's gods, as we have seen, do not make sport of men as they do of one another, but it is taken for granted in the *Iliad* that it is not disgraceful but rather a hard won privilege to crow over a defeated enemy. Gods and men alike treat one another in this way. Now, at the beginning of this play, two men are shown to be on the same terms of affection and trust with a goddess. One is entirely deluded, and the other asks whether he may not himself be so on another occasion. The suggestion that it is gratifying to mock another is introduced by the goddess herself. Odysseus is chastened, and refrains from such laughter; this eventually becomes the point around which the drama is resolved. Ajax, in his madness, indulges himsef in laughter of the most meaningless sort. When Tecmessa describes his antics (301-4), she says that he abused the Atreidae and hurled a good deal of laughter: *gelon polyn* at Odysseus in return for the *hybris* he believes he has suffered. This inappropriate laughter is exactly like that of the suitors in *Od.* xx 346-7, contributing not only to their characterisation but to the reasons for their demise. It is clear that no Greek author so far finds it necessary to state whether the laughter he describes at any time is appropriate or not; he takes it for

granted that the context makes it perfectly clear. If the laughter has sinister overtones, the author may add embellishments, like the bloodstained feast that presages the death of the suitors, or the dripping of blood from the hapless victims of Ajax's sword.

Another feature which these two episodes have in common is the explicit mention of Athena's intervention. Homer tells us that Athena struck the suitors with uncontrollable laughter and fuddled their wits, and it is quite clear what she does in this play. In each case, the goddess is providing an advantage for Odysseus, but in this play her attitude is different, and Odysseus' response is tantamount to outright rejection. In Sophocles' play it is Odysseus who reinstates Ajax after his death, but in the *Odyssey* it is Athena who brings hostilities to a stop. Homer's Odysseus has complete trust in the goddess, but Sophocles' Odysseus is thoroughly disillusioned, though his respect for the gods, mingled now with caution, is more rather than less than it was before. The most striking similarity between the two episodes, however, and one that leads me to suppose that the similarity was intended, is the inappropriate laughter that springs from delusion. The delusion is not necessarily a part of madness any more than it is the madness itself; but the laughter acts as a signal.

It is also worth noting that in *Ajax* Sophocles associates laughter and *hybris*. Again, this has a precedent in the

Odyssey. The suitors' laughter is treated as an indication that their attitude is hybristic, and Sophocles for his part brings laughter and *hybris* together in 367:

οἴμοι γέλωτος, οἷον ὑβρίσθην ἄρα.

In his subsequent attack on Odysseus, Ajax says that he is enjoying a good laugh at his expense (379-82). The chorus' rejoinder that the god decides who rejoices or grieves (383) is filled with irony; we have heard of Ajax's inappropriate laughter, and see just how short lived his pleasure, and how great his sorrow by contrast. Ajax continues to lament, and repeats that thanks to the goddess his enemies have escaped his vengeance and are laughing at him (484). After his suicide, the chorus and Tecmessa say that Ajax has destroyed himself and his enemies are laughing in triumph. Once again, *gelos* (955) and *hybris* are associated, and again in 969-71. A most forceful compound, ἐπεγγελᾶν (969) is subject to dispute. Pearson (OCT) accepts the reading which Porson has emended to τοῦδέ γ' ἐγγελῶεν, Elmsley to τοῦδ' ἄν ἐγγελῶεν, and Meineke to τοῦδ' ἔτ ἐγγελῶεν. ἐπεγγελᾶν is not objectionable here; it also appears in 454 in a similarly forceful context. Tecmessa continues to reproach Ajax's enemies and the emphatic form certainly implies that her indignation has reached a climax. However, it reappears almost immediately (989). It is possible that repetition so soon could be considered to weaken the usage, but in a context where laughter is referred to so frequently it is necessary to have recourse to more emphatic forms. Having thus strongly deplored

the gratification which Ajax's enemies must be deriving from his death, Tecmessa makes an important statement: "This man died to please the gods, not them (970). thus indicating that the Atreidae have not earned, in Homeric style, the right to crow over Ajax.

Up to this point, every comment except Athena's in 79 has dwelt on the pain that ridicule inflicts; Teucer now (988-9) ruefully describes this laughter as common behaviour, even a right.

The last mention of aggressive laughter in the play refers to Menelaus; as he approaches, the chorus sets the tone of the conflict with which the rest of the play is engrossed. By warning Teucer to bury Ajax quickly before that hostile man comes to crow over him, the chorus establishes Menelaus as a villain before the dispute even starts: It is to be noted that the chorus is not so resigned as Teucer to the prospect of ridicule and does not describe it in neutral language. From this point on, *hybris* is mentioned six times (1061, 1081, 1088, 1092, 1151, 1258) but laughter is not mentioned at all. The emphasis shifts from Ajax's feelings to the behaviour of his peers. It is to be noted that Odysseus, as a consequence of his experience at the beginning of the play, derives no pleasure from Ajax's death, although he has been expected to laugh most of all (79, 382, 454, 957).

This play is entirely concerned with the esteem in which Ajax is

held by his fellows. It is all-important; Ajax dies for lack of it in the first part of the play, and the second part is devoted to re-establishing it. The one thing Athena needs to do in order to deprive Ajax of his own sense of worth is to render him ridiculous in the sight of his fellows. Their laughter and contempt are the decisive factor in his death, and after it the greatest preoccupation of his colleagues.

The character of Electra is equally sensitive to aggressive laughter. She nurses a sense of injury against her mother, and mentions *hybris* and *gelos* in the course of her complaints (271, 277). When Electra believes that Orestes is dead, she watches her mother depart after their altercation and bitterly observes that the woman is delighted because her son is dead: ἀλλ' ἐγγελῶσα φροῦδος (Soph. *El.* 807) There is no doubt that Clytaemestra's attitude of gleeful triumph increases Electra's anger, but this is not necessarily to say that she has uttered peals of laughter as she has left the stage. Electra is speaking subjectively about her own feelings of humiliation. When her hopes have been dashed and Chrysothemis appears, Electra attacks her sister in words (880-1) that are similar in style and intent to Aesch. *Cho.* 222-3. Her extreme despondency shows in her response to Chrysothemis, who has arrived full of hope. Chrysothemis' joy is free from guile, but Electra chooses to assume that she has come to crow over her (880). Sophocles shows his character no mercy; by the time Orestes' ashes, as she supposes, are placed in her hands, Electra is desperate. She has

lost all that she values, and her enemies are mocking her: γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί (1153). She has no power to assert herself in any way and feels utterly deprived and humiliated. When she and Orestes are finally reunited, Orestes looks forward to the time when the tables will be turned and they can be revenged on their "laughing enemies" (1295). He observes that they cannot rejoice or laugh until they have established their ascendancy (1300). Electra feels no such caution and sees no reason to conceal her joy. She already feels that revenge is in her hands and would perhaps, like Clytaemestra, crow too soon were it not for the intervention of the tutor (1309-10).

When characters are as vulnerable as Ajax and Electra, they are depicted as being very sensitive to ridicule. Gloating triumph is deeply felt, whether or not it truly exists, and it seems that death, of one's enemy or oneself, is the only adequate recompense. Ajax carries out his suicide; Electra plans (947ff) to kill Clytaemestra and Aegisthus herself, but events turn out otherwise. Sophocles makes no attempt, however, to depict Electra's reaction to their deaths as anything but sheer vindictive delight.

Antigone only uses *gelao* twice; once to Ismene (Soph. Ant. 551) and once in anguish and desolation by her tomb (838). In 551 she seems to be responding to Ismene's reproach in 550; "If I am ridiculing you, I am wretched indeed." As Ismene has pointed out, she can derive no benefit from it, and it is clear

that her position is hardly such that she can afford to indulge in ridicule. This is the feeling behind her response to the words of the chorus (834-8). The chorus offer what consolation they can, comparing her fate as a mortal to that of the divine Niobe. They are not speaking in hostile or mocking language, but Antigone seems to perceive both laughter and *hybris* in their attitude. Her cry is like Ajax's; it indicates the depth of her sorrow and sense of isolation. Although she has wilfully set herself apart from her fellows, she reacts to that isolation as though it has been forced upon her.

Creon also associates laughter with *hybris* when he reproaches Antigone for her actions in 480-3 He is outraged by her evident satisfaction in what she has done, taking it as a personal insult rather than the act of piety she intended. Later, when confronted by Haemon (635ff), he shows his vulnerability when he declares that disobedient children expose their parents to hostile ridicule. Sophocles' choice of language shows that Creon is not concerned with issues of duty and piety but with his own personal standing.

In the same way Philoctetes says (Soph. *Phil.* 258) that his comrades "laughed at him in silence" when they banished him from the camp. It at once becomes clear that only Philoctetes is aware of this silence as laughter; that is, he is describing his own predicament. Since it is no more likely that the Greeks stood and laughed at Philoctetes than that Antigone laughed at

Creon or that Odysseus laughed at Ajax, the conclusion emerges that when characters in these plays say that someome is laughing at them, they are in fact saying something about their own frame of mind. Philoctetes sounds very like Ajax when he accuses the Atreidae and Odysseus of laughing at him (*Phil.* 1020-24), and Sophocles introduces the term γηθέω as well. Once he has lost his bow, Philoctetes is in a pitiable state. He imagines Odysseus sitting on the beach laughing at him (1125); what in fact Odysseus is doing at this moment is of no consequence; it is Philoctetes' feelings with respect to Odysseus that Sophocles wishes to convey.

In *Oedipus at Colonus*, Theseus has no intention of letting himself appear at a disadvantage. Creon must not make a fool of him: μὴ .. γέλως .. γένωμαι.. (*O.C.* 902). Polynices twice mentions this feeling in connection with his brother (1329, 1423). At the end of *Oedipus the King*, Creon appears as the picture of magnanimity. The first words he utters to the blinded king are intended to reassure him that he has not come to crow over him: οὐχ ὡς γελαστής (*O.C.* 1422). Even though Creon has taken no direct part in Oedipus' ruin, he nevertheless feels it necessary to make it clear that he does not in any way see it as a source of personal gratification. In Homeric terms, Creon is dissociating himself from any suggestion that he is hostile to Oedipus. This remark is also rendered necessary by Oedipus' attack in 532ff. If Creon had in truth been planning to seize power for himself, he could be expected to be very gleeful now.

Were it not for the compelling manner in which the oracle has been proven right, Creon's words at this point could be interpreted in a very bad light.

In describing laughter, Sophocles has recourse to a far greater variety of expressions than was available to the composers of oral epic. It is plain that oral composition is to some extent limiting, but the variety of Sophocles' expression indicates nevertheless a developing interest in the notion of aggressive laughter. The formula ἡδὺ γελᾶν ἐπί τινί is abandoned, though the dative is retained and used more frequently than accusative or genitive to express aggression. Sophocles twice expresses the possibility of offering oneself as a laughing stock, as in the Homeric expression *me charma genometha dysmeneessin* (Hom. X 193 inter alia). Creon, in *Ant.* 647, complains that Haemon exists for nothing but to cause trouble and to be a laughing stock to his enemies. It is to be noted that, as in the Homeric model, the dative, presumably of advantage, is used with this expression, and the same is true of its variants. In *O.C.* 902 Theseus stakes his reputation on rescuing Antigone and Ismene:

ὡς μὴ .. γέλως .. ξένῳ γένωμαι τῷδε.

This variety is also found in the work of Euripides. Ajax's cry, οἴμοι γελώτος, is used quite literally in Euripides' *Cyclops*. In a lampoon of suffering, the unfortunate Cyclops cries οἴμοι γέλωμαι (687) as he is teased and made to blunder into things. It is interesting to see how Euripides chooses to satirise this

particular notion, which one assumes must have been well established for the joke to work. In the same line κερτομέω is used as an equivalent to *gelao*, as in Sophocles' play. It is reminiscent of the κερτομίοις ἐπεέσσι in Hom. V 419, and also gives an indication of the value placed on *gelao*.

Euripides makes use of this value for more satire in *Alcestis*, when Pheres shows himself impervious to ordinary strictures and reproaches (724-8). He feels no obligation to sacrifice himself for his son, much less for his daughter in law, and is cynical about avoiding ridicule: "You won't smile as you handle this old corpse" (724). Because of this, all that matters is that the corpse in question is not his; he is able to turn the fear of ridicule into an argument to support his case. He has, however, some ridicule of his own to offer; Admetus should marry many times and put off death indefinitely (720). This kind of gibe is highly cynical and in its inappropriateness reminds us of the laughter of the suitors in the *Odyssey*. Under pressure, Pheres becomes more cynical; life is sweet, evil report will not hurt him once he is dead, Alcestis may have behaved nobly but she was a fool (728). He has completely turned the tables on conventional values, pouring scorn on νῖδυς and going so far as to accuse Admetus of *hybris* (679). The loyal servant of Admetus' house utters a more conventional reproach (804) when he objects to Heracles' drunken κώμος and γέλως, neither of which is appropriate to a house of mourning.

In *Heracles*, with no thought of satire, Euripides depicts the kind of madness that afflicts Sophocles' Ajax. As Euripides says (931ff), Heracles is no longer himself, frothing at the mouth with starting, blood-rimmed eyes. When he speaks, it is with a deranged laugh: *gelos parapeplegmenos*. The same kind of laughter afflicts his servants as they glance at one another, torn between terror and laughter, and ask whether Heracles is joking or crazy (950-2). It can be seen that they do not know whether to join in the joke, and thus appease their master, or to give way to fear if this is indeed the laughter of madness.

In *Bacchae* 1079-81 Euripides uses *gelao* to express a strong sense of offence as he leads Pentheus, the mocker, on stage. Only in *Medea* does Euripides use *gelos* to express such a strong sense of offence. In 1041, Medea is ready to kill her children. She has deceived Jason, and all her plans have been set in motion. The chorus has just sung that there is now no hope for her children, who have taken her gift to Glauce. Now the children return and stand before her, and they smile at her. Innocent of hostile intent or interpretation, this is the only real smile in Greek tragedy[4], comparable, and perhaps intentionally so, to the smile of the infant Cypselus, to be mentioned in a later chapter, in Herodotus V 92. Medea uses the same word to describe both this smile and the mockery she dreads. For a moment it seems that she may relent (1040-8), but in 1049-50 she reminds herself of what else a smile can mean; she asks herself what she can be doing to risk making herself a

laughing stock,; and remains determined, justifying herself in 1060-1 with the words that are so similar to 781-2, rejecting any possibility of allowing her enemies any satisfaction.

During her final confrontation with Jason, Medea insists that he had no right to betray her and expect to enjoy himself at her expense: ἐγγελῶν ἐμοί 1355.
Shortly follow the two lines κ'αὕτη γε λύπη ..ἢν σὺ μὴ 'γγελᾶς that sum up the theme of the play; Jason points out that Medea has hurt herself as much as she has hurt him; but she retorts that he may bear in mind that she can endure it as long as Jason has no chance to crow over her. These lines say a good deal more than simply that she wants to make him miserable or herself happy; what is important to Medea is that she should have the ascendancy, and that Jason should acknowledge it. Hence the imperative ἴσθι in line 1362. Jason certainly concedes defeat; and Medea is, if not happy, at least willing to point out that his *hybris* has been the cause of it all. Pietro Pucci[5] adds: "The idea that 'it is unbearable to be laughed at by the enemy' still survives, but Medea can wipe that mocking grin from Jason's face only by initiating and then by sharing with him the most outrageous pain. Only from this equal sharing of grief can Medea reap eventually the 'gain' of inverting the symmetry and of placing herself as master over Jason." This is rather complicated; as has been noted, there is not necessarily any mocking grin on Jason's face, since Medea is talking about her own feelings. It should further be noted that Jason tries to

impress Medea with the notion that their sorrow is shared, and fails.

This fear of ridicule arises again in *The Children of Heracles*; Macaria makes it clear that she knows how important it is to avoid it in 476ff. Iolaus' cries of despair have brought her out of doors, taking more upon herself than befits her sex (479). When she hears of the sacrifice that is necessary if the city is to be saved, she makes a noble speech, in which she states that she will not hold her father's name up to ridicule. This is the principle that Creon expresses in Sophocles' *Antigone*; by failing in their duty to the *oikos* children humiliate the head of the family just as surely as if his enemies had ridiculed him in public. It does not appear to be a preposterous notion that this duty should include self-sacrifice to the point of death. This is the sole mention of laughter in the play; the theme is self-sacrifice and revenge. Revenge, however, must be justified; Eurystheus is the villian and there is never any doubt that punishment is in store for him.

It is possible that there is some macabre laughter in *The Trojan Women*. Cassandra makes her prophetic utterance (352ff), in which she urges her mother not to grieve, as by becoming Agamemnon's concubine she will become the means of his destruction. The chorus does not understand her, and finds her joy inappropriate. It is by no means sure that outright laughter

is always what is meant by *gelao*; but there is no doubt that the chorus is disturbed by Cassandra's attitude, and it is not unlikely that she could have burst into triumphant laughter at this point. The chorus' comment that she is laughing merrily amid the destruction of her family (406) then makes perfect sense, as the laughter seems to them to be the laughter of delusion. It should not be confused with the Homeric *hedy gelan epi tini* which refers to aggressive laughter. The only other mention of laughter in this play is Hecuba's famous debunking of the myth in 983. It is γέλως πολύς that three goddesses, not one of whom has anything to prove, should engage in the kind of competition that Helen and Paris have suggested. It should be noted that this is contemptuous language on Hecuba's part, and puts her in the wrong. It is to be expected that she will lose the argument.

Similarly, an example of inappropriate laughter occurs in *Iphigenia in Tauris*. The cowman announces the arrival of Orestes and Pylades. There has been disagreement over the possible identity of the two strangers, and foolish ridicule (276) of the suggestion that they may be the Dioscuri. In 502, Euripides makes a curious suggestion; Orestes is unwilling to tell Iphigenia his name, and explains that if he dies he will not be laughed at; that is to say, no one will be able to crow over him. This is all constructed in order to delay the anagnorisis, but if it is assumed that Euripides is here offering a plausible reason, then there is some interest in the

suggestion that there can be no satisfaction in supremacy without identity. This notion has been foreshadowed in the exchange between Odysseus and Polyphemus (Hom. ix 306, 408) and rejected in Arch. 6.

Euripides depicts embarrassment rather than humiliation in *Ion* 528. Ion, after repelling what he takes to be irrational advances, thinks Xuthus has come to make fun of him, when in fact he is greeting the youth as his son. Xuthus has, in his inconsiderate eagerness, made Ion feel a fool; not only does what Xuthus says sound ridiculous - *gelos* - but Ion has been put at a serious disadvantage if he has just threatened to shoot his own father (524). He is little comforted by the oracle's message; his first consideration is that the people of Athens will not take kindly to having a stranger foisted on them as the heir to the throne. Worse, he will be thought ridiculous by "men of influence and discretion" (598-600).

In all Euripides' work, and in Medea most of all, it can be seen that laughter is an extreme form of personal *hybris*. The two concepts are frequently associated, and there is never the explicit separation found in Sophocles' *Ajax*, where laughter is reserved exclusively for questions of self-esteem and *hybris* is the term bandied about during the quarrel that takes place after Ajax's death. In *Ajax*, *gelao* is used only once to mean a smile of any sort, when Teucer is describing the acerbic temperament of the aged Telamon (1010-1011). All other

usages refer to the aggressive attitude of others; the same is true of Euripides' *Medea*, as we have seen. The great difference between Medea and Ajax is that in his madness Ajax laughs aggressively, but Medea neither laughs nor is laughter attributed to her by others. When Ajax says οἴμοι γέλωτος he is really turning that laughter and aggression on himself, just as Antigone does when she insists on risking death and refuses to permit Ismene to share that risk with her. By contrast with these two, Medea is clear headed and single minded, and it is worth noting that in his reproaches to her at the end of the play Jason does not accuse her of laughing at him, nor is laughter mentioned at all; only *hybris*. The dread of ridicule is thus reserved exclusively as a motive for Medea. Like Sophocles, Euripides displays great variety of expression in the matter of ridicule. In addition to flexibility of cases and prefixes, including κατα-, which will receive attention in a subsequent chapter, he repeatedly employs the notion of rendering oneself a laughing stock, expressed in such phrases as μὴ γέλωτ' ὄφλω (*Supp.* 846, *Med.* 404, etc). An interesting usage appears in *Ion* 600: γέλωτ' ἐν αὐτοῖς λήψομαι.

Euripides many times, but Sophocles never, uses γέλως to denote not only the laughter but the absurdity itself, as in *Tr.* 983: *gelos polys*. Neither Sophocles nor Euripides is interested in *gelos* or *gelao* as ordinary smiles or laughter. The chorus' observation in Soph. *Aj.* 383 carries overtones of triumph; *Aj.* 1010-1011, as has been seen, refers to the morose parent

of Ajax and Teucer. In the case of *Iph. Aul.* 912: οὐδὲ φίλος οὐδείς γελᾷ μοι it should be noted that it is hostile persons who gloat; hence it is right to emend γελᾷ to πελᾷ with Markland (cf. O.C.T.). Laughter is inappropriate to friends and quite meaningless in this context.

It can be seen that notions of ridicule and humiliation have developed somewhat from those expressed in the Homeric epics. Whereas the latter works frequently depict laughter that is acceptable in its context, tragedy is concerned with aggressive laughter, inappropriate laughter, and the effect of such laughter on various characters. In tragedy, the sense of humiliation is so closely associated with ridicule that characters will speak of their feelings in these terms whether or not there has been any overt laughter. This is in complete contrast to the Homeric epics, where attention is focused on the laughter and the reaction is taken for granted. This reaction is of far greater interest to Sophocles and Euripides than it is to Aeschylus. In the *Odyssey* inappropriate laughter is a manifestation of *hybris*; in the work of Sophocles and Euripides it denotes an attitude that is related to *hybris*, but far less to be tolerated and greatly dreaded.

Notes to Chapter 3.

1. J D Denniston and Denys Page, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, edited with commentary, (Clarendon Press 1957), p 186.

2. E Fraenkel, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, edited with commentary, (Oxford University Press 1950), pp 589-90.

3. A W Verrall, *The Agamemnon of Aeschylus*, (Macmillan 1889), p 145.

4. *P Oxy.* 2256 9a: 36 may be an exception, however, though κἀγέλακακόν seems ominous. See above, p 66.

5. Pietro Pucci, *The Violence of Pity in Euripides'* Medea, (Cornell University Press 1980), p 131.

6. Euripides sets great store by self-sacrificing devotion; Alcestis, Polyxena, Iphigeneia, Macaria, Menoeceus, and Megara, who refuses to allow the citizens of Thebes to suffer on her behalf and recommends courage in the face of death. It should also be noted that of these willing victims only one is male. The other two tragedians do not seem to share his interest; certainly Iphigeneia does not go consenting to her death in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.

For the question of sacrifice, see H S Versnel, 'Self-Sacrifice, Compensation, and the Anonymous Gods', *Le Sacrifice dans l'Antiquité*, pp 135-187, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* (1980).

7. Woodbury, *diss.* 1944, p 77ff, notes the link between laughter and *hybris*; draws attention to Soph. *Aj.* 196-9, which include the rare and forceful term κακχάζω. Woodbury's study, and indeed scholarly work in general, has most to offer, as far as ridiculing laughter is concerned, on the work of Homer; from this point on, and particularly in this chapter, I have had recourse chiefly to primary sources.

Laughter, *Hybris*, and Humiliation.

In the *Iliad*, *hybris* is a personal matter. L Stoianovici-Donat[1] suggests that the theme of the *Iliad* is in fact based on the notion of *hybris* followed by *nemesis*. To account for the scarcity of the term *hybris* in the poem, he sees etymological links with the prefix ὑπερ. This is plausible and attractive, but does not alter the fact that Homer is not, even by implication, writing about *hybris* and *nemesis*. N R E Fisher[2], by contrast, says: "Agamemnon may commit an act of *hybris* against Achilles, but it would be wrong to see *hybris* as the most important part of his (or of Achilles') character; *hybris* is a major part of the character and actions of the suitors, and their downfall, while not without interest and variety, does not arouse the depth of emotions as does the end of the *Iliad*."

Homer does indeed first associate the notion of *hybris* with ridicule in the *Odyssey*. There is a passage, repeated three times, that gives some notion of the implications of *hybris*. On three occasions, when Odysseus finds himself in a strange place, he asks himself the important question: what kind of creatures inhabit this place? He couches the question (vi 120-1, ix 175-6, xiii 201-2) in antithetical form. It is tempting to see here an attempt at definition; the formulaic repetition indicates at the least an accepted notion. Odysseus asks, are they *hybristai te kai agrioi oude dikaioi*, or are they

philoxeinoi kai sphin noos esti theoudes?

It is interesting that no comment of this nature is offered on the way that Odysseus and his crew treated the Cicones. It seems that their only error was to hang about at the scene of the crime. It may be that for Homer, if guest-friendship is not by consent a two-sided affair, it is not an issue at all. When this question is applied to the Cyclopes, it is reinforced by Odysseus' remarks in ix 106ff, which are based on hindsight and add ominous irony to his question. The Cyclopes are ὑπερφίαλοι (cf. *Il.* XIII 621) and ἀθέμιστοι. The stress here is placed on the way men treat each other; it seems that arrogant, overbearing behaviour is not appropriate to those who cherish ties of guest friendship and are godly in their thinking.

With the above exception, hybristic behaviour is regularly imputed to the suitors. Athena says they are *hybrizontes hyperphialos* (i 227), their *hybris* is *hyperbion* (iv 321, 627; xvi 410); it reaches the sky (xv 329; vii 565); and Telemachus says of them: *hoi te moi hybrizontes atasthala mechanoontai* (iii 207). This phrase is repeated in xx 170, 370; and in xxiv 282, 352 the suitors are *atasthaloi* and their *hybris* is *atasthalos*.

Like *hybris* and *hybrizo*, *atasthalos* seldom refers to anyone other than the suitors. One such exception is the example in i 7. It refers to Odysseus' crew and describes their

behaviour in a context that makes it plain that they entirely deserve the consequences of their foolishness; Homer calls them νήπιοι for devouring the cattle of the sun. *Atasthalia* and its cognates form an interesting concept which seems to be derived from ἄτη and θάλλω. The scholia offer a variety of synonyms to explain *atasthalia*: ἀφραδία, ἁμαρτία, παράνοια; all of which contribute to an impression of brainless, wilful folly.

William F Wyatt Jr[3] concludes that ἀάω implies a gastric metaphor expressing overindulgence. He cites ii 61 and xxi 296, both of which refer to being glutted with wine and falling into error. To these I would add i 7 already mentioned, where the crew of Odysseus fall into fatal error through eating. Wyatt proceeds from these two examples to argue that *ate* itself is a form of overindulgence. He finds that *ate* is opposed to hunger in Hes. *Op.* 230-1, that Herodotus speaks of oversatisfying hunger in VIII 115, and that Panyassis (fr. 13 7-9 Kinkel, fr. 14 5-6) defines drinking too much as *ate* and *hybris*. He cites the use of *koros* in Pindar and Herodotus, and the phrase *tan akoreston auatan* (PMG 973). Verdenius[4] is doubtful about such a derivation, chiefly because he finds that θάλλω is not used in an unfavourable sense before Sophocles. I am, however, persuaded by Wyatt's suggestion.

This notion of self-indulgence is certainly well expressed in Homer's descriptions of the suitors, whose behaviour is described as *atasthalia* and who are continually stuffing

themselves with food and wine. Frisch [5] on the other hand ascribes rather too much to the concept when he suggests: "... *atasthalia* has a more religious flavour, as an audacious effrontery in regard of the gods, a meaning that *hybris* was later on to acquire". The association of the two in this way may have led to certain commonly held notions about *hybris*.

In book i 28ff, shortly after the mention of the foolishness of Odysseus' crew, a conversation on Olympus sets the theme for the poem itself. With Aegisthus in mind, Zeus observes that men blame the gods for their troubles but in fact bring most of their troubles upon themselves. They are destroyed by their own *atasthaliai*. Athena protests, saying that Odysseus is at present suffering the most evil fortune, but has done nothing to deserve it. This is picked up later (iv 693) when Penelope tells Medon that Odysseus has never been guilty of an *atasthalon* to anyone in his household. Zeus points out that Poseidon has a substantial grievance against Odysseus, but agrees that Odysseus must surely have paid for his treatment of Polyphemus by now. We are left in no doubt as to the nature of Odysseus' behaviour in this respect; Eurylochus describes it as *atasthaliai* in x 437.

Just as Odysseus pays for his wilful folly, so must the suitors. Again and again, their attitude is described in these terms, and just as Odysseus mocked the Cyclops, they laugh and laugh. *Hybris, atasthaliai, gelos*; these are the hallmarks, so to speak, of an attitude that brings disaster and forms the major

preoccupation of the *Odyssey*. What is the significance of this laughter? When associated with headstrong folly and arrogance, it makes for vivid characterisation. Even if the suitors do not always intend to ridicule their victims, their attitude is humiliating because it indicates their confidence in their ascendancy. As has been seen, this confidence is often misplaced; the suitors' laughter is loudest and emptiest when they are about to fall. Their laughter was truly the death of them.

In the *Theogony*, *hybris* is no more than a derogatory term that adds an element of violence to unacceptable behaviour. We notice the association of *hybris* with *atasthalia* that occurs in the *Odyssey*, and find in line 516 that *hybristes* Menoetius reaps the reward of his *atasthalia* just as do Odysseus' crew in Hom. i 7.

When Gaia makes the sickle and confronts her children (164), she calls Uranus *atasthalos*, meaning that his behaviour has no limits. The same attitude is ascribed to the Titans in 209. Frisch[6] summarises the use of *hybris* and *ate* in the earlier lyric poets. He links *ate* with *atasthalia*, and notes that *hybris* tends to mean presumption, arrogance, or both.

In *Works and Days*, there is a different concept. *Hybris* becomes an aspect of social behaviour that can destroy a community (238ff). If any member of that community acts

selfishly on his own behalf, the orderly production of crops will be disrupted, bringing disease, crop failure, famine, death, a drop in the birth rate, and vulnerability to external piracy and aggression. This, of course, applies particularly to a farming community where co-operation is obviously essential to success, but as will be seen this principle is extended to more complex communities.

Solon and Theognis take the same view as the author of *Works and Days*; *hybris* is opposed to *dike* and is seen as a disruptive element in the *polis*. All three of these poets are preoccupied with the community in which they live. As a consequence, they deal exclusively with the public face of *hybris* while describing it in terms that have so far been applied to dealings of a personal nature. The implication seems to be that force, greed, self indulgence, and indifference to the needs of others are as destructive to the community as they are to the individual (Theog. 835).

Of Aeschylus' plays, that which contains the most references to *hybris* is *The Suppliants*. For the purposes of the drama, *hybris* is not only a human but a male attribute (426, 487, 528, 817). The suppliants describe the Egyptians as hybristic in order to convince Pelasgus that the attitude of these men is such as warrants opposition.

The same attitude to *hybris* can be found in *The Persians*.

The Persians' behaviour is shown to be the cause of their defeat: *hybreos apoina k'atheon phronematon* (808).

In the same passage, blossoming *hybris* plucks the ripe ear of *ate* (821-2). Not every author associates *hybris* with *ate*; as already noted, the author of the *Odyssey* is more likely to associate it with laughter. Aeschylus, however, and others who will be mentioned in due course, seems to refer, albeit infrequently, to an accepted principle, and I believe this principle is foreshadowed in the association of *hybris* and *atasthalia* in the works examined so far.

In *Prometheus Bound*, the unpleasantly triumphant Kratos is most sarcastic to Prometheus as he chains him to his rock of torment: "Now see if you can take it upon yourself to steal the gifts of the gods and share them with the creatures of a day." (82-3) The term *ephemeros* is to be noted; it is another example of the bitterness that develops when mortals describe themselves, and of the contempt that can be implied by the words of a deity, neither of which has any place in the relations between gods and men as described by Homer.

In 970 Prometheus refers to the *hybris* of Zeus' messenger, Hermes, when he says: "This is the way to treat the hybristic with *hybris*". casting a slur on the master through the servant. The presence of Zeus, the uneasy tyrant, dominates the stage although he never appears. This concept of the deity is

never found in Homer, though there is more than a hint of it in Hesiod. Here the deity is resentful of mortals and determined to humiliate Prometheus. *Hybris* only occurs twice in this play, but in each case its use is striking enough to draw attention to this sense of rivalry between men and gods.

More rivalry occurs in *Seven Against Thebes* when Eteocles looks forward to defeating Tydeus. Tydeus' rather vainglorious shield will be fitting testimony to his *hybris* once he lies dead (406). Here the use of *hybris* is incidental, almost casual, with none of the weighty overtones that occur, for instance, in the *Oresteia*.

In *Agamemnon* Aeschylus makes his strongest statement yet about *hybris*, in the well known passage 763-771. Here the poet suggests that *hybris* is a quality that thrives from generation to generation, and that *ate* is an inexorable consequence. The next usage (1612) pales by contrast; the ineffectual chorus tells Aegisthus that it does not approve of *hybris* in evil circumstances. They mean that Aegisthus is showing obvious satisfaction in his present supremacy; Aegisthus is not interested in their views, but the implication that *ate* will follow cannot have been lost on the audience. M Mund-Dopchie[7] notes the antithesis of *hybris* and *dike* in the works mentioned so far. The author also notes that the absence of *dike* and the presence of *hybris* produce identical consequences; they engender *ate*, "l'égarement funeste". In

Cho. 508-515, the phrase *to dikaion metabainei* seems to imply that what is just is moving in another direction, and the author is suggesting that what is changed is the path of *hybris*. This is certainly the nearest that Aeschylus comes to mentioning *hybris* in *The Choephoroe*. In *The Eumenides* the Erinyes, lashing out in fury, speak of *hybris* in a different way, calling it the child of unholiness (534). This is the only reference to *hybris* in the play; it conveys strong feeling and foreshadows the inevitable humiliation of the Erinyes.

It can be seen that Aeschylus regards *hybris* as a useful concept, and resembles the lyric poets more than Homer in his views. Personal humiliation is not an issue for Aeschylus, who is more interested in relating his characters to universal principles.

Pindar takes the view of *hybris* that is found in Aeschylus and the lyric poets[a]. Pindar, however, does not concern himself with the welfare of the community; his concerns and subject matter are different. He twice uses the phrase *hybris knodalon* in the first instance it refers to the excited state of the donkeys that the Hyperboreans are sacrificing to Apollo (*Py.* X 36), and in the second to the snakes that attack the infant Heracles (*Ne.* I 50). This phrase expresses energy and little else. Otherwise *hybristes* is used as an epithet (*Py.* IV 284) or to denote an attitude or mistake that leads to disaster. The idea of a mistake occurs in *Py.* I 72, where *hybris* refers to

the behaviour of the Carthaginians and Etruscans, who thought they could win at Cumae. Their *hybris* was *nausistonos*, and obviously derived from a miscalculation.

The connection between ridicule and *hybris* is not to be found in the poets between Homer and Sophocles. The terminology is present in all their work, but Homer treats *ate* and *atasthalia* as a cause, rather than an effect, of *hybris*. D Herbert Abel[73] notes four generatons in the family of Vice; *Ploutos* in the first, *Koros* in the second, *Hybris* and *Aphrosyne* in the third, and *Ate* and *Kakotes* in the fourth. He accepts Gildersleeve's explanation of the curious reversal of the generations in *Ol.* XIII 10, where Pindar speaks of *hybris* as the "bold-tongued mother of surfeit". I am inclined to think that this and other loose definitions occur because it is not Pindar's prime object to make a point about the causes or results of *koros* or *hybris*. He makes free and general use of the term, as has been shown, and is by no means consistent in listing the generations. For instance, in *Ol.* I 54-7 he omits *hybris*, and in *Py.* II 25-9 he omits *koros*. If, like Solon and Theognis, he had a didactic purpose in describing these generations, he might well be more specific and consistent.

In two of his plays, Aeschylus makes reference to *hybris* as a personal matter. In *Prometheus Bound*, it describes the feeling between Zeus and Prometheus. Theirs is an intense personal rivalry in which no quarter is given or asked. The same feeling

appears in *Seven Against Thebes*, and is part of the process by which Eteocles not only introduces his adversaries to the audience but works up his courage for the conflict ahead. These are intimations of the kind of feelings that are expressed in later work, and which are so clearly portrayed in Sophocles' *Ajax*.

The first mention of *hybris* in this play occurs in 153 when the chorus comes to see whether what they have heard is true. Odysseus, in spite of his compassionate words in 121-6, has apparently wasted no time in spreading the tale of Ajax's delusion. The chorus says that "everyone who hears rejoices more than he who tells it, congratulating himself - κακθυβρίζων - on your misfortune". The chorus describes just what one would expect Ajax to imagine: the whisperings and the petty envy and spite. The chorus expresses nothing but contempt for this behaviour (154ff) and in 196-9 refers again to busy tongues and *hybris*. It is the *hybris* of enemies that is important. It seems to be taken for granted that friendship and esteem can only exist between equals; by falling into error Ajax has made himself an object of contempt. By definition, anyone in a position to behave with *hybris* must be an enemy. In lines 303-4 Tecmessa describes how Ajax has deceived himself. In his delusion, he thinks he has got the better of his enemies. He slaughters creatures wholesale, hurls abuse, laughs long and loud, and thus thoroughly indulges his personal animosity against Odysseus and the Atreidae. He thinks he can afford to

laugh, having exacted compensation for the way they insulted him. But by laughing too soon he has made his position impossible. As soon as he sees what he has done, he becomes ridiculous in his own eyes. The passive voice in 367 expresses his plight; to be γέλωτος and ὑβριστὴς are one and the same. In 560, he extends his fears to his son; there is adequate motive for suicide in these lines. Better a dead father than one who commands no respect.

After his death Tecmessa, before her character vanishes from the play, utters a speech that is full of antitheses and worth quoting at length. The chorus has thoroughly reviled Odysseus; he "gloats in his malignant heart" and "laughs a mighty laugh" at Ajax's woes. The Atreidae are just as bad, and Tecmessa agrees:

> Just like them, to guffaw and gloat over his sorrows.
> Perhaps, even if they didn't want him when he was alive,
> now that he is dead they may miss his spear in battle.
> Fools do not recognise the good they have in their
> hands - until someone throws it away.
> The death he died is as sweet to them as it is bitter to me,
> and a blessing to him. He brought upon himself the fate
> he wanted, a death of his own choosing.
> Why would they mock him for that?
> He died to please the gods, not them.
> Let Odysseus enjoy that, if he is so foolish.

Ajax no longer exists for them, but he is lost to me
and leaves me grief and sorrow.

(961-973)

As so often, Sophocles puts the important words into the mouth of an idealistic woman. The antithesis is strongly drawn between what Ajax's death means to him and what it means to others, with a poignant word for Tecmessa's grief and despair, which all know have no bearing on the action of the play. If Ajax had thought as Tecmessa does, there would have been no need to die; but in practical terms this was not possible. It was not sufficient for him to know that the mockery of his fellows was empty and foolish; he could not live among them unless they knew it as well.

The argument that rages over Ajax's corpse is full of charges and counter-charges of *hybris* but does not mention laughter at all. Menelaus flings the charge at Teucer (1061, 1081, 1088), the chorus bravely returns it (1092); so does Teucer (1151), and Agamemnon retaliates in his turn (1258). All seem to be impelled by righteous indignation; they are not talking about their own feelings so much as criticising another's attitude. This is not comparable to Ajax's anguish; his was such that only the subjective mention of laughter could express it. All the contenders are quite secure in their own opinion of themselves and of their position with regard to their fellows. Even Teucer is not overborne by the slurs cast on his breeding, but returns

the insults of the Atreidae with gusto. *Gelos* and *hybris* may be closely associated, but they are by no means the same thing. A character is demoralised indeed before he speaks of laughter.

Fisher[10] notes that *hybris* in *Ajax* implies "dishonouring and aggressive behaviour", correctly insisting that this play is not about "*hybris* against the gods". He is worried by Ajax's "boasting" 756-759, and attempts to explain why it is not called *hybris* in spite of the punishment he receives. Fisher in fact goes on to make the necessary point, that Ajax "felt total confidence in his own abilities" and does not "offer a direct challenge to the power of the gods". In any case, such is clearly not the subject of this play. Engelbert Drerup[11] falls into the same error when he interprets certain passages of Hom. V as hybristic behaviour on the part of Diomedes. Although Diomedes' behaviour is nowhere described as such, Drerup sees it in such phrases as *isa phroneein theoisin* (V 440-1) and *daimoni isos* (V 438). Drerup says "Denn nichts ist den Göttern mehr verhasst als die aus der innersten Persönlichkeit des Menschen hervorquellende *hybris*." I think Hom. V is unique not for descriptions of *hybris* but for the interaction it shows between men and gods. It is intimacy that is described, not presumption.

Sophocles' Electra is another character who speaks of laughter when demoralised. She finds the conduct of Clytaemestra and Aegisthus intolerable; their *hybris* is *teleutaion* to her

(*El.* 271) and although she does not yet feel that their scorn is directed at her, she is disgusted by Clytaemestra's complacency (275-281). When Clytaemestra comes to defend herself, it is plain that she feels herself at a disadvantage. She loses no time in reproaching Electra for her charges of *hybris* (522-3), but their position is obviously a stalemate of long standing (612-615). It is the news of Orestes' death that breaks this stalemate, and the change is reflected in the words that Electra uses. Clytaemestra makes no attempt to conceal what the news means to her, and Electra is devastated to see her brother's memory thus insulted (790). In 794 she says, "Congratulate yourself! Now you are the lucky one." Clytaemestra does exactly that, and as she leaves Electra speaks of her own feelings in the terms noted in the previous chapter. This mood is not easily relieved; when Chrysothemis arrives with good news, Electra assumes that she is taunting her. Significantly, in her reply Chrysothemis immediately protests that she is not speaking with *hybris* (881). Even when confronted with Orestes himself, Electra remains preoccupied with her despair. In what is perhaps the only truly moving moment in the play, Electra, holding a funerary urn in her hands, mourns her brother and abandons all hope. Not only does she say that her enemies are laughing: γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί (1153) but she goes so far as to say what she means; her mother, who is no mother, is "mad with delight" (1153-4), which are strong words to describe Clytaemestra's new-found ascendancy. Orestes, however, despite the warnings of his tutor, can allow Electra to

suffer no longer, but makes himself known to her. The play then proceeds to its appointed end; there is no more talk of *hybris* or mocking laughter.

It is significant that in *Antigone* the first person to mention not only *gelan* but *hybris* is Creon. He is astonished by Antigone's behaviour; iron can be heated and moulded, a mettlesome horse can be controlled by a small piece of metal, and yet this feeble creature not only tramples the established laws but glories in what she does. His reason for his sense of outrage follows at once; the creature is trespassing on his manhood (473-485). It is at once obvious that Creon must assert himself at any price. This is the tragedy; by threatening to make Creon despicable in his own eyes, Antigone has made it impossible for him to act otherwise than he does. At all costs, he must maintain face and assert his authority, otherwise she, not he, will be the man (484). By introducing the theme of humiliation in this way, Sophocles is able to portray moments of great vulnerability. At this moment, the contrast between Creon and Antigone is quite clear. Antigone, because she is thinking only in terms of where her duty may lie, is so self confident that she can contemptuously ask Creon whether he has anything worse than death in store for her; Creon, on the other hand, thinking only in terms of his own prestige, can only relate her actions to himself, and his mental state approaches panic. While I have no intention of making this a philosophical or psychological study, it should be noted here that Sophocles is

portraying Antigone at this point as a character who is capable of distinguishing between her own concerns and the external necessities. He has already drawn such a contrast between her and Ismene (1-99), and will shortly do so again (536-60).

Once Antigone approaches her grave, her attitude changes. This is not to be considered as inconsistent characterisation, or even a change of heart. It is a new situation and calls for different behaviour. It is not that Antigone regrets her decision - in fact she reiterates it in some detail (891ff) - but her thoughts at this moment are concentrated on herself. Not for Sophocles the appalling serenity of Euripides' self sacrificing maidens; his Antigone is terrified by the prospect of death and calls to mind all the attributes of life. In this moment of weakness and vulnerability she says what we might expect: *oimoi gelomai. ti me ..ouk oichomenon hybrizeis?* 839-841). No one in fact is laughing at her or even treating her with contempt; the chorus' attempt at comfort is no more than the usual trite offering at such moments. Antigone is describing her own feelings in truly subjective terms. Like Ajax, she is alone and on the brink of death. No one can imagine another's feelings at such a moment, but Sophocles' choice of words is an attempt to convey a state of mind.

Sophocles' purpose is quite different in *Oedipus the King*. The only mention of *hybris* is in the well known and problematic passage 872-82. Here Sophocles goes to great lengths to define

hybris. It is not a word to be bandied about in argument, as it is in *Ajax*, but is conspicuously absent from such interchanges as the quarrelling of Oedipus with Teiresias and Creon. Other terms are used instead; there are accusations of plotting to betray the king and destroy the city (330), dishonouring the city, (340), or speaking in shameless hostility (354-5).

Sophocles' definition is thematically important, coming as it does at the turning point of the play. *Hybris*, according to the chorus, gives rise to the tyrant. This is the only cryptic line in the ode; Oedipus is clearly no tyrant in the bad sense, though he has just behaved in a most arrogant manner towards Teiresias and Creon. If *hybris* is treated simply as arrogance which may lead to more tyrannical behaviour, the ensuing lines lose much of their point, which surely is to establish *hybris* as the kind of complacency that thrives on unpunished wickedness. That is to say, an offence not against other men but against the gods themselves. To suggest that Oedipus is guilty of both kinds, the chorus really should be in the know, and in order to achieve the particular irony and foreboding that he wants at this moment, it may be that Sophocles has chosen to let it speak as though it is. Thus he is able to suggest that arrogance and pride based on overblown success are part of what the gods have planned for Oedipus. Little wonder, then, that the term *hybris* is not bandied about in this play as it is in *Ajax*; here Sophocles is concerned not with competitive

arrogamce between men, but with a more dangerous kind of complacency which only the gods can see and punish. I suggest that this is also the reason why ridicule is only mentioned once, when Creon reassures the blind Oedipus at 1422.

I am much attracted to Winnington-Ingram's[12] argument in his discussion of the second stasimon, in which he accepts, despite his confessed repugnance, Blaydes' emendation ὕβριν φυτεύει τυράννις. This at least removes the difficulty of the apparent reversal of the familiar maxim; Ruth Scodel[13] however, rejects this emendation and provides respectable antecedents for the reversal. Her reading then requires an interpretation of the poem referring equally to the problem of *hybris* in the community and to Oedipus and his fate. It is simpler, I think, to bear in mind that Sophocles deliberately avoids referring to *hybris* in a personal or political sense anywhere else in this play, and to take *hybris*, whether nominative or accusative, in the Aeschylean sense as referring to the real anxieties and dangers represented in Oedipus' current attitude and position. Fisher[14] likewise sees no need to adopt Blaydes' emendation and for his part warns against assuming that the *Oresteia* and *Oedipus the King* are intended to make a point about *hybris*. He feels that the usage in *O.T.* 873ff indicates the chorus' anxious comments on the previous scene: "..tyrannical tendencies in him are just beginning to appear".

It seems, then, that in Sophocles' work, and particularly in

Ajax, *Electra*, and *Antigone*, *hybris* may imply a degree of offensive ridicule that is less than that implied by *gelao*. This distinction is clearest in *Ajax*, where the drama falls into two sections, of which one deals with humiliating laughter and the other with offensive *hybris*. In this play Sophocles shows under what circumstances a man becomes sensitive to ridicule. The cause of Ajax's rage is the difference between his estimation of himself and the judgement placed upon him by his fellows. By the accepted standards of strength and valour, he should have received the arms of the dead Achilles; Odysseus, however, had other qualities to offer, and received a public token; the esteem of his peers. As a consequence, Ajax has lost the grounds on which he may base his self esteem; his thoughts turn first to murder, and then, when he finds that the gods have turned against him as well, to suicide. In *Antigone*, Creon is a similar character; he fears the kind of *hybris* that leads to laughter. Sophocles does not treat *hybris* as part of the *koros - hybris - ate* cycle but as part of the relations between individuals or between exceptional individuals and the community. As Fisher[15] remarks: "..Aristotle was quite right not to mention *hybris* in the *Poetics* ..it is clearly wrong to characterise tragedy in general, or Aeschylean or Sophoclean tragedy in particular, as being largely concerned with the punishment of mortal men by Zeus for their *hybris*, or with the great or heroic man failing to avoid *hybris*". For Fisher, *hybris* has to do with "the honour of the individual in his community". In Sophocles' work it is part of the process of

mutual jostling that is such an important part of characterisation, and lends interest to the drama. In *Oedipus the King* Sophocles introduces two vehement arguments (314ff, 512ff), each of which takes place because Oedipus feels his power threatened. What is interesting, though, is that in neither of these confrontations is *hybris* mentioned. Its only occurrence in this play, as has been seen, corresponds more closely to the Aeschylean sense. Otherwise, when Sophocles' characters speak of *hybris* to one another they are usually trying to put one another in the wrong. As long as characters are secure in their opinion of themselves and what they are doing, they will counter all charges and speak of *hybris* in return. If, however, they feel themselves humiliated, they will become disconsolate and speak of laughter.

This is the motivation for Medea's behaviour in Euripides' play. She repeatedly says that she is being mocked, and attributes her predicament to Jason's *hybris*. In 255, for instance, she says: ὑβρίζομαι πρὸς ἀνδρὸς, and in 603-4: ἀλλ' ὕβρις. She does not mean that he is gloating; she is drawing the contrast between the way he looks after himself and the way he looks after her. She extends this attitude to her children; in 1060-1 she intends to make sure that her enemies cannot insult - καθύβρισαι - her children. Even after they are dead her attitude is the same; no one shall touch even their tombs to insult - καθυβρίσῃ - them (1380-1).

Medea feels this *hybris* so keenly that she calls it laughter, and takes desperate measures to counter it. It should be noted that she speaks in masculine and heroic terms when she is describing her motives; this almost sounds like a parody of male values, especially as Euripides is at some pains to give her some very feminine motives and behaviour, rather as Aeschylus does in the case of Clytaemestra, who is otherwise so masculine. There is no doubt that in some contexts *hybris* seems to imply masculine aggression; McDowell[5] has gone so far as to suggest that "the most common meaning of *hybris*, even in Aeschylus, is *lust*", and we have noted the examples in Aeschylus and Pindar so far. This makes it all the more interesting when these alarming women speak of *hybris* and the treatment they think it deserves.

If Euripides wishes to establish a character as a villain, he accumulates the accusations of *hybris*. In *The Children of Heracles* Eurystheus is the villain and the audience is never permitted any doubt that punishment is in store for him. In a strong statement (18) Iolaus mentions his insulting behaviour: ὕβρισμ' ὕβρισας, and goes on to describe his actions with emphatic prefixes: ἐξαιτεῖ, ἐξείργει (20), προτείνων (21). καθύβρισας refers to Eurystheus in 457, ὕβριν in 924, and finally Alcmene reproaches him with ἐφύβρισας .. καθύβρισας in 947-8. *Hybris* and its verbs and compounds refer in this play only to Eurystheus; thus he is established as a character who brings his doom upon himself in the Homeric manner.

In Euripides' *The Suppliants* Theseus makes a formal and sermonising reply to Adrastus' plea, and offers a number of general observations including one concerning the kind of man who seizes power in order to gratify himself: ὡς ὑβρίζῃ (235). The next characters to mention *hybris* are the supp liants themselves, on the arrival of the herald, who establishes himself as the overbearing bully. Theseus finds him too talkative, and the suppliants find him too smug, saying that whenever the god grants success to the wicked, they believe in their self importance - ὑβρίζουσ' (464) - that they will always prosper. No whit abashed, the herald returns the charge. Theseus, he says, wants to receive and bury dead enemies whose *hybris* destroyed them (495); the implication is that it was their own choice, and their own fault. The suppliants complain

again of the herald's attitude in 512: ὑβρίζειν .. τοιαῦτ' ὕβριν. In 633 they remind Zeus that this insult to the Argives is as bad as an insult to him. Later, the messenger announcing Theseus' victory praises him for showing mercy and restraint. The ideal leader hates the ὑβριστὴς λαός (728); it seems that Theseus will avoid disaster by remaining temperate in success.

Aegisthus is thoroughly put in the wrong in *Electra*. He is repeatedly accused of *hybris* (58, 257, 266, 231, 947). In 698 καθύβρισαι means the same as *gelao* in *Medea* or *Ajax*; Electra will go to any lengths to ensure that her "enemies" never have a chance to take their insulting vengeance on her body. Pentheus is put in the wrong in the same way in *The Bacchae*. Not only is he accused (206, 1081, etc) of *hybris*, but a symptom of his hybristic attitude is that he accuses others of such behaviour - ὕβρεις ὑβρίζων (247) - and considers the old prophet and his grandfather a great joke (250). Menelaus behaves in the same way in *Andromache*, accusing even the helpless Andromache of *hybris* and thus deserving the charge himself (434).

When Hippolytus is defending himself against his father's accusations, he carefully lists his own good qualities. Among these he mentions that he never mocks his associates: *ouk eggelastes ton homilounton* (1000), but has the same attitude of friendship towards φίλοι whether or not they are present. The use of *philoi* is significant; it indicates that since his

associates are dear to him he will not indulge in the luxury of mockery; how much less is he likely to rape another's wife? There is a suggestion that an ἐγγελαστής is more likely to commit the kind of offence that Theseus later describes as *eis patroon alochon hybrizein* (1073).

Another character whose *hybris* puts him firmly in the wrong is Lycus (Eur. *Her.* 261, 313, 741, 808).

There is no doubt that Euripides, like Sophocles and Homer, uses *hybris* on occasion to describe an offence very similar to that described by *gelao*. The only difference is that of degree. Medea seems to consider the laughter worse than the *hybris*, but this is not necessarily so in every play. In *Andromache*, Orestes, still apparently obsessed by his mother's death, is applying to marry Hermione, who was promised to him before she was married to Neoptolemus. It seems that Menelaus despised the matricide: ἦν ὑβριστής, and reproached him with mention of the furies (977-8). There is no doubt that here ὑβριστής refers to sneering and contempt. In *The Trojan Women* 997, Euripides puts a most unusual and emphatic compound into the mouth of Hecuba when she imagines Helen's behaviour once restored to the court of her husband. The term she uses is ἐνκαθυβρίζειν, the only example extant in Euripides. In 1020, Hecuba says ὕβριζες of Helen's conduct in Paris' household; although this is strong language, it means little more than that Helen, confident in her beauty, is giving herself airs, and in fact tells us more about

Hecuba's feelings than it does about Helen. In *The Phoenician Women* 1592 Creon says to Oedipus, in words that remind the reader of Soph. *O.T.* 1422:

καὶ τάδ' οὐχ ὕβρει λέγω οὐδ' ἐχθρὸς ὢν σός

showing how close to laughter *hybris* can be in Euripides' work.

Euripides is exceptional in attributing *hybris* to gods as part of their attitude to mortals. Fisher[7] observes that "his gods, when treated anthropormorphically, show excessive concern to react to attacks on their honour ..Their *hybris* might possibly evoke a response of human *nemesis* (e.g. *Ion* 463ff); it will not be followed by punishment". In *Hippolytus* 445-6, the nurse suggests that Cypris always makes a fool of - καθύβρισεν - anyone who thinks himself superior. The notion is not strange; Aphrodite's familiar epithet has been remarked upon in chapter 1; what is disconcerting is that instead of the usual terms the nurse uses *hybris*. She is reiterating Aphrodite's statement in 6: *sphallo d' hosoi phronousin eis hemas mega*; she repeats φρονεῖν μέγα, and καθύβρισεν seems to be the equivalent of σφάλλω. The nurse then develops a specious argument to show that failure to indulge in sexual gratification is an insult to the goddess, for *hybris* consists of the wish to be greater than the gods. This is most ironic in view of the fact that it is exactly Aphrodite's claim against Hippolytus. In *The Bacchae* 616 Dionysus shows his contempt - καθύβρισ' - for Pentheus by escaping without effort from prison. It seems, then,

that *hybris* on the part of a god is not quite the offence that is committed by mortals.

In these contexts, contemptuous *hybris* is similar to contemptuous laughter and like laughter is a privilege that must be earned. There is an example of *hybris* treated as the prerogative of a mortal; in *Electra* 900ff Electra is embarrassed, but she very much wants to express her contempt and triumph over the corpse of Aegisthus. She uses the term ὑβρίζειν, which is used in the reproachful sense everywhere else in this play. She is also anxious that she should not incur φθόνος by so doing (902). This does not seem to imply divine *phthonos*, for Orestes hastens to assure her that no one could find fault with her for this, and she proceeds to give vent to her pent up bitterness and hate. This is very striking, for it is normal for characters in all works studied so far to disclaim *hybris* on their own behalf. At the very least she is saying that she does not want to be rude but she can't help it.

When mortals use the term *hybris*, they may be speaking subjectively of their own reactions to another's behaviour or they may be letting us know that a particular character is about to receive his or her just deserts. This even applies to the much wronged Hecuba; when Polymestor in his agony asks if she is enjoying what she has done to him: χαίρεις ὑβρίζουσ', the words are well chosen, for the awful prophecy about the bitch scrabbling at the mast is about to follow. The implication is

that Hecuba gets what she deserves, in spite of the extreme provocation she has suffered. It is not, however, until we hear the prophecy that *hybrizousa* takes on this colour.

Again and again in tragedy, it is not the simple use of the term *hybris* that necessarily marks out a character as being misguided or in the wrong. A character may accuse others of *hybris* and yet be the most hybristic character on stage; on the other hand, a character may be accused of *hybris* and yet events may show that the gods are on his side. In a play like *The Bacchae*, the use of the term *hybris* combined with the context in which it appears clearly establishes the weakness of Pentheus' position; in *Andromache*, on the other hand, the unsympathetic characters Menelaus and Orestes use the term of others and seldom have it applied to them. This is very different from the unequivocal *hybris - ate* formula that is found in Aeschylus' work, and it seems that Euripides is far more interested in depicting attitudes or behaviour in which *hybris* may figure as a stage along the way to the ultimate offence of aggressive laughter. That is to say, he is describing degrees of humiliation.

In the course of knockabout fun, it is inevitable that Aristophanes' characters accuse one another of *hybris*. In such contexts, the term almost invariably means cheek, and the more gross it is, the better. This cheek runs from inspecting the moon's backside, which is an insult to the gods (*Clouds* 1506), to using a breastplate for a commode, which the breastplate seller declares is an insult to his handiwork (*Peace* 1229). Cleon is shown to be particularly sensitive in *Knights* 722-727. He is exchanging insults with the sausage seller, who turns his righteous phrases into obscenities. Cleon promises that the sausage seller won't be so cheeky in council. He calls on the "dear people" to see how he is insulted, having recourse, in parody of tragic style, to the unusual flourish of περιυβρίζομαι.

In two more instances at least, *hybris* is used satirically in the tragic mode. In *The Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis has declared market, not war; the chorus says Aristophanes is as instructive as tragedy, though he has been accused by the city of making fun of it and insulting the people'ȣ. Earlier in the same play, the reference to tragedy is clearer as Euripides, speaking ludicrously in grand style, tries to get rid of Dicaeopolis:

ἀνὴρ ὑβρίζει· κλεῖε πήκτα δωμάτων.

There is no doubt that most of Aristophanes' humour is derived from setting characters up as the butt of ridicule either from the audience or from another character. What is interesting is

that the term used for ridicule of this nature is *hybris* rather than *gelao* in any of its forms. There are but eight instances of laughter expressed with this verb, whereas there are at least thirty examples of ridicule expressed by *hybris*. Of the examples of *gelao*, *Wealth* 757 is an expression of joy in a passage that in style and vocabulary parodies tragic narrative; *Birds* 733 and *Clouds 1078* include laughter in a list of harmless pleasures; and *Wasps* 567 associates σκώπτω and *gelao* to express the kindlier side of laughter:

οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἵν' ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν
καταθῶμαι.

On the other hand, in *Frogs* 42-5, Heracles is enjoying his own hilarity, which is certainly ridicule of another. He is so amused at the sight of Dionysus that he cannot contain his laughter, which he describes as *gelao* and *gelos*. In *Peace* 1066, 1245, *Birds* 802-3 and *Acharnians* 1126 the character protesting under ridicule refers to it with the term *gelao*.

In general, however, *hybris* is the term used for ridicule. It seems that, like Sophocles and Euripides, Aristophanes occasinally uses *gelao* to express a greater degree of *hybris*. It is to be noted that in all cases *gelao* is used to denote outright laughter, which in one case is even spelt out - ἀἰβοιβοῖ (*Peace* 1066).

Herodotus' interest in cause and effect shows in his use of *hybris* and his development of varied and forceful compounds.

In I 100 2, Deioces, a sensitive ruler, newly established, seems to be seeking status. He sends his spies all over the country looking for instances of *hybris*. Since no one is allowed to laugh or spit in the royal presence, it is likely that the possible *hybris* would be on the part of his subjects toward himself rather than one another. It seems clear that it is contemptuous behaviour that is meant. In I 106 1 and VI 137 3 Herodotus associates *hybris* with ὀλιγωρία, humiliation. This seems to be the sense in which he most commonly uses it; in I 114 5 the youthful Cyrus has just betrayed his ancestry and belaboured the son of Artembares. When Artembares shows Astyages the boy's shoulders, he uses strong language, περιυβρίσμεθα, a forceful compound not found before Herodotus. Another strong compound is κατυβρίσας, which occurs in I 212 3 where Tomyris of the Massagetae sends a message to Cyrus after his triple victory: τριτημορίδι τοῦ στρατοῦ κατυβρίσας. This term has been translated as "triumph over", which goes some way towards expressing the notion of humiliation in defeat that Herodotus is apparently at some pains to convey.

Perhaps the worst *hybris* of all, though, is expressed by ἐξυβρίζειν. In IV 146 1, Herodotus describes the insufferable behaviour of the Minyans, who demanded a share in the kingship of Sparta and altogether failed to show the proper gratitude for

the friendship shown them. ἐξυβρίζειν is here associated with doing things that are not fitting: τὰ οὐκ ὅσια . For such a flagrant breach of the rules of hospitality it seems that an emphatic word is needed. Another variation that appears for the first time in Herodotus is the noun ὕβρισμα in III 48 1; an insult perpetrated by the Spartans is rankling with the Corinthians. In VII 160 Gelon is retaining his dignity; the harsh words he has just heard from Syagrus are provoking, but he will not be goaded into unseemly behaviour by these ὑβρίσματα.

Study of the compounds that appear in the work of Herodotus and the dramatists suggests that at about this time the term *hybris* was becoming somewhat overworked, and that emphatic compounds were developed according to need. There is no doubt that the changing nature of drama and the direction of Herodotus' interests have a similar effect; *hybris* more and more frequently comes to mean what Homer means by *gelao* in the *Odyssey*. There is now a difference expressed between the inevitable consequences of prosperity and behaviour that is wilfully offensive and self indulgent at another's expense.

The first mention of *hybris* in Thucydides' work is in I 38. The Corinthian envoys are addressing the Athenians on the subject of Corcyra. The Corcyreans want Athenian assistance against the Corinthians, who in their view are making too much of the privileges of a mother city. The Corinthians use emotive language; the Corcyreans have not behaved as *agathoi andres* and have shown no *arete* or done the things that are *dikaia*. The Corinthians did not found a colony in order to be insulted - ἐφυβρίζεσθαι - but in order to be leaders and to be respected as such. They claim that they have the devotion and respect of their other colonies, whereas the Corcyreans, full of *hybris* and confidence in their resources, have seized Epidamnus. It is interesting that in their reply the Corcyreans do not accuse the Corinthians of *hybris*; is Corinth here to be regarded in the same way as Euripides' Menelaus? (see above p 108).

Another example of this kind of emotive language occurs in III 39 when Cleon is advocating massacre at Mytilene. He insists that the case calls for firmness and intimidation and says, taking a moralising tone, that the Mytileneans have abandoned the alliance and put force before justice. If prosperity comes too easily, he says, *hybris* follows; the Mytileneans do not value their good fortune because they have not learned to appreciate it. Diodotus' reply is interesting because it makes no attempt to contradict the familiar maxim. He agrees that licence is fed by *hybris* and greed, these being part of man's nature. This being so, it ought to be clear that men are

incorrigible and no deterrent is sufficient to prevent them from following their desires. It is the Athenians' privilege, then, to show moderation in this instance.

The Spartans make a similar plea on their own behalf in IV 18. The occasion is the temporary armistice at Pylos, and Thucydides seems to choose this moment to place a review of the situation into the mouth of the Spartan envoys. It is clear that the Spartans are at a disadvantage and know it; the terms in which they couch their request are of course governed by this knowledge; however, the words which Thucydides gives them to say have implications for more than the immediate conflict, which as it happens will end successfully for the Athenians. Like Diodotus, they reflect on the effects of unexpected prosperity, which in their case has caused them to overreach their capabilities. In what is perhaps a less than cogent argument in their present circustances, they suggest that the Athenians may find themselves in the same situation one day. The Spartans know what their reputation has been and now they must ask for what it was formerly their place to give. They plead that they did not become hybristic when their power was great, but made their errors γνώμῃ σφαλέντες rather than because of *hybris*.

This distinction between *hybris* and an error in judgement is worth noting, particularly as our study so far has made it clear that *hybris* is distinguished above all by wilfulness. What is the difference between the attitude referred to as *hybris* and

a mistaken estimation of one's own capabilities? It cannot be that one escapes the charge of *hybris* by being correct in such an estimation, for the Spartans are expressly rejecting the charge in spite of their error. The difference must lie in the motive, and IV 98 bears this out. In this passage, the Boeotian envoy is opposing the Athenian envoy after the battle at Delium. The Athenians have allegedly committed various impieties in the temples there, which include the use of the libation water. The Athenians deny it; the Boeotians should, in alien territory, allow the local customs to prevail, and therefore the Athenians should arrange matters in the temples. Furthermore, they had been compelled out of need to use the water, and had not done so out of *hybris*. It is evident here that the Athenians wish to emphasise that they did not act out of a wish to humiliate; this in turn implies that this was the expected motive for persons in their position. Thus it comes about that Thucydides, when discussing the mutilation of the *Hermae*, uses the expression ἐφ' ὕβρει (VI 28) when describing the parody of the Eleusinian mysteries that Alcibiades was thought to have enacted in a private house.

Only twice does Thucydides use the term *hybris* when speaking on his own behalf; in every other instance he is imputing the usage to another in either direct or reported speech. In both cases of his own usage, Thucydides is permitting himself one of his rare moralising digressions. In the case of the death of Hipparchus, he says that one assassin was motivated by the rage

of one in love, and the other by a sense of grievance or humiliation: ὑβρισμένον. Commentators have expressed surprise that this story should occur at this point in Thucydides' narrative (VI 57); I think that he is quietly making some suggestions about the role of erotic pique in Athenian politics.

The second instance occurs in Thucydides' well known remarks about Pericles in II 65. Here Pericles has obtained the Athenians' consent to go to war. They have forgotten their resentment and the losses they have suffered, and elect him general. Thucydides then goes on to observe that Pericles' moderation was not exercised after his death. Making the distinction that he puts into the mouths of the Spartans in IV 18 2, he suggests that the Athenians went on to make plans beyond the necessities of war and to act to further their own glory and ambitions (65 7). They treated one another and their allies badly and forgot about honour and the needs of the city. Pericles, not one to be corrupted, was able to keep the *demos* in check. When he noticed them in any way becoming arrogant - ὑβρεῖ θαρσοῦντας - beyond measure, he deflated - κατέπληττεν - them with his words and then reassured them of his favour (65 9). The implication seems to be that it was the *hybris* that Pericles kept in check that eventually emerged to bring the Athenians down[13]. Another expression that the Spartans use in IV 18 2 is used in this passage; Thucydides says that the Athenians were in error - (65 12) - in Sicily as a consequence of their policies at home. Throughout this passage, the

distinction is drawn between wilful self aggrandisement at another's expense and the ordinary processes of survival. The attitude that made the Sicilian expedition possible is different from the errors that were made during its course. These are described in such terms as ἁμάρτημα, σφάλλω.

When Thucydides is so sparing with moralising language, the occasions on which it occurs are all the more significant. This leads me to suppose that it is likely that he used the medium of the formal speech to make his own points. This is by no means a novel suggestion, and these remarks of Kagan[20] are typical of what seems to me to be a useful approach: "There can be no doubt that the *History* of Thucydides is a unified work of art created by a single man and that the speeches are fundamental to its construction. I would go further and say that they are often used to express points of view with which Thucydides agrees, to expose the weaknesses in positions with which he disagrees, to set forth the character and ideas of major actors in the historical drama. None of this, however, requires that the speeches be invented". If it is borne in mind that Thucydides clearly selects his vocabulary according to the task in hand, such an approach is easily reconciled with Thucydides' express intentions in I 22. The fact that *hybris* is used almost exclusively in speeches strongly supports this approach. Thucydides' characters hurl charges of *hybris* at one another just as though they were on the tragic stage, and this indeed is where he seems to have placed them.

In contrast to the early poets, Plato opposes *hybris* not to *dike* but to *sophrosyne*. Thus the process is complete; *hybris* as the opposite of *dike* is a social evil that threatens the community, but as the opposite of *sophrosyne* it is an acknowledged attribute of a human being, ever present in his nature and requiring constant control. In *Phaedrus* 237-8, Plato endeavours to specify the difference between *sophrosyne* and *hybris*. It is the difference between judgement and desire, reason and unreason, considerations of what is best and considerations of pleasure, between leading and dragging, and real control and enforcement. Plato observes (238a) that *hybris* takes many forms and requires definition by its characteristics. Love itself may be good or evil according as it is fed by *hybris* or *sophrosyne*. These represent the two selves in each of us (237d); one of these selves may prevail at any time, since they are in continual conflict. One is interested only in gratifying carnal desires; this is *hybris*. A little further on, we find again that *hybris* is a form of self indulgence, in the well known image of the two horses yoked to the chariot of the soul. One is obedient and willing, but the other is hybristic; that is to say, it is interested only in what it wants.

In *Phaedrus*, Plato concentrates on one aspect of *hybris* because he has a particular point to make about the difference between love and lust; in other contexts he exploits other

possibilities. In *Apology* 26e, Socrates, in tragic style, says that Meletus has drawn up his indictment out of *hybris*, *akolasia*, and *neotes*. Plato notes the sneer implicit in *hybris* when in *Protagoras* 355b4 Socrates suggests that a hybristic person might laugh and call his suggestion ridiculous. David[24] rejects the suggestion that Plato (*Rep.* 452b-c, d, 457b) has Aristophanes in mind when he condemns those who may laugh at new ideas, particularly those concerning women practising gymnastics. He does not, however, give sufficient value to the notion of ridicule itself, but assumes that "Plato is defending himself, not against Aristophanes, but against a possible and unjustified imitation or abuse of comic methods to ridicule his own ideas". It is not necessary to posit such a notion; ridicule was a sufficiently alarming prospect in itself.

Although Plato is aware of the various implications of *hybris*, he is primarily concerned to establish it as the opposite of *sophrosyne*. The term is thus not a part of his vocabulary when he is depicting his sly, self effacing character, Socrates. This is in part due to the fact that Socrates does not make use of aggressive laughter but rather invites ridicule in order to disarm his opponent.

Aristotle, on the other hand, has a great deal to say about the humiliating aspect of *hybris*. In the *Nichomachean Ethics* 1124a-b he says that without *arete* one cannot bear good fortune decently - ἐμμελῶς. As a consequence those who have no virtue are *hybristai* because of their good fortune. This mention of one who is *hybristes* occurs in the passage which describes the μεγαλόψυχος - an individual whose virtue is such that even his contempt is justified because he judges others correctly. It seems that the despising of others is not in itself a fault, but that the right to do so must be earned. Since the *megalopsychos* is evidently an ideal character, it is likely that Aristotle did not envisage any individual availing himself of this right, but otherwise his notion reflects Homer's view; in his world the right to abuse another is publicly earned and tacitly approved, even by the one abused.

In 1129b Aristotle is defining justice and injustice. When he mentions *hybris*, and that only in passing, he does not, like the poets, oppose it to *dike* but like Plato he contrasts it with *sophrosyne*. However, he makes this contrast in a narrow sense, as he is speaking of self control. He discusses it again in 1148b30 when he suggests that one cannot apply the term to people whose aberrant behaviour is the consequence of having been abused - ὑβριζόμενοι - from childhood. In 1149b he discusses anger - θυμός; anger is a natural reaction based on some process of reason, and thus is less devious than desire. Uncontrolled desire, ἀκρασία, is perhaps an evil - κακία πως

(1149b20). In this context he mentions Aphrodite and then goes on to discuss *hybris*, which at this point is usually translated *rape*. If this translation is accepted, Aristotle must be taken to be saying that no rapist feels any sorrow at the act - *oudeis hybrizei lypoumenos* (1149b20); everyone acting out of anger does so in sorrow, but the rapist enjoys what he does. The more justified the anger that arises from these offences, the more unjust they must be, and the same applies to the ἀκρασία that arises from desire; for, according to Aristotle, there is no *hybris* in anger. At this point I pause and, although I can see how it comes about, I can see no justification for translating *hybris* as *rape* anywhere in this passage. Aristotle is making a distinction between a wilful offence and a natural response to a real or imagined insult - ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία (1149a30) and made it clear at the outset what kind of *akrasia* he wished to discuss (1149a25): "Let us now discuss the proposition that the lack of control that arises from anger is less reprehensible than that which arises from the appetites". It seems to me that to restrict the discussion of *akrasia* at this point to sexual terms interrupts the flow of the argument and imposes limitations which the author did not intend. In fact, he goes to considerable lengths to emphasise that by *akrasia* he means bodily self indulgence, and only mentions Aphrodite to show by means of a suitable poetic tag that ὁ ἀκρατής is a conniver in search of his own gratification. In this context, *hybris* defines the attitude, not the act.

Most of Aristotle's observations in *Politics* are made in the context of the organisation of the *polis* and repeat propositions that are familiar. He emphasises that *hybris* causes personal reprisal, thus drawing attention to its implications for the individual as well as the state. He adds some examples of insults, affronts to *amour propre*, and physical injury, all of which are classed as *hybreis*. The best of these is the story of Hellanocrates, who when he received no reward for granting sexual favours took it to mean that Archelaus' attitude to him was one of *hybris* rather than *eros* (1311b). There is a tantalising reference in 1341b, where Aristotle suggests how a tyrant should conduct himself. His wife must avoid *hybris* in her dealings with other women, since feminine *hybris* has been known to bring down tyrannies. Aristotle makes no attempt to define feminine *hybris*, though he appears to consider it different from male *hybris*, which as has been seen so far has much to do with aggression, whether moral or physical, and sometimes sexuality. What he may be suggesting is the contemptuous aspect of *hybris*, that which seeks to belittle the other.

It is plain that the attitude that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of *hybris* is one that fits into any context in which the term may appear. *Hybris* implies any wilful behaviour which obtains gratification at the expense of another. Inevitably, such gratification brings about the humiliation of the other, though Aristotle tends to take this for granted and does not go

into detail. We do, however, find this detail in the spurious *On Management*, and although this work is of doubtful origin the comments it contains on *hybris* are sufficiently close to Aristotle's own to justify the view that the first part is by Theophrastus or some other of the first generation after Aristotle. In 1378b the author uses the term *oligoria* to express the sense of humiliation that *hybris* inflicts. He says that anger is a desire, felt with rancour, for revenge that will match the humiliation as soon as it is perceived - φαινομένην.

Whether it is oneself that is humiliated or those near to one, the feeling is that it is undeserved. As in *Nic. Eth.* 1311a, the humiliation and the anger take place between individuals; the author is not referring to public matters. Humiliation, in his view, is putting into practice an opinion that the other is worthless. There are, perhaps for the sake of elegance of argument, three degrees of humiliation, καταφρόνησις, ἐπηρεασμός and ὕβρις, of which *hybris* is the strongest. The author goes on to make the point that *hybris* is a way of reducing the other, and it gives satisfaction to the offender and indeed is done for no other reason. This satisfaction arises out of a sense of superiority.

ἀτιμία is the term the author uses to express the sense of worthlessness that arises from humiliation. For an example, he turns to Homer, and cites Agamemnon's treatment of Achilles and the latter's response. In *Oec.* 1379a the author examines the

factors involved in a sense of worth. He lists birth, power, virtue - ἀρετή, material possessions, skills and talent, any of which may be belittled by another. A failure to respond to friendship or generosity may also be seen as a slight, and anyone who is deprived or thwarted may feel that λυπή which causes ὀργή. *Lype* and *orge* are the feelings of those who are mocked, ridiculed and scoffed at, and it is this mockery and ridicule which the author terms *hybreis* or insults. He extends his definition to acts that are signs of *hybris*; these may be identified by the fact that they are performed quite gratuitously, neither in retaliation for any deed nor to any practical advantage. This is the nature of *hybris*. These comments develop the notion, already discussed, that appears in Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1149b. Both Aristotle and his successor make a distinction between acts of righteous indignation and gratuitous acts that are part of the process of acquiring a sense of advantage.

In 1380a, the author moves on to the subject of appeasement. If men admit a slight and retract it, those offended feel recompensed for their grievance, and cease to be angry. The author cites Hom. xiv 29-31 in which Odysseus cunningly sat down in order to appease Eumaeus' hounds. It seems that men are πρᾶοι towards those who take them seriously rather than insult, mock or humiliate them: δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι. In 1380b it appears that πραότης is the opposite of *hybris*[22] and the laughter of πρᾶοι is joyful without being hybristic.

This comment bears out the distinction that has been noted between gentle and aggressive laughter.

The discussion ends with a comment from Socrates; that it is just as humiliating to be unable to return good treatment as bad (1395a, 1398a). This observation sheds light on the part that humiliation, or the fear of it, plays even in dealings of friendship; it can be seen how it comes about that the obligations of guest friendship are so weighty.

Something of the philosophers' idealistic approach can be found in the work of Xenophon. In *Cyropaedia*, he is clearly captivated by the personality of Cyrus and goes to some pains to present the man who inspired his admiration, affection and trust. To this end, V v 41 is a moralising anecdote. Cyaxares invites Cyrus to dine, and he declines on the grounds that he has brought his soldiers to this endeavour and must not be seen to indulge himself and take no thought for them. If he does, the good soldiers will lose heart and the bad ones will become more hybristic. This kind of remark is so contrary to the kind of attitude apparently accepted as part of the privileges of command that one cannot help but take it as idealism on Xenophon's part. Still, it is significant that the ideal man should be one who is entirely free from *hybris*, though it is difficult to see how such an individual could have survived in a world where considerations of *hybris* played such an important

part.

In a passage which indicates Xenophon's admiration of the Persians, Cyrus encounters Gobryas the Assyrian. In the conversations that ensue between them, more of Cyrus' character is revealed, and Xenophon takes full advantage of this opportunity to present one of his characters through the eyes of another. When Gobryas dines with the Persians for the first time, he notices how the Persians do not allow themselves to be carried away by food and drink, but retain their self command even at table. In conversation they never ask questions that cannot be gladly answered, and their banter is far removed from insult - πολὺ μὲν ὕβρεως ἀπῆν (V ii 10). This is rather different from Herodotus' implication that the Persians were a hybristic race.

In *Cyropaedia* VIII i 30, 33, Xenophon notes Cyrus' way of setting example by conduct. He concludes that if he who has the most power is not hybristic, then even the weaker members of his society should refrain from *hybris* according to his example. Cyrus and his court indeed conduct themselves well, and are never to be heard raising their voices in anger or expressing delight in hybristic laughter; this, of course, being the offensive laughter that seeks to humiliate.

Xenophon seems to attach great importance to the behaviour of his characters at a dinner party. In this relaxed setting he can

depict the way they behave when they are off their guard. VIII iv 9-23 is concerned with a banquet at which Cyrus and Gobryas share the honours. The atmosphere is such that Hystaspes is able to ask Cyrus why Chrysantas has been promoted in preference to him. Cyrus asks if he wants to hear the truth (10); Hystaspes replies that he will be happy to hear it if he learns that he has not been misjudged - οὔκ ἀδικοῦμαι . He seems to accept Cyrus' explanation and his conduct inspires Gobryas to declare that he would willingly give his daughter in marriage to one of Cyrus' followers. He notices that they bear good fortune well, and makes the observation that this is more to be desired even than bearing evil fortune well, since it is the former that causes *hybris* and the latter that gives rise to *sophrosyne* (14). Xenophon goes on to demonstrate the point that has been mentioned about laughter that is free from *hybris*. In 22-3 he describes the banter and laughter that enliven this banquet. The laughter, as noted before, shows the relationship of equality between the diners; the exchange between Cyrus and Hystaspes shows that Cyrus is undisputed leader, but the teasing shows that his companions are confident of his esteem and goodwill. This is further borne out by Hystaspes' confidence as he presses for the hand of Gobryas' daughter, even indicating Cyrus as the source of his wealth. This idealised monarch, free from *hybris* or caprice,[13] is an example even to Aeschylus' Zeus, but less realistic.

It is apparent that the object of an orator in a law suit or other public dispute is to demolish his opponent's argument. The style and vocabulary of the Athenian orators make it plain that the short cut to demolishing an argument is to discredit the opponent. Ridicule thus becomes a convenient oratorical device; the same is true of charges of *hybris*.

It should first be noted that, although the word for physical assault is *hybris*, the term is freely used regardless of whether the attitude or the act is meant. In *Against Timocrates* 137-8, Demosthenes treats laughter as an offence as serious as that of *hybris*; he suggests that Athens will be a laughing stock - καταγέλαστος- if she passes a measure designed to let temple robbers get away scot free, and that she should not tolerate this insult - ὑβρίζεσθαι. In this context we can see that the *hybris* is, to use a modern term, virtually self inflicted.

In the speech against Meidias the subject arises at once, *hybris* being the sole basis of Demosthenes' complaint. Demosthenes suggests that everyone is aware of Meidias' ἀσέλγεια and *hybris*, and that anyone ὑβρισθείς as Demosthenes has been would have no choice but to bring the present action. He indicates the nature of the *hybris* by mentioning πληγάς and πολλὰ .. βίαια (1); then he speaks of *hybris* in a general sense (4) when he suggests that it is likely that Meidias will behave in a similar manner in the future. He actually draws a

distinction (6) when he says that he received blows and was insulted as, for all he knows, no choregus has ever been insulted before. He says further (18) that Meidias ὕβρισε τὸ σῶμα as well as depriving him of his prize. The tone of the speech makes it clear that the quarrel between the two was of a personal nature; it seems likely that Meidias struck Demosthenes on a public occasion in order to humiliate him all the more, rather than, as Demosthenes suggests, in disregard and contempt of the customs and institutions of the democracy (31ff). The humiliation, however, did not require public recompense; it is another personal enemy, Aeschines, who tells us that 30 minae were enough to buy Demosthenes off (*Against Ctesiphon* 52). We find here that the law makes a distinction between *hybris* that is wilful and that which is involuntary (43): ..νόμοι πάντες, .. ὃν μὲν ἑκὼν βλάψῃ, διπλοῦν, ἂν δ' ἄκων, ἁπλοῦν τὸ βλάβος κελεύουσιν ἐκτίνειν.

Demosthenes interprets this to mean the difference between behaviour during a fit of anger - μετ' ὀργῆς - and an act that is premeditated - βεβουλευμένως. In his view, Meidias committed a wilful act of *hybris*, for which the law exacts a double penalty. So seriously does the law view *hybris* that even slaves can seek redress (48). In 70ff Demosthenes recounts some anecdotes that that show how great is the provocation from *hybris*. He goes on (72) to explain why; it is not the blow that causes the rancour, but the humiliation - ἀτιμία; being insulted, not hit, no matter how hard, is hard for civilised persons to endure.

This notion appears in Isocrates, *Lochites* 1; the body is the most precious possession, so physical injury is worse than verbal injury. It is not, however, the physical blows but the humiliation and indignity for which Isocrates comes to claim justice. Lysias (XXI 12) claims that being deprived of one's property is bad enough, but tolerable; it is the humiliation caused by confiscation that is so bad. Finally Aeschines (*Embassy* 181-2) says of execution that it is not death that is terrible but the *hybris* that surrounds it. How could one not be pitied when beholding the face of his sneering enemy, and hearing his insults? Remarks like these help to explain why it is sometimes difficult to tell just what is meant by the term *hybris*. In one passage of Isocrates (*Cyprians* 36) there is the suggestion that *hybris* against wives and children is the worst, and Isocrates rather quaintly remarks in Nicocles' favour that he touched no woman but his wife after he became king. In this context, the meaning of *hybris* seems to be rape, and there is no doubt that in certain contexts this is indeed part of what is meant, though I suspect, as Isocrates' remark suggests, that the *hybris* was felt and recompense demanded by the *kyrios* of the *oikos* concerned.

Isocrates regularly uses *hybris* as a term of reproach. Two examples refer to the Persians. In *Panegyric* 153, in similar manner to Herodotus but in contrast to Xenophon, he says that Persian satraps are faithless to their friends and cowardly to

their foes, and generally treat friends as enemies and enemies as friends. In Greek terms, this means that they humiliate - καταφρονεῖν - their allies and cultivate - θεραπεύειν - their enemies (152). Worst of all they treated their allies with more *hybris* than their prisoners (153). In *Panathenaic* 160 Isocrates says that the Great King treats with *hybris* those who court him and tries to reconcile his differences with those who look down on him - καταφρονεῖν - and keep their distance. It can be seen that in this instance, in order to build up the rhetorical effect, *hybris* is treated as a greater degree of καταφρόνησις.

In Lysias' speech on behalf of Eratosthenes' murderer (1), the *hybris* in question is Eratosthenes' adultery with the defendant's wife. It should be noted that the *hybris* is felt personally by the defendant, and was the sole justification for his killing of the adulterer. In (4) the priorities are listed, possibly in ascending order; Eratosthenes had intercourse with the defendant's wife, ruined her, disgraced his children, and insulted him - ὕβρισεν - by coming into his house. The point is repeated in (16) and (25), with some emphasis on the insult offered by entering the defendant's house.

In the speech against Simon, *hybris* is apparently used in two different ways in the same passage (5,7). Both the defendant and Simon were in love with the same boy; he sought to win him by treating him well, whereas Simon tried *hybris* and force. He

broke into the defendant's house by night when drunk and burst in on his sister and nieces, reaching such a pitch of *hybris* that he would not go away until driven out. Furthermore, he showed no regret for his behaviour, but continued in his attitude on subsequent occasions. It can be seen here that although the first mention of *hybris* refers to sexual aggression and the second to a deliberate attempt to insult and humiliate, the attitude described is the same in either case. In 34 Lysias asks whether the defendant would really risk confronting Simon and being treated with *hybris* by his enemies. In this instance, *hybris* really is the equivalent of *gelos*.

In the speech about the olive stump, Lysias approaches the problem by suggesting that there was no motive to commit the offence. *Hybris* alone is not enough; where is the profit in it? This seems a rather enterprising line of defence when *hybris* is a routine charge that needs only definition, not justification; however, Lysias is anxious to make the point that the removal of the stump is not the kind of offence that men commit for reasons of *hybris*; in my view this implies that there was no personal motive.

Speech XXIV is in defence of a man who has been accused of collecting a disability pension that he does not need. He has been considered "above himself" for riding horses rather than mules διὰ τὴν ὕβριν (11). This is a rather pleasing example of

hybris simply being a matter of failing to behave according to one's situation and thus causing offence to others. Lysias protests that no *hybris* was intended; the defendant just happens to be lent a horse from time to time. He then goes on to insist (15ff) that a charge of *hybristes* against his client is an absurdity. He describes the kind of person who is capable of *hybris*; he must be rich, strong or young, none of which terms can possibly apply to the defendant. It can be seen that for the purposes of the defence Lysias is suggesting that *hybris* is not so much a matter of will as of favourable circumstances. Even the question of *sophrosyne* is neatly disposed of; he says that the poor are compelled by their lack of power to be circumspect - σωφρονεῖν (17). The suggestion that even *sophrosyne*, as the opposite of *hybris*, is forced upon us by circumstances shows some resourcefulness on the part of the writer, and incidentally demonstrates that the notion put forward by Plato was certainly current at this time. Altogether, Lysias has a very lively concept of *hybris*; he has a keen sense of his clients' feelings of humiliation and assumes that he can appeal to similar sensibilities in his hearers.

Isaeus takes the common view that *hybris* is an attitude. As was noted in Lysias XXIV, this attitude may only become objectionable when the hybristic individual is not entitled to it. This is not the moralising view that appears in the work of the philosophers or the historians, but the popular view to which the orators appeal and in which, presumably, they must

have had some faith. In his second speech, on the estate of Menecles, Isaeus notes that the interested parties made no objections to any arrangements during Menecles' lifetime; but only insult him - ὑβρίζειν (15) - now, when he is dead, and try to render his house desolate. Here the insult meant is the attempt to discredit a man when he cannot answer for himself, and take away the reputation that he had built up for himself during his lifetime. This is just as serious a matter as directing his estate elsewhere; part of the value of the *oikos* lies in the continuing esteem in which its members, living or dead, are held. These are the notions behind the strong expression ἐξερημοῦν .. τὸν οἶκον; the verbal prefix demonstrates that severe damage would be done by this *hybris* to the dead Menecles. In V 24, *hybris* clearly refers to humiliation. The plaintiff says that he has lost his inheritance, been deprived of 40 minae, and has besides been humiliated - *hybrismenos* - by Dicaeogenes.

It can be seen from all these examples that Isaeus, like Lysias, treats *hybris* as an aspect of relations between persons and makes it his object to use the term to awaken similar feelings in his audience. It is plain that both he and Lysias count on a particular response by appealing to their self esteem. Lysias' reference to the rich, the physically strong, and the young is especially revealing; it is obvious that the ability to rely on one's own resources was an important requirement in the time and circumstances in which these speeches were composed, and

that a hybristic attitude was likely to imply actual physical ascendancy and a very real threat. To what extent the law kept this threat in abeyance can only be judged by the number and variety of *hybris* cases that have been recorded in one way or another, and it seems likely that any individual whose personal resouces were such as to render him free from the restraints of his immediate associates may well have posed problems for the legal system.

MacDowell[24] makes some useful observations about *hybris*. He defines it as "having energy and power and using it self indulgently". He goes on to say that it "is not, as a rule, a religious matter". With this I would concur; Aeschylus, Solon, Pindar and Hesiod are generally cited to justify the religious interpretation, but even Aeschylus often has a social evil in mind rather than an offence against the gods. However, I take issue with MacDowell when he suggests that the most frequent meaning of *hybris*, even in Aeschylus, is *lust*. I would suggest that it is a concept closely tied up with questions of self esteem , and expresses, as indeed Fisher[25] notes, a desire to humiliate. Wurmser[26], writing on a different topic with a different approach, offers this comment: "The dilemma is briefly this: either one uses one's power and thus infringes upon, hurts, or destroys someone else's integrity and well being, possession, or rights, or one accepts instead one's own weakness and failure, shows one's taintedness, and flaunts one's dependency. In the former case guilt is the prevalent affect; in

the latter it is shame." MacDowell observes (pp 20-1) that *hybris* often appears in close conjunction with laughter, and it often has a sense not only of mockery but of "triumphing and crowing over someone else's misfortunes". This, to me, is the kind of observation that is required, and is the line I have pursued in this chapter. There seems to be a relationship between *hybris* and laughter, and in many instances the humiliating aspect of *hybris*, even when it is not expressed in physical violence, is keenly felt and greatly deplored.

Study of *hybris* and ridicule shows how important it is to have the ascendancy in any situation. This ascendancy can only be measured in terms of one's position in regard to one's fellow, and the attempt to establish such a position is very often indicated by laughter at another's expense. The one ridiculed can be convinced by the laughter, and collapse either into acceptance of a subordinate role or into despair. If the implications of the laughter are not accepted, there follows an attempt to exact redress in order to reverse the position, preferably in the opinion of a third party. It may be another character in a play who is the third party; it may be the audience, whether of epic or drama; it may be the judges in a law court. The gods, whose standpoint we often share, are frequently the third party. In the *Odyssey*, the absence of Athena's favour, and the disparaging way she speaks of the suitors, justify Odysseus' revenge, while in Sophocles' *Ajax*

the knowledge that Athena has consented to his humiliation is sufficient to deprive Ajax of his self respect and all interest in living.

This laughter is expressed as an aspect or even an equivalent of *hybris*; in this sense a hybristic act establishes a position between two parties which one accepts and the other does not. That is to say, whoever does not accept the insult or humiliation offered will term it hybristic. So important is this contest that much of the interest of drama and all of the interest of oratory can stem from the attempt to establish a genuine grievance. Writers resort to various means in order to indicate the genuine grievance; the laughter of the suitors, for instance, is an elaborate literary device to put us, as third party, "in the know".

The narrative style of Xenophon and Herodotus is such as to place the reader in the privileged position of third party; Thucydides takes this process a step further by appointing himself third party and inviting the reader to share his standpoint. The moralising in his speeches and the deployment of his characters indicate his attempt to distance himself from his subject. In works of this nature the author develops an interest in the relationship between events and human aspirations; this leads not only to questions concerning *hybris* but also to those concerning καταφρόνησις, which is the topic of the next chapter.

Notes to Chapter 4.

1. L Stoianovici-Donat, '*Hybris* in *Iliada*', *Studii Clasice* VIII (1966), pp 17-24.

2. N R E Fisher, *The Concept of* Hybris *in Greece from Homer to the Fourth Century B C*, British Thesis no. D26180/79 CL, p 420.

3. William F Wyatt Jr., 'Homeric *ATH*', *AJPh* 103 (1982), pp 247-276.

4. W J Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod* Op. *1-382* (Brill 1985), p 90.

5. Hartmut Frisch, *Might and Right in Antiquity* (Copenhagen 1949), p 99.

6. Frisch, *op. cit.* p 254-6.

7. M. Mund-Dopchie, 'Les Vers 306-308 des *Choephores*', *L'Antiquite Classique* XLII (1973), pp 508-15.

8. See B L Gildersleeve, *Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Baltimore University Press 1895), p 229, n. 10.

9. D Herbert Abel, 'Genealogies of Ethical Concepts from Homer to Bacchylides', *TAPhA* LXXIV (1943), 92-101.

10. Fisher, '*Hybris* and Dishonour' II, G&R XXVI (1979), p 33.

11. Engelbert Drerup, *Das fünfte Buch der* Ilias (Paderborn 1913), pp 200ff, 202 esp.

12. R P Winnington-Ingram, 'The Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Tyrannos*', *JHS* 91 (1971) 124-7.

13. Ruth Scodel, 'The Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Rex*', CPh 77 (1982), 214-23.

14. Fisher, *G&R* 1979, note p 47.

15. Fisher, *thesis* p 420.

16. Douglas M MacDowell, '*Hybris* in Athens', *G&R* XXIII (1976), pp 14-31.

17. Fisher, *thesis*, p 373.

18. Oliver Taplin, 'Tragedy and Trugedy', *CQ* XXXIII (1983), pp 331-3.

19. M H B Marshall, 'Cleon and Pericles: Sphacteria', *G&R* XXXI (1984), pp 27-8, makes an interesting point concerning ὀρέγεσθαι, II 61 4, IV 17 4, 21 2, 41 4. He sees a link with *hybris* and defends such definitions of it as are found in Solon. Curiously he cites McDowell (*G&R* 1976) but not Fisher. He considers (p 31) that Thucydides has a point to make about true foresight, *i. e.* that of Pericles, and that Cleon's "mad plan" (IV 39 3) and its unexpected success "is a further piece of good luck which triggers the descent to ruin" (p 31). According to Marshall, Thucydides suggests but does not state (p 31) that Athens was doomed to downfall because, incited by Cleon, she was "led on by the good luck at Pylos and so committed *hybris*." I will have more to say about Pylos and Sphacteria in the next chapter; at this point I would only say that this is not the way Thucydides sees the concept of *hybris* or uses it in his *History*.

20. Donald Kagan, 'The Speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene Debate', *YCS* XXIV pp 71-94.

21. E David, *Aristophanes and Athenian Society of the Early Fourth Century B C*, *Mnem. Supp*, 81 (1984), p 28.

22. On the subject of πραότης, see A G Nicolaidis, 'Aristotle's Treatment of the concept of ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ', *Hermes* B D 110 (1982), pp 414-22. "..one has the feeling that , despite its inclusion among the mean virtues of his ethical system, he treats πραότης in his ethics as a matter of words as well as a moral quality" (p 417). This passage from *On Management* shows the same tendency.

23. P Walcot, *Envy and the Greeks*, (Aris and Phillips 1978), p 17, notes in addition that "a lack of envy was not characteristic of a Greek or a crypto-Greek like Xenophon's Cyrus". Thus envy, like *hybris*, is deemed unsuitable to an idealised character.

24. MacDowell, *op. cit.* pp 21, 22.

25. Fisher, *thesis*, passim.

26. L'eon Wurmser, *The Mask of Shame* (Johns Hopkins University Press 1981), p 204.

Kataphronesis.

It soon becomes apparent from studying laughter in Greek literature that two kinds of laughter are interesting in different contexts: the laughter of one who has a correct grasp of the situation and the laughter of one who does not. The unabashed glee of the victor is an uncomplicated example of the former, and is represented in the *Iliad* as a right of which no one is ashamed to avail himself. In the *Odyssey*, it is the suitors' inappropriate laughter which places them at a disadvantage, and disposes them towards their eventual doom. As Levine has noted[1], their laughter, besides indicating their misguidedness, also indicates their ignorance. Because they have no comprehension of their situation, they break into laughter appropriate to one who has the ascendancy. As the reverse is in fact the case, the irony is made more piquant for the audience - or reader. Related to this kind of laughter is that which is an indication of madness.

Obviously, no one could take more interest in this kind of laughter than one who is, or would be, wise after the event; for this reason it is as well to turn at this point to the work of the historians.

Herodotus favours the aggressive compound καταγελάω; he also develops the notion of καταφρονέω, which like καταγέλαστος[2] is not found in any extant work before Herodotus. First, however,

it may be appropriate to consider Herodotus' other references to laughter.

Like Homer, Herodotus notes kindly laughter; the relationship of Cyrus and Croesus in I 90 is marked by indulgent laughter which resembles Zeus' smile when Artemis flees to his lap in Hom. XXI 508. After the fall of Sardis, Croesus has established some kind of position for himself at the court of Cyrus; when he tells the story of his encounter with Apollo, Cyrus is diverted by the tale and laughs. Since Croesus is obviously quite dependent on Cyrus for the future, this tolerant laughter is a good sign. How do we know that it is not ridiculing laughter? Simply because under the circumstances Cyrus has nothing to prove and Croesus has nothing to lose. Croesus' position is like that of a child in his father's house. In a tale in VI 125, referring to the time of Croesus' own prosperity, Croesus laughs indulgently when he sees how Alcmaon goes about taking away as much gold as he can carry. This is the kind of laughter that the builder's resourceful son counts on in II 121. Worn down by his mother's entreaties, he manages to ingratiate himself with the soldiers who are guarding his brother's corpse. He is so successful in this endeavour that the guards take him for a fool and show their lack of anxiety by making a joke - σκώπτω . He laughs in response, and the guards are not affronted. This is appeasing laughter, and it is successful. It resembles the smile of Labda's child, whom the assassins cannot bring themselves to kill, and the smile of Medea's children.

The story of Zopyrus is told as a paradigm of extraordinary courage and loyalty (III 155). One of the exceptional virtues of this man is his pride, which is indicated by his inability to tolerate ridicule, even of those with whom he is associated. When Darius mounts his attack on Babylon, so secure are the Babylonians in their great city that they indulge in aggressive dancing - κατορχέομαι, laughter, and wisecracks from the battlements. For Zopyrus, revenge must be obtained by any means possible, and be as humiliating as possible. The Assyrians must have no more opportunities to crow over - καταγελάω with the dative of disadvantage - the Persians. This is sufficient motive for Zopyrus to inflict upon himself the mutilations normally reserved for the enemy whom one holds in the greatest contempt; this action is so extraordinary that the Assyrians are easily taken in when he puts his plan into effect, though Darius at first thinks he has gone mad, and even when the plan has succeeded is not reconciled to the means of its accomplishment.

In VIII 100, Mardonius speaks to Xerxes, having after Salamis given some thought to his own position. He presses for action on land, and his feelings are similar to those of Zopyrus; the Persians must not become a laughing stock for the Greeks.

Herodotus makes inappropriate laughter a symptom of madness in III 29ff, when discussing Cambyses, describing him as being ὑπομαργότερος in 29 and οὐδὲ .. φρενήρης in 30. He relates a series

of extraordinary acts attributed to Cambyses and inappropriate laughter figures in a number of them. In 29 he laughs when he succeeds in wounding the sacred calf at Memphis, and in 37 he is alleged to have opened up tombs, inspected the corpses inside, and made fun - *eneprese polla kataskopsas* - of the image in the temple of Hephaestus. In 34-5 Cambyses is angered by suggestions that he is mad; he proposes to refute these by showing that his faculties are not impaired. As far as Cambyses is concerned, if he can shoot straight, he cannot be mad. He shoots the son of Prexaspes, has him cut open, finds that the arrow has passed through the heart, and laughs with pleasure. This tale abounds with features included to show that Cambyses has no grip on normality. Herodotus himself makes it clear that it is Cambyses' attitude, not his faculties, that determines his madness or otherwise; in 38 he says, "it is absolutely clear to me that Cambyses was highly insane; otherwise he would not have dared to make a mockery of what was holy or lawful.."

..οὐκ ὦν οἰκός ἐστι ἄλλον γε ἢ μαινόμενον ἄνδρα γέλωτα τὰ τοιαῦτα τίθεσθαι.

Given Herodotus' views on the matter, it is clear that Cambyses' opinion of himself is to be taken in the worst possible light. He proceeds to demolish his claim by showing callousness, lack of remorse, and laughter which is, to say the least, inappropriate.

Herodotus maligns Cleisthenes of Sicyon in similar fashion in V 68. He assures us that it was Cleisthenes who changed the name

of the Dorian tribes, making them into a joke - *katagelao* - by attaching prefixes meaning *pig* or *ass*. Herodotus is by no means concerned to present Cleisthenes as an attractive character; in depicting the grandfather as lacking a proper sense of what is fitting, he casts doubts on the grandson as well. John Hart[3] observes that that Herodotus' "treatment is light-hearted and cynical ..Herodotus clearly saw that his political arrangements were made with a view to securing his personal position and were not ..the handiwork of a high-minded legislator."

The preceding examples show that it is necessary to establish who has the right to laugh in a given situation. Sometimes this only emerges in the course of the narrative, and at others it is clear from the outset. In most of Herodotus' tales, the outcome is presumed to be known to the reader, so laughter becomes a device to add irony to the narrative. Lateiner[4] has made a study of this device, which he calls a "literary tactic". I think he is right in seeing a connection between laughter and *hybris*, but I must take exception to his statement that "Laughter, then, in Herodotus indicates a hybristic state of mind" (p 181). I do so because in making this statement he makes certain assumptions about Herodotus' idea of *hybris* that I do not believe can be substantiated. All of Herodotus' references to *hybris* refer, as we have seen, to personal affront rather than to the kind of attitude that comes before disaster. Lateiner cites three instances of an attitude of this kind (I

207 2, III 53 4, VII 10 6), but in none of these instances does Herodotus use the term *hybris*. II 120 10 is an example of the kind of language he uses in such contexts: ..τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν. Lateiner is, however, correct in noting that Herodotus uses laughter to indicate this attitude. These usages are quite different from that found in the *Odyssey* and in tragedy, which repeatedly and specifically associate laughter with *hybris*. Lateiner, with some caution, also suggests that "Herodotus seems almost alone in employing such amusement multivalently: as a narrational indication of a character's disdain and as an authorial intimation of disaster in store for the laugher" (p 174). We have seen numerous instances to contradict this assertion, and will see more.

It should, however, be stressed that laughter does not in itself constitute an offence; it indicates an attitude that stems from an appraisal of a situation. This appraisal may or may not be correct; Lateiner notes that in eighty per cent of cases it is not (p 180). According to Lateiner, "almost all laughers in Herodotus can be divided into three types ..those who are innocent of serious wrong doing but ignorant of their own vulnerability to fortune", Cambyses, who is mad, and those who are "insolently confident in their own power" (p 176). The difference between the first and third is only one of degree, and it is evident that inappropriate laughter is one of the conventional ways of indicating madness. Rather I would repeat

that a distinction is drawn between one who is aware of the realities of a situation and one who is not. Herodotus himself, for instance, was as far as he knew entitled to laugh at those who draw maps in an authoritative manner, claiming knowledge where they have none (IV 36 2). In the same way, the Ethiopian king is not impressed by the Persians' gold bracelets; he chooses to take them for fetters and laugh at them. This laughter is not based on a misconception; Cambyses eventually does give up his designs on the Ethiopians (III 22 2). In IX 82 2, 3 Herodotus tells a story which hardly seems worth while; it is interesting, however, to consider why Herodotus should have thought it worth telling. Pausanias, in the enthusiasm of victory, has two feasts prepared, one in the Spartan manner and one in the Persian. He bursts out laughing and sends for the Greek generals in order to show them the absurdity of the Persians, who have so much, coming after the scanty possessions of the Greeks. As Herodotus says, it is a story that got about after Plataea, and as such it is a fair indication of popular attitudes at the time. It conveys the delight of the underdog as well as the earned triumph that is such a feature of the *Iliad*.

These are examples of laughter that shows a correct grasp of the situation. There is no irony in this laughter; for this reason as much as any other, it is less interesting as a narrative device, and occurs far less often.

As Lateiner notes, laughter of the other sort varies from a relatively innocent error to an arrogant assumption that is subsequently proved wrong. I would not go as far as Lateiner and term this a "lack of self awareness" (p 174); I refer to it as a correct or incorrect grasp of the situation because this is the way it is designed to appear to the reader, who is invited to share the privileged viewpoint of the narrator.

In IV 79 4 Herodotus tells the story of Scylas, king of the Scythians. The Scythians blamed the Greeks for the spread of the cult of Dionysus, and it seems that much of their criticism fell upon the Borysthenites. One of them went to the Scythians and said, "You laugh at us - καταγελάω with dative - for practising the Bacchic cult; now your king is under the influence. Come and I'll show you!" The Scythians' laughter ends in humiliation; they are compelled to behold their king, the representative of them all, disporting himself in a manner they have publicly decried. Scylas, as Herodotus informs us, did not long survive his error.

In book VI, Leotychides makes the mistake of crowing over Demaratus when he has managed to take his place as king in Sparta. He asks him a malicious question ἐπιγέλωτι (67 2), but as Herodotus remarks (VI 72 1) he did not get the chance to grow old in Sparta, and Demaratus was avenged. As Lateiner notes[5], Leotychides is not the only one to make this mistake; Demaratus' relations with Xerxes are marked by the latter's inability to

comprehend the situation in spite of Demaratus' attempts to instruct him. In VII 103 1 Demaratus assures Xerxes that the Spartans will fight even if they only have a thousand men. Xerxes laughs. This is the laughter of one who thinks he knows what he does not. Scornfully, he says to Demaratus, πολλὰ φλυηρέεις (103 5). In 105, Demaratus repeats his warning, but Xerxes treats it as a joke - *es gelota de etrepse* - and dismisses him graciously. In VI 209 1 the Spartans are preparing to hold Thermopylae; what they are doing seems to Xerxes, for the reason Herodotus gives, to be *geloia*; he sends for Demaratus, who reminds him of his previous laughter and repeats his warnings. ἀκούων δὲ Ξέρξης οὐκ εἶχε συμβαλέσθαι τὸ ἐόν (VII 209 1). No words could express more clearly than these just what Herodotus means by this laughter.

Even after Thermopylae, Xerxes apparently has not changed his attitude. In VIII 114 2 the Spartans, acting on an oracle, send an embassy to Xerxes, insisting on satisfaction for the death of their king. Xerxes laughs, pauses, then indicates Mardonius, who he has already decided shall stay behind and deal with the Greeks. This laughter is particularly heavy with irony since Mardonius, in pressing for these measures, has previously suggested that they are necessary if the Persians are not to be a laughing stock. It should be noted that no one laughs more than Xerxes except mad Cambyses.

There is no doubt that Herodotus has a particular interest in

this aspect of laughter; however, laughter is not the only term that he uses in this way. The only compound of *gelao* that he uses, except one, is *katagelao*; the exception is the striking compound used to describe the disarming smile of the infant Cypselus in V 92 (see above p 77). As one would expect, the more aggressive the laughter, the more likely it is that *katagelao* will be used. In VIII 100, when Mardonius is speaking of the Persians' fear of being made a laughing stock, he uses the word καταγέλαστος, which as I mentioned before is not known before Herodotus. *Katagelao* is used of the ridicule that the Greeks assume is meant by the Trojans in II 118 4, and for the laughter of which the Borysthenites accuse the Scythians in IV 79 4. It is used of Cambyses' sacrilegious laughter in III 37-38, and of the mockery that Zopyrus dreads so much in III 155 2. In V 68 1 Cleisthenes intends mockery when he gives offensive names to the Sicyonian tribes.

In the same way, other words become aggressive when prefixed by κατα-. The harmless term σκώπτω is used once only, of the good mood induced in the guards in II 121, but its compound κατασκώπτω appears three times. In II 173 1 it is in fact as harmless as the simple form, as it refers to the bonhomie of Amasis, which his courtiers thought most unbecoming to a ruler. The other two, however, are aggressive; one (III 37 3) refers to mad Cambyses, and the other (III 151 1) to the behaviour of the Babylonians that so affected Zopyrus. The same applies to χαίρω; we have seen that Homer occasionally uses the term in the sense

of vaunting, but Herodotus chooses an aggressive form. The first example occurs in I 129 1; Harpagus is quite unrestrained in his gloating over Astyages: *katechaire te kai katekertomee* .. It should be noted that this is also the first extant instance of the violent κατακερτομέω; nowhere else does Herodotus express anyone's feelings so forcefully. Harpagus is entitled to his feelings after the ghastly meal which Astyages served up to him; Astyages, however, only responds with contempt, upbraiding Harpagus for giving the Medes away to Cyrus when he could have seized power for himself. The other instance concerns Demaratus (VII 239 2), who after all his warnings to Xerxes sends a secret message to warn the Spartans that Xerxes is on his way. Herodotus says that it is anybody's guess whether he did so out of friendliness or spite, although Demaratus can hardly be expected to be well disposed towards the Spartans. Herodotus uses the strong word *katachairein* to express the other possible motive; I suspect that this is because he doubts Demaratus' motives, but realises that the elaborate secrecy with which the message was sent points to a warning rather than any wish to indulge in vindictive glee. Perhaps the most interesting of these aggressive terms is κατορχέομαι, which as I have noted is used of the offensive Babylonians on the city walls. The notion of aggressive prancing and posturing is a colourful one, and well conveys Herodotus' interest in behaviour, social or otherwise.

The word which seems to carry all the implications so far

mentioned, and from which the title of this chapter is derived, is καταφρονεῖν. On the analogy of the foregoing, it should convey the idea of aggressive thinking, and this appears to be the case. Once again, Herodotus seems to be the first to use it, and the instances, although not numerous, show the number of possibilities contained in the word. In I 59 Peisistratus has designs - καταφρονήσας - on the tyranny at Athens and leads a revolt on his own account in competition with Lycurgus and Megacles. Powell[7] suggests *aim at* as the meaning in this context, and it will appear from the work of Thucydides that it has to do with having a clear understanding of the problem at hand. As in the case of laughter, just how this word should be understood depends largely on the outcome of events, which in this case must have been well known. In I 66 1, this aggressive thinking has gone too far. The Spartans, flourishing in Arcadia, come to look down on the people among whom they live, and consult the oracle with a view to increasing their territories. As Herodotus notes, the Spartans were led into error by the answer they received. Again, it is the outcome that determines the meaning of *kataphroneo*. The meaning is not in doubt in I 134 2. The Scythians, on the brink of battle, allow themselves to be distracted by a hare, and amuse themselves by chasing it. Darius, baffled by their behaviour, assumes that they must mean it as a gesture of contempt for him and his army. It can readily be seen that this is another reference to the extreme sensitivity of the Persians to injury and insult. Lateiner points out[8] that according to Herodotus the Persian

nobility is "quick to fear itself laughed at" and there can be no doubt that Herodotus intends this to be a Persian characteristic. From the fear of contempt, we pass to a demonstration of it in VIII 10 1. Xerxes' generals and soldiers see a few Greek ships sailing out fron Artemisium; in complacency - *kataphronountes* - they sail out and encircle them, only to receive a surprising reverse, made worse by the ensuing storm.

It can be seen that describing this attitude and its relation to events is part of Herodotus' narrative method. It may not be true that Babylon fell to Cyrus because the Babyonians grievously offended the pride of Zopyrus; those, however, are the terms in which Herodotus chooses to present the event. There must have been numerous factors that influenced Xerxes' decisions during the second Persian invasion, and indeed Herodotus describes many of them himself; nonetheless he chooses to give considerable attention to the personality of Xerxes, since it is clearly his view that events have their origin in the behaviour of individuals. Given this, it becomes necessary to enquire why he should present the character of Xerxes in this way. I am inclined to think that these are the terms that were most comprehensible to his public. We have a sample of the kind of story that got about after Plataea; the tale of Pausanias and his two dinners is not Herodotus' own but a popular anecdote, nicely expressing the attitude of the successful underdog. This is an approach, of course, which is only successful after the

event; Herodotus seems to employ it quite unselfconsciously, but Thucydides' style carries indications that he is aware of its possibilities.

The first instance of laughter in Thucydides is well known and has drawn much comment. In IV 28 the Athenians are in a terrible fix. The expedition to Pylos is stranded and Cleon, according to Thucydides, is trying to keep the facts from the public. The Athenians try to call his bluff, whereupon Cleon issues a challenge which is promptly taken up by Nicias and the Athenians. Cleon tries to extricate himself, but the Athenians insist. Cleon boastfully rises to the occasion and undertakes to perform wonders, whereupon "something of laughter" falls upon the Athenians at his κουφολογία. Thucydides then observes that the sensible were pleased and laughed just as much, thinking they would achieve one of two benefits; either that they would be rid of Cleon, which they would have preferred, or that the Spartans would indeed be worsted in spite of all indications to the contrary.

From the variety of comments on this passage, I mention two: Cornford and Gomme, whose standpoints provide sufficient contrast. Cornford[9] has this to say: "Chroniclers and story writers like Herodotus had chosen the lax form of epic ..So

Thucydides turned to drama - the only other developed form of literature then existing which could furnish a hint for the new type to be created ..it will be found ..to show an analogy with the older form existing in the tragedies of Aeschylus". I do not believe that Thucydides cast about for a form of writing in which to present his work. It is rather that the tragedians and the historians approached characters and events in the same way. The more drama develops, the more it comes to have in common with historical writing. Gomme[18] on the other hand observes: "..the frivolity of the Athenians in general is well marked" and points out that οἱ σωφρόνες are not behaving as the Spartan envoys suggested they should in IV 18 4." I think Thucydides means no sarcasm in the present context. As Gomme himself notes (p 469), Thucydides was one of those caught out by Cleon; in my view the use of *gelos* adds a personal touch to the recollection.

This laughter, which has to do with more than mere frivolity, is not tragic but Homeric. It has as many implications for the Athenians as it does for Cleon himself. It is to be noted that some Athenians laugh because Cleon has indulged in wild boasting; the sensible citizens, however, realise that only two things can happen, neither of them without advantage to themselves. Thus we have the two kinds of laughter noted at the beginning of this chapter; one caused by a failure to grasp the situation and the other showing a correct appraisal of the situation. It can readily be seen that only hindsight can tell

us which is which, and the historian's viewpoint thus confers many opportunities for irony. As Connor[128] notes: "An ironic perspective ..also prevails throughout this episode ..the reader simultaneously recreates the emotions of one part of the citizenry and yet separates himself from these reactions by his knowledge of what is to come." Another example of this occurs when the Athenians are sailing for Syracuse. The Syracusans do not know whether to believe it or not; Hermocrates insists that it is so, but some of the Syracusans *pany kataphronountes es gelota etrepon to pragma* (VI 35 28). We can see that on the one hand their laughter is folly, as the Athenians really were on their way, but on the other the enterprise ended in disaster, so the laughter of the Syracusans was vindicated.

In III 83, Thucydides is describing the breakdown of social structures as a result of the conflict between Athens and Sparta, and the ensuing power struggles: *pasa idea kateste kakotropias dia tas staseis ..kai to euethes ..katagelasthen ephanisthe..* Here Thucydides is referring to laughter which is not literal, but inappropriate in the sense that it indicates a misplaced sense of values; he goes on to reinforce the point in very emphatic terms. τὸ εὔηθες and τὸ γενναῖον refer to a guilelessness that is natural and entirely free from calculation. By referring to it with the aorist passive of καταγελάω Thucydides forcefully renders this quality an anachronism and laments its passing. The quality of calculating thought is referred to as γνώμη[129]; in III 83 1 Thucydides

refers to the divergent attitudes of opposing camps, and in 3 makes a distinction between γνώμη and ἔμγα. Calculating thought becomes a hindrance rather than an asset, because those who know that they lack that advantage simply move swiftly into action. In 4 *gnome* is condemned with the term *kataphronountes*. On this passage, the scholiast (Hude 1927) comments that *hoi kataphronountes* are those who have the resources and ability to deal with a situation but are destroyed because they do not deem it necessary to use them. Gomme[14] notes the similarity to the usage in Herodotus I 66 1. He also notes the characteristics of compounds with κατα- in Thucydides, and cites II 41 3 and III 16 1. Thucydides is making the point that in the absence of natural honesty and simplicity practical cunning must prevail; an intellectual grasp of a situation tends in these circumstances to lead to complacency. This is not the first use of *kataphroneo*, but occurring as it does in this important digression, and in a passage containing *katagelao*, it merits introduction in this context.

Before discussing *kataphronesis*, it is worth spending a little time on φρόνημα and φρονέω. Thucydides is careful in his usage; when he speaks of political allegiance, for example, he never speaks of *gnome* but of *phronein*. A typical example is VIII 31 2 τοὺς τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονοῦντας, referring to those on Clazomenae who were sympathetic to the Athenians. It can thus be seen that if *gnome* represents an opinion, *phronein* or *phronema* indicates an active point of view. In I 81, the

Athenian ambassadors have addressed the Spartan assembly, and Archidamus speaks in response. Like the Corinthians before him, he goes to some lengths to describe just what it means to have Athens for an adversary. When he speaks of their characteristic attitude and the kind of behaviour that can be expected from them, the term he uses is *phronema*. He is speaking of a fixed bent of mind, not of an opinion that may be swayed or changed. It is important to note the difference between these remarks and Pericles' observations in I 140. Pericles is in fact making strong claims on his own behalf when he says that his *gnome* is always the same; this is simply not the nature of *gnome*.

When Thucydides introduces Alcibiades in V 43, he explains his attitude to the Spartans by listing his reasons for wanting some kind of satisfaction from them. The phrase Thucydides uses for this attitude is φρονήματι φιλονικῶν. Obviously, this is no transitory opinion or mood; the phrase implies a fixed intention, likely to lead to action. It is precisely the lack of this attitude that causes Cleon to reproach the Athenians in III 38. Thucydides is not sympathetic to Cleon and there are elements of cynicism in his speech that will be discussed in due course; as a consequence, we may legitimately wonder to what extent Thucydides intended an element of truth in his criticisms. When Cleon decries the Athenians' illogical preoccupation with the art of rhetoric rather than the facts of the matter, he concludes at one point that they do not take the trouble to consider the prevailing circumstances and develop a

firm point of view: *phronountes de oude peri ton paronton hikanos* (III 38 7). As can be seen in the example in VIII 31 and in similar phrases, there is a hint of developing a policy in the meaning of the term *phronein*.

Phronema is actually used in an aggressive sense in IV 80; the Spartans have become uneasy about the number and strength of the helots. In order to pick out possible ringleaders, the Spartans asked the helots to select from among their number those whom they deemed to have given most service to the state. Two thousand were named, and naively made themselves conspicuous by appearing in the temples wearing wreaths; on the grounds that these were the most likely to have sufficient initiative to start a revolt, the Spartans secretly made away with them. The phrase used to express this initiative so feared by the Spartans is ὑπὸ φρονήματος.

In III 45, *phronema* becomes a term of reproach. Diodotus is replying to Cleon during the debate on Mytilene. He rejects Cleon's cynicism with statements of his own that in their very practicality could seem more cynical than Cleon's if they were not the grounds for clemency. He is not inclined to treat the Mytileneans as offensively recalcitrant; he simply wishes to make the point that certain aspects of behaviour are inevitable in certain circumstances and no amount of punishment, however ruthless, will change this. If any speech in the *History* could be taken as an expression of Thucydides' sentiments, this might

be the one; its message is the message of the whole work. Like Thucydides, Diodotus stresses the force of circumstances; poverty makes for daring due to necessity, whereas wealth makes for ambition due to *phronema* and *hybris*. Gomme[15], noting this strong use of the term *phronema*, cites the scholiast's rendering of the term in V 43 as μεγαλοφροσύνη. This is indeed so; the scholiast (ABFc2) goes on to mention drunks and prostitutes, as in Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1094a 1, and offers the occasional explanatory gloss such as ἐπάρσει (I 81) or ἀλαζονείας (IV 80) or ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλπίζοντες (V 40). This direct association of *phronema* and *hybris* is most significant; the striking and consistent feature of *hybris* is the implication it carries of active, wilful aggression. The same quality emerges unmistakably in Thucydides' use of *phronema* and *phronein*. This quality appears again in V 40 3, where the Argives are nervously looking for support and are quite certain that the Spartans have it in mind - ἐν φρονήματι - to be leaders in the Peloponnese. There is no doubt that the Argives see this attitude as a threat.

In VI 18, Alcibiades is urging the Athenians to mount the expedition to Sicily. He presents the enterprise as a means to put the Peloponnesians out of countenance - στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα. It can be seen from the graphic use of στόρνυμι that *phronema* here refers to an attitude that in Alcibiades' view needs cutting down to size. It is, of course, significant that he chooses to put his argument in these terms and that the Athenians find them acceptable.

Phroneo can be related to *kataphroneo* in the same way that *gelao* can be related to *katagelao*. If *phronema* can refer to an active, aggressive frame of mind, it follows that *kataphroneo* has a significance that should not be overlooked.

In I 122 the Corinthians are addressing the congress of Sparta's allies concerning the advisability of attacking Athens. They warn against complacency; *kataphronesis* will not do, and is more likely to be called *aphronesis*[16]. For Thucydides, *aphronesis* is *to enantion*, the opposite of *kataphronesis*. It becomes so when it causes many to trip up - *sphallesthai*. This is not the only time that *sphallein* and *kataphronesis* appear in the same context; an example appears in Nicias' speech in VII 63. It is obviously this deceptive quality in *kataphronesis* that renders it potentially similar in effect to its opposite; how then should it be translated in this passage? Herodotus may provide a clue; in I 59 it appears that Peisistratus has his mind firmly fixed on the tyranny in Athens; that is to say, he has formed in advance a clear concept of what he wants to achieve. Peisistratus was successful in achieving his object, and so in this context *kataphronesis* bears no pejorative force. Henceforth, however, Herodotus uses the term of projects that fail; and thus it acquires a connotation of reproach. It appears that Thucydides in this passage is retracing Herodotus' process of thought; if the careful forethought lead to a tumble - *sphallein*, then it becomes complacent folly. The trouble

with this idea is that it supposes only one cause for failure: the inability to take proper cognisance of a situation. Presumably this is the rationale by which generals who failed, including Thucydides himself, were so severely punished. Far from questioning such a rationale, Thucydides applies it without mercy to the characters in his narrative.

In II 11, the Spartans, after Plataea, prepare to invade Attica. Archidamus addresses the allies; he, or rather Thucydides, is making an occasion of it, using an argument that becomes routine to warn against complacency; διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύους γίγεσθαι. It should be noted that Archidamus' words are in fact confirmed by the narrative in II 21 2, thus confirming the implications suggested by the use of *kataphroneo*. It can be seen that here is no suggestion either of fixing one's mind firmly on an objective or of taking careful forethought. Now the notion expressed is that of forming a concept that is larger than reality, or divorced from it altogether. In this particular instance it consists of underestimating the problem at hand; hence the tendency to translate *kataphroneo* as *despise*.

In II 62 Pericles is addressing the demoralised Athenians; they are blaming him for their sufferings and he, having foreseen this, prepares to play upon their emotions and reactions. (59)

ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναι τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆναι

Incidentally, it can be seen here that *gnome* is to be taken to

refer to a transitory frame of mind. Pericles is speaking of *kataphronesis* before the event; that is to say, he wants the Athenians to believe that they are making the decision to stand firm in the light of a true understanding of their situation. In order to make this point, Thucydides chooses his words with some care. In 61 he says that things that are unexpected and beyond calculation rob one of the initiative to think and plan - δουλοῖ τὸ φρόνημα - and then goes on in 62 to make the point that the Athenians should know their strength and trust in it. They should come to grips with the enemy not merely with *phronema* but with *kataphronema*. If we take *kataphronema* to mean here what it means in Herodotus or in II 11, this advice appears to be quite extraordinary, but as in the case of numerous cryptic references to laughter in the work of other authors, the meaning is to be determined from the context. This, I believe, is why Thucydides is at some pains to make his meaning clear. He has said before (I 122) that *kataphronesis* is the opposite of *aphrosyne*; here he suggests that *kataphronema* is a development beyond mere *phronema*. Immediately he defines the distinction he is making; it is *auchema* that even a coward can feel as a consequence of ignorance of his own luck, but it is *kataphronesis* that enables one to perceive, as a consequence of using his intelligence (*gnome*), that he is superior to his enemies. It can be seen from this passage that Thucydides makes no difference between *kataphronesis* and *kataphronema*; he does not make his distinctions by using these words in different senses.

Gomme[17] terms the use of *phronema ..kataphronema* "an elaborate conceit", and finds difficulty in adequately rendering this paranomasia. I am not convinced that a paranomasia is all that is intended. Dionysius[18] does not care for the passage at all; he criticises the naivete of style and the "sophistry" that appears in the use of the paranomasia. Gomme also suggests that αὔχημα is a variant for *kataphronema*, not *phronema*, as assumed by the scholiast. I do not think either is right; the term *auchema* was surely chosen specifically to indicate a lack of thought. Edmunds[19] notes *phronema ..kataphronema* in passing, being more interested in the use of *gnome*. He seems to equate *gnome*, *dianoia* and *phronema*, and renders *phronema* as *pride* and *kataphronema* as *disdain*. Despite these observations, I think it should be understood that the strong term *auchema* entirely removes any pejorative force from *kataphronesis* in this passage. Thus we may understand *phronema* in the preceding sentence as *prudence*, and *kataphronema* as *confidence*. There is no necessity to go any further and render the latter by such terms as contempt.

In IV 34 Thucydides uses some of the same terminology to describe the feelings of the Athenians at Pylos. At first they shrank back, unable to find a sense of initiative because they were attacking Spartans[20]:

τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους

but gradually they gain confidence - *kataphronesantes* - and

press forward with the attack. The telling phrase *te gnome dedoulomenoi* says a good deal about the force of preconceived notions and their paralysing effect on the processes of reason. As in II 62, *kataphronesis* should not be understood to mean *contempt*. Thucydides in interested in the increasing confidence of the Athenians as they gain a true understanding of the situation; this is not the context of failure.

Thucydides uses the term in a similar way in V 8. Brasidas, at Amphipolis, does not wish to expose his inexperienced troops to the contempt of Cleon's forces. In 7 Thucydides draws a comparison between Cleon and Brasidas. Cleon has been forced to do what Brasidas predicted, and move forward. In spite of this, his mood is optimistic; Thucydides makes disparaging reference to his good fortune at Pylos. What Brasidas had predicted was that Cleon's superior numbers would make him over confident. The term Thucydides uses is ὑπερδόντα, which is by no means free from connotations of arrogance and contempt, as we shall see. Brasidas, on the other hand, is aware of his weaknesses, and is not willing to let Cleon see what they are; if he is to succeed at all, it will not be by permitting Cleon to base his assumptions on reality - μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος καταφρονήσεως. Gomme's discussion[21] of this difficult passage adequately enumerates the difficulties and possible, if partial, solutions; the further difficulties caused by the contradictory suggestions about the actual numbers have been noted by Westlake and Hunter among others and will be discussed below. It will be seen that

in interpreting the passage I have followed the Oxford text.

In V 9 Brasidas proceeds to address his troops, and Thucydides makes him use *kataphronesis* in the other sense. He says that the Athenians have presented themselves before Amphipolis out of a false sense of superiority, which he describes in detail; they do not expect anyone to come out against them, but now that they have reached their present position they are enjoying the view and have become complacent: τοὺς γὰρ εἰκάζω .. ὀλιγωρεῖν. It is the use of *oligorein* which makes it clear in what way *kataphronesis* should be understood in this passage. There is an echo, too, of Herodotus' use of *oligoria*.

In VI 33 Hermocrates speaks to the Syracusans, who are anxiously waiting for confirmation of the rumours concerning the Athenian expedition. He insists that a large force is on its way; the Syracusans should not feel superior - *kataphronesantes* - and be caught unawares, nor should they refuse to face facts and make no preparations. In 34 Hermocrates sums up; it is all very well to show a sense of superiority through vigorous action, but fear should direct the Syracusans to the most prudent course. This rather cryptic remark becomes clearer if we realise that Thucydides is making the distinction between a real and a false sense of security. It is never wise to assume that any sense of superiority is justified until after the event. Thucydides seems much more aware than Herodotus of his position as historian; this passage shows very clearly the ironies present in the

predicament of the Syracusans at this point. The Syracusans' response to these suggestions has already been discussed; it is an agreeable mixture of justified and unjustified comtempt, which finds expression in the laughter in 35.

In VI 49, Alcibiades, Lamachus and Nicias discuss the assault on Syracuse. Lamachus wants a surprise attack and makes a number of points that have become familiar from similar discussions in other contexts, including the description of the encounter at Amphipolis in book V. As in III 83, calculated opinion is called *gnome* and is less likely to cause alarm - ἀναθαρσεῖν. ὄψις, as a consequence, leads to *kataphronesis*. Once again the contrast is drawn between the process of forming an opinion and that of acquiring a mental grip on a problem, both of which can in their different ways lead to disaster.

In 63 2 Thucydides is describing the mood of the Syracusans as the Athenians fail to make the expected immediate attack. They pass from φόβος and unfulfilled προσδοκία to the point where they ἀνεθάρσουν μᾶλλον, and finally, when the Athenians pass them by altogether in favour of an unsuccessful attack on Hybla, ἔτι πλέον κατεφρόνησαν. By thus depicting the Syracusans' reactions, Thucydides is able to build up the surprise of the Athenians' failure to fulfil expectations. At this point in the narrative, however, it is not clear what kind of *kataphronesis* this is. Thucydides, however, darkly adds that the Syracusans' next decision was typical of an over excited group - οἷον δὴ ὄχλος

φιλεῖ θαρσήσας ποιεῖν. In VI 68 Nicias is addressing his men before battle. He says that the Syracusans look down on the Athenians, but will not wait about to finish the encounter, since they are inexperienced. Nicias is hoping that the confidence of his opponents will fade when it comes to the test. He sums up his advice by pointing out that his men can afford to feel confident, even though the Syracusans despise - ὑπερφρονοῦσι (68 2) - them. Here the reference is to the kind of contempt that is not earned; Thucydides refers to it not as *kataphronesis* but as *hyperphronesis*, a term that will shortly be discussed. It is in fact this *hyperphronesis* that is not justified; the Athenians, when the armies eventually meet, carry the day.

In book VII, however, there is no more success for the Athenians. Reverse follows reverse until in 61ff Nicias must address his troops before the engagement which is to prove decisive. He knows (60) that they have lost heart and tries to rally them by reminding them of those factors which they can recognise from their own experience. He says that they can afford to look down on - *kataphronein* - the Corinthians, whom they have often defeated before, and the Syracusans, who once would not have dreamt of resisting the Athenian navy at its full strength. All he can do to overcome their feelings of fear and despondency is to urge them to place reasonable confidence in the resources actually at their disposal. There is no irony in the use of *kataphronein* here; Thucydides is stressing the fact

that Nicias is not attempting to send his men into battle on false hopes, but is showing them the grounds on which they can afford to feel confident. It is courage rather than folly that Nicias shows here; courage which renders the outcome truly tragic.

In book VIII Thucydides shows the change in Athens' position after the disaster in Sicily. Even those that were not previously allied with either Athens or Sparta are throwing in their lot with the Spartans, and Tissaphernes is showing interest. All this greatly increases the confidence of the Spartans; but in VIII 2 Thucydides only says *he de ton Lakedaimonion polis ..etharsei*. In 8, however, when describing the movements of the Spartan fleet, Thucydides notes that these took place quite openly as the Spartans looked down on - καταφρονήσαντες - the weakness - ἀδυναμίαν - of the Athenians. This leads us to wonder whether they may be in error; certainly the Chians are not prepared to show open defiance (9).

In VIII 24 Thucydides is far more forgiving towards the Chians than to others who fall into error. The Athenians inflict a sound defeat on them, but Thucydides is not willing to let it go at that. He observes that the Chians are the only people that he knows of, besides the Spartans, who have retained their common sense - ἐσωφρόνησαν - in times of prosperity. They have come to grief - ἐσφάλησαν - not through taking risks - *para ton asphalesteron praxai* - but *en tois anthropeiois tou biou*

paralogois. They made a miscalculation which many shared, and came to know their error. This passage is similar in style to VI 63f; Thucydides treats the Chians with more respect than he does the Sicilians, but uses the same technique to build up the sense of surprise when the Athenians carry the day. It should be noted that he does not use a possibly derogatory term like *kataphroneo*; it is for this reason that I suggest that he is forgiving toward the Chians. It is certainly more devastating when reasonable conclusions drawn from all available evidence nevertheless lead to error. In such a context, the success of the Athenians is the more impressive.

In VIII 82, the Athenian party at Samos decides to recall Alcibiades in order that he may negotiate to win Tissaphernes over from the Peloponnesians. Thucydides shows no generosity to Alcibiades; in 81 it appears that he made exaggerated promises to the Athenians, and insisted that Tissaphernes was willing to establish relations of trust. The army put everything in Alcibiades' hands, and were won over to such an extent that, simply on the strength of what they were told - *ek ton lechthenton* - they were ready to despise - *kataphronein* - their enemies and sail to Piraeus. There is no doubt of the derogatory sense of *kataphroneo* here. Thucydides is painting an unattractive picture of Alcibiades, with his eye to the main chance, negotiating a position of safety for himself in dubious circumstances. Little value is to be placed on the confidence the army at Samos feels.

A term which arises in these contexts is ὑπερφρονέω; it in fact occurs four times in various forms, and as in the case of *kataphronesis* its meaning must be determined from the context.

In II 62 5, the term occurs as a natural development in Pericles' argument. It has been suggested (p 167 above) that in this context *phronema* should be taken to mean *prudence*, and *kataphronema* to mean *confidence*. Thucydides does not wish his reader to understand the notion of contempt here; in the next sentence he moves from *gnome* to *xynesis*, and from *kataphroneo* to *hyperphroneo*. If *gnome* is an opinion, *xynesis* is a certainty; this certainty, deriving from a feeling of superiority, leads to an increase in confidence. Pericles goes on to say that blind hope is only useful when the situation is hopeless; whereas a conclusion based on facts gives a sounder foundation to the process of forethought. In this passage, *he xynesis ek tou hyperphronos* refers to earned contempt rather than rash over confidence.

In Cleon's speech during the debate over Mytilene, *hyperphroneo* becomes part of the language of blunt speech[22]; somehow or other, he says, man naturally despises what is good for him, and is all agog for what does not suit him. Here it is the use of θαυμάζειν as an antonym that gives *hyperphroneo* its meaning. Blunt speaking appears again in VI 16; this time it is put into the mouth of Alcibiades, who is opposing Nicias in the

matter of an expedition against Syracuse, and replying to what he considers to be a personal attack upon himself. He can see no harm in special treatment being given to one who thinks well of himself; the phrase used here is μέγα φρονεῖν. He is countering Nicias' criticisms by refusing to apologise for any aspect of his behaviour. Rather he chooses the way of aggressive self affirmation, thus cutting short any further argument.

I do not think Alcibiades is, in Edmunds'[23] words, "in some ways Pericles' spiritual descendant". When Alcibiades scorns ἡσυχία (VI 18), he is exhibiting his reckless nature, and employing fear of *kataphronesis* to support his proposal. Edmunds fails to see the language of cynicism in VI 16; "Alcibiades has not gone beyond the Periclean concept of Athens in arrogating to himself such grandeur". Edmunds notes that the notion of *kataphronesis* occurs in II 63 and VI 63, but does not find accordingly that Nicias is like Pericles although he follows Pericles' principle, explicitly set forth by Thucydides, that Athens should avoid expansionist policies. It should, however, be noted that Edmunds' is a structuralist approach; such is not the method of this study.

Similar in usage to *hyperphroneo*, but far more frequent in occurrence, is ὑπερφορόω, and forms derived from it. ὑπεροψία occurs in I 84 3, in which Archidamus is replying to the Athenians. He is aware of the contrast usually drawn between the quick witted Athenians and the pedestrian - τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον

- Spartans[24], and replies with the sly suggestion that the Spartans' strength may lie in unquestioning obedience to discipline, since they are not brought up to be so smart as to look down on their laws, and are yet clever enough to pay heed to them. Here the term *hyperopsia* lends the required note of sarcasm to ἀμαθέστερον.

In III 37 Cleon makes the points that have been heard from Archidamus in I 84; this criticism is all the more striking coming from an Athenian, albeit an Athenian toward whom Thucydides makes no attempt to disguise his hostility, and it is reasonable to suppose that here the historian has an opinion of his own to express. In 38 5 Cleon reproaches the Athenians for becoming obsessed with public speaking as a form of entertainment, so that they value words more than deeds and follow any novelty: δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν ἀεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων.
It can be seen that the use of ὑπερόπται here is similar to that of ὑπερφρονεῖν in 39 5, discussed above.

In IV 62 3 Hermocrates uses ὑπερορᾶν as the opposite to προϊδεῖν; he is genuinely anxious that the Sicilians should not look down on the advice he has to offer. There is no irony intended in this straightforward use of the verb.

The same verb is used in V 6 3. Thucydides is relating the events at Amphipolis, and as usual making no attempt to conceal

his hostility toward Cleon or his admiration for Brasidas. The use of this verb is typical of Thucydides' approach to Cleon in 6-9; the episode culminates in the different manner of their deaths, and Thucydides' respectful tribute to his redoubtable adversary (11).

In V 28, Thucydides is describing the general position after the Peace of Nicias. Argos has benefited from neutrality and is now looking for allies to support her against the aggression she expects from Sparta. Argos has every confidence that she will receive this support; Sparta has fallen into contempt - ὑπερώφθη - as a consequence of her losses. The scholiast notes the use of *hyperorao* here and renders it as ἐξουδενώθη. The irony of this contempt does not appear until the description of the battle in Tegea (66-74). After this there is no doubt that the Spartans are still a force to be reckoned with.

In VI 43 Alcibiades feels that the Spartans despise him because of his youth. In fact, *despise* is too strong a term for *hyperorao* here; Alcibiades feels the Spartans' attitude as contempt, but they have simply overlooked him. The meaning here is quite different from that in the previous example, where Sparta has received scrutiny but been underestimated.

Hyperorao is associated with *sphallo* in VI 11. Nicias is addressing the Athenians during the debate that took place before the Sicilian expedition. His meaning here is similar to

that in V 28; he points out that all of Hellas is watching the Athenians for any sign of weakness. Book V contains a good example of Thucydides' own thinking on the subject; the shifting in allegiances after the Peace of Nicias clearly shows how anxious the Greek states were to align themselves with whichever state appeared at any time to be in a strong position. Indeed, this is not so much remarked on as presented as the natural course of events; it is for this reason as much as any other that Thucydides refuses to describe the Peace of Nicias as anything other than a continuation of the war. Thus it is that Nicias says: εἰ σφαλείημέν τι, ταχίστ' ἂν ὑπερίδοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο. Alcibiades is quick to pick up the point and convert it to his own use; in VI 18 he suggests that the Athenians show some contempt of their own by setting out on the expedition. In his view, it will shake the complacency of the Pelponnesians if they see that the Athenians look down on - *hyperorao* (18 4) - comfort and leisure. This is stirring advice, quite impractical, and quite in keeping with the character of Alcibiades as Thucydides chooses to present it to us.

The next example of *hyperorao* occurs in VI 104 3, and is free from irony. Nicias inspects the number of ships drawn up against him, and is not perturbed - ὑπερεῖδε. It can be seen that there is no question of his overlooking the ships, or underestimating their number on the other hand. Thucydides simply states that he looked down on them, and subsequent events prove him to be right - for the time being.

Hyperorao is the verb that condemns Nicias in VII 42 3. Thucydides is discussing the disaster at Syracuse; when Demosthenes arrives, he does not wish to repeat Nicias' experience. When Nicias came, he was feared but did not immediately attack Syracuse, choosing rather to winter in Catana. In so doing, he became an object of contempt - for he gave the Syracusans time to send for Gylippus, who destroyed him, as Lamachus predicted (see above p 170)[25].

The first thing to note about *kata-* and *hyperphronesis* is that words expressing this notion occur more often than not in direct speech. A great deal of very interesting work has been done on the speeches in Thucydides; it is not my purpose to contribute to this material so much as to find what bearing my particular interest may have on the task of illuminating Thucydides' purpose. There is no doubt that he delights in examining the success or failure of plans and projections. When the notion of *kataphronesis* does not appear in a speech, it still appears in a context where Thucydides is making a point. It is arguable, of course, that even in the speeches it is his own point that Thucydides is making. He asks, time and time again, how can man learn to plan only what he can achieve? When he falls, is it the fault of his *gnome* or is it a matter of chance[26]? Can one be forgiven for deeds committed in spite of careful forethought and *gnome*, or should one be punished as Thucydides was after Amphipolis? At Amphipolis, Cleon's

confident assumptions were wrong and those of Brasidas were right. Thus it was Brasidas' enterprise that was successful, and thus it comes about that for Thucydides at any rate Brasidas' death is the more lamentable. The verb σφάλλω occurs with sufficient frequency in these contexts to justify the conclusion that Thucydides asks questions like these. It should be noted that he does not conceive of such errors in terms of *hybris*. Thucydides' *kataphronesis* has more in common with Homer's *atasthalia*.

Virginia Hunter[27] notes that Thucydides has a "technique of anticipation" and sets out to "see if it has some larger significance". The author wishes to "go beyond de Romilly[28]" and study not in isolation but in relation to one another the various episodes that in her view embody this technique. Taking Archidamus's speech and subsequent move to Oenoe as an example, Hunter notes that Thucydides can have had no idea why Archidamus delayed at Oenoe. This in her view makes Thucydides' version of his motives all the more interesting. Hunter says of this version, "this is reasoning after the fact, heard in Athens and recorded by Thucydides because he himself could offer no more plausible motives and more important, because it suited his own concept of the writing of history. In other words, Thucydides has events and their probable (or possible) motives turned on their head. He knew what resulted at Athens when Archidamus camped at Acharnai; these results he converted to purposes on the part of Archidamus." Hunter then proceeds in her

second chapter to the subject of Brasidas. She notes the close correspondence between the words of speech and narrative in IV 125-6 and 127; this is certainly a notable feature of Thucydides' method. In my view it is very different from, for example, Xenophon's method in *Anab.* I 7 4, 8 11, when Cyrus describes to his troops the Persians' habit of moving into battle with a great noise and screaming, whereas in the event Artaxerxes' huge force approaches quite steadily, in silence. It can be seen that this is by comparison an artless narrative. Thucydides' process of predicting events is indicated by the terms εἰκός and εἰκάζειν; Hunter devotes the substance of this chapter to the implications of this process. She suggests that in V 6 Thucydides' reasons for Cleon doing as Brasidas expected do not hold up, and that in 7 another, no more likely, motive is given, and the incidence of verbs of thinking and feeling greatly increases. 8 is devoted to Brasidas' strategy and 10 shows that everything happens according to his predictions. Hunter notes that in spite of all Thucydides says Brasidas' forces are not so inferior as his reported anxiety would suggest, and that Cleon's move to reconnoitre was not unreasonable. It seems to me that Thucydides' use at this point not only of verbs of thinking and feeling but also of the subjective compounds of *phroneo* bears out Hunter's suggestions; she herself notes the use of these terms.

With reference to Demosthenes (IV and VII), both Hunter and Westlake[29] are struck by Thucydides' handling of the matter.

As Westlake says, "Nowhere does Thucydides assess, or even refer to, the contribution of Demosthenes to one of the most decisive and most valuable victories in Athenian history". Hunter notes that if Thucydides mentions motives at all, he mentions those of the Peloponnesians while Demosthenes appears at all times to act without reflection and at the mercy of *tyche*. This in her view is Thucydides' way of indicating that Demosthenes' actions, even when attended by success, were of no value in terms of their aftermath, the rise of Cleon. Westlake on the other hand says: "Though showing some interest in the personality of Demosthenes, Thucydides is far more concerned with drawing attention to the lesson of his chequered career in the Archidamian war. This lesson is that not even an energetic and intelligent leader with original ideas could successfully break the military stalemate; that Periclean strategy, which accepted this stalemate as inevitable and even desirable, was right.." It can be seen that discussion of motives, whether in the form of a speech or a digression, does not accord with Thucydides' purpose at this point. Whatever the reasons adduced for his decision, Thucydides has decided that Demosthenes was not one of those whose personality and actions affected the course of events. Needless to say, there is only one reference to *kataphronesis* in this passage, and it describes the notable surge of confidence (IV 34 2) when the Athenian troops discover that the dreaded Spartan hoplites are not so terrible as they had feared; there are no references of this nature to Demosthenes at all. I have dwelt on this episode at some length because although these two authors

treat it in very different ways and come to some markedly different conclusions (Hunter even suggesting that Thucydides has suppressed the fact that Nicias deliberately fired the woods on Sphacteria), they both take note of the significance of Thucydides' method. Yet another approach to Thucydides' language is that of Connor[24], who seeks to understand Thucydides' intent by giving significance to the words he uses in terms of theme and structure. "Although Thucydides never says so in so many words, we can infer that the same deficiency accounts for Lamachus' assent to Alcibiades' diplomatic offensive and ..to the delays that later (VII 42 3) seemed so damaging to the Athenian cause." This approach seems inappropriate in the light of the obvious care with which Thucydides chooses his words. There is no doubt that the relation between speeches or reported motives and actions is important, and certainly no doubt that Thucydides' language reflects his interest.

In book VII, Thucydides' treatment of Demosthenes is quite different; his opinion, as Hunter (p 95) suggests, may be Thucydides' own, but since the consequences of Demosthenes' decision are important to the narrative, this is the moment to discuss his thoughts and motives. Hunter notes the correspondence between Lamachus' predictions (VI 49) and the event as perceived by Demosthenes, including the terms *kataphroneo - hyperorao* (p 97-8).

When turning to Xenophon, it is not hard to see that his approach is quite different from that of Thucydides; in fact, it seems naive by comparison. This is not to say that he is not aware of the way in which people behave toward one another, but he sees this in terms of *hybris*, and his observations and choice of vocabulary reflect this interset. His use of the term *hybris* has been discussed in the relevant chapter (see above p 121); it remains to be seen whether he develops the notion of *kataphronesis*.

There is no doubt that laughter does not occur as significantly in his work as it does in that of Homer or the tragic writers. A typical example occurs in *Cyropaedia* VII 1 22, when Cyrus the elder is preparing to fight Croesus. He reviews the troops and makes them a splendid promise - the opportunity to crow over the enemy. He will send a camel corps against the opponents' cavalry; this will put the latter in a laughable fix. It can be seen that the familiar notions are taken for granted, and used by Xenophon here without reflection.

Like his predecessors, Xenophon is inclined to use *katagelao* when he speaks of aggressive laughter. In *Anabasis* I 9 13, Xenophon is speaking of Cyrus after his death. With sorrow and regret he describes his abilities, his attitudes, and the response of others to him. He would, for instance, allow no one to make a fool of him by misbehaving and getting away with it. Although *katagelao* is such an emphatic term, it is clear that

overt laughter is the last thing on Xenophon's mind. In fact, it is Cyrus' conduct that is important. The bad behaviour of his subjects only becomes aggressive mockery if Cyrus allows them to get away with it. As so often in Greek literature, the term is entirely subjective in its usage. It is also interesting at this point to note the difference between what the ideal ruler, Cyrus, and Herodotus' uneasy tyrant, Deioces, finds humiliating. While Cyrus judges people's behaviour and acts accordingly, Deioces permits no one to laugh or so much as spit in his presence.

In *Anab.* II 4 4, Xenophon is describing the uneasiness of the Greeks after the death of Cyrus. They are sure the Great King will decide to kill them as an example to the rest of the Greeks. He is probably preparing a trap for them; he certainly will not permit them to go home and say that they defeated him at his gates, laughed in his face, and went home. Again, the term used is *katagelao*, and again it is the Great King's response that will turn the efficiency of the Greeks into aggressive mockery.

In *Cyrop.* VII 5 13, there is the notion of the pride that goes before a fall. The Babylonians laugh from the city wall as Cyrus the elder goes about his preparations. In 5 14 they laugh still more at the thought of being guarded by Cyrus' allies, whom they consider more friendly to themselves than to Cyrus. The term used is *katagelao*; it is the kind of laughter that indicates

an incorrect appraisal of the situation, and is overt mockery. As in the work of Thucydides, it is susequent events that bring out the irony, and determine the nature of this laughter, which is like the laughter that so infuriated Zopyrus in Herodotus' story. Xenophon's approach to his work, like that of Herodotus, tends to the anecdotal; it is as easy to read too little into their work as it is to read too much into that of Thucydides.

Xenophon shows his interest in inappropriate laughter in *Cyrop.* II when he gives a great deal of attention to Cyrus' relations with his officers. When they are all at table the occasion is enlivened with banter and story telling. The stories are received with laughter, but on each occasion Xenophon is careful to note that the laughter was acceptable and appropriate to the occasion: ὥσπερ εἰκός, ἐγέλασαν .. ὡς εἰκός, ἐγέλων.. (II 2 5, 2 10). The first story indeed, told by Hystaspas, shows his tactfulness; he describes the efforts of an anxious guest to make sure of his share at a banquet, to the unconcealed delight of one of the diners; Hystaspas however, being unable to restrain his own laughter, had turned it into a cough. It seems that it was not polite to laugh in the face of another's discomfiture, but it is now acceptable to relate the tale on another occasion. Another officer however, Aglaitidas, is not of this opinion. and objects to boasting and fabrication in order to make a funny story (2 11). Xenophon notes that he is of a more austere disposition - στρυφνότερος. Cyrus however does not agree that he who tells a joke is necessarily an ἀλάζων. To

Cyrus, the *alazon* is one who makes false claims on his own behalf for his own benefit and fails to honour his own promises, whereas those who make a joke do so quite harmlessly, without any view to their own advantage.

Xenophon describes another pleasant occasion involving Hystaspas in *Cyrop.* VIII 4. Cyrus is entertaining Gobryas at a feast, and the two are at pains to show themselves to advantage. Hystaspas has become nettled at the fulsome talk and behaviour of Chrysantas, another of Cyrus' lieutenants, and asks how he should show his pleasure in Cyrus' good fortune. Should he clap his hands or laugh; what should he do? An awkward moment seems to be developing, but Artabazus saves the situation like Hephaestus. He suggests that Hystaspas should dance the Persian dance (4 12), a mysterious remark which suggests to me the elaborate ritual of courtesy for which the Persians were known. As Xenophon says, ἐπὶ τούτοις μὲν δὴ γέλως ἐγένετο, and the subject is dropped.

In *Anab.* VII, Xenophon forms an association with Seuthes, a Thracian prince, and a most attractive character. A feast is held to mark the event, and the occasion is enlivened with a good deal of merriment. One of the Thracian customs is to throw food to others rather than help oneself; the terrible eater Arystas will have none of this, but secures his meal and gives it his full attention. He even sends the wine cup on to Xenophon untasted, unselfconsciously remarking that he is still too busy.

The wine bearer repeats the remark to Seuthes, and there is a good deal of laughter. Arystas has become a clown unawares; the readiness of the company to laugh at him indicates the atmosphere of relaxation and trust that prevails at Seuthes' feast (3 25). Later on (33), Seuthes seems to do a little clowning himself. Xenophon, for lack of any other resources, has offered as a gift to his host himself and his men, along with the booty they will capture in alliance with him. Seuthes rises and drinks with Xenophon, and then the musicians arrive. Seuthes' enthusiasm seems to be so great at this point that he lets out a war cry and leaps sideways as though avoiding an imaginary missile.

Laughter appears again as a social skill in *Anab.* V 4. The Greeks, on their journey to the Black Sea, find the Mossynoecians most uncivilised; they do in public what they should do in private, and when alone they do what others would do in company; conversing and laughing by themselves and even dancing as though for an audience. The Mossynoecians' laughter is as suspect as that of Sophocles' Ajax because they laugh when they are alone. Ajax, of course, thinks that there is someone present to hear and be wounded by his laughter, but in fact he is alone with the creatures he is tormenting.

In *Anab,* II 6 23 Xenophon describes the character of Menon. He is ambitious, greedy and fawning, and only acquires power in order to abuse it. Lies and deceit are his way to success;

simplicity and truth are alike folly to him. He never shows affection; if he appears friendly to anyone he is sure to be plotting against him. This catalogue of inappropriate behaviour Xenophon completes with the assertion that Menon never ridiculed his enemies but always spoke to his associates in a comtemptuous manner - *katagelao*. Xenophon draws the moral by relating that he was not killed as soon as he was captured but tortured for a year before meeting the death of a scoundrel. The important point here is the reversal of accepted behaviour. The notion of saving ridicule for enemies is commonplace; Menon's habits place him beyond the pale of commom humanity. Hence the undisguised relish with which Xenophon describes his end.

Xenophon makes his idea of *kataphronesis* clear in *Ag.* I 28. Speaking for Agesilaus, he says that the king orders all captured barbarians to be put up for sale naked, because it was his belief that contempt - τὸ καταφρονεῖν - of the enemy would add a certain force to efforts in battle. The soft white bodies of the barbarians seem to have had the desired effect on the troops.

The other four examples of *kataphronesis* are all to be found in the *Hellenic History*, and all refer to overconfidence which results in disaster. The first is in IV 1 17; the Greeks are caught out by Pharnabazus διὰ τὸ μηδὲν πρότερον ἐσφάλθαι. It is interesting to find σφάλλω once again in this context; it clearly denotes the fall that follows the pride, and the whole

passage amusingly depicts the naivete of the Greeks is assuming that their success would continue indefinitely. The next is the story of Thibron in IV 7 8; his overconfidence quickly brings its consequences. In V 3 1 the Olynthians make the same mistake, and in VIII 4 30 the Eleans, in spite of having been despised by the Arcadians, Argives, Achaeans, and Athenians, manage nonetheless to surprise them .

Lysias treats *kataphronesis* in a similar way in II 27. He says that Xerxes underestimated Hellas and was deceived in his hopes, humiliated, stung, and angry. On the other hand, Lysias uses *kataphronesis* in quite the opposite sense in 50 when he speaks of the Athenian achievement under Myronides at Megara. They made no attempt to summon help, but relied on their own courage and correctly estimated their opponents. *Kataphroneo* is the verb used in both these remarks; but in each case the meaning can only be determined fron the context, whether of success of failure.

This principle operates in an interesting way ~~in~~ when the speech del purports to take place in a law court. A typical example is III 20, in which Lysias suggests that Simon has brought his action in contempt of his opponents. In the same way, in VI 11, Andocides is alleged to have shown contempt for the gods, and in IX 17 Lysias says that his opponents have shown contempt for the

populace and no fear of the gods. In IX 2 he emphasises the difference between contempt for him and for what he says. It is important to note that in all such examples (see also XII 84, XIII 73, XIV 9 etc) the use of the term *kataphronesis* is much more dramatic than it is in tragedy or in Thucydides' work; in these the exact nature of this attitude is inevitably revealed in the course of events; Lysias by contrast, or any other orator, cannot know what the outcome of his endeavours may be; such is the usefulness and flexibilty of the term, however, that that in the light of the outcome it will be immediately understood with its appropriate significance. Thus it can be seen that in the speeches of the orators the claims made are not so extravagant as one might suppose. *Kataphroneo* is just as likely to refer to the all-important process of perceiving the nature of the problem as it is to any process of acting in error under a false impression of the circumstances.

Isocrates makes it quite clear what he means by *kataphronesis* in *Panegyric* 14; he invites his hearers to ridicule and scorn him - *katagelan kai kataphronein* - if his efforts are not up to standard. Thus he eliminates the possibilities of ambiguity in *kataphroneo* . In 30 Isocrates wishes to emphasise that the story of Demeter and Persephone is not one which is to be disparaged. Here the apologetic tone of his remarks gives a derogatory sense to *kataphroneo*: ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις καταφρονήσειε τῶν λεγομένων .. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων εἰκότως ἄν ..νομίσειεν.

In 86 and 91 the usages have more implications: in 86, Athens and Sparta led their forces against an enemy that despised the whole of Hellas. They did this (91) not in contempt of the foe but in rivalry with one another. In both these cases, the outcome of the *kataphronesis* is known to Isocrates' readers. In the first instance, Isocrates is not the first to offer his audience the enjoyment of the notion that the haughty Persians' contempt led to destruction. In fact, the contempt lends the more credit to the efforts of Athens and Sparta. On the other hand, in 91 Isocrates wishes to make a distinction concerning the attitude of Athens and Sparta. It could well be supposed, or so Isocrates implies, that Athens and Sparta were impelled by a sense of confidence, rash in the case of Sparta, to move against the foe; but Isocrates prefers to suggest a striving for further glory on the part of the Athenians and envy - ζηλόω - on the part of the Spartans. Having used the term *kataphronesis* a number of times with some effect, Isocrates proceeds to threaten his hearers with it. In 136 he points out that the Hellenes are wrangling with one another and justly earning the contempt of the barbarian. Here Isocrates is invoking the principle enunciated by Hesiod, that of good and bad ἔρις ; it was good *eris* that brought Athens and Sparta together to fight the Great KIng, but bad *eris* that separates the Hellenes now. In 147 he speaks of Xenophon's army in order to establish the superiority of Greek troops. After the death of Cyrus, the Great King's estimation of his own troops was so low that he took treacherous measures to protect himself from a mere six thousand

Greek troops. The word Isocrates uses for this low estimate is *kataphroneo*, in the sense of taking a good look and presumably forming a correct estimate. Isocrates repeats this notion in 152; not only did Artaxerxes have a low opinion of his own troops, but the Persians in general are apt to despise their allies and court their enemies. This is not the first time that we have seen that this reversal of the accepted norms of friendliness and contempt is considered irrational by Greeks; Xenophon makes the same point concerning the unpleasant Menon and the curious Mossynoecians. This is a good rhetorical point and one that was meaningful to its hearers, and which Isocrates is prepared to apply in any direction that he thinks fit. In letter I 4, he tells Dionysius that he has heard a shocking thing ; that Dionysius honours flatterers and despises those who have some advice to offer. He is of course perfectly certain that this is untrue, and on the basis of this certainty proceeds to offer Dionysius some advice.

Isocrates takes a different view of some advice in *Peace* 52; he says that the Athenians are sunk into such political confusion that they cannot form any lasting opinions (cf. Thucydides' Cleon in the Mytilene debate) and still fancy themselves as great advisers while offering the kind of advice that anyone might despise.

Kataphronesis is a notion that proves useful in the making of oratorical points. The *Antidosis* provides a good example. In

15 Isocrates attacks Lysimachus, who apparently so underrates his opponent that he thinks he can refute his truth with lies. The word for underrate is κατα πεφρόνηκεν which clearly indicates a mistaken impression on Lysimachus' part, which Isocrates will shortly correct. In 137 he appeals to Timotheus on behalf of his argument and of those whom he considers sensible. He begs that Timarchus not despise them, but rather value what they have to say. In 151 he makes a point on his own behalf; he insists that he acts as he does not out of arrogance or contempt - *kataphroneo* - for those who do not live as he does, but because he has the highest possible motives and standards by which he conducts himself. In 204 he observes that philosophy produces good results; how then can one scorn this discipline when we can see the products? This suggests that *kataphronesis* is part of ignorance; he pursues this notion in 209, when he says that the ignorance of those who despise philosophy is amazing. Furthermore (215), some do not merely despise it, but they mistake it for sophistry and comdemn it out of hand.

In *Euagoras* 47, 58, *kataphronesis* is treated as the opposite of fear. In the first case, Isocrates says that Cyprus was raised from being an object of contempt to be one of fear, and in the second that Artaxerxes despised his brother Cyrus but feared Euagoras. In each case, Isocrates is paying Euagoras a compliment; Euagoras had to achieve a great deal in order to replace the *kataphronesis* of others with fear.

In *Busiris*, the term is used to mean ideological opposition. It seems that his opponent has argued that Busiris is an admirer of the exemplary figures Orpheus and Aeolus; therefore Isocrates enquires what his behaviour would have been like if he had happened to be καταφρονῶν αὐτῶν. The passage is a series of arguments from absurdity in the context of a rhetorical exercise, but it illustrates nonetheless the notions taken for granted in establishing a point. *Kataphronesis* has a similar sense in *Panathenaecus* 26, when Isocrates insists that he does not despise the traditional forms of education, but rather that he approves of them. *Kataphronesis* is here opposed to ἐπαινῶ, and clearly implies the process of taking a close look at something and finding it wanting.

In *Panathenaecus* 229, Isocrates has more to say about this process. He describes a dispute with one of his former pupils, during which he has won his point but retained his respect for his opponent. His young pupils, on hearing his account, underestimate his opponent - *kataphroneo* - and thus miss the point in both directions. Isocrates supports this stance in 232 when he regrets having spoken slightingly - ὀλιγώρως - of the Lacedaemonians. So great is his concern, in fact, that he calls together some of his pupils and someone who has spent considerable time in Spartan society in order to ask their opinion of what he has said. It is the latter who expresses any reservations; in the course of his remarks he suggests that

someone whom everyone despises may well be the one to give the right advice; Isocrates on the other hand, who is widely admired for his skills, may find that certain sections of his speech may be treated with *kataphronesis* by the more intelligent of the Spartans. This is one time when Isocrates appears to give some thought to the implications of *kataphronesis*; at other times it seems to be little more than the small change of rhetoric, bandied about as freely as the term *hybris* in oratory or certain scenes in tragedy. Here he is obviously aware of the possibilities of incorrectly appraising a situation or an opponent, and reflects ruefully on the consequences.

At other times he takes pleasure in pointing them out; in *Philip* 70 his comment is that Philip may think it petty minded to pay attention to his foolish and drivelling critics, but it is not wise to overlook - *kataphroneo* - the mob. He invites Philip to consider Artaxerxes II (100), who is weak and an object of general *kataphronesis*. Here Artaxerxes is by no means overlooked; he is rather the object of close scrutiny. In 124 Isocrates says that the Hellenes are being outstripped by the barbarians whom they look upon as being weak and effeminate. Who would not be quite right to despise - *kataphroneo* - them for this? All his arguments are directed at what he obviously takes for granted in Philip: a competitive streak. If the contemptible barbarians find the Hellenes contemptible, the only possible recourse is to prove whose *kataphronesis* is in fact based on correct assumptions. There is no doubt that it is

extremely shaming - and a great source of pleasure for the adversary - to act confidently out of *kataphronesis* and fail in the enterprise. It does not appear that this kind of argument carried any weight with Philip; what is clear is that the Athenian Isocrates thought that it would. To round off his argument, Isocrates emphasises the comparison between Philip and Artaxerxes II, who is καταφρονημένος by all as no king before.

Unlike Thucydides, Isocrates appears to mention *kataphronesis* freely in a variety of contexts without reflecting on the possible ironies implicit in this flexible term. Whereas the historian makes his meaning precise in subsequent narrative, Isocrates is by contrast quite undiscriminating in his usage. Neither, for that matter, is *kataphronesis* associated with the sense of risking all on the basis of one's judgement, as it is in the work of Lysias. To illustrate the point, I cite one more example from Isocrates; in *Panathenaicus* 9, in which he comes as close as he ever does to a critical examination of the term, he quite uncritically says that in his old age he has become so irritable that he is the only man who actually despises himself.

There is no doubt that the laughter of the suitors portrays a notion that reappears in subsequent literature; the more they laugh, the greater the sense of triumph at their downfall. This is a simple pleasure, in which Herodotus also indulges in the course of his anecdotes. Laughter inappropriate to a situation can imply more than mere social ineptitude and less than the villainy imputed to the suitors. It is Thucydides who elevates the notion into something more complicated and incorporates it into his historiographical method. A knowing laugh can equally indicate knowledge or ignorance, and can only be justified in the event, and the term used to describe the attitude behind such laughter is *kataphronesis*. No author develops or uses the term as Thucydides does, and the greater part of this chapter has accordingly examined certain features of his work. After Thucydides, the term becomes less interesting and more likely to occur in contexts of personal affront.

Notes to Chapter 5.

1. Levine, *thesis*. p 16.

2. I take note of J E Powell's observation, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge University Press 1938), preface p 8, that the "uncertainty of literary dates in the fifth century occasionally renders this distinction arbitrary". I take context and usage into account in order to establish which forms and usages seem to have been either chosen or developed by Herodotus for his own purposes.

3. John Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History* (Croom Helm 1982), p 11.

4. Donald Lateiner, 'No Laughing Matter: a Literary Tactic in Herodotus', *TAPhA* 107 (1977), pp 173-182.

5. Lateiner, *op. cit.* p 178.

6. Apart from the examples cited, καταχαιρω appears but seldom; in the *Septuagint* (*Pr.* 1 26), in *Alciphron* 2 4, in *IG* 14 2410 11, and in *Supp. Epigr.* 2 844 (Syria). As can be seen, the word appears to be more characteristic of κοινη than of classical Greek.

7. Powell, *op. cit.*

8. Lateiner, *op. cit.* p 178.

9. F M Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (Arnold 1907), pp 137-9.

10. A W Gomme, A Andrewes and K J Dover *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1945 - 1981), vol. III pp 455, 469.

11. See above p 118.

12. W Robert Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton University Press 1984), p 118.

13. Lowell Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Harvard University Press 1975), p 10, notes that in I 140 Pericles makes a distinction between "policy based on intelligence or insight" and *gnome* in the sense of a "potentially fickle state of mind". It can be seen that in the passage under discussion and in others to be discussed the latter sense is to be understood. Edmunds' concern is to show that "Thucydides characterises persons and cities in terms of *gnome*, *techne*, and *tyche*, and these concepts give the *History* a certain thematic structure.." but has some helpful comments to offer on *gnome*.

Antonios Rengakos, *Form und Wandel des Machtdenkens der Athener bei Thukydides*, *Hermes* Einzelschriften Heft 48, (1984), refers in discussing Pericles' language to *gnome* and *paranoia*, which he terms *Einsicht* and *Vorausssicht* (p 45). He does not discuss *kataphronema* but concentrates on the intellectual and idealistic components of Pericles' policies.

14. Gomme, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p381-2.

15. Gomme, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp 319-320.

16. Gomme, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p 417, refers to W H Forbes, *comm*, Thuc. I, (Oxford 1895), who writes, "The meaningless play on words is an element of weakness in Thucydides' writing, due to the influence of contemporary rhetoricians and sophists". Gomme does not consider the play on *kataphronesis ..aphrosyne* meaningless, but rather that it would be juster to complain of II 62 3-4 in this manner. Gomme also notes correctly that "the argument is not addressed to Archidamus 84 4", in which Archidamus is permitted the play on ἀμαθέστερον ..καὶ σωφρονέστερον in discussing the advantages of the Spartan temperament and intellect.

17. Gomme, *op. cit.* vol. I, pp 171-2.

18. Dionysius of Halicarnassius, ed. W K Pritchett, *On Thucydides* (University of California Press 1975).

19. Edmunds, *op. cit.* p 73.

20. The scholiast (Hude 1927) notes this vivid phrase, and offers τεταπεινωμένοι in elucidation.

Gomme, *op. cit.* vol III, p 475, suggests that the rhetorical use of δουλόω may have lost its force by Thucydides' day. He notes that the encounter is clearly written from the Spartan point of view. He also makes a most interesting comparison with the encounter between the young men and the herdsman described in Eur. *IT* 260ff (see above p 80), finding parallels in the narrative and suggesting that there is "even a Cleon": Euripides' ἄλλος δέ τις πάτταλος . This comment is interesting from the point of view of this study, because it takes note of the kind of attitude implied by γελάω.

21. Gomme, *op. cit.* vol. III, pp 642-3.

22. On the subject of language assigned to characters, Daniel P Tompkins, 'Stylistic Characterisation in Thucydides', *YCS* XXII (1972), pp 181-214, shows that Thucydides actually depicts his characters' style of speaking. Nicias has two characteristics: "his insistence on talking about himself, and his tendency to admit concessions that weaken his argument" (p 194). Alcibiades uses "regular emphatic assertions aligned in clear parataxis" (p 205).

23. Edmunds, *op. cit.* p 90.

24. Gomme, *op. cit.* vol. I, p 248, observes: "Thucydides was under no illusion at all as to the value of Spartan slowness as it often showed itself in practice.."

25. Dover, *op. cit.* vol. IV, p 420-1, has given this portion of the narrative full and useful discussion; in drawing his conclusions he notes the importance of ὑπερώφθη.

26. Adam Parry, 'Thucydides' Historical Perspective', *YCS* XXII (1972), has this to say (p 59): "The Athenians are in fact the moving force throughout the *History* ..They are that incommensurate, irrational factor in reality which makes it sure that ultimately you never win ..that which the keenest intelligence cannot foresee." And on p 60: "Pericles is the essence of Athenian intelligence. The word constantly attached to him is *gnome*."

27. Virginia Hunter, *Thucydides - the Artful Reporter* (Hakkert Toronto 1973), p 8, note to p 21.

28. J de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Blackwell 1963).

29. H D Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge University Press 1968), pp 111, 120.

30. Connor, *op. cit. passim* and p 174.

The Character of Socrates.

Enid Welsford[1] says of the fool, "the fool exploits an inner contradiction; the incongruity due to that strange twofold consciousness which makes each one of us realise only too well that he is a mere bubble of temporary existence threatened every moment with extinction, and yet be quite unable to shake off the sensation of being a stable entity existing eternal and invulnerable at the very centre of the flux of history.." Welsford is speaking about the fragility of self esteem; the terms of her proposition well convey the nature of the risk, and the extent of the sacrifice, when self esteem is deliberately risked upon a venture.

I have already suggested in the first chapter that in the *Iliad* Thersites and Hephaestus take upon themselves the role of buffoon, whereas in the *Odyssey* this role is thrust upon one character by another. Assuming the role of buffoon is not to be confused with Odysseus' grim acceptance of humiliation in order not to be detected in his disguise; Odysseus wishes only to escape attention, whereas Thersites' and Hephaestus' intention is to draw attention to themselves in order to take command of a situation. Just how little Odysseus relishes this role can be discerned from the way he at times fails to efface himself; he cannot control his glee when escaping from Polyphemus, he is goaded to join in the athletic games at Phaeacia, and although he remembers not to hit him too hard, he

floors the beggar Irus under the noses of the suitors. He is more successful, however, in the matter of the stool and the ox's foot.

It seems, then, that Homer has established the self appointed buffoon, whose disarming force is so great, as a character. This character appears in the work of Herodotus, who tells the stories of the builder's resourceful son (II 121) and of Zopyrus (III 151). In carrying out an enterprise in this way, the self appointed buffoon risks more than ordinary failure. In order to reinstate himself he has no choice but to succeed; this is a greater risk even than that taken by the orator who guarantees that his opponent's argument is nonsense. The story of Zopyrus is thus all the more repugnant because his self mutilation is a perversion of the buffoon's role, being irreversible rather than a temporary pose in order to achieve a particular end. Like Thersites, Zopyrus is defined as much by the way he looks as by the way he acts.

In Homer's work, as has been noted (see above p 30ff), one character may smile at another in order to avert actual or impending wrath. The one thus appeased may not necessarily smile in return; an exception is Zeus, who is inclined to smile graciously when one of the gods capitulates to him. In later literature, the laugh or smile is a sign that the attempt at appeasement has been successful. The laughter of the guards in Herodotus II 121 4 shows that the builder's son has been

successful in his designs. In Lysias I 13 Euphiletus' wife teases him till he laughs, and then she knows that it is safe to slip away. In *Wasps* 566-7 various litigants attempt to win a laugh or a smile from Philocleon; this is like Hermes' trick when he steals Apollo's bow in the Homeric hymn to Hermes. Both Apollo (281) and Zeus (389) show by laughing that they have been won over, and the litigants who approach Philocleon are hoping for the same result. Aeschines has a sharp eye for an attempt at appeasement; he describes in scathing terms (I 26) Demosthenes' attempt to win sympathy after the failure of his speech before Philip. In III 87 Aeschines attacks Callias' brother Taurosthenes, who was at one time quite prepared to wipe the Athenians out, but now shakes hands and smiles ingratiatingly at everyone. This particular smile is distinguished by the prefix προσ- which also distinguishes the smile that saved the life of the infant Cypselus and almost saved the lives of Medea's children.

The techniques of appeasement are more in keeping with the character of Odysseus than of Thersites. Detienne and Vernant[2] in discussing μῆτις observe the same ploys in Odysseus and Socrates, and have this to say about Hom. III 205-224: "Consider the most subtle and most dangerous orator of Greece preparing .. to weave the glittering web of his words ..at the moment when he is about to speak the master of tricks, the magician of words pretends to have lost his tongue.." There is no doubt that in depicting his character, Socrates, Plato takes the cunning

behaviour observed in Odysseus a step further.

In Plato's work Socrates' trick is continually to forestall ridicule by inviting it. In *Phaedrus* 236d4, Socrates says he has no intention of making a fool of himself - γέλοιος - by expounding his art to a professional. Similarly, in *Philebus* 23d2 Socrates modestly suggests that he is risking ridicule by engaging in numerical concepts. There are numerous examples of this ploy, which generally leads to Socrates successfully bringing off the manoeuvre he has just deprecated[3]. A development of this trick is to provoke the ridicule in order to turn it back on the opponent. In *Phaedrus* 260b-c Phaedrus thinks Socrates is being very silly, and is beguiled into entering his trap. Socrates willingly appears to be sillier still, and then, having disarmed Phaedrus, proceeds to spring the trap. It is no sillier to pass off a donkey as a horse than it is to pass off evil as good.

In *Hippias* I 288b2, 5, Socrates proposes to explain what is beautiful to an imaginary opponent. Hippias asks whether Socrates thinks that the opponent may make a fool of himself if he asks what Socrates means by *beautiful*; it is to be noted that this invention of a third party keeps the danger of ridicule one remove further away. Socrates is about to try out Hippias' definition on this imaginary opponent; by unwisely making this remark, Hippias is showing the extent of his confidence. There is a slight hint of this confidence being

misplaced when Socrates replies that the event will show whether the opponent makes a fool of himself. Undeterred, Hippias asserts that if he does not accept what Socrates says, he will certainly make a fool of himself. Socrates, preparing the trap, slyly suggests that if he takes Hippias' definition of the beautiful to this hypothetical fellow, he will laugh worse than ever. Confidently, Hippias replies that it will be a silly laugh; if he laughs because he has nothing to say he will laugh at his own expense and be ridiculed by the assembled company. In describing inappropriate laughter, Hippias inadvertently predicts his own downfall; even though Socrates has invented a character and the laughter is entirely hypothetical, Hippias' discomfiture will be real and complete.

Plato's character Polus in *Gorgias* is a ready made victim for Socrates. We are given to understand from the start that Polus has no idea what is going on. His vocabulary: σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, .. ἀτοπά ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν ... (467b, 473a), his abrupt, insistent questions, and finally his inappropriate laughter show him up. Socrates calmly asks, "Are you laughing? Is this some kind of refutation, when someone makes an observation, to laugh, which is no refutation at all?" He compares Polus' behaviour to that of the assembly when he disallowed a vote[4]. He does not elaborate, but takes it for granted that Polus will know what he means and realise that he is as wrong as the citizens were. Polus, however, fails to perceive the warning, and falls into the trap. So inept is he, a

Thersites rather than an Odysseus, that in fact Socrates defeats him by using a faulty argument, as Callicles points out in 482d5-483a1. Callicles says that Polus was justified in his earlier laughter; this remark, coupled with the reproach of φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, indicates to me that Socrates' ploy is deliberate. This is certainly in keeping with Socrates' character as Plato presents it.

Archie[5] has produced a very useful article on this question. He summarises the main views on Socrates' demolition of Polus[6], all of which I have consulted, and successfully establishes the point that Callicles "said and knew what was wrong with the Polus argument ..Socrates' questionable argumentation is a clever and effective device for engaging subsequent and more capable interlocutors in the dialectic ..the dialogue is designed in stages, so that one can move gradually to deeper and more philosophical levels". Archie concludes that Socrates' fallacious argument must be seen as deliberate.

Another example of Socrates' playfulness can be found in *Phaedrus*. The dialogue proceeds by a series of false starts and excursions to Socrates' great discourse on inspiration. It is Plato himself who is playful at first, putting into Phaedrus' mouth a speech after the manner of Lysias, an improbable and cynical argument to establish an unworthy proposition. Having completed his recitation Phaedrus triumphantly asks Socrates for his opinion; having pleaded modestly before Phaedrus spoke:

οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν· σκοπεῖν
γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια (229e5),

Socrates renews his disclaimers, making the remark already mentioned (236d4-e) concerning teaching a professional his trade. When Phaedrus becomes excited, Socrates capitulates, feigns embarrassment, and proposes to cover his head, speak as fast as possible, and not look at Phaedrus. In spite of his invocation of the Muses, which prepares us for his subsequent shame and embarrassment (242b7), the discourse he now utters is but a parody of what is to come. When he has finished, he prepares to leave the shade of the plane tree and return to the city, and as he begins to cross the river it is not the pleas of Phaedrus but something more mysterious and profound that causes him to turn back and speak with shame of his former words. From the midst of this byplay emerge three levels of utterance; the specious rhetoric of the professional that so impresses the innocent Phaedrus, Socrates' intellectual response to it, and the wisdom of the third discourse, which Socrates expresses in mystical terms and is careful not to ascribe to himself.

A very different situation arises in *Euthydemus*, Plato's witty and ironic exposé of sophistry. It is worth comparing with Isocrates' diatribes against the sophists; so much more attractive and persuasive is this treatment of the topic. The piece as a whole is full of laughter and incident; but the pace increases as the end approaches. Such is the irony that Socrates never succeeds in springing any of his traps; when his associate

Ctesippus succeeds in doing so (300d2), Socrates can only conclude that he has been paying close attention to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus and has picked up some of their tricks. The collusion between the clever pair is noted; when they disparage Socrates (273d1), they "laughed and glanced at one another" like the suitors in the *Odyssey*, and protest that they only dabble in the military skills which he has attributed to them in an attempt to demolish their argument. When (300d2) Ctesippus succeeds in catching Dionysodorus in the trap he has set for Euthydemus, he bursts out, as in his wont, according to Socrates, in a guffaw. Cleinias enjoys the joke and Ctesippus puffs up more than ever. In spite of all this, it is the laughter of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus that is justified. In 303b3 Dionysodorus finishes Ctesippus with an appalling piece of word play and he abandons the contest amid laughter, applause and general uproar. The fatuousmess of the final point is what really settles the matter. Socrates has cheerfully parodied himself and told the entire story to his own disadvantage, secure in the knowledge that his adversaries are worthless. The emptiness of their arguments shows in the general laughter, which is that of those who, like Polus, have no idea what is going on. Socrates' final remarks to Crito, quietly and soberly expressed, convey Plato's views on the matter.

Plato presents absurdity as something to be avoided, and it is interesting to note the contexts in which this motif is introduced. *Philebus* is not only a discussion of pleasure but

furnishes some excellent examples of what is meant by τὸ γελοῖον. In 40c6 Socrates says that there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitating true pleasures to make fools of them: ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα . That is to say, the experience of having been deluded by a false impression is a kind of intellectual humiliation. The same applies to notions of what is painful. It appears from these remarks that the philosopher has a considerable personal stake in forming definitions that will hold good in all circumstances.

In 48c4 Socrates decides to examine *to geloion*. He says it is mainly a wickedness given the name of an attitude. Of all vices it is that which is opposite to self knowledge. Socrates goes on to explain himself, saying that people delude themselves that they are rich, beautiful or good. If they are weak and cannot stand up for themselves when mocked (49b6) then one is right to call them ridiculous; if they are powerful we are intimidated and call them strong, frightening and so forth. It thus appears that to entertain a false conception of oneself is ludicrous and deserves ridicule of a kind which Plato seems at 49d3 to consider quite permissible[7]. The point of the discussion is to establish that pleasure and pain are generally mixed, so Socrates digresses a little in order to describe envy. It seems that while it is acceptable to laugh at one's enemies, οὔτε ἀδικον οὔτε φθονερόν, if we laugh at our friends when they make themselves ridiculous we do it out of envy. Taking it for granted that laughter is a pleasure, and omitting altogether to

consider what we call our feelings if our friends are strong enough to defend themselves, Socrates considers that he has made his point. These remarks were necessary because Protarchus, although he could see that people enjoy weeping at tragedies, could not understand that those attending comedies may also feel a mixture of pain and pleasure. Plato says more about this in *Rep.* 606c; "And can't we say the same about what is ludicrous? That, if in comic performances or private conversation you hear foolishness that you would be ashamed to commit yourself, but you are delighted with it and do not find it objectionable as something disgraceful, you do the same as those who are sentimental (about tragedy)? For the urge to play the fool, that your reason keeps suppressed beause you fear the reputation of a buffoon, you now let out; and then by being silly you often get away with your private compulsion to be a comedian."

When, in *The Republic*, Plato comes to censor the poets, he manages to make use of ridicule and discuss it at one and the same time. He is anxious that certain passages of poetry should not be taken seriously; they must be seen to be ridiculous. At first it seems that Plato may be speaking of incongruity, which is what he means by γέλωτ' in *Laws* 669d. The incongruity Plato refers to in this passage is that found in music or poetry, when the techniques employed are not fitting to the subject or actually clash with one another. What he has in mind, however, is the example that art should set to youth. For this reason, Homer's unquenchable laughter must go (*Rep.* III 389a4)[e]. As

is so often the case, it is the attitude that is important. *Asbestos gelos* is an uncontrolled act, and as such deserves censure, but in other contexts what appears as *to geloion* may not in truth be so. For instance, in *Rep.* V 452a, b, c, Plato observes that many of the ideas he is expressing would appear ridiculous because they are new and strange[9]. Some things which are eventually accepted as common practice are laughed at at first. This idea is expressed by Thucydides in similar terms in I 6. I take it to be a commonplace notion expressed in terms which in each case the writer uses uncritically in his desire to explain certain attitudes, and quite different from Socrates' deceptive ploy. It shows here that one should reflect before taking up an attitude, and only what is evil in the light of reason should be held up to scorn. In *Rep.* VI 517-8 Plato has more to say on the subject: those who have experienced the light of thought appear confused or purblind, and their attempts to take part in human affairs seem ridiculous. One should not laugh thoughtlessly when one sees a soul confused, but wonder whether it is adjusting, like eyes, to light or darkness, and pity it; and if one must laugh at this soul so dazzled, the laughter will be less foolish than that at the expense of one coming in from the light. In *Theatetus* 174, Plato remarks that philosophers seem as foolish as Thales did when he fell down the well, and goes on in 175 to say that the philosopher considers it ridiculous to pride oneself on rich ancestors when, if you count back far enough, you are related to myriads of people of all estates and qualities. If the philosopher takes a petty minded

man up with him to the higher regions of thought, this fellow in his perplexity will amuse no Thracian girl or any other uneducated person, because they will not be able to see him, but he will amuse those who have not been raised like slaves.

In the above passages there is the familiar distinction between laughter to which one is entitled and that to which one is not, but now the distinction is applied on intellectual grounds, so that the Homeric principle is enunciated in new terms.

When Plato is not discussing the nature of the ridiculous, he uses the concept mechanically to denote a weaker argument, or simply as a derogatory term. An example is the passage from *Laws* II 669 already cited, in which *ho gelos*, the absurdity itself rather than *to geloion*, that which is absurd, is the term used to denote infelicities of style and technique. If it is a weaker argument that is meant, Plato refers to it as *to geloion*[16]. This can be extended to include plain error, as in *Laws* II 670b8, when Plato says that it is silly for the general crowd to think that keeping time is all there is to an understanding of music. In *Protagoras* 355a6, Plato is searching for definitions; he says that the argument becomes ridiculous - *geloion* - when you say that often, when a man recognises evil for what it is, he still does it, even when it is possible not to, because he is induced and confused by pleasures. So, any impudent person - *hybristes* - could hold us up to ridicule - *gelastai* - if we say that we do evil when

worsted by what is good. As in the *Odyssey*, the *hybristes* is distinguished by his unpleasant laughter. An argument must be particularly inept if such a person can laugh at it and get away with it.

In the *Symposium*, Plato uses the notion of *to geloion* with a lighter touch. In 174e. Apollodorus says something silly happened: he had promised to bring Socrates to dinner, but when he arrived he turned round and found he wasn't there. He had apparently trotted off to have a think. This pleasant anecdote sets the tone of the whole piece. There is more lighthearted banter in 189, when Aristophanes is about to speak but is having trouble with hiccoughs. He stops them with a sneeze, which he considers a terrible physical disturbance, but which the body seems to need in this instance. Euryxymachus says, "There you are, Aristophanes, you fool about before you speak, and I have to keep an eye on you, in case you say something absurd now that you have the chance to speak". Aristophanes replies that he should only worry about foolishness; a little humour is helpful and pleasing to the Muse. Again Plato is indicating a difference between what might be termed apt and inept laughter.

When Alcibiades makes his drunken entrance (213a) he promises to garland the head of the wisest and most beautiful guest with his own garland. Of course, the difficulties implied in this promise are obvious to all, and he says, "Do you laugh at me because I am drunk? You may laugh; I know what I am saying". He does

indeed; he goes on to describe his disastrous courting of Socrates (219c). He ruefully admits that Socrates despised him and was not impressed by his youth and beauty. His lauguage in describing his own humiliation is as strong as may be (221e):

καταφρόνησεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τῆς ἐμῆς ὥρας καὶ ὕβρισεν.

We may be sure, of course, that Socrates did none of these things; Alcibiades, like a character in tragedy or a speaker at the law courts, is talking about his own feelings. He continues: Socrates is deceptive in appearance; his speech is like the gaping of a Silenus; his words are ridiculous at first hearing, cloaking his real intent like the animal skin covering the erection of a satyr. There is no other translation possible for *hybristes* in this context; the great flexibility of the term is apparent in this passage, and amusingly conveys a sense of wishful thinking on Alcibiades' part. At any rate the result, says Alcibiades, is that Socrates' plain language induces the inexperienced or ignorant to laugh. Thus Alcibiades makes his point about Socrates' true beauty and at the same time conveys Plato's notion of inappropriate laughter. Alcibiades has in fact used Socrates' own technique to achieve his effect. He and Socrates are characters of the Odysseus type, capable of risking or withstanding ridicule in order to achieve their ends. By comparison, Aristophanes was merely making a bid for attention. Socrates makes his own comment on this process in *Euthyphro* 3c6 when Euthyphro expresses his indignation at the ridicule Socrates suffers in the assembly (3c2); Socrates merely observes that it is no great thing to be laughed at. If the Athenians

treat him as a joke, his trial will be an amusement and not painful. If they are serious, only the prophets know where it will all end. It should be noted that although Socrates and Alcibiades are wily like Odysseus, their success is due to their deceptive assumption of Thersites' behaviour, like the builder's son in Herodotus. However, although Alcibiades is successful in bringing off his argument, he gives himself away; he is plainly still in love with Socrates, and the company bursts into laughter (222c), the knowing laughter of Aphrodite.

Because Plato's work is written in dialogue form, the examples of laughter as a part of interaction between characters are as numerous as they are in drama. However, whereas drama, and epic as well, describe struggles for ascendancy between individuals, Plato's work shows a struggle of a different order. It is a struggle to avoid falsehood, incongruity or perversity, all of which render ludicrous the endeavour to arrive at the truth. In a remarkable paradox Plato presents an incongruous figure, perverse and satyric of aspect, who constantly courts absurdity and invites ridicule in the course of these endeavours. The paradox is necessary; where Aristophanes shows us a charlatan and a buffoon, Plato shows us an individual who is utterly determined to reject any possibility of gaining credit for the truth he may uncover.

Notes to Chapter 6.

1. Welsford, *op. cit.* p 320.

2. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Paul Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (Harvester Press 1978), pp22-5.

3. In Xenophon's work on Socrates, we see the character Plato knew, but the laughter is different and Xenophon does not make the same dramatic use of it. In *Mem.* II 6 38 there is an example of arguing from absurdity in the way that is now familiar: Socrates simply suggests that it would be ridiculous to try to live up to false expectations. Here *to geloion* is the weaker proposition. In *Oec.* XIII 5 the Platonic characterisation is reversed; Ischomachus is afraid that Socrates may laugh if he tells him how he trains his manager. Socrates responds to this self deprecatory ploy by saying that it is no laughing matter; if he can do it at all he deserves praise, not laughter.

4. E R Dodds, *Plato - Gorgias*: a revised text with introduction and commentary (Oxford 1959), pp 247-8, argues for a reference to the trial of the generals after Arginusae. He is in my view correct to discount Hatzfeld's objections (*REA* (1940), pp 165ff) to laughter on such an occasion, but his argument depends rather heavily on an assumption that Plato forgot what he had written in the *Apology* by the time he came to write *Gorgias*. Socrates only says here that he is not a political man and when it was his turn to be on the council he made a fool of himself. It is likely that Plato, writing after the event, included the remark as an observation of Socrates' character and was not concerned with strict chronology. There is no doubt, however, that the reference is pointless unless Socrates means that he was right then and he will shortly be right again.

5. J P Archie,'Callicles' Redoubtable Critique of the Polus Argument in Plato's *Gorgias*', *Hermes* 112 (1984), Heft 2, pp 167-76, pp 174-5 esp.

6. Dodds, *op. cit.*, A W A Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960), G Vlastos, 'Was Polus Refuted?' *AJPh* 88 (1967), 454-460.

7. Damascius, *Lectures on the* Philebus, ed. L. G Westerink, (North Holland Publishing Co 1959), on 49c4-5: ὅτι ἡ κωμῳδία ἡ ὀρθὴ κολαστική ἐστιν τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ἀμαθίας, ἡ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἐπιτίθεται.

8. Another objection to laughter is that if it is indulged to excess there must be an equal and opposite reaction, no doubt equally undesirable.

9. See reference to E David, p 123 and note 21, chapter 4 above.

10. Aristotle also, to pursue his argument, may introduce an absurdity to illustrate his point. He uses *geloion* and *atopon* interchangably when speaking of incongruities or an argument that fails. See *Physica* 246a17, *Meteorologica* 352a26, 357a24, 362b12, *Topica* 117b17, 1406a33.

Comedy and Oratory.

There are two fields in which the intent is to engage in ridicule at another's expense. These are fifth century comedy and fourth century oratory. Aristotle shows some awareness of this in his frequent mention of the techniques of oratory in the course of discussing what is absurd. He offers a little about comedy in what we have of the *Poetics*[1], and in 1448b39 sketches a history of the genre. He says that iambics were introduced so that poets could lampoon one another[2], and that Homer was the first to demarcate the types of comedy: not only ψόγον but τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. In 1449a35 he goes on to discuss the ridiculous. He says that it is a species of whatever is gross. It is a perversion, a harmless, painless monstrosity; as for example the comic mask which is ugly and distorted but not distressing. Aristotle is here drawing an entirely visual image of what is funny. It is a departure from the norm; a *hamartema*, *aischron* and *diestrammenon*, but it is not meant to upset anyone. The comic is grotesque without *pathos* which I take in this context to mean suffering both felt and inflicted. Like Plato, when he considers the nature of the ridiculous he does not think of aggressive ridicule, which is obviously something quite different.

Aristotle comes to this topic in *Rhetoric*; in 1371b-1372a he says that laughter is a pleasure, so funny things, whether people, words or deeds must be pleasant. In 1380b he says that

joyful laughter is not insulting; this presumably is mentioned in contrast to aggressive laughter. Then he relates the subject of laughter to the matter in hand. When the orator appeals to the hearer (1415a37), he wants to engage either his sympathy or his indignation. Sometimes he wants his full attention, sometimes he would rather distract him, for, as he says in 1380b2, he does not always want him to pay attention, and as a consequence will try for a laugh. His language should fit the context (1408a); if the language is meant to convey an insult it should be the language of anger. It is important to avoid attaching ornamental epithets to unimportant words, for then the composition has the effect of comedy.

In 1419b Aristotle passes to the use of ridicule. Jokes are useful in debates, and Gorgias rightly says that one should meet seriousness with ridicule and ridicule with seriousness. Aristotle says that he has discussed in the *Poetics* what form jokes take, and whether they are becoming or not to the free intellect. One should select the kind of joke that is suitable to oneself. Irony is wittier than absurdity; one uses the latter at one's own expense, and the former at the expense of another. The doubtful *Rhetoric for Alexander* repeats this notion, and seems to owe something to Plato; a mere scoff at an opponent will not suffice, but should be substantiated (1441b16, 18, 19); one should employ irony and ridicule in one's opponent those attributes on which he prides himself (24). It will be seen that Aeschines was particularly adept at, or well suited to, the last

mentioned.

Aristotle returns to the subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1128a; those who overdo ridicule are thought to be buffoons, who are determined to have their joke at the expense of sensible conversation and the feelings of their victims. On the other hand, if one is never witty, one is considered a bore. There is a general tendency to laugh, joke and play more than is necessary, so buffoons are often considered witty. In Aristotle's view, comedy has improved by abandoning the use of obscenity in favour of the witty allusion. He asks whether it is possible to define "good" teasing - *skopto* - and suggests that it may be a matter of taste. The free man should be sufficient law for himself, but perhaps some regulations could be laid down. What we need, according to Aristotle, is humour somewhere between that of the bore and of the clown. Much of what Aristotle says on this topic is necessarily shaped by his desire to define extremes and a mean, but it is possible nonetheless to observe in the practice of others the usefulness of some of his observations.

When Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is discussing extremes and the mean in human behaviour he passes in 1108a20, and again in 1127a20, to the subject of truth. The quality of truthfulness itself is the mean, *aletheia*; embellishment of the truth is *alazoneia*, and understatement is known as *eironeia*, the quality associated with Socrates in 1127b26.

When Aristotle comes to the subject of play: τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ, he describes the extremes in terms of βωμολοχία and ἀγροικία. In 1165b16ff, he says that one should not be attracted to wrongdoing: φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι. These terms occur in that handbook of comic characters, Theophrastus' *Characters*, and in the work of Aristophanes himself.

Eiron appears but rarely in Aristophanes' work; in *Clouds* 444-51 it is included in a catalogue of pejorative terms, but some of these terms are only pejorative in the context, so this passage is not helpful as a source of definition. In *Wasps* 174 Bdelycleon remarks on the pretence Philocleon has put up, so like an *eiron*, in order to be let out. In *Birds* 1211 Iris is accused of dissembling when she cannot understand the questions that Peisthetaerus is firing at her. Taken as a whole, these three references convey a sense of evasiveness which is more in accordance with the Theophrastan character than with Aristotle's description.

As for *poneros*, Aristophanes uses the term continuously in a derogatory sense. In *Knights* 181 the Sausage Seller is promised that he will become a great man because he is *poneros* and *thrasys*. In 186 he says that he is not, as Demosthenes puts it, *kaloskagathos*, but *ek poneron*. In 265 a *poneros* is one who is neither rich nor frightened of public life - *tremon ta pragmata* - the inference being that he is not afraid of making a fool of himself. In 336 the Sausage Seller proudly

says that he is a *poneros* just like Cleon. In *Wasps* 192, Bdelycleon calls Philocleon a *poneros technes kai parabolos*; this carries the notion of slyness that is not found in *Knights*. Philocleon chooses to ignore the overtone; in his reply he makes a gustatory pun, saying that he is not nasty but delicious. In *Lysistrata* 1022-3 *poneron* and *ponera* simply refer to bad behaviour, and in *Ecclesiazusae* 178 *poneros* is the opposite of *chrestos*. These are only a few examples, and do not include the many exclamations of *O ponere*, but it can be seen that *poneros* is simply a term of abuse, though it is not infrequently applied to a character, such as Philocleon, with whom the audience can sympathise. McLeish[3] gives the title of *poneros* to a character type which he discerns in Aristophanes' plays, finding a similarity between *metis* as observed by Detienne-Vernant[4] and *poneria* as displayed by certain of Aristophanes' characters. Certainly, characters in comedy will exclaim *O ponere* out of indignation much as a tragic character or an orator would exclaim *hybriste*, and there is no doubt that Demosthenes chooses the Sausage Seller to set against Paphlagon because a *poneros* will have the gall wherewith to oppose him. I would not, however, go so far as to term any character of this sort "a human being glorying in his own humanity", and still less would I compare him with Odysseus, but there is no doubting the attractiveness of the unashamed rascal. Another character, the unashamed buffoon, shares this attractiveness and has so many characteristics in common with him that it seems inadvisable to sort Aristophanic characters

into categories or combinations of categories. It is possible, however, to determine the varying effect of ridicule when it forms part of the interchange between characters.

In both comedy and oratory, ridicule has the purpose of winning the sympathy of the audience; there is no doubt, however, that in comedy it is applied to different characters with different results. In *Wasps*, for instance, Philocleon is impervious to ridicule. He does not bear it grimly like Odysseus or invite it like Thersites; he simply risks it continually, and cheerfully prosecutes his endeavours regardless of the abuse, ridicule or recrimination that may be heaped upon his head. He receives a temporary setback when Bdelycleon succeeds in pointing out to him that he has been grossly underpaid for his services and others are deriving advantage from his efforts. In the second part of the play it is in fact Bdelycleon who is sensitive to the ridicule of others; he decides to take his father to a party in order to cheer him up but first subjects him to a tremendous training in etiquette so that he will not disgrace him. Far from meekly observing instructions, as might be expected from his conduct in the previous episode, Philocleon ruins the party and joyously abandons himself to wild behaviour. Although Bdelycleon in shame drags his father indoors (1442-5), Philocleon triumphantly reappears to cavort until the play's end.

In *Frogs* the ridicule flies freely in all directions, and not even Dionysus makes any attempt to maintain decorum. The

characters move from one foolish situation to another, intent only on looking after themselves, but during the long drawn out ridicule that forms the basis of the poetic contest Dionysus makes it quite clear (851-9) that the contestants are beside themselves with eagerness not to speak on their own behalf but to heap ridicule on one another. Like Aeneas reproving Achilles in the *Iliad* XX 231ff, Dionysus remonstrates with them and hopes they will not scream at each other like breadwives. The audience, of course, hopes that they will, and in contrast to the Homeric warriors Aeschylus and Euripides proceed to ignore Dionysus' advice. It is to be noted that he calls Aeschylus *polytimetos* and Euripides *poneros*; certainly it is Aeschylus who thus far has shown the most sensitivity to ridicule. Since Dionysus is on Euripides' side in this play, it is likely that Aristophanes' own opinion of the poets can be deduced from this choice of adjectives.

In *Clouds*, the interplay between Socrates and Strepsiades is similar to that between Philocleon and Bdelycleon in *Wasps*. The rascally sophist is entirely shameless in his approach to Strepsiades, whereas the latter is so anxious about his ignorance that he willingly submits to humiliating treatment. In 627-699, 723-790, Socrates takes unlimited advantage of his position as instructor in order to heap abuse on his pupil. The tone of his remarks is similar to that adopted in *Frogs* 460ff by the formidable Aeacus, who has nothing to fear even from Heracles. Strepsiades' self esteem has sunk so low that he

takes exception to none of Socrates' remarks, whereas Socrates offers the audience the chance to contemplate the happy situation of being able to speak without restraint or fear of retaliation. Euripides enjoys this kind of advantage in *Thesmophoriazusae*; Mnesilochus is his uncle, but he treats him with intellectual condescension (e.g. 1-22) and takes advantage (210-217) of his sentimental good nature.

This sentimentality, like Strepsiades' wish to escape his debtors, is the kind of weakness that renders a character at a disadvantage in a comic confrontation. In *Frogs*, Aeschylus' temper puts him at a temporary disadvantage (1132ff), but he recovers sufficiently to annoy Euripides later with the joke about the oil flask (1200ff). In *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis grants himself this advantage by declaring an area that is all his own, where he makes the rules not only for buying and selling but for the bestowing of respect or ridicule. Secure in his territory, he can treat others as he wishes without fear of reprisal. In 1072ff he ridicules Lamachus with all his might, answering all his lofty ideals with gross reference to food and other indulgences. In 1113 Lamachus asks Dicaeopolis μὴ προσαγορεύειν, a mild protest which is followed (1117) by a cry after the manner of Ajax - οἴμ' ὡς ὑβρίζεις - undoubtedly a parody. In 1126 he protests at Dicaeopolis' use of broad farce in the face of his honest endeavours; Dicaeopolis only retorts that it's nice to be broad. The mention of laughter in 1126 shows that Lamachus feels the ridicule; in this context κατα γελος is a

stronger form of *hybris*. In *Clouds*, when Dikaios Logos has put his case in rather compelling terms, the chorus urges Adikos Logos to answer promptly, as he is in danger of looking a fool - μὴ γέλωτ' ὀφλήσεις (1035).

Trygaeus in *Peace* and Peisthetairus in *Birds* are two more characters who are more likely to inflict ridicule than to receive it. Trygaeus is not affected by Hierocles' scorn in *Peace* 1060ff, but laughs merrily at mention of the cunning Spartans (1066); when the artisans who normally profit fron war upbraid him, he simply suggests alternative uses for their artefacts. The trumpetmaker shows his discomfiture like Lamachus - οἴμοι κατηγόρως (1245). In *Birds* 802-3 Peisthetaerus laughs at Euelpides' strange feathers; this is quite in accordance with the nature of their relationship, as Euelpides has to accept the role of buffoon thrust upon him by his more adroit associate. By comparison, in *Wealth* 833, Dikaios says that all his friends are laughing at him now that he has made himself poor through generosity. Without wealth, he has no social advantage at all, and thus cannot retaliate in the face of ridicule. His grief, however, is nothing in comparison with that of the hapless sycophant, whose lamentations culminate in the conviction that he is a general butt of ridicule (880,886). Perhaps the best laugh of all is ascribed to Heracles in *Frogs* 42-6; he cannot restrain his laughter as he beholds Dionysus in his lion skin and yellow frock.

The express purpose of comedy is ridicule. If ridicule has a particular purpose in relations between individuals, it is likely to have a purpose in the relationship between performer and audience, and it is likely that these purposes are related. McLeish[5] reminds us that ridicule is a technique, one of the main techniques of the farce dramatist; I would suggest that in the literature under examination ridicule is as much a technique off the stage as on. McLeish goes on to say: "Whereas farce distorts and parodies the human predicament, comedy describes and defines it. Irony rather than ridicule is the dominant mode.."

It is the hostile ridicule of comedy that pertains to this study; what is interesting about it is that it was both expected and accepted. Aristotle is exceptional in not seeing hostile ridicule as a function of comedy. He may be thinking of New Comedy as an improvement on Old, as in *Nic. Eth.* 1128a discussed above. On the hostile intent of comedy, Giangrande[6] has much to offer, and suggests that Old Comedy "..has its origins in the licentiousness and subversiveness of magical ceremonies in country life and customs and in the expression of discontent by farm people towards city dwellers."

The next point to note is the great similarity of method in the ridicule of fifth century comedy and fourth century oratory, noted by Dover[7] among others. Comedy works in the opposite direction to tragedy; when a character exclaims *gelomai* or

hybrizomai the audience is not shocked or grieved but delighted. It is likely that the laughter is "in the right" in so far as what is right can be said to be a concern of comedy. There is no doubt that ethics are simple and the issues uncomplicated in Aristophanes' world. When it comes to outright ridicule of characters on stage or of real persons known to the audience, there is no question of actors or audience showing any compunction; ridicule is expected, part of the rules, as it is in the law courts. The purpose of ridicule is to involve the audience in a situation in such a way that by laughing they may indicate their sympathies[8]. This is analogous to the situation in epic and tragedy, where the sympathy or corroboration of a third party is sought to make the ridicule or the charge stick. If the case is weak, there will be no corroboration, or in the case of comedy, no laughs. In comedy, the weaker the case the more scatological the humour becomes.

Grant[9] notes the difference between the "liberal and illiberal jest" and briefly surveys the possible origins of the use of laughter in oratory. She cites the numerous antecedents of hostile ridicule and notes the consensus among the ancient writers that, in contrast to the purely hostile purpose of the iambic poets, comedy had, or inherited, a moral purpose. Aristophanes himself has something to say about this in the parabasis of *Acharnians*, which he foreshadows in the remarks of Dicaeopolis 496-501.

Dicaeopolis begs to be excused from offering advice to the city during a comedy, but he knows what is right as well as what is comical. Taplin[16] suggests that Aristophanes intended τρυγῳδία as a pun on τραγῳδία in order to reinforce his claims on behalf of comedy (*Ach.* 628, 686). This seems likely, though the poet makes his claims quite clear in any case. In the parabasis the chorus picks up the point and develops it, except that now it speaks for the poet himself. He claims that his achievement has been to teach the Athenians to identify false persuasion. This is a claim which is not uncommonly made by orators. He has been accused of mocking the citizens - *kathubrizei* - but replies that he has saved them from deception by the arguments of foreigners, from the enjoyment of flattery, and from gaping credulity (634-5). This may fruitfully be compared with Aeschines, I 75 (see below). These remarks make the same assumptions about the way to impress an audience, which is the way to win an argument. Apart from personal flattery, there is another way to gratify an audience, and that is by involving them in the ridicule of an opponent. This is the way Aristophanes treats the butts of his ridicule. To demolish his victims' credibility he begins with their remote and immediate forebears; we are never allowed to forget that Euripides' mother sold vegetables, and the rumour about his wife and Ctesiphon is regularly given an airing. The characters cast aspersions on one another's ancestry too; the initiates make sly reference to Archedemus' tribe (*Frogs* 422) and Paphlagon and the Sausage Seller exchange this kind of abuse in *Knights* 445-9, 464.

Aristophanes often invokes contempt of lowly occupations for purposes of ridicule; apart from the references to Euripides' mother, there is the joke about the Sausage Seller, the contempt poured on the character named Socrates in *Clouds* because he charges a fee, and the characterisation of buyers and sellers in general, including Philocleon's preoccupation with his fee and the baking woman's anxiety about damage to her stock, both occurring in *Wasps*. High on the list of priorities is random name calling; the abusive epithets in comedy are too familiar and numerous to list, but the usage extends to the speeches of the orators[11]. These in their turn belong to real life; Aristophanes and the orators are delighted to make capital out of the nicknames freely bestowed on well known persons.

Another popular source of ridicule is sex, as in the endless references to the supposed effeminacy of Cleisthenes and others. Whether or not homosexuality was socially or morally respectable in Athenian society, it is quite plain that the aspect of a man's sex life that was available for public appraisal and comment was the homosexual aspect. This, with the double standard mentioned by Dover[12] and others, in my view explains the discrepancy that seems to exist between regular practice and the criticisms found in comedy and oratory. It also explains why Aeschines so confidently makes the claims that occur in the speech against Timarchus. The passive aspect of homosexuality also makes for ridicule on the grouds of effeminacy, an

obviously vulnerable spot.

Knights is notable for its long and elaborate forensic episodes in which two worthless speakers vie for the favour of the chorus, who are too hopelessly biased to see that there is no difference between them. The Sausage Seller, in fact, only plucks up his courage after the triumphant entry of the knights. The antagonists begin with random abuse and name calling, and attempt at first to outshout one another (273ff). By 288 they are offering one another violence, and actually indulge in it in 375 and 451. The knights thoroughly enjoy the spectacle and encourage the combatants. The Sausage Seller eventually prevails by offering the assembly the larger bribe (624ff). Every aspect of their disputes, except of course for the fisticuffs and the wrestling, reflects the technique of oratory; the prime object of the disputants is to humiliate one another.

Perhaps Aristophanes' most successful method of ridicule is caricature. Even so, Alcibiades' lisp (*Wasps* 44-5), Agathon dressing up as Phaedra in order to feel his way into the character (*Thes.* 130-152), Euripides scribbling away amid the tatters that his characters wear (*Ach.* 407ff), Cleon shouting, threatening and scuffling (*Knights* 275ff), and the whimsical, irritable Socrates floating in his basket in *Clouds* are if anything more kindly drawn than Aeschines' portrait of the unfortunate Demosthenes forgetting his words in the presence of Philip of Macedon.

The Athenian orators use ridicule as part of their stock in trade. Not only does it function as a weapon, with the intention of provoking aggressive laughter, but the notion of the ridiculous is invoked, as in philosophical discourse, for the purpose of point scoring. Isocrates, in *Demonicus* 15, 31, has this to say about misplaced mirth and its reverse: "Don't give way to helpless laughter ..for it is brainless - *anoeton* - ... don't be serious when it is time to laugh, or enjoy the joke when the occasion is serious". Here Isocrates is discussing the proper deportment for a young man, and the appropriate occasion for laughter is high on his list of priorities.

In *Panegyric* 14 he produces a self deprecatory ploy; he invites his audience to despise and ridicule him if he does not prove worthy of his subject. This is risk taking of the kind that we have noted in the chapter on *kataphronesis* (see above p 191); having taken the risk, at 187 he admits his failure. He regrets that he has not been equal to the greatness of his subject - *ouk ephiknoumai tou megethous auton*. As part of his platform of Panhellenism, Isocrates is determined to undervalue the Persians. In *Pg* 149 he applies to them a selection of epithets that begins with *malakia* and finishes with what is always the culmination of ridicule - *katagelastoi*.

Isocrates is self deprecatory again in 169; he prepares in advance for his point by suggesting that some may laugh at his naivete. He uses the same ploy in *Areopagiticus* 3, when he

says he is aware that his audience may look down on him for advancing opinions concerning, of all things, public safety. In *Pg* 176 he turns his ridicule onto the treaty of Antalcidas; in his view it is most absurd - *katagelastotaton* - that the worst features of this treaty are those that have been adhered to the longest.

Isocrates' address to Philip contains many features of the *Panegyric*. This is deliberate; in 84 he refers to his remarks in *Pg* 14 in order to stand by them. In 101 he attempts to win Philip to his point of view by inviting him to despise the Persians. He reminds him that Cyrus made a great expedition against Egypt but retired *katagelastos*. In *Archidamus* 37, 84, he argues for a point simply by suggesting how ridiculous it is to reject the sensible course and do the opposite. The suggestion that it is better to die than to be found ridiculous degenerates to a moralising commonplace in *Archidamus* 89: εἰ δὲ δεῖ μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενον εἰπεῖν, αἱρετώτερον ἦν ἐστὶν ἀναστάτοις γενέσθαι, ἢ καταγελάστοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν.
which may owe something to Euripides' Medea.

In *Antidosis* and *Sophists*, the vehemence of Isocrates' language suggests that more than mere difference of opinion is involved in the composition of this speech. After some preliminary point scoring in 56 - καὶ γὰρ ἂν πάντων εἴην καταγελαστότατος, εἰ .. δι' ἑτέρων ποιοίμην

τὴν ἀπολογίαν.. - he goes on to say that Sophists lay themselves open to ridicule by behaving as they do. "For they see most of those men ..giving displays in the assemblies and in private discussion, competing with one another, making extravagant claims, quarrelling[13], abusing one another, trying every disgraceful trick but only succeeding in inflicting their own abuses upon themselves.." (147-8). In 243-8 Isocrates has strong words to say about those who, having no real ability themselves, envy men of ability and accomplishment but are too lazy to imitate them[14]. Instead they resort to critcism and ridicule. It is interesting that, while ridicule is such a useful and presumably effective rhetorical tool, both philosophers and rhetoricians decry it in their opponents and see it as a sign of weakness and lack of resource in argument. As in the case of *hybris*, its interpretation depends entirely on the point of view.

The opposite point of view is to be found in 297. It seems that the Sophists adopt a pose of being unimpressed by admiration; Isocrates suggests that they should not make themselves ridiculous by disparaging their admirers and their popularity. He makes a similar point in *Sophists* 23; among other ridicule, he alleges that they affect to despise money yet make sure that their fees are safely stowed away. Isocrates is not unaware that some oratorical ploys have become hackneyed through long usage. In *Peace* 36 he says that men who hold the people in contempt can be bribed to moralise in old fashioned terms, such as to say

"emulate the ancestors" or "don't be made a laughing stock" (see my comment on *Arch.* 89 above). Neither of these ploys is foreign to his own method, yet such is his assurance that he goes on to ridicule the invoking of the ancestors. Which ancestors? he asks. It might be as well, he suggests, to take the actions of some ancestors as a warning against blunders in the future. Most of the time, however, he uses the notion of the ridiculous in a dismissive way that seems quite unconscious. *Peace* 40, *Helen* 9, 46, and *Busiris* 1 are all examples of this kind of point making. *The Banker*, on the other hand, provides examples of the direct ridicule that Isocrates inflicts on the Sophists. It seems that Pasion, as long as he was not sure of himself, made every effort to appease his accuser, even pleading fear of becoming a laughing stock. As soon, however, as he had succeeded in bribing slaves and falsifying the record, he became *thrasutatos hapanton anthropon*. Isocrates seems here to suggest by the term *thrasutatos* that Pasion was not affected even by the fear of ridicule that he had pleaded.

This fear is mentioned in a speech of Isaeus, II, in which the author in his peroration suggests that if Menecles were to vanish and leave his father's house desolate it would be ridiculous and give his enemies the opportunity to evil-speak him (43). This is not mere rhetoric; it describes a serious risk and a real fear.

In his speech against Simon (III), Lysias seems to feel obliged

to explain his clients' tardiness in bringing this action (9). His client and Simon were in love with the same boy; Simon, unable to prevail on the youth in any other way, attempted to remove him by force from his rival's house. The defendant was, according to Lysias, very reluctant to take action against Simon, as he felt at a disadvantage and that he would be ridiculed if people heard the circumstances of his case. So he took his boy and went abroad. In support of this course of action Lysias asks (24) whether his client would really be expected to confront Simon and risk being treated with *hybris* by his enemies. Here *hybris* is an equivalent to aggressive laughter (see above pp 135-6), and is no different from the behaviour Lysias alleges in XIV and XV; in the first he says that Alcibiades is jeering at him for leaving out, rather than enumerating, half his crimes (46), and in the second that Alcibiades will go away sneering if the city lets him off (10). In all these instances Lysias uses the term *katagelao*; it seems that the aggressive compound is what is required in such contexts. To return to the speech against Simon, Lysias uses ridicule aggressively when he points out that, in spite of having valued his property at two hundred and fifty *drachmai*, Simon is insisting that he managed to hire the boy for three hundred.

Demosthenes, too, is capable of enlivening an argument with wit; in the speech against Androtion he indulges (68) in a jibe which he uses again in *Timocrates* 125; Androtion's father managed to

dance his way out of prison, fetters and all, during the city Dionysia. In 68, 69 of the same speech his aim is still to belittle his opponent rather than refute his argument in detail, so he makes several galling references to saucer making, similar in tone and application to the constant references to vegetables with which Aristophanes enlivens his portrayals of Euripides. In his speech against Aristocrates, who has proposed that the person of Charidemus be declared inviolable, Demosthenes makes fun (160-1) of the self congratulatory letter - καλὰ γ', οὐ γάρ, sent by Charidemus to the Athenians; in fact, says Demosthenes, he was looking after his own interests in the Chersonese. In 186 Demosthenes combines indignation and ridicule, asking his audience to contemplate the delightful prospect of the man who carried a spear for hire on behalf of their enemies now being protected by their decree. The same technique appears in the speech against Timocrates. In 55 Demosthenes has had a law read out; he observes that Timocrates' proposed edict is the exact opposite of this law, and reads like an indictment of its proposer. This insult should not happen to the citizens or the city.

Demosthenes' style is less attractive when he is moved by personal resentment. It becomes reminiscent of Isocrates' treatment of the Sophists. His quarrel with Meidias seems to have been no more pleasant than the speech he makes against him, which contains not only repeated descriptions of encounters that do Demosthenes no more credit than his

opponent, but entirely gratuitous jibes that have no bearing on the case in hand.

In 149, for instance, he says that Meidias' mother, who bore him, was the most sensible of mortals, but she who adopted him was the silliest of women. One sold him as soon as he was born, but the other bought him when she might have got a better bargain. In 134 he says that in spite of the requirements of his position Meidias does not even own a horse; after the Theban truce he led the procession on a borrowed one. The resentment in his speech is apparent; it is possible that it is more reckless because it was never delivered[15]. In settling out of court, Demosthenes may have avoided the humiliation of presenting a weak case, but the episode did not go unremarked by Aeschines.

Personal animosity finds full expression, however, in the series of speeches concerning the embassies to Macedon in 346 BC. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with the question, fascinating though it is, of the truth of Aeschines' and Demosthenes' motives and conduct during the ascent of Philip II of Macedon. The problem is well expressed by Hornblower[16]: "The evidence for the Peace of Philocrates of 346, and the run up to it, has to be retrieved from Aeschines II and III and Demosthenes XVIII and XIX, all speeches written years after the events, and full of the most amazing lies, especially - since the peace later became very unpopular - on the central issue of individual responsibility, or culpability, for the peace." In

the speech against Timarchus, Aeschines makes it his first objective to discredit the man who was to be Demosthenes' chief associate in the proceedings that he knew were being prepared against him. Half the speech is taken up with Timarchus' sexual and financial history, and then Aeschines turns his attention to Demosthenes himself.

The speech is remarkable for its abusive language and features an interesting use of the term *hybris*, to denote the hiring out of sexual favours (15, 163). This is the only speech, apart from one instance in III, in which he makes use of the term βδελυρία or βδελυρός; he uses it a total of fourteen times[17], whereas Demosthenes makes but occasional use of it in all his extant speeches and writings. It is apparent that Aeschines must destroy Timarchus' character at all costs; not only must he be seen to be unfit for public office and function, but he must appear ludicrous in character and person. Aeschines makes great play of Timarchus not only buying but selling sexual favours. By harping on the notion of *hybris*[18] he manages to convey the notion that Timarchus is treating even himself with contempt - and if a man will humiliate himself for money, he must be contemptible indeed. In 31, 43, and 76 Aeschines describes this contemptible behaviour as *katagelastos*; it deserves not laughter but aggressive contempt. Aeschines apologises pointedly in 38 for the necessity to use shameful words to describe Timarchus' shameful life. He undertakes to avoid this extremity whenever possible, and then in 52 and 76,

each time with a pious oath, he abandons the attempt at circulocution - περιπλέκειν(52), οὐ γὰρ ἔχω .. τίνα τρόπον εὐφημότερον (76) - and derives additional emphasis from his plain language. He depicts Timarchus as speaking not merely with his arm outside his cloak, as he admits is common practice nowadays, but throwing the garment off and displaying his naked body in all its drunken nastiness - *bdeluria* being a conveniently vague term to use here. He is equally vague when it comes (55) to describing the use that Pittalacus made of Timarchus' body; *hamartemata* and *hybreis* are all that he will mention. So notorious were Timarchus' predispositions, in fact, according to Aeschines, that when he addressed the assembly in the previous year he could not use certain words and expressions in his speech without the listeners taking them as allusions to his sexual habits and preferences and breaking into shouting and laughter (80).

In 119 it seems that Demosthenes has made an attempt to demand concrete proof of Timarchus' source of income. Since prostitutes are taxed, a tax gatherer's receipt should suffice. Aeschines' response is to beg the question, pretending that he has no wish to humiliate Timarchus in such a fashion, and he takes refuge in a moral stance. He pours scorn on Demosthenes for having recourse to a defence suitable for a prostitute rather than a free man, choosing to pass over the fact that it is he himself as prosecutor who has called Timarchus a prostitute (123).

As Aeschines was successful in this action, it can only be assumed that he knew his fellow citizens. He continues to demolish Demosthenes' argument in advance, in 126 sneering at an attempt of his to win the jurors over. I should remark at this point that I am not attempting to make a distinction between attempts to forestall the opponent's argument, retorts to possible interjections, and material incorporated for publication after the event. The passage in 126, however, must surely have been more effective delivered in court, in the heat of the moment. The passage is short but interesting as it seems to refer to an accepted commonplace of behaviour: παραφέρει δ' αὐτὸν ἐν σκώμματος μέρει, ὡς ἡδὺς ὢν ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἰδίας διατριβὰς γελοῖος .. Demosthenes, as an ambitious man intent on public success and esteem, must indeed have longed to be this kind of man, so the jibe itself is unkind; however, it is much less likely that Demosthenes made this comment at his own expense than that Aeschines was determined to reproach him with the unpleasant nickname applied to him in his ineffectual and sickly youth. He refers to it again in II 99 and adds another; it is no doubt from these passages that Plutarch derives his material on the subject[19]. Aeschines is quick to justify this apparently gratuitous reference; he suggests that nicknames or reputations are not acquired without substantial cause, and just as the name Batalus indicates something that is true about Demosthenes, Timarchus' reputation indicates the truth about his way of life. This reputation, apparently, is that of Timarchus *ho pornos*; this

only a very short space after Aeschines has declined on the grounds of decency to prosecute him as such by actually producing tax gatherers' receipts. If Aeschines really knew his citizens, he was treating them with contempt while affecting to appeal to their sensibilities. In 131, Aeschines reflects on Demosthenes' sexuality, as he will again in 167. This leads to the subject of Aeschines' own sex life (132ff). He has heard or found out that Demosthenes will bring a witness to testify to his opponent's undignified amorous activities, and to ridicule him - διασύρειν - for taking a lofty stance concerning passions and practices in which he himself indulges.

His defence is simple; he is *erotikos*, but he is *sophron*; he does not pay or charge for love - an interesting variant on Plato's maxim. If at this point he feels the lack of the tax gatherers' receipts, he does not say so. He is concerned to establish himself as one who has a proper understanding of sexual matters, and to this end he offers a very thin anecdote against Demosthenes, who is supposed (167) to have made some unfortunate sexual innuendoes concerning the young Alexander, thus, according to Aeschines, making Athens a laughing stock. He then embarks on a routine process of character assassination, culminating in an appeal to his hearers' fear of ridicule. He draws a picture (175ff) of "this sophist" returning successful from court and boasting to his associates of the way he has manipulated the dikasts, ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν φεύγων κατηγορεῖ, ὁ δὲ κατηγορῶν ἐκρίνετο, οἱ δὲ δικασταί, ὧν μὲν

ἦσαν κριταί, ἐπελάθοντο, ὧν δ' οὐκ ἦσαν, περὶ τούτων ἤκουον. It is plain from even a cursory reading that ἀφαίρειν τὸ πράγμα τῶν δικάστων is an accepted technique, part of the rules, of these encounters; as Grant[20] says: "That the orator was permitted, and even expected, to attack his opponent angrily, we know from such passages as *Rh.* I 1367a, in which Aristotle says that it is noble to be avenged on one's enemies, and that a courageous man should not allow himself to be defeated". Aeschines certainly sees no incongruity in holding up these methods as a reproach to Demosthenes; III 205 provides another example. In ascribing a triumph of this nature to Demosthenes, Aeschines uses a curious expression: μὴ γέλωτα καὶ διατριβὴν παράσχητε, which is obviously similar in meaning to Euripides' γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν τινί. Aeschines is drawing a picture of ease and satisfaction which, it is presumed, had the desired effect upon its hearers.

Aeschines' second speech, concerning the notorious embassy, contains a remarkable description of Demosthenes' failure and discomfiture. This is no mere routine of sexual irregularity, financial incompetence or social insecurity; this is an anecdote that has the ring of authenticity, reported by an acute and unsympathetic observer. In 21 Aeschines describes Demosthenes' overconfidence and rash promises during the journey to Macedonia. More spiteful than these claims, however, is the image Aeschines draws of the insecure Demosthenes' attempts to ingratiate himself with the group of which Aeschines clearly

wishes to present himself as the centre - συσσιτεῖν ἡμῖν ἐσπούδαστεν. Setting aside Aeschines' betrayal of his own interests in the matter, there is something particularly malign in his noting these feelings, which are small and reassuringly human compared with the issues at stake. As to what really is at stake, we shall return to that later; it is necessary at this point to note the means by which Aeschines goes about achieving his end. After Demosthenes' reckless promise to sew up Philip's mouth with an unsoaked rush, he failed, according to Aeschines, to live up to his words. He insisted on speaking last, as he was the youngest - or so he said (22). However, when his turn came, he dried up, and in spite of Philip's courteous encouragement, found himself unable to continue. As Aeschines says, he made himself *katagelastos* and to Aeschines' unconcealed satisfaction (38-9) received little attention from Philip in his formal response to the ambassadors.

In 40-43 Aeschines makes the kind of attack already noted in 21. Demosthenes, in his attempts to rehabilitate himself, made ingratiating approaches to various members of the delegation, including Aeschines himself, and even essayed a joke at his own expense - αὐτὸν μὲν ἔσκωπτε - hoping thereby to turn aside his humiliation[21]. This particular detail is similar to that in I 126; it apparently takes an Aeschines, with his sharp eye for his opponent's vulnerable spots, to notice it, and a Demosthenes, who seems to have been more likely to fail in self assurance, to provide it. Having fixed his eye upon his rival,

he does not let it wander. In 111-2 he gleefully makes Demosthenes' supposed attempts to reinstate himself further appear quite pathetic. At Pella Demosthenes apparently recited a list of the favours he had obtained for Philip's ambassadors, and was not ashamed to refer to the wish of his rivals to insult him. To the embarrassment of all, ἐν οἷς οἱ συμπρέσβεις συνεκαλύφθησαν, he recounted the most ridiculous - *katagelastos* - story possible, concerning a special dinner he had given in the ambassadors' honour, and the trouble he had taken over it. He went on and on, until the ambassadors fron Hellas could bear it no longer, and burst into more than ordinary laughter.

Compared with these assaults, the description of Demosthenes in 127 as a hermaphrodite, or the reference to his *oxeian kai anosion phonen* in 157, or the aspersions on his ancestors in 171, have the sound of routine abuse. Assuming that personal abuse is part of the rules, it becomes necessary to look beyond routine reproach for evidence of the relations between the two men. In this encounter, Aeschines spoke second, so it is not possible to discover how Demosthenes responded to these various attacks. The shrewd observations of his personal behaviour are relevant neither to his standing in the community nor to his political acumen; that they were effective can perhaps be surmised from the fact that they are more extensive in this speech than in I. Perhaps the most sensible observation he makes is that Phalaecus of Olynthus was not the only one to misjudge Philip (136). All the Athenians (and by implication himself),

the Lacedaemonians, and even the Theban ambassadors expected that Philip would crush the Thebans. The Thebans even laughed the laugh that shows an incorrect grasp of the situation and insisted that the expedition was for their own benefit.

If one thing is clear at this point, it is that Philip alone knew what his intentions were in 346, but it is also clear that to argue in these terms alone was not sufficient to estalish the speaker in the eyes of the dikasts. The speech against Ctesiphon shows Aeschines taking, at long last, his opportunity to revenge himself upon Demosthenes for the accusations of 343. He makes no bones about his object; in 10 he pretends to offer a general hypothesis about the crowning of statesmen before their assets have been audited, but in 12 he moves swiftly to the subject of Demosthenes himself. Having established, apparently successfully, that Ctesiphon's proposal was illegal, he proceeds to attack Demosthenes' character, starting from the beginning of his career (51ff). He quickly passes over the early cases, but does not omit to mention that in settling out of court with Meidias he valued the enormous insult to himself at 30 *minai*. As in II 14, he coins epithets for his adversary; *Misophilippos Misalexandros, Misotyrannos*, the last designed to carry a sense of Demosthenes' exaggerated fears. In 76 he repeats the remarks he made in II 111 concerning Demosthenes fawning on the Macedonian ambassadors; indeed both this speech and Demosthenes' reply contain reworked, improved or altered material from the confrontation of 343. In 77-8 Aeschines refuses to ascribe real

feelings to Demosthenes; while respecting his misfortune, Aeschines is quite certain that he felt no proper grief for his daughter's death when he made his thank offerings for Philip's death only seven days after she died. In addition to Demosthenes' supposed lack of feeling, Aechines attacks, as so often, his vanity, suggesting that he claimed to have heard of the death of Philip not from a mortal messenger but from Zeus and Athena. The detail seems unnecessary and absurd, but it is part of the idea that Aeschines has formed of Demosthenes and is so determined to portray.

In 166 he mocks his metaphorical language, presenting a remarkable and incoherent array of mixed metaphor that in fact does not compare with the best known example of Demosthenes' imagery, the passage comparing the Athenian state to an unskilled boxer in *Philippic* I 40-1. He objects in the same fashion to Demosthenes' splendid gestures - κινῶ περιδινῶν - and appears to become incoherent with rage, resortin g to name calling - ὦ κίναιδος - and piling up the rhetorical questions, culminating in a sarcastic reference to gold crowns. In 170 he embarks on the demolition of his opponent. He lists the five qualities that ought to be found in a good servant of the people - five qualities, naturally, that regularly emerge as topics for ridicule in oratorical contest. One by one he mocks and belittles Demosthenes' claims to be a citizen and free born, the conduct of his ancestors, his integrity and his courage. His ability as a speaker he prudently avoids denying, but it is made

to appear all the more reprehensible in the light of the uses to which he puts it. In 206 Aeschines warns the dikasts against Demosthenes' skill, using, oddly enough, an image of two boxers circling for an opening, but he may have intended to be Homeric rather than Demosthenic. Part of Demosthenes' cunning is that he is no respecter of oaths and weeps more readily than other men (207-8), a reversal of the notion more commonly expressed, that it is laughter rather than weeping which is likely to be excessive and inappropriate. In 212 Aeschines refers again to the self inflicted cut on the head (see II 93) which has now grown to a thousand gashes, and to the clout Demosthenes received fron Meidias. Aeschines wittily remarks that this head of Demosthenes has now become an asset, which he will improve further by adorning it with a crown of gold, in order to have the laugh of the Athenian people - *katagelao.*

It is perhaps unfortunate that all that remains of Aeschines' work is that devoted to personal reproach of Demosthenes. There is no point in disparaging the various techniques of name calling, slander, ridicule and apparent indifference to consistency or truth, but rather in determining the nature and the rules of the contest.

When we pass to the corresponding speeches of Demosthenes, we find the same techniques used, with the added interest and confusion of hearing the familiar story told from the opposite point of view. Demosthenes makes capital of the obviously embarrassing departure of Philocrates and embarks on the re-telling of the tale; one episode that seems particularly to rankle is the meeting of the assembly that took place after the second embassy (XIX 19ff). He attacks Aeschines in the familiar manner, recounting the extravagance of his speech and his claims of intimacy and success with Philip, and not omitting to mention the self importance with which he swept from the platform at the end of his speech. Jaeger[22] has this to say: "[Demosthenes] sees in [Aeschines] the deliberate traitor, brought up by Philip and accordingly compelled to put the best light possible on all Philip's enterprises gainst Athens; and there is no doubt that Demosthenes believes firmly in this caricature". I doubt that Demosthenes was greatly concerned with the truth of his accusations; Jaeger is certainly right, though, when he observes that "The scorn of Aeschines is subtler and consequently more telling". Demosthenes does not flinch from recounting his own humiliation in 23; when he attempted to reply to Aeschines' speech Aeschines and Philocrates ranged themselves on either side of him, shouting, heckling, and jeering. In the end the assembly burst out laughing, and Demosthenes was unable to make his point. It should be noted that this story is worth telling if Demosthenes wishes to account for making the point at another time or in a different way. Cawkwell[23] notes: "Since

the people knew that Philip already controlled Thermopylae, they laughed - even though the situation that day was no laughing matter. Demosthenes had made a fool of himself, a decisive moment in his development." The author is making the point that Demosthenes' attitude derived largely from the necessity to retrieve and maintain his own standing along with his policies. Be that as it may, Aeschines is proved correct when he notes Demosthenes' willingness to ingratiate himself with his audience by telling an anecdote against himself. Apart from this brief excursion, Demosthenes contents himself with a bewildering series of facts and considerations until 188, when he begins his assault upon Aeschines himself.

Demosthenes justifies in advance his denunciation of a fellow ambassador (188-191), and proceeds to two anecdotes that combine by means of comparison to show Aeschines in a bad light. The story of the Olynthian captive (196-198) certainly depicts behaviour more heinous than that of Demosthenes when he tried and failed to make an impressive speech before Philip, but it is likely that the latter tale, with which Aeschines responded, was more galling. By the time Demosthenes reaches the end of his anecdote, he is ready for some name calling: ἡ παροινία τοῦ καθάρματος τουτουὶ δεινή· ὁ ἀκάθαρτος οὗτος (198-199). He bitterly refers to Aeschines' bell like tones, which must have rung out so much in contrast with the afore mentioned *oxeian kai anosion phonen* (II 157). At any rate the sound of it, proclaiming Aeschines' blameless life, makes

Demosthenes choke with rage - ἀποπνίγομαι 199. He makes disparaging mention of Aeschines' early career (199-20) and then moves on to demolish Aeschines' various claims. He refers again to Aeschines' voice in 206 and in 208 again has recourse to self disparagement. He readily admits that Aeschines is the more powerful speaker, stresses his own feebleness, and uses it to make the point that in spite of it he can prevail over even the most aggressive speakers because what he says is the truth. Like Aeschines in I 175, he accuses his opponent of introducing material not pertinent to the case, and in 216 compares their voices again. In 241-2 he quotes Aeschines I 175, and points out to him the inconsistency of his attitude; this is a very fast about face. He continues (243ff) to quote Aeschines' earlier speech and retaliates to his quoting of poetry with some lines from Sophocles' *Antigone* (247). They are lines which Aeschines has spoken himself, during his career as a third rate actor or a tritagonist at any rate, for it is this actor who plays the part of the tyrant. The irony of Aeschines failing to pay attention to his own lines, which are those of Creon concerning good government and behaviour, is obviously more important to Demosthenes than the irony of Creon's eventual fate, which detracts somewhat from the effectiveness of the lines within Demosthenes' argument. Whether the dikasts noticed this cannot be told; Demosthenes, however, obviously assumed that they would not. Without delay, he turns to Aeschines' point about Solon, and systematically demolishes it.

It is certainly much easier to prepare an answer to a speech two years after its delivery than to rebut its points on the spot, but Demosthenes' personal attacks on Aeschines are woven into the structure of his speech with considerably more skill than Aeschines can muster. He turns Solon's words against Aeschines (255-62) and proceeds by way of the topic of bribery to attack the character of Aeschines once more. He refers slightingly to his parents (281) and eventually returns to personal abuse. In 314, he mentions *ho gegrammateukos Aischines* and describes him pacing the agora, letting his robe trail down to his ankles[24], mincing or otherwise aping the style of Pythocles the actor, and making self important faces. In 336 he returns to the topic of Aeschines' lovely voice - καλὸν φθεγγομένῳ - in order to disparage him first as an actor and then as a performer of any sort. In spite of Philocrates' record, of which Demosthenes makes great capital in this speech, Aeschines was successful in his defence.

In their next great encounter, Demosthenes spoke second, and this time was successful, as well he might be after the battle of Chaeronea. I have mentioned before the difficulty of establishing the truth of Philip's wishes and intentions during these years, but I cite the two following. Griffith[25] defends Aeschines' conduct with regard to the Phocians and suggests that Philip in 346 "had no wish to pick a new quarrel with the Athenians, but rather to lay the old one to rest, and to develop the alliance into something serviceable". Ellis[26] suggests:

"..in his dealings especially with Athens [Philip] demonstrated a generosity and a readiness to compromise that took all the rhetoric of Demosthenes and his colleagues to disparage and distort ..On the other hand, although one might incline to the view that Philip in fact wanted not a Hellenic empire but merely Hellenic cooperation in an Asian empire, such an interpretation cannot be said to have been clear beyond reasonable doubt at this time". In my view, this observation explains the traditional view of Demosthenes' role in Athenian foreign policy and, for the purposes of this study, explains the personal animosity between these two men that clouded the issue so obviously and for so long. It certainly seems apparent that after Chaeronea Aeschines' case was weaker, as Demosthenes, for what it is worth, points out; in XVIII 3-4, by way of complaining that he is speaking at a disadvantage, he points out that Aeschines has had the easier task, since men are entertained by abuse and invective, whereas he has the less entertaining task of recounting his own achievements. There is no doubt that at this point he operates under the advantage of hindsight; however, he fully avails himself of the more diverting aspect of public speaking. First he makes it clear that he would not be pressed to these unpleasant necessities had not Aeschines begun the process (9). As he deals with the political accusations first, it is not until 123 that he returns to *loidoria* and *kategoria*. In 122 he compares Aeschines to a coarse jester at a Dionysiac festival, and then moves on to a distinction between abuse and an accusation. If an accusation

refers to a recognised crime and correct judicial procedure, then *loidoria* is simply name calling - βλασφημία - of the kind that people inflict on one another, according to their nature, in their personal quarrels. This lofty distinction prepares the way for the abuse in 126-31.

Demosthenes insists that what he has to say is not *loidoria* but the plain truth, and proceeds to hurl the epithets σπερμόλογος, περίτριμμ' ἀγόρας and ὄλεθρος γραμματεύς ; as he proceeds, the schoolmaster father and the strangely mystic mother of XIX 249 become a slave with shackles on his legs and a timber collar around his neck, and a prostitute plying her trade in a lean to. Having brought his rhetoric to the level of a tirade, he maintains it so, addressing most of his remarks directly to Aeschines as he recounts the events of their combined careers. As Cawkwell[27] observes: "..it is clear that Demosthenes has here not risen above his customary standard of truthfulness". Demosthenes devotes 258-64 to abuse of Aeschines, beginning with mention of his own fortunate upbringing in 257. 258 contains the offensive reference to Aeschines' parents, and is followed by a passionate description of Aeschines' wretched career, rounded off by repeated reference to Demosthenes' own distinguished history for purposes of comparison.

Gavigan[28] gives a short summary of Aeschines' career and the attack made upon him by Demosthenes "as a sample of what a classical orator deemed the proper way to attack an opponent".

Dyck[28] understands that the attack is part of Demosthenes' "rhetorical strategy" and makes useful reference to Silver and Sabini[30], who focus on envy "as a transgression". They note that envy is unusual among trangressions as "sinning is usually fun; envy is not." In the context of this study, the "fun" lies in arousing and subsequently enjoying the envy; for the Greeks however, this enjoyment is not a transgression but an earned privilege like Homeric laughter.

Since so little of what is said in these speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes agrees with what is said elsewhere either by the speaker or his opponent, it seems likely that the nature of the contest was that of display and effect. Demosthenes' work is structured with skill, well balanced, and persuasive; to Aeschines, however, must go the crown for the sly personal jibe, born of acute and malicious observation of his quarry. It is quite clear that the mutually destructive relations between these men had an incalculable effect on the events of their time; I suggest that it is not going too far to say that if Demosthenes had not dried up at the first embassy, and Aeschines had not been so delighted, relations between Philip II and Athens might have been very different.

There is no doubt that Aristophanic comedy and the speeches of the fourth century orators have a great deal in common. The more the personal feelings and animosities of the disputants are involved, the more the aims and even the methods of oratory are likely to coincide with those of comedy. That is to say, it is taken for granted that comedy makes a blatant appeal to the interests of the audience, and it is plain that the more hostile speeches of the orators did the same. These works are directed at an audience with an eye for physical appearance and personal foibles. Anything that implies weakness or self indulgence, such as preoccupation with money, food, wine or sex (homosexual in the case of men, heterosexual in the case of women), provides a target for ridicule and an opportunity to humiliate. The best target of all, however, is preoccupation with one's own self importance. Cleon seems to have provided Aristophanes with endless material of this nature, and even Thucydides notes the delight that seized the Athenians when Cleon called Nicias' bluff over Pylos. Demosthenes and Aeschines were obviously vulnerable to mention of their own self importance; this vulnerability, however, did not prevent them from making every attempt to demolish one another rather than their arguments. In oratory, as in comedy, the facts of the matter are not a consideration; the effect is all, and complete and public discomfiture the object. Even Cicero, whose nature was somewhat different, includes these purposes in his evaluation of humour in rhetoric:

Est autem, ut ad illum tertium veniam, est plane oratoris movere risum; vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat ei, per quem excitata est; vel quod admirantur omnes acumen uno saepe in verbo positum ..vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat; vel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maximeque quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat et relaxat odiaosque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit.

De Oratore II 236.

Notes to Chapter 7.

1. R Janko, *Comedy: Aristotle's* Poetics II (Duckworth 1984), bases a reconstruction of Aristotle's lost work on the *Tractatus Coislianus*, which he considers a genuine summary of Aristotle's views. Unfortunately, such a summary, even if genuine, has but little to offer on this topic.

2. See above pp 58, 62.

3. K McLeish, *The Theatre of Aristophanes* (Thames and Hudson 1980), p 55.

4. Detienne and Vernant, *op. cit.*

5. McLeish, *op. cit.* p 15-16.

6. L Giangrande, *The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature, Studies in Classical Literature* 6 (Mouton 1972), pp 79ff.

7. K J Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Blackwell 1974), pp 23ff.

8. The story of Hephaestus, Ares and Aphrodite in Hom. viii provides an early example of this ploy. Lutz Lenz, 'Komik und Kritik in Aristophanes' *Wespen*, *Hermes* 108 Bd 1980, pp 15-44, argues that insufficient attention has been given to the critical aspect of comedy and observes p 20: "Ein eindeutiger Primat der Kritik vor der Komik wäre erst beweisen, wenn tätiges Engagement des Zuschauers gegen die lebensweltlichen Missverhältnisse, die das Stück in ihrer Lachhaftigkeit zeigt, zwingende Konsequenz des Spieles wäre ..Den intentionen des Autors kommt man hinreichend nach, wenn man seine Komik und Kritik versteht, nicht erst, wenn man die Kritik praktisch befolgt."

9. Mary A Grant, *The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable, University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature* 21 (Madison 1924), ch. I; p 46.

10. Taplin, *op. cit.* p331-3.

11. Cratinus, fr. 307 (Edmonds), applies the following to Aristophanes: ὑποληπτολόγος γνωμοδιώκτης εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων.

For some of Aeschines' epithets, see below p 247.

12. Dover, *op. cit.* p 215.

13. Isocrates apparently takes it for granted that his audience will know that it is to bad *eris* that he refers. He uses the term in a bad sense also in *Helen* 1, when he embarks on his diatribe against eristic disputation. There is no sign here of

the distinction that is implicit in Homer and explicit in Hesiod.

14. Cicero puts the same point, but with a different emphasis, in *The Orator* 7 24: Nunc enim tantum quisque laudat quantum se posse sperat imitari..

15. Plutarch, *Dem.* XII, suggests that he had not sufficiently established himself to be able to carry through with confidence the case against Meidias.

16. Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC* (Methuen 1983), p 253.

17. Aeschines I 26, 31, 46, 54, etc; III 246.

18. Aeschines I 15f, 17, 29, 55 etc.

19. Plutarch, *Dem.* IV 5-8.

20. Grant, *op. cit.* p 31.

21. H Montgomery, *The Way to Chaironaea* (Universitets - forlaget 1983), p 62, points out that an audience can be collectively susceptible to humiliation. Demosthenes intends them to "feel shame on behalf of the state". Montgomery also suggests (p 71) that Demosthenes manoeuvred Aeschines and Ctesiphon into speaking favourably of Philip after the assembly. Thus Aeschines' remarks in II 44 are not a calumny but a naive description of Demosthenes' ploy. This is an ingenious suggestion, but not borne out by the subsequent demeanour of the pair. Sooner or later, Demosthenes would have had to lay public claim to this ploy in order to regain face.

22. W Jaeger, *Demosthenes* (University of California Press 1938), pp 134, 157.

23. George Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (Faber 1978), p 105.

24. Anne Geddes informes me that the exaggerated folding and trailing of the *himation* was a sign of great affectation and extravagance; however, if Aeschines had really arranged the garment in such a way as Demosthenes suggests, it is likely that he would have had great difficulty in strutting like Pythocles, or indeed in strutting at all.

25. N G L Hammond and G T Griffith, *A History of Macedonia*, vol. II (Clarendon Press 1972), pp 346-7.

26. J R Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (Thames and Hudson 1976), pp 127, 129.

27. Cawkwell, *op. cit.* p 117.

28. J Gavigan, 'Classical Abuse', *CW* 37 (1943-4), pp 140-1.

29. Andrew R Dyck, 'The Function and Persuasive Power of Demosthenes' Portrait of Aeschines in the Speech *On the Crown*', *G&R* XXXII (1985), pp 42-48.

30. M Silver and J Sabini, 'The Perception of Envy', *Social Psychology* 41 (1978), p 106.

Conclusion.

This project was suggested by Ajax's words οἴμοι γέλωτος, but in order to make a beginning it was necesssary to go back to Homer, if only because there are so many Homeric echoes in Sophocles' *Ajax*. It soon became evident that the author of the Homeric poems describes objectively the social pressures expressed subjectively by Ajax's cry in Sophocles' play. This can be discerned most of all from the fact that laughter or ridicule in Homer is always overt; the one who laughs is seen to do so and the laughter is always significant. The great difference between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is that the latter portrays a set of obvious villains who may be discerned by their behaviour, which contravenes all the standards of decency so clearly delineated in the *Iliad*. This laughter, and the standards of behaviour that attach to it, could be termed the one great anachronism in these poems, for the principles established arise again and again in subsequent literature, as this research has shown, and are by no means treated as an eccentricity of a bygone age.

The first principle established is that the right to laugh with or at another is a privilege that must be earned; this is made clear by the various responses of persons to laughter or ridicule. The more offensive the ridicule, the more it is likely to be associated with the idea of *hybris*, but subsequent works, and tragedy in particular, make it clear that aggressive

laughter is a worse degree of *hybris*, rather than the reverse.

Laughter in the *Odyssey* is not necessarily directed at any particular individual; if it is not, it is the laughter that indicates a sense of ascendancy in a particular situation. This sense may be correct or utterly misguided; that is to say, the laughter may or may not be appropriate to the situation. Therein lies an opportunity for the narrator which is never allowed to pass. The use of a term which, if hardly neutral, is nevertheless capable of interpretation in entirely opposite senses, allows irony and suspense to be developed in a way that defies translation. This is never more apparent than in the work of Thucydides, who repeatedly introduces the notion of *kataphronesis* into his narrative and gives no indication of the way it is to be understood. The course of events brings hindsight; and with it the true nature of the attitude described.

To be the object of ridicule, even if it is deserved, is intolerable and every attempt is made to maintain or regain face. Certain characters in tragedy bear witness to this; it is unlikely that a writer of reputation would present unrealistic motives to his audience. Individuals impervious to ridicule are treated as remarkable in fantasy and insane in fact; one exception is Socrates, whose character as we know it lightly treads the boundary between the two. Another is the builder's son in Herodotus, whose exploits are worthy of Odysseus.

Otherwise, an indifference to ridicule or an inclination to inappropriate laughter are treated as signs that the individual concerned has renounced his claims on society. Those who habitually invite ridicule acquire the status of buffoon, a status not easily relinquished.

The fourth century orators seem to have striven to achieve in fact what fifth century comedy achieves in fantasy. Neither kind of endeavour could be effective were it not that the society that produced them was highly conscious of honour and individual standing. By this I do not mean social status, although the social and intellectual snobbery in Athens in these times was obviously of a high order. What is at stake is the standing of an individual at any given time in terms of his own self respect, which depended entirely on the esteem of others. This is why the literature of these times is filled with references to laughter and ridicule, and the advice of Isocrates, which seems so trite, is given in real earnest: Μήτε γέλωτα προπετῆ στέργε, μήτε λόγον μετὰ θράσους ἀποδέχου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητον, τὸ δὲ μανικόν. .. μηδὲ παρὰ τὰ γελοῖα σπουδάζων, μηδὲ παρὰ τὰ σπουδαῖα τοῖς γελοίοις χαίρων (τὸ γὰρ ἄκαιρον πανταχοῦ λυπηρόν).. *To Demonicus*, 15, 31.

Erving Goffman, the distinguished sociologist, in a collection of papers entitled *Interaction Ritual* (Cox and Wyman 1967), says of what he terms "face-work" (p 44-5): "If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to

for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilise their members as self regulating participants in social encounters ..the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are imposed on him from without." On p 10 Goffman remarks: "In any case, while his social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it."

In the introduction to this study, I have suggested that the attitudes of the ancient Greek writers were neither elementary nor naive. Everything suggested by Goffman is implicit in their writings, and there seems little doubt that humiliation and ridicule were mobilising factors in the society that they describe.

Bibliography.

Abel D H, 'Genealogies of Ethical Concepts from Homer to Bacchylides', *TAPhA* 74 (1943), pp 72ff.

Adkins A W H, *Merit and Responsibility* (Clarendon Press 1960).

Adkins A W H, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (Chatto and Windus 1972).

Adkins A W H, 'Threatening, Abusing, and Feeling Angry in the Homeric Poems', *JHS* 89 (1969), pp 7-21.

Adkins A W H, 'Values, Goals and Emotions in the *Iliad*', *CPh* 77 (1982), pp 292-326.

Allen D J, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (Oxford University Press 1970).

Allen Michael J B, *Marsilio Ficino: the* Philebus *Commentary* (University of California Press 1975).

Allen R E, *The Dialogues of Plato* (Yale University Press 1984)

Archie J P, 'Callias' Redoubtable Critique of the Polus Argument in Plato's *Gorgias*', *Hermes* 112 Bd 1984, Heft 2, pp 167-76.

Auerbach Erich, *Mimesis* (A Franke Ag. Verlag, Bern 1945).

Bassett S, *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley 1938).

Beye Charles Rowan, 'Male and Female in the Homeric Poems', *Ramus* III (1974), pp 87-101.

Bradley E M, 'The *Hybris* of Odysseus', *Soundings* 4 (1968), pp 33-44.

Bremmer J N, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton University Press 1983).

Burnet A P, *Three Archaic Poets* (Duckworth 1983).

Bury J B, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* (Cambridge 1890-2).

Calhoun G M, 'The Art of Formula in Homer - ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ,' *CPh* XXX (1935) 215-227.

Campbell David A, *The Golden Lyre* (Duckworth 1983).

Campbell David A, *Greek Lyric Poetry - a selection* (Macmillan 1974).

Carden Richard (ed), *The Papyrus Fragments of Sophocles* (De Gruyter 1974).

Cawkwell George, *Philip of Macedon* (Faber 1978).

Cawkwell George, 'The Defence of Olynthus', *CQ* n.s. 12 (1962) 122ff.

Clarke H W, 'The Humor of Homer', *CJ* LXIV (1969), pp 246-252.

Combellack F M, 'Milman Parry and Homeric Artistry', *Comparative Literature* 1959, pp 193-208.

Connor W R, *Thucydides* (Princeton University Press 1984).

Considine P, 'Some Homeric Terms for Laughter', *Acta Classica* 9 (1966), pp 15-25.

Cornford F M, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (Arnold 1907).

David E, *Aristophanes and Athenian Society of the Early Fourth Century BC, Mnemosyne* Supplement 81 (1984).

Denniston, J D and Page D L, *Aeschylus*: Agamemnon (Clarendon Press 1957).

de Romilly J, 'La Haine et l'Inimitié dans Homère', *Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honour of G F Else*, edd. Arms J H and Edie J W (Ann Arbor 1977), pp 1-10.

de Romilly J, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Blackwell 1963).

de Ste Croix G E M,'The Alleged Secret Pact Between Athens and Philip II Concerning Amphipolis and Pydna', *CQ* n. s. 13 (1963) pp 110ff.

de Ste Croix G E M *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Duckworth 1972).

Detienne M and Vernant J-P, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society* (Harvester Press 1978).

de Vries G J, *A Commentary on the* Philebus *of Plato* (Hakkert 1969).

Dindorf W, *Iliad* and *Odyssey* - Scholia: Clarendon Press.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus ed. Pritchett W K, *On Thucydides* (University of Californmia Press 1975).

Dodds E R, *Plato* - Gorgias (Oxford 1959).

Dover K J, *Aristophanic Comedy* (Batsford 1972).

Dover K J, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974).

Dover K J, *Plato* - Symposium (Cambridge University Press 1980)

Drerup E, *Das Funfte Buch der* Ilias (Paderborn 1913).

Dyck A R, 'The Function and Persuasive Power of Demosthenes' Portrait of Aeschines in the Speech *On the Crown*' *G&R* XXXII (1985), 42-48.

Edmonds J M, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy* (Brill 1957).

Edmunds L, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Harvard University Press 1975).

Ellendt F, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Georg Olms 1958).

Ellis J R, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (Thames and Hudson 1976).

Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem, Odysseam* (J A G Weigel) Leipzig (1825)

Farnell R, *Pindar: a commentary* (Hakkert 1961).

Fenik B, *Studies in the Odyssey, Hermes* Einzelschriften Heft 30 (1974).

Fenik B, *Typical Battle Scenes in the* Iliad, *Hermes* Eizelschriften Heft 21 (1968).

Finley J H Jr, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge Massachusetts 1955).

Finnegan R, *Oral Poetry* (Cambridge University Press 1977).

Fisher N R E, '*Hybris* and Dishonour' I, *G&R* XXIII (1976), pp 177-193; II, *G&R* XXVI (1979), pp 32-47.

Fisher N R E, *The Concept of* Hybris *in Greece from Homer to the Fourth Century BC*, British Thesis no. D26180/79 CL.

Fortenbaugh W W, *Aristotle on Emotion* (Duckworth 1975).

Fraenkel E, *Aeschylus* - Agamemnon, edited with commentary in three volumes (Oxford 1950).

Francis E D, 'Chiron's Laughter', *CPh* LXVII (1972), 288-291.

Frisch H, *Might and Right in Antiquity* (Copenhagen 1949).

Gavigan J, 'Classical Abuse', *CW* XXXVII (1943-4), pp 140-1).

Giangrande L, *The Use of* Spoudaiogeloion *in Greek and Roman Literature, Studies in Classical Literature* 6 (Mouton 1972).

Gildersleeve B L, *The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Baltimore University Press 1895).

Goffman E, *Interaction Ritual* (Cox and Wyman 1967).

Gomme A W, Andrewes A, and Dover K J, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* in five volumes (Oxford 1945-81).

Grant M A, *The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable, University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature* 21 (Madison 1924).

Griffin J, *Homer on Life and Death* (Clarendon Press 1980).

Griffin J and Hammond M, 'Critical Appreciations VI: Homer, *Iliad* I 1-52', *G&R* XXIX (1982), pp 126-142.

Hackforth R, *Plato's* Phaedrus (Cambridge University Press 1952).

Hainsworth J B, 'The Criticism of an Oral Homer', *JHS* 90 (1970), pp 90-8.

Hainsworth J B, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968).

Hammond N G L and Griffith G T, *A History of Macedonia* in two volumes (Oxford 1979).

Harrison A R W, *The Law of Athens* in two volumes (Oxford 1968).

Hewitt J W, 'Homeric Laughter', *CJ* XXII (1927) pp 433-47.

Highet G, *The Anatomy of Satire* (Princeton University Press 1962).

Hohendahl-Zoetelief I M, *Manners in the Homeric Epic, Mnemosyne* Supplement LXII (Leiden Brill 1980).

Hornblower S, *The Greek World 479-323 BC* (Methuen 1983).

Hude C (ed), *Scholia in Thucydidem* (Teubner 1927).

Hunter V, *Thucydides - the Artful Reporter* (Toronto 1973).

Huizinga J, *Homo Ludens* (Roy 1950).

Immerwahr H R, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland 1966).

Jaeger W, *Demosthenes* (University of California Press 1938).

Janko R, *Comedy: Aristotle's* Poetics *II* (Duckworth 1984).

Kagan D, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Cornell University Press 1981).

Kagan D, 'The Speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene Debate', *YCS* XXIV (New Haven 1975) 71-94.

Kirk G S, *The* Iliad: *a commentary*, vol. I (Cambridge University Press 1985).

Kirk G S, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge University Press 1962).

Kirk G S and Parry A, 'Homeric Studies', *YCS* XX (New Haven 1966).

Lateiner D, 'No Laughing Matter: a Literary Tactic in Herodotus' *TAPhA* 107 (1977), pp 173-82.

Latham K J, 'Hysteria in History: Some *Topoi* in War Debates of Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides', *Mus. Phil. Lond.* V (1981), 54-67.

Lattimore R L, *The Iliad* (University of Chicago Press 1951); *The Odyssey* (Harper and Row 1965).

Lenz L, 'Komik und Kritik in Aristophanes' *Wespen*', *Hermes* 108 Bd 1980, pp 15-44.

Levine D B, 'Laughter and the Demise of the Suitors', Cincinnati University Ph D thesis 1980.

Lloyd G E R, *Aristotle; the Growth and Structure of his Thought* (Cambridge University Press 1968).

Lobel E and Page D L, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford 1955).

Lord A B, *The Singer of Tales* (Harvard University Press 1960).

Lord A B, 'Homer as Oral Poet', *HSCP* LXXII (1968), pp 1-46.

Lowry E R, 'Thersites: a Study in Comic Shame', *HSCP* LXXXV (1981).

Marshall M H B, 'Cleon and Pericles: Sphacteria', *G&R* XXXI (1984), pp 19-36.

Montgomery H, *The Way to Chaeronea* (Universitets-forlaget 1983).

Mund-Dopchie M, 'Les Vers 306-308 des Choephores', *L'Antiquite Classique* XLII (1973), pp 508-15.

MacDowell D M, '*Hybris* in Athens', *G&R* XXIII (1976), pp 14-31.

McLeish K, *The Theatre of Aristophanes* (Thames and Hudson 1980).

Nicolaidis A G, 'Aristotle's Treatment of the Concept of ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ', *Hermes* Bd 110 (1982), pp 414-22.

O'Neal W J, 'Fair Play in Homeric Greece', *CB* LVI (1980), pp 11-14.

Page D L, *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Clarendon Press 1962).

Page D L, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955).

Page D L, *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis* (Clarendon Press 1974).

Page D L, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford University Press 1955).

Parry A, 'Thucydides' Historical Perspective', *YCS* XXII (1972).

Parry M, 'About Winged Words', *CPh* XXXII (1937), pp 59-63.

Pickard-Cambridge A, *Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom* (New York and London 1914).

Powell J E, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge University Press 1938).

Pucci P, *The Violence of Pity in Euripides'* Medea (Cornell University Press 1980).

Quiller B, 'The Dynamics of the Homeric Society', *Symb. Os.* 56, pp 109ff.

Radin P, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (Dover 1957).

Redfield J M, *Nature and Culture in the* Iliad (University of Chicago Press 1975).

Rengakos A, 'Form und Wandel des Machtdenkens der Athener bei Thukydides', *Hermes* Einzelschriften Heft 48 (1984).

Roberts J W, *The City of Sokrates* (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1984).

Robertson H G, 'The *Hybristes* in Homer', *CJ* LI (1955), pp 81-3.

Scodel R, 'The Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Rex*', *CPh* 77 (1982), pp 214-23.

Snell B and Maehler H, *Pindar: a commentary* (Teubner 1971).

Slings S R, 'Archilochus. The Hasty M ind and the Hasty Bitch', *ZPE* 21 (1976), pp 286 ff.

Solmsen F, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Cornell University Press 1949).

Snell B, *The Discovery of the Mind* (Harper and Row 1960).

Stanford, *The* Odyssey - *a commentary* (Macmillan 1947).

Stoianovici-Donat L, '*Hybris* in *Iliada*', *Studii Clasice* VIII (1966), pp 17-24.

Stolz B A and Shannon R S III, *Oral Literature and the Formula* (Ann Arbor 1976).

Taplin O, 'Tragedy and Trugedy', *CQ* XXXIII (1983), pp 331-3.

Tompkins D P, 'Stylistic Characterisation in Thucydides', *YCS* XXII (1972), pp 181-214.

Van Sickle J, 'Archilochus: the Hasty Emendation', *BASP* 15 (1978), pp 171-3.

Verdenius W J, *A Commentary on Hesiod Op. 1-382* (Brill 1985).

Vermeule E, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (University of California Press 1979).

Verrall A W, *The* Agamemnon *of Aeschylus*, ed. with introduction, commentary and translation (Macmillan 1889).

Versnel H S, 'Self-Sacrifice, Compensation and the Anonymous Gods', *Le Sacrifice dans l'Antiquite*, pp 135-87, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquite Classique* 1980.

Vlastos G, 'Was Polus Refuted?' *AJPh* 88 (1967), pp 454-60.

Walcot P, *Envy and the Greeks* (Aris and Phillips 1978).

Welsford E, *The Fool* (Faber and Faber 1935).

West M L, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (De Gruyter 1974).

West M L, *Hesiod* - Theogony, ed. with prolegomena and commentary (Clarendon Press 1966).

West M L, *Hesiod* - Works and Days, ed. with prolegomena and commentary (Oxford University Press 1978).

Westerink L G (ed.), Damascius - *Lectures on the* Philebus (North Holland Publishing Co 1959).

Westlake H D, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge University Press 1968).

Whallon W, *Formula, Character, and Context* (Centre for Hellenic Studies 1969).

Winnington-Ingram R P, 'The Second Stasimon of the *Oedipus Tyrannos*, *JHS* 91 (1971), pp 124-7.

Woodbury L, 'Apollo's First Love: Pindar, *Pyth.* 9-26ff', *TAPhA* 103 (1972) 561-73.

Woodbury L, *Quomodo Risu Ridiculoque Graeci Usi Sint* (Dissertation - Harvard 1944).

Wurmser L, *The Mask of Shame* (Johns Hopkins University Press 1981).

Wyatt W F Jr, 'Homeric Ἄτη', *AJPh* 103 (1982), pp 247-76.

Young D (ed.) *Theognis* (Teubner 1971).

Zuntz G, 'Theocritus I 95f', *CQ* X (1960), p 35ff.