



House of Commons Committees and County Committees 1640-1644,  
with an Epilogue concerning the Political Behaviour of  
leading Members after 1644.

by

Lotte Glow, M.A. (Malbourne).

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## SUMMARY.

During the English Civil War a novel method of government was needed if Parliament was to achieve a dual victory - control over the executive and military defeat of the King. This thesis all but ignores the political battles on the floor of the House of Commons and the armies in the field; instead, it focuses upon how this new form of executive government was brought into being.

Parliament's age-old device of appointing committees was particularly adaptable to the problems preceding the outbreak of war and those of the early war years. Committees provided the essential delegation of function needed when a vast new field of activity opened suddenly for Parliament. They supplied for the first time an executive wholly responsible to the legislature. In addition they served an important political purpose. They enabled the self-appointed leaders of the Commons to exercise a control out of all proportion to their following in the House. Without obvious packing, Pym who "master-minded" the exploitation of this system, could control the House in order to implement his policies. For committees could easily be led by a group with a firm and coherent policy, while on specific occasions making use of the support of others with quite disparate views.

Before the war the leaders of reform found themselves with three major tasks: First, they had to consolidate the opposition against the King and his advisers in order to make the sharpest constitutional attack on the crown. Here, the later royalists co-operated as enthusiastically as any in committees concerned with breaking down the props of personal rule. The next phase began with the more audacious demands of control of the King's council. In order to implement this, committees became concerned with propaganda to build up a public image of Parliament as defender of the nation's liberties against subversion from the Catholic-tainted court and council. The royalists ceased to co-operate on these committees and the membership became more radical. Finally, the need for control of the militia became clear, and with it, the building up of parliamentary defence. Here Pym's moderates depended on the enthusiasm of the radicals to support their programme and its execution by committees.

After the outbreak of war the immediate needs and policies changed. An all-embracing executive committee of safety was at once established to act as

co-ordinator of the war. But its efficiency was hampered by a pressure group of pacifically orientated Lords who eventually sabotaged its work. Simultaneously the problems of financing the war, administering it in the counties, co-ordinating the war-effort in each of the Associations, treating with the king and negotiating with the Scots had to be dealt with by committees outside the Committee of Safety. The excluded and dissatisfied radicals dominated all committees concerned genuinely in furthering the effective administration of the war. Pym kept them in check until he came himself to realize that more drastic action was needed. The Middle and War Parties' union of views achieved at the end of 1643, was effected by their mutual interest in the committee system.

The study of the membership of committees reveals at every stage the relative strength of the parties in the Commons. In addition to showing who bore the brunt of the executive work, this analysis reveals that many of the men on whom this edifice of executive government was built were not political front-benchers at all. In every sphere of committee activity there was a hard core of men with considerable administrative experience, with urban backgrounds and mercantile connections. They were practical men, lawyers, estate-managers, ex-civil servants from Charles' administration. These men backed efficient leadership, whether it stemmed from Pym or from his successors, the radicals. Without them the experience and continuity needed for strong central and local government would not have existed.

At the end of 1643 Pym's death, the collapse of the Committee of Safety, the emergence of religious differences among Members of Parliament, the need to reorganize the army and the entry of the Scots into English affairs, all led to a transformation of political alignments among the Commons. The Epilogue seeks to explain the direction of these winds of change.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University. To the best of my knowledge the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference has been made in the text.



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PART I

FROM THE MEETING OF THE LONG PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 1640  
TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AUGUST 1642.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Committees and the Opposition

Historians of Civil War politics have until recently devoted themselves to the study of the behaviour of Members of Parliament in their legislative capacity by noting their speeches on the floor of the Houses. This resulted in the view that what determined the policy of Parliament was the ascendancy of one of two opposing factions, composed of the most outspoken and influential M.P's. Hexter's analysis of the tellers in divisions <sup>1.</sup> during the critical period of peace negotiation with the king in 1642 and 1643 expanded this rigid dichotomy and showed that political opinion in the House of Commons was divided into three "parties", the less committed centre being most susceptible to the winds of political change. He also showed that policy decisions did not depend solely upon the persuasiveness and stature of the leading politicians, but were shaped according to the temporary allegiances of a body of enthusiastic followers who were active but not necessarily consistent in their support for particular policies. The work of Mrs. Keeler <sup>2.</sup> and Messrs. Brunton and Pennington <sup>3.</sup> shifted the emphasis further from the leadership to the rank and file by their interest in the background and grass roots of the most insignificant Member alongside his more illustrious colleagues.

In the present work a third method of analysing the parliamentarians has been used. By switching the focus from Parliament's legislative to its executive functions we can see its members in their administrative capacities. Once we have moved our attention from the floor of the Commons to the committee

chambers it becomes obvious that a great deal more took place there than the routine execution of orders issued by the parent body. For the committee system as it was evolved during the early months of the Long Parliament and as it developed during the years of war met the challenge of the absent Privy Council in providing Parliament with a new and responsible executive. Those who manned the committees became the framers of policy as well as the executants of orders from the Houses.

It can therefore be seen that during a period of rapid political change, a period of almost complete hiatus in all constitutionally appointed governmental bodies, the behaviour of M.P's in their new role as committee-men is of paramount importance. From 1641 to 1648 Parliament was not only supreme in the sense of a modern democratic constitutional legislature, but much more a complete dictatorship of an oligarchic body, unhindered by rival claimants for power in the form of separate executives or the common law. The latter having been a supreme weapon against autocracy in the early part of the century, was now kept remarkable in the background. Its chief exponents sat as private men in the Commons, either helplessly expostulating amongst themselves about the evils of illegal actions (like Sir Simonds D'Ewes), or citing the common law when a useful ally and disregarding it when not to the point (like John Pym). The Privy Council on the other hand, had its limited functions further restricted to that part of the country which was under royalist administration. If Trevor Roper's thesis is correct, that the only aims to emerge from the parliamentary melting pot were not positive ideas of reconstruction, but purely destructive forces

against the pre-war brand of "totalitarianism", then we must at the same time allow that the abandoned, disrupted, and abolished institutions were, in a more or less efficient form, incorporated into the function of Parliament itself. Nor need we see this as a haphazard seizure of power in the spheres where the country gentlemen and the rich bourgeoisie most felt the oppressions of a regime in which they were not represented. Parliament's demolition of the structure of the eleven years' tyranny was motivated not so much by distrust of any body not strictly within the physical limits of the two Houses, nor by sheer lust for universal control - not likely in a corporate body of hundreds of men of all shades of political opinion. In fact, the positive side of the work of destruction gave rise to a parliamentary machine which had to develop if government was to continue. In other words, Parliament certainly knew what it did not want; but it also knew, or found out step by step, that a substitute would have to be found, and quickly too, for the obnoxious organs which had been displaced. Inevitably then, the committee system flowered from its simple procedural seeds in the sixteenth century into an effective executive and policy-making organism, basically made of the stock of the parent body. It would be anachronistic to say that the parliamentarians had a clear substitute in mind when they passed the 1641 legislation abolishing prerogative courts, temporal power of the church and the crown's control over its ministers. These had been the adjuncts of a despotism too hated for delay in destroying them, or for men to stay to think what would go in their place. But

the mechanism for a substitute was already in action, albeit on a humbler level than the grandiose activities of the later months.

Mitchell, in his work on the committees in the Commons from 1603 to 1629<sup>4.</sup> indicated that the use of committees had already been accepted as a method of lobbying for the growing opposition party. He traces the tradition established during the early Stuart Parliaments, to work through ever larger committees in order not only to get away from the influence of the Speaker, as earlier writers have shown,<sup>5.</sup> but also to discount the influence of the Privy Councillors who had previously governed proceedings at committees as well as in the House. On the other side there was no indication of any kind of "establishment" party formed by the office-holding members, whose privileges did not act as a sufficiently unifying force.<sup>6.</sup> The tendency to involve as many of the members as possible in the work of committees Mitchell shows to act in favour of the opposition party and against court domination. The importance of these conclusions in our period is to show that the opposition had the basis of an effective anti-court organization within its hands before the recall of Parliament in 1640. The early tendency to appoint very large committees as well as the use of Committees of the Whole House can be seen to be related to this earlier period when freedom from royal influence was achieved by a similar method. It is perhaps ironical that as time went on and the opposition party grew in strength and confidence the use of small and often secret committees recurred. The parliamentary leaders learned to use the methods of influence earlier employed

by the Privy Councillors, and used them to similar purpose.

Committees of the Whole House.

Before turning to a consideration of the select committees of the House of Commons which is the main concern of this work, it is useful to look at the rise and early decay of the system of Committees of the Whole. This constitutional expedient to avoid interference of the royal spokesmen has already been fully dealt with.<sup>7</sup> Committees of the Whole flourished most in the Parliaments of James and in those of Charles' early years, when there was still the problem of an unsympathetic Speaker, and when the Privy Councillors sitting in the House had the unfair advantage of prestige, closeness to the king's ear, and precedence in speech. But by 1640 Parliament no longer existed under royal sufferance, nor was the factor of royal patronage any longer a disintegrating force on the unity of the House. After 1629 there was no necessity to be rid of the Speaker from his chair. The king's very grave need for placating Parliament in order to save the nation's honour meant that the concern for currying favour for royal rewards fell into the background. The corporateness of the newly assembled Short Parliament clearly showed that the communal suffering under Charles' regime of class discrimination meant more to individual parliamentarians than could personal royal favour. It is not possible to judge whether this was the result of balancing private budgets - weighing past losses in taxation and forced loans against the possibility of future gains from royal office-holding; or whether there was a genuine drive towards parliamentary

government even at the expense of private advancement. While the House held the trump card of finance in its hands it could disregard the pressure from Privy Councillors.

If the factors which had produced the expedient of Committees of the Whole in earlier Parliaments were no longer present in 1640 why did the institution survive, even for a time? As delegatory bodies they were of course largely redundant, since they required a large attendance, and replaced but did not supplement the sittings of the House. However, as each Committee of the Whole appointed a chairman, there was to some degree specialization of function.<sup>8</sup> Like the select committees they could send for witnesses and hear counsel, they had a permanent time and place of meeting appointed which meant that the House could sit again, as a Committee, in the afternoons.<sup>9</sup> Committees of the Whole were therefore useful in ensuring that major topics would receive regular attention at pre-fixed times.

There is a tendency to regard the Short Parliament as a curtain-raiser to the great drama of the Long Parliament. But it would be anachronistic to draw <sup>a</sup> sharp line through the continuity of parliamentary procedure after the Resolutions of the Commons in 1629. The men of the Short Parliament were still very conscious of the spirit of the Petition of Right, and of the corporateness which provoked it. Therefore it would be wrong to see the reasons for the use of Committees of the Whole as new ones, determined solely by the new situation facing the revived Parliament. Since the same spirit of antagonism to Charles and of unanimity amongst themselves prevailed, the same techniques were at first used to assert the wishes of the



corporate body against the half-thwarted autocracy of the crown.  
 10.  
 Mitchell shows how Committees of the Whole developed with great spontaneity in the early seventeenth century, once it became obvious that coherence among members was more important than adherence to the crown. The expedient was only feasible during a time of harmony among the large majority of members. When that harmony ended, the method also decayed.

When the Short Parliament met it appointed a number of Committees of the Whole with great speed, which indicates that members seemed to feel the proven method was efficient for organizing business on the lines of earlier sessions. In any case, there were two overriding advantages of adjourning the House into committee. Since strict rules of debate did not apply, people of strong views could state them more fully as they could speak more than once to a bill or on any other subject. Although Notestein suggests that this method gave back-benchers more  
 11.  
 opportunity to voice their opinions I think on the whole the reverse effect was stronger - that in fact those with their ideas clearly formulated and advocating action, would prevail. Rules of debate are meant to guarantee the largest possible number of speakers on any subject, and the relaxing of those rules must give the strongest speakers a greater opportunity to have their views heard. Committees of the Whole would therefore make excellent vehicles for strong leaders with majorities behind them, and this was the situation during the period in which they flourished. A further procedural advantage of a House sitting as a Committee was the possibility of forming sub-committees to deal with more particular matters arising

from the general subject. Unlike select committees appointed from a sitting of the House, a sub-committee appointed from a session of a Committee of the Whole was restricted to a very limited specific function related to the work of the larger body. Nor was it necessary to appoint individuals to the sub-committees. Rather the people most concerned in the work were specified generically - for example the Gentlemen of the Long Robe did most of the work on the sub-committees of the Committee of the Whole for Courts of Justice.

How and why did the use of Committees of the Whole decline after the opening months of the Long Parliament? Within a week of meeting, all the Committees of the Whole which had existed in the Short Parliament were revived and their subjects brought to fruition. For example, Courts of Justice, Religion, and Grievances were again committed under the same chairmen as in the earlier Parliament.<sup>12.</sup> The Committee of the Whole for Courts of Justice was now enabled to get to work, whereas its predecessor had been frustrated through lack of counsel to hear petitions.<sup>13.</sup> But its work and existence were both very limited. Despite its general name, the Committee only dealt with the Court of High Commission, and restricted itself to declaring some of the court's actions illegal. Early in 1641 its activities were dispersed among various select committees dealing with more particular matters,<sup>14.</sup> and later petitions which reached Parliament came to be sifted through a committee set up as a clearing house for grievances, referring them to relevant select committees. Simultaneously with the decline of one Committee of the Whole an

attempt was made to bolster up another, the Committee of the Whole for Religion, before the decay of the whole institution. This committee began by hearing petitions against various high ecclesiastics and officers of state who interfered in religious matters,<sup>15.</sup> but at the time when the Justice Committee was in decline the Religion committee was empowered to take over consideration of ecclesiastical courts and government of the church.<sup>16.</sup> Despite this transfer of business the reports of the Committee tailed off and after April 1641 it was not recalled. As we shall see, the work for which the Committees of the Whole were originally formed, was very quickly absorbed by the large number of select committees which lent themselves to easier manipulation, greater specialization and more expertise. Many of these were set up concurrently and began their infiltration of the large committees at once.<sup>17.</sup> The composition of these select committees indicates why the transfer of business took place. Membership was not only restricted, but a nucleus of specialists began to appear.<sup>18.</sup> At the same time whole groups of people were named to attend the committees which needed the advice of lawyers or local members.<sup>19.</sup> However, the main argument against the use of Committees of the Whole was the pressure of business and the need to organize the opposition to the crown as quickly as possible while the momentum was at its height. It is obvious that a system which required the whole House to attend to the business of particular petitions was inefficient and wasteful. For example, the diverse grievances which came in concerning trade and monopolies ranged widely in detail, although their import was

usually predictable. Select committees were set up in answer to this challenge,<sup>20.</sup> which could employ small groups of qualified people and which could extract the principle underlying the grievance ready to forward it to the appropriate place for later political use by the reform leaders. On the other hand, the Committee of the Whole for Trade was originally meant to investigate the whole scandal of monopolists and patentees from the crown. This committee summoned all profiteers complained against by the petitions to appear before it.<sup>21.</sup> But once again the system of investigation by a Committee of the Whole was undermined by the simultaneous establishment of a select committee to enquire into the names of all monopolists who sat in the Commons.<sup>22.</sup> This resulted in the anomalous situation where, on the day the offenders were to appear before the large committee, orders were issued to the select committee to take over the investigation of monopolists and advisers of the king. This meant that the Committee of the Whole was left with the treatment of specific grievances, while the select committee formulated policy.

While the select committee for monopolists virtually took over the business of the Committee of the Whole for Trade, another variation in the administrative experiment was tried. The select committee had referred to it a petition concerning the gunpowder monopoly. This was a matter for general concern, and the House voted that all who came to the committee were to have voices in determining the matter. In other words, although referred to a select committee the matter was left open to all

interested people, presumably the very same people who would have attended the Committee of the Whole on the matter. The only difference between this novel treatment and the older established method was that in this way a central core of nominated members were in charge of affairs, while everyone interested could have a marginal say. By providing a core who formulated general policy on monopolies, a framework was kept which ensured that the political purpose was kept in the forefront, without swamping the issue with personal concerns in particular commodities. The select committee also had the vengeful and perhaps delicate task of investigating their colleagues who had in the past profited from royal monopolies. This was an important political function, for it rid the House initially of the obvious supporters of the government, and presumably it needed fairly careful treatment by safe and enthusiastic members rather than by the haphazard attendance of the Committee of the Whole.

The original 36 members of the committee consisted of 7 Londoners,<sup>23.</sup> 14 men with merchant connections and port or urban backgrounds<sup>24.</sup> and some interested parties such as the Evelyns whose family had held the gunpowder monopoly for generations but who were themselves strongly identified with the opposition leaders. In addition, the London burgesses and later all merchants of the House were generically added to the committee. The purpose was obvious. These men were not only the experts in the technicalities of monopoly and restrictive trade but also the most aggrieved parties - the men excluded by the system of royal largesse, who resented their handicap in the trading and manufacturing

world. At the same time they were also sure enemies of the absolute government, resolutely committed to its destruction, and therefore most efficient in dealing with this aspect of the parliamentary leaders' first political aims.

A last example of the decay of the institution of the Committee of the Whole House which illustrates its supersession by the more politically manoeuvrable select committees was the all-embracing Committee of the Whole for Grievances, which by its name, might have swallowed up the entire activities of the Commons in the first months. Its predecessor in the Short Parliament had been set up specifically to deal with petitions flooding into the House relating to Ship Money. For while a select committee had been set up to deal with the vital sorting out of different politically significant grievances,<sup>25</sup> those concerning Ship Money were immediately referred to the large committee for immediate attention, leaving other batches concerned with such things as complaints against Convocation and monopolies to other select committees set up specifically for the purpose. A very similar method was used in the Long Parliament. While the Committee of the Whole was set up at once, it was followed by the politically vital Committee of 24 or committee "to draw from all that is presented to the House all that indicates the Estate of the Kingdom", which soon became to be called the committee for the Remonstrance.<sup>26</sup> This sorted and classified the grievances and collected them again for general political use and incorporation in the monster petition which was to itemize all the well-documented grievances of the nation. So the Committee of the Whole, despite its grand name, was left with

much more specific functions than might at first appear. In fact it concerned itself with matters which should have been left to the Committee of the Whole for Trade, such as petitions about the tobacco patent, monopoly trading with Guinea, salt, pin, wine, and soap monopolies. While its predecessor had been concerned solely with grievances relating to Ship Money, leaving other matters to select committees, this grand committee had only one political purpose, to consolidate the case against monopolists and to condemn the government trade policy, in which it overlapped with the Committee of the Whole for Trade.

The floods of grievances and petitions which poured into Parliament as soon as it met could be dealt with in four distinct ways. There were the Grand Committees, which quickly shed their general functions and tended to specialize briefly in one aspect of public disquiet. There were select committees set up to deal with innumerable private matters complained of by particular persons, which tried to cover, before the parliamentarians became blase and overworked, vast and often trivial complaints from the nation. There were other committees set up to deal with matters of greater national importance about which a bill needed to be framed or a general policy put forward. And finally, there was the Committee of 24 for grievances which comprised the essence of the case against arbitrary government.

At the beginning of the Long Parliament the Committees of the Whole still had a part to play in the opposition's tactics for attacking the absolute government. As we shall see, Pym and his group were adept at trying out different policies and

methods simultaneously, persevering only with the most successful ones. Select committees, with their carefully chosen membership, their adaptable size and their manageable business came quickly to replace the cumbersome Grand Committees which took up so much time and allowed for comparatively little control or co-ordination.

### Select Committees - Method of Study

The body of this work deals with the select committees set up in the Commons from 1640 to 1644. The committee system developed during this period will be looked at from two different angles; constitutionally or administratively it yielded a method of increasingly efficient executive government which was centralized and yet extended authoritative tentacles into the counties, while at the same time being for the most part responsible to the two Houses; and politically it served as an effective medium for control by the strong leadership which could never be certain of its following on the floor of the House. Consequently the men who sat on committees could be seen both as administrators whose job it was to bring expert knowledge to bear on the subjects committed to their care, and as politicians who carefully guided the deliberations of the committees to suit the current political needs of the ascendant "party" in the Commons.

In order to study the committee system three distinct periods have been selected. The pre-war months show the system in its experimental stage, attempting to set up a kind of "shadow-executive" during periods of political crisis, in this way learning tentatively the first steps in executive government. But



more obviously at this time the committees reflect the political aims and methods of the parliamentary leaders in establishing their hold over the majority in the House and especially in making use of the widest possible support for their policies in order to heighten the strength of their position as against the supporters of the king. The first eighteen months of the war show the system working in its most profuse and chaotic way, beginning with a single strong executive committee supplemented by hosts of overlapping select committees, and gradually pointing the way to the need for an even stronger and more unique central organizing group unhampered by rival committees and more closely aligned with the policies of the leaders of the Commons. Finally, a brief look will be given to the situation after 1644 when a stable executive committee had been set up, the select committees had become negligible in number and influence and a major political upheaval had taken place.

Apart from the temporal divisions, the committees have also been divided into groups of differing subjects in order to see how the various administrative and political problems were dealt with and also to look at the people who tended to specialize in different ways. To give continuity to the treatment of committees in different categories answers were attempted to the following kinds of questions:

1. Who sat on each of the committees, and who attended most in any given subject group?
2. What was the administrative experience, training, religious activity, and political orientation of the members of the more important committees in any subject group?

3. From the members and their background what conclusions could be drawn about the committee's political, religious or administrative policy?
4. What can we learn about the relative importance of the whole group of committees from their most active members?
5. If there were any conflicts in political or religious views among the members of any important committees how were these resolved, what interests prevailed, and how could the committees be used in order to get favourable policies suggested to the Commons?
6. What kinds of subjects were referred to committees and what was left for discussion by the House?
7. Did the committees overreach their instructions or try to encroach on the authority of the House?
8. Was there any direct or indirect manipulation of the membership of a committee by the leaders of the House?

The main hypothesis which underlies these questions is that membership and business of the committees was determined by the men with most political influence in the House, and that the background, training and political opinions of the committeemen were relevant to their appointment. As we have no direct evidence of how members were appointed, or, for the most part, what transpired at the meetings of the committees, we can only test the hypothesis indirectly. By looking at a large number of committee nominations and the reports which sometimes reached the House and were reported in the Journals we learn a great deal about how the committees were used as a political and administrative tool in the hands of the political leaders in the House.

Before turning to the detailed examination of the work and membership of the committees several procedural points have to be established about how committee nominations were made, how conscious contemporaries were of being manipulated by the leaders both in and out of the committees, what criteria may be used for making political labels for M.P.'s, and how the work submitted to committees can best be classified.

How were members Nominated to Committees?

The "committee consciousness" of the Commons becomes obvious very soon after the opening of the Long Parliament, when a series of orders regulating committee procedure were made.<sup>27.</sup> Four days after the first meeting it was ordered that "everyone who names one for a committee to stand up and name the party",<sup>28.</sup> and on the next day the clerk was ordered to cease recording names for a committee while anyone had risen to speak.<sup>29.</sup> When a committee for a given subject was suggested, the clerk busily scribbled down the names called out by members who were to identify themselves by rising rather than by anonymous shouting from the benches. At the same time a kind of guillotine was introduced by cutting short the list of nominees as soon as anyone rose to speak. If a member was really popular and his supporters wanted to be sure of his nomination, several people would get up to call his name,<sup>30.</sup> but if the clerk failed to record it, his name would be left off the final list as his written record was the final determinant of a committee's membership.

Did the parliamentary leaders procure compliant committees by assiduous shouting of dependable names? The arrange-

ment of the seating in the early Long Parliament gives us some idea of their methods.<sup>31.</sup> The Privy Councillors sat together in the front, and the other parliamentary leaders clustered close within the range of the Speaker's eye and the clerk's ear.

Nicholas, himself one of the supporters of the government on the front benches commented sourly: "the Speaker diligently watches the Eye of Pym".<sup>32.</sup> The decline of the importance of Privy Councillors in the House earlier in the century meant that it was hardly surprising after 1629 to find the Speaker watching the unofficial but acknowledged leader of the House, rather than men like Sir Edward Herbert, the Solicitor General, or Sir Thomas Jermyyn, who were men of ephemeral importance. Not only did the role of the king's party in the House decline, but its organization was negligible. After initial failure they hardly tried to initiate legislation. Their support in the Commons was very weak in the early part of 1641, nor were there any signs of a real attempt to organize a royalist party. The actual membership of committees on the other hand, indicate a very close surveillance from the leaders of the opposition. It will later be shown that the royalists stopped attending at committees quite early in 1642 and that there were few members of the king's party who attended at any time. This may have been partly due to lack of organization, but it was also due to the custom of not appointing anyone to a committee if he was wholly opposed to the matter committed. The case for this has been argued elsewhere.<sup>33.</sup> Elsynge, writing about the House of Lords, said that no one who spoke against the body of a bill

could be named to a committee. But as many committees dealt with far more general things than the mere framing of a bill this rubric could only mean in a less dogmatic fashion that people antagonistic to a specific policy would not be named to a committee set up to formulate it. For example, a man was "excepted against to bee of the committee [to charge Strafford] and by president [precedent]"<sup>34.</sup> because he was a friend of Strafford's and had worked under him. Presumably he was nevertheless included because he subsequently declared that "hee loved noe man soe well butt hee loved truthe better"<sup>35.</sup> Similarly, Holles who had been named as a member of the close committee to prepare the charges against Strafford, was replaced by Erie and Hampden because of his own friendship with the earl. Finally, Whitelock asked to be excused from the committee indicating bishops because of the debt he felt he owed to Laud, under whose guidance he had first risen in his profession. Clarendon's slightly different experience also highlights this custom. He suggests that he was appointed to chair a committee by his enemies so as to stop him from speaking against the committed subject—the abolition of episcopacy.<sup>37.</sup> But he was referring to a committee of the Whole House, for the Commons did not trust this ticklish subject to a select committee. In a Grand Committee the operative factors would be quite different, for everyone could speak as often as he wished and no-one could be excluded from attending and saying his piece. Voting him into the chair was therefore quite an effective way of muzzling a prominent member of the other side. But in a select committee

antagonists were excluded far more simply by not being allowed to speak or vote, (although they could usually attend, except at close committees).

Were the Committees "Packed"?

We have already seen that technically it was difficult and unpleasant for anyone to become a member of a committee if he disapproved of its business. This excluded therefore the men who stood in opposition to the leaders of reform. But is there any evidence of more obvious manipulation of the membership of committees, and in particular were contemporaries aware of the process by which committees were elected?

The kind of committees which came in for most direct antagonistic comment were the "close committees", for the self-evident reason that they excluded all but the nominated members and worked in an atmosphere of secrecy and detachment from the Houses. In this way they were eyed with suspicion not only by the royalists who were excluded in any case, but also by many supporters of Pym and his group who felt that this was not the way to secure responsible government.

Nowadays it would seem to us a perfectly reasonable phenomenon of democratic government that a high-level executive should work with speed, efficiency and secrecy in order to formulate policy, especially at a time when so many new executive measures came all at once to be taken by Parliament, but at the time there were many who objected, both inside and outside Parliament. For example, during the parliamentary recess while the King went on his ill-fated visit to Scotland in October 1641

a "close committee of seven" was set up in order to correlate parliamentary policy and to keep informed of political developments. But "divers spoke very vehemently against having any more of the close Committees saying that it was the ancient privilege of the house for every member of the house that would be present at the committee"<sup>38</sup>. Despite this, the antiquarian Sir Symonds D'Ewes who loved precedent, spoke in favour of close committees on the grounds of efficiency, not condoning them because they were a means of consolidating the policy of the leaders. A cynical view of these closed meetings came from Sir Roger Twysden, later a peripheral supporter of Parliament. He was commenting upon the method of indictment of the Earl of Strafford by close committee. "I saw the unusual proceedings against the Earl of Strafford by a close committee first . . . What was it to me . . . whether the Earl of Strafford or Mr. Pym sat at the helme of government; if their commands carried equal pressure?"<sup>39</sup>. Clearly, the method of proceeding by secret committee meetings was identified with Pym's leadership and showed awareness of his manipulation of the business and membership of the committees. This is supported from a clearly hostile source, the royalist Sir Philip Warwick. On the procedure of committees he commented: ". . . They first vote a close committee, which was opposed by divers and much stomach-ached at by an old factioner who was then my neighbour in Westminster, Sir Peter Heman of Kent; alledging that it was to make the rest of the members see by other men's eyes"<sup>40</sup>. On the other

hand, Warwick wanted to have it both ways, as later he objected to everyone having access to open committees where "all that come to have voices"<sup>41.</sup> because in this way interested parties might vote at committees out of all proportion to their attendances.

This brings us to the next point, namely, the attitude of members towards open committees and the possibility of influencing their business and membership. Holles, in 1641 still a virulent member of the reform group, complained that such crowds were attending committees, "so committee members had noe room"<sup>42.</sup> As a result door keepers were appointed and an order was made to keep non-members out. This perhaps indicates some fear on the part of the organizers of the new machine of opposition that their own men would be swamped by the non-members attending the committees, in this way frustrating the plans to rush through a co-ordinated policy against the unorganized opposition. On the other hand, there seems little reason to suspect that this really happened, or that Warwick's fear of open meetings was justified. When we look at the membership of individual committees on various topics we can conclude that anyone who was interested in any particular matter and whose presence it was felt could be of use, could be named if he so desired. Such "designs" as Warwick talked about could be carried out far more successfully by the elected members than by any unofficial attenders. In any case it was only at a small percentage of committees where everyone who came in could vote,



and in every case this was specified by an order of the House. Far oftener the procedure resembled that which Warwick claimed had existed in the past, and it was this system which enabled Pym to dominate policy to such a great extent. For example, D'Ewes tells us that at open committees non-members were often asked to leave before the voting took place,<sup>43.</sup> in this way enabling useful extra information to be given by those who were not members but who were interested enough to attend, while at the same time excluding them from a vote on the committee's proceedings.<sup>44.</sup>

#### How did the Political Leaders Influence the Business and Membership of Committees?

We have seen that there was no real feeling among the members of the Commons in general that the membership of committees was being handled in a suspiciously factious way by the leaders or by anyone else. Although the development of the committee system into an integral part of government by Parliament roused some feelings of exclusion and departure from precedent, it seems plain that on the whole the innovation was accepted as inevitable and did not arouse strong opposition.

One of the most important of the committees which helped to formulate policy against the royal government in the early months of the Long Parliament was the committee to draw together all the grievances of the nation into a remonstrance to be presented to the king. This gave the opposition leaders a focal point around which to organize all their work of destruction

as the grievances were clearly directed against the organs of arbitrary rule which Parliament most wanted to destroy. In correlating the nation's grievances this "Committee of 24" as it came to be called, actually set out the main political platform on which the parliamentary leaders based their work. Its work will be studied in detail later; here it is only necessary to look briefly into its composition to see whether this vehicle for reform was composed of a tightly knit group of reform leaders. Among the 24 there was Pym and at least eight of his close associates.<sup>45.</sup> On the other hand there were also eight men who later became ardent supporters of the king,<sup>46.</sup> although certainly in the early months of the Long Parliament they were just as keen to dismantle the machine of non-parliamentary rule as were the later Puritans.<sup>47.</sup> The total membership was certainly likely to follow Pym in his work of attacking the king's methods of government,<sup>48.</sup> but quite a number of them withdrew their consent from the Remonstrance as it finally emerged a year later. For example, Culpepper and Falkland supported Hyde's attack on the very Remonstrance they had earlier helped to frame, while Digby, through whom the original suggestion of collecting grievances in this form came,<sup>50.</sup> and who headed the list of committee members, had long withdrawn his support for the reform party since his elevation into the House of Lords.<sup>51.</sup> Dering, although he later sided with the king, supported the eventual Remonstrance because of his interest in dismantling the ecclesiastical hierarchy, while Sir William Widdrington probably owed his position on the

Committee to his presentation of the grievances of the northern counties which he represented. He had spoken of the local grievances condemning the policy which had resulted in the Scottish incursion over the border, and at the same time indicted Strafford's policy in the north.<sup>52.</sup> As these complaints were naturally referred to the Committee of 24 Widdrington was included as their proponent.

This all-important committee then, was hardly packed with leaders or advocates of drastic reform. On the other hand, there was advantage in having others present who could be most useful in putting grievances, at the same time giving a universal character to the committee purporting to speak for the whole nation in its dissatisfaction with the status quo. The committee, with its mixed composition was prepared to make small concessions without jettisoning any of the main issues of reform. There was clearly a rift among the disparate membership on the issue of whether the queen should be allowed to have Sir John Winter as her secretary when both Houses had asked for his sequestration. This was not a matter about which anyone would have had any passionate feelings. No one was in favour of a rabidly Catholic court, but those who had connections with the court could well have held out for an exception being made in the case of the queen, enabling her to choose her own servants.<sup>53.</sup>

It would appear then, that Pym and his allies had no need to be certain of the support of every member of even an important committee in order to use it for their own purposes

and policies. What methods did they use to swing committees and their reports into line? One example is the management of the Remonstrance committee and its extension to cover the Ministers' Remonstrance. This latest move from the radical Presbyterian element in London seemed to have caught the leaders by surprise and no moves were prepared to have a separate committee named to deal with it. All through the early period of the Long Parliament matters relating to the government of the church seem to have been handled in a clumsy ad hoc manner, partly because of the desire of Pym and some of his supporters to shelve the issue until the political reform had been made, and partly no doubt because on this vital subject there was clearly going to be a split among the leaders of the opposition themselves. From the beginning issues of religious settlement were discussed always by the House as a whole and never committed. There was much discussion about whether to refer the Ministers' Remonstrance to a committee at all, and if so, where.<sup>54.</sup> Finally, the House reaffirmed the principle of keeping the central point of discussion, Episcopacy, to itself, and referred the rest of the petition to the committee of 24.<sup>55.</sup> This probably shows that the leaders had united sufficiently to ensure its commitment here rather than to an untried body. It is evident from Robert Baillie that the budding "Root and Branch" faction of the Leadership were behind the vote to add six more members to the committee especially for this matter.<sup>56.</sup><sup>57.</sup>

The House was split on whether these additions should be made, and the names of the tellers show us the main alignments. Dering and Clotworthy, both strong enemies of the bishops<sup>58.</sup> were in favour of the additions, while the royalist Carnaby and the violent radical Henry Marten were against them. This odd partnership shows the split on the religious issue among the reform party.<sup>59.</sup> Baillie underlines the issue and the methods employed: ". . . by 36 to 37 voices our party carried it, that it [the Ministers' Remonstrance and the London Petition] should be referred to the committee of religion, to which were some 4 or 6 added young Sir Harry Vane, Mr. Pynes, and some more of our firm friends"<sup>60.</sup> This shows clearly that it was the Presbyterian rather than the moderate wing of the reform group which had won. Baillie goes on worrying that Dr. Burgess, who spoke for all the ministers who appeared before the committee was "too much Episcopal", despite the fact that "the passages of the Remonstrance that yet has been called for he has cleared to the full contentment of all the committee, except Mr. Selden, the avowed proctor of the bishops".

This affords us a complicated example of the victory of one faction of leaders against the opposition of the Anglicans, aided untypically, by others of their own side. Probably Pym's usual supporters in this instance wrested control from his hands using his very methods. The Root and Branch group with the Scots behind them, wanted to see the Ministers' Remonstrance safely committed instead of being left open to

general discussion in the House. They also wanted to assure themselves of a strong hand by putting their ablest men into the committee to see that their point of view triumphed, for it was more likely that a small group of determined and able extremists could put their enthusiasm over a small and undecided gathering, rather than over the House as a whole. The additional six members over whom a division occurred were Roe, Palmer and Holborn, three unexceptional Anglicans, and Holles, Fiennes, and the younger Vane representing the extreme anti-episcopal branch of the reform party. Historians agree that it was the disparity of talents which made the majority suspicious and which forced a division,<sup>51.</sup> for the Anglicans could not have relished such mediocre representation against the most illustrious names of the extreme faction. But considering that the royal supporters were at this time few in numbers and unpopular with the majority, it seems unlikely that this could have been the only reason for a division, especially in view of Marten's position as teller on their side. It seems more likely that the Episcopalians did not want the matter referred to the Committee of 24 with or without additions in the first place, because of its composition and business which would inextricably reflect on its decisions in religious matters side by side with the other grievances against Charles' regime. This makes it easier to account for Marten's co-operation with them, as he may well have shared their view that the Committee of 24 should not become involved in religious matters which might have swamped their political deliberations

in which this early Republican was more concerned.<sup>62.</sup>

D'Ewes itemized some of the people on either side of this split.<sup>63.</sup> Those who were in favour of committing the Ministers' Remonstrance, were, apart from Dering, all Pym's political allies or else well-known Puritans.<sup>64.</sup> The opposition had a far less organized look, and apart from Selden, "the protector of the bishops," they were all eventual royalists. On both sides there were some members of the Committee of 24; Pym, Bagshaw, Harrington, Hampden, Clotworthy, St. John, Erle and Ferd stood out against their fellow-committee men Digby, Culpepper, Seldon, Roe and Palmer. Which of Pym's supporters also backed him in his middle-of-the-road religious policy we do not know, except that D'Ewes mentions Crew as a supporter of reformation rather than abolition, showing that Pym was not alone in his stand. Bagshaw confirms that Pym was in favour

of a mild form of Episcopacy<sup>65.</sup> despite his stand with his colleagues here.<sup>66.</sup> He even rescued Cromwell, clearly a Root and Brancher, despite their fundamental disagreement on religious settlement, when the latter, who had far less experience, blundered too far too early on the subject of abolition of Episcopacy.<sup>67.</sup>

Holles and D'Ewes, who were both more radically disposed than Pym on this issue, also defended Cromwell, who probably wanted quick and drastic action by the House, rather like Marten. In any case Pym wanted to shelve any real discussion of the point and moved for the adjournment of the debate. Despite this, the next day the radicals wanted to bring the subject up again;<sup>68.</sup> and a clash between them and Pym might

have broken out had the whole issue not been shelved temporarily by referring it to the committee. For committee tactics, although they lent themselves well to pressure from an active and extreme group, were also to Pym a weapon of control used to time the proceedings and give him a chance to come to terms with his own supporters. In any case, the main point of Episcopacy was of course not committed at all, so that Pym had no real fear of the religious controversy being settled too precipitately. At the same time, this proviso saved the House from feeling over-organized and probably helped the leaders in managing more easily settled matters through the medium of the committees.

On another critical occasion we have some evidence of direct interference with the business and membership of committees. This was concerned with the politically dangerous situation which arose out of Pym's desire to launch the attack on the king's councillors in November 1641. The political manoeuvres which preceded this crisis are discussed within; here we are only concerned with the immediate methods employed in order to force the House of Lords to co-operate with the radical attack of the Commons. Pym put forward a motion to let the Lords know that if they did not pass the bills sent up to them by the Commons, the latter would act only with those of the Lords who agreed with them.<sup>69.</sup> Pym's motion therefore suggested for the first time quite expressly that the Lords were inessential to the process of legislation.<sup>70.</sup> This drastic motion was committed to a group composed, with the exception



of the Privy Councillor Culpepper, of Pym's closest associates. There can be no doubt that commitment here meant that the motion should be dressed, discussed and made as attractive as possible before putting it to the House for a vote. Pym's introduction of this issue out of the blue, the tightness and compactness of the committee to deal with it, and the general unpopularity of such drastic action all indicate that he intended to use the committee to steer an outrageous proposition through the Commons by his favourite method of controlling the House. In no other case was the membership of a committee at this time so carefully arranged. But we also have some direct evidence about the planning of Pym's strategy. Weckherlin, one of the trusted clerks of the House, later to become clerk of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, wrote to his daughter on the 18th October: <sup>71.</sup> "Many beleve the house of Comons will at last protest, and desire such of the Upper house as stand with them to declare and with them to protest against those that hinder their Endeavours". This was rumoured a propos the Lords not dispatching the bill to send 10,000 Scots to Ireland. Pym's actual move to this effect in the House did not occur until December 3rd, and in relation to quite another matter.

In the absence of any direct evidence of how the committees were used by the reform leaders to influence the policy and decisions of the Commons we need to look further for illustrations of how the system was applied in politically critical situations to gain victories for the opposition. One further such example arose early in 1641 as a result of Hyde's

well-meaning proposal to raise money in the City in order to disband the king's army in the north and get rid of the Scots. The situation in the north was quite useful to Parliament in that it guaranteed, while the armies remained unemployed and unpopular, that Parliament would continue to sit. On the other hand, lip-service was paid in the Commons to raising the necessary revenue, and Clarendon was right to point out the need to settle the matter. As a result of his suggestion, a curious committee was despatched to the City to ask for money: <sup>72.</sup> the Treasurer, (Lyttelton), Digby, Capell, Ingram, Hyde, Culpepper, Strangways, Hopton, Herbert, Pye, Hales and Hungerford. <sup>73.</sup> This group was more heavily packed with prospective royalists, men with court connections, <sup>74.</sup> and, even more strangely, men who had little or no ties with the London merchants. <sup>75.</sup> However, they returned with promises of £50,000 made by particular merchants of the City in one pocket, and a remonstrance against the Scottish Presbyterian system in the other. This makes it clear that there was a strong anti-Presbyterian faction in the City who were prepared to finance the expediting of the Scots and the removal of a threat of Presbyterianism creeping into the English church system. The committee's report, Clarendon says, was greeted with applause from the House, but with stunned silence from the leaders who were embarrassed by their success. The radical Alderman Pennington, who later became Lord Mayor, then belittled the report and promised aid of £100,000 from the City, if only "such members of this House, might be sent as the cittle had a good opinion of: which he would name. . ."

He did so, and a much more typical committee consisting of Erle, Pym, Hampden, Holles, Piennes, Vane Jr. and the four London burgesses emerged. <sup>76.</sup> This recommendation was confirmed by the House. But Pennington in his zeal to cancel out the political advantage of the royalists evidently overplayed his role, for on the next day he reported from the committee's mission that he and some five or six of his friends had under-  
<sup>77.</sup> written the loan. A near-riot followed; those who had been outraged on the day before at the impertinence of an outside interest daring to name a committee of the Commons now had even more cause for grievance, when this high-handed gesture failed and incurred ridicule on the Commons. It looks as though Pym and his friends had planned on the discomfiture of the Hyde group, never expecting that the anti-Scottish sentiment in the City would bring their mission success. However, as the first suggestion came from Hyde, it could hardly be squashed, or a committee appointed which excluded the latter's friends. The fact that they did all get elected to the committee was probably due to the habit of members to vote to a committee man who assumed to feel in accordance with the mover. It was obviously sensible to accept as the committee, men who would be led by its chief promoter, Hyde. There was quite open collusion between Pennington, his City friends and Pym's group which led to the appointment of the other committee consisting entirely of the reform leaders. They did not between them consider sufficiently the strength of the anti-Puritan faction

in the City which backed Hyde's proposals, while Pennington was left with only his own personal lobby to save himself from coming back quite empty-handed. For Hyde was of course right in speaking for a section of the City which found it "an universal discomfort and discouragement to all men of estates and discretion to see two armies still kept on foot in the kingdom at so vast a charge, when there remained no fear of a war".<sup>78.</sup> His unexpected success in raising the money for this purpose was due to a split within the governmental circles of the City itself; at this time at least the Common Council and those about the Lord Mayor were unrelenting royalists. Pennington's connections on the other hand were also at the head of part of the civic authorities, but were centred about the Court of Aldermen, and formed a group whose policies and interests were closely co-ordinated with those of Pys and his intra-parliamentary group, based on the useful liaison of the City burgesses themselves.<sup>79.</sup> Therefore, while Hyde appealed to the royalist, anti-Presbyterian faction of the City who wanted to pay their debt before it became even larger, Pennington's supporters saw the army as a buttress against the dissolution of Parliament and as a bargaining point for further concessions. Perhaps his lack of success in raising funds at this time was due to the conflict between this attitude and those who saw in the armies the admittedly far fetched fear of the king using it for purposes of his own, while at the same time suspecting that by not paying the Scots their possible support for Parliament might be alienated.

Further evidence of the partisan nature of committee management emerges in quite another quarter of parliamentary affairs. This was the role which the Scots should play in subduing Ireland after the outbreak of the rebellion in October. On November 2nd a committee consisting of 48 commoners and 24 Lords was set up to be a standing committee on Irish affairs.<sup>80</sup> On the following day the House recommended that the committee should order the Lord General to Ireland and ~~we~~ seek Scottish aid. But meetings over two successive days resulted in Pym's report back from the committee to the House that despite the recommendations the committee "did not assent to . . . desiring any assistance of the Scots, conceiving it might be dishonourable to our nation".<sup>81</sup> D'Ewes comments "as for our Committees bringing in opinion contrarie to the resolutions of the howse yesternight . . . I cannot blame them because they weere to offer our Votes to select Committee of the Lords who might differ . . . from us, which our Committee must relate to us". This would be all very well, but on the other hand he reported that "this resolution was taken this morning, at the committee's second meeting being verie thinne, whereas yesternight they had agreed wee should accept the offer". If that was the case, then the party lobbying against Scottish assistance must have arranged the second meeting to get its view across, and it is unlikely that this lobby came from the Lords; so D'Ewes' generous interpretation of the committee's reasons for the report is unlikely to have fitted the facts. The idea of a minority getting its way by leaving the vote until

the attendance had thinned out parallels the use of that technique in the House. Why was there this apparent disparity between Hotham putting the view that Scottish assistance in Ireland was not honourable, and Holles' earlier motion to accept the offered aid? The reason emerges later in the proceedings when the subject of payment for the Scots arose.<sup>82.</sup> In fact Pym's group was probably not split over this issue, but was merely worried about giving the Scots a free hand in Ireland. Pym himself had prepared a paper suggesting the payment of the Scots should be a guarantee against Scottish claims for recompense in Irish land; that is, the Scots were to go as employees and not as partners. It is very likely this worry which made Hotham and those who prevailed with his vote that Scottish assistance might "dishonour" England. Holles, always pro-Scottish, left this out of his original proposal, and yet he was not likely to have aligned himself with Calpepper and the others who wanted to send the Scots to Ireland without any settled pay from England. Once again then the committee had been used so as to procure the policy of the reform leaders and perhaps to weld over certain cracks among the members of their own party.

During the largely fabricated crisis of the middle months of 1641, at the time of the army plot and the rumoured invasions, and when the king was setting off to go on a possibly suspicious visit to Scotland, Pym had inaugurated a powerful "committee of 7" to cope with possible emergencies, which of course never arose.<sup>83.</sup> At the time this select band of

revolutionary leaders had virtually taken over command of military resources, albeit that their powers were purely theoretical.<sup>84.</sup> In November of that year this committee was revived in an illuminating way. By that time it had become obvious to the politically astute that control of military forces would become a far more permanent aim of the parliamentarians than the purely temporary situation associated with the king's Scottish trip had warranted. On November 27th Strobe suddenly moved a bill for putting the kingdom in a posture of defence and commanding the arms of the kingdom.<sup>85.</sup> Barrington followed this up at once by moving for a committee to consider this, and Erle indicated that a committee already existed which was capable of dealing with such a matter, namely the Committee of 7, and suggested that one more meeting could end its business. The committee was then ordered to draw up the whole proof of the first design to bring an army into England. Here we have a very well co-ordinated piece of political manoeuvring which involved committing a matter of vital propaganda value to a trusted and extremely carefully selected committee. Not only were the prominent reform leaders making sure of promoting the parliamentary plan for control of the militia, but they were doing so through the use of an important steering committee. This move in its turn was made successful by careful timing and planning which can be seen from the prompt co-operation of everyone concerned in this neat piece of strategy.

Another, possibly suspect piece of evidence about how Pym managed to get the widest possible support through the use

of committees is given by the hostile source, Lord Digby. The latter had been, as we saw, an early central member of the opposition clique, but had changed his outlook and joined the supporters of the king, even on Strafford's impeachment. Sir John Coke wrote of him that "(he) declared himself as much on the behalf of the Lieutenant (Strafford) as he had formerly against him, and gave his reasons, that he had at first accused him upon the article of reducing this kingdom by the power of the Irish army, wherein being of the committee, though he saw no other testimony discovered but that of Mr. Treasurer Vane yet he was borne in hand by Mr. Pym that Mr. Treasurer's testimony should be affirmed by other men's notes"; in fact no corroborating evidence had been produced, and Digby cast aspersions on Vane's reliability as he did not remember the episode until the third questioning. As Digby was by this time no longer a supporter of Pym his evidence concerning Pym's methods of persuasion may not be justified, but on the other hand he may have been reporting his own position quite accurately, which would indicate Pym's persuasive powers to gain support for his own plans among recalcitrant committee members. In any case, the ensuing episode, where Pym evidently tried to discredit Digby by throwing suspicion on him as a member of the Strafford committee who had removed some secret papers from his desk, might indicate only a general distrust of Digby's reliability or an outright effort to discredit his stand at the Strafford Trial. A contemporary writer suggested that Digby made his final break with the party by obliquely accusing Pym of being



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"an unworthy fellow who had his eye upon place and preferment".  
 Whatever Digby's relations with Pym were at the time the whole episode looks like a political intrigue, engineered under the cover of the close committee.

So far we have been concerned with evidence which pointed to the political use of the committees by the leaders of the opposition in the Commons. In the instances discussed there was explicit evidence of how Pym and his helpers used the system of committing vital issues to committees and then dominating the business there in order to influence most effectively the policy of the House as a whole. A final example of the way in which committees were used will indicate how closely identified in the minds of members was the use of committees with organizing the opposition. Perhaps the most revolutionary way in which a committee was used in this period was the expedient to adjourn the House to Guildhall, to sit there as a committee, after the attempted arrest of the five members.<sup>88</sup> This suggestion came, surprisingly enough, not from Pym or his cohorts, but from the body of the House itself, and this would indicate how well assimilated was the lesson on the political use of committees. Pym, who always had his ear close to the ground, had asked on December 30th 1641 that the House should approve of a motion to have the trained bands guard the House in case of a design against it "this day". The majority opposed this, and someone moved for an adjournment. But six days later the awaited attempt against the members actually occurred. An adjournment without the king's

consent was impossible, and so the expedient of meeting at the Guildhall as a committee was suggested. There was the useful precedent of previous adjournments during which committees had continued to sit, notably during the crisis of August to October of that year. The only proviso stipulated was that all members who attended could vote at the "committee's" meetings. This suggestion therefore transferred the whole of the Commons into the City and had the dual purpose of cementing the alliance with the pro-Puritan parts of London, while at the same time making all possible political capital out of the king's illegal action. The division on whether this kind of adjournment should take place indicates how quickly the idea was taken up by the reform leaders.<sup>89.</sup>

These examples have served to show how "government by committees" came to be used as a powerful weapon in Pym's struggle to gain the upper hand in the Commons. Numerically he probably had an over-all majority backing most of his final policies on the floor of the House. But he wanted to guide affairs in such a way as not to obtrude too obviously upon the business of the Commons, and he seems to have found that working through the committees he could establish his point of view diplomatically, without letting his hand be seen too clearly. The system of committees obviously suited his purposes very well. It was still respectable, (although later "committee-man" came to be used pejoratively), it was compact and easy to manage, and with the necessary preliminary preparation business could be transacted in the quickest, most

efficient and least confused manner. Most importantly, it was easier to keep his finger on the pulse of events by delegating so much to the committees than by leaving things to the quixotic temper of the House as a whole. Even when there was a split in his own ranks Pym was able to get his way in the end. And so much were committees considered to be an organ of opposition that they were used even by the membership as a whole in order to meet a political crisis when there was no direct guidance from the leaders to suggest this method to them. <sup>90.</sup> In the later chapters we will see how the political struggles to keep the Commons behind Pym were carried out in the committees rather than on the floor of the House.

So far in our discussion, the role of committees on the political stage in the months before the outbreak of war has been highlighted in order to establish the importance of this new institution. But the work and use of committees must be placed in its context if it is not to be distorted out of all proportion. We need now to look at two further questions which should add perspective to the political parts played by the committees; first, the technical way in which the committee system developed as distinct from the use of the House as a whole, and second, the political control of the leaders over the membership of the whole House as distinct from their manipulation of committees.

How did the Use of Committees Develop from 1640 - July 1642?

At the beginning of the Long Parliament the Commons made a practice of reserving some matters of vital importance for consideration in the House as a whole and not allowing the commitment of any aspects of it. This was especially true of matters where there was likely to be unwonted dissention and controversy, such as the issue of Episcopacy and church government. Pym and his group had the support of a substantial majority on nearly all the issues which he allowed to come up in the first months of the session, and it is significant that the religious issue alone made a special case during the early part of our period, for, as we have seen, there was incipient dissention among the leaders themselves on this subject. The treatment of the central point of Episcopacy as a matter not to be referred to committee can also be seen as an indication of suspicion on the part of members that any committee might be dominated by a clique which could sway this delicate debate too radically one way or the other. D'Ewes played an important part in the settlement of this apparently procedural, but actually political business. <sup>91.</sup> "Mr. Rowse moved that some divers be appointed to prepare to settle church doctrine and discipline. Severally moved that a committee be set up to prepare a declaration. Sir Hugh Cholmley moved we first vote it here and only leave it to a committee to put it in words". D'Ewes himself moved "that whereas I found there were two opinions in the house some desiring a committee might be named to draw a

declaration and others that wee might not entrust it to any committee but first prepare it here, I conceived that both these opinions might easily be reconciled if wee did followe our usuall course . . . that is, to vote the Heads here and then leave it to the committee to draw in what they shall at all receive from the sense of the House. We may amend it when it is brought backe to us".<sup>92.</sup> There can be no question that the violent Puritans were quite happy to proceed by committee, whilst the more conservative men who could not see beyond clipping the bishops' wings feared the radicalism of the religious enthusiasts.

Later, when far more dissention became obvious there are many examples of how the House did not trust the delegation of a matter to a committee but insisted on framing the essential aspects of policy itself. One example will suffice here. In December 1641 Pym made his revolutionary proposal that the Commons should take notice only of those members of the House of Lords who were prepared to co-operate.<sup>93.</sup> Although the proposal came from Pym and appeared to take most members by surprise, they did not react in the usual manner by referring the whole matter to a committee. Instead, the resolution was framed in the House, and referred to a committee only for formal wording. Although Pym had his victory on the floor of the House, there must have been some suspicion of a committee perhaps making the break with the upper House too irrevocable and so the whole policy was outlined first by the membership as a whole. On other occasions too, the House

debated matters at length and then referred only the drafting of bills, resolutions, petitions, and so on, to a committee, giving it specific instructions. When looked at in this way we can see that the use of committees in taking over the role of executive government developed slowly over the pre-war months, and that a certain amount of jealousy of the possible power of committees kept the House from becoming a mere rubber stamp.

In the period we are considering we can see several experiments in how to go about using the system of committees most effectively, discarding the less efficient methods and continuing with the more workable ones. We have already seen how Committees of the Whole ceased to be used when their effectiveness declined and their main political purpose became out-moded. Similarly, it was found in the early days of the Long Parliament that the proliferation of committees was such that the system might have come to a standstill, not only from the weight of business, but also by the overlapping and wasteful manner of appointing new committees for related matters instead of turning the more important ones into standing committees. Some semi-permanent "standing" committees, such as the one for grievances, had been appointed; but in addition there were over 60 odd committees set up from November until early January 1641, of which over half were concerned with petitions of private persons or groups. There was indeed an important committee appointed on December 12th 1640 for the very purpose of sorting the petitions which poured into

Parliament and recommending their reference to relevant places. This clearing-house served two vital purposes - it fed relevant material to the Remonstrance Committee and its subsidiaries dealing with the indictment of particular organs of the arbitrary system, and incidentally it helped to streamline the administration of the system by cutting out wherever possible duplication of committee work. But even then the proliferation of committees for petitions did not stop, as Sir John Danvers ruefully noted while trying to assess the subsidies in his county of Wiltshire. He wrote to Sir Edward

95.  
 Dering: "In the meane tyme the monstrous easie receipt of Petitions at the Standing Committees makes authority decaye and the threatening of lewd persons to petition the parliament seeme of too greate power and encouragement for an inendacon of beggars become for want of orderly government". This suggests not only that local authority was on the decline when every Tom, Dick and Harry could write straight to Westminster, but also that the authority of Parliament itself would decline from the chaos it had invoked by opening its gates to these petitions.

On January 12th 1641 an attempt was made to meet this situation. An order was made to lay aside all committees except those specifically named so that only matters of primary importance might be dealt with, 96. presumably in order to preserve the energies of those elected to committees for vital matters. This purge was characteristically carried out by the appointment of yet another committee which was

to investigate what were the important matters at present before the committees. <sup>97.</sup> Hotham, its chairman, reported, and on his recommendation the purge was carried out. Hotham was supported, again characteristically, by such leading reformers as Stapleton, Holles, Hampden, and Barrington, and backed by prominent lawyers, of whom Cage, Crew, Selwen, Griaston and White later sided with Parliament, while Barnham, Culpepper, Hyde, Stragways and Palmer became royalists. The system of sorting the sheep from the goats resulted in all the committees dealing with the indictment of persons who represented vast areas of royal prerogative being placed at the top of the list, for example those relating to Strafford, Laud, the new canons, Secretary Winbank and the recusants, and so on; then came a group dealing with the indictment of institutions of arbitrary rule - the Star Chamber, the Council; then followed the committee of 24 for the Grand Remonstrance, the committee for the king's army, for Ship Money, for frequent Parliaments; and finally, the five Grand Committees. This whole working programme and the method of proceeding from the particular to the general indicates a clear policy of what was to be covered in the House during the next five months. The plan is far too coherent to have arisen out of the informal discussion of this selection committee which met perhaps only twice. The policy underlying the sorting must have been well established before-hand.



The urgency of the work as well as its organized nature can be seen too, in the order on 22nd December that committees may sit during the Christmas recess, and that the charges against Laud should be sorted out by a sifting of petitions against him. At various stages during this early period a similar committee purge was mooted although never as systematically organized, partly no doubt because the committees themselves had already sorted out the business referred to them, and partly as more standing committees came into being. On March 20th an order was made for the committees and chairmen to lay aside all but matters of the most public concern. Marten moved that no new petitions be received for some time, and others proposed a purge of the minor committees, but D'Ewes suggested that experience had shown the work of the lesser committees did not hinder the others; rather, the amount of business before each committee was what made its progress slow. Nevertheless, it will later be argued that the brunt of committee work was borne by a small minority of members; long agendas before large standing committees were more manageable than attendance by the active committee-man at great numbers of committees, and at the same time made the guiding of affairs easier. Despite D'Ewes, a similar order was made on May 18th and another list drawn up on January 1st 1642, again by Hotham and the same committee of a year earlier, with some additions. Even after the inauguration of the large executive committees similar orders occurred.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

This technical

concern for the system of committee government shows how carefully the leaders planned to use them in order to get through their business in the quickest and most efficient way and also attempts to conserve the energies of the most prolific attenders at these meetings which must have taken up every waking moment of some of the most enthusiastic supporters.

We now need to turn our attention from the political manoeuvring on the committees to the wider arena of the Commons itself. For comparative purposes it is useful to watch Fyn at work controlling the broad policies which emerged from the House as a whole, as well as manipulating individuals, snapping at their heels if they showed sign of straying or showing his fangs in earnest if they indicated a desire to leave the fold altogether.

#### How did Parliamentary Leaders Establish Control in the Commons as a Whole?

"The Greivances of the Kingdome haveing been fully enumerated and declared, some of the members of both houses had private meetings and consultations how to direct their parliamentary resolutions in order to a present redresse and future security, and it was conceived by them to be the most certaine way, and most consistent with the duty and allegiance of the Subjects to fix their complaints and accusations upon evill Councillors, as the imediate actors in the tragicall miseries of the Kingdome rather then upon the personall faileings and male-administrations on the King. Therefore it should . . . draw up such a remonstrance as might be a faithfull and lively representation to his Majestie of the deplorable Estate of his Kingdome, and might point out unto him those that were most obnoxious and lyable to censure, owneing still such a due regard to his Royall Authority as not to mention his name, but with honour, and in the deepest sense of their former greivances to render thanks for the calling of this parliament, as the happy omen to their present hopes of future redresse and establishment." 104.

From this extract from Manchester's memoirs we get a sharp insight into the methods employed by the parliamentary leaders to introduce vital political matters into the Commons. Not only does it show how the Grand Remonstrance was planned and organized right at the beginning of the Long Parliament, but it gives a clear indication how well established the leadership of both Houses was before the session even began - that in fact, it did not need to develop spontaneously during the early months. Of necessity the leaders were self-appointed, but their later success shows clearly how they came to be accepted by the rank and file. Manchester's statement is one of the very few instances we have which records the behind-the-scenes organization of business for the House. But even without it, the existence of such organization could not be doubted. The whole system of government by committee depended upon the co-ordination of the leaders; they proposed not only the committees by moving the commitment of important matters, but also the membership, as we shall see. It is therefore useful to look carefully into the methods employed by Pym and his friends to control the House in order to assess the importance of the committee system to his methods of government, and also in order to learn something of the way in which political decisions could be implemented at a time when there was not real party system in existence.

One of the most interesting implications of Manchester's comment is the explicit statement of how the leaders were going to go about attacking the prerogative by sidestepping the

"personal" aspect of the Personal Government of Charles and concentrating instead upon his theoretical "evil counsellors". This device had several important consequences. First, it gave a rationale for the attack upon Laud and Strafford by establishing in everyone's mind that the evils of prerogative rule stemmed from them rather than from their master, who was, it would appear, blindly led along the path to absolutism; second, the fiction could be extended indefinitely even after the removal of the two main authors of Charles' unpopularity, if care was taken not to specify who it was that was being attacked; third, it gave Pym the ever-ready excuse to bring up the danger of catholic subversion, as he could accuse the "evil counsellors" in their anonymity, of responsibility for all the real and imagined catholic plots; finally, it provided the spring-board for the most revolutionary demand made in the years before the outbreak of war on the part of Parliament, the demand to control the king's council and make it responsible to Parliament.

The rank and file members must have realized that the attack which was being made upon the Council was in a sense artificial, that the king's ministers were in fact bearing the brunt of an attack which ought to have been made on Charles himself. But they were perfectly happy to play along with Pym's deft fiction in order to avoid the unconstitutional and unpleasant business of attacking the king personally, especially as no-one could be sure whether a charge of mismanagement levelled at the king might not result in an accusation of treason. In deed, when Henry Marten made his famous

"republican" speech in the House after the outbreak of war, Pym had him packed off to the Tower. His attitude at that time was not shared by many, and so the myth of fighting for "King and Parliament" continued throughout the early part of the war.

In the meantime the fate of Laud and Strafford would intimidate the rest of the council and show the royal administration that Parliament was in earnest. Charles indeed was clever enough to try to explode the myth of "evil Counsellors" which could be used indefinitely to attack himself, by continually asking the parliamentary leaders to make their attack specific and to charge particular persons on the Council - a move no-one was prepared to undertake after the escape of Windbank and the other Catholic members of the Council.

The ultimate purpose of the ruse to attack the king through his council was the crux of the whole opposition policy before taking up swords, namely, to get control of the executive and to make the council responsible to Parliament. This aspect of Pym's policy was carefully kept out of sight in the early months of unity and co-operation among most of the members of the Commons, because he knew that here a split would develop between those who would not allow the king's inalienable right of choosing his own advisers to be violated, and those who felt that Parliament could not rest assured of its constitutional victories until the Council was effectively fettered. He allowed it a first public airing in May 1641, when quite unobtrusively he said: "Being the king hath a tender

conscience, 'tis fit he should have good counsellours about  
 106.  
 him". This kind of prologue to the battles ahead was repeated throughout Strafford's trial in different forms. In October, with Strafford and Laud well out of harm's way, a friend and political associate of Pym's, Robert Goodwyn suddenly moved, with no relevance to preceeding events, that "if we did not take care to remove the evil counsellors who remained and prevent others coming after, all we did in parliament will come to nothing and we shall never be free from danger." 107.

Strode seconded him "with great violence", insisting that Parliament should have a veto over the appointment of councillors. D'Ewes commented that "I think most hee saied was premeditated", despite the apparently off-the-cuff manner in which the speech was made and the random choice of opportunity on which he raised the matter. Strode provoked Hyde into confuting the position by declaring that the crown had always had the right of choosing its councillors, and D'Ewes agreed with this view. 108.  
 Nicholas recorded that Falkland, Strangways, Waller, Hyde and Holborn defended the king's prerogative, a solid phalanx of later royalists. The opposition of D'Ewes indicates that the sticklers for precedent who otherwise cautiously backed the reformers' moves may have been antagonized by this blatant disregard for past practice. We can see from his comment that by this time even the uninitiated members suspected prior planning to parliamentary manoeuvres, although it is significant that D'Ewes never commented on the existence of a "party" of any kind, and still spoke of Pym with reverence. In fact, 109.

Notestein points out that Moore in his manuscript made the first mention of parties - "Lord Digby and his side stode for one subsidie" - on 18th March 1641,<sup>110.</sup> but there is nothing about this in D'Ewes.<sup>111.</sup>

When Pym at last explicitly stated on November 5th 1641 that "hee feared that as long as [the king] gave eare to those evill Counsellors about him, all that wee did would prove in vaine and therefore hee desired that wee might add some declaration . . . that . . . unless the king would remove his evill counsellors and take such counsellors as might be approved by Parliament, wee should account ourselves absolved from this ingagement [to end the war in Ireland]<sup>112.</sup>", his motion was only passed by a change in the wording - "that if his Majestie would not be graciouslie pleased to grant it though wee would continue in that obedience and loialtie to him which was due by the lawes of God and this kingdome, yet wee should take such course for the securing of Ireland as might likewise secure ourselves"<sup>113.</sup> The change was due more to trying to pacify those who did not want to blackmail the king by making support in Ireland a condition of getting their way, and showed at the same time that the idea of a parliamentary voice in the appointment of councillors was already an acceptable one to the majority. This makes it perfectly plain that in the months following Strafford's death the issue had progressed from an attack on particular councillors as a way of indirectly attacking the king, to the far more revolutionary demand for a negative

voice in the appointment of a council which would become in part responsible to Parliament.

This radical transition happened partly by way of the failure of a plan to create a positive voice in the appointment of the Council. The Earl of Bedford's plan had been to impose a nucleus of respectable reform leaders upon the Council, in this way inverting the political maxim by asking the enemy to join you. Unlikely as this idea sounds, there was a distinct chance that it might have succeeded, with imponderable consequences. <sup>114.</sup> Clarendon in expounding the Bedford plan naturally suggested that the prize positions in the Council were in fact the sole aims of Pym and his confederates, who were on this view moved by desire for personal aggrandizement. <sup>115.</sup> In fact, the plan would perhaps have solved many of the difficulties that arose on both sides, and its implementation might even have averted war. However untrustworthy Charles was, and not even Pym knew at that time how untrustworthy he could be, control of the executive would have given an effective check to any designs the king envisaged. After Bedford's inconvenient death in May and the subsequent failure of the plan, <sup>116.</sup> Pym proceeded to act on the assumption that the king could not be trusted, and used the scare of invasion and the Irish rebellion as weapons to set up safeguards against the King's possible treachery on his trip to Scotland. <sup>117.</sup>

Clarendon saw the threat to "free counsel" in constitutional terms - the effective removal of the executive and its replacement by direct leadership of the two Houses. <sup>118.</sup>



He named the leaders of each as being the new definers of policy; Essex, Bedford, Warwick, Say, Kimbolton, attended by Brooke, Wharton and Paget in the Lords, and Pym, Hampden, St. John, Holles and Fiennes, supported by Strode, Hotham, Erle, and the younger Vane in the Commons. But, "truly, I am persuaded whatever design either of alteration or reformation was yet formed, I mean in the beginning of the Parliament, was only communicated between the earl of Bedford, the lords Say and Kimbolton [Manchester], Mr. Pym, Mr. Hampden, Mr. Fynes, and Mr. St. John . . ." Here then, are the very people who probably attended the meetings to which Manchester referred, and the suggestion that they drew up the policy for the later months. However, it is unlikely that Clarendon was aware of this co-ordinating group at the time. Much of his comment throughout the History is through hind-sight. It would not have been difficult to compile his list of the inner and outer circles of leaders once the events had passed and the patterns declared themselves.

Here then, was one attempt to control the executive which failed. It was carried out behind the scenes while much more generally popular reforms were being implemented within Parliament. When it came to be voiced officially, this issue more than any other caused the split which left some members on the side of the king's prerogative, while others were prepared to accept the unconstitutional position which Parliament took, either because they did not trust the king or because they had other motives. D'Ewes, a good barometer on constitutional issues, spoke against the illegality of Parliament

claiming the right of naming councillors in November 1641, but despite his legal training and conservative make-up remained an adherent of Parliament in August of the following year. He may have been persuaded by his interest in a reformed church; or else like many others lukewarm in their support for so strong a measure, he may have been swayed by the king's counter to it - the attempted arrest of the five members.

We have been looking at the execution of the master plan to organize the whole range of parliamentary business drafted by Pym and his closest associates. This plan was only put into action after the failure of its predecessor - the Bedford plan. For further insight into the leaders' method of control it is necessary to examine more closely the day-to-day management of the affairs of the Commons. At the same time it will be useful to try to assess the extent of the leaders' influence on parliamentary opinions and decisions.

It is significant that almost the very first business raised in the Commons after the formalities of the opening and the appointment of standing committees were petitions brought in by Pym and Hampden, <sup>119.</sup> the former's being Burton's petition, the latter's concerning Ship Money. So began the constitutional struggles concerning the King's Purse and the Reformation of Religion, and they also indicate a careful preliminary plan. Pym's skill at management and control of the various elements in the House - his most essential attribute as a leader - was commented upon favourably by Sir Edward Nicholas, <sup>120.</sup> the arch-enemy of all reformers, as a sane influence upon his

firebrand supporters. On the other hand before the outbreak of war Pym emerged as a man who would brook no compromises and who proposed one drastic measure after another, in contrast to his behaviour as leader of the "Middle Party" after the start of hostilities. In this sense he both led the House and followed the radical temper wherever he found it, in the field of religious or constitutional reform as well as in straight politics. Sometimes, though rarely, he overstepped the limits to which the House would agree, for example, his motion on February 20th 1641 that at a time of great necessity the House should compel London to lend money; <sup>121.</sup> this was one of the few cases of mistaken timing, evident in the disarray it caused in party alignments, Holles speaking against Pym, <sup>122.</sup> and Capel, strangely, supporting him. Presumably this was an impromptu piece on Pym's part. On the other hand very occasionally the House outstripped Pym in its enthusiasm for destroying the organs of absolutism. The famous "close committee" to prepare charges against Strafford which was to concern itself with a wide series of indictments and to "collect such matters as might cause jealousies of alteration of Church and State" <sup>123.</sup> was set up on November 11th 1640. It met immediately, and recommended that the House should ask for Strafford's sequestration from the Lords and his summary imprisonment. This shows that the members of the Close Committee must have prepared for the result before they were actually appointed to do so. On the other hand, although the speed of the proceedings necessary to render Strafford harmless was Pym's work, <sup>124.</sup> Notestein suggests that he had intended to spend some weeks

preparing the charges. As it was, the committee had no time to do so, and the reasons for their request to the Lords could not therefore accompany the request itself. It was the work of this committee <sup>125.</sup> and what must have been its prior discussions, that made Pym the clearly recognized leader of the House, as we have already noted. <sup>126.</sup>

One of the most obvious devices used by the opposition leaders to make sure of a favourable vote on some vital matter was to bring the subject up for legislation when most members had already left or had not yet arrived. This technique was used both in committees and in the House itself and was constantly cited in later months as a sign of the dishonest intention of the more radical groups in the Commons. For example, when Hollis and Cornelius Holland moved to read the bill for removing the clergy from temporal offices, Hyde supported by Falkland and Henry Lucas declared "that hee did not thinke it fitt, that it should bee read att that tyme, by reason of the Thinnes of the house. Mr. Hollis replyed that was not the reason for what if men would neglect their duties therefore should the busines of the Commonwealth perish." <sup>127.</sup> As D'Ewes <sup>128.</sup> had spoken at length before the vote was taken the House would doubtless have been very thin indeed.

There is also some evidence of how Pym treated individual Members, both those who supported him and those who opposed him, which throws some light on his methods of keeping control of the House. His own friends and supporters sometimes put him in a position which he clearly had not envisaged,

because of their occasional rashness or extremism. For example, Alderman Pennington, a very radical figure, was indiscreet enough to tell the Clerk not to enter the order of the House to send for Overton the printer for an offence as he himself would guarantee the latter's presence. Whistler, one of the Commons' ablest lawyers, stressed the injury done to the House by this interference but Pym defended Pennington on the expedient ground that he had in fact seen to it that Overton appeared.

On the other hand, D'Ewes resentfully recorded his manoeuvres in regard to his friends of whose support he was already sure. D'Ewes was known to be radical on church reform, yet had had no warning of the debate on the bill for the abolition of Episcopacy, and in fact was only informed about it by Stephen Marshall, one of the Scottish Presbyterian ministers who was implicated in the planning of the Root and Branch programme. "I asked him why I had no notice of this as well as others. He told me they were sure of me. I said aye, if you expect only my aye or no; but if you expect of me to speak in the cause, you should in civility have given me notice". He then tried to prepare his notes but was called into the House by John Moore as the bill was being voted on, "which shows the hollow-heartedness of Mr. Pym, Mr. Kaapden and those other seeming wise men who, though they relied upon me to speak, yet they concealed their intendment from me, that I might do below myself in speaking". Poor D'Ewes, snubbed by the leaders because no one wanted to listen to his antiquarian and irrelevant subtleties, but still flattering himself that he

was necessary as a speaker.

Sometimes Pym used very high-handed methods to get his way and to intimidate those who did not follow his line. Edward Reed wrote to Sir John Coke on October 24th 1641 that Pym wanted to see an exemplary punishment performed on a constable who disobeyed the order of the House to remove images in churches. Thomas Coke questioned whether by law the House could inflict punishment in such a way; "the question Mr. Pim conceived did detract from the power of the House, and was an impediment to the intended reformation which was in a fair way and he did conceive that the gentleman that moved desired to be imprisoned, others conceived farther. But Sir John Strangeways Mr. Bridgman and others did conceive otherwise, and that not any man committed an offence who informed the house what legally they might do". This looks like a case where Pym let his impatience with the legalistic gentlemen who interfered with the important issues get the better of him. However the dictatorial note of this exchange did not strike the writer evidently, as he prefaced his remarks, by: "Mr. Pim is very careful man both for the keeping quiet of the House and people.", so his behaviour was perhaps regarded by more neutral observers as upholding law and order and ensuring that Parliament's commands were carried out.

Hampden was guilty of similar rough-riding. The well-known lawyer, Geoffrey Palmer made his famous protest against the printing of the Grand Remonstrance in November 1641 and wanted to have his protest entered in the Minutes. Hampden

at once picked on him for claiming to speak for "all the rest" who protested, by demanding "how he could know other men's minds"<sup>132.</sup> Out of this case, in which Palmer was handed summarily over to the Sergeant and sent to the Tower, arose another which also reflects the high-handedness and hypocrisy of the ruling politicians when the occasion warranted it. Richard Chillingsworth was overheard in a tavern supporting Palmer's stand and referring to "some of the other side" as being guilty of treason. He was sent to prison, not because he had imputed treasonable activities on any specific person, but because he had said that there were parties in the House.<sup>133.</sup> This furious denial of what was so obviously the case was partly due to the fact that "faction" had always been a work implying unworthy pressure from outside and devilish plots, but also an attempt on the part of the ruling group to keep its activities looking like spontaneous growth from the parliamentary floor.

So far no mention has been made of any external influences or pressures which might have affected the policy-making of the leaders. I do not believe that there was much personal lobbying; although Pym and his friends sought power, they certainly did not want glory or profit. We might mention one instance of scandal within the party however, and it is likely that there were more. In April 1642 the Earl of Warwick wrote to his son Lord Mandeville<sup>134.</sup> "I am sorry to heare that upon reading of my Bill for regulating the Law offices, it findes not more chearfull advancement from my friends in the hous of Commons. The hinderance proceeds from Sir Henry Vane the

Younger, in regard of his father, who as he did at first procure an illegall sequestration through, see his labours (for some particular interests) to continue the same in sequestration still. But now finding that he cannot prevaile therein, he endeavours to cry the same downe as a Monopoly and publicly to asperse me (as a protector thereof) whereof I am very sensible. I am so well satisfied by my Councill that it is clear from any Monopoly, and do consider the business to be of so great consequence to the State and commonwealth both in their trade and correspondence that I am confident it will find few enemies except from those interested persons who claime no right at all in the thing". This kind of politics was inevitable, and especially ruinous to those who had to leave the political vortex for the field of action, which annoyed Warwick particularly, and which Manchester was later to experience with Cromwell. Perhaps the implication of that shady character, Sir Henry Vane the Elder made this a special case, as he cannot clearly be identified with his son's political views and was known to be unreliable personally and politically. But it would be anachronistic to regard this kind of action as reprehensible in seventeenth century politics which depended so openly and with approval on personal patronage.

Another, but possibly spurious sign of strife among the leaders is revealed in a piece of gossip recorded by that hostile source, Sir Edward Nicholas. <sup>135.</sup> "The speech is that Mr. Holles or Mr. Hampden shall be Secretary of State but Lord Mandevill does now again put hard for that place". This



boxing in the "shadow cabinet" may well have been going on during the months preceeding the awaited Bedford plan, but it seems unlikely that news of it would have trickled out to the Privy Council, especially as we have seen that the leaders who would have participated in it met semi-secretly outside Parliament.

One aspect of parliamentary policy was clearly open to lobbying, and that was the machinations of the Scots. Baillie, a kind of permanent ambassador of the Presbyterian kirk in London seemed to delight in behind-the-scenes manipulation, perhaps because it reminded him of the intricate politics at home in Scotland. The whole business of relations with the Scots at this time indicated a shady aspect of Pym's policy and one which required the secret co-operation of a very small, integrated and clandestine group. Baillie's own lobbying nearly upset the smooth passage of Strafford's indictment when a letter of his was intercepted which stressed for the authorities at home how much the Scots had been behind the Lord Lieutenant's removal and assuring them that this was only the first step in getting rid of the bishops and setting up Presbyterianism in England. Baillie was conscious very early on of the beginnings of the later religious split among the Root and Branchers, naming Say and Brooke, but using the blanket term "leading men" in the Commons as "inclining to the Separatists". This was as early as December 1640, when he hoped that unity would prevail and that the Separatists would be grateful for what they could get. Just how secret the

Scottish influence was kept is illustrated by the unwontedly inaccurate comments of Giustiniani, the usually astute Venetian ambassador who loved to see plots everywhere. To him the Scots' support of Parliament seemed inexplicable as they appeared to be acting against their own interests in letting Parliament gain control of the distribution of offices, instead of making use of such appointments as the king let fall their way. <sup>138.</sup> He, like Clarendon, attributed the wish for acquisition of offices as the main cause of the parliamentary leaders' attitudes.

From what has been said we gain some insight into how the political affairs of the Commons were managed by the leaders. We have seen that there is clear evidence of careful planning of the whole campaign of reform among the leading members of both Houses, and we can trace some instances of how this control was exercised in the Commons. On the whole the planning and control was kept in the background in a masterly way so that the members did not have the feeling at this time that they were merely their leaders' puppets. Occasionally, when prior planning was impossible due to the chance introduction of some matter not previously expected, mistakes were made, the leaders were peremptory and impatient, their supporters spoke out of turn, and one set of allies had to be played off against another. But for the most part the organization of the opposition went ahead smoothly, and in the main successfully, through the extensive use of the committee system. As we have seen, it was difficult for Pym to control

everything that happened on the floor of the House, but once a matter was delegated to a committee it nearly always fell out the way the leaders wished. The Bedford plan might have supplied Pym and his friends with the glory and profit which they lacked in their undoubtedly powerful positions on the floor of the House and backstage. But the failure of the plan threw them back with more emphasis upon the use of committees as the sure alternative for responsible executive government. In this way they certainly proved the Venetian ambassador wrong, for there was no glory or profit to be gained as yet from the committee-chamber or from the floor of the House.

#### Analysis of Work and Composition of Committees.

The committee system provides us with a great deal of information about the politics and structure of organized opposition which budded throughout the early months of the Long Parliament until it flowered into effective government at the moment when it became necessary for Parliament to take over from the self-banished executive. At first glance the proliferation of committees appears ad hoc. But on reflection, there is nothing obvious about this particular solution to the problem of turning a predominantly legislative body practically overnight into a full-blown administration, capable of issuing coherent and co-ordinated orders, and more importantly, having them carried out by the lower echelons of the hierarchy. This is especially so when it is remembered that this transition accompanied the need to wage a civil war. What follows is an attempt to show how Pym and the leaders of

the early years of the Long Parliament imposed their particular brand of thinking on politics, religion and administration, and how far their efforts were tied to the development and use of committees which lent themselves so easily to the purposes required of them. By looking at the membership and business of the committees it is possible to show exactly how the transition from opposition to government took place. In order to do this most usefully, the committees studied here have been divided arbitrarily into four categories - arbitrary because the patterns emerge most clearly only when seen in retrospect, so that it would be rash to assume that contemporaries were aware of this schematization. But although no-one could claim that Pym and his associates went self-consciously about having every select committee nominated to fit their explicit purposes it becomes clear throughout this study that the machinery which developed in the early months of the Long Parliament was no fortuitous or unco-ordinated growth. Rather, the parliamentary leaders had a broad plan of opposition to the crown for which the committee system came to hand as the most convenient tool. The first stages of the plan were probably worked out before the calling of Parliament, while later developments occurred as the need and opportunity arose. The committees proved conveniently adaptable to every phase of the plan. Thus, at first the committees were used to try to put pressure on the king to accept a very wide set of demands from Parliament as a whole; they provided a spearhead for the leaders to strike home cleanly and

efficiently. As time wore on and more concessions had been wrung from the unwilling Charles, the committees were used to put pressure upon the less enthusiastic members of both Houses to go further in their demands and to push them beyond their naturally timid inclinations, into following their leaders. At the same time the committees were useful in influencing the "political" public to support the actions of the Commons: they could justify each move going beyond established precedent; they could make careful use of anti-papist and foreign propaganda; and finally they could paint every action of the king, thinly disguised in their propaganda as the royal "evil Counsellors", as black as suited the current needs of the opposition. This aspect of the work of committees carried on well after the actual outbreak of war and was effectively put in the foreground of policy whenever the enthusiasm of Parliament's supporters flagged. With the outbreak of war came more practical problems than those which had faced the parliamentary leaders when they were in the comparatively easy position of a popular opposition. The framing of policy now required something more positive than indictment of the king's advisers, and became instead the problem of executive government. Once again the committee system was adapted to suit the current needs ranging from the co-ordination of broad policy at the centre, to the execution of the smallest order to put this policy into effect. As it had to cope with government on a nation-wide basis, the system became transformed from a series of separate and unconnected groups into whole

hierarchies of committees specializing in every aspect of government, from finance to poor relief. The culmination of this phase of the system was the setting up of the Committee of Safety to deal with the formulation of policy and many matters of war administration, and the institution of concomitant finance and county committees whose work was interrelated with it. As well as providing the basis for organized government, the committees had the additional advantage of being more easily controlled by the leaders than the unwieldy mass of the Houses as a whole. They were often used as cadres responsible for hatching out Pym's various schemes into fully-fledged national policy.

#### Political Classification of Committee Men.

The need to classify the men who sat on the committees emerges clearly from what has already been said about the way in which the political leaders exploited them. One of the aims of this study is to see not only who the men were who predominated on the committees, but also how they were related politically to the most prominent members of the Commons. This classification is hampered however, by the difficulty of knowing with any precision what the political attitudes of members were, or whether any sustained support for a policy can be accredited to them. Before the outbreak of war we can only differentiate with complete consistency between those who disliked the turn of events at the beginning of 1642 enough to disassociate themselves from the actions of the House, and those who were prepared to back up their distrust of the king

by concrete preparations for war. The former can easily be shown to become less and less active on committees after the end of 1641. Among those who supported Parliament the only positive split which occurred before the war was the religious one which did not clearly mirror any subsequent political attitudes. The only real information about the political views of members comes from their occasional speeches in the House as reported by the diarists, from their position as tellers showing their orientation on vital questions, from their background association with the leading group, or from comments by Clarendon or other contemporary historians, hostile or otherwise. Apart from the easily identifiable leaders, the grouping of other M.P's has had to be done somewhat arbitrarily, since their positive affiliation to any political view is not only tenuous but restricted to a few instances and therefore to a short period of time. This makes it inaccurate to ascribe any generic political behaviour to a member for the whole period under discussion. At the same time it is well-known that the lack of party discipline made members behave with great inconsistency. With these provisos it was still considered necessary to use political criteria for the behaviour of members on committees; for even if the information about their views is limited and restricted in time, it is nevertheless a significant pointer to their general outlook on events over the period.

139.

The thesis of J.H. Hexter has been adopted for want of more specific information. His categories, which apply strictly only to the time of the peace negotiations of 1642 and 1643 were based on the examination of the behaviour of members in divisions during that time, supplemented by background evidence. With very few alterations and additions I have used the classification even in the period before the outbreak of war, when strictly the connotation of Peace, Middle and War Parties were meaningless. However, it was found that the men who later formed the nucleus of the Peace Party, like D'Ewes and Selden, were earlier more cautious and reluctant towards Parliament's most drastic measures, while the later radicals, like Marten and Mildmay were most outspoken for promoting a quick and drastic change and were most impatient of Charles even before the war. To some extent, later attitudes on the big issue of War versus Peace were reflections of the general conservative or progressive nature of the participants. I am not suggesting that anyone was able to predict or even expect the turn of events of 1642 in 1640. But it seems legitimate to assume that people had differing limits to which they were prepared to go in striking a bargain with the king, and that the ones who subsequently acted and spoke most clearly on these limits were the ones who earlier had the strongest political convictions. We will find that there are some very tenuous early indications of political tendency among the later parliamentary side which emerge on the major issues - for example, it is possible to predict dimly the emergence of

140.



141.

Pym's own followers of the Middle Party. But on the whole no satisfactory guide to a large group of differing political opinion can be got from the internal evidence of the early period. Other tests, such as using Clarendon's list of those whom he regarded as the leaders of the House right from the beginning of the Long Parliament <sup>142.</sup> also suffers from similar hind-sight.

Hexter was only concerned with the political behaviour of the most notable men on the floor of the Commons over the early peace negotiations, and therefore naturally did not interest himself either in the eventual royalists, or in the men who did not declare their party affiliations by overt activity in the House. The royalists form an easily identifiable group. Enough is known of them and their opinions to class them either as a Court party from the start, or else as reluctant champions of Charles - some from the beginning of 1642, others only after the outbreak of hostilities. The "Straffordians" hardly featured on committees. This especially indicates that those totally against the general proceedings of the Commons were forced or wished to take only a back seat in political affairs. The many active royalists who appeared frequently on committees until the beginning of 1642 were usually the ones who had wholeheartedly co-operated in stripping down the powers of arbitrary government, but who found themselves as time went on more and more on the horns of a dilemma. Their dramatic withdrawal from the affairs of the Commons in January 1642 can be closely observed from their

committee participation which acutely reflected their general attitude to the proceedings of the House. Their attendance at committees is a useful yardstick of the extent to which members were thought to be in favour of the subject committed, and of the degree of organization which went into the naming of the committee members.

The other group of men who do not emerge from Hexters analysis of the political behaviour of men on the floor of the House is the non-political members, who did not take public stand on the major issues of the day. In looking at the most active men on committees some names emerge which do not tally with the best known men of the Commons. These men, who were prepared to do the bulk of the work on the committees cannot be labelled with any political tags as they never took positions from which any affiliations could be safely assumed. Special attention has been paid to the behaviour of these politically undistinguished men, the administrators, who formed an interesting minority the existence of which might easily pass unnoticed in a general study of the active members of the House as a whole. From an examination of their background, their interests and their distribution over the subjects covered by committees certain facts stand out which make it possible to think of them as a real "group" of administrators. It has been found that they were usually men of town or city background, with legal training, often with interests or connections with trade; some had been officeholders in one or other of the royal departments and this provided them with

specialist knowledge and experience; others had a background of estate management, financial activity, or military or naval connections. One could expect therefore to find them most active on committees dealing with administrative matters such as finance, county administration, trade, and so on. This was found to be the case, but they were also present in varying strength on political committees, and from the ease with which these committees co-operated with Pym's policies it has been deduced that they formed a useful basis of support for his own particular associates. The amount of committee work done by these men shows how important they were in helping Pym to construct a workable war administration. One may look upon this group as an embryonic public service ready to take over from the royal administration. The more complex the machinery of administration became, the more Parliament had to depend on them for their special skill. At the same time, like good public servants they were not compromised by any obvious political affiliation, usually giving support to the ruling group and its general policies which they were asked to administer.

This is not to say that the administrators were in a majority among the active committee attenders. They were almost never in this position, known political figures always making up a substantial element on committees. In fact the participation of the administrators showed no marked change during the period when the political balance of power shifted from the Middle Group to the War Party. After the outbreak

of war the War Party was always represented on committees which were concerned with pursuing a vigorous policy out of all proportion to their numerical strength in the House. No doubt the political tone of the committee was set by these men, and by all appearances they were also active on administrative committees which they considered would lead to a more efficient and productive collection of finance, distribution of arms and so on. But in all cases there was a solid basis of administrators. It was on them that the whole structure of government by committee during the war depended. Without them, Pym's political schemes and those of his radical successors would never have triumphed into practical measures.

CHAPTER 2THE ATTACK AGAINST THE KING AND HIS COUNCILLORS.

We have already seen how the plan to attack the king through his "evil Counsellors" had been hatched by a group of reform leaders meeting outside Parliament, probably well before its first session. We can observe the development of this attack in the early months of the Long Parliament along the various fronts on which the first onslaughts were made. The committees which were set up in vast numbers as soon as Parliament met indicated the direction of the attack and the ammunition and tactics used to force the king to retire from the political battle if he was unprepared to accept the terms offered to him. The parliamentary leaders concentrated their forces on the privileges of both Houses; on petitions flooding to Westminster from the whole nation; on the prerogative courts; on the unfortunate recusants who made a useful scapegoat for Puritan vengeance; on the Earl of Strafford who represented the entire iniquity of non-parliamentary rule; and finally on the focal point of the attack, the Grand Remonstrance, which drew together all the grievances into a cumulative indictment of all the Stuart monarchy had stood for.

Election Returns and Privileges of the House.

Traditionally one of the first Standing Committees appointed at the beginning of each Parliament was one to examine election returns and to consider matters of privilege.<sup>1</sup> The subject matter of these committees was obviously directed against royal encroachment of parliamentary powers, either through interference at elections or through unwary attacks

on the traditional liberties of both Houses. However in the Long Parliament the committee which was appointed did not combine the two functions implied by its original name, but concentrated on judging the cases of disputed elections and asserting its traditional privilege of deciding who should be allowed to take up the coveted places on the crowded benches. Matters of privilege were referred instead to separate and ad hoc committees appointed when the need and occasion arose.

The committee of 88 members who were to be responsible for deciding on the election returns was rather unwieldy in size, and one would expect that it could hardly be manoeuvred with ease to fall in with the wishes of the reform leaders. 37 of these election judges were to become royalists, although of these perhaps only 20 supported the king right from the beginning of 1641.<sup>2</sup> 20 were men in close connection with Pym during the first year of opposition, at least 7 acted with his party in more administrative capacities, and 4 became later radicals; 9 others would have backed Pym at this early stage but later became orientated towards the pacific view, favouring an accomodating attitude to the king. We can see that there was certainly a majority on the committee who would have favoured the policy of the reform leaders, although the actual nucleus of Pym's close friends was comparatively small. At the same time the membership contained a large enough selection of royalists to make it clear that all sides were represented. Despite its size and mixed composition, the

committee acted wholeheartedly as an organ of the reform party. Clarendon, with his usual hind-sight, condemned the activities of the committee (of which he might well have approved at the time), as one "in which no rule of justice was so much as pretended to be observed".<sup>3.</sup> Certainly it made sure that the strength of the reform party was augmented by deciding in a vast majority of cases in favour of the "country" as opposed to the "court" candidate.<sup>4.</sup> It further fulfilled the political purpose of disenfranchising the hated monopolists and deterring the returns of their successors.<sup>5.</sup> This committee augmented the electioneering work of the parliamentary leaders by ensuring that the House was more fully stocked than ever with sympathisers. It did so, moreover, as we have seen, without sign of being packed, which indicates the widespread popularity of Pym and his ideas, and the ease with which the committee lent itself to the subtle pressures of the leading reformers. In addition it is probably significant that unlike other topics with which committees concerned themselves, the Elections committee dealt with nearly all facets of the business in hand; there were only one or two select committees named to deal with specific problems in relation to particular election returns.<sup>6.</sup> This would further confirm that the Standing Committee was able to cope with its business without delegating some of its functions to more specialized or politically reliable bodies.

On the other hand the time-honoured union of Privileges and Elections was now dissolved, presumably for purely practical reasons. Although each was in its way necessary in order

to build up a solid front against the king, privilege was much more likely to be a matter of immediate political importance in testing the solidarity of Parliament, and in particular, the House of Commons, against outside attack. In election matters one was hardly turning the attack against the king directly, for although people were known to be royal nominees they were never officially so. In matters of parliamentary privilege however, it might well have proved embarrassing to launch an attack against royal interference through the agency of a committee which had several Privy Councillors among its members. As a result, safer, smaller and more agile political groups were set up to deal with what had always been the bastion of those opposed to arbitrary rule.

The attack against the king through parliamentary privilege took several forms. First, the Commons wanted to be sure of their constitutional ground which played such an important part in 17th century rationale. It was therefore important to know what precedents had been established in the records, and if necessary, to adjust them with some skill if the occasion demanded it. A committee was appointed to be in charge of the records which was to work together with the Clerk of the House, otherwise the authority on matters of procedure.<sup>7</sup> The six original members were composed of the political and legal elite,<sup>8</sup> while the later additions, although containing some obvious later royalists were also chosen for their legal prowess. This heightens the importance placed on precedent in order to pursue the constitutional changes



planned for the first months of the session, and while never defining privilege, allowed favourable constructions to be placed on past tussles between crown and Parliament. The work of this committee no doubt helped others which were set up to deal with injustices incurred by past and present Members during the past 15 years, such as the seizure of Lords Warwick and Brooke after the 1628 Parliament,<sup>9.</sup> and the repercussions of the imprisonment of the eleven Members at that time.<sup>10.</sup> Privilege therefore was used also in another way to attack the king, namely through insisting on protection for M.P's even when Parliament was not sitting. Of the 30 original members of the committee to look into breaches of privilege at least 24 had connections with Pym and only 3 were firm royalists.<sup>11.</sup> Apart from attacking the king for his treatment of the parliamentary leaders, there were of course useful occasions for castigating him for interference with the business of the Commons in old-fashioned Elizabethan style. The Commons made useful capital out of the king's "taking notice of proceedings in the House before a bill had been passed",<sup>12.</sup> for apart from breach of privilege this occasion warranted an attack on the king's councillors who were plainly to blame for leaking the information to him.

The original vote for holding annual Parliaments was in a sense the culmination of the indictment of the king's interference with privilege. It was formulated by a select committee of 46 members including quite a spattering of Privy Councillors and a large minority of later royalists<sup>13.</sup> a clear indication

of the popularity of the move. This was reinforced by the eventual referring of the matter to a Committee of the Whole where the final form of triennial Parliaments was hit upon.<sup>14.</sup>

Safeguarding parliamentary privileges and prestige needed some publicity to the nation at large. It was felt that there was no use in castigating the king for arbitrary action against the nation's representatives if the latter were in bad repute with their constituents, and at the same time assurance was needed that members were safe from private litigation involving their official duties. As a result committees were set up to deal with the reformation of election disorders which brought so much contempt upon the Commons.<sup>15.</sup> This clearly implied an attack on royal patronage and obvious coercion which was meant to show people the new independent spirit of the opposition and to draw their attention to the iniquities of royal interference with privilege. Next, the evil of "parliamentary protections" was attacked, not as one might suppose, to improve the status of M.P's among their electors by cutting down on their perquisites or on their nepotism, but rather to attack the king's servants in the House in an indirect way - namely to point out the recusants and other personae non gratae among the membership.<sup>16.</sup> Finally, members were indemnified so that they could not be sued while in pursuit of their duty.<sup>17.</sup>

As the months of 1641 rolled on parliamentary privilege took a different and new turn. There was the almost fortuitous boost given to the powers of the Commons as a result of

the king's projected visit to Scotland in the middle of the year. Later we will see how this occasion presented a golden opportunity to Pym to initiate independent parliamentary action; here it is only necessary to note that the Commons for the first time appointed a committee to draw up the agenda for the House in order to make sure that the most important legislation was passed before the king's departure.<sup>18.</sup> This was the first official recognition of the right of Parliament to decide what was to be dealt with in the Houses,<sup>19.</sup> in this way removing yet another function of the Privy Councillors seated in the Commons. It is obviously significant that of the 32 men on the committee to order the business of the House<sup>20</sup> had connections with Pym, while only 5 were to become royalists. Only one Privy Councillor, the Treasurer, was among them. The proceedings of this committee which was so basically concerned with the powers of Parliament are a tribute to the usefulness of the committee system both for political and procedural matters. Not only was a committee given the function of deciding upon the agenda of the House,<sup>20.</sup> but its eventual report included a list of the committees whose work was to continue while Parliament was not sitting, in this way testifying to the fact that the important political work of the Commons was by that time in the hands of committees. Through them the parliamentary leaders remained in absolute control of government in London while the king<sup>21.</sup> and his entourage were absent.

The opposition leaders received perhaps the biggest boost for their attack on the king's infringement of parliamentary liberties from Charles himself. At present we need not consider the far-reaching political effects of the disastrous attempt to arrest the five members of the Commons. Any previous examples of royal tampering with privilege was at once overshadowed by this blatant show of force. It had the immediate effect of tempting some waverers back to the parliamentary fold, while many of the later royalists acted with their opposition colleagues for the last time in opposing the king for his arbitrary action so reminiscent of the days of non-parliamentary rule. The king's panicky miscalculation was a godsend to the radicals in the House, for it showed that they were justified in taking all possible precautions to safeguard against Charles' untrustworthy and arbitrary behaviour. Pym had of course had due warning of what was afoot and on the last day of 1641 he had initiated an attempt to get the king to agree to a parliamentary guard to be supplied by the City. The committee to deal with this safeguarding of parliamentary integrity from the armed threat of the "malignant party"<sup>22.</sup> was composed of Pym and seven of his close associates,<sup>23.</sup> without any aid from a possible royalist. This part of the drama still looked unreal and the danger artificially inflated. Five days later Pym's suspicions were confirmed, and in the absence of the accused five a committee was set up to "consider vindicating the privileges<sup>24.</sup> parliament" which included 9 of Pym's group and a royalist,

Belasyse. When the tension had died down the time came to capitalize out of this golden opportunity to show up the king's tricks. The committee to consider the petition to be sent to the king vindicating the Commons and attacking his ill-advised action included, apart from a solid cluster of opposition leaders,<sup>25.</sup> such leading Councillors as Falkland and Culpepper and five other royalists. As the majority of these certainly condemned the arbitrary actions of the king before 1640 they can be assumed to be attempting to pull him back into line by reminding him of his role as protector of constitutional law.

From January onwards the parliamentary tacticians no longer felt the need to concentrate upon attacking the king in order to impress him with their case. By that time a break seemed likely, and the impetus shifted to preparation of possible hostilities, and the concomitant propaganda to make the parliamentary cause palatable to the nation at large. As a result, the issues concerning parliamentary privilege shifted also. The former unanimity of the Commons had been broken and the opposition leaders now concentrated on attacking those M.P's who had already declared themselves for the king. Parliamentary liberties now shrank to embrace only the solid core of members who backed the reform platform. From March to July measures were taken to punish, discredit and (wherever possible) fine those who refused to attend at Westminster.<sup>26.</sup> As the Commissions of Array issued by the king spread more widely, Parliament retaliated by suspending,<sup>27.</sup> fining and disabling those who associated themselves with the king.<sup>28.</sup>

The people who were most active on committees relating to privilege reflect the political nature of the issues raised under this guise. Those who sat on eight or more of the nineteen committees considered <sup>29.</sup> were all immediate supporters of Pym, including several of the political nucleus of leaders. The list of those who attended at more than three of these committees indicates clearly the lead given by Pym's party and the later radicals who take up most of the places at the top of the attendance list. But they did not form a majority, which indicates that committees could well be employed to serve a useful political end without being stacked by men all of the same view. The royalists who also sat frequently on these committees did so as we have seen, partly in protest against the king's attack on parliamentary privilege, but partly also they must have formed a dissident minority. The attendances at these committees relating to privilege clearly show how Pym and his supporters were able to use the backing of their eventual enemies in order to attack the king by a method most likely to produce harmony. For with few exceptions everyone was prepared to do battle for the time-honoured rallying-cry of "privilege".

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON PRIVILEGE COMMITTEES.

<u>Names.</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>tees.</u>	<u>War</u> <u>Party</u>	<u>Middle</u> <u>Party</u>	<u>Peace</u> <u>Party</u>	<u>Admin-</u> <u>istrators</u>	<u>Royalists</u>
Barrington	12		X			
Glyn	11		X			
Holles	9		X			
Hampden	9		X			
Pym	8		X			
Reynolds	8				X	
St. John	8	X				
Piennes	8		X			
Erle.	7		X			
D'Ewes	7					X

<u>Names.</u>	<u>No. of</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Peace</u>	<u>Admin-</u>	<u>Royalists</u>
	<u>ctees.</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>istrators.</u>	
Selden	7			X		
Strode	6	X				
Stapleton	6		X			
Whistler	6					X
Vane Jr.	6	X				
Gerrard	6		X			
Goodwyn	6		X			
Bowyer	6					X
Holle J.	6				X	
Evelyn	6				X	
Irby	6		X			
Lytton	6				X	
Strangways	6					X
Lyttleton	4					X
Kirton	4					X
Wilde	4				X	
Whitlock	4		X			
Widdrington	4				X	
Balsize	4					X
Whitaker	4			X		
Dering	4					X
Grimston	4			X		
Holland J.	4				X	
Palmer	4					X
Paines	4			X		
Higby	4	X				
Maynard	4			X		

### Petitions

The main weapon to beat the king which the parliamentary leaders forged for themselves was the thousands of petitions sent from every corner of the country attacking the period of non-parliamentary rule for its maladministration, officiousness or illegality. We have seen how this paper flood was encouraged by the leaders who appeared to treat the grievances of the subjects in a similar way to the cahiers of the 1789 Assembly. Naturally those petitions which attacked the aspects of Charles' rule singled out for immediate reform received priority treatment. A committee was set up in order to sift the petitions as they arrived and refer them at once to the relevant specialists dealing with the general problem.

The Remonstrance committee then correlated the work of the groups dealing with the razing of particular prerogative institutions. Naturally, the leaders had no control over the numbers or the subject of the petitions which they had encouraged. Minor complaints, not necessarily fitting easily into the major lines of attack, had to be dealt with somehow, if Parliament's name was not to be discredited in the eyes of the constituents. At the same time the ad hoc manner in which these petitions were referred to myriads of special committees nominated on the spot often hid the subsequent importance of the subject. Many of the complaints which look at first like the particular grievances of a small number of people turned out soon to be so common that the indictment of yet another aspect of the old regime could be undertaken through the method of collective proof.

When we come to look at the general picture of how petitions were dealt with however, it becomes obvious that there was a great deal of co-ordination and planning about proceeding from the particular to the general. Indeed Pym and Hampden themselves started the ball rolling by introducing petitions from aggrieved citizens whose cases involved an attack on some corner-stone of the rule of "Thorough". When therefore on November 9th 1640 a committee was set up specially to consider "Mr. Leighton's petition"<sup>30.</sup> this turned out to be a collecting centre of grievances against the arbitrary nature of the Court of High Commission.<sup>31.</sup> In the six weeks following many other petitions were added to it, and as a result of the



hearing of evidence and examination of the specific cases  
 an order <sup>was made</sup> ~~resulted~~ which established the liability of the ecclesiastics who fined and imprisoned laymen through the Court.<sup>32.</sup>  
 The fourteen members of this committee were easily dominated by Pym and his immediate associates.<sup>33.</sup> In a similar way a committee set up to look into a very specific complaint on November 14th came soon to be called the "committee for the Stannaries" and had similar petitions referred to it.<sup>34.</sup> Again, two days later, a committee was set up to examine a complaint against an M.P. for allegedly possessing a monopoly.<sup>35.</sup> Nine days later the committee officially had all complaints concerning monopolies referred to it. Its work was perhaps even more thorough than that of other committees as it was important to establish who were the monopolists sitting in the House and what the evidence against them comprised, in order to be able to disable them from sitting. At the same time the subject lent itself admirably to furthering the attack on the king through his councillors as proof of monopoly grants were the clearest indication of the arbitrary and inequitable distribution of royal largesse.

Sometimes quite apparently disparate petitions were referred to committees which later combined in order to strengthen the attack on one arm or other of the prerogative rule. The Council was attacked for its destruction of St. Gregory's church in the City;<sup>36.</sup> the committee to deal with Smart's petition<sup>37.</sup> that his son was being converted to popery at Cambridge, attacked the ecclesiastical courts; yet the two were joined in order to proceed with the principle of individual culpability,

as in each case the individuals concerned were to pay reparations to the petitioners. But this method of oblique attack was only a diversionary activity meant to keep the petitioners happy and to show that Parliament intended to compensate them to some degree for their sufferings during the preceeding years.

The main political onslaught on the organs of prerogative rule all followed the pattern already discussed. The Ship Money committee began officially as a result of a petition from the residents of Watford,<sup>38.</sup> although as we have seen Hampden foreshadowed the attack by raising his local petition a few days after the opening of Parliament. Although other petitions were referred, this committee reported within two days<sup>39.</sup> to indict the illegality of the collection and condemn the proceedings against Hampden and the other opponents of the levy. A separate committee was sent off brashly to enquire "how and by whom the judges were solicited or threatened" to give their opinion on Ship Money.<sup>40.</sup> But even after the general indictment had been resolved further petitions were received by the committee throughout the early months of 1641. Like many of the large committees concerned with the most hated and unpopular of the prerogative institutions this committee was open to "all that come", with the proviso that no one who had levied ship money as a sheriff could be present, thus ensuring a onesided investigation by the committee which could be cheered on by all who felt themselves outraged at the arbitrary tax. This was further reinforced by the membership of the committee which included 17 out of 38 names who had

been outspoken against Ship Money in the 1630's or who had objected to collecting it.<sup>41.</sup> Apart from Lord Digby and St. John there were no powerful opposition figures on the committee, the eight supporters of Hym being relatively minor figures.<sup>42.</sup> In addition there was a large number of royalists who were not otherwise known to be active in the campaign to destroy absolutism. The resolute report from the committee indicates however that they were quite prepared to ensure the destruction of the tax now that Parliament had the upper hand. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the committee which went to consult the judges had more famous royalists than opposition leaders among its members although these were all the prominent critics of the excesses of "thorough".<sup>43.</sup> Although the principles underlying the collection of Ship Money had been thoroughly trounced throughout, the act condemning it was not prepared until June 1641, when all the legislation which had been hatching in committees during the preceding months came to fruition.<sup>44.</sup> Unlike the earlier committees, the group which drew up the bill was well integrated under the watchful eyes of St. John and Hampden, and included 23 supporters of the reformers' platform, and only four later royalists. This change of political orientation was partly due to the gradual emergence of a political split and partly to the need to word the condemnation as strongly as possible.

In the next three months the other "illegal" taxes and those responsible for collecting them were attacked in a similar fashion: Coat and Conduct Money,<sup>45.</sup> Customs Farmers and the salt

46.

and leather monopolies, the method of collection by using armed musqueteers, especially for cutting down timber for the Navy, and the general levying of customs and impositions reaching back to James's reign. The main work of this committee was to see that the men who were put into the jobs of customs and collectors should be got rid of. It was not so much that corruption worried the parliamentarians as that they felt the jobs should go to more worthy supporters of their policies. In addition, apart from the attacks against the major councillors, a host of committees were to deal with the less important officials responsible for administration of the hated policy. These were sometimes reached obliquely by ordering compensation as a result of a particular petition as we have seen. At other times royal officials were attacked directly; Sir Henry Spiller, Secretary Windbank, even the Queen herself for issuing patents and grants in her own right. Others dealt with further aspects of Charles' rule. The special grievances of the areas known as royal fens and forests were attacked by the local inhabitants and committees with strong local interests were set up. The universities were investigated wherever there seemed a shred of evidence of popery or royal favoritism. The earlier Committee of the Whole House for Grievances had dealt by way of a sub-committee with a large number of complaints about the post and foreign couriers. When the method of dealing with grievances changed this was turned into a select committee which concerned itself primarily with the maladministration of this aspect of central government. Verney shows up the degree of favouritism, engrossing and

corruption which must have ruined the postal system. Here there is a clear indication that dissatisfaction with the years of unparliamentary rule was not entirely political and that the parliamentary leaders were prepared to devote themselves to some extent to improving the running of the government. Setting to rights such anomalies helped to popularize the reforming zeal of the Commons and gave added ammunition to the attack on the principles of rule through the Privy Council.

We have seen how the members went about organizing the petitions voicing the discontent of the nation. This method, which was clearly preliminary for the general incorporation of grievances into the Grand Remonstrance, fulfilled a political purpose and at the same time showed the nation at large how closely its newly elected members concerned themselves with their constituencies' troubles. We notice that these committees almost stopped functioning by the middle of 1641 and that after February no significant new ones were appointed to cope with petitions. The political purpose of the petitions had been fulfilled as soon as sufficient evidence was collected for condemning the machinery of personal rule, and after that petitions either ceased coming in or else were disregarded. In other words, grievances only interested the members in so far as they affected the years prior to the calling of Parliament. Here contemporary ones were more likely to prove an embarrassment than a political asset.

The membership of these committees was necessarily spread widely over the whole House. There were 300 members involved on the 51 committees looked at. The majority of men returned

to the Long Parliament had come prepared to fight for the grievances of their electorate and to unite in dispelling the chance of another period of absolute rule. ~~unusually~~ In the early months the committees nominated were usually large in membership and this necessarily kept most members permanently involved in the committee rooms. It was only later that committees became characteristically smaller and more clandestine as the need to formulate policy became more important and as the subjects discussed no longer held such overwhelming appeal to the members at large. In any case, despite the large named membership anyone could attend at most of the meetings as it was unlikely that an antagonistic clique could be got together to ruin the discussions of the committees. Yet this is not to say that there was no planning or premeditation in the membership or the business committed. Despite the apparently random way in which particular grievances were brought to the attention of the House we have seen that the leaders made sure of relevant petitions being forwarded at appropriate times which would initiate the discussion of each of the organs of arbitrary rule. <sup>56.</sup> At the same time there appeared to be a nucleus of important political figures on most of the large committees to guide them to the point and to sharpen the mode and expression of the attack. The large number of nominations help to obscure the solid core of political leaders who were found to be present on all the important committees of the early months. <sup>57.</sup> Apart from the political element there were large numbers of lawyers nominated to all these committees, <sup>58.</sup> concerned as they were with constitutional and legal points.

Of the 91 men who sat on 5 or more of these committees nearly 80 ~~men~~ had legal training. It is true that a large proportion of M.P.'s probably had a legal education, but they must have needed all the talent possible to cope with the diverse and copious aspects of the petition flood.

As we might expect there was a larger proportion of later royalists among the active men on these committees. The 20 on the list included many who began by being very critical of absolutism but who swung behind the king for reasons discussed later. There were 20 of Pym's immediate supporters, 9 later radicals and 9 later Peace Party men while 16 of the remainder followed the reformers' policies more in the role of administrators.<sup>59.</sup> The lead given by Pym's group is obvious from the way in which they dominated the positions at the top of the list of most active men on the committees. Of the 11 men who sat on more than 15 committees 6 were later Middle Party men. Only Culpepper stands out as an active later royalist but obviously at this stage he supported the dismantling of Charles' rule. Despite the routine nature of the work and the overwhelming popularity of the attack on the prerogative institutions it is obvious that a close watch was kept on this aspect of committees and that the willing following of constitutionalists was ably but inconspicuously led by the politicians.<sup>60.</sup>

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES DEALING WITH PETITIONS.

Name	No. of cases						Name	No. of cases						
		War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists			Lawyers	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists
Glyn	21	X				X	Moore J.	21						X
Perd	20				X	X	Palmer	20					X	X
Selden	19		X			X	Dutton	19					X	X
Widdrington	19				X	X	Belasize	19					X	X
Barrington	19	X					Goodwyn R.	19	X					X
Spile	18	X				X	Cradock	18						
Fairfax	18	X				X	Anderson	18					X	X
St. John	17	X				X	Harley	17				X		X
Culpepper	15					X	Sutton	15					X	
Gerrard	15	X				X	Dalston	15					X	
Irby	15	X				X	Holle J.	15				X		
Hyde	14				X	X	Reynolds	14				X		X
Wray	14	X				X	Crane	14		X				X
Cage	14				X	X	Noel	14						
Ingram	14						Owfield	14				X		X
Evelyn	14				X	X	North	14				X		X
Palmer	13		X			X	Shuttleworth	13					X	X
Bering	13				X	X	Pierrepoint	13		X			X	X
Rigby	13	X				X	Whitelock	13	X				X	X
Grinston	13		X			X	White	13				X		X
Ayscough	13	X					Partridge	13		X			X	X
Wothan	12	X				X	Mildmay	12	X				X	X
Haselrig	12	X				X	Buller	12					X	X
Hayman	12	X					Ashburnham	12					X	X
Kirton	12				X		Fiennes	12		X			X	X
Whistler	12				X	X	Holland	12			X			X
Cholmley	12		X			X	Seymour	12					X	
Luke	12	X					Felham	12						
Lytton	12				X	X	Pennington	12	X					
Hungerford	11	X				X	Goodwyn A.	11		X				X
Strode	11	X				X	Allinson	11	X					
Strangways	11				X	X	Upton	11						X
Washam	11	X				X	Janes	11					X	X
Pye	11				X	X	Green	11				X		X
Capel	11				X		Broxholm	11						
Falkland	11				X	X	Hill	11				X		X
Maynard	11		X			X	Montague	11				X		X
Mountford	11	X					Purefroy	11		X				X
Hampden	10	X					Fowall	10						
Prideaux	10	X				X	Whittaker	10			X			X
Pym	10	X				X	Whitehead	10					X	X
D'Ewes	10		X			X	Wheeler	10				X		X
Crew	10				X	X	Bagshaw	10					X	X
Strangways	9				X	X	Fleetwood	9						X



### Prerogative Courts.

The method of attack against the king and ~~his~~<sup>the</sup> adjuncts of his rule is now familiar. His hated courts were indicted in the way used for all other aspects of his rule. Some specific injustice committed against a worthy subject was picked out and referred to a committee which rapidly came to deal with the whole gamut of grievances against the same institution until it very quickly became known as, for example, the Star Chamber committee. For the sake of speed and efficiency a sorting committee to send relevant petitions to the right place was set up as we have seen and thus ensured that no committee could be idle for want of cases to investigate. The work of the leaders was both facilitated politically and hindered administratively by the spate of petitions received from the discontented subjects who had been primed during the elections to voice their grievances in this form. The administrative difficulties were overcome by means of the adaptable system of committees which enabled the leaders to make the fullest political capital out of the manifest unpopularity of Charles' rule.

The work of destruction did not need to be delegated to a select and reliable group. As we have seen, the committees of the early months of the session were usually large and contained a minority of opposition men. The courts were so universally disliked and had claimed so many victims that the leaders were able to rely on the unanimity of the vast majority

of members to destroy these symbols of absolutism for ever. Most of these committees were filled with lawyers - partly in the role of experts in constitutional matters, partly as injured parties representing the claims of superiority of common law in opposition to the prerogative law. They were often added generically, or else the committees were frankly open to "all that came". Where local grievances particularly were concerned, as with the Council of Marches and the northern courts all local members were added to the named membership.

From November 1640 until February 1641 all the prerogative courts were either abolished or attacked. On November 23rd a committee was set up to consider petitions against the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshall's Court and the High Constable's Court, to consider the fees paid to them and their proceedings.<sup>61.</sup> There were no intermediate reports, but the result was inevitable. As a consequence of the committee's report on the 19th February<sup>62.</sup> it was decided that the existence of the court was a grievance of the kingdom, that it had no jurisdiction over the matters before it, and that charges were to be drawn up against all who were involved in the usurpation of power involved in its jurisdiction. Significantly the reporter who spoke for the committee was Hyde, later to become one of the staunchest royalists, but at this stage fully in support of dismantling of the years of non-parliamentary rule. 25 of the 30 members were lawyers, including 14 of the most prominent later royalists.

Naturally the most important of these committees was the one which was to deal with the abolition of the Court of High Commission and the Star Chamber. The petition of Burton which Pym first brought into the House soon after its opening was referred, along with all others of a similar nature, to a committee which was not named until December 3rd.<sup>63.</sup> The delay in setting up such an important committee was perhaps due to the need to see how incoming petitions were orientated and also to enable the idea of reparations to be tested. For the committee concerned itself not only with the destruction of the courts but also with seeing justice done to the victims of prerogative law. The committee's powers were later extended to include consideration of the judicial proceedings of the Council Table itself, and even deliberated upon the validity of Proclamations.<sup>64.</sup> In this way all the king's servants who were responsible for putting his policy into practice were attacked in his stead, and the culpability of individual judges was spread to all the ecclesiastics and others who were present at the famous trials of Frynne, Eastwick and Burton.<sup>65.</sup> Within three months of its first meeting the committee drew up a bill concerning the jurisdiction of the courts and terminated its business. This exceptionally large committee of 62 men certainly had half its members in some way behind Pym together with a nucleus of leaders, but there were also a large number of later royalists and even some Privy Councillors.<sup>66.</sup>

The judgements of the Exchequer in relation to non-parliamentary taxes were attacked in the same way as the prerogative courts. <sup>67.</sup> Although initially this concerned itself with tonnage and poundage and the issues of the Petition of Right <sup>68.</sup> the main political case was made on the Ship Money judgements. In this way the charge against an institution was converted as in previous cases against individual advisers of the king, in this case the Lord Keeper and the other judges who had supported Ship Money. This made good propaganda against the absent Keeper, but Judge Berkeley who remained behind was indicted for High Treason. <sup>69.</sup> The comparatively small initial committee consisted of 10 of the most famous lawyers of the House but <sup>70.</sup> also had a strong nucleus of political leaders. Hyde acted as reporter for the committee and was quite prepared to condemn the supporters of arbitrary taxation to death at this stage. In the same capacity he also served on the committee to consider the jurisdiction of the Court of York and the Council of Marshes <sup>71.</sup> which destroyed the local arm of the royal administrative machinery. Although the committee appeared to devote itself entirely to technical and legal points of precedent <sup>72.</sup> its political content appeared in Hydes report which declared their jurisdiction "unprofitable to his Majesty" <sup>73.</sup> a convention of 'newspeak' similar to the indictment of the king's "evil Counsellors".

The work of all these committees was all but completed by April 1641. The only court which was not demolished entirely was the Court of Wards. The committee was set up and had

relevant petitions referred to it in the usual way but no wholesale condemnation followed and in fact revenue from the ships continued to flow into Parliament throughout the early years of the war, which may indicate that profit sometimes outweighed principle. On the other hand it is noticeable that the 28 named members <sup>74.</sup> included 10 very conservative royalists, mainly from Wales, and no strong opposition leaders. <sup>75.</sup>

The membership of this group of committees must necessarily be seen as rather arbitrary due to the number of generic inclusions of lawyers or local burgesses. This meant that the named personnel was not necessarily that which was most active on the committees. In any case the men named must have been considered sufficiently well versed in the matters to be committed and of high enough reputation to be nominated. <sup>76.</sup> We have noticed that Hyde was the reporter, and therefore probably the chairman of two of the committees, and he also attended more of them than anyone else. Whistler was another famous lawyer who later sided with the king although he remained at Westminster until after the outbreak of war. Probably Hyde and Capel were the two earliest dissillusioned with parliamentary reforms, and both found themselves isolated as soon as the major reforms were completed. Selden, D'Ewes and Griaston formed the nucleus of the later Peace Party, but as leading constitutionalists they were active in destroying the rivals of the common law. The only close associates of Pym's were Barrington, Erle, Holles and St. John. Eleven of the 16 most active men were lawyers. It is perhaps more significant that Barrington, Hayman, Capel, Culpepper and Broxholm, all laymen,

should have been active on these committees. Capel and Culpepper were generally occupied with committee work in this period and were regarded as strong men in prominent positions with wealthy and influential backgrounds who were greatly in favour of constitutional reform. Barrington was also a prodigious attender at committees who was perhaps regarded as a spokesman for his "cousin" Pym. At least one of the men appearing on a number of these committees, Worsley, suffered particularly from the rigours of the prerogative courts,<sup>77</sup> although no doubt many of the obscurer figures who filled the large committees such as the one for the High Commission had earlier suffered from its jurisdiction. This committee was generally filled with more laymen than the other smaller ones, probably because the abuses of the courts it dealt with were wider - reaching and more general in implication, as well as being of far greater political significance for the reform leaders. For this reason they also made sure of a nucleus of common membership with the other opposition committees.<sup>78</sup>

The work of these committees which led to the destruction of all the prerogative courts save the Court of Wards followed closely the pattern of dealing with petitions generally and indicates the overall plan for attack on the crown as formulated by the leaders. Although we have no clear evidence of the direct intervention of Pym and his friends in setting up all these committees it would appear highly likely that someone was primed to voice the first complaint or petition against one of the courts and that the general commitment of the business of that court automatically followed. Whether the first

case was initiated by the leaders or not, they could be pretty certain that the grievances would pour in after the pre-sessional campaign. Once again the system of committees admirably suited the method of using the widest possible support for a policy framed and formulated by a tight clique of leaders.

**MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF COMMITTEES FOR PREROGATIVE COURTS.**

Names	No. of tees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Admin- istration	Royal- ists	Lawyers
Hyde	4					X	X
Holles	3		X				
Hayman	3	X					
Selden	3			X			X
St. John	3	X					X
D'Ewes	3			X			X
Perd	3				X		X
Palmer	3					X	X
Barrington	3		X				
Broxholme	3						
Capel	3					X	
Culpepper	3					X	
Erle.	3		X				X
Lytton	3				X		X
Whistler	3					X	X
Grimston	3			X			X

**Religion**

One of the main prongs of attack on the years of unparliamentary rule was naturally the religious policy of Laud and especially the means of its enforcement, namely, the ecclesiastical courts. There was perhaps more unanimity about the need to be rid of Arminianism than about any other facet of the years of "thorough". Beyond that it is of course well known that all unanimity stopped; that no-one even knew for himself what kind of church settlement or organization he wished for. For this reason the committees which were set up early in the Long Parliament's sitting had little to do with the major

religious controversies of the day - Episcopacy, separatism, or doctrine. In so far as these matters were discussed they were dealt with by the House meeting as a Committee of the Whole. Select committees as we have seen, proved a useful tool for controlling a largely favourable rank and file, giving it direction and leadership at the same time as administrative efficiency. But this method could not be used where it was suspected that important differences of principle were going to arise. The political leaders must have been well aware that they themselves were not united on the vital issue of Episcopacy - some were wholeheartedly in favour of Root and Branch reform, while others favoured minor adjustments within the established system. Moreover, everyone must have been aware that religious loyalties cut across political loyalties; bringing out religious differences too early in the piece might well have created a political rift which would have hindered the smooth passage of legislation in the early months of 1641. Although therefore it might appear on first sight that select committees on religion were rejected by the rank and file because they did not want to entrust such a vital matter to a tendentious minority, there is every reason to believe that the leaders themselves wished to avoid commitment of such matters. Leaving religion to a Committee of the Whole meant that everyone could speak as often as they wished and in the presence of all who wanted to attend. This kept the issue clearly in the open and prevented factional or "close" proceedings and also effectively hid the split between Pym and Hampden on the vital



In the first two months the Committee of the Whole did not concern itself with anything beyond particular petitions and the indictment of various aspects of the prerogative ecclesiastical institutions. Sometimes it referred petitions to other committees,<sup>80.</sup> at other times it dealt with the individual case and ordered punishment and compensation for proved injustices. At the same time select committees were set up on a parallel with those dealing with the other aspects of prerogative rule. On December 9th 1640 a committee to examine licenses of Convocation was set up, which was also to prepare the debate on the new canons and the benevolences granted by the clergy.<sup>81.</sup> Once again relevant petitions were referred here, and the committee only took a week to bring in resolutions declaring the benevolences and canons illegal.<sup>82.</sup> The committee probably expedited its work because of the select band of twelve eminent lawyers who were delegated to the job.<sup>83.</sup> Next the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Bath and Wells came in for attack, by the usual method of referring all petitions against him to a committee.<sup>84.</sup> After this followed in quick progression the jurisdiction of the Bishops of Ely<sup>85.</sup> and Norwich,<sup>86.</sup> the ecclesiastical courts in Lincoln,<sup>87.</sup> and concluded by April with the committee to draft the act for "reformation of divers abuses in ecclesiastical courts".<sup>88.</sup> The attack on Laud began through the new canons and as a result of the quick resolutions of the committee.<sup>89.</sup> This had concerned itself merely with the issue of their legality. Now the matter of responsibility was brought up in a neatly prejudged way: the committee was to consider "who were the promoters and actors in these new canons

. . . in particular the Archbishop of Canterbury has been a participant and how far he has been an actor in the design of the subversion of the laws of the Realm and of Religion! Nothing could show more clearly how religion was treated as a mere compartment of the constitutional issues at this stage. The committee which was at the same time to prepare the charges against Laud worked with great speed and only two days after its meeting he was accused of High Treason.<sup>90.</sup> But the committee continued to meet for several weeks to consider further petitions condemning him; Pym did not read the final charges from the committee until February 24th.<sup>91.</sup> There was no question <sup>about</sup> ~~of~~ the dominance of Pym's group here - nearly half of the 38 members were close associates while the royalist element had shrunk to six or seven. In this the committee for Laud differed from the others which were more filled with constitutionalists than with politicians.<sup>92.</sup> The opposition nucleus was strengthened no doubt through the chairmanship of Pym.

It is significant that the only constructive religious administrative measure which was dealt with at this time by the Commons was the appointment of a committee to investigate the placing and maintenance of preaching ministers.<sup>93.</sup> Like the other proceedings this resulted from petitions received from local inhabitants who were being pastorally neglected, but unlike the usual method this committee was originally set up as a sub-committee for the Committee of the Whole and only subsequently made into a separate committee of the House. This would seem to indicate extreme care that doctrinal and

organizational matters were not taken out of the hands of the House as a whole, but the evident need for such a committee to consider the petitions which complained of religious neglect necessitated it. Certainly the committee contained a large number of fierce Puritans, but its total membership was extremely large and included the representatives of nearly all Welsh and northern counties. However, there were only six royalists among the 70 named members,<sup>94.</sup> and it is probably significant<sup>95.</sup> that the first six men on the list had strong Separatist views. At least 24 of them were later connected with Independency in some practical religious way, and 18 were probably religious Presbyterians or Puritans who would be impossible to classify. We can therefore see that there was a difference between the kind of religious reform wanted by most of the later supporters of the king who identified religious with constitutional reform, and those who wanted to see a positive settlement made. The appointment of actual ministers to vacant parishes did not interest them as it did the religious enthusiasts.

However, the later royalists could still be counted on in the measures to dispose of the temporal power of the clergy, because even those of them who were in favour of Episcopacy felt that they should not exercise their jurisdiction in Parliament, in commissions of peace or in ecclesiastical courts. When the first spate of activity was over and the work of destroying the courts and other aspects of the king's prerogative was well in hand, the Commons initiated the struggle to get rid of the clergy from temporal positions. This

struggle had to be fought step by step against the House of Lords who felt themselves threatened as they could see the imminence of their eventual emasculation. The Commons began mildly enough with a move to put clergy out of holding commissions of peace.<sup>96.</sup> Even so there were seven of the opposition leaders present on a small committee of 23, with only Culpepper, Bagshaw and Vaughan from the later royalist group. This was followed a week later<sup>97.</sup> by a committee to frame the act to disable clergy from holding any lay or temporal office or commission - a committee which carefully skirted the House of Lords issue but which considered at length petitions against the exercise of lay office among the clergy. Once again Pym's immediate group predominated on this much bigger committee, although the large number of eventual royalists were presumably still backing the disabling of the clergy.<sup>98.</sup> In fact this committee and the one following it two days later<sup>99.</sup> to prepare the act against "pluralities of spiritual promotions" had a vast membership precisely because everyone wanted to have a say in the removal of this hated abuse of the preceding administration. Nearly half of its 76 named members were eventual royalists and they included some of the king's early supporters.<sup>100.</sup> The committee for the act to remove abuses in the ecclesiastical courts<sup>101.</sup> belonged to the same genre.<sup>102.</sup> Although smaller and more clearly dominated by the opposition there were still some notable opponents to Puritanism present.

In May 1641 the major onslaught against the Arminian church began with conferences between the two Houses on the power of the bishops. <sup>103.</sup> The reporters and managers appointed for these vital political conferences leave no doubt about how this aspect of religious policy was organized. Pym, Holles, Hampden, St. John, Sir John Holland and Pierrepont obviously shared their views on the original attack on the bishops, <sup>104.</sup> and Falkland and Culpepper who joined them at a later conference <sup>105.</sup> also held clear Erastian views. We cannot of course be sure whether the split between the religious moderates and the extremists had been allowed to emerge, both parties being represented on the conferences; but it seems unlikely that any internal divisions would be allowed to damage the need to present a united front to the Lords. The attack at the conferences was backed up by a committee which was to consider <sup>106.</sup> what the strategy for the battle with the Lords was to be. There can be no doubt that this group must have been unanimous in its views if it was to be successful as a steering committee. The six prominent later royalists were all (except Hyde) <sup>107.</sup> men we have seen favouring the Erastian line. Pierrepont appeared to lead the committee's deliberations as its chairman, but his Root and Branch propensities do not emerge clearly in the carefully worded reasons produced by the committee. These put forward cautious and oblique criticisms of the bishops' powers - such as maintaining that bishops could not act independently in the House as they were bound to obey their archbishops. It is also interesting that the argument for

precedent was pushed aside openly by subscribing to the view that if something inconvenient happened, then time and usage were not to be considered by the lawgivers. This wrangle continued for the rest of the year with the Commons gradually pushing the Lords further and further into the background, until finally they were forced to submit, more by the power of radical feeling in the City than by the Commons' committees.

The committees <sup>108.</sup> and conferences <sup>109.</sup> which had to produce more reasonable sounding phrases to keep the argument going with the Lords remained constant in leadership. Fyn, Rolles, Glyn, Karten and Vane, supported by the illustrious lawyers, Maynard, Wilde, Whistler and Hyde had to think of precedents which might

<sup>110.</sup> help them. In any case the anti-episcopal forces had to be mustered against the king's threat to name new bishops.

Certainly the same later royalists who had co-operated with the opposition supported the petition against the new creations. <sup>111.</sup> Doctrinally the Root and Branch radicals gave the

lead in tightening up on Sabbath observance and suppressing "innovations" in the worship of the Church of England. <sup>112.</sup> The "erastian royalists" were not likely to go so far towards a Puritan transformation, interested as they were merely in the destruction of temporal power of the clergy. It is not surprising that on this first committee to deal with doctrine the extreme Puritans such as Whittaker, White, Wilde and Hampden <sup>113.</sup> predominated.

In order to classify the men who attended with greatest enthusiasm at these committees we need to look at their religious as well as at their political attitudes. These are difficult to pin-point, especially in the case of the Presbyterians, about whom it is difficult to know their degree of religious as opposed to political fervour. The Independents may be more clearly identified through Yule's useful index of religious activity. <sup>114.</sup> In any case this kind of division is of course anachronistic as the religious split into these categories was not obvious until 1643. Nevertheless it is interesting to note which of the committee members had pronounced religious views. The later royalists who were active on these committees included Dering and Falkland who were certainly Erastian, although others may have shared their views as well, while others like Strangways were against the reforms even to the extent <sup>115.</sup> of the measures of 1641. Probably they were acting as foils to the Puritan extremists. But with a very few exceptions everyone on these committees favoured the destructive work of removing the clergy from positions of authority in the state and this work was best done by men who were able to frame the necessary bills efficiently. As the later royalists contained many famous lawyers they may well have chosen to participate for administrative as well as religious reasons. In any case whatever the political views of the active members, at least half of them had a strong interest in religious reform and had known religious views.

That is not to say that the religious issues here at stake were not judged by political yardsticks. Among the sixty-odd members considered as activists on these committees 38 were in Pym's camp and only 11 were later royalists or deserters. In this sphere it is more difficult than usual to ascribe political views to people except in a vague way. No one could ever be certain where his neighbour stood on religious and political issues at any given moment, especially in view of the complicated stresses often pulling in opposite directions. This was made worse by the incipient split among the opposition leaders themselves. The religious views ascribed to the members in the Table <sup>116.</sup> naturally refer to a later period but give some indication of their positive interest in doctrinal and organizational matters.

Committees dealing with religion were structurally very similar to those setup to deal with other aspects of constitutional reform, but only as long as "religious reform" meant erastian measures attacking the religious hierarchy which had become so clearly identifiable with Laudianism. They were used to attack the king on the religious front by stating clearly the objections to his administration and demonstrating solidarity among the representatives of the nation by the width of participation. It is clear from the membership of these committees that there was wide support for the policy of the opposition leaders who were very willing to allow the burden of work to be spread among men who could demonstrate the extent of the royal administration's unpopularity.



On the other hand a very different method was used when there was any question of positive religious reforms, either doctrinal or structural. The settlement of the church was not entrusted at first to select committees but was specifically reserved for discussion by the Committee of the Whole. This departure from the usual method of expediting important matters by careful delegation of authority was due in part to the conflict implicit among the opposition members themselves; at the same time there was probably reluctance on the part of many members to settle anything positive about church government while there were still so many prior problems to be got out of the way. This difficulty was later met by setting up an extra-parliamentary body under supervision from the Commons to consider ecclesiastical theory and government. Few steps were taken in a positive direction in religious affairs, and it is significant that the enquiry into the ministry was carried out by a sub-committee of a Committee of the Whole which meant that the whole membership was consulted.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS OR COMMITTEES OF RELIGION 1640-JULY 1642.

Name	No. of ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists	Presbyterians	Presbyterian Independents	Independents	Erastians	Puritans (died early)	Political Independents
Barrington	11		X									X
Baselrig	10	X							X			
Widdrington	10				X							X
White	10				X						X	
Hampton	9		X								X	
Glyn	9		X				X					
Selden	8			X			X					
Goodwyn A.	8		X					X				
Housee	8		X						X			
Whistler	7					X						
St. John	7	X								X		
Harley	7				X		X					
Holles	7		X				X					
Goodwyn R.	7		X					X				
Gerrard	7		X				X					
Pyn	7		X								X	
Culpepper	7					X						
Erle	7		X				X					
DiEwes	7			X			X					
Dering	7					X				X		
Wheeler	6				X		X					
Maynard	6			X			X					
Mountford	6		X								X	
Whitehead	6						X					
Bagshaw	6					X						
Holland J.	6				X				X			
Hyde	6					X						
Hungerford	6				X						X	
Ferd	6				X						X	
Piennes	6		X						X			
Rigby	6	X						X				
Whittaker	5			X					X			
Moore J.	5				X			X				
Strangeways	5					X						
Hatcher	5						X					
Hutchinson	5	X							X			
Prideaux	5	X						X				
Pierrepoint	5			X					X			

Name	No. of ctees	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists	Presbyterians	Presbyterian Independents	Independents	Erastians	Puritans (died early)	Political Independents
Palmer	5				X							
Palmer	5			X								
Cromwell	5		X						X			
Falkland	5				X							
Irby	5		X				X					
Lytton	5				X		X					
Holle	5				X						X	
Reynolds	5				X		X	X				
Vane	5	X							X			
Marten	4	X							X?			
Wilde	4				X				X			
Strangways	4					X						
Hotham	4			X								
Crew	4				X						X	
Cage	4				X						X	
Corbett J.	4		X				X					
Ashe E.	4		X						X			
Anderson	4					X						
Luke	4		X				X					
North	4						X					
Fowell	4						X					

Recusants.

One aspect of the religious policy of the Commons before the outbreak of war which was more plainly political in implication even than the removal of the bishops was the treatment of recusants and delinquents. The vindictive measures taken against Catholics, or even high-church Laudians clearly reflect the strategy of smearing the king with popery. The recusants were treated as security risks, undermining the laws of the realm and insinuating themselves into royal favour with the purpose of overthrowing parliamentary government and the church. Although this aspect of opposition policy

was loaded with political implications it is not surprising to find that the heresy hunt was carried on by the most active Puritans and shunned by the otherwise active later royalists.

The militant Puritans began their attack by turning against any colleagues who could be identified as recusants, as early as November 9th 1640.<sup>117.</sup> This obvious method of weakening the automatic supporters of the king in the House was nevertheless carried out by men with mainly religious fervour and the committee which was to point the bone was chaired by the fanatical Harley who had declared himself an active Puritan early in the Parliaments of the 1620's. This committee brought forward a scheme by which all Members were to bring their certificates of communion, to declare their faith and to agree on paper that the communion table was to stand in the aisle rather than at the altar. This made sure that anyone of high-church scruples would be disqualified right at the beginning of the session. Next, the net to catch recusants was spread to a ten mile radius of London.<sup>118.</sup> The implications of this committee's work were quite clearly political for it was not only to see that all recusants were disarmed, but also to examine all dispensations granted to them, an obvious stab in the direction of the court despite being dressed up as a security measure involving possible treasonable elements such as Irishmen living in London. The report of the committee given by its London chairman Glyn, indicates that its interest centred about the discrediting

of the Privy Council whose warrants had been mainly responsible for the release of Jesuits and recusants from prison; it also indicted the king's "letters of Grace" giving dispensations to obvious Catholics. The London burgesses, all safe Puritans, were asked to co-operate by collecting the names of papists. Both these committees significantly include such central opposition figures as Pym, Hampden, Masham, St. John, and Vane, and at the same time well known Puritans such as White, Mildmay, Hous, and of course Harley.

Seen the attack on the court became even more obvious. Two Councillors, Sir Kenelm Digby and Edward Montague were questioned by a committee about collecting money for a "northern expedition"<sup>119.</sup> clearly implying the existence of a popish plot. There were similar overtones arising from a committee investigation into the reprieves granted to a catholic priest and Jesuit.<sup>120.</sup> Both committees had a select membership of political leaders from the opposition camp and some of the leading disgruntled lawyers who later joined the king,<sup>121.</sup> indicating that this was not purely the province of the religious enthusiasts. Throughout 1641 the recusants were hunted with monotonous regularity - usually at periods when anti-catholic scares were most useful to the leaders and when they could be used for political purposes in the guise of security measures.<sup>122.</sup>

The men who concerned themselves most with the hunt for recusants were of course mainly Puritan, although this label could describe attitudes of greatly varying intensity. There were among the 36 men who sat on more than three committees<sup>123.</sup>

seven genuine Presbyterians, and six "Presbyterian Independents" in Yule's category. <sup>124.</sup> Seven were genuine religious Independents while two others supported them politically. (Not enough is known of their religious attitudes to class them with the religious Independents). <sup>125.</sup> Four others died before the religious dichotomy had been properly established but they were probably moderate Puritans. The men who later sided with the king or who deserted Parliament after the opening of hostilities included Dering who was an anomalous "Puritan" royalist in the sense that he was a strong erastian, and to some extent Falkland who shared with him his dislike for the bishops. It is probably significant that Sir John Hotham who was to betray the parliamentary side to the king and who was not known to have any strong religious views, nevertheless sat on more committees concerned with recusants than anyone else. The men who shared the greatest attendances at these committees appeared not to have been the most fanatical Puritans as the list of attenders shows. Nor were the opposition leaders the most prominent on these committees. Although Pym's followers were clearly in a majority among those who participated most, our list shows that the top places were taken by men who had no direct connections with his group. All this would tend to show that although the treatment of recusants was of vital interest to the fanatical Puritans and to the political opposition yet the work of removing them from positions of influence and rendering them harmless was shared by men of a wide variety of political and religious

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES DEALING WITH RECUSANTS.

Name.	No. of votes.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists	Presbyterians	Presbyterian Independents	Independents	Tractians	Puritans (died early)	Political Independents
Rotham	2		X									
White	2				X						X	
Culpepper	2					X						
Palmer	2			X?								
Perd	2				X						X	
Barrington	2		X					X				
Piennes	2		X						X			
Dering	2					X				X		
Hyde	2					X						
Hutchinson	2	X							X			
Washam	2		X					X				
Mildmay	2	X						X				
Selden	2			X						X		
Evelyn	2				X				X?			
Pym	2		X								X	
Goodwyn	2		X					X				
Reynolds	2				X				X			
Corbett J.	2		X				X					
Rouse	2		X						X			
Prideaux	2	X						X				
Whittaker	2			X					X			
Holles	2		X				X					
Widdrington T.	2				X							X
Hungerford	2				X						X	
Harley	2				X		X					
Mountford	2		X								X	
Seymour	2					X						
St. John	2	X								X		
Glyn	2		X				X					
Gerrard	2		X				X					
Grinston	2			X			X					
Iynton	2				X		X					
Vaughan	2					X						
Vane Jr.	2	X						X				
Falkland	2					X						
Fairfax	2		X					X				

attitudes. In other words there must have been a genuine fear even among the less committed members about the danger from Catholics at court and in the country - a fear which the leaders were very adept at exploiting for political purposes and in which they were supported ably by the religious enthusiasts.

### Strafford

The campaign against Strafford must have been one of the most closely organized plans of the opposition leaders, preceding in importance and immediacy even the Grand Remonstrance. It was of course closely related to the whole plan of attacking the king through his advisers, and Strafford made a useful effigy of the royal will of which it was easier to dispose and which could be used as a warning to all who envied him his place. The membership of the "close" committee to damn Strafford shows how closely the plan fitted into the general opposition blueprint for parliamentary action. Pym,<sup>126.</sup> Clotworthy, Holles, Strode, Digby, Erle and Hampden formed the vortex of the whole opposition and all but Holles and Strode were among the 24 select men planning the Remonstrance.<sup>127.</sup> These men were all party to the later Bedford plan which was to launch the opposition into the government. Digby, as we have seen, was a trusted friend of Bedford and a promoter of the Remonstrance.<sup>128.</sup> Clotworthy was a protégé of Pym's with strong Presbyterian views and Irish interests, who owed his position among the opposition elite not to his kinship with important families but rather to his personal attachment to Pym.<sup>129.</sup> Here he was of vital importance as an informed insider on Strafford's Irish policy.



The committee was set up on November 12th and was so well planned that Pym was sent to ask the Lords to continue to sit and to commit the Lord Lieutenant while the charges were being drawn up. <sup>130.</sup> On the same day the charges had already been tabled and sent to the Lords. This speed was probably due to reasons other than political enthusiasm. There was possibly the danger of a prior counter-accusation being levelled at Pym and his confreres, and so Falkland's temperate advice to wait until the evidence was clearly examined and the charges related to it was rejected out of hand. <sup>131.</sup> Apart from the haste and premature accusation the leaders were evidently influenced by the need to disguise their proceedings from the rank and file. The intentions of the "close committee" were thinly masked by the casual way in which the business was wedged between accusations against Secretary Windbank, <sup>132.</sup> and by the very general purpose at first ascribed to the committee which was to "prepare and collect such matters as might cause jealousies of alteration of the Churches and State". This, and the fact that Holles was prepared to have himself nominated to the committee, would indicate some confusion about how direct the attack against Strafford was going to be, and might mean that the campaign was originally meant to be far more oblique than the actual proceedings turned out to be. In any case it looks as though the immediacy of the need to indict Strafford was not appreciated even by someone as close to Pym's counsels as Holles. There is every indication that Pym regarded the handling of this delicate matter as so

important and so secret that he kept as many people in the dark about it as possible. His personal touch can be seen throughout the early days of the committee's proceedings. He put his own views on what should be done about those Members who were unprepared to give evidence to the committee. <sup>133.</sup> Even members who were not among the political elite recognized Pym's leadership in the House from his proceedings on this committee as we have already seen. <sup>134.</sup> The committee was fully occupied until Christmas with the preliminary examination of witnesses which should really have taken place before his impeachment, and it continued to sit uninterruptedly throughout the recess. <sup>135.</sup> Unlike most of the other committees of this period the "close committee" dealt with grievances only after the main political issue of the business in hand had already been declared. The activities of the committee indicate how widely the net for the king's misdeeds was being spread in Strafford's name. Its business included the disbanding of the army in Ireland <sup>136.</sup> and concerned itself closely with the king's power to levy forces in England and Wales. <sup>137.</sup> The charges against Strafford and his trial which were prepared here need not be dealt with as they are already well known. But the "close committee" remained in charge through the whole business of the impeachment and attainder, and Pym acted throughout as prime mover. The trial was to him the symbolic direct attack on the arbitrary powers of the king himself, and the thinness of the evidence could not have disguised this fact from Charles.

A large number of subsidiary committees were appointed to deal with specific problems arising out of the preparation for the trial. These were of course mostly legally inclined, such as looking for precedents for acts of attainder in order to further the charges <sup>138.</sup> against Strafford. Select committees were used continually to force the Lords to accept the role of the Commons at the trial and at the preliminary hearing of witnesses. <sup>139.</sup> Once their right to manage the prosecution was established small legal committees were set up in order to settle particular points with which the close committee was to <sup>140.</sup> proceed.

The men who participated on the committees involved in the condemnation of Strafford were widely spread throughout the Commons. At least 120 Members were on one or more of the committees and between them shared in one way or another the responsibility for Strafford's death. Admittedly some of these took part on only one of the large committees to discuss <sup>141.</sup> particular points with the Lords, leaving a small nucleus of men who participated on three or more and who were therefore the most enthusiastic anti-Straffordians.

The men who were most active on these committees were largely a legal body - as a result both of the legal nature of the proceedings and because so many of the points committed concerned intricate matters of law and precedent. Indeed the most famous lawyers of the Commons were present to a man. <sup>142.</sup> It is this factor, rather than any political affiliations of the committee-men which is illuminating. For it seems clear

that the charges against Strafford were trumped up and even if precedent could be found for the procedure, it was certainly irregular and not in accordance with the usual methods of establishing charges of treason. In addition, it must have struck those astute minds that this attack on the king's chief minister, even if it could be disguised as concern for the safety of the state, involved the dignity and power of the king himself. Naturally no one tried to prove that Strafford had expressly gone against the king's wishes, for as we have seen, it was just this implication which the leaders wanted to see made. The summary treatment by the commons was, even at this early stage, an implied attack on the king's right to choose his own counsel. Once again there ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> a significant minority of later royalists to be found among the men most active on the Strafford committees. Why did they fall in with the opposition tactics of attacking the king through the transparent ruse of blaming his "evil counsellors" with Strafford as the most evil of all? It is unlikely that any of them really believed in his treason, based as it was on the evidence of the unreliable Vane senior. Some may not have realized, as Lord Digby later claimed, just how tenuous the evidence would turn out to be, having been lulled into a prior acceptance of Strafford's guilt by Pym's strong assurances. But at the back of this more immediate reason there is also the deep dissatisfaction which all these men felt about the preceding years of administration under Strafford; there was good reason to feel that he was largely responsible for his

own policies and their execution, for Charles left him alone once his area of influence was established. In addition, they may very well have co-operated with the reform leaders in the fiction of attacking the king's "evil counsellors" for similar reasons, namely, because they agreed that the best way to keep the king in check was to attack him in this indirect way. This did not mean that they were prepared to follow the logic through to the end, for all of them refused to back Fyn when he began logically enough to query the king's legal right to choose his own council. The immediate experience of the preceding years made them content to exercise what was effectively a negative veto on the king's advisers. But they drew the line at the obverse and more positive interference with his prerogative.

It would in any case be a mistake to regard these eight men who later joined the king as a real coherent group. Some of them, like Whistler and Palmer remained with Parliament until after the outbreak of war and did not differ fundamentally from the views of the nervous Peace Party lawyers like D'Ewes and Haynard, except on the purely subjective score of how far they felt they could trust the king. Their legal training did not help them to decide the issue as there were obviously innumerable arguments from precedent to be quoted by both sides. The others, such as Falkland, Hyde and Culpepper who were active in most of the fields dealt with by committees in the early months were of course very critical of the royal policy and were not prepared to back the king until some (however unspecified) safeguards were established against arbitrary rule.

Pym's own supporters once again formed a powerful nucleus on these committees. Men like Strode, St. John, Glyn and Whitelock provided a useful combination of legal expertise and political reliability, but it is significant that there were also men like Harrington and Clotworthy among the activists - men whose politics were inextricably tied up with Pym's, and who were regarded by unsympathetic observers as his "creatures".

Much of the political struggle between the two Houses was carried on by means of conferences. It was by means of the managers of conferences that the Commons were able to put into effect the arguments provided by the select committees to force the Lords to accept the Commons as the actual accusers of the Lord Lieutenant. Here the spearhead of the political management of the Strafford affairs were even more sharply defined. Pym managed nine conferences out of twelve, Culpepper was on seven, Maynard six, Hampden, Whitelock, Glyn, St. John five, Strode and Whistler, four, and Holles and Reynolds three. All but the last two were ~~also~~ also very active on the committees, but it is clear that Pym's own group predominated far more at the conferences. Despite the wide appeal of the proceedings against Strafford, the vital issue of forcing the Lords to conform with the Commons' line was left to those who were most involved in the planning and presenting of the opposition policy.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES RELATING TO STRAFFORD.

Name	No. of ctees.					Name	No. of ctees.				
	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrat- ors	Royalists Lawyers		War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrat- ors	Royalists Lawyers
Maynard			X		X	Hyde				X	X
Culpepper					X	Strangways				X	X
St. John	X					D'Ewes		X			X
Glyn		X				Clotworthy		X			
Whistler				X	X	Erle		X			X
Pym		X			X	Hotham		X			X
Palmer				X	X	Harrington		X			X
Hampden		X			X	Vaughan				X	X
Strode	X				X	Falkland				X	X
Whitlock		X			X	Grimston		X			X
Selden			X		X						

The Grand Remonstrance and Protestation.

The "grand committee" for grievances was as we have seen, the mainspring of parliamentary opposition to the royal administration and the focal point of organization of the reform party's programme over the first months of the Long Parliament. It combined the useful centralizing function of tying together all the grievances of the nation into a formidable weapon of attack against the king's rule, and at the same time made the support for the policy of the opposition as wide as possible. Few parliamentarians were opposed to the scheme of petitioning the king for redress of grievances which so patently disturbed his subjects, and in this way Pym and his followers had the political advantage of near universal support for the first part of their attack against the whole hierarchy of absolute rule.

The careful co-ordination of the work of the committees set up in the first weeks of the session with the deliberations of the Remonstrance committee was a clear sign of prior planning on the part of the opposition leaders who wanted to make the greatest political capital from the feeling of national outrage. The committee was mooted in the Commons in an apparently casual fashion by Lord Digby at the end of his speech concerning the grievances of his Dorset electorate. <sup>143.</sup> This unobtrusive method of distracting attention from main political onslaughts was typical of the procedure of Pym and his friends at this stage. The committee itself was named on the following day, <sup>144.</sup> but there is no record of who re-introduced the idea.

In considering the membership of the committee of 24 we saw that there was a definite minority of later supporters of the king <sup>145.</sup> as well as Pym and his usual clique. <sup>146.</sup> The former were obviously men who were prepared to petition the king to reform his ways, and the opposition leaders used their support in the early months of the session in order to demonstrate the width of their political appeal. The alliance ~~was~~ lasted while the plan remained manifestly only to attack the king indirectly by petition. The final form of the Remonstrance and the political purpose for which it was used no longer got the backing of the incipient royalists. <sup>147.</sup>

In the meantime the grievances continued to pour in, and after being sorted out they were received by the committee. No one could doubt its political importance, heading as it did the list of committees whose work was to continue without



interruption at the time of the "committee purge" on January 12th 1641. In addition to all the legal, political and social grievances which were referred here for amalgamation, there was, as we have seen, a political battle about the commitment of the Ministers' Remonstrance, which finally found its way to this committee, with some significant additions. Although numerically balanced by safe Anglicans there can be no doubt that this manoeuvre was a victory for the religious radicals whose representatives were personally so much more weighty than their opponents. We have already seen that there were strong objections to the Ministers' Remonstrance being committed to the committee of 24 as well as the addition of extra members. Perhaps as a result of the combined distaste of the Anglicans and the crastians who did not want the political programme slowed down by considerations of religious grievances, the ministers' remonstrance was in fact considered by a number of men who were later added to the original committee with the specific instructions to go into this matter only. This meant that people like Marten who were interested in quick political action were appeased because the committee of 24 was left alone to get on with its other grievances, while at the same time the religious extremists were satisfied by the type of men to whom the religious aspect was entrusted. These 21 additional members were quite evidently dominated by the extreme Foot and Branch element. Eight of them were active Presbyterians, two were strong reforming Puritans, and six were Independents or Presbyterian Independents all of whom

were actively concerned in fundamental reform, Bosville and Falkland though later to become clear royalists were both erastian and anti-episcopalian. Only Hyde, Hatton and Coventry were outspoken defenders of the bishops. In this way the composition of the effective group which was to consider the Puritan petition was even more inclined to extremism than the original committee of 24.

From February onwards it appears that the religious adjunct of the committee was busier than the Remonstrance committee itself, because a great many references were made to it from the House and the reports and resolutions followed with predictable regularity.<sup>152.</sup> In this way it helped to correlate the work of the committees indicting the religious courts and by April was beginning an overt attack on the power of the bishops.<sup>153.</sup> By contrast, the committee of 24 hardly reported and had no new references made to it. It had a solid two months work in front of it which needed sorting and drafting. It was stirred into action by an order of the House on April 2nd which called for the committee to draw up a petition for redress of grievances to the king. This precipitating move was initiated by Glyn, an enthusiastic political and religious reformer. He did this by suggesting that a committee be named to "draw upp the heads of these grievances . . . to be speedily preferred. . . to his Majesty".<sup>154.</sup> He may of course have wanted to see another, more completely radical committee appointed to take the work out of the hands of the mixed 24 committee-men, or he may merely have wished to see the job done quickly

by whoever was ready to take it on. His enthusiasm was frustrated by several counterproposals. D'Ewes, who agreed with the need to send the petition, specified that it should be left to the original committee together with the additional members for the Ministers' Remonstrance.<sup>155</sup> The reformers were here clearly at cross-purposes, for those who were prepared to have the original committee of 24 complete its task were urging to have its numbers supplemented by replacement for deceased members.<sup>156</sup> This was an uninformed attempt to stock the committee with more reformers. As a result of all this lobbying and counter proposing, the whole move failed and the actual order to draw up the Remonstrance of the State of the Kingdom was not made until July,<sup>157</sup> by which time the original membership had been officially increased by addition of the whole ministers' remonstrance committee, giving the extremists a far better representation than before.

The work of the committee in either extending or collating its conclusions was interrupted by the king's projected trip to Scotland. This event distracted the attention of the parliamentary leaders away from their first stratagem of the remonstrance and focused them more upon the possibility of substituting the king's administration with their own machinery.<sup>158</sup> Although the committee was specifically enjoined to continue its meetings during the enforced recess, the king's absence prevented a suitable timing for its presentation. The first draft was read on November 9th but proceedings were further delayed as the members wanted to have additional grievances referred for incorporation into the whole document.

This may well have been a way of increasing both the radical content of the petition and the extremist membership, for Strode was added to strengthen the wording on breach of parliamentary privilege, Crosswell to investigate the administration of sewers commissions, Wilde to look into the destruction of royal timbers by recusants, and so on. <sup>159.</sup> The result of the reading of the Remonstrance need not be re-iterated, but it is probably significant that before it was put to the political test it had to be toned down in order to gain even the narrow majority it achieved. The over-zealousness of the members of the ministers' remonstrance committee was rewarded by removing from the committee's resolutions those clauses which were considered to conflict too much with the preserves of the House on religious matters. In this way the disposition of the bishops and the fate of the book of Common Prayer were taken out of the committee's jurisdiction. Perhaps as a reaction against the original unanimity of all who favoured reform the committee was even forced to tone down its condemnation of some of the prerogative courts <sup>160.</sup> (although not of course, the most unpopular ones.)

When we consider that the proceedings on the remonstrance was the fulcrum of opposition activity in 1641 it is important to see how the later royalists reacted. Related to the business of the Remonstrance was the earlier Protestation made to the king, partly as a result of the Strafford indictment and partly arising out of the collection of grievances. This was drawn up by a small committee on April 23rd and bound all

M.P.'s who subscribed to it to the belief that the papist plots in the country, in the army and in Ireland were responsible for arbitrary government, illegal taxation and innovations in the church. It included the vow to "defend . . . the true reformed, Protestant Religion expressed in the doctrine of the Church of England"<sup>161.</sup> This very provocative gesture which anticipated the open attack on the king's councillors was planned by such uncompromising opposition figures as Holles, Glyn, ~~Widd~~ Marten and Evelyn, all of whom were anxious not to lose the impetus of the gathered grievances before the remonstrance committee. They were supported by Maynard, a famous constitutionalist, and also by Culpepper and Falkland. The latter were more sympathetic than some of their colleagues to the erasian aspects of the Puritans; here they were helping Pym however in a far more overtly political way, by co-operating with his scare campaign and lending credence to the fiction of the king's "evil counsellors". Certainly they shared with the opposition a real fear of catholic subversion, and at least at this early stage they shared the conviction that a united front against the king and his advisors was necessary. The vow framed by the committee was in any case put into an ambivalent form in order to encourage as wide a membership as possible. The vote was carried that all M.P.'s were to take<sup>162.</sup> the Protestation as drafted by the committee, and the debate which followed included a compromise - that "against all Popery and Popish Innovations" meant only the public doctrine and

not the forms of worship or the government of the church or its rites - a clause which practically nullified the content of the vow. This watering down was probably the result of conservative opinion in the House and not the desire of the committee which included Falkland and Culpepper. Clarendon suggested that the Protestation was regarded as a safeguard against religious reform, <sup>163.</sup> as it first read "to defend the Protestant religion expressed in the doctrine of the Church of England" when it was taken by M.P.'s on the 3rd May. He maintained that the addition "against all Popery and Popish Innovations . . . contrary to the same doctrine" with the proviso built in was added two days later after outside Puritan pressure had been brought to bear on the parliamentary leaders, and that therefore the majority who signed the Protestation did so under false pretences on the first day. In this way he was also exonerating his colleagues Culpepper and Falkland after the event. Clarendon's facts are wrong, but his explanation may well have been correct. For as we have seen the tempering of the Protestation was rather the other way round. It was passed with the words "against all Popery and Popish Innovations" on the 3rd May, and as such was signed by all including the royalists. This statement was toned down later on 12th May with the milder statement that it "meant <sup>164.</sup> only public doctrine" etc. But despite the anti-Arminianism of this clause the affirmation was still about the Church of England and the royalists may well have thought this some safeguard against the Puritans. Culpepper and Falkland were

therefore instrumental in disabling the first batch of royalists who refused to take the Protestation, even in its toned down form regarding the interpretation of the "doctrine of the Church of England". They and a few kindred spirits continued to be active on committees to see that M.P.'s did take the vow and to investigate those who were remiss. 165.

It is therefore not surprising to see Falkland, Dering and Culpepper featuring on the list of those active in this sphere of committee work. They were all pushed beyond the usual level of royalist tolerance for Puritanism and helped Pym immeasurably to widen his support in this manner of attacking the king. It is clear that in this important field his own group should have predominated. The vortex of the opposition leadership in the persons of Pym himself, Glyn, Hampden, Holles, Piennes, Vane and Goodwyn testify to the importance attached to these committees and their work. Conferences with the Lords in this field were dominated by Pym, Holles, Culpepper and Glyn. As usual then, Pym's organization was able to influence the choice of active committee-men to the extent of easily dominating any other group or even any strong individual, but it did not exclude other interests taking part. He could thus ensure a victory for his point of view without being too obviously dictatorial or secretly devious in his manoeuvres.

The committee for the Remonstrance and its related committees demonstrate probably more clearly than any others the concentrated effort which went into planning the methods of opposition to the crown and the heavy reliance on well-

organized committees to put the wishes of the leaders into effect. Both the membership and the business of these committees were carefully controlled and handled without dictatorial methods being needed. As originally conceived this committee and its later adjuncts were meant to draw to the attention of the king the nation-wide grievances brought on by his regime. In this way they were meant to illustrate the universality of the opposition and the need for total reform. They combined the necessary propaganda weapon of appeal to the electorate in order to underline the main purpose of persuading the government of the serious intent and the justice of its cause. In this form it did not antagonise many later royalists and therefore fulfilled perfectly the aim of the leaders to get as wide support as possible for an as yet undefined and purposely loose policy of reform, without at the same time losing the impact of the attack upon the king and his advisors.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES FOR REMONSTRANCE AND PROTESTATION.

Name	No. of ctees	War Party	Mid-Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royalists	Lawyers	Presbyt- erians	Indepen- dents	Erest- ians	Church of England
Glyn	5	X				X	X				
Maynard	4		X			X	X				
Falkland	4				X					X	
Dering	3				X					X	
Holles	3	X				X	X				
Culpepper	3				X	X					X?
Fym	3	X				X		Puritan			
Piennes	3	X				X		X			
Hampden	3	X				X		Puritan			
Selden	3		X			X				X	
Pye	3			X		X	X				
Vane	3	X				X		X			
Evelyn	3			X		X		X			
Goodwyn R.	3	X				X		X			



### Conclusion.

The whole basis of the opposition leaders' attacks upon the king and his Council was the unity of the Commons on the need to strip the king of the trappings of arbitrary rule. This truism does not need an examination of the committees to support it, although the study of the membership showed that all but a small group of sycophants, who were in any case inactive in the House, took part. But what were the general methods employed to gain the co-operation of a large number of men with differing aims, aspirations, backgrounds, and limits to which they were prepared to go?

First of all, there was almost universal agreement about the heinousness of the king's attacks upon parliamentary privilege. Of all the grievances which the leaders could cite to gain popularity among the members, the infringements upon their rights in the earlier Parliaments and the final outrage of the attempted arrest of the five members were certain trumps. Pym exploited this unity at strategic times in order to pull together dissidents, and for a time some of the leading later royalists even supported the committees set up to flagellate the king after the failure of his coup. Mainly however, the attack on privilege was turned to use by stressing the evil and perverseness of prerogative rule which had caused the suffering of parliamentarians defending their privileges, and even further by indicting the "counsellors" ~~responsible~~ responsible for the comparative success of the eleven years' tyranny.

This line of attack was made far more explicit in the committees which dealt with petitions received by the Commons. Despite their apparent randomness the petitions for redress had been carefully solicited by the reform leaders before the meeting of Parliament, and once received they were introduced in such a way as to be of maximum use in indicting the organs of arbitrary rule against which they were directed. The efficient and disarming method - to commit a particular petition to a committee which subsequently became the centre of all similar petitions - resulted in an effective build-up of evidence undermining separately each one of the props of personal rule. The technique was streamlined even further by a steering committee which took some of the spontaneity out of the receipt of petitions and grievances but added a note of bureaucratic efficiency to the whole proceedings. In order to leave nothing to chance, the major committees were set up in response to urgent pleas for redress from worthy citizens who were lucky enough to have people like Pym and Hampden take up their cause. At a more general level the committees to draw up the charges against each of the unpopular institutions fed their conclusions to the Grand Committee for Grievances which was the final sorting-house and produced the most pointed and wholesale attack upon the king and his advisors before the outbreak of war. The membership of all these committees reflected the usefulness of this method of attack. They were usually very large and allowed anyone

who had anything to contribute to attend; they were filled with lawyers of every political nuance; they contained a core of opposition leaders; as a contrast, the Grand Committee meeting in secret, comprised a careful selection of parliamentary leaders. This stressed the unanimity of the Commons with the added prestige of a whole barrage of lawyers joining to lay low the prerogative. At the same time the leaders were able to direct the course of proceedings in the committees without giving the impression of precipitating the members into the revolutionary abyss. Finally, the Remonstrance Committee gave direction and force to the attack, making sure that all available resources were fully exploited, and ensuring that only the top-level ~~statesmen~~<sup>strategists</sup> would have a hand in planning a tactical victory over the king.

The success of this system of promoting the attack on the king through large committees which passed on their conclusions to a more politically sophisticated junta for completion broke down when there was a lack of unanimity among the leaders about the exact ends sought. This was shown to be so in the committees relating to religion, where at first the attack upon the established church took a similar form to the attacks on the other unpopular institutions of Charles and Laud; but as soon as the existing structure had been pulled down there was a hiatus in what was to take its place. So unsure were the leaders of their own minds and those of their opponents', that they were unwilling to use the machine they had created themselves in order to reach a solution

in case it turned into a monster and attacked their own most cherished edifices of church government.

One would expect that the leaders would depend very largely upon the support of the Puritans in their attacks on the ecclesiastical policy and in their hunt for recusants. But the membership of committees indicates that these projects had much wider support and that the Arminian policy of Laud and the fear of Papists provided a firm ground of unity for the majority of the members. It appeared that there was a strong element of erastianism among some of the later supporters of the king who were happy to support the Puritans in rooting out the catholics from the court and from all positions of prominence. In this way the leaders played their cards skilfully to get the widest possible support for their policies as long as they were able to stress the essential unity of their aims with those of the majority in the Commons.

In planning their attack upon the crown the parliamentary leaders were careful to adapt the committee system methodically to fit their current purposes. Wherever they could, they made the delegation of authority as wide as possible in order to spread the work, the enthusiasm, and the responsibility over as many members as they could trust. In this way committees were used not to direct the opinion of the House, but mainly for purposes of efficiency which delegation of functions entailed. When the purely administrative purposes had been fulfilled the committees were used in a different way to achieve the final political result; they became

carefully selected small bodies whose meetings excluded the plodding administrators and lawyers who had helped to draw up the material for the final indictment. The élite who made up the membership of the politically important committees for the Remonstrance, for Strafford, the Star Chamber, etc. were the real policy makers, and they used the committees not merely to expedite a mass of work as efficiently as possible but rather to co-ordinate and bring to fruition the plans of the "Shadow cabinet".

CHAPTER 3THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROPAGANDA

It has been suggested that when the parliamentary leaders became aware of the limits to which the king would allow himself to be pushed they began to concentrate less upon trying to force further concessions from him, and more on building up a rationale to justify the eventual steps needed to gain supremacy. During the emergencies arising in the year before outbreak of war Pym and his colleagues underlined the need to convince their supporters and the nation at large of imminent danger if the king would not consent to parliamentary ascendancy over his advisors and his army.

The ideal political opportunities arose out of the successful exploitation of the army plot, the Irish menace and fear of foreign invasion in the middle of 1641, the possible dangers of Scottish intervention in favour of the king later in the year, the attempted arrest of the five members which appeared as the penultimate repressive act of the advocates of non-parliamentary rule, and finally the king's departure from London early in 1642 which could be used to show how his advisors were forcing him to alienate himself from his truest friends. The committees dealing with these emergencies provide the closest insight into the methods employed to build up a public image of the heroic parliamentary band striving to safeguard the national defences and liberties against a king in the hands of unscrupulous traitors, against Popery and against foreign invasion.

Naturally propaganda measures were also dealt with by committees whose primary purpose was defence or county organization. Propaganda cannot be easily divorced from the more positive measures of policy-formation or defence in any situation which is not a figment of the imagination on the part of paranoid leaders. In the following section reference will be made to committees whose work was also related to other matters such as defence but ~~where~~<sup>which</sup> illustrated the way in which the committee system was used to build up an effective propaganda weapon against the enemies of Parliament.

#### The King's Visit to Scotland.

Until the middle of 1641 the opposition leaders had been busy in the Commons feeding the Remonstrance committee with evidence to build up the attack on the king, with settling their internal religious differences, and with dismantling the organs of prerogative government. These activities, partially completed, were interrupted by the unexpected announcement of the king's intention to visit Scotland - to supervise the dismantling of the English army still mouldering away in the north, and to settle the terms of the peace treaties between the two countries. When the king first intimated to the Commons that he intended to travel northwards the parliamentary leaders felt very ambivalent towards the idea. It suited them well to have the undisbanded army squatting on the remote counties as a reminder to the king of both his unpopularity and his need for financial support from Parliament. They looked with suspicion on the very notion of the king going to Scotland. His ostensible reason, to try to settle the two

armies and to re-establish friendly relations between the nations, could be seen in more sinister light - the possibility of forming a strong royalist party in government circles at Edinburgh might ensure that Parliament would be left isolated should a showdown occur . . . It is doubtful if this was ever a realistic assessment of the political situation in Scotland. It is true that Argyll and his supporters were powerful figures but the overwhelming strength of the leaders of the <sup>Kirk</sup> ~~king~~ was never likely to allow the victory of the Bishops' War to be dissipated. On the other hand Pym was probably right in assuming that this was the king's main purpose in going and he used his suspicion as a propaganda weapon. The Commons' unwillingness to let the king go was at least in part the result of a campaign to make the king's motives look sinister. And this early astuteness lent colour to the subsequent events of the "Incident".

There were of course reasons other than propaganda for delaying the king's departure. The rapid succession of bills breaking down the king's power could not be signed in his absence and this meant that the reform programme was bound to be slowed down by the enforced recess. As we shall see, a great deal was made of the necessity for the king's presence for the orderly proceedings of Parliament, although in fact most of the legislation dismantling the institutions of arbitrary rule had already been passed. The main delay which was envisaged therefore was not direct legislation, but rather the proceedings of important committees such as the collection of grievances and the formulation of the Remonstrance.



But all these disadvantages arising out of the king's plans had to be balanced against some very positive gains. There was the first opportunity to cast suspicion on the king's motives. And, once the king finally got under way, there was the important administrative lesson to be learnt; the Commons found themselves in a position of sole authority in the king's absence. For the first time their committees were able to exercise briefly some control over military and civil matters which had never before come under their jurisdiction. In order to see how these initial disadvantages and the eventual gains were exploited we need to look more closely at the way in which the parliamentary leaders approached the situation of June to October 1641.

Although Pym appeared at first preoccupied with trying to delay the king's departure at least for some time it appears that he saw at once the possibilities of a temporary acquisition of executive power for Parliament. He was astute enough to realize that a straight transfer of power would not succeed even for a short time. The Commons therefore suggested to the Lords immediately the news of the king's intentions was received that a Custos Regni be appointed by both Houses to assent to bills in the absence of the sovereign.<sup>1</sup> This proposal had the sanction of precedent. It also had the political advantage that a "caretaker" would be able to assent to any bills proposed by Parliament. The alternative, suggested by the Lords, of appointing mere commissioners,<sup>2</sup> meant that all legislation would have to be foreshadowed before the king's

actual departure, as their powers would have to be limited to specific legislation. This move of the Lords was an obvious counter to taking so much power from the hands of the king for ever a short time. Pym's objections were concerned with the need to act in an emergency which he thought might well arise during the troubled times of the king's absence. His sudden deep concern for precedent<sup>3.</sup> was brought about by his unwillingness to specify just what kind of emergency he had in mind. In order to highlight the need for the king's continued presence at Westminster a committee was set up to list the outstanding legislation for which his signature would be needed. This constituted the beginnings of an official parliamentary agenda dictated by a select committee which naturally acquired important powers in determining the relative importance of Parliament's interests.<sup>4.</sup> This committee was well stocked with Pym's immediate associates as it is clear that a uniform policy had to underlie a co-ordinating committee of this kind. The committee's report went even further to strengthening the power and extent of the committee system, for it proposed that if a recess were made inevitable by the king's absence then the vital work of Parliament was to continue in the most important steering committees whose work could go on uninterrupted. These were listed in order of importance and empowered to continue sitting during any possible recess. It is doubtful whether all these precautions had to be taken, especially in view of the meetings of the recess committee itself but this early manoeuvre stressed not only the vitality of parliamentary enterprise but added a note of urgency to the political climate

By now nearly six weeks had elapsed since the king's intentions were first discussed in the Commons.<sup>5</sup> Pym's ostensible reason for putting off the king's departure was of course his concern with pushing through the volume of legislation needed to free Parliament from the shackles of royal control. But the bulk of this demolition had already taken place, while Parliament's other preoccupation, the framing of the Grand Remonstrance, did not need the king's presence, nor, indeed a full session of the Commons at all, since it was being carried out in committees. Yet great pressure was brought to bear on the Lords to get them to vote in favour of delaying the king's departure by another fortnight. The urgency of the matter was highlighted by having the committee sit on the Sunday and arranging for a conference between the two Houses to take place at the same time.<sup>6</sup> Pym stressed that only a matter of national importance would warrant such a departure from the usual observance, and the king's proposed northward journey, to begin on the next day, necessitated such drastic haste.

Pym's tactics at this committee indicate that his real purpose in delaying the king's departure was not so much concerned with the legislative programme as with anti-royal propaganda. His report from the committee which had been organizing the stalling of the king's departure included the suggestion that the king should send commissioners to Scotland to explain his continued absence. These commissioners might be given powers to represent him there if matters were really so urgent. This proposal therefore cast serious doubt on the

need for the trip to take place at all. It began to look as though the Scottish commissioners resident in London did not have orders to hurry the king northwards.<sup>7.</sup> If it were possible to show that the haste to get Charles to Scotland was entirely due to the king and his advisors and had not been called for by the Scottish government, then suspicion could justifiably be raised about his motives. Despite the trouble to which the Houses went, the king left on the Monday,<sup>8.</sup> after appointing a Custos Regni, signing the papers for the treaty with Scotland, and assuring Parliament "on the word of a prince" that he would do his best to see the Scottish army disbanded. On the following day a committee was appointed to investigate ~~the~~<sup>9.</sup> the instructions of the commissioners from Scotland. The propaganda motif was brought out further by coupling the investigations of this committee with the instruction to consider "whatsoever may concern the safety of the kingdom" - stressing the need to take security measures. This committee's deliberations led to the appointment of parliamentary commissioners with unspecified duties and powers, to join the king in Scotland. Four days after the king's departure the Earl of Bedford together with Hampden and Stapleton from the Commons were named as the commissioners to Scotland.<sup>10.</sup> Whether the parliamentary leaders really feared a royalist party resulting from the king's visit to Edinburgh or whether they were merely using the occasion as a tool to cast suspicion on the king's trustworthiness is impossible to say. Certainly the Scottish commissioners in London and therefore presumably their masters

11.  
in the Estates were favourably inclined to the reform party. Certainly there were people in Scotland who would have preferred the king to a powerful Parliament. The very success of the politically loaded "Incident" during the king's stay there, and Charles' apathy towards it, depended on some element of truth for its effect. On the other hand there could be no fear of the king using the disgruntled army still in existence in the northern counties, against Parliament. Although technically they were waiting for a parliamentary vote to pay their arrears they were too much involved in the fiasco against Scotland to give Charles any support. It looks therefore much more as though the commissioners were sent, as Charles himself thought, as spies to keep an eye on him, and as part of Pym's plan to cast suspicion on the king's motives and actions.

It was characteristic of Pym to put in motion two, not necessarily compatible, policies. He did not miss the golden opportunity to give the Commons a chance of temporary executive power at the same time as strenuously opposing the king's departure which would have enabled a delegation of authority. Similarly he did not forget the chance to establish useful liaison between Parliament and the Scots by means of the very commissioners who had been despatched with a view to keeping an eye on the king. The reliable men chosen to accompany the king were to set in motion Pym's later policy of involving the Scots in the affairs of Parliament. They were to come to some tacit alliance with the Scots in any case, and more particularly to ensure that the king did not exercise undue influence

upon government circles. In this way the tentative entente between the Scots and the English Parliament through the commissioners in London was strengthened and Pym was able to begin using the as yet unexploited asset of the friendly Scots on his side.

Clearly it was expected that there would be trouble about the king's necessary assent to being spied upon by a parliamentary delegation. The matter was not raised before his departure and he had to be chased by the request to give his assent without which the parliamentary delegates could not be endowed with any powers. He was requested to agree to the commissions of the men named, who were to keep Parliament informed of developments in Scotland and at the same time were to keep the king posted with news from Westminster.<sup>12.</sup> No-one expected Charles to accept this transparent story at its face value. After a committee had drawn up the instructions for the commissioners Pym stressed the importance of sending the delegates by suggesting that as the king was not available for giving his consent the commissioners should be authorized by the two Houses alone.<sup>13.</sup> In making this proposal to the Lords the outline of the commissioners' powers was sketched. They were to be given authority to deal with matters of trade, to establish "good correspondency" between the kingdoms, to demand satisfaction for the debts incurred in the northern counties, to keep the Scottish Parliament informed of what was really happening at Westminster (implying at the same time that they

had been misled in the past), to keep Parliament informed of the scene in Scotland and to follow further instructions. Then a final catch was added - that the treaty with Scotland should not be passed until the king sent word that he had issued a warrant for the official appointment of the parliamentary commissioners under the Great Privy Seal. The Lords only objected weakly that blackmail should not be used and that the commissioners should await the king's reply in London rather than facing him with a fait accompli in Scotland. <sup>14.</sup> It is not clear whether the Commissioners did leave at once. In any case <sup>15.</sup> the king's warrant was received on August 20th and the commission, including Nathaniel Fiennes and Sir William Armine was despatched.

A large part of the business arising from the king's planned absence had been so far discussed by conferences between the two Houses which were astutely managed by Pym and his conferees. <sup>16.</sup> The committee pressing for commissioners was made up entirely of Pym and his supporters though it included eminent <sup>17.</sup> lawyers of less radical bent. <sup>18.</sup> By contrast the men who drew up the headings for the instructions to the commission included men like Falkland, Culpepper, Sutton and Bridgeman, the latter <sup>19.</sup> a staunch supporter of the king. Pym as chairman must have handled the situation carefully to avoid giving the impression that the commissioners were mere spies, for the king's own supporters were in favour of settling the northern question as efficiently as possible. The presence of the conservative Bedford among the other commissioners who were all associates

of Pym's, together with the uncharacteristic membership of the drafting committee, indicates that once again Pym was able to gain support for his double-edged policy from a wide variety of opinions in the House. Further, it shows that his propaganda purposes were not apparent to everyone in the House at the time.

Once the king had actually departed Pym was able to concentrate on the more positive advantage to be gained from ~~the king's~~<sup>his</sup> absence - namely, to take over temporarily the reigns of government. During the king's absence Parliament was in recess, and as we have seen, certain committees were empowered to continue to sit if their business required constant attention. Earlier, at the time of the Army Plot a vital executive committee meeting in secret had been appointed, as the precursor of the later Committee of Safety.<sup>20.</sup> But the business relating to dealings with Scotland and information about the king was referred to a special joint committee of both Houses.<sup>21.</sup> Over and above its liaison work this committee was given wide powers in case of emergency. It was to answer letters arriving from the commissioners in Scotland, in this way formulating policy in its own right. More specifically, it was to see that the armies were disbanded and paid according to Parliament's wishes, it was to keep in touch with the commissioners from Scotland in London, it was to proceed against delinquents in case of riots and invoke the aid of the Justices of Peace if this proved necessary, and it was to have access to the records and precedents of the House. These instructions could be



interpreted very widely. Apart from giving continuity to the recently initiated policy of liaison with Scotland they added to the impression of urgency and civil strife by implying the possibility of civil disturbance, and in this way heightened the uneasiness of people about the king's absence.

In addition to these wide political powers a list of surprisingly detailed administrative measures were delegated to the committee. These included the preparation of the king's accounts and revenues, consideration of the West Indies Company, the regulation of the fishing industry, abuses in the exchange and transportation of money between countries, Irish affairs, and investigation into the state of the saltpetre mines and gunpowder locally produced.<sup>22</sup> Probably these matters had been before the Commons before the recess and the committee provided a convenient way of overcoming the galling delay in the sessions of the Houses. Despite the specific and somewhat arbitrary nature of the functions delegated to the committee it became potentially a most important precursor of the later administrative committees. Its primary purpose was certainly to keep in touch with the commissioners in Scotland. But it is obvious that the king's absence was used by the parliamentary leaders as a period to test the ability and flexibility of the Commons to cope with executive and administrative matters. The powers of the Custos Regni were purely formal, while the committee to carry on during the recess was intensely practical and wide-reaching. Nor were the executive functions delegated to the committee a mere formality - certainly it did not restrict

itself to answering letters from Scotland. The orders it issued showed concern for a wide range of matters which had been delegated to it.<sup>23.</sup> The committee also departed from precedent by keeping semi-official minutes.<sup>24.</sup> From ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> agenda on two of its meeting days we can see how very like the functions of the later Committee of Safety were the operations of this committee.<sup>25.</sup> This would further support the view that this period was regarded as a test of parliamentary flexibility for later eventualities. On the other hand the committee's proceedings were hamstrung by a lack of co-ordination, as the failure to provide the money for the committee's orders for payment indicates.<sup>26.</sup>

Parliament met again on October 20th and Pym immediately reported fully on the proceedings of the committee during the recess. These included what had been done about the disbanding of the northern garrisons,<sup>28.</sup> what precautions had been taken against the expected riots in London,<sup>29.</sup> treatment of Irish affairs,<sup>30.</sup> and the whole correspondence with the commissioners in Scotland, including a detailed account of the "Incident".<sup>31.</sup> The anticipation of this political godsend had enabled Pym to work on the atmosphere of forboding and panic in London and Westminster which had made some of his extreme positions acceptable. He represented it as a papist plot against some Scottish Lords who were suspected of having "correspondency" with a party in London. Hence the preparatory measures taken by the Lord Mayor to guard the City, and the orders to the J.P's to obey the Earl of Essex who was appointed general of the forces south of the Trent during the king's absence. This explains

why the committee had been instructed to <sup>be</sup> prepared for "riots". D'Ewes indicates that Pym knew very well what the "Incident" was about, that he had known about it before it happened, and that he knew of the "correspondency" with the malignant party in London. There is no need to embark on the confusing details of the "Incident" except to suggest that the whole thing appeared to have been rigged. For example, there is the mysterious role played by the shifty Sir Henry Vane the elder. He appears to have been in Edinburgh at the appropriate time in quite an unofficial capacity and there is some indication that he was there in order to stir up trouble between the king and the Scots. Sir Peter Wroth, a member of the recess committee despite his enmity for Pym and Puritanism <sup>33.</sup> assumed in his correspondence with Vane that the latter shared his views, and warned him that his implication in the Scottish intrigues would harm his reputation. Wroth ~~did not~~ <sup>did not</sup> evidently know just how Vane was involved, but it is clear that he knew a plot of some sort was afoot before it had actually taken place. Vane's role is indeed difficult to place. Whatever he was doing was outside the business of the official commissioners. Since their unofficial business was concerned with securing the promise of Scottish support for Parliament and with keeping an eye on the king's manoeuvres to get support there it is only to be supposed that the fractious old Privy Councillor Vane was using his experience as negotiator between the king and the Scots at Ripon in an underhand fashion. It seems likely therefore that he

was sent to make trouble for the king by making his visit there look unreliable, even treacherous, by placing a sinister interpretation on his double mission of coming to terms with the Scots and the northern army. By exploiting the "Incident" he was then able to intensify the security measures in London and Westminster which made people accept more readily Parliament's take-over of royal powers.

Pym's report from the committee included the fact that they had ordered the return of the commissioners but had had no reply. Two days later the House<sup>34.</sup> ordered that a letter be written to Vane that he was to present the commissioners' instructions to the king if they had already left. These instructions were to ask for the details of the Scottish plot, to inform the king of the guard ordered in London as a result of the plot, and to tell him that Parliament thought it most important that religion, liberty and the peace of Scotland be preserved according to the treaty, as the peace of England and Ireland also depended upon it. This was a tacit acknowledgment of the role Vane played in Scotland. The tone of the communication indicates that Parliament had not only established its own support in Scotland but that it was prepared to use the "Incident" as a weapon to implicate the king personally in the plot. It even managed to imply that there would be a resort to force if the plot were extended to England or Ireland. In this way the propaganda value of the king's visit and the resulting drama was exploited to the full.

At the same time Pym had been able to use the events of the recess to gain temporarily a great deal of delegated authority for the committee which handled the affairs of this period. As always, the committee lent itself to easier manoeuvring than the sitting of the whole House. He had turned the king's absence which he had been unable to prevent into a positive asset both for valuable administrative experience and for propaganda purposes. The committee had alerted, without the king's assent, the military powers in existence. It cut across the work of other committees in dealing with delinquents. It undertook the necessary fiscal and security measures. When we consider how unwilling Pym had been to let the king go at all it is surprising how useful these events turned out to be. Clarendon suggested that there were in fact two factions among the powerful members of the Commons, one wanting the king to go and the others wanting him to stay.<sup>35</sup> It looks as though Pym used the urgent demands to keep the king at Westminster as a means to create a feeling of insecurity and panic, implying as it did the king's untrustworthiness. This in turn whetted the temper of the House and the country and made Pym's sweeping defence measures the more acceptable. The "Incident" made a useful trigger for these pent-up feelings in England.

Is it justifiable to speak of the activities of the recess committee as synonymous with Pym's policy? D'Ewes, as a member of the committee reported its proceedings on the days he attended.<sup>36</sup> He makes it clear that Pym not only sat in the

chair but managed all the business of the committee. He underlines Pym's absorption by mentioning that when he came back late one night after an absence he found Pym alone working in the committee room on the next day's agenda. But it is necessary to look at the men who stood behind their chairman in this large and important committee. Certainly Pym could count upon the support of the majority of the 47 members. However it is interesting to note that those of his immediate circle who later made up his Middle Party were comparatively thin in numbers, making up ten members,<sup>37.</sup> while there was an unusually high proportion of the later radicals who contributed eleven.<sup>38.</sup> This is worth noticing because in the period before the outbreak of war most of the work on committees was done by Pym's associates, while the radicals only came into their own later in 1642 when they felt hopeful of implementing a war-like and radical policy which was at times in opposition to Pym's temporising. Thus although we cannot speak of a War Party in the middle of 1641 it does look as though the men with radical propensities were prepared to come to the fore at a time when a drastic break with traditional functions of Parliament could be foreseen. They experienced their first taste of executive government at the earliest opportunity and they used this experience to the full a year later when Parliament found itself faced with the problem of fighting and administering a real war. By contrast there were comparatively few non-political men who otherwise appeared as constant attenders at committees.<sup>39.</sup> This might be a reflection of the view that the committee was

meant primarily as a political weapon rather than as a seriously administrative body despite the details of its executive power. The predominance of men with strong political views would indicate that the parliamentary leaders wanted to be sure of a good front against their more conservative colleagues from the Lords who shared in the committee's activities. The administrative duties of the committee, while foreshadowing the later functions of the organizing committees were not only secondary in importance but also obviously temporary in scope and extent. All but one of the non-political members were London merchants and their part was probably related to the specific function of keeping the City in touch with the committee while at the same time helping to put into effect the measures to secure the City's defences. Although the later pacific party was also represented, its numbers were weak, nor were they among the most influential within their own ranks. It was probably their interest in the affairs of London, or their legal capacities which gave them their place on the committee. In addition there were eleven later royalists on the committee, including the most active among them, Culpepper and Falkland, who, together with men like Bowyer were still sufficiently concerned to muzzle the king to support Pym at this stage. Those like Orlando Bridgman who supported the king throughout were minor figures and small in number. At the same time it is also obvious that nearly half the members were in some way connected with London through trade or family connections. The necessity to have London interests strongly

represented arose out of the financial help which would be needed if the Scottish army were at last to be disbanded as well as out of the feeling they were vitally involved in any attempt to govern without the Council, for political as well as financial reasons. In addition, the plots which Pym uncovered were directed more against London than in any other direction and provided a strong need for unity between London and Westminster.

In reviewing the membership of the whole group of committees related to the recess and its problems it is noticeable that those who were most active were the most prominent figures in the House, irrespective of political affiliations.<sup>43</sup> The political differences could not at this stage be differentiated but it is clear that there were comparatively fewer of Pym's immediate supporters present than on other groups of committees and that later royalists like Falkland and Culpepper, and Selden who never took a revolutionary position, should have outpaced the usual committee members who clustered around Pym. Despite the probable unanimity of most of the participants on these committees it is clear that Pym was unwilling or unable to exercise direct influence on their membership because of the pressure from leading political figures who did not belong to his own circle. This is even more striking when we notice that all the committees in this group with the exception of the Recess Committee itself were very small. The whole matter tended to be left to the best known people in the House rather than to a specific group. This is supported by the names of



those who managed the conferences which were so important to the handling of this subject. Of the ten conferences relating to the king's trip Pym and Holles managed nine, Culpepper six, Hampden five, Erle and Falkland four, and Strode and Selden three. The people on whom the whole problem of administration in the king's absence and manipulation of the political scene depended in this instance were chosen for their positions in the House rather than for their close adherence to Pym.

The period of the king's absence provided an ideal time for developing the experiment of government by committee. Pym made sure with political skill that the process of government would not cease when the king's retinue left London and he provided valuable experience for the future administrators of the country at war by giving them not only the machinery with which to rule but also the occasion on which to give it a trial run. In this way Parliament gained the precedent for emergency action which it later put to <sup>good</sup> ~~immediate~~ use. It is true that much of the power which theoretically devolved on the recess committee was not in fact exercised; but the emergencies which were being foreshadowed never occurred. It is also true that the payments ordered by the executive branch of the committee could not be made due to a lack of fiscal machinery; this problem remained with Parliament throughout the first year of the real conflict and was not solved until a proper form of equitable collection had been evolved.

The committees called to cope with the exigencies of the king's trip also initiated another branch of later policy - namely liaison with Scotland. The committee instructing the commissioners sent to keep an eye on the king had very wide discretionary powers and once again they lay down the pattern of later policy and its execution which culminated in the co-ordinating Committee of both Kingdoms.

But the most immediate use to which the events of the king's absence were put was the political capital made out of his intentions. Pym queried the necessity of the king going north at all; he used the previous emergency of the army plot to suggest that chaos might ensue if no proper authority were left behind after his departure; he cast suspicion on the most obvious need to come to terms with the Scots; and he probably engineered the timely "Incident" in order to trigger off the very panic which he had indicated he wished to avoid.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES RELATING TO THE KING'S VISIT TO SCOTLAND.

Name	No. of ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Adminis- trators	Royal ists	Lond- oners	Obvious "Leaders"
Pym	7		X					X
Culpepper	5					X		X
Falkland	5					X		X
Holles	5		X					X
Rolle	4				X		X	
Selden	4			X			X	
Strode	4	X						X
Glyn	3		X				X	X
Vane Jr.	3	X						X
Barrington	3		X					
Hampden	3		X					

The Adjournment of January 1642.

Although the issues which adjourned the House at the beginning of the fateful year of 1642 were different from those of five months earlier there are fundamental similarities in the use to which these emergency situations were put and in the propaganda value which could be squeezed out of them. The adjournment arose out of the king's attempt to arrest the five members of the Commons. In the fortunate absence of their notorious leaders the Commons voted that their very existence was in danger and without the king's assent they declared themselves in recess and set up a committee to meet in the safety of the City's protection to carry on their vital business. It is doubtful if the members really feared that a later attempt against them and their leaders would be more successful, for the five heroes returned triumphantly along the Thames within the week. It seems more likely that the adjournment was a publicity stunt to increase the bonds and involvement with the City. With a firm precedent from the earlier recess the committee could exploit to the full the illegality of the king's action, the fear inspired by the blatant use of force, the triumph for those who had never trusted the king in the past and the mutual protection and common interests between City and Parliament. All these motifs, repeated and strengthened the propaganda value of the earlier experiment of parliamentary government by committee. In addition the worst fears about papists at court and the intention to subvert parliamentary government were now confirmed.

Like the earlier recess committee the group named to meet at Guildhall<sup>44.</sup> were given very wide powers indeed. They were to "resolve all things that concern the good and safety of the City and Kingdom and in particular how our privileges may be vindicated and our persons secured and to consider of the affairs and relief of Ireland . . . etc". Everyone knew that these powers were purely theoretical as it was assumed that the Houses would meet again shortly. But once again an attempt was made to delegate a great deal of power to a committee which became another curtain-raiser to the full-length drama to come. In actual fact despite its wide powers the committee concerned itself entirely with the great breach of privilege. The five members declared themselves ready to stand open trial and to shed their parliamentary privilege.<sup>45.</sup> The committee declared those who followed the king into the Houses traitors and pressed the king to give satisfaction for his heinous deed by confessing who advised him to do it. Other orders of the committee dealt with the printing and distribution of its declarations on privilege.<sup>46.</sup> On January 17th the committee changed its sittings from Guildhall to Grocers' Hall<sup>47.</sup> and its functions were re-stated, perhaps to let the Lords know for the first time what was going on. At the same time further specific instructions were added to the committee. It was to find out who accompanied the king, to investigate the size, purpose and authority of any armed forces in existence in the country, to consider how a scheme of defence could be carried out, it was to feed the Remonstrance Committee with

further evidence on the cause and removal of "the present distempers", to draft a protest against the king's action which was to be subscribed by all loyal citizens, and to investigate the precedents for the House adjourning to a place outside Westminster. Not all of these functions were carried out, but Skippon was approached to undertake the leadership of the London forces and the printed protestation was disseminated within 2 days.<sup>48</sup> Somewhat later it considered how to raise money for the Scots and for the Irish campaign.<sup>49</sup> At the same time as these varied and extensive concerns the committee also dealt with quite specific matters such as the defences of the Parliament Houses, the river fortifications and a guard for the Commons members.<sup>50</sup> Once again, like its predecessor, the committee dealt with minute administrative matters and paid lip-service to the larger and more sweeping functions which had been ascribed to it more for propaganda purposes than because there was any real need for executive action.

The function of the committee can be seen to be retaliatory and provocative. On the one hand it forced an impossible situation on the king by wanting him to declare his "evil Counsel" which it was known he would not do and which was patently absurd. On the other hand it discredited the king by publishing the affair throughout the country forcing people to take sides by obliging them to sign the protestation. Unlike the earlier recess this committee was concerned chiefly with public relations and far less with the ostensible executive

functions. Its primary purpose therefore was not defensive as its initial powers would indicate. It coped with instructions such as "removing the present distempers" etc., by providing the Remonstrance Committee with its prime grievance which could be starred in the later Grand Remonstrance. Nothing very concrete came out of the radical proposals and resolution of the committee apart from turning the London militia into a working force. This aspect of the committee's work proved a lasting benefit to Parliament and provided the basis for its first competent army. It established machinery of contact between the military authorities of the City and Parliament by meeting with representatives of the Common Council and planning together the defence measures of the City and the appointment of Skippon.

The dramatic occasion resulting from the king's ill-advised attempt on the members lent itself as we have seen to excellent political exploitation by Parliament and this was the committee's prime aim. Unlike its predecessor which took over the minutiae of Parliament's work during the king's absence the adjournment committee was much more ephemeral in its functions which were left very wide indeed. Once the House met, its powers were automatically revoked. Its composition too differed from the earlier recess committee. The latter had been full of militants and Londoners who had eclipsed Pym's immediate circle as well as the royalists. The committee of January 1642 which indicted the king fiercely and which organized the beginnings of Parliament's militia was composed of nine of

<sup>51.</sup> Pym's circle, no later radicals, four non-political "committee-  
<sup>52.</sup> men", four later Peace Party men, <sup>53.</sup> and seven royalists <sup>54.</sup> in a  
total membership of twenty-five. This lack of radical member-  
ship and comparative minority of Pym's kith appears strange  
when we consider the provocative nature of the committee's  
business and its high political content. It may not be fanci-  
ful to detect in the composition of this committee the absence  
of the five members themselves, and especially the guiding  
hand of Pym to direct the most canny and useful into service  
on this committee. It was never intended to devote much of  
its energy to administrative matters, yet it included men of  
chiefly administrative talent, unlike the earlier committee  
which was stocked with strong political figures. The role of  
the royalists will be discussed more fully elsewhere <sup>55.</sup> but it  
is significant that apart from Culpepper and Falkland there  
were a number of minor figures who usually stood behind the  
king. We cannot be sure what their attitude to the committee's  
business was - whether they participated in order to prevent  
the king's cause from suffering too much or whether they joined  
the opposition in genuine outrage against the king's unconsti-  
tutional behaviour. It seems likely that men like Falkland  
and Culpepper did not approve of the direction in which the  
reform leaders were pushing the Commons, but found that they  
had to temper their inevitable support for the king by express-  
ing strong disapproval of his reversion to the techniques of  
arbitrary rule against which they had earlier aligned themselves.  
This occasion would have provided them with a last opportunity

to make a stand on principle with the opposition. The general haphazardness of the composition might indicate lack of leadership but it also indicates a very wide-spread unanimity among members about the king's actions and its possible results. As it was not intended to proceed with carefully correlated work during the adjournment there was perhaps less need to have a committee with carefully weighed membership. This is accentuated by the fact that the committee was in any case a rather arbitrary selection as a stipulation was made that "any who come to have voices". This meant that the meetings at Guildhall were literally meetings of the adjourned House of Commons with only the formality of a committee to satisfy the precedent-hungry. How close the committee's sessions were to regular meetings of the House can be seen by the unique reports in the Journals of their daily proceedings. In this additional way the committee was purely an implement of propoganda stressing the dangers incurred by meeting at Westminster but not primarily concerned with administrative measures.

There was a spate of other committees related to this period and the business of the recess but they were of minor importance and were purely meant to supplement the work of the central committee, more in the manner of delegated functions to speed along the committee's work. They concerned such matters as framing a vindication of the five members from the accusations against them,<sup>56.</sup> organizing the wording and publication of the declaration of current events,<sup>57.</sup> publishing the committee's resolutions,<sup>58.</sup> Framing an act enabling Parliament to adjourn to



wherever was found suitable<sup>59.</sup> thus creating the necessary precedent for the future, looking into the precedents set by the last recess committee and enlarging the present committee's power,<sup>60.</sup> and finally petitioning the king to restore parliamentary privilege and declare who had advised him to dispense with it.<sup>61.</sup> Sometime later the last drop of news value was squeezed from the situation by considering the petitions of the people wounded by the proceedings.<sup>62.</sup> Each of these minor committees had a core of radical leaders among their members and each had a sprinkling of non-political administrators. All these committees as well as the major recess committee were orientated almost entirely towards discrediting the king and building up a public image of Parliament as the vindicator of the nation's liberties against aggression. Once again Pym and his colleagues were able to use a situation brought about by the king's action in a way which best suited their current needs. In giving the Commons' leaders food for propoganda against him Charles was his own worst enemy.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON ADJOURNMENT COMMITTEES JANUARY 1642.

Name	No. of ctees	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Admin- istrators	Royalists
Clyn	4		X			
Wilde	4				X	
Whitelock	4		X			
Grimston	3			X		
Browne S.	3		X			

The King's Withdrawal to York.

After the unsuccessful attempt to arrest the five members and the ensuing moral triumph on the part of Parliament the king and his court withdrew from London, fearing for their

safety and unable to bear the opprobrium in which they found themselves. Their departure heralded the real beginning of preparation for the inevitable hostilities as both camps began to take stock of their assets and set in motion some form of military organization. But before both sides got down to the serious business of preparing themselves for the conflict there took place a period of exchanges, alternately conciliatory and threatening. No-one wanted to appear to be the aggressor, everyone wanted to gain a moral and tactical victory without resorting to bloodshed. This period extended from February 1642 and continued for some time after the actual raising of the standard in August. It seems unlikely that Pym and his colleagues seriously hoped for a belated settlement which would suit both sides. Whatever their ultimate hopes there is no doubt that the exchanges with the king during this period took the form of intensive propaganda meant to build up the public image of Parliament as the upholder of the nation's liberties, the supporter of precedent and the law and the real representative of the wishes of the nation. The Commons made every effort to establish the fiction of the king misled and duped by wily catholic councillors into treacherous and illegal ways in the minds of the subjects. The natural corrolary of this view was that the king's real interests, obliterated by those who persistently misguided him, were represented by Parliament rather than by his own spokesmen. This legalistic fiction, dependent presumably on the medieval concept of the supremacy of the King-in-Parliament probably persuaded no one but it continued to be used as a justification for taking up arms against him.

The committees which were formed to engage in this early paper warfare constantly vacillated between aggressive and conciliatory attitudes, trying to avoid being blamed for the deterioration of relations between the two sides. On March 29th 1642 Pym moved that Stapleton and Piennes, two of his closest associates, should be sent to the king "to beget a right understanding between him and Parliament"<sup>63</sup>. But shortly afterwards, on April 9th the Commons were urging the Lords to have the magazine of arms sent from Hull to London,<sup>64</sup> a move obvious to all as indicating a lack of trust in the king's intentions. The committee which was to persuade the Lords of the need for this move was at the same time to publicize the king's refusal to comply with Parliament's request to move the magazine out of his reach.<sup>65</sup> This indicates how all measures taken from this time on were intended to popularize Parliament's provocative mood in readiness for the inevitable.

It was only after Hotham's refusal to let the king enter Hull with his forces that Pym managed to persuade the Lords<sup>66</sup> of the need to have a committee sent to the king, something which they had earlier refused to do. They were evidently unwilling to begin on the kind of prosecution which was inevitable once hostilities were officially recognized. However, they were swayed by the Commons' argument that Hotham's stand, which he had taken in the name of both Houses had to be sanctioned. As a result it was also necessary to begin proceedings against the Duke of Richmond, if the policy of blaming the king's counsellors, in this case his military adjutants, were to be

pursued. Although the Lords now agreed to send some commissioners from both Houses to Hull and York in order to receive first-hand information about the king's movements and to see  
67.  
Hotham, they hesitated for over a week before they agreed that the commissioners should have the power to see the king. In the meantime a committee was sent from the Commons alone with  
68.  
a conciliatory mission to placate the king. The Lords' real objection was to setting up a negotiating body with the king which was indisputably ranged against him and which was dominated by those who were to draw up the commissioners' instructions - Pym, Fiennes and Hatcher.  
69.  
Pym, on behalf of those drafting the instructions showed that they intended to declare traitors all who refused to disperse on receiving the order to do so from Parliament. The violent radical Warten tried to railroad the House into accepting this provocative measure against the evident wishes of Pym, who began now to align himself with a more moderate policy than some of his more heated supporters. He tended to support those on the committee who felt that some of the Members of Parliament who had joined the king in York should be declared only "enemies of the kingdom" rather than "traitors" in order to avoid a possible breach of privilege.  
70.  
He gained the support of the House for his more moderate stand. The instructions which the commissioners finally received put to the test for the first time the loyalty of the local dignitaries and administrators who had to choose between following  
71.  
Parliament's or the king's commands.

Once the Lords found themselves in a position of having to defend Hotham's stand against the king's demands to have him punished, they could only fall back on the old and tried method of blaming his evil counsellors. With Essex's prompting they suggested tentatively,<sup>72.</sup> and later reiterated with more force,<sup>73.</sup> that they should be removed from the king's presence. From that time on a series of conferences and committees mirrored the deterioration of relations with the king as more and more defensive measures were taken, justified by the initial stand against the king's action in Hull. On May 12th the Lords were asked to agree to send commissions like the one grudgingly sent to the north to the other counties, and to issue orders for training and exercising the local militias.<sup>74.</sup> Further, security measures had to be agreed on to stop the king recruiting in the north.<sup>75.</sup> This was followed by a declaration of Parliament against the king's removing some of the law courts to York and cancelling his summons for people to appear before him.<sup>76.</sup> The Commons, now evidently in the grip of the "fiery spirits", put forward to the Lords at a conference their decision to declare for the first time quite plainly that the king intended to levy war on Parliament, and made their meaning even plainer by declaring anyone who levied war on Parliament a traitor.<sup>77.</sup> D'Ewes tried to temper this direct accusation against the king on the ground that the latest news showed that he did not want to start a war, but the vote was after all carried by the "hotter and more violent spirits". It must have been of little comfort to the king or his supporters that Pym's pseudo-temporizing

resulted in the ubiquitous clause "seduced by wicked counsel" being inserted after "the king".

The Nineteen Propositions sent to the king through the parliamentary commissioners on June 1st <sup>78.</sup> did not appear to have been drawn up by a committee but by the whole House. They were passed with little difficulty as it was probably not expected that there could be any basis for negotiation on so uncompromising a document. During the time between the sending of the Propositions and the king's reply to them on the <sup>79.</sup> 23rd the embryonic war machine in the counties grew. Yet the debate which followed the king's reply to the Propositions indicates how badly prepared some of the Members were for the revolutionary principle of a responsible executive. D'Ewes carped about the king's need to seek advice from men outside the official council, <sup>80.</sup> while others suddenly realized that if the Privy Councillors had to declare openly their opinion on particular issues then they would be afraid to take office for fear of the displeasure of the Houses. These fundamental qualms had to be hurriedly swept out of the way as events outpaced constitutional discussion and the king's impatience over the intransigence of the Propositions led inexorably to the raising of the standard.

Before looking at the general trends in the membership of the committees concerned with this phase a brief look is needed at some of the particular groups responsible for the policy of the months preceding the outbreak of war. There appears to have been a remarkable unanimity behind the committees

concerned with "negotiating" with the king, influenced strongly by Pym's immediate circle. Admittedly the commissioners who were busily putting the revolutionary orders of Parliament into execution in Lincoln, Hull and York were mainly men chosen for their local influence. Nevertheless there was always a strong nucleus of men close to Pym's opinions. Strickland, Ayscough, Wray, Armine, Stapleton, and of course Hotham, were all men who were both active and well thought of northerners as well as being among Pym's associates. The others who were responsible for putting the Militia Ordinance into execution were men of minor importance in the House but of unimpeachable loyalty.

The most conciliatory committee considered in this section, which reported Parliament's compliance with the king's wishes to Charles was also differently constituted. Certainly Pym himself, together with at least eleven supporters were on the committee, but there was also Lewes, Pierrepoint, Rudyerd and Cholmley, all known to take a very moderate line in the Commons, together with Culpepper and Vaughan, both active royalists. No other committee of this period was composed of this mixture. Its business reflected a somewhat anachronistic attitude to Parliament's role of advice and submission to the king's will. The isolation of this committee's work and membership only serves to highlight the radicalism and extremity of the others.

The batch of committees dealing with the propaganda war associated with the king's withdrawal shows a marked increase in the membership of the later radicals who were beginning to

differentiate themselves from Pym's more moderate views on some matters. As the time for open hostilities approached the radicals began to take a more active part in the verbal aggression between the two sides, as witnessed by their comparatively high proportion of nomination on committees in May and June.<sup>81.</sup> On the other hand the committee which considered the king's answer to the Nineteen Propositions on June 23rd was overwhelm-<sup>82.</sup> ingly manned by Pym's immediate supporters.<sup>83.</sup> This might mean that Pym wanted to ensure widespread support on the major issues which might have been looked at as too revolutionary if the most heated radicals had manned them. Nevertheless they earned their place on minor committees as enthusiastic supporters of a policy pointing towards a firm and aggressive line with the king.

The men who predominated on the committees relating to the king's withdrawal were certainly Pym's immediate circle. They were however well supported by the non-political administrators and also by the radicals who could be seen coming to the fore as the crisis approached. As it became obvious that an uncompromising attitude towards the king would have to be followed Pym came to rely more on the enthusiasts on the "Left". The prominence of Marten and to a lesser degree of Wentworth, both of whom were considered extremists, stress this tendency, especially as both had been only average attenders at committees in earlier months.

By contrast, the management of conferences was left almost completely to Pym's group. Pym managed 7 of the 10



conferences, Holles and Glyn 5, Vane 4, Fiennes 3, Hampden, Lewes and Stapleton 2 each. All these men with the possible exception of Lewes were closely ranged about Pym and confirm the previous observation that Pym kept the relations between the two Houses very much for his own province. The radicals might have harmed the  rapprochement  between them. While the royalists Culpepper and Falkland and their circle of well-known and respected figures were still active it was difficult for Pym to dominate the management of relations with the Lords so clearly. After they left the field of leadership he was able to dominate on conferences even more decisively than on committees.

These committees which were concerned with negotiating with the king in the period preceding the outbreak of war served several purposes for the leaders who wanted to see the committee system emerge as the executive machinery of government. They were of course primarily concerned with propaganda in a similar though more extreme way that the committees of the earlier critical periods. No one believed the methods used by the committees - alternating between minor reconciliations and major rifts - could even reach the ostensible purpose claimed for them, the avoidance of an open break. It was clear that they were more concerned to publicize the parliamentary position and lay as much blame as possible on the king for the inevitable hostilities. They tried to influence public opinion by elementary methods of propaganda; they advertized the attempts of their commissioners "to beget a right understanding between (the king) and Parliament" which were baulked by the king's unfavourable replies; they pandered to the king by acceding to

his demands on curbing seditious pamphlets, but renewed their attack on his "evil counsellors" and asked for their removal. These gestures were accompanied by more positive defence measures which were intended to make it clear that Parliament on its side meant business. Orders to remove the magazine out of the king's reach accompanied the desire for "right understanding"; orders to local officers to ignore the king's summons and to obey Parliament accompanied the commissioners sent to the king; commissions to the counties to organize local defence were a preliminary to the Nineteen Propositions. This phase of the committee system shows clearly the aims of the parliamentary leaders who linked the building of the war machine, enabling the war to be fought realistically, with the propaganda machine which had first to be set in motion to persuade the nation of the justice and strength of the parliamentary position.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES RELATING TO THE KING'S WITHDRAWAL TO YORK 1642

Name	No. of ctees								Name	No. of ctees.							
		War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Adminis- trators	Royalists	War Party	Middle Party			Peace Party	Adminis- trators	Royalists				
Pym	14		X						Waller	5	X						
Vane Jr.	10	X							Barrington	5		X					
Marten	9	X							Wentworth	5	X						
Holles	9		X						Goodwyn R.	4		X					
Hampden	9		X						Gerrard	4		X					
Strode	7	X							Erle	4		X					
Glyn	7		X						Haselrig	3	X						
Coke J.	7			X					Reynolds	3					X		
Crew	7				X				Ludlow	3	X						
Piennes	6		X						St. John	3	X						
Pierrepoint	6			X					Harley	3					X		
Stapleton	6		X						Heyman	3	X						
Holle	6				X				Cromwell	3		X					
Evelyn	6				X				Whitlock	3		X					

### Conclusion

Generally speaking it is true to say that the early months of the Long Parliament's activities were taken up with attacking the king and forcing him to comply with constitutional reform, put forward by the leaders. The need to propagate the parliamentary position and to denigrate the king's supporters only came later when the unanimity of the early days had exhausted itself. However Pym was not above using his flair for public relations even earlier if he was given an opportunity. This was provided right at the opening of the session when a committee was set up to look into the disbanding of the army in the north. Part of its duties was to investigate "what commanders are papists". The implications of this simple insinuation are manifold; it manages to suggest the irresponsibility of allowing the king to give military appointments to men who may be traitors; it presages the possibility of an invasion from the north led by a papist command; it anticipates a fanciful combined Scottish and catholic threat to Parliament and the South. All these implications were later to be used by Pym when the slightest evidence of disaffection in the army could be found. The political use to which he put the alleged Army Plot was as effective as any of his moves to discredit the king. The only difference between this very early sample of political expertise and the later use of political propaganda was that the matter was not followed up and no machinery was instituted to investigate the allegedly catholic infiltrated army command. By contrast, careful timing of the Irish plot and the scare

84.

of foreign invasion, provided the first and most useful opportunity for Pym and his colleagues to begin setting up some machinery to ensure the strength of Parliament's acting power and at the same time to publicize this need in order to be able to cope with what was generally regarded as a national emergency. The Committee of Six set up in answer to this scare, which became the first executive committee to deal with defence measures, also helped to publicize the dangers facing the country and to imply the untrustworthiness of the king's advisers who, it was already being hinted, were in league both with the enemy in Ireland and with the Catholic powers in Europe. It was against this background that the suggestion of a controlled Council was first mooted, and a hint given that there was a need at least for dual control of the armed forces. It was a testament to Pym's genius in exploiting political situations for propaganda purposes that the king's probably innocent but badly timed decision to make his peace with the Scots was made to appear as though it was related to the scares which were already causing such unrest in the south. Pym's plan to set up the framework of an alternative government in the absence of the king not only gave Parliament a dress-rehearsal for full-scale executive government, but drew attention to the dangers of leaving the nation without a head at a critical time. Thus the whole gamut of appointing a Custos Regni, a powerful committee to meet in the recess, and parliamentary Commissioners to Scotland to keep an eye on the king, all served a dual purpose. They provided the Houses with the practical means to cope with

administration in the king's absence and at the same time drew attention to the dangers of allowing the effective control of national policy and the armed forces to lie with irresponsible and possibly treacherous advisers to the crown.

As a propaganda weapon the committees certainly came into their own. It was patently useful to have a powerful committee sitting in the period of adjournment which could execute such wider functions than the legislative body. There was a flexibility about committees which allowed them to meet quietly, in secret if necessary, and even, to the consternation of some, on a Sunday, in order to get through their business. The delegations to accompany the king showed the adaptability of using committees to safeguard the newly acquired, if temporary, executive powers of Parliament against irresponsible action of the king and his advisers. They also provided the background information for the "Incident" which arrived as a shot in the arm for the less enthusiastic. They stressed the real possibility of a coup involving the papists in the unpurged army and the known catholic royalists in positions of authority in Scotland. As a result the need to set up security measures became obvious to all, and the propaganda machinery clearly related the necessity for security measures with publicizing Parliament's precarious stand. The Committee for Irish Affairs at the same time stressed the need to "clear the king's name" from the aspersions of encouraging the Irish rebels, providing another effective link in the treacherous combination of forces threatening the righteous.

The next national crisis which occurred as a result of the long awaited attempt to arrest the five Members was treated similarly. The adjournment of the House and the appointment of a committee to sit in the meantime echoed the previous hiatus in government. It served a similar purpose - stressing the emergency situation at the same time as delegating wide powers to a committee to organize defence and to make political capital out of the king's blunder. The situation was exploited to strengthen the hands of the parliamentary supporters in the City, where the crisis drew attention to the royalist-controlled Tower, and probably helped a parliamentarian faction to emerge at the head of the City government. This swing was encouraged actively by a delegation of the radical London burgesses backed by the reform leaders who were used as the bridge between Parliament and the City. At the same time the victorious "exile" of the five wanted members in the City helped to further their cause among the citizens in general.

The adjournment committee too, felt the need to impress the nation as well as the City. It not only recommended that everyone should make a "protestation" against the momentous events of earlier in the month, but foreshadowed defence measures for the counties. In London, the parliamentary-orientated City Committee of Safety actually took some positive action. In the counties there was as yet no method of carrying out parliamentary policy and therefore the orders were more for propaganda than for actual defence needs.

By the time of the next emergency, the withdrawal of the king and his advisers to York, there was a more effective fusion of defensive action with the need to advertize the emergency. Propaganda now had a triple purpose - it had to convince people of the possibility of armed conflict, it had to justify the defence measures which were being taken, and at the same time it had to show that every attempt was being made to come to terms with the king before it was too late. As a result of the situation at Hull the northern counties had to be instructed to arm themselves and to disobey the king's orders. Unlike in the emergency a few weeks earlier, some attempts were now actually made to link the administrative units in the counties with the executive in London. Trustworthy local M.P's were sent to spread the parliamentary propaganda among the county authorities and the populace by presenting Parliament as the real exponent of the king's will as against the distortions inflicted upon him by his evil counsel.

When the king began issuing Commissions of Array another opportunity arose for Parliament's claim to control the membership of the Council. This was carried a step further as a result of the slowly gathering clouds of conflict which accompanied the Militia Ordinance. For before any forces were actually put in the field the nation at large would have to swallow the natural dislike of such a revolutionary step as Parliament claiming to exercise the right of control over military matters. By appearing to try so hard to gain the king's consent to the

Militia Bill they showed their concern for the traditional forms, and when this inevitably failed the justifications offered for taking over control had to be carefully handled so that it would appear as digestible as possible to the precedent-ridden members of the 17th century gentry.

The leaders of the House exploited the committees both to stress the irregularity of the king's proceedings and to give the members an opportunity of trying out the powers which they would eventually have to exercise. They were able to justify the steps necessary to become powerful enough to control the executive and to set up an effective machinery of war. This dual purpose was fulfilled by small and powerful committees carefully controlled and led by Pym and the supporters of his policy. They were aided appropriately by the War Party men who provided stamina and enthusiasm and by the "committee-men" who provided technique and specialized knowledge.



CHAPTER 4.FORMULATION OF GENERAL POLICY AND DEFENCE PLANNING.

The following section deals with the method employed by the reform leaders to set up a properly functioning administrative system which would be needed if all the powers claimed by Parliament from the king's prerogative actually accrued to it. The most dramatic of these events was of course the imminence of war, but this was preceded by several earlier emergencies where Parliament was able, due to its far-sighted leaders, to evolve a method which was later to be employed on a far wider scale for the administration of the army and the co-ordination of intelligence and supplies.

It is not difficult to guess from what we already know about the methods used by the parliamentary leaders to implement their policies, that the problems of defence were delegated to a series of carefully controlled committees which took over entirely the administrative details involved in defence planning. Parliament had the opportunity to learn something of army administration and defence planning long before there was any suspicions of the possibility of civil war. Some of the early committees which were set up to help disband the northern armies and to pay off the Scots could not have been seen by uninitiated contemporaries as in any way related to an actively hostile attitude to the crown. But by examining their structure and the business delegated to them we can see that they were generically related to the later more overtly aggressive committees.

The complex issues facing the leaders at a time when they could not openly predict the likely outcome of relations with the king, made it impossible to separate problems of defence

planning from formulation of fundamental policy. As we have seen, the committee which took over effective government during the king's absence in Scotland, not only concerned itself with ad hoc measures of defence and with publicizing the reform leaders' attitudes, but also with formulating a wide policy involving relations with the Scots, county organization, extending support for Pym's policies, and stipulating the unspoken hypothesis that at a time of national crisis effective power and defence planning could be left in the hands of a few capable politicians and administrators who might be able, if a more serious need arose, to dispense with the royal administration altogether. But it was also important to learn how to integrate the experience gained in army administration from the disbanding of the king's forces and in national co-ordination from relations with the Scots. The leaders had to evolve a general plan of independence from the crown and needed to use the existent situation to learn how to exercise responsible executive government. They had to do this, moreover, without actually breaking with the king. The major executive committees dealing with finance, county administration and general defence, while concerned with useful practical details, also provided the opportunity to plan an independent administrative system.

#### The King's Northern Army

The existence of a disgruntled army in the northern counties together with the triumphant Scottish forces were the prime reason for the calling of the Long Parliament. The Parliamentarians could hardly be blamed for not making the disbanding of

these armies their primary aim since the unpaid forces provided the raison d'être for the present session. Indeed, paying off the armies was naturally the most effective bargaining point in securing the reforms for which everyone was clamouring. Therefore Parliament's dealings with the king's army had a basic political content which probably at first outweighed the valuable lesson in army matters and fiscal administration. It was only in the long run that the experience of disbanding an army proved important for the planners of Parliament's executive machine who were <sup>found</sup> ~~seen~~ ~~found~~ themselves having to provide the money to create a new army so soon after having paid off the old one.

It is significant that the discussion of what was to be done about the king's army was opened on November 21st 1640 by a committee which was to "consider the state of the King's Army and what commanders are papists and consider the state of the northern counties and the payments issuing thence to the Scottish army"<sup>1</sup>. This gambit clearly indicated that Parliament had no intention of paying off the army until it secured a political victory over the king. All the implications of the danger of an ill-advised monarch, the unsuitability of his control of the army, disapproval for the whole military adventure and criticism of the king's method of choosing his advisers were embodied in this opening sally. In any case it was to Parliament's interests to keep the army stationed in the north, for the discontent which it aroused was clearly directed against the king who was responsible for its plight and not against Parliament which opposed the military venture against Scotland. No-one took seriously

the implied fear that the army might descend on Parliament in a papist coup which the committee pretended to be a possibility. The army had just refused to fight for the king and bishops and was not likely to become a hotbed of catholicism overnight.

However, despite its political implications, the committee's work was mainly administrative. Sir William Uvedale was appointed Treasurer and most of the committee reports concerned the process of collection and payment of arrears. No report was issued on the progress of removing the papists from the army, although the order was strategically reiterated.<sup>3.</sup> Once the political point had been driven home the affairs of the committee became entirely concerned with administration. In fact the committee's reports ceased in December and a new committee was appointed which took over all the financial functions from its predecessor without any of the wider entailments.<sup>4.</sup> From that time on it concerned itself with useful administrative matters - borrowing money from City merchants and customs collectors,<sup>5.</sup> checking the musters on which payment depended and collecting extra revenue.<sup>6.</sup> In this way Parliament gained experience in methods of raising money which came in useful for the fiscal committees whose function it became to find finance for the war. Parliament certainly took its task seriously and took great pains at rationalizing the method of payment; so much so that it was not before June 1641 that the committee reported on its deliberations. By that time the major destructive legislation had all been completed and the parliamentary leaders were looking about for the best way of tackling the more awkward issues of control of the executive and religious settlement.

Sir John Hotham had been chairman of the new committee, chosen presumably for his knowledge of military affairs as well as for his identification with northern interests. His detailed report to the House included an account of all the money owing to the army and the Scots<sup>7.</sup> and also a very comprehensive scheme<sup>8.</sup> for taxation in proportion to rank embracing the whole country, thus ensuring that the burden borne by the northern counties would be eased. Certainly the extent of the committee's researches and the thoroughness of their work justified the delay in bringing in the report, though there can be no doubt that political considerations played an important part in its timing. Hotham's suggestions for a method of raising money by taking<sup>x</sup> according to rank were never followed in later months. Presumably it would have been very difficult to administer, but as a first attempt to deal with an unfamiliar situation it seemed ~~opposite~~ enough. It also appeared to point at the notion that the nobility had been more involved in the wrong-headed project of the bishops' war because of their closeness to the king and therefore that they ought to be more financially liable. It is ironical that had the scheme been put in operation the merchants who had made the initial loans enabling the armies to be paid would have been repaid by money collected from those whom they probably held responsible for a scheme of which they bitterly disapproved. The hierarchy laid down by the committee ranging from £100 per duke to £5 for a gentleman of £500 income per annum, also included the higher clergy, members of the king's household, Members of Parliament, members of the Inns of Court, while

recusants were to pay double amounts. A whole executive arm was appointed by the committee to deal with the collection of this widespread tax throughout the country.<sup>9.</sup> The committee managed to collate and centralize the whole fiscal administration by dealing directly with the army commanders, receiving petitions from the unemployed "reformed" officers and corresponding direct with the commissioners in the north. All this proved valuable experience for later months.

The preparation of legislation arising from the executive policy of the committee was usually dealt with by a committee of the Whole House.<sup>10.</sup> This dispensed with the need for select committees to draft legislation as was customary in other spheres although one or two specific matters were given to select committees to transact.<sup>11.</sup> With the work of this committee the whole administration of the king's army was practically wound up. But it is worth mentioning that the army did provide one final political asset to Pym in May<sup>12.</sup> when he was able to lay charges against the secret practices of papists and sympathisers in the army. Apart from the number of recusants who conveniently fled before the accusations reached them, the Queen herself had become involved. This brought the strategy of the parliamentary leaders around full circle. They had begun by treating the problem of the king's army as a political one and finished by exploiting its propaganda potential in order to tighten the bonds of self-protection among the members of the Houses and the nation at large.

It is not known whether the minor witch hunt for papists in the army ever really eventuated, but clearly its purpose was far more likely to be related to propaganda than to security. The fact that the committee never reported any progress on the issue of papists shows that this was meant only to impress the public and not waste the time of the administration. Pym only resurrected the subject at a time when an army plot suited his political purposes in order to induce unity among the ranks and introduce the difficult issue of attacking the Council. But the king's army provided in addition some valuable lessons in fiscal organization which were useful to Parliament in the later emergency.

As much of the work relating to the king's army was carried on in conferences, it is worth looking at their management alongside the men who were most active on the committees. Culpepper was on the management of nine out of the ten conferences, Hotham and Pym served on six, Barrington, Strode and Stapleton on four, and Vane, Armine and Capel on three. From these and the committee attendances it is clear that Hotham was regarded as the leading figure in these affairs as we have already seen. As a vociferous supporter of reform, as a northerner with military experience and as chairman of the committee organizing the whole machinery of disbanding he was in an obvious position to dominate the related committees. Quite evidently he had been delegated the task of settling the king's army by the leaders. Pym and Holles gave him substantial support, the former on conferences, the latter on committees. Culpepper

was very active in both capacities, acting still as a genuine critic of the policy which had led to the existence of the army which now had to be paid off. In this he was by no means isolated from the other later followers of the king. On one committee dealing mainly with administrative matters relating to the army there were twenty seven later royalists out of a total of sixty eight while Pym's own associates numbered only eighteen.<sup>14.</sup> Of the royalists, thirteen came from the north, as did at least ten of the others. It was of course overwhelmingly in their interests to have the army paid off as soon as possible and to remove this burden from their constituents. Among the twenty-nine men who were most active participants on these committees fifteen were northerners and we may assume that they were there to represent the interests of that region in a matter of vital importance to it. But there is also a far greater correlation between the northerners and the royalists than between the northerners and any other political group. Of eleven royalists seven were northerners, while of eleven of Pym's group only four were from the north. The northerners were certainly anxious to disband the army as quickly as possible and even the king's closest friends would have co-operated with the opposition in getting rid of it. It was the solid core of leaders from the south who probably kept the political ends more in view.



MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES RELATING TO THE KING'S ARMY

Name.	No. of ctees.							Name.	No. of ctees.							
		war party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royalists	Northern- ers.			war Party	Middle Party	peace Party	Administ- rators	Royalists	Northern- ers.	
Hotham	8		X				X	Scawen	3							X
Hampden	7		X					Hyde	3						X	
Holles	7		X					Dalston	3					X	X	
Culpepper	6					X		Digby	3		X					
Erle	6		X					Crew	3				X			
Stapleton	5		X				X	Clotworthy	3		X					
Strode	5	X						Widdring- ton	3				X			X
Pym	4		X					Wilmot	3						X	X
Cholmley	4			X			X	Anderson	3					X	X	
Cage	4				X			Paifax	3		X					X
Wrey	4		X					Piennes	3		X					
Meyrick	4						X	Vane	3	X						
Barrington	4		X					Soel	3						X	X
Belasize	4						X X	Ashburnham	3						X	
Littleton	4						X X									

Scottish Affairs

Until Pym's scheme for the intervention of the Scots in English affairs came to fruition after the outbreak of the war, relations with that nation were officially concerned with settling the peace and disbanding the armies left over from the king's last unfortunate effort to dismantle the Scottish Kirk. Behind these mainly fiscal concerns, there were religious currents, sometimes reaching the surface, but usually kept discreetly hidden, which sought to affect the settlement of the English church in a manner complementary to the Scottish solution. This aspect of the relations with Scotland is dealt with elsewhere,<sup>15</sup> as it forms an elusive background to the discussions on episcopacy, and party politics in the House. Here we are mainly concerned with the official matters to be settled between the two nations. In the settlement of the military affairs with Scotland there was some unanimity between the king and

Parliament, as both saw some threat to themselves in the continued existence of the Scottish army gathered on the northern borders. The king was also conscious of the harm to his cause offered by the hungry and unpaid soldiers living off the land in the northern counties causing discontent to all. The king's real desire to come to terms with the Scots and pay them off was far more obvious than the shady motives attributed to him at the time of his visit to Scotland in August 1641. No one could have believed seriously that the Scottish army would invade England at Charles' behest, - hence Pym's need for creating a climate of suspicion and terror associated with the king's departure. In earlier and calmer times, the unity of their aims was still clearly to be seen, as for example in the speech to a conference of both Houses on March 23rd<sup>16.</sup> by Lord Bristol, a staunch supporter of the king's; "Truly we conceive it can scarce be paralleled in any time where the House of Commons hath showd so great affection to the good of the Kingdom as in their own Particulars to be so engaged as they have been". Despite this unity there was in the early months of the Long<sup>17.</sup> Parliament the paradoxical situation stressed by Mrs. Pearl: "if [the Parliament] could not raise money for the army they faced dissolution; on the other hand, if they raised too much, Charles could presumably dispense with Parliament". The policy of the leaders was certainly to procure the loans necessary for the repayment, but to do so in such a way that concessions could be gained from the king in return.

Most of the business in relation to the termination of the Scots' presence in England and their eventual payment was conducted at conferences of both Houses, beginning as early as November 12th. <sup>18.</sup> The earliest of these concerned the extent-<sup>19.</sup> ion of time for cease-fire, deciding what amounts were due to the Scots, and how taxes were to be collected for payment, <sup>20.</sup> which kept the Houses busy until March. In the following month they discussed the arrangements for disbanding and the removal of garrisons. <sup>21.</sup> Verney, <sup>22.</sup> who took notes at one of these conferences, reported that the Scots desired to return home but could not do so without money. They assured Parliament that they did not aim to interfere with the religious affairs of the country, and only desired that the church be governed as it was in Scotland. (This as Baillie, one of the Scottish Commissioners, indicated was not true. The Scots were very much implicated in the Root and Branch controversy and had a strong faction in operation in the Commons as well as being closely associated with the Pennington faction of the City and well aware of the role they played in safeguarding the "redemption of their liberties, estates, religion and lives".) <sup>23.</sup> Then follow in Verney's notes what appear to be other points to be raised in the treaty. "Places about the king, queen and prince; quality of coyne; chusing councill; naturalization for both kingdoms; kingdoms freedom of trade; wishing manufacturers' associations with foreign princes; etc.". The implication that the Scots were advocating control of offices and the Council at this stage seems hard to reconcile with the fact that Pym

did not raise these matters himself until October, except in a very veiled and devious way. It may well have represented a tactical blunder, like several others committed by the Scots in their attempt to interfere in religious matters, which resulted from prior discussion with the reform leaders, but which were prematurely leaked out. Whatever the import of Verney's notes, the Journals observe a discreet silence and we have no record of how these matters were received at the conference.

For six months the Houses occupied themselves with settling the principles of pacification. On May 17th <sup>24.</sup> a committee of the Whole House, under the chairmanship of Crew finally drew together the votes of the months of conferring and resolved on a desire for church conformity with the Scots (which had been delaying the Treaty as the Root and Branch discussions had not taken place), on borrowing money from the City towards the £400,000 agreed to be paid to the Scots, on the Act of Oblivion, and on the mutual assistance with Scotland in case of foreign invasion.

It was not until May that a committee of both Houses was finally appointed to deal with the administration of the peace treaty with the Scots. <sup>25.</sup> This Committee of 52 ~~is~~ incorporated all the functions until then handled in the time-consuming and administratively unsuccessful method of conferences. Evidently once the outline of the treaty had been decided on the Houses were prepared to hand on the administration of it to a large joint committee. This committee was to settle the whole fiscal policy of the Brotherly Assistance and the arrears

of the counties. The armies were to be paid off progressively as the money came in. The committee was also delegated to deal with any differences of opinion which might arise between the Houses. It prepared the drafts of the treaty, which were at each stage further debated by the Houses.<sup>26.</sup>

The Army Plot in June, which, like the later "Incident" was used by Pym to precipitate a situation suitable for radical action and to create an atmosphere of urgency if not panic, called for another conference.<sup>27.</sup> This acted promptly to hasten the disbanding of the Scottish army, from which the plot to threaten the Houses in Westminster was supposedly emanating. Holles' and Hampden's mission to the Lord General was evidently intended to bring home the need to act at once.

Other select committees were set up during June to deal with specific matters, such as receiving claims from the Scots for payment.<sup>28.</sup> Some of these appeared to encroach upon the powers of the Committee of 52, such as one to consider the best way of disbanding the armies,<sup>29.</sup> while another set out punishments for not disbanding or not contributing to the money levies for the payment of the Scots.<sup>30.</sup> None of these committees reported back to the House, so it is doubtful if they fulfilled the business referred to them, overlapping as they did with the joint committee. Despite the Committee of 52 more conferences took place throughout July about the details of the disbanding, so that the committee never had the opportunity of formulating and executing the policies referred to it.

One reason that offers itself for the repeated return to the method of proceeding by conferences of both Houses and committees of the Whole was that the Commons' contingent at the joint committee was so largely composed of backwoodsmen. Of the 52 there were 29 later royalists, most of whom were not experienced either in the House or in committees and who were named rarely to committees. There were only five close associates of Pym,<sup>31.</sup> four later War Party figures,<sup>32.</sup> and six "committee-men", comparatively a very small number. The reason for this peculiar composition for what was, after all, supposed to be an administrative committee, was that members appeared to have been named according to their own locality - (not necessarily where they held seats). Among the northern members there were many later royalist backwoodsmen, who made up the bulk of the membership. Of the 29 later royalists, 19 were Northerners. The regional interest made up 27 of the 52 members. Perhaps the management miscalculated, in thinking that the administration of Scottish affairs could best be left to men who had landed interests in the region. In the later months key committees dealing with administrative matters were largely to be composed of "committee-men", and their absence here very possibly made the work of the committee of 52 less valuable or conclusive.

As the conferences between the Houses arranged much of the policy on Scottish affairs their management is important. There were 33 conferences held in the nine months when these affairs were being dealt with. Holles was <sup>in</sup> the management of 20,

Culpepper 18, Littleton and Falkland 17, Fiennes 10, Olyn 9, Hotham 8, Hyde 7, Barrington, Hampden and Digby 6, Pym, Strangeways, Marten, Pierrepont, St. John and Erle 5, Maynard, Crew, Thomas Widdrington, Reynolds and Roe on 4. Thirteen of these managers were also active on Scottish committees.<sup>33</sup> The later royalists were stronger in the conferences and Pym's adherents predominated in the committees. Men like Falkland, Hyde, Pym and St. John, all leading figures who later developed very divergent political views, were active at conferences but not on committees. This may support the view that all important aspects of Scottish policy were dealt with at conferences. In contrast to the Committee of 52, these active figures were evidently not chosen because of their regional interests. There were only four northerners among the managers, and ten among the most active men on committees. The participation of many later royalists was due, as in other matters which cropped up in the early months, to a united effort to destroy the king's arbitrary powers, among them the armies in existence. ~~Others~~ Others may have acted from motives similar to the ones leading to the disbanding of the king's army - the wish to see this embarrassing reminder of Laudianism removed. Taking all committees and conferences on affairs relating to the Scots together obscures the role played by the London burgesses in the early financial aspects of the topic. It was obviously useful to approach the city's financial coffers through the highly sympathetic M.P's rather than beginning from scratch with possibly royalist dignitaries of the City. The special qualifications of the

burgesses for financial committee work of this kind needs no examination and their usefulness to the reform leaders was straightforward. The reverse has also been suggested, namely that Pennington used the position of prominence gained through these negotiations to further his own political ends.<sup>34.</sup>

Finally, another reason may be put forward for so much of the early management of Scottish affairs being carried out by conferences between the two Houses and by a Committee of the Whole. This unusual departure from the use of committees might be explained by the conflicting aims of the reform leaders. On the one hand they needed to make the necessary preliminary arrangements to obtain the money for the Scots, and on the other hand they wished to defer final payment for as long as possible in order to keep hold of the trump to be played against the king. Committees had been found very useful in getting things done; here was a situation which required only the framing of a policy without any concomitant action. Conferences were able to deal with this effectively because whatever the rationale for the policy differing according to the political slant of members - both Houses were agreed on the principle of repayment. The final resolution of the Committee of the Whole was agreeable to all; but the underlying policy of involving the Scots in English affairs, by using the religious bait, and even possibly gaining their prior consent to the idea of a completely controlled executive - these were known only to the reform leaders and the Scottish Commissioners and they were not aired at the conferences or at the Grand



Committee. When the treaty finally reached the administrative stage, the whole business was handed over to a committee of both Houses. This committee's defects made inevitable the return to procedure by conferences.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES DEALING WITH SCOTLAND.

Name.	No. of ctees.						Name.	No. of ctees.						
		War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ. rators	Royalists, Northern ers.			War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ. rators	Royalists, Northern ers.	
Hampden	6		X				Pierrepoint	3		X				
Marten	5	X					Piennes	3		X				
Barrington	5		X				Goodwyn A	3		X				
Glyn	5		X				Merrick	3						X
Hotham	5		X			X	Ogle	3					X	X
Culpepper	5					X	Fairfax	3		X				X
Holles	4		X				Erle	3		X				
Stapleton	4		X				Holland	3				X		
Widdrington T	4				X	X	Belasise	3					X	X
Blakiston	3	X				X	Littleton	3					X	X
Cage	3				X		Strangways	3					X	X
Lewes	3			X										

Irish Affairs

The whole political aspect of Irish affairs at this time has been covered by J.R. McCormack,<sup>35</sup> Here the main concern need only be the parliamentary management of Ireland in committees of the Commons and the political pressures behind them.

Following the precedent of earlier Parliaments, Irish Affairs were referred at the opening of the session to a Committee of the Whole House.<sup>36</sup> Sir John Clotworthy, an intimate associate of Pym's with land and interests in Ireland, became the chief spokesman in the Commons for Irish Affairs. He and the radical Mildmay put on pressure at once to set up a select committee. But until February all matters concerning Ireland

were in fact dealt with by a Committee of the Whole, under the chairmanship of the able lawyer Whistler, a later royalist. One reason why the leaders of the House may not have pressed for a select committee earlier was that at first Irish affairs were inextricably tied up with the Strafford trial. In fact the first time the disbanding of the army in Ireland was discussed it was left to the Strafford committee to draw up the heads.<sup>37</sup> The war in Ireland was at a quiescent stage at the outset of the session, and its political potential was not at first exploited by the leaders. It may therefore have been expedient to allow the committee of the Whole to deal with any grievances which came in, and have them referred whenever relevant, to the Strafford committee, leaving in abeyance the ones which were not for the moment politically useful.

On the other hand, Irish affairs were also interwoven with the anti-papist campaign, which began somewhat later. Whenever the leaders needed an extra source of pressure to persuade the lukewarm of the necessity to take a firm line with the king, they bracketed together the disbanding of the Irish army with measures to dispose of recusants at court.<sup>38</sup> In this way Ireland became a useful bogey threatening fifth column activities. They never stated quite explicitly the underlying assumption. This was that the rebellion in Ireland had somehow been plotted and fomented by the catholic advisers of the king. The highly suspect evidence for this was the supposedly treasonable utterance of Strafford about bringing the Irish army into England to fight against Parliament. The king's move to

rid himself of the Irish problem by allowing the army there to be recruited as mercenaries by the catholic monarchs of France and Spain was given a sinister interpretation. Parliament saw in it a direct threat of outside intervention in the nation's affairs. As early as August 1641 Pym began to make it look as though a possible weapon against a refractory Parliament was being built up by the king.<sup>39.</sup>

In November a standing committee for Irish Affairs was at last set up,<sup>40.</sup> in answer to the alleged plot for an invasion of England which Pym had exploited so effectively. Up to this time the need for a permanent committee to deal with the affairs of Ireland had not been apparent. They had impinged only peripherally on important matters in England, and could be used mainly to put pressure on unwilling supporters and on the king himself. When the need arose a joint committee set out ~~at once~~ to procure money from the City for a loyal army and coastal guard to safeguard the country from the rebels. Significantly it also aimed to "clear the king's name" from the suspicions cast on him by the rebels themselves.<sup>41.</sup>

In the meantime another problem arose about the part the Scots should play in the Irish campaigns. There appeared to be no clear line even among the leaders about how this was to be arranged.<sup>42.</sup> There was conflict about how many troops were to be sent and who was to command them, but the main difficulty which faced Parliament was how payment should be effected. Some feared that the Scots' very presence would give them a stake in carving up lucrative Irish estates, and others wanted to make sure that their status there was entirely that

of mercenaries. The Scots' Commissioners who arrived in London soon after the king's return, in October, argued that the Scots should fight in Ireland in return for steady pay. In order to meet their arguments, the committee for Irish Affairs shed some of its powers which were delegated to a smaller but powerful commission. It is evident that the setting up of this committee gave rise to some political manoeuvrings. The rather large and unweildy committee of 57 contained 12 later royalists and four Peace Party men, while there were 13 of Pym's supporters, 9 radicals and 10 supporting "committee-men". Numerically then Pym's supporters dominated the committee's proceedings. But in keeping with his policy to expedite matters with small, compact and easily managed groups, it is quite possible that he persuaded the large committee to suggest that ~~some~~ some members be delegated to deal with the Scottish Commissioners. In the division in the House Cholmley and Lewes, both very mild Peace Party men were tellers for those who wanted a larger commission of sixteen while Evelyn and Moore, fringe supporters of Pym, were tellers for those who wanted only commissioners. Pym's dominance over the Irish committee is indicated by the fact that the chairman Wilde, a non-political "committee-man", suggested a list of commissioners to the House consisting of Pym, Hollis, and eight others. There were not enough members present in the House to determine the matter at the time, so it was brought up again on the following day. "See divers disliking such a nomination by a committee at last the question was put whether we should appoint the number of them onlie,

and the house divided." This certainly tends to the view that Pym was in favour of the smallest possible commission consisting of pre-selected commissioners. . . . The Irish committee was sufficiently under his sway to vote away some of its powers to a smaller and more vital group, unhindered by too much political dead wood. The fact that his side was defeated in the division and fourteen men were appointed, did not evidently upset his arrangements. D'Ewes, who opposed Pym here, was more concerned with the principle of having a commission named by an existing committee. It may be that the vote to increase the size of the nominated group was intended only as a protest against Pym's method rather than as a firm statement of the political composition of the commissioners. In any case those elected, Holles, Pym, Marten, Erle, Cromwell, Harley, Merrick, Coke, Vane Jr., Wallop, Evelyn, Parkhurst, Reynolds and Cave, were substantially the men originally suggested, with some augmentations. Most of these men had some interest in Ireland, either as prospective Adventurers, or with some ties there.<sup>46.</sup> Cave was the only royalist among a group who were dominated by Pym's immediate supporters.<sup>47.</sup> The duties delegated to this committee were wider and yet more explicit than those of the larger committee. They were to use their discretion about the "maintenance of the Protestant religion" there, to administer army finance ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> shipping, to supervise arrangements with the Scottish Commissioners and to see that all bargains were kept, and to keep in touch with the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Council there about the running of the war. In other words,

they were a fairly autonomous body with power to look after all aspects of policy in regard to Ireland, and with very wide powers indeed. This committee's importance for parliamentary policy can be seen by the fact that Pym took the whole business into his own hands, and such reports as the commissioners made to the House were always handled by Pym.

With the bulk of the administration now disposed in the hands of a small and fairly united group, the larger committee evidently atrophied from disuse. Committees appointed later did not interfere with the business of the commissioners and dealt with specific and unrelated matters such as the prevention of Irish papists coming to England,<sup>48.</sup> and a petition to the king not to go to Ireland.<sup>49.</sup> This necessitated a joint committee and could obviously not be dealt with by the administrative body. The latter committee implied the threat that the Adventurer<sup>s</sup> would stop financing the war if the king disregarded Parliament's advice and went to Ireland. This attitude was typical of the rest of the negotiations with Charles about the war which he was waging as Parliament's ally. Financial questions were referred to committees consisting mainly of the merchants who were lending or guaranteeing the money.<sup>50.</sup>

By the time of the outbreak of war management of Irish affairs was well entrusted into the hands of committees. Various methods had been tried for dealing with the administration of the awkward Irish war. It was found that neither a committee of the Whole, nor a large and unwieldy committee were well suited to something so specific and administrative<sup>ve</sup>. In this Irish

affairs necessarily differed radically in treatment from the earlier constitutional and religious legislation which were the chief enterprises of the House in the early months of the session.

As the committees relating to Ireland included not only those interested in its political implications but also many whose interests were more financial, their membership contrasts with the conferences which were managed mainly by politicians. Pym managed 11 of the 17 conferences, Holles 10, Erle 6, Culpepper, Clotworthy Reynolds and Vane Jr. 5, and Mildmay, Barrington and Fiennes 4. Few of the managers had ties with London, while those active on committees were predominantly men with connections and interests in London who had a financial interest in the future of Ireland. Pym, Holles, Culpepper and Vane were predominant at conferences in almost all fields because it was traditional that the strongest figures of the House should speak to the Lords. Culpepper was no longer active by the time the blackmailing Adventurers dictated policy on Ireland, his final appearance as manager being in December 1641. He is the only one of the managers significantly absent from those most active on committees, partly because of his retirement from participation by the end of 1641 and partly because his role as manager was probably more due to the esteem in which he was held by the House than to his real interest in Ireland.

The Table of activists indicates how closely the City interest in Ireland was identified with the political leadership. Not only were the London burgesses mainly radical, but they were interested in the profits to be made out of Ireland once

the war was successfully over. Ireland was therefore an important political issue for the leaders of the House uniting the unenthusiastic because of the threat of subversion from there, discrediting the king by implication, and providing a useful means to indict his ministers. It was also a potentially rich source of profit for those prepared to invest in the successful waging of the war there. These combined aims emerge illuminatingly from those most active on committees, where the overlap between political and financial interests can best be seen.

Ireland served Parliament not only as a financial incentive and a source of useful propaganda, but also as a lesson in successful war administration. It is true that the large Committee for Irish Affairs had had its initial uses as a propaganda weapon, set up as it was in the first place to deal with the rumoured plot for an invasion of England. By also being concerned with clearing the king's name it managed at the same time to embroil him in a matter with which any connection, no matter how remote, was a smear, and it provided an initial tactical victory for Pym. The smaller committee on the other hand, because of its size and its carefully controlled composition was far more suited to act as an executive and policy-making body to control all affairs relating to the war in Ireland. Being a kind of specialized "Committee of Safety" for Irish affairs it successfully framed policy, looked after financial administration and general problems of executive government



in Ireland, and prevented the need for any new machinery of government being set up after the outbreak of war in England. The Committee for Irish Affairs was clearly a prototype of the kind of efficient administrative unit, able to take over one whole department of government, which Pym and his colleagues sought in their experiments with the committee system.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON IRISH COMMITTEES.

Name	No. of ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royalists	Londoners	Irish interests	Name	No. of ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royalists	Londoners	Irish interests
Erle	14	X							Evelyn	6			X				X
Marten	10	X				X	X		Morley	6	X				X		
Holle	10			X		X			Lewes	6			X				
Barrington	10		X						Gerrard	5		X			X		
Pym	10		X				X		Pye	5			X		X		X
Vassall	8			X		X	X		Hungerford	5			X		X		
Reynolds	8			X			X		Waller	5			X				
Pennington	8	X				X	X		Wheeler	5			X		X		
Strode	8	X					X		Spurstoe	5					X		
Soame	8					X	X		Harley	5			X		X		
Holles	8		X						Haselrig	5	X						
Vane Jr.	8	X							Stapleton	5		X					
Coke J.	7			X					Armine	4		X					
Venn	7	X				X	X		St. John	4	X						
Hoatham	7		X						Pierrepoint	4			X				
Lumley	7			X		X			Wildmay	4	X						
Glyn	7		X			X			Corbet	4		X			X		
Clotworthy	7		X			X	X		Smyth	4							
Long	6			X					Cage	4			X				
D'Ewes	6			X			X		Piennes	4		X					
Wilde	6			X					Potts	4							X
Crew	6			X					Lytton	4			X		X		
Goodwyn R.	6		X			X	X		Belasise	4				X			
Cave	6					X	X		Onslow	4		X					
Hampden	6		X			X											

London Defence.

In the period before the outbreak of war, relations between the City and Parliament were of paramount importance if the programme of the reform leaders was to be implemented.

Financially the Houses were almost entirely at the mercy of the London merchants, while in return they offered the City some security from royal absolutism. The fiscal arrangements between London and Westminster will be discussed later in relation to the whole financial machinery set up by Parliament. Here the main concern is with the other major facet of relations between the two bodies, namely, the defence measures taken to safeguard the City. The defence of the City was planned and to some extent put into effect on several occasions before the war itself. As a result when war broke out and the City was threatened by royalist forces the machinery for defence was well established and the liaison between London and Parliament well oiled. The occasions which brought about these early safeguards against aggression naturally coincided with the panic periods induced partly by the king's shifty behaviour; partly by Pym's undoubted policy of encouraging suspicion and uneasiness in order to prepare for the big upheaval to come; but partly also by the real possibility of open insurrection breaking out early in 1642 in the streets of the City itself, when citizens were arming themselves out of the public armories against the possibility of an armed attack by the Cavaliers.<sup>51.</sup>

In this way the occasion of the Army Plot and the Catholic menace was exploited in May 1641, when a committee was despatched to search for arms in Lambeth Palace, suspected of being a bee-hive of papist activities and harboring treasonable enterprises.<sup>52.</sup> The next occasion for popular panic was at the time of the suspected attempt to arrest the five members.

Before the king marched into Westminster the position of the Tower was investigated and the king was forced to concede Parliament's authority over the main arsenal. The removal of Lunsford, the royal Lieutenant of the Tower, was seen by the Houses not only as another step in the possibility of a coup at their own front door, but also as guaranteeing their own control of the only fully supplied arsenal in the country. By now the Lords and the royalist minority in the Commons refused to co-operate, and both strongly opposed the nomination of a parliamentary candidate for the position of Lieutenant of the Tower.<sup>53.</sup> The committee responsible for policy on the Tower consisted of men such as Pym, Holles, Strode, Glyn and Hotham, which reflected the importance placed on the issue. Culpepper was added to the committee on December 29th after a<sup>54.</sup> petition had been drafted against Lunsford. This may have been an attempt by the more conservative element to avoid a further encroachment on the king's prerogative by attempting to dissuade the leaders from actually nominating a new Lieutenant. They may have hoped in this way to stop the deteriorating relationship between the leaders and the king and even perhaps to avert the suspected attempt by the king against the members.

<sup>55.</sup> Mrs. Pearl has shown at length that the traditional identification of the views and activities of the citizenry of London with those of its government was based on false premises and that until the beginning of 1642 the Common Council and Aldermen were becoming increasingly royalist. Certainly the burgesses were by no means representative of their electoral

<sup>56.</sup> body. But the parliamentary leaders could not have exploited the danger of having the Tower in uncontrolled hands had they not had the support of the bulk of the citizens, and Lunsford's fate could not be averted even by the City fathers. <sup>57.</sup> There was a sudden change of policy in the London government about the time of the attempted arrest of the five members, which enabled them to shelter in the City safe from the wrath of the king. This timely change was due probably less to the change in personnel after new elections to the Common Council, than to the election of a radical and Puritan Committee of Safety, which acted as a steering committee for the business of the Common Council and in fact appeared to govern the City from then on. <sup>58.</sup> It was this committee which was responsible, completely against the Lord Mayor's will, for putting the City in a state of defence. <sup>59.</sup> It did this partly in support of Pym who wanted to get the maximum propaganda value out of the king's attempt to use force which could be evidence of the treachery of his advisors. But at the same time there was some anxious anticipation of civil war breaking out in the streets of the City itself. <sup>60.</sup> The train bands were not only called out, but put under the command of firm supporters of the reforming party in Parliament. <sup>61.</sup> They formed a fitting protection and triumphal arch for the return of the five members to the House. <sup>62.</sup>

The committee's unanimity with the leaders of the reform group could be seen also in the petition to the Commons in defiance of the Lords to take control of the armed forces and to get rid of the bishops. <sup>63.</sup> In March, the Common Council ostensibly

but really the Committee, submitted to Parliament a list of grievances concerning the City's defences, asking for the Militia Ordinance to be put into effect. In this way the City showed its complete identification with the most radical elements of the House, almost anticipating the work of their opposite numbers in the Commons. It is therefore not surprising that the parliamentary committee appointed to deal with the grievances included five radicals among its original sixteen members, as well as Glyn, Whitelock, Holles and Hampden of Pym's group, and an assortment of other members all with strong London and Puritan connections.<sup>64</sup> Although the Londoners in Parliament had a strong affiliation with the later radicals, there were quite a number who were not directly bound to the more militant policies after the outbreak of war, and who would not have been ranged clearly on the issue of the Peace Negotiations. These were the men who received their backing from the more conservative quarters in the City's government. Nevertheless they were often useful political allies, and certainly before the outbreak of war they were wholeheartedly behind the reform leaders. The participation of Harley, Spurston and Vassall with Glyn, Gerrard and Cromwell on the committee to ensure the safety of the Tower in July indicates this marriage of views.<sup>65</sup> Two days later when the removal of the royalist Lord Mayor was mooted in a petition from the City the committee appointed to consider it was not violently disposed, consisting mainly of unpolitical figures, such as Perd, Pury and Wilde supporting Glyn and Prideaux.<sup>66</sup> But the actual lobbying among the Councillors was done by the radical Puritan successor to the

Mayoralty, Pennington, who reported the activities of the Aldermen, and in effect intimidated the conservative element on the Council by threats of parliamentary interrogation.

The Londoners wanted to co-operate in the plans to initiate defence measures without being committed to the political attitudes of the main parties. One indication of this is the composition the committee which was to broach for the first time the matter of financing a real army to defend the City and Parliament. This consisted of three men with London connections but of no known political affiliation except a consistent parliamentarian line - Sir John Potts, Sir William Lytton and Sir Martin Lumley, together with the Essex magnate and political ally of Pym,<sup>and</sup>/Barrington.

The one last obstacle which remained in the way of parliamentary co-operation with the City and its representatives was the remaining authority of the royalist Lord Mayor. Although he had been imprisoned, the Aldermen were still unprepared to elect a locum tenens for him and insisted that there was no precedent for such behaviour. The royalism of the Aldermen has already been mentioned, and it is obvious that they would hardly concede victory to the radical burgesses by allowing their candidate to the Mayoralty to be considered. The trial of the Lord Mayor<sup>67.</sup> indicates the extent of support for him and his general attitude still afforded him by the London dignitaries. The power gained by the parliamentary radicals through the election of Pennington did not really match the gradual shift of membership of the Court of Aldermen, which never became

an out-and-out supporter of Pym's more extreme policies but which did eventually become infiltrated with supporters of the parliamentary cause. <sup>68.</sup> The committee <sup>69.</sup> which was to consider the recalcitrant Aldermen who refused to appoint a replacement for the Lord Mayor was composed of only three significant political figures - Barrington, (who appeared to act in these committees as a political link with Pym and whose local interests were close to those of London especially on matters of defence,) Prideaux, and Waller. The others were either non-political London administrators, like Vassall, Owfield, White and Mathews, or men with legal and administrative backgrounds from other urban areas like Cage (Ipswich), Lisle (Winchester), Reynolds (Cambridge), Noble (Lichfield) and Wilde (Worcester). D'Ewes and Bowyer the later royalist, both had strong London connections. These men were very suitable for handling a situation which required some skill in legal procedure as well as experience with City corporations.

Among the 23 most active men on the committees considered, 19 were Londoners or connected with London, while Sir Thomas Barrington was interested in London issues both for political as well as for local reasons. The others were all important political figures, such as Holles, Strode and Prideaux. <sup>70.</sup> The table indicates that none of them were likely to have opposed to the policy of the leaders to begin preparing for the inevitable by arming London and finding the means to finance the necessities of war. It is interesting that there were a greater number of administrators than straight supporters of

Pym active here; for they were mainly men who had experience in administration, finance and trade - all qualifications which might have been useful in the practical business of the defence of London.

The complicated interplay between the parliamentary leaders and their committees with the dominant interests in the City show that the issue of the defence of London hinged on the ultimate victory of the parliamentary puritans in the City. The reform party in the House helped things along by disregarding the grievances of all parties except their own supporters' in all communications from the City. In the fight for unity of Parliament and City the various plots which Pym used so advantageously in other directions aided him here also, creating an atmosphere of near-revolution in which immediate defence measures were the obvious steps to take. <sup>He</sup> ~~He~~ was fortunate in having a group of influential men with interests in the City who could use all methods at their disposal to persuade their fellow-citizens of the need to defend the City against papists, Irishmen, and Cavaliers in turn. As time went on he was well on the way to ensuring the eventual identity of policy between the leaders of the City with his own views.



MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES DEALING WITH LONDON DEFENCE.

Name	No. of tees	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	London Towns	Name	No. of tees	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	London Towns
Glyn	5		X			X	Harley	2				X	X
Vassall	5				X	X	Hotham	2		X			X
Prideaux	5	X					Holles	2	X				
Pennington	5	X				X	Pury	2				X	X
Soames	5					X	Strode	2	X				
Perd	5				X	X	Marten	2	X				X
Gerrard	5		X			X	Venn	2	X				X
Evelyn	5				X	X	Cromwell	2		X			X
Barrington	5		X			X	Long	2				X	X
Wilde	5				X	X	Lumley	2				X	X
White	5				X	X	Reynolds	2				X	X
Tomkins	5					X							

Finance

It is clearly impossible to discuss the development of a fiscal administration by Parliament before the outbreak of war without including many other subjects dealt with by committees; supplies for Ireland, money for the Scots, City affairs, raising money in the counties, and so on. But as the main purpose here is to see how the whole executive machine which was later to run the war developed in its early stages, it becomes important to get a broad view of the early stages of one of its most important branches, namely finance.

For the first few months of the Long Parliament, the collection of finance was entirely related to paying off the Scots and disbanding the Northern armies. At first a temporary expedient was used on which no permanent method of raising money could be based, namely borrowing on the security of a single wealthy citizen and on personal contributions. Parliament was not yet concerned to find a method of taxation for the permanent

needs of the state. Even the collection in the counties by collectors responsible to Parliament, (exempting the Lords who would be assessed independently in their own House,) was temporary and unsatisfactory.<sup>71.</sup> By March 1641 a suggestion was made which was to be echoed later as a means of enforcing enthusiastic contributions and competitive loans from the M.P's themselves. This was suggested by the Court of Aldermen of London who were approached to lend £100,000 for paying the Scots. They parried by saying that they would lend proportionally to the the Members themselves. It was Pym's policy of close co-operation with the London M.P's led by the radical Pennington which was probably responsible for this suggestion. Pennington's support in the City came from the Court of Aldermen rather than from the conservative Common Council which supported the royalist Lord Mayor. In this way Pym neatly involved the City in paying the Scots and at the same time allowed the pace to be set by the parliamentarians themselves. In this instance he may have wished to slow down payments by this method. Later, radical pressure was brought to bear on unenthusiastic M.P's to pay their contributions as a sign of fealty to Parliament. In any case, the liaison between the reform leaders in Parliament and their supporters in the City established an immediacy of contact, and both groups were aware of the benefits of paying the piper and calling the tune; the advantages of an army in the north eagerly waiting for pay could be put to a great many uses by those who took it upon themselves to be responsible for it. But this expedient hardly helped to establish a functional method of collecting money.

The unpracticed and impractical attitude to financial problems is probably reflected in the use made at this time of Committees of the Whole, to direct, allocate and administer the financial expedients submitted to the House by various select committees. In a matter so well suited to administration by a select and well qualified group, the use of Committees of the Whole was particularly inept, with their large shifting membership, the lack of continuity and the difficulty of delegating functions to individuals.

The handling of the Tonnage and Poundage shows more concern with consistent administration by a committee. This was to deal not only with the preparation of the bill, but with methods of collection, and with its disbursement to the Navy. The whole administration of the tax was delegated to one group which was able to concentrate on the raising and paying out of the money in hand. Vane Jr. as a Treasurer of the Navy, provided a liaison with the department which was to receive the money. The fact that he was included showed closer attention to co-ordinating fiscal matters into a network of administrative committees with established liaisons between them in order to rationalize the receipt and payment out of the money. By later standards this committee was still far too large. Its 45 members precluded close and informed consultation on problems. On the other hand it was also concerned with raising money before the tax payments came in by approaching the merchants and using the Tonnage and Poundage as security. The presence of 30 men with some connections with the City and other main towns may have been regarded as a positive asset to the committee's work.

The lessons learnt from this may have been applied to the wider problem of subsidies and money for the Scots. On May 11th 1641 a Committee of the Whole decided finally to delegate the whole matter of "raising £400,000 for the great affairs of the Kingdom" to a select committee.<sup>76.</sup> This became the first great finance committee dealing with the planning and administration of major national fiscal policy. The decisions to raise the money needed by a county-wise collection assessing people by land in each county,<sup>77.</sup> ~~the~~ assessing the counties' proportions, consideration of what money was due to the Scottish and English armies and what had already been paid,<sup>78.</sup> the possibility of advance borrowing on the security of the tax - all these fell to the committee's jurisdiction. Its deliberations led to borrowing (as usual) from the Merchant Adventurers,<sup>79.</sup> the plan to bring in and melt the plate of the kingdom for coinage, as well as the suggestion to make Spanish money current;<sup>80.</sup> these fancy schemes indicate as yet no feeling for the need for permanent measures of fiscal collection and administration. Soon however, we find a real preoccupation with setting up a reasonably efficient machine for the collection of money on a nation-wide basis. In July a committee was set up which was to see that the collectors appointed under the terms of the bill for the collection of £100,000 and the sheriffs aiding them should be carefully audited and duplicates of their returns kept;<sup>81.</sup> this was followed by another which was to consider the allowances to be made to the collectors for their trouble.<sup>82.</sup> The hesitant and experimental nature of this period is indicated by the need for a committee

to explain and remedy the ambiguities and defects in the act for the speedy provision of money.<sup>83.</sup> On the other hand new methods were used to help in getting rid of some old abuses, such as the expensive and troublesome custom of local sheriffs, to give feasts for the visiting judges, the compulsory presents to the whole entourage, and the expense of entertaining the king and his servants. This ancient and disliked custom was removed in quite a casual way to suit the general atmosphere of stripping the trappings off the royal image.<sup>84.</sup>

From March to July 1642 a great number of committees relating to finance were appointed, reflecting the sudden importance of an efficient method to handle the sinews of war. This can be seen in the committee to take account of all money coming in from the kingdom at large and of all money in hand.<sup>85.</sup> Although this was still ostensibly done in order to collect payment for the Scots, the political situation would make it seem likely that this step was taken as a useful preliminary to setting up an independent financial administration for the needs of Parliament. The rapid progress from this clandestine survey of the situation, to open declarations of the need for money to fight against the king, mirrors the general trend of events over that period. The committee to see that fines levied on impeached persons should be used towards the Irish war "or other public uses"<sup>86.</sup> indicates a minor but significant step towards the allocation of money to specific functions in the coming months. Three weeks later the first general statement of the problem of collecting money for the war was opened by a committee<sup>87.</sup> to consider

how a stock of money could be provided "for the better defence of his Majesty's person, and Parliament, and the public peace, against the king's intention by wicked counsel to levy war on Parliament". This important committee was composed of Pym with his immediate supporters Barrington, Fiennes, Holles and Glyn, radicals Marten and Haselrig and "committee-men" Cage and Crew, both of whom had a financial and town background. As they did not report it is impossible to tell whether they were in fact responsible for any of the machinery which was later set up to cope with the provision of money. Certainly in the weeks after its inception a number of specific committees were set up to deal with some aspects of money-raising and they may have been due to the recommendations of this committee.

In June moves were made to get a large loan from the city; a standing committee was set up to look after borrowing money from the Merchant Strangers, the College of Physicians and the great officers;<sup>89.</sup> and finally an important committee of accounts was appointed, consisting of Pym and Strode on the political side and Trenchard and Green as administrators,<sup>90.</sup> to whom Pye, Wheeler and Whittaker were added in October to help in the cumulative work.<sup>91.</sup> The report of this committee indicates that it dealt with an embracing efficiency drawing together all current levies which were still not paid up and delving into the methods of securing regular and complete payment from the local authorities who were to be forced to co-operate with the committee in sending in full lists of arrears and weekly accounts of the receipts and to open all their records to them. Significantly, special

messengers were appointed to act as the committee's executive officers to bring in the accounts and to supervise the local collection. This was the first attempt by Parliament to superimpose its own officers over the local fiscal hierarchy and made the county administration directly responsible to Parliament by the creation of an intermediary force. As a result of the committee's report too, an order was issued that the poorer yeomen were not to be too harrassed for their arrears, while the richer ones were to be made to pay double for their prior neglect, an interesting and uncharacteristic approach for the Puritan Parliament. The difficulties of its new role as co-ordinator of fiscal measures became evident to the Commons with early troubles from Collectors who refused the honour of being appointed. This became one of the bugbears of executive government soon after the outbreak of war and had to be met already in July <sup>92.</sup> in relation to the collection of the £400,000. In areas where there was no general sympathy with Parliament's stand there was naturally great difficulty, not only in collecting the money to support its planned campaign, but also to find anyone whose demands would carry weight in the area and who was prepared to take on so onerous a duty, especially in hostile territory. This also reflects upon the comparative rewards for holding office. Payment was commensurate with the amount collected, and where that was likely to be small due to general local unwillingness, there was even less incentive on the part of the office-bearer to do his job.

In the meantime the London burgesses and other merchants in the House were appointed to the equivalent tasks of arranging for arrears to be paid in by the London tax payers and to see that all defaulters were suitably admonished.<sup>93.</sup>

It is obvious that the leaders and administrators in the Commons were well aware of the complexities awaiting them in the attempt to organize an efficient fiscal machine which would support the expensive business of waging a civil war, that some of the difficulties were already faced before the outbreak of war, but that many more were to come. The system of working by small select committees to deal with administrative problems was initiated by the beginning of 1642. But as yet there was no satisfactory suggestion of a permanent method of levying sufficient money to ~~pay~~<sup>pay</sup> for the war, something which did not emerge for many months after the outbreak. As the Table of activists indicates, there was a great preponderance of "committee-men" who made up nearly half the activists on these committees. This indicates that the problem was treated from the start as one which was not mainly political, and the need for a small circle of trained and experienced men to give uniformity and continuity to a fiscal programme was appreciated. Among the 52 activists there were also 43 lawyers, and at least 7 merchants. 21 of them subscribed to either the Irish loan or the £1,000 loan in 1641 or to some of the other large loans.<sup>94.</sup> Others subscribed on a smaller scale.<sup>95.</sup> The Table indicates which men had special City interests or interests in trade, and it also shows which members were active in any of the colonizing ventures



in Ireland, <sup>the</sup> East India Company the Massachusetts Bay Company, the Virginia Company, the Saybrook project, the Providence Island Company, etc. But the most significant thing shown by the Table is the number of men who had fiscal training and administrative experience, either at Court or by working for some noble landowner. The large numbers of ex-office-holders from the crown who could bring their experience to their new positions included St. John, the Solicitor General; Pym, for a short time the Receiver General; Pye, Auditor of the Exchequer; Mildmay, Master of the King's Jewels; Cornelius Holland, Clerk of the Acatry and Clerk of the Greencloth of the Prince; Harley, Master of the Mint; Gerrard, Master of the Rolls and Clerk of the Court of Duchy Chamber; Thomas Smyth, Secretary to the Lord Admiral; Bedingfield, Attorney of the Duchy; Evelyn, gunpowder monopolist; Lytton, Secretary of the Council of the North. The reasons for the change of allegiance which involved them in considerable loss of office and fees are discussed at length by Aylmer.<sup>96.</sup> Here we are concerned with them only in their new capacities to which they brought their early training. Pym and Green had had early experience in administering estates of the nobility which also gave them excellent administrative training, while Whistler, Erle and Wheeler had shown interest in financial reform and administration in previous Parliaments.<sup>97.</sup> The specialized membership of these committees is excellent testimony to the degree of organization which went into the appropriate choosing of committee-men and indicates the awareness of the leaders of the problems of administration and the need to exploit all who had training as administrators.

Politically it is interesting to note that the 52 activists contained only four royalists. Some of the committees pre-date the time when this division was significant, but in itself it is still noteworthy that this matter should have been left so very exclusively to Puritans, and is perhaps related to the latter's interest in financial and trade matters, such as the colonizing ventures. Of the four, Capel, known to be one of the richest men in the House, may have been there as an expert on money, and Whistler, apart from being an eminent lawyer was a financial reformer and wanted to see the end of the fiscal arrangements made outside of Parliament by the Crown. The large number of radicals who supported Pym's own group was probably also significant, partly because many of them had financial interests and experience, but also as an indication of things to come, when the War Party interested themselves in any positive measures which ensured the success of the war. As usual the most frequent attenders here as elsewhere were however Pym's own immediate circle indicating the close concern which they had for a matter so central to the whole problem of preparing for the hostilities which were clearly marked on the horizon by this time.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON FINANCE COMMITTEES.

Name	No. of tees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royal- ists	Lawyers	London- ers	Other Towns	Finance Experienc Loans	Colonizing Activities
Barrington	11		X				X	(Essex)	X	Pr. Is.	
St. John	10	X					X			Pr. Is. Solic. Gen.	
Pym	10		X				X	X		X X	Pr. Is. Rec. Gen.
Holles	10		X				X				
Culpepper	9					X				X	
Pye	8				X		X	X		X X	Aud. Exch.
Whistler	8					X	X			X	Fin. Ref.
Prideaux	8	X					X			X	
Glyn	8		X				X	X			
Folle	8				X		X	X		X	Ire.
Perd	7				X		X	X		X	
Cage	7				X		X		X		
Hampden	7		X							X	Ire. & Pr. Is.
Vassall	7				X		X			X	Ire.
Erle	7		X				X			X	Exper. other parlts.
Wilde	6				X		X		X	X	
Reynolds	6				X		X			X	
Crane	6			X						X	
Crew	6				X		X			X	
Hyde	6					X	X			X	
Goodwyn A.	6		X				X	X		X	
Green	6				X		X		X	X	Estate Mngr.
Selden	5			X			X				Virg. C.
Littleton	5					X	X	X		X	
Palmes	5			X			X				Virg. C.
Pierrepont	5				X		X			X	Master of
Mildmay	5	X								X	Virg. C. King's
Middleton	5				X		X			X	Jewels
Marten	5	X					X	X		X	
Wheeler	5				X		X		X	X	
Rigby	5	X					X				
Holland C.	5	X							X	X	Clerk of Green-
Harley	5				X		X	X		X	cloth, Master of
Hungerford	5				X		X			X	Mint.
Gerrard	5		X				X	X		X	Mass. Bay Master of Rolls & Pr. Is.
Trenchard	5				X		X				
Smyth Tho.	4										
Pennington	4	X					X		X	X	Secr. to Ld. Admiral
Mountford	4				X		X	X			Ire. & Pr. Is.
Haselrig	3	X					X				Pr. Is.
Bedingfield	3				X		X			X	Attorney of Duchey

Name.	No. of ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administ- rators	Royal- ists	Lawyers	Londoners	Other Towns	Finance Experience	Loans	Colonizing Activities
Goodwyn R.		X				X	X					Ire.
Evelyn					X	X				X		Gunpowder Monopoly
Venn	X						X			X		
Piennes		X				X						Saybrooke
Strode	X					X						
Maynard				X		X	X					
White					X	X		X				Mass. Bay
Capel					X	X				X		
Hales				X		X				X	X	
Ingram												
Lytton					X		X					Secr. of Council of North.

### County Organization 1642

It had been customary for any liaison between the counties and the Houses of Parliament to be carried on through the members for that area who forwarded any petition, grievance or other communication to the House. Only when war was already in the air, in March 1642 was there an attempt to form a communicating mechanism with the counties through parliamentary committees. In part they were sounding-boards for county opinion and gave a good indication of the support Parliament could expect if hostilities broke out. As such they also relayed to the House the grievances of the local administration and the discontented gentry, and gave Parliament a chance, before it was too late, to win local support for its case.

These committees also took the first steps to set in action the machinery for the later running of the war. They formed an embryo executive which was to develop into an unwieldy

giant during the years of uneasy and shifting control by Parliament. Acting usually through the local M.P.'s it tried to use the existing administration in the counties, from the Lords and Deputy Lieutenants through the public-spirited local gentry, right down to the wardens, tax collectors and constables.<sup>98.</sup>

In examining the committees prior to the outbreak of war on these county matters it will be useful to compare the membership on committees of interested local M.P.'s and of others. In order to see whether there was any group which considered co-ordination of county administration as its own speciality, we can look at the membership of these committees to see if it was predominantly composed of men with special local interests, or whether the political figures with national pre-occupations led the field.

The method of dealing with the petition received from Kent in March 1642 is an illustration. The committee to receive this moderate-to-royalist inspired petition which was to deal carefully with a blow to parliamentary prestige from an area always considered traditionally in the London sphere of influence, was composed not so much of men of local importance as of political experts who were to deal with the public relations with the county. The extension of its power on 21st April to consider similar outbursts elsewhere indicates the importance attached to the national character of the matter referred to the committee. The House was worried that the militia in Essex was not going to be loyal to Parliament and might be influenced by the anti-parliamentary movement in Kent. It<sup>99.</sup>  
<sup>100.</sup>

was the younger Vane, coming now into the forefront of radical political action, who moved that all petitions of a "like nature", that is, criticising Parliament's calling out the militia without the king's consent, should be referred here. Barrington, the leading Essex M.P. took the message to the Lords, and the committee was empowered to deal specifically with Essex.

The situation in the two counties was however rather different. The Kentish petition had been inspired by Sir Roger Twysden and Sir Edward Dering, who formed the centre of a coterie of lesser but influential royalist gentry in Kent. On recommendation from the committee no one was punished for the petition though all who participated were called to the bar and examined. The county Members themselves were noted for their backwoods attitude and lukewarmness to the parliamentary cause, and the only notable M.P's for the area were two famous royalists, Dering and Culpepper. The one Puritan Member from that centre of high Anglicanism, Augustine Skinner, was put in his place by the local authorities, for his stand on the petition. They wrote him a very brusque letter informing him that the county wanted reparations for the aspersions laid on its loyalty and discounted the rumours of disturbances which had led the House to despatch a committee to supervise the local assizes. Their suggestions, enclosed, for averting war and giving the king satisfaction in his "just desires" were not likely to have been forwarded by this particular unrepresentative member to the House. The committee which was to deal primarily with Kentish affairs did not contain a single local M.P., for obvious reasons,

103.  
 although there were at least 5 Members from adjoining areas  
 with safer political views. On a political break-down we find  
 that there were five each of Pym's supporters and radicals, two  
 Peace Party men, and eight administrators. 104. The participation  
 of so many radicals was due to the political import of the comm-  
 ittee's work, as it put into operation for the first time the  
 militia ordinance, while the administrators were interested  
 in the details of execution of local defence. In addition,  
 there were the religious implications for a committee set up  
 to put the dominantly anglican county in its place. At least 17  
 of the 24 were convinced religious Puritans of both the Presby-  
 terian and Independent persuasion. 105.

Another example of how the connections with the counties  
 were maintained can be seen in the committee to go to Lincoln-  
 shire for the "preservation of the peace". 106. This was connected  
 with the business of the king's entry into Hull as it was ob-  
 viously important to try to dissuade the locals from joining  
 the king's forces there. The committee to draw up instructions  
 to the commissioners attending the king at York 107. was also to  
 instruct this committee. Its job was to clarify and broadcast  
 Parliament's position and Hotham's stand in Hull, while at the  
 same time ordering the sheriffs and officials of Lincolnshire  
 to help the parliamentary committee to obey the Militia Ordinance  
 and to see that no troops were levied against Hull. The  
 committee was to encourage the gentry not to give the "wicked  
 faction" any chance of mustering troops, to explain Parliament's  
 care for the king's personal safety, and finally to declare that

taking over the magazine in case of insurrection was lawful. In this way it fulfilled the double purpose of seeing that the Militia Ordinance was carried out while at the same time ensuring that the king's canvassers did not get a foothold in the area. The apologetics which preceded this move in all counties were considered an essential aspect of public relations with the counties. This committee remained to be used later as the official intermediary between the county and Parliament. It was instructed to see that the local contribution money should be paid to Hotham for immediate use,<sup>108.</sup> and to keep constantly in touch with affairs at the centre, providing a communicating channel with the county.<sup>109.</sup> This committee, then, provides a typical example of how Parliament worked to take over the foundations of power and defence in the counties, using a fairly small number of M.P's to whom virtually all local office-holders became responsible.

The committee to go to Lincolnshire consisted of five local members,<sup>110.</sup> and two other northern gentlemen with property in Lincolnshire,<sup>111.</sup> all of whom had a direct interest in events around Hull and Lincoln as the fate of their own properties was at stake as well as the whole future of the area. It was obviously good policy to send local men as emissaries of Parliament, who were not only known and respected locally as men of power, but who would be regarded as less bureaucratic than a deputation of "foreign" southern M.P's. The men concerned were in the best position to influence the local gentry to follow their lead on Parliament's side, and at the same time were



significantly all either close associates of Pym's, <sup>112.</sup> or else acted in conjunction with his party on other occasions. <sup>113.</sup>

Similar committees to execute the Militia Ordinance <sup>114.</sup> were subsequently sent to Essex, Devon, and Cheshire. In other areas where the immediate problems were not so pressing as in Lincolnshire, this form of central control grew to be standard procedure. The Militia Ordinance was accompanied by the formation of a network of liaison with the counties. The later county committee system was founded on the necessity to see the orders of Parliament for the prosecution of war put into practice by a hierarchy of local dignitaries who could best be persuaded of loyalty to the Houses by an initial boost from an influential pre-parliamentary committee of M.P.'s.

The Essex M.P.'s of whom we shall hear more later consisted entirely of local men, of whom four were direct associates <sup>115.</sup> of Pym's, <sup>116.</sup> together with one radical and one Peace Party adherent; <sup>117.</sup> all were subordinate to Barrington's great local influence. The two Members to go to Cheshire were both influential local men; Brereton who later became the district's powerful military commander power, and Thomas Smyth, whose appointment was evidently a misjudgement as he defected shortly afterwards, and who could not have had a very salutary influence upon the local gentry on Parliament's behalf. Banfield, who despite his Cornish constituency, came from Exeter, was sent to Devon, and although not active politically in the House, was a steady supporter of the Parliamentary cause. On the whole there appeared to be great care taken that the Members despatched were politically

sound, and, where possible, actually Pym's own supporters, as well as being locally influential.

Sensibly, local magnates were sent to the counties while the political and administrative work at the centre was done by the more important political figures whose aims were centred upon national rather than regional affairs. The committee which was to instruct the <sup>dele</sup>~~obligation~~ to be sent to Lancashire, <sup>118.</sup> consisted of only one local man, the radical Rigby, while the rest <sup>119.</sup> were either political figures, <sup>120.</sup> or lawyers of importance. On <sup>121.</sup> the other hand the committee actually sent to the area included Rigby, whose presence on the planning committee provided some connection with the executive body, ~~actually sent~~, supported by three minor figures who were all loyal Parliamentarians ~~and~~ <sup>122.</sup> of no political importance but of local origin. Wide powers were given to committees in districts where it was known that the Militia Ordinance would meet opposition and where the Commissions of Array from the king might conflict with parliamentary instructions. <sup>123.</sup> The committee under Rigby's leadership encountered great <sup>124.</sup> difficulties, as did the other committees sent to the northern <sup>125.</sup> counties. Parliament became highly concerned at this countermanding of orders in the counties. The resulting attempts to prevent the dispersion of Commissions of Array <sup>126.</sup> produced the initial bouts of paper warfare in which both sides forbade compliance with the other side's orders, both frantically searched <sup>127.</sup> for precedents and made counter-claims of legality. The intricate legal nature and great political importance of finding suitable precedents for the propaganda campaign meant that the subject

was committed to the best qualified lawyers of the House,  
 128.  
 apparently irrespective of political slant, as D'Ewes and  
 Selden appeared together with St. John and Glyn, and were  
 equally concerned to make the parliamentary case look as  
 legal as possible.

129.

The committee sent to Bedford consisted of two local  
 Members; Sir Oliver Luke associated directly with Pym's pol-  
 icies, and Sir Beauchamp St. John, not politically active but  
 a firm adherent to Parliament. The Warwickshire deputation  
 consisted of two politically inactive Parliamentarians,  
 Barker and Boseville, together with Purefoy, one of Pym's  
 group, and Wentworth, a radical, all four being local men.  
 In this case, they were to be supported by the local Deputy  
 Lieutenants, who were in any case the immediate agents to help  
 the dissemination of the parliamentary policy wherever they  
 could be persuaded to be loyal.

When the policy of raising money locally through the  
 collection of money, plate and horses, was begun, the local  
 committees had the double onus of effecting the Militia Ordin-  
 ance and raising the local forces, as well as organizing the  
 beginnings of local fiscal administration - supervising and  
 popularizing the tax needed to make war possible. From July  
 on the delegations sent to the counties were instructed to  
 deal with this double burden, ranging from the committee to  
 Devon on July 4th <sup>130.</sup> to Buckinghamshire, <sup>131.</sup> Wiltshire, <sup>132.</sup> Hertford-  
 shire, <sup>133.</sup> Monmouth, <sup>134.</sup> Herefordshire, <sup>135.</sup> Cornwall, <sup>136.</sup> Derbyshire, <sup>137.</sup>

	138.	139.	140.	141.
Northamptonshire,	Worcestershire,	Sussex,	Cambridge,	
142.	143.	144.	145.	146.
Berkshire,	Yorkshire,	Surrey,	Bedford,	and finally Lines.

in December. The despatch of these committees during the second half of 1642 indicates the different local pressures that the war made, following the counties in areas where attack was most likely and where money was most needed to support the local militias. Where previous committees had been despatched for the Militia Ordinance, a duplicate committee was often ~~sent~~ sent with the later instructions, and usually consisted of the same local Members with further additions. Generally, the men sent to the local areas were by no means the most important or influential M.P.'s, although they were invariably local men. Obviously Parliament could not despatch all its talent to administer policy in the counties, as some, especially the most gifted of the politicians had to remain behind as the master-minds. With the exception of Buckinghamshire, where the local talent was overwhelming and included Hampden, Whitelock and Goodwyn, the other counties' representatives were invariably minor political figures. It is significant that the only royalists who later defected among these delegates were the three sent to Cornwall <sup>147.</sup> which may have given Parliament a bad start in the south-west before hostilities even began, by having no one there to put its case with sufficient gusto, and which probably encouraged neutralism in the area. One Hertfordshire Member, Harrison, was the only other royalist, but his supporting three members were all firm "committee-men" throughout the war, and as such, diligent supporters of the parliamentary programme.

The policy of county organization though fragmentary at this early stage, was clear. It began uniformly with committees of M.P.'s despatched in the first place to see that the militias were mustered under parliamentary auspices, and later to see to the collection of local funds for the financing of the local armies. The method employed - delegations from the parent body to ensure loyalty to the cause, seems sound enough in areas where the M.P.'s were sufficiently loyal to do justice to the case they were meant to present, and where they were sufficiently well regarded by their peers and inferiors to have their orders carried out. This network of delegations with close ties to the legislative and administrative centre was an obvious way of cajoling local office-bearers into compliance, or alternatively, of finding other support which could be regarded as more reliable, to take the brunt of the local administrative work once the M.P.'s returned to their posts. Unfortunately there is almost no evidence about how these early committees organized themselves, but wherever possible, details of their functions and successes have been given in the later section on county committees.

#### Navy Committees, 1641 - July 1642.

Matters relating to the Navy were always kept quite distinct from other measures of defence, and its administration formed an entirely separate system. Naturally however, initial interest in naval affairs coincided with the political events of the Irish scare and the foments of the king's Scottish trip, just as the beginnings of defence measures generally were begun

as an answer to the real or imagined threat to the country's security by the papist forces inside and outside the kingdom,

The coincidence of the foreign invasion threat, the Irish panic and the king's departure which was mooted in May all gave rise to the early defence measures, and at a conference of both Houses on the 7th May Warwick suggested from the Lords that the sea should be "secured", and that an act should be passed to impress sailors. In answer to the specific threat of invasion, it was voted the following day that Portsmouth should be defended and that the Admiral was to see that all unreliable elements were removed from command there - indicating a direct assault on the king's Catholic officers or others suspected of antagonism to Parliament. Warwick's suggestion was at once taken up and an act for the pressing of mariners was drawn up by a committee.

On August 25th, the most important step in the administration of Navy affairs was taken. The Navy committee was set up, about the only committee which survived intact throughout the following year and which provided the only link, apart from the administration of Ireland, with the administrative system before the war. Unlike the measures for the defence on land, the problems of the Navy remained much the same and once it was to be organized by a parliamentary committee, the running of it needed few changes at the outbreak of the war. The committee was to consider the state of the Navy, what money was needed for supplies and to see that the seaboard counties were responsible for the fitting out of their armories, to

consider the Admiral's list of requirements for the Navy and to organize the transport of ammunition from Hull to London. This indicates that political considerations apart, the committee had the entire job of administering the Navy at the highest level. The role of the Admiral was of course separate, but he was dependent upon the committee for all his supplies and money which was to be organized without his own interference. The officers' accounts were to be presented straight to the committee, <sup>151.</sup> decisions about the numbers of ships needed were referred to it in conjunction with the chief officers, <sup>152.</sup> as was the provision of finance through negotiations with merchants and ship owners. Vane, presenting the list of officers drawn up by the committee, had obviously worked over it with the Admiral who vouched for the reliability of all. <sup>153.</sup> As a leading figure on the committee, Vane Jr. was subsequently named as Treasurer of the Navy, <sup>154.</sup> thus being responsible for a department which had previously pertained to the committee as a whole.

Political matters which involved the Navy were almost invariably handled by the House in Committees of the Whole. In this way it was decided to petition the king (through the unlikely person of Henry Marten, a generous donor to the Navy's needs but hardly a person likely to persuade the king) to appoint Warwick as Admiral of the Fleet, for obvious political advantages in having a great leader of the reform group in sole charge of the strategy and tactics of the Navy. Needless to say the king refused on the grounds that this would establish a precedent by letting Parliament appoint the commander.

The original membership of the Navy committee of August 25th consisted very largely of specialists with interests in naval affairs, merchants, lawyers from the ports and others. Rainsborough and Walsingham both had experience in the Navy;<sup>155.</sup> Bence, a friend of the former's, Vassall, Pye, Hungerford, Pennington and Venn were all merchants whose interests were involved in naval ventures, being responsible for the loans and ships on which the Navy depended; others were Members for seaboard constituencies, such as Masham, Knatchbull, and Potts. The later additions to the committee who were probably only meant for the specific business referred to it, reflect a more solidly political strain. Pym, Holles, Fiennes, Stapleton and Rotham among others were included at the time of the negotiations for financing the setting out of the fleet. On the whole, however, the specialist group which was to administer the Navy's affairs was not determined by its political activeness but by its administrative experience, as the Table of activists indicates.<sup>156.</sup> Cage was a merchant, lawyer and Portman of Ipswich, and therefore had good reason to be interested in the Navy's affairs as well as being a well-qualified administrator; Mathews, Bence, Vassall and Pennington were all London merchants and shipowners, with a financial interest in the well-being of the Navy on which the possibility of external trade depended in troublesome times as well as being willing creditors; Vane had held office in the Navy, Rotham and Gerrard were interested in military tactics which were relevant to the Navy's manoeuvres, Barrington was perhaps acting in the interest



of his kinsman Warwick, later the Admiral of the fleet. In addition at least seven of the activists were supporters of Pym or of radical policy in regard to the war, and Cage was a loyal administrator.

MORE ACTIVE MEMBERS ON NAVY COMMITTEES.

Name	No. of votes							Name	No. of votes							
	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists	Merchant	Naval		Sea-borde	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Administrators	Royalists	Merchant	Naval
Barrington	4	X					X	Glyn	3	X						London
Cage	4		X		X		X	Bence	3	X					X	
Mathews	4				X			Gerrard	3	X					London	
Hotham	3	X?				X		Vassall	3			X	X			
Pennington	3	X			X			Vane	3	X					X	

Defence

We have seen how Parliament gained valuable experience in the problem of defence and administration in the year preceeding the outbreak of war in special fields which cropped up from time to time - London defence, the Irish war, disbanding the Scottish armies, and so on. At the same time primitive but functional machinery was constructed to cope with finance, county liaison and administration. It now remains to look at the most central problem of all. What experience did Parliament gain in co-ordinating a whole national defence policy at a time when it had no official power to raise one armed soldier? Pym's technique of creating crises in order to make extraordinary measures look justifiable was one of the answers. Another was the effective use of committees to take over power whenever a hiatus in ordinary methods of government appeared.

The first occasion which Pym was able to exploit in order to gain power and experience for his own "shadow administration" was the advent in May 1641 of the Irish "plot" with its concurrent invasion scare. The committee of Six<sup>157.</sup> which was to meet this emergency was a significant advance on Parliament's bid to take over effective government from the king. It indicates just how temporary propaganda arising from the mid-1641 scare could be used to initiate a far-reaching policy of national defence which was to last right to the outbreak of war and beyond. It foreshadowed the work of the Committee of Safety set up more than a year later, which became the central executive for organizing the war.<sup>158.</sup> The form it took points to the distinct possibility that Pym realized in the middle of 1641 that a war might be inevitable. Finally, it gave invaluable experience to the parliamentary leaders in organizing the immediate campaign of stripping the king of his rights over his own council and the militia, and the long-term aim of setting up a parliamentary substitute to take the place of the king's lost powers.

There can be no doubt about the importance attached to the setting up this exclusive and secretive committee. Holles, Pym, Hampden, Strode, Fiennes, and Clotworthy made up the original membership—an entirely self-contained group of leaders completely identified with the planning group which met outside Parliament and whose activities have been commented upon in the other "close committees" for the Remonstrance and for Strafford. This committee, like a very few others,

demonstrates Pym's ideal of a policy-making body. It was in a sense the focal point of the whole committee system. A planned bureaucracy, with a small close coterie of leaders at the centre to dominate the administrative proceedings by secret and high-level formulation of policy, can be seen operating at its best in such committees. Pym was able to arrange this arrogation of functions more or less without considering any other interests in the House, due to the almost self-generated situation which it was called to meet. When later the Committee of Safety was set up, he was no longer able to disregard other pressures in the Commons or the Lords and as a result the joint committee could not have its membership or proceedings dominated with quite such pervasiveness.

The committee's first concern on being voted into office was to send delegations to the trouble spots to investigate possible dangers. In order to keep complete control over its delegates they sent men who were closely in touch with the ideas of the inner core. Stapleton, a trusted member of Pym's group, was added to the initial six on the following day, and sworn to secrecy "for service of the kingdom and the House" - an oath which significantly excluded the king. He was sent, together with Pym's protégé Clotworthy to report on affairs at Portsmouth where the "invasion" was expected. Another of Pym's friends, Sir Walter Erle was sent on a similar mission to Dorset, while two trusted northerners, Hotham and Cholmley were sent to the north. The committee's opening activities indicate a sureness of touch in the concrete and non-theoretical

methods used to deal with the critical situation. By sending their agents to the troubled locality they at once showed ability in handling executive authority.

The embracing nature of the committee's work can best be indicated by a survey of the suggestions it made to the House. Apart from the delegations to the trouble spots, the committee suggested that troops should be recalled from the counties to guard Parliament, Jersey and Guernsey, to be guarded, ships to be kept ready, the Admiral's officers to be investigated (presumably so that the Army plot was not repeated in the Navy), keeping in touch with the army commanders so that the plot could be uncovered, and impressing sailors for the coastal guard. <sup>159.</sup> The neat way in which all the plots were connected so as to appear more like a real conspiracy against Parliament can be seen by the handling of the information given to the Lords. The committee wrote to the army commanders that pardon would be given to anyone who had taken part in the plot provided they explained their part and swore fidelity to Parliament. This seems to indicate that whatever the plot was supposed to consist of it could not have been very serious and its repercussions could hardly have been a real threat to the Houses. But coming together with the information presented by Siennes and Holles about the plot from France and Portsmouth, the local papists and the Irish intriguers, the whole thing was made to appear as a gigantic plot involving all the parties whom Parliament wanted to discredit. The committee did its job so well that after its report the House made demands at a

conference with the Lords which would have appeared quite implausible without the incitement of the Close Committee. These included the demand that the king should disband all the armies before going north (this despite the fact that his mission was supposed to include arranging for the final disbanding of the northern armies); the kingdom to be put in a state of defence against all opposition; the train bands of the counties to be exercised especially in the north; the armories to be stocked - (resolutions which flatly contradicted the earlier ones); and all important bills to be expedited before the king left. The vagueness and contradiction of these recommendations from the House were put to good use by the committee; the programme which it drew up was neither vague nor <sup>contra</sup>dictory, nor did it follow from the Commons but was far closer to Pym's own lines of thought about current problems. The actual programme as reported by Pym was as follows: 160.

1. As much of the army should be disbanded as there was pay, and the king should allow the disbanding to take place before he goes north.
2. The king should take only such counsellors as were approved of by Parliament.
3. All foreign catholics should be got rid of from the Court and from among the Queen's counsellors.
4. The train bands should be allowed to be in readiness while the king was away, the ports should be put into safe hands, and the Admiral should be provided with enough money from Tonnage and Poundage to ensure an effective Navy.

5. A general pardon should be prepared for the plotters.
6. The Lords should be asked to appoint a committee to join with a committee of the Commons to confer "from time to time" upon "such particular courses as shall be most effectual to the common good."

The peculiar nature of this programme lies in the combination of obvious measures to tighten the security of the country at a time of crisis such as the measures dealing with the removal of Catholics and the training of the train bands, together with other matters which did not follow directly from the situation in hand, but which were nevertheless uppermost in Pym's mind. The call to make the Council responsible to Parliament was certainly premature, nor did it follow in any way from the situation at the time, since the king and his councillors were not implicated in the plots which were meant to free a combined Catholic menace. The suggestion of a joint committee too, was premature, foreshadowing as it did the Committee of Safety. The committee of Six was by its very nature a temporary expedient, set up to deal with a specific situation, to ensure the security of the realm in a time of acute crisis. It was one of Pym's cherished schemes that a committee of both Houses should consult on a regular basis about issues of defence and general policy, with no specific and hamstringing conditions to retard its business. Both these steps in the programme therefore stemmed directly from Pym's own stratagems and were not implied even vaguely in the initial recommendations of the House. The radicalism of the instructions

of the House was a tribute to the success of Pym's scheme for inducing an atmosphere of crisis and demonstrates his influence over the political thinking in the House. However Pym's premature and extraneous instructions were finally disregarded by the House, which indicates that there were still many moderate men ~~in the House~~ who neither wanted to antagonise the king to the point of no return, nor wished to see Pym's power increased by the formation of what was clearly a steering committee which would have dominated the policy-making of the House, and thus further encroached upon its independence. Ironically, a committee of both Houses was set up as a result of Pym's urging, but its functions were made quite specific and executive, with every piece of business delegated separately by the Commons; instead of becoming the steering committee for which Pym had had such hopes it became merely a means of obtaining a common front between the Houses for putting extra pressure on the king to fulfill the various demands made before his departure to the North. The result of the committee's joint deliberations was that the Lords were persuaded to join the Commons in asking that the King postpone his trip, to approach him not to grant commissions to papists, not to let any Irish troops out of the country for foreign service, and to stop the queen's priests from ministering to others. The committee's size, which was much larger than anything Pym would have wished to see formulating policy, was due to the custom of appointing twice as many Commoners as Lords to a joint committee. The 48 Commons' members included the entire Committee of Seven

and another 16 men of politically radical and reform orient-  
 164. 165.  
 ation, seven administrators, four more cautious later Peace  
 166.  
 Party men and nine later royalists. The remaining six were  
 all safe but politically inactive Parliamentarians. It is  
 probable that the feelings of most members were so stirred  
 against the Catholic menace that they all acted together with  
 167.  
 unanimity despite their later divergence, but in any case  
 Pym's majority was undoubted. The committee's recommendations  
 shunned the radical suggestions of the steering committee and  
 did not encroach at all upon the king's prerogative. Its  
 mood was strictly anti-Catholic, not pro-Puritan or pro-reform,  
 which made it, as Pym intended, a good rallying body to bind  
 together the Houses through the common fear of Catholics,  
 Irish and foreigners.

Even while the Committee of seven was still meeting,  
 it delegated other functions to lesser select committees,  
 such as preparing the order for securing land and sea, 168.  
 and preparing for a conference about the position of the Queen  
 169.  
 Mother and the tumults in London about her presence there.  
 These duties were delegated so that the time-consuming busin-  
 ess of drafting orders could be done outside the deliberative  
 170.  
 committee.

A whole series of committees followed the Committee  
 of Seven's suggestion when that committee no longer met.  
 These were all ostensibly concerned with warding off danger  
 from outside, although it does not take much imagination to  
 see that they were useful preliminaries to the methods employed



a year later for getting the kingdom ready for hostilities at home. The committee to arrange for regulation of arms in the kingdom, ordering the train bands and supplying ammunition, was directly meant as a preparation for the king's departure, although nominally concerned with warding off the threat of foreign invasion.<sup>171.</sup> A committee to concern itself with the importation and domestic manufacture of gun-powder was also directly related to the recommendations of the Committee of seven and provided Parliament with experience in organizing defensive policy.<sup>172.</sup> These defensive measures were really practical and not merely restricted to paper. There was a detailed concern with the training programme of the local militias, to be organized by yet another committee, to which all M.P.'s were to report the lists of Lords and Deputy Lieutenants of their constituencies, presumably so that the commanders could be vetted for political reliability.<sup>173.</sup> The king's absence was also used to acquire all kinds of ad hoc powers for the Parliament about which there would have been trouble under normal circumstances, such as securing the Tower, the ports, the local militia officers, the Navy etc.<sup>174.</sup> There can be no doubt that the leaders of the reform group regarded this period as a testing ground of the temper of the House and the powers which it was prepared to see taken over by Parliament at a time of emergency, as well as of the organizational method of committees to deal with the added burdens of administration. The early suggestion that Parliament should have a say in the appointment of a general due to the situation

175.

in the king's absence, indicates how far August 1641 presaged later events.

In this kind of atmosphere built up over the months since the army plot and the invasion scare the king's departure for Scotland fitted uneasily; no one was prepared to do more than hint that he might be suspected of trying to get a faction in Scotland to support him with arms in a stand against Parliament. The news of the "Incident" in Scotland came <sup>as</sup> a welcome refresher to the tensions of the preceding months which had enabled Pym and his friends to persuade the rest of the Commons into actions of unprecedented independence and solidarity. In the accompanying air of general mystery and intrigue, it resembled the earlier scares and served a very similar purpose, heightening suspicions of the king's untrustworthiness even if no concrete evidence of his involvement with the plotters could be produced. Like a man acquitted of a serious crime, the mere suggestion that there might have been some substance to the charge indicted the king in many eyes. There is no doubt that Pym felt that circumstances were now as favourable as they ever would be to force the issue of the choice of the king's councillors which he had brought up but not pursued on several earlier occasions. <sup>176.</sup> The Lords were given a build-up at a conference where the news of the "Incident" was relayed to them; <sup>177.</sup> and Pym managed to imply that it involved a threat to the security of Parliament because of the information he had which tied the plotters up with suspected papists in London. As a result a committee was set

up to frame a petition to the king to "prevent mischiefs in the Commonwealth by the choice and employment of evil counsellors, ambassadors, judges, officers and other ministers of the state"<sup>178</sup>. The clear implication of this measure was a far greater infringement of royal prerogatives, than the preceding arrangements for defence or the appointment of a parliamentary general. Indeed it was the only one which was intended to be a permanent limitation on the king, for the others were meant explicitly as temporary measures to ward off danger during the king's absence. In other words, while the defence measures were merely a test of the Commons' willingness to take on administrative responsibility in a time of crisis, the petition to the king about his choice of councillors was an abrupt and revolutionary step towards the final limitations of royal powers. Curiously, this committee was not dominated exclusively by Pym's close associates. Certainly the radical and reform groups made up eleven of the <sup>179</sup>eighteen members. But in addition there were men like D'Ewes, Waller and Cholmley, who, even if they could have been persuaded of the justice of this petition were obviously not fervently convinced of its legality, while the inclusion of Belasyse and Hyde indicates that a hostile element was also present. It is most unlikely that any of the king's later supporters could have been sufficiently swayed either by Pym's persuasive arguments or by the prevailing atmosphere of distrust to vote for this limitation of the king's fundamental rights, even if they could be made to believe that his present councillors were implicated

in the "Incident". Clarendon throws some light on the motives which may have guided him and his colleagues to participate on the committee. He does not mention his own role which in itself is strange, but refers in passing to "a motion that the King might be desired to make no Privy Councillor but such as the two Houses might approve of; and many other such extravagancies, which, though they seemed then but the murmurings of inconsiderable persons, were artificially vented to try the pulse of the House, and whether they were sufficiently inflamed with the new discoveries"<sup>180</sup>. In other words, he might well have been nominated to the committee, expecting to meet little opposition in quelling the whole matter, only to find that the "inconsiderable persons" were ranged solidly behind Pym and the opposition. His reasoning - that this issue was introduced at the same time as the displacing of the bishops during this critical period - is obviously correct.

Only a month after the attempt to interfere with the king's choice of councillors,<sup>181</sup> the House resolved that the Lords should not be consulted if they refused to co-operate with the Commons, and that in future only those Lords who were prepared to go along with them would be considered to be representative of the House as a whole.<sup>182</sup> This resolution was suggested by the House, which highlights even more strongly Clarendon's miscalculation about the current feelings of the Commons. The committee appointed to draft it into proper form consisted entirely of Pym's group and radicals,<sup>183</sup> including

all the most illustrious names, and concluding with Culpepper,  
184.  
whose inclusion, already discussed elsewhere, may have been  
similar to that of Hyde's mentioned above.

Apart from these sweeping political committees, the House was also beginning to be concerned with actual defence measures, which could no longer be disguised as inspired by the menace from outside after the various plots and intrigues had subsided. On December 31st a committee to consider how the kingdom might be furnished with powder and arms was established 185. as a standing committee which remained in existence for some time. 186. It is interesting that while it was as yet politically impossible to organize the militia or to set any moves in motion for calling up volunteers when there was no obvious crisis to justify it, the less conspicuous but equally necessary measures to organize ammunition could go on. The committee's activities were certainly practiced. The Ordinance 187. Officers wrote to the committee claiming a say in the activities of the Navy and manning of the forts etc., and included lists of the defects of the magazines so far examined which were found to be in bad shape. As one would expect, the members originally nominated to this committee were chosen more for their specialist knowledge than for political reasons. At the same time it must have been possible to make the committee's work look as though it referred only to danger from outside aggression, for otherwise it would be difficult to see why people like Culpepper, Cave, Hopton, Falkland and Partridge would have attended, even in specialist capacities;

dissenters would be ill-placed on an executive committee whose work they could only hinder. It is therefore likely that they attended in good faith because of the contribution they could make. Of the twelve named, Culpepper, Erie, Hotham, Falkland and Hopton had experience either in organizing the local militias or in actual soldiering abroad; Barrington, Pury and Wlyn had interests in overseas trade and could have had some knowledge of importation of powder or salt-petre; Cave was experienced in administration with the Court; Evelyn came from a family which had held the monopoly of gun-powder and was obviously an expert on its importation and production; Partridge was a Member for Sandwich where salt-petre was imported. <sup>188.</sup>

The additions made in March to the committee included nine <sup>189.</sup> merchants or men with trading connections, <sup>190.</sup> who were added specifically to ask the Common Council to contribute to the project; five soldiers or militia-men; <sup>191.</sup> an amateur chemist, Blanning, who concerned himself with the technical difficulties; Bippisley who had had experience with naval administration; Dayman was probably included as Member for Lye, another centre for imports and shipping; and six Members from the south-west where it was expected that the gunpowder would be produced.

This appears as one of the first of the great executive committees delegated the specific task of administering one aspect of the defence programme. It was manned by practical experts, a method which was later to be used extensively throughout the period of committee administration.

At the same time there was a preoccupation with making the current defence measures appear justified. A committee on the 12th January 1642<sup>192.</sup> ordered the local authorities to be prepared to defend the counties "from invasions by papists and other ill-affected persons", at the same time catalogued the various plots and designs of the last few months to justify the orders and to make an attack by papists seem a possibility. In addition it described the attempted arrest of the five members as a popish plot and vaguely accused the king's advisers of asking for foreign intervention.

Two days later a committee for "putting the kingdom in a posture of defence"<sup>193.</sup> was named, to make actual the vague orders for defence sent to the counties' various authorities. Although this defence committee was probably meant to survive, it probably did not meet after the end of the month. However, during its shortlived existence it was instrumental in framing the first attempts at gaining permanent control of the militia by Parliament. First it ordered the Members to nominate trustworthy Deputy Lieutenants in their local areas - repeating the methods tried during an earlier emergency. Having satisfied themselves of the reliability of the local commanders without meeting serious opposition from the king, the committee proceeded to far more radical suggestions. Without the consent of the Lords, the committee drew up a petition to the king to put the Tower and the militia into "the Hands of such persons as shall be recommended unto your Majesty by your petitioners", that is, the Commons.<sup>194.</sup> This too, had been foreshadowed during

the earlier months at the time of the king's departure for Scotland and the concurrent crises in England. But now the situation had completely changed and the Lords refused to co-operate. These demands were of course not only those of the committee, but were referred to it by the House as a whole, indicating that it was by now a majority view that the control of the militia and Tower were the only means of checking the king's untrustworthy actions. When the king refused the petition, <sup>195.</sup> the Commons justified the infringement of an essential prerogative of the crown on the ground of expediency and not at all on any form of precedent, letting "times of danger" justify everything. The capitulation of the Lords and the restoring of a united policy, if not the acquiescence of the king, led to the closing of the committee's business.

Its membership remains a mystery. The original eight Members included the courtier Cave, and Chancellor Culpepper, together with Pierrepont who although on the reform side was not a leading member, St. John, Holles, Glyn, Vane and Stapelton. The royalists by this time must have been in direct opposition to the uncompromising line taken by the committee and were probably appointed because of their knowledge of defence and military matters rather than as defenders of the king. It would thus seem as though when the committee was appointed it was not clear that its deliberations would indict the king's actions of the past few months. Rather it was probably regarded as being in line with previous defence measures - continuing the myth that safety precautions were needed in case of attack



from outside. This would be consistent with the initial report from the committee which concerned only the naming of Deputy Lieutenants. Before the next report on January 25th, further additions were made to the membership, which certainly boosted the representation of Pym's adherents. With the radicals they made up at least eight out of seventeen, with five "committee-men", and only one added royalist. It was the committee with its additions which was responsible for the revolutionary votes. The royalists were not only swamped by numbers, but any misunderstanding about the nature of the committee was disguised by the additions.

The Defence Committee's suggestion to petition the king to put the Tower and forts into the hands of people recommended by Parliament was taken up by a new committee, which negotiated at first only about the specific issues referred to it, but soon became known as the Militia Committee for it handled the transactions between king and Parliament on the Militia Ordinance. Significantly it comprised four of the original eight members on the Defence committee, all reform leaders, together with four others, all at the centre of Pym's circle. This seems to indicate that anything arising from the Defence committee's meetings which had to be pursued further was to be committed to a safer and more radical group. Yet the overlap in membership shows the relevance of the subject to the discussions of the Defence committee. Pym and his committee's treatment of parliamentary control over the Tower and forts shows his ability to negotiate from strength, making

the king accept unconditionally the position offered him by Parliament by treating each concession as a major victory.<sup>201.</sup> The committee became openly antagonistic to the king only when he withdrew his consent from the Militia Bill. Their indictment of the evil councillors sounded even hollower than usual, especially as the king specifically disclaimed any desperate design or papist plot on Parliament at the time of the attempted arrest.<sup>202.</sup>

This makes no bones of the fact that the king's switch in policy, presumably due to his decision to leave London and the whole sordid business, was the cause of the eventual breakdown of understanding between the two sides. The actual details of the Militia Ordinance were then discussed by the House as a whole, and the committee only drafted it into proper form.<sup>203.</sup> Pym must have persuaded the rest of the House by this time that it was impractical to trust the king especially in view of his departure. The king's first equivocal answer to the suggestion of the Ordinance, was not however referred to the Militia Committee, but to another,<sup>204.</sup> which comprised Pym, Glyn, Holles, Fiennes, and Stapleton, who were all on the latter committee, together with Marten and Lytton. There is no obvious reason for this duplication of committee appointment, as the political weight was not altered by the changed membership. When the king finally changed his mind about the bill and went back on his earlier agreement to it,<sup>205.</sup> yet another committee was set up to meet the Lords. This larger group, once again included the whole inner ring of Pym,

Glyn, Holles, Stapleton, Fiennes, and Hampden, who had featured on the previous two; to add more weight their numbers were supplemented by Vane, St. John, Strode, and twelve other close associates of Pym's, supported by four administrators. D'Ewes, although not a member himself, recorded that the committee sat for three hours deciding whether to direct the declaration regarding the consequences of the king's refusal to sign the bill to the king, the kingdom, or to both. The Earl of Northumberland put the view that it be addressed to the king only, and this was finally agreed upon. There was very likely a dispute between representatives of the two Houses on this point as there is no doubt that a declaration to the kingdom was the far more extreme measure, appealing as it would have done, over the king's head direct to the nation. The Lords always took the more conservative line and Northumberland was himself only a very cautious supporter of Parliament's case, while the Commons' committee had only Crane and Lewis who might have wished for a less extreme line with the king. All this would make it appear that Pym and his group must have decided that the agreement of the Lords was enough concession and therefore the declaration was agreed to be sent to the king only.

By way of contrast to these powerfully constructed political committees which dominated all the policy-making in regard to the Militia issue, the committee to take the declaration to the king and to await his answer to the petition regarding the Militia bill consisted entirely of minor

figures, with the sole exception of the younger Vane. The  
 rest included three of Pym's lesser cohorts, two administrators <sup>210.</sup>  
 who by their nature were not forthcoming on political matters  
 but who were loyal to the reform programme, <sup>211.</sup> one later royalist  
 Belasyse, and five other back-benchers who although Parlia-  
 mentarians were not known for political zeal. Presumably it  
 was thought that this kind of committee would arouse less  
 antagonism from the king, especially as it was nominally led  
 by Lord Granbourne. In actual fact however, this committee  
 which received Charles' famous answer: "[I] am so much ass-  
 ured that [my answer to the Militia petition] is agreeable  
 to what in justice or reason you can ask, or I in Honour grant,  
 that I shall not alter it in any point" <sup>212.</sup> was probably dominated  
 by that rising personality, the younger Vane. <sup>213.</sup> Sachard accused  
 him of completely dominating the otherwise accommodating comm-  
 ittee, and wrecking the negotiation. This view may be open  
 to doubt, coming as it did from a royalist historian, and  
 attributing such power to Vane at a time when he had not yet  
 played a very leading part in affairs. On the other hand  
 his case is certainly arguable, for the very colourlessness  
 of the rest of the committee might make it plausible. He  
 recorded that while the committee was framing the report of  
 its meeting with the king to deliver to Parliament, a message  
 came from Warwick who had managed the committee of both Houses  
 and had been its spokesman to the King. The note said that  
 he heard from his brother who was with the king that if the  
 committee would wait it would receive a more satisfactory

answer. The committee agreed to wait, but Vane, "a dark enemy to all accomodation, declared himself to wonder at it and said; 'Is there any person here who can undertake to know the Parliament's mind, whether this which we have, or that which is called a more satisfactory answer will be more pleasing to the two Houses? For my part, I cannot' . . ." This could have been quite an intimidating tactic considering the fate of Geoffrey Palmer who had undertaken to speak for all who protested against the passing of the Remonstrance and Protestation, <sup>214.</sup> and therefore, despite the much milder attitudes of the others, Vane may have had his way. If the speech attributed to him was correct, it was certainly harshly realistic in admitting that the leaders no longer sought accomodation, but were going all out to make the king's position impossible.

The resolutions of the House after receiving the king's answer from this committee- that the kingdom be put in a posture of defence against the king and his counsellors' evil practices - <sup>215.</sup> shows the decisiveness of this point of no return. These resolutions were drafted by a committee of which Pym was chairman, supported by Hampden, Holles and Vane Jr. from the Commons, which indicates the degree of unanimity and the importance attached to Pym's own handling of the matter. <sup>216.</sup> Verney reported an outline of Pym's report to the Commons. The resolutions were to include an account of the king's crimes and blunders, with the emphasis on the Catholic plots and the queen's role as well as the attempted arrest and the

dealings with foreign princes. Verney did not record the formula of evil counsellors which was doubtless used, perhaps because he, like all the rest must have known that it was purely a formality. These resolutions were agreed upon, and the Lords gave their blessing at a conference on March 2nd managed by Pym.<sup>217.</sup>

<sup>218.</sup>  
On 14th March a committee headed by Pym was set up to prepare a declaration to show the kingdom at large what grounds of "law and necessity" led the Houses to proceed in the Militia Ordinance.<sup>219.</sup> The Lords had earlier managed to forestall this move when the king had first given his consent. But now when the king had changed his mind for good and refused to sign away his power over the Militia it was felt that a justification and rationalization of Parliament's view had to accompany publication of the Militia Ordinance. The declaration, published on May 3rd with the Militia Ordinance,<sup>220.</sup> gave the whole history of the dealings with the king in relation to the Ordinance. This committee of 31 which drafted it was packed with eminent lawyers, including two who later took the king's side, but who remained with Parliament until well after the outbreak of war.<sup>221.</sup> The only two who possibly did not have legal training were the elder Vane, and Hampden, both well qualified in other directions to be useful here. All the legal talent of the House was surely needed in drafting a declaration which could base the need for the Militia Ordinance on "law and necessity", the latter practically negating the former. D'Ewes highlighted the difficulties faced by himself

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and his legal colleagues on the committee. The question was raised whether the subject ought to obey this Ordinance "by the fundamentall lawes of the Realme". Some said a law could only be binding if it had the king's assent as well, others argued that the Ordinance was warranted by the law of God, the law of nature and of necessity. D'Ewes himself added that to say one should obey the Ordinance did not mean it had "the same virtue and efficacie" as an Act of Parliament or that "we can bind the liberty of the subjects against their wills" by the Ordinance. The argument for its legality was evidently lost in a welter of argument for its necessity. This indicates how fundamental the issue of the Militia Ordinance was to the stand later taken by Parliament, forced as it was to rely entirely on Ordinances after that time. D'Ewes' hesitations could hardly have stemmed from uncertainty about the legal precedent but rather from a timidity of nature to commit himself unequivocally to the argument by necessity. They indicate what was probably a widespread feeling of the uncommitted members of the House about the whole business of ruling without king or council. Yet despite their desperate attempts to dress these matters up as legal expedients it must have been obvious to the many trained lawyers and others in the House that necessity only guided the move. The familiar Puritan argument from the "law of nature and necessity" which cropped up so often in the Leveller literature was here characteristically though prematurely applied to cover a case where the usual appeal to the case law did not favour the desired end.

After this complicated manoeuvre had been got out of the way, the difficulties arising from the king's absence began to arise. The most obvious of these was the pressing matter of the war in Ireland where king and Parliament were supposed to be fighting against a common enemy. One of the king's early communications to the Houses after his departure bracketed together his support of the Irish campaign with his declaration of the illegality of the projected Militia Ordinance. <sup>223.</sup> The Commons seized this and argued at a joint committee with the Lords that it proved the king's advisers favoured the rebels and once again sought to have the "evil counsellors" specifically named, <sup>224.</sup> but they did not get the co-operation from the Lords with this ploy. It is to be presumed that not only the Lords, but a proportion of the Commons were once again feeling lake-warm about carrying on in the present manner which daily appeared to be more disastrous and smacking of treachery. The news of war-like preparations in Denmark, the appearance from Holland of Sir John Pennington with a royal fleet, together with the Earl of Newcastle's attempts to get to Hull, <sup>225.</sup> served Pym well in the manner of his earlier hat-tricks showing the king's unreliability at just the right time to pull the waverers back into line. The ensuing accusatory tone and the repeated threats to get the king back to Westminster were handled very closely by Pym's most loyal supporters in small committees. <sup>226.</sup> These committees with close memberships which were responsible for relations with the king at this time were certainly dominated by Pym who handled the



reports and the writing of letters as his private domain.

<sup>227.</sup>  
D'Ewes reported Marten moving a propos a committee to consider the king's warrants to sherriffs, that it should handle all other matters relating to the king, in this way cutting down on the proliferation of committees and assuring the properly radical tone which one would expect from a group consisting of Pym, Glyn, Whitelock, Stapleton, Vane Jr. Miles Corbett, John White, Wylde, D'Ewes, and Marten himself.

Tentative preliminary orders were then issued about the security of the country. On April 28th an order was made to raise 16,000 men, <sup>228.</sup> but the main preoccupation at this stage was still with the citing and finding of precedents, and a committee of five lawyers were suitably nominated. <sup>229.</sup> The next concern was with gunpowder, for which provision had already been made earlier as we saw, but which now had to be thought of in actual terms of production to meet a likely need. <sup>230.</sup> The committee to put this to the Lords comprised almost entirely of men on the earlier committee to take charge of the production and supply of powder. <sup>231.</sup> The next concern, and by far the most vital one was the provision of sufficient money. On May 26th a committee to meet the Lords to consider the defence of the kingdom was nominated, <sup>232.</sup> whose concern was not the provision of defence measures but the money to pay for them. Perhaps the initial intention of the use to which this committee was to be put was not clear, as on the 27th <sup>233.</sup> the Lords agreed to a standing joint committee to have its power enlarged to "consider all means for continuing and preserving of the peace

of the Kingdom and the preventing of civil War". But Holles' report from the committee on June 10th<sup>234.</sup> dealt entirely with the publication of arrangements for ensuring finance for the war by providing 8% on all plate and cash brought in by lenders. It also named a City executive committee which was to be in charge of the proceedings, consisting of four prominent London Aldermen who were not M.P's. These Treasurers were to appoint valuers for the objects brought in. At the same time the organization of the "Propositions" scheme as it came to be known, was bracketed with something of a witch-hunt among the M.P's themselves. The more diffident supporters of Parliament, as we shall see, were haunted during the early months of the war by the constant pressure put on them by the radicals to declare how much they would contribute personally to the war effort and by the constant checks made on how actual performance measured up to the initial promises. This aspect of the committee's work was certainly not financial nor even administrative, but plainly political. The stress on the individual members' contributions could only have been meant as an intimidatory measure against possible waverers, and in fact became a standard policy of the War Party. The fact that this committee was later to consider the excuses of absent M.P's and the relevant fines<sup>235.</sup> confirms the political nature of its deliberations, and indicates at the same time the lack of planning in committing two such unrelated matters to one group.

In the meantime other legal and administrative problems arose, associated with the realization that a separate organization for local executive machinery would be needed. On the one hand the lawyers had to concern themselves with trying to counter the king's Commissions of Array by trying to establish their illegality,<sup>236.</sup> hoping to discredit them in the eyes of the county administration, and on the other the administrators had to devise handy means for distributing Parliament's orders to the nation at large;<sup>237.</sup> in other words, to cope with the setting up of a loyal administrative hierarchy in the counties. Appropriately the chairman of the committee dealing with this was Pury, himself an excellent administrator. He was supported by two "committee-men" suitable for the administrative work in hand, and three more political figures.<sup>238.</sup> He reported that the best means for spreading parliamentary orders was by distributing them among all Members who were to issue them to their local sheriffs. The latter would be responsible direct to the committee for doing their job. This reliance on the Members as the obvious links with the counties, and the initial employment of the traditional officers of executive government in the country at large was typical of the first attempts at parliamentary local administration until more direct liaisons were established through the county committees. For example the Remonstrance was circulated under the aegis of this committee, and its printing and distribution was left entirely in its hands, as Pury's detailed report shows.<sup>239.</sup>

It is obvious from this welter of committees dealing with defence matters, set up over the year from May 1641 to July 1642 that no clearly organized machine for running the war had yet been evolved, even though the principle of committee planning had been well established. As in other spheres this appointment of committees in this important aspect arose purely to meet current needs. The kind of work which was referred altered from the purely theoretical situation in 1641 to the actual one in 1642. The papist scares and army plots and incidents of 1641 can be seen as useful preludes to the war in the sense that Parliament was able to evolve some means of organizing the defence of the kingdom before they were seriously needed. The early committees which were not faced with the actual problem of financing a war or raising large bodies of troops, concentrated mainly on propaganda - putting across parliamentary suspicions of the king and his counsellors and using them to justify the idea that national defence without the king's advice or consent was not only feasible but necessary. The odd sorties into actual army organization, such as the delegations despatched by the Committee of Six were restricted and localized, and their intention was more to root out subversion than to organize the army itself. Until the beginning of 1642 the defence committees were mainly agents to propagate the verbal warfare against the king - or rather his counsellors. Pym clearly considered it a political necessity to produce the climate of opinion favourable to the radical steps which he could see might be

needed in case of actual war. The earlier committees on the whole merely paved the way ideologically for the events of 1642, although some practical measures, like the organization of the supply of gunpowder were initiated before the end of the year. The committees of May and June 1642 which began in the most primitive way to organize the call-up of men and money none of them survived long, but dealt purely with the immediate business allocated to them and then went into abeyance, no matter how general their original instructions were. If renewed at a later date, they were generally only called back for specific functions.

Nevertheless, there is among these committees at least the beginnings of the idea that a committee can formulate policy as a preparation for the House and not just execute the minutes committed to it. Although the majority of committees were concerned with detail (even when the subject-matter was a large and continuous one, such as the committee to take charge of the Propositions), there were two, the Committee of Seven, and the Committee of Defence which went well beyond their instructions and which probably formulated policies not expressly stated, and perhaps not even intended by the House. The former committee especially, is a good example of how a small group could be used simultaneously to formulate policy and to act as an executive for the orders of the House. The great difference between this and the other committees discussed here is that it was set up in answer to the emergency of threatened invasion, and that its members acted in secrecy, even

from the House, and therefore could not be entirely responsible to it. It is along the lines of this committee rather than any of the others that the Committee of Safety was modelled.

The men most active on these committees were a more concentrated group than on any other topic discussed. <sup>240.</sup> This would indicate that despite the width of scope of this subject of defence, a small group of specialists were regarded as the most suitable men to run the committee work. Among the 30 men who sat on seven or more committees, the Middle Party had twelve members, the later War Party seven, the later Peace Party three, the "administrators" seven, and the royalists one. This shows the care which must have been taken by the leaders to see that important committees were well packed with reliable and often radical members. The seven "administrators" took up 76 places on these committees, which indicates that the political leadership depended to quite an extent on the administrative support which these men were able to give their more politically orientated colleagues.

Comparing these names with those of the next 29 most active members, (those on four or more committees), there is a sharp decline of Pym's supporters and radicals. Among this group the figures are: Middle Party 5, War Party 3, Peace Party 6, "administrators" 9, and Royalists 1. There was thus a decline among all the more radical groups, but a sharp increase among the later "Peace Party" and the "administrators". We cannot be sure with how much enthusiasm the former group supported the measures taken by these committees up to the

outbreak of the war, and the role of people like Selden and D'Ewes always appeared somewhat contradictory. From D'Ewes' earlier statements one would never have expected that he could agree to the Militia Ordinance. Yet he was prepared to swallow the pill, and even work towards covering it with enough sugar to make it appear digestible to legal palates like his own. He and men like Maynard, Selden, Rudyerd, and soon, all had their part to play in producing a climate of opinion which would make war acceptable to the nation at large. A glance at the political orientation of the most active men on these committees shows Pym's circle was the most prominent in working out a defence policy and in fumbling towards its implementation. They were supported by the radicals, many of whom were at this time still indistinguishable from Pym's own supporters, while their more extreme adherents wanted to precipitate the break with the king. The increased participation of the moderates further down the list reflects their lesser importance to the leadership but at the same time the usefulness of their support for the general policy. The large numbers of <sup>Administrators</sup> ~~committee-men~~ especially lower down the list, indicate the beginnings of the dependence built upon the administrative experts whose work after the outbreak of the war tended more and more to be centred around committees where executive rather than political functions predominated.

This group of committees also makes a good test of  
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 the political activeness of the royalists, and gives an

indication of when they finally broke with Parliamentary support. The percentage of royalists in the membership of the defence committees at this time <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~:

1641: 6May, 8May, 28Jun, 15Jul, 21Jul, 24Jul, 14Aug, 16Aug, 20Oct, 28Oct.  
 12% 30% 20% 27% 18% 20% 20% 33% 16% 11%  
 15Nov. 3 Dec. 31Dec.  
 28% 8% 20%

1642: 12Jan. 12Jan. 14Jan. 1 Feb. 10 Feb. 21 Feb. 28 Feb. 1 Mar.  
 10% 4% 12% 0 0 0 0 25%

14 Mar. 17 Mar. 18 Mar. 25 Mar. 5 Apr. 28 Apr. 11 May  
 6% 5% 0 0 13% 0 0

26May. 27May. 3 Jun. 6Jun. 7Jun. 4 Jul. 9Jul. 9Jul. 13Jul.  
 8% 7% 0 4% 0 0 6% 4% 0

From this it can be seen that the decline was not gradual but that with a few exceptions the royalists no longer participated on these committees after January 1642. Some of the anomalies among these figures can be explained. On the Committee of Seven on the 6th May there were no royalists among the original number but among those added specifically for the business concerning Portsmouth three later royalists were added in their capacities as Sussex and Kent M.P.'s. All the other early committees dealt with the emergency of the king's departure to Scotland, and the invasion scare etc., and it can be assumed that the House acted with a fair degree of unanimity about the defence needed in case of an invasion. Up to October 20th then, the committees dealt with here were nominally concerned with the problem of meeting a foreign or treacherous foe, and except perhaps for the inner political circle, there cannot have been any ambiguity about the purpose of the defence measures. Even Pym and his associates could not have planned the



war so many months in advance, although, as we saw, Pym was early aware of its possibility. They were more concerned at this stage with the increase of administrative power for the Commons than with establishing any permanent defences to be used against the king. But on October 28th the committee which attacked the king's councillors differed radically in tone from the previous committees in indicating clearly how far the indictment of the king was implicit in the previous measures. Clarendon's explanation of his own and probably Belasyse's participation has been noted earlier, and was due to a miscalculation of the seriousness of the matter and the political weight behind it. Significantly it contained the lowest percentage of royalists to date. The following committee on the 15th November was back dealing with the emergency measures comparable to the earlier defence committees, and the participation of the royalists was proportionally increased. On December 8th the outspoken attack on the Lords was formulated by a committee with only Culpepper from the royalists. The committee on December 31st was another practical administrative one dealing with the supply of gunpowder, and the inclusion of seven royalists was consistent with their previous appearance on defence committees especially as we have seen that many of them were regarded as experts on the manufacture, use and financing of the project. The fiasco of the attempted arrest probably dissuaded a few potential royalists from giving their support uncompromisingly to the king, although

it coincides with the majority of royalists dropping out from committees due to the distrust of the Remonstrance and its implications. The presence of some, like Culpepper, on committees in January to publicize the plots and to warn the country as a whole of the danger of papists may be due to their revulsion of the king's action, although they reversed their judgements later in view of the rapidly deteriorating relations with the king. The last committee with any sizeable percentage of royalists was the Committee of Defence on January 14th., which included Culpepper, Bowyer and Cave. As this committee had quite a radical tone and may have counselled taking an independent stand on the Militia, it is surprising that these three were still present, especially as they all joined the king right at the beginning of hostilities, and therefore must have been repelled by this revolutionary move. However, the appointment of the committee was preceded by a Committee of the Whole to consider "ways and means of removing the present distempers and disorders and settling . . . the kingdom" <sup>242.</sup> which voted that the king had no cause to depart and that the Commons had no intention of charging the queen, blaming the ubiquitous evil counsellors for spreading the rumour of this intention. At the same time the House stressed that the power of the malignants, recusants, and priests over the queen, and her influence in turn over the king was the "chief cause of our evils". It indicted the preferment of recusants, the public exercise of the popish religion at Court,

and the removing and preferment of men without parliamentary consent, as well as the king's consultation with unknown counsel, the votes of the bishops in the Lords, the influence of the clergy in temporal affairs, the breaches of parliamentary privileges, and the false rumours against members of Parliament. This indicates that the temper of the House was well established before the Committee of Defence was named. The royalists may have hoped to get the king to accept the condition of a negative voice only in the choice of counsellors, in return for the meagre satisfaction that no new demands were being made here. This was really the only serious obstacle at this stage, and it was put here in an indirect way, suggesting that only changes in the membership of the Council were to be put up for parliamentary approval. This may have been enough to make the royalist leaders hopeful for some compromise, and therefore led to their participation on the committee.

After the failure to modify parliamentary policy on this committee, the royalists practically withdrew their participation from the affairs of the Commons, feeling obviously outmanoeuvred and outnumbered. In February no royalists appeared on these committees, and there remained only the committee on March 1st where there was a sizeable percentage of royalists. Significantly this was the committee to approach the king personally, and contained only moderate men, apart from the younger Vane. Pennyman's, Russell's and Belasyse's

reasons for associating themselves through this petitionary committee with the demands of Parliament for control of the militia were probably the hopes that the king might modify his answer to the Militia Ordinance if the committee had been more patient. There may have been a hope among his later supporters that a compromise under their aegis and with their active co-operation could still be reached, but they were once again outmanoeuvred by the radicals, who, if Eackard is to be believed, did not wish even to consider anything less than wholesale capitulation from the king. In any case, Belasyse's experience in military affairs, Pennyman's friendship with Strafford (despite his kinship with the radical Hutchinson) and Russell's kinship with Bedford were well known to the members and might have made them acceptable negotiators with the king.

Among the later committees such as the one to justify the legality of the Militia Ordinance (March 14th) the activities of people like Whistler and Vaughan can only be explained in terms of their indecision to relinquish the parliamentary side. The four royalists, Pettiplace, Lloyd, Hunt and Harrison on the committee of April 5th were all very much backbenchers and the committee was in any case out of alignment with the others on defence being concerned with information given to the Council about "tumults and seditious pamphlets" which presumably dealt with uprisings in the counties.

This distribution of royalists indicates strongly that membership of committees was a planned and not a haphazard arrangement, that there a strong correlation between activeness in the House and activeness on committees, and that the tone of the House and its future decisions were largely determined by the beginning of 1642. It also indicates that the royalists were almost completely unorganized and could not meet the challenge of concerted action presented by Pym and his associates. In addition the disillusionment of the royalists was not gradual from the beginning of Parliament onwards, (most of them supported the reform measures up to mid-1641 anyway) but was a fairly sudden disengagement when the demands of the radicals suddenly became more audacious and when their efforts became more pointedly directed against the king rather than against some foreign enemy or even against his counsellors.

The other striking characteristic about the membership of these committees of defence was the preponderance of men with trading interests and connections with London.<sup>243</sup> The ties with London finance, the background military experience, the interest in shipping and trade as it affected defence of the coastal areas and the import of material for war, were all relevant to the committees' work. The large numbers of men with an urban background and commercial leanings on these committees contrast strangely with the general membership of the Commons which was purely county-orientated. The enthusiasm among the main towns for Parliament's cause is well-known. Whether the urban interest was mainly religious, commercial

er strategic, the parliamentarians with town backgrounds made enthusiastic and appropriately trained participants on the committees which organized the national campaign in the early days. Although some of the parliamentary leaders were "mere" gentry, the majority of their *bucolic* colleagues kept to the back-benches and left administration to the townsmen.

Summary. The membership of the defence committees has shown the growth of organized opposition to the crown before the outbreak of war. But the committees also proved useful in other important ways; some helped to set in motion the actual machinery of administration on which the possibility of armed conflict depended; others served as a concerted propaganda weapon not only against the king but also to put the parliamentary viewpoint across to the nation by previously unchartered channels; some committees served the Commons as a means to force the king to accept its claims or else pay the stipulated price; and finally the committees proved an excellent tool for the leaders of the reform party to formulate fundamental issues of policy both to control their allies as well as to confound the enemy.

The powerful committee of six, perhaps more than any other single committee until the Committee of Safety a year later, reflected the self-conscious attempt by the leaders of the House to meet all these needs. This committee attempted for the first time to set up some form of machinery to deal with organized defence in the counties; its propaganda value consisted not so much of blackguarding the king as of putting

the nation into a frame of mind in which emergency measures of unprecedented scale and parliamentary domination of unheard of dimensions would be accepted; as a result it was possible for the first time to frame publicly the demand to have the king's right of appointing councillors questioned; and finally Pym's overriding desire to have the committee system used to set up a real alternative to a nominated executive council was foreshadowed by the blanket instruction to "confer upon such particular courses as shall be most effectual to the common good." It was noted that this intention was too far in advance for the membership of the Commons as a whole; instead, the committee was used for a more applied but nevertheless important function, namely to force the king to make various concessions to the Commons arising directly out of the current situation - the departure of the king to the north. This committee, in foreshadowing the Committee of Safety, was a microcosm of all the requirements of organized opposition so that armed conflict became not only a possibility but one which could be met by a system of political planning and executive government.

Several strands can be unravelled from this promising start. The system of defence administration which was touched off by this committee was at once followed up by such practical matters as the supply of gun-powder, and drilling the train-bands in the counties. Due to the convenient absence of the king, such previously royal domains as the Tower and other forts, the navy, the ports and all aspects of defence such

as they were, could be examined with impunity. Although no permanent committees survived from one crisis to another in the 1641-2 period a group of specialists with expert knowledge of defence was beginning to emerge in the form of prolific committee-men. By January 1642 the thinly disguised foreign danger was beginning to be framed in terms nearer to home. Attempts were made by another early defence committee to gain lasting control of the militia, by-passing the king in sending instructions straight to the county authorities in charge of the local train-bands. At the same time it combined the political and administrative purpose of attempting to get control of the Tower and Forts on a more permanent basis. Four months later, with the king gone and much acrimony built up, the need for providing money for the inevitable conflict was raised and a committee came up with the first scheme ~~was~~ albeit a very ad hoc one, <sup>for</sup> provision of the sinews of war. This early adventure into the maze of financial administration was not well planned; the idea of borrowing money on plate and valuables brought in by the faithful could hardly have been a serious answer to the pressing needs of the situation. It was muddled up with the political purpose of hounding out unenthusiastic M.P.'s who did not contribute "on the Propositions" with sufficient zeal.

Another task facing the parents of the embryonic administrative organism was the immediate development of an executive system which could ensure that the orders generated at the centre would be carried out. The existing hierarchy



of administrative functionaries was tested by being ordered to see to the distribution of Parliament's commands, especially in such matters as the training of the local militia and the early collection of money. Where these proved ineffective, new methods had to be invented. At first executive authority stemmed from the M.P's themselves, sent back to their constituencies to organize loyal bodies from amongst their own neighbours and peers to carry out Parliament's orders.

On the administrative level the committee system arose directly out of the need to delegate authority in order to break down the myriad of functions and duties which were to face the legislative body suddenly bereft of its executive head. But it is one thing to say that the whole system developed in answer to a pressing need for delegating administrative authority, and another to say that individual committees were set up to meet emergencies as they arose. Although the post facto generalization is true, in actual practice the relevant committees were not always able to cope with the swiftly changing situation and by the time the king raised his standard no effectively working executive machinery was as yet in evidence. The principle of executive government by committees was well established but the facts lagged sadly behind, due to inexperience. The changing situation and the need for co-operation from the lower ranges of the executive scale were even more difficult to control by the parliamentary leaders than was the general trend of opinion of the Houses themselves.

Related to the need to set up a properly functioning war machine was the prior step of convincing as large a slice of the nation as could be reached, to accept what Parliament was doing in its name. The Privy Council had its own established channels of propaganda to propagate official policy and attitudes, and Parliament had to find new ways of convincing people of its general policy as well as to put them into a frame of mind where the extreme measures needed to wage war against the anointed king would become acceptable to the large number of the people whose support mattered. The Committee of six which foreshadowed the need for a defence machine in the unreal situation of mid-1641 also served as a testing-ground for nationwide propaganda for Parliament. The whole trend of its recommendations was to stress the need for concentrated suspicion of the Catholic menace, which could at a later stage be used effectively against the papist-riddled court - an implication which clearly emerged from the early attempt to influence the king's choice of councillors. The work of the committee was so successful in convincing the sceptical of the need for immediate defence measures that the first steps of defiance against the king and his advisors' executive authority were undertaken with no evident opposition from anyone. These useful preliminaries made it easier in January 1642 to persuade the county authorities to prepare their militias, with adroit use of the history of the various plots of the preceding six months which stressed the real possibility of subversion by the Catholic menace.

As the year drew on and the situation grew tenser the propoganda machine began to operate more effectively and widely. The whole manoeuvre of the Militia Bill entailed not only a tactical victory over the king, but rather an appeal over his head to the nation at large to accept Parliamentary responsibility for military organization. Pym was able to use the imminent departure of the king as well as his equivocation over the bill as means of convincing the vacillating and timorous members and the nation at large. As in all these committees which put the view of the opposition leaders to the House the membership was confined to a small and influential coterie. To reinforce their view that a point of no return had been reached after the king's answer to the bill, the inner group kept up a barrage of declarations from committees of similar membership to ensure that the nation at large would appreciate the connection between these events and the treacherous proceedings of the earlier months. Apart from being a useful reminder of the king's dealings with Parliament these declarations subtly indicated the revolutionary principle that it was not precedent but "law and necessity" which justified the passing of the Militia Ordinance. This clever shift was required to give a semblance of justification to many of the gentry and other classes who were accustomed to thinking in a legalistic way about political issues. Nor was it effected entirely by the inner group of leaders, but by the support of all the eminent lawyers who were still actively concerned in the affairs of the Commons. The self-conscious way in which

all communications with the king after his departure were left to groups of similar and closely knit membership, indicates how far Pym had succeeded in winning over the Commons to supporting the propaganda machine, which was supplemented by batteries of lawyers on specific occasions when it was considered useful to cite precedents in order to make the point more effective. Members were aware of the need for a proper administrative machine to set in motion the archaic militia organizations, and the logically prior need to convince the local authorities responsible for it that they were legally or morally justified in carrying out Parliament's orders. Parliament's countermanding of the king's commissions of Array sent to the sheriffs are a clear indication of how this new tool for the effective working of a new executive was used. The committee system proved to be invaluable for putting across a new public image of the activities of Parliament, which was needed before the stringencies of war and implicit obedience could be attained by Parliament.

Allied to the public relations aspect of the work of these early committees was the classical need of the opposition to force the king to accept as many of its demands as possible without a resort to force. The steering committees which took over this closely organized function of the Commons were necessarily identified with the leaders. The history of this aspect of the work of committees goes back much further than the beginning of the defence measures of 1641<sup>244</sup> but a new and

more radical phase opened by the Committee of six with its stress on control of the executive and the Militia. Pym had hopes of developing even then some more permanent machinery to control these two vital aspects of the king's prerogative, but he was only successful in persuading his more conservative colleagues to support him on the temporary plane of the king's imminent departure for the north. He was at least partially successful in going further with his plan as a result of the timely "Incident" which allowed him to take a much more radical line with the king<sup>by</sup> petitioning him about his choice of councillors, and shortly afterwards putting him at an even greater disadvantage by threatening to disregard the views of the Lords if they disagreed with those of the Commons. This resulted in the Commons alone petitioning the king to put the defences of London into parliamentary hands in a situation no longer related to external danger, highlighting the undisguised claims of Parliament to executive authority.<sup>245.</sup> Any serious attempts to force the king to accept Parliament's demands stopped about the time of his departure, despite the continued barrage of demands for concessions which were despatched to him in later months. Such devices as the Militia Ordinance and the demands to name specific "evil Counsellors" were no longer concerned with gaining executive power but rather with pressing the parliamentary advantage for the maximum propaganda value.

The committee system was not used only as a means of finding expedients to meet issues as they arose, but became especially with defence, a means of foisting a whole policy on Parliament and the nation at large. It was the most effective tool of the opposition which had to organize itself, the Commons, the Lords, and the whole gamut of executive officials into a coherent system, at first to stand up to the king and his advisers and later to form an entire new administration. Pym's concern with the basic policy-making functions of committees which culminated in the setting up of the Committee of Safety at the time of the outbreak of war was foreshadowed by the Committee of six which sketched in microcosmic detail the solutions to problems which were later to arise on a far more pervasive level. Both this committee and the later one of defence went beyond the conventional role of committees in merely carrying out orders specifically committed to them by the House. Their secret sessions excluding all other members showed the radical departure from the established uses to which committees had been put; their recommendations did not arise in any way out of the matter submitted to them in the first place, and indicated that a new governmental system had come into being; this recognized parliamentary superiority but established the precedent of an executive and planning nucleus which was not entirely responsible to the parent body.



### Conclusion.

The main concern of the committees examined in this section was directed towards the organization of various branches of national defence. Although the possibility of actual war breaking out against the king only dawned upon most of the members of the Commons about the time of the attempted arrest of the five members, there can be no doubt that the experience gained from such earlier crises and political eventualities was useful to the leaders of reform in providing them with techniques appropriate to every branch of executive government. They ranged from secret and high-level policy discussions in close committees restricted to the most reliable and integrated of themselves, down to the care for the execution of parliamentary Ordinances by the officials in the counties.

When Parliament took upon itself the raising of money to pay the Scots off it received in return the guarantee of existence and the right to dispense the money as well as raising it. Its first attempts at raising money from the City's coffers and the way it was administered through a Treasurer-at-War in the House established a pattern which re-emerged when the need arose to finance an as yet non-existent army in the middle of 1642. Getting ready cash from London was comparatively easy; the real difficulty lay in striking upon an equitable, easily administered method of raising a nation-wide tax to distribute the load without unduly penalizing specific areas or classes. This difficulty was not solved by the committees at work on payment of the northern armies. The distribution of the levy,



although fair on paper, was extremely difficult to administer. Due to the lack of interest of the local administration it was only raised in considerable proportions there where the army could be used in helping to collect; that is, in the very regions which had already suffered out of all proportion from quartering and feeding two separate forces.

The early problems relating to Scotland were theoretically similar to those created by the king's army; ostensibly the main aim was to pay the Scots to leave the country and disband their forces. But <sup>this</sup> administrative problem was tempered by all kinds of political considerations. While the English army was being disbanded, the committees to deal with the Scots spent months on fundamental matters of policy without getting down to the bare bones of raising money for them to disband. When after six months of negotiation a committee ~~was~~ finally taken charge of the administrative details of the treaty it did not bear any fruit; its work was partly duplicated by other committees which also reached no conclusion; the committee itself was too large and too dependent on instructions from the House; it was composed of a heterogeneous mixture of members not chosen for their political acumen or their administrative prowess. Scottish affairs foundered on the cumbersome and otherwise rejected method of dealing with details of administration in a Committee of the Whole. The singular nature of negotiations with the Scots which may account for the fumbling treatment was that this aspect of the Commons' work was

not intended to be brought to fruition for it served a definite political purpose to leave matters unresolved and inconclusive. The treatment received by this subject from the parliamentary leaders indicates their full understanding of the techniques required in order to achieve either success or failure, whichever they desired, by manipulating the kind of committees which were put in charge.

The treatment of Irish affairs forms an excellent contrast to the purposely meandering and languid dealings with the Scots. It has been noted that the Grand Committee for Ireland was left suitably titular until a real political need arose, when a joint committee was at once set up to cope with Irish affairs generally. Unlike the Scottish issue however, there was every need for action here, and matters were not long left in the hands of a large and unwieldy joint committee before Pym saw to it that a small and effective executive group was formed. In this way the urgent problems raised by the rebellion there could be exploited for their political potential, while at the same time coping with the minutiae of administration. Pym's own vital concern in the committee clearly reflected its efficiency and effectiveness, which was further guaranteed by its carefully chosen membership which stood in close liaison with the Irish Adventurers of the House and the City. Its efficiency and co-ordination made the committee one of the very few bodies which provides a link between the pre-war administrative experiments, most of which were initially failures, and the fully-fledged executive committee-system of the later years.

The defence of London during the times of real or induced crisis before the outbreak of war was not strictly a matter organized by committees of the House as the policy of the leaders was rather to establish constant and friendly liaison with the pro-parliamentary power-groups in the City. The success of the venture in the long run was as much due to the victory of the parliamentarian group in the internal struggle for power between the Aldermen and the Common Council, as to the overt manoeuvring by Pym. The liaison was provided happily by the burgesses of the City themselves, who incidentally acquired more power through their unique position. All that was required of the House to ensure the strength of London's defence and the City's support on issues such as control of the Tower and the City Militia was to keep sending small committees composed of the political leaders and the ubiquitous burgesses to relate Parliamentary policy to the City, both on wider issues and on specific matters such as caring for the defences on the river and the outposts.

The finance committees had to deal at first with the payment of the English and Scottish armies in the North, of the troops in Ireland, and later with the beginnings of a national militia. All this provided good experience for a group of administrators, carefully chosen for their interest and knowledge in fiscal matters. But despite the good intentions and the useful experience they did not achieve the real aim of developing an equitable and easily administered tax to be levied constantly by an effective executive arm and paid out

in the most direct and efficient way where it was most needed. Apart from raising money by borrowing from the City the schemes hit upon to pay off the northern armies were ad hoc, badly conceived and difficult to carry out. True one or two schemes were effective in their purpose, but these were concerned with specific collections for specific purposes, such as finance for the troops in Ireland. Even when it became clear that money would be needed for the imminent struggle with the king the nation-wide financial expedients which were thrown up were not yet conceived as permanent taxes to be levied to cover the cost of the war. All experience however was useful experience, especially in the methods of administration. The centrally planned schemes were purposefully put into execution by the existent machinery for collection in the counties, with explicit orders sent to the sheriffs and constables for the collection of specific taxes administered in stated ways. In places where the armies were stationed they were also used, as in later times, to collect levies on the principle that self-interest was the surest means of successful promotion. Only in the weeks immediately preceeding the outbreak of war was a serious attempt made to superimpose new parliamentary officials over the existent county officials with special messengers despatched to put pressure on them and to report back to London; later still, delegations of M.P's who were sent off to the counties to look after parliamentary interests began the county committee system and its organic ties to the central body. In Parliament at the same time attempts were made to pull together the piece-meal methods of gathering money and checking and auditing the collections. However.

the great problems were still to be faced by the financial administrators and were not to be solved until rationalized by the large committees of 1642-3.

At the county end, the administrative problems could not begin to be solved until the military situation became defined and the balance of power established. However on the few occasions when trouble arose in the counties before the outbreak of war and Parliament had to impose its will upon the local hierarchy the method employed was uniform. A delegation of loyal local M.P's were despatched who could put over the leaders' policies to the county and at the same time be influential enough among their peers and constituents to succeed in their task. This method was effective in quelling local riots and disquiet as well as in avoiding royalist infiltration where it was hoped parliamentary influence could prevail. The delegations to Lincolnshire at the time of Rotham's strife with the king in Hull, attempted to deal with such a situation. The system of parliamentary delegations was extended over the whole nation when the Militia Ordinance was put into effect. M.P's everywhere were sent back to their constituencies to supervise the raising of local forces and to undertake the first steps towards supplying them with money and necessities. Although it was a logically necessary step to ensure ~~organization of a parliamentary orientation~~ that the local hierarchy was orientated towards Parliament it was inefficient and to some extent self-defeating to send off useful and loyal men to work in the counties at the very time

when their support was needed at Westminster. This problem abated when local committees were set up on which the M.P.'s sat only when time and the occasion demanded it. Nevertheless it did become one of the constant difficulties facing men who felt that their responsibilities lay equally heavily towards the county as towards the country as a whole.

Pym's adroit use of committees for forming general defence policy and attending to minor details of administration during the various crises before the war has already been noted. The committee of mid-1641 set up in response to the various plots showed excellent co-ordination in using the situation to its full political content as well as recommending concrete measures to meet the specific crisis. It demonstrated the appropriate method of a very small central steering committee meeting in secret for high-level discussions while co-opting a large number of other members for specific tasks to be carried out "on location". The specific committees set up in answer to the threats to the security of Parliament from various sources followed the instructions of the steering committee and established a fund of knowledge and techniques in how to handle the threat of imminent war. The detailed orders stemming from these committees of specialized composition leave no doubt about the use and manoeuvrability of the committee system which Pym exploited to the full.

Pym's plan for the establishment of an administrative machine before the outbreak of war was only partly successful. Generally speaking it succeeded whenever a small and well

integrated committee was able to take over the entire field of administration from policy-making down to executing the details, but failed usually where a large number of M.P.'s, some of whom were not privy to his deliberations, were included. Thus the defence plan of the Committee of Six and later of the Defence Committee was efficiently carried out and effective, while liaison with the counties was still by no means established, depending as it did on the close co-operation of a very large body of men. The personal interest in the issues at stake in the City and in Ireland made the committees on defence there a reflection of a successful lobby implementing parliamentary policy. On the other hand nation-wide financial planning, while delegated to a specialist group of men most of whom followed Pym's ideas and policies was also left to a very large group and lacked a real centre of direction and planning.

In so far as we can separate the formation of policy from its execution it is useful to look at the bodies through which Pym and his associates acted in order to frame and then spread their views to the rest of the Commons.

The formation of policy on Scotland provides a clear example of how committees were used to implement the policy of the leaders. As we have seen, during the early months of the Long Parliament it suited the reform group not to conclude the treaty and to keep the Scots on English soil partly as a safeguard against the king's arbitrary actions and partly

as a means of forcing him to make concessions for which payment of the armies was the ultimate recompense. To guarantee that Scottish affairs should remain inconclusive only restricted functions were delegated to committees and settlement was effectively hindered either by large and unwieldy committees with little steering from the centre or more often by using Committees of the Whole to treat vast administrative detail without coming to grips with it. On the other hand a few weeks later policy towards Scotland took a radical turn with the king's plan to go north himself, and as a result the carefully selected recess Committee which took over effective government in his absence was delegated such wide functions that a positive policy on Scotland emerged, unhampered by large numbers of M.P's with differing views. This committee was able to have an effective say in directing the parliamentary delegates in the north, and apart from implementing quite specific aspects of the treaty it also managed to convey to the Scots the importance of keeping "good correspondency" with Parliament instead of giving tacit support to the king. Pym used this ~~as a~~ <sup>as a</sup> vehicle for exploiting the "Incident" which played a decisive part in aligning the Scots and Parliament against the royalist faction in the north.

Irish affairs also clearly reflect the importance Pym placed upon the method of policy-formation by an efficient and closely co-ordinated committee. While relations with Ireland and the war there required mainly routine administration a large committee was set up to cope with money-raising



and dispensing. When it became evident to Pym that closer co-ordination of policy was required, a small compact committee of experts and politicians was set up. This could deal effectively with the complications caused by the presence of the Scots, with exploiting the propaganda value of the popish faction there, as well as safeguarding the interests of the English financial interests. This select group continued to direct policy until well after the outbreak of war in England.

The parliamentary leaders did not have to seek support from the City in quite the way in which other important matters needed planning because they had the all too willing aid of the London burgesses, especially Pennington, who were happy to act as liaison and to arrange policy between the House and the City interests. Nevertheless on matters of vital importance for propaganda and defence, such as the management of the Tower and the implementation of the Militia Ordinance in the City, carefully controlled committees of radical leaders and their City supporters were set up to co-ordinate policy and to overwhelm the moderate and retiring section of the Commons who were unwilling to face the need for drastic action.

The financial expedients needed to raise an army were only in an early experimental phase before outbreak of war. There is no evidence of real political steering in the management of financial affairs although the radical leaders did of course interest themselves generally in the problem. But no really effective means of raising money were worked out in this early period and it is impossible to see the guiding hand of the inner group in the expedients propounded from the

various committees. In county affairs the leaders were certainly aware of the need to centralize and rationalize the policy expounded at Westminster, and by the middle of 1642 the small deputations of M.P's dispatched to their electorates presage the formation of the vital link in efficient administration of policy - the county committees. Only in Kent, where trouble occurred before the Militia Ordinance could be put in execution, is it possible to see just how important control of local affairs was to the management of effective policy. The leaders made sure of getting the parliamentary line across in a vital county with neutralist and royalist leanings by setting up a controlling committee of carefully chosen radical men with local influence.

However, it was the committees set up during crises of 1641 and 1642, and primarily the Committee of Six, which really reflects the methods of policy formation of the leaders best. Here a very tightly knit group meeting in secret joined to put forward not only a detailed defence plan in case of actual invasion, but exploited the emergency to implement the general policy of control over the king's executive powers. In addition Pym was able to use the effective method of small steering committees to submit ideas to the House without waiting to receive specific instructions on which to act. Although the situation of 1641 only provided a testing ground, for no steering committee of any permanence resulted, this committee did provide a clear precedent for the later executive committees. The committee's recommendations led to two further steps towards

establishing Pym's policy. A committee was despatched to the king to petition him about his choice of councillors, and another considered the right of the Commons to "go it alone" if the Lords refused to co-operate on a fundamental matter of policy. The former arose directly out of the skilful exploitation of the "Incident" by the Recess Committee. The latter showed the direction in which the leaders were prepared to go if they were not successful in gaining the necessary support for their radical schemes. The threat to discard any opposition by cursorily dismissing its views and refusing to incorporate it in parliamentary policy was an extreme but effective means of quelling all but the most hardened opposition and intimidating the more unresolved to follow the strong lead given by the nucleus of leaders.

The later committees dealing with the emergency of the attempted arrest, and the committees which petitioned the king about the Militia Bill could hardly be seen to be formulating anything very new, but rather carrying into effect in a more tense and real situation the policies initiated under the carefully controlled conditions of the earlier experiments in effective government.

The categories into which this study of the use of committees and their development into a "system" has been divided are of course arbitrary and chosen only for the illumination which they might cast of the most important aspects of the work facing the Commons' leaders. It is not suggested that there was a prior plan to divide people on committees up

according to different interests into various subjects. The membership of the committee groups was dictated partly by interest and partly by the individuals' attitudes to the political divisions in the House. On the other hand it is possible that the membership of some significant committees was not at all random and that the leaders substantially controlled the nominations. Miss Keeler in her article on the committees of 1640<sup>246.</sup> has argued that the early large committees which set the tone of proceedings on matters of such far-reaching importance as the charges against Strafford, Laud, the prerogative courts, and the drawing up of grievances for the Grand Remonstrance, etc. reveal the "knot of men who constituted the inspiring force of the parliamentary Opposition" talked about by Gardiner.<sup>247.</sup> The central core of men who sat on more than half the number of these significant committees certainly appears to be too concentrated to be accidental, but the large size of the committees and their predominantly legal orientation might well have meant that men who were not really close to Pym's deliberations but who had strong objections to prerogative rule were enthusiastic in breaking down the institutions on which non-parliamentary rule was based. Her list of most frequent attenders on these committees<sup>248.</sup> shows a large number of later royalists who were unlikely to be men Pym wished to see made responsible for policy. The fact that this elite core of committee attenders were not necessarily a group who regularly consulted about the direction and shape of future policy is reflected

in the membership of the only small and tightly-knit committee considered, namely that which drew up charges against Strafford and which was composed of Pym, St. John, Holles, St. John, Erie, Hampden, Clotworthy and Digby.<sup>249.</sup> This group indicates that where speed and effective action was needed very close control indeed was exercised about the membership of a committee. In composition and size this was much more like the effective committees of a year later, where policy was in the hands of small groups of highly organized individuals. It differs radically from the amorphous committees set up to gather exhaustively and ponderously all the evidence which could be accumulated about the iniquities of arbitrary rule, and whose composition certainly reflected wide-spread opposition to royal politics, but not necessarily the policies of a "knot" of acknowledged leaders.

To highlight the difference in composition between the early committees set up in 1640 and the later ones which formulated the policy against the crown up to the outbreak of war, it is useful to compare Miss Keeler's group with the men who attended most at committees which formulated policy in 1641<sup>250.</sup> and 1642.

The men most active on Miss Keeler's group of committees include eight later royalists, two later Peace Party men, nine later radicals and close supporters of Pym, and three non-political <sup>ad ministrators</sup> ~~"committee men"~~. The later list of activists by contrast includes only two later royalists, of whom one,

Culpepper, appeared on the earlier list; four later Peace Party men of whom only Selden appeared on the earlier list; fifteen later radicals and supporters of Pym of whom five were on the earlier list. Crew, a "committee-man" appeared on both lists. The shift towards the radicals speaks for itself, but it is also significant that so many more of Pym's immediate followers were among those active on the later committees. The order in which the various activists appear reflects how much more organization there was in the later membership of committees. Despite the much smaller numbers on each of the later committees, which would tend to make the chances of repeated nomination smaller, there were eight men who sat on at least half the number of committees, and of these all were members of Pym's group or radicals.<sup>251.</sup> The size of the earlier committees made multiple nomination easier so that in fact all twenty two of the activists were on over half the number of committees considered. But among the nine most active men five were later royalists, and Pym himself was not among them.

The highly organized membership of the committees which were responsible for formulating the policy of the later months of the pre-war Parliament reflects the treatment of the subject matter which was committed. The manner in which the committees were used to put policy to the Commons and to digest the suggestions received from the floor of the House considered along with the men who took the brunt of the work on them testifies to the main political function of the "committee system".



## CHAPTER 5.

THE COMMITTEE-MEN.

"Love, griefe and zeale doth make me sing this dittie,  
 To warn my brethren of each close committee,  
 That each of them learn like a good disciple, 1.  
 To shun foule treason and the tree that's triple.

My wicked life I do lament with teares,  
 I was in debt quite over head and eares,  
 But when I purchas'd a committee chaire,  
 My broken State I quickly did repaire.

I got some two and twenty of my faction,  
 (All witty members and all men of action),  
 We (as we pleas'd) made all our brethren widgeons,  
 We wink'd at tumults and at strange religions.

For though (by tale) we sat above four hundred,  
 Yet I myselve was for the first part numbred;  
 Most of the rest were crowned men of Gotam,  
 And I was almost Dominus Factotum.

Thus by my faction the whole house was sway'd,  
 But (most) to me the people flocked for ayd,  
 I promis'd ease for all their griefs most troublesome,  
 But wracked them more than ten times twice the double  
 sum . . ." 2.

Much has already been said about Pym's domination of the House of Commons through the agency of committees. The foregoing section has covered the period up to the outbreak of war, which forms a natural break for the problems, administrative and political, which faced the leadership. The whole tenor of government by committees took on a new turn in August 1642 when the Committee of Safety was set up and took over many of the central problems which had been left unsolved or undecided.



### Politicos and Administrators.

Who were the men who helped Pym to bring this system of government to fruition? So far the men who bore the brunt of the work on committees have been noted under various subjects into which it is possible to divide the business covered by committees. In order to complete the picture of Pym's associates who helped him in his approach to the problems of political and administrative government it is necessary to classify the men who were most active on the whole batch of committees before the outbreak of war.

Table I<sup>3.</sup> gives a list of men who sat on most committees during the period. These committee "activists" are classified according to their political leanings, for which the criterion has been discussed in the Introduction. With the ubiquitous caution that the party affiliations are only a tentative measure of a member's enthusiasm for the cause of reform before the outbreak of war, it is still possible to separate out the men of whose political background nothing is known, who did not commit themselves publicly to any stand by speeches in the House or by becoming identified with the views of the leading personalities in the minds of contemporary commentators. It will be useful to see not only who these men were but also whether their interests in committee work differed significantly from those of any of the "political" members. At the same time the relative interests of the more politically committed - ranging from the radicals to the royalists - will be looked at through

their participation on various subjects dealt with in committees. The identification of the idea of committee government with Pym and his associates makes tautologous the hypothesis that we might expect most of the active committee-men to be among his personal supporters; but it is worth establishing their relative strength in comparison with the other groups, and especially to compare their work and distribution with that of the non-political "committee-men". It becomes quite evident from the work of these "administrators" that they must have given their support to the policies propounded by Pym's Middle Party for the latter to win so many battles in the committee-chambers. Whether one is justified in talking of the "committee-men" as though they were a real group is a moot point, but the ensuing analysis of their background and work is meant to indicate their basic similarities and from the available circumstantial evidence seeks to ascribe a kind of corporate personality to them.

Criteria for Political Fame.

In order to highlight the distinction which is being drawn between the "political" activists on committees, and the non-political "administrative committee-men" some criterion other than the ante-dated ascription of political views to the former is needed. The Commons' Journals provide very little help in trying to classify members according to their views. Speeches were not reported and could, in any case, only provide isolated and particular instances of a man's views at a specific point in the shifting pattern of political issues. The record of tellers in divisions provides a useful measure of political

attitude after 1642, but ~~issues~~ before that time the subtle distinctions needed in order to draw attention to the political differences are not reflected in the divisions which occurred mainly on obvious and universal issues. Above all, the splits do not reflect the finer shades of opinion among the reform group itself. A useful addition to the Journals was found to be the published version of D'Ewes' diary<sup>4</sup> which provides not only some details of members' speeches and comments on their political orientation (albeit often naively assessed), but also includes a useful index from which the relative importance of the various men mentioned throughout can be gauged. Both Notestein and Coates incorporate into their editions of D'Ewes' notes the contemporaneous diaries of other M.P.'s which provide a telling counter to D'Ewes' possible bias or preference for some particular colleagues which may have made him report more frequently some minor member's speeches. In fact, as the analysis of the most frequently mentioned members indicates, the only prediction for particular members' speeches which D'Ewes shows is for his own, which are usually reported at length and ad nauseam between his commentaries.

Some other cautions about this method of assessing the relative importance of Members are needed; D'Ewes mentions Members in connection with their speeches, the motions which they propounded, and sometimes (though not often enough to warrant confusion with the list of committee activists), their election to a committee; the diaries published only cover two short periods of significant activity in the pre-war Commons

and do not run for the whole of our period; at the same time there is a significant difference between the most noted speakers in the two volumes, covering as they do two distinct periods, which reflects the different central themes as they developed over the months, and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in the House; finally, the indexes include mentions of members made in the works of other diaries which add to the testimony of an individual's noteworthiness to his colleagues and thus provide a useful criterion of political importance and personal prestige.

Whether the method of assessing political activity is reliable can be tested by a comparison with the list provided by Clarendon of those who in his opinion were the chief planners and leaders of the revolutionary party in the Commons.<sup>5</sup>

The following lists comprise in descending order the names most mentioned in D'Ewes' notes (apart from his own, which outstripped all others), and Clarendon's compilation of leaders in the order in which he named them:

D'Ewes

Pym  
 Holles  
 Erle  
 Vane Jr.  
 Glyn  
 Strode  
 St. John  
 Hotham  
 Hampden  
 Maynard  
 Culpepper  
 Hyde  
 Pennington  
 Whitelock  
 Falkland  
 Strangways  
 Hopton

Clarendon.

Pym 6.  
 Hampden  
 St. John  
 Holles  
 Fiennes  
 Strode  
  
 Hotham  
 Erle  
 Vane Jr.  
  
 Stapleton 7.  
 Lewes  
 Glyn

From this it is evident that D'Ewes had the same idea of the relative importance of some of the leading members as Clarendon. The first nine on his list coincide with the names mentioned by Clarendon; Culpepper, Hyde, Falkland, Strangways and Hopton would hardly be mentioned by Clarendon as revolutionary leaders; ~~in this instance~~. Whitelock and Maynard were leading lawyers whose religious and political line was close to that of D'Ewes, and whose views he might have represented out of admiration and agreement with ~~their line~~ <sup>them</sup>. This would be especially true of Maynard who later took a leading part in the Peace Party. This may also have been the reason for Clarendon's neglect of Maynard's name in a list of instigators of the rebellion. Pennington was frequently mentioned by D'Ewes as spokesman for the religious extremists of the City of whom at that time D'Ewes approved, and as the chief agent for raising the money needed to pay the Scottish army which D'Ewes noted in detail. On the other hand Fiennes, Lewes and Stapleton from Clarendon's list do not appear near the top of D'Ewes'. There is in fact no record of any of them in the volume dealing with the opening months of the session, although they were all quite active in the record of the later months. The activities of Fiennes and Stapleton increased as the tone of the House became more radical.

Having established a criterion for the political noteworthiness of some of the members of the Commons it is now possible to compare them with the men who led the field of activity in committees. All the names of political leaders on both lists with the exception of Strangways, Hopton and

8.  
 Lewes appeared among the first 40 of the committee activists. On the other hand the people at the top of the committee lists who were not included on either list as well-known figures of the House include: Barrington, Selden, Marten, Evelyn, Holle, Gerrard, Reynolds, Perd, Widdrington, Cage, Crew, Whistler and Pierrepoint, (if we exclude D'Ewes). These were the men who took the brunt of committee-work without being acknowledged as principal figures in the House. Barrington and Gerrard, who were known as Pym's adherents, were evidently the executive members of his inner circle prepared to support his line on committees without making political speeches in the House. Their association with Pym stemmed from the early "colonizing days" prior to the meeting of the Long Parliament which helped to cement the views and friendships of the inner Puritan opposition group,<sup>9.</sup> and also from their inclusion in the ramifications of the Eastern gentry connection which tied the political associates of Pym to each other by their grass roots.<sup>10.</sup> Gerrard, as Treasurer-at-Wars became responsible for an important executive post on which depended the whole effectiveness of Pym's policy of working through committees. Barrington after the outbreak of war became the paradigm of a county committee-man who kept up his responsibilities to the central government and diligently saw to the execution of policy in one of the most important parliamentary counties, Essex. Neither of these functions correlate with being an important or impressive speaker in the House (indeed they were so time-consuming that they would have precluded playing a large part in matters discussed

on the floor of the House), but both lent themselves perfectly to administration through committees. Marten, the leader of the radicals, who together with his colleagues of the War Party Venn, Ludlow and Pennington, was added to the Five Members in the king's accusation of High Treason in August 1642,<sup>11.</sup> probably only earned the wrath of the royalists and achieved his position of note on the extreme "left" of the House in the period just prior to the outbreak of war when he first publicly uttered his anti-monarchical sentiments.<sup>12.</sup> Earlier he was regarded by D'Ewes merely as one of Pym's "fiery spirits" without ascribing to him any special place for radicalism, and his extreme views were probably not known by the House as a whole.<sup>13.</sup> In the committees which were formed after the outbreak of war the radicals appeared regularly as the strongest supporters and hardest workers both on executive and policy-making committees, because they soon realized that Pym's method of approaching the problem of waging a successful war depended upon a strong centralized administration carried out by good administrators and keen politicians. Marten was obviously conscious of the need to cooperate with Pym in the earlier period as well and his keenness for committee-work reflected his political enthusiasm for efficient preparation of the war machine.

At the other extreme of opinion in the House, Whistler, Selden and Pierrepont also participated on committees without being among the most noted of political figures in the House. Whistler initially backed the reform group but joined the king soon after the split, while Selden and Pierrepont remained

in the House as outspoken critics of Pym and the radicals, and at least until 1644 favoured accommodation with the king's party. All three men were eminent lawyers and took part in the welter of committees concerned with petitions and legal issues on which the framing of the Remonstrance was said to depend, as well as on the many committees which were concerned in legally justifying the revolutionary situation in which the Commons found themselves and which they were anxious to dress up in constitutional terms. Although they were respected specialists in the House it was perhaps their unresolved political position which prevented them from becoming decisive personalities among the leaders.<sup>14.</sup>

#### The Administrators.

This leaves among the men most active on committees who were not noted for their political activities Evelyn, Rolle, Reynolds, Perd, Widdrington, Cage and Crew. Between them, they averaged an attendance at 52 committees during the period under consideration. The fact that none of them appeared among the ten most frequent committee attenders indicates the predominance of politicians in guiding the policy and establishing the framework of government by committee. This might well have been necessary in a constantly changing situation where those who exercised most pressure exerted the most influence upon the membership of the Commons. Other men who were noted for their attendances of committees but who had no defined political orientation were: Wilde, Hungerford, Harley, Lytton, Holland and Pye.



Given the fact that these men were not known for their political enthusiasm which would have included them as either recognized prominent figures in the Commons or who took a definite political stand during the later months, it is interesting to know why they attended committees so industriously. In the absence of any direct evidence some comparison of their background and interests might be useful in identifying them as a coherent group rather than a random collection of individuals.

Sir John Evelyn of Wiltshire was the most active of the non-political "committee-men" who ~~he~~ attended on a wide variety of subjects covered by committees.<sup>15.</sup> His family's possession of the gun-powder monopoly and his father's official post as one of the Six Clerks of Chancery gave him the entree<sup>16.</sup> into court circles of which his association with the royal favourites, the Ashburnhams, is some evidence.<sup>17.</sup> He was closely connected with important London trading families through marriage, and in addition he owned lands and manors in all the home counties which identified his personal interests further with London politics. His considerable experience of estate management, his connections with trade and with the manufacture of gun-powder assured him of an advantageous position on committees where administrative skill and experience was required. He attended all committees relating to the local production of gun-powder, giving Parliament the benefit of experience gained as a royal monopoly holder. His membership of committees inclined towards administrative subjects like petitions, finance and defence where his training was of most direct relevance.

John Rolle was one of the merchants connected with the Turkey trade in London, as well as having roots in the south-west which he had represented in past Parliaments.<sup>18.</sup> His treatment by the Star Chamber in the 1620's would not have endeared the crown's policy to him. He was sub-poenaed for trading offences as well as for subversive speeches in the Commons in 1629. As one of the heroes of the opposition to the arbitrary rule his case was taken up by the Long Parliament which ensured his adequate recompense for losses incurred due to the rigours of royal policy against free trade.<sup>19.</sup> Another factor which predisposed him towards committee activities was his enthusiasm for Irish affairs as an Adventurer for Ireland;<sup>20.</sup> his participation on committees reflected his interests, as they included such administrative categories as defence, finance, and Irish affairs.

Robert Reynolds was a well-known lawyer from Wiltshire, like his fellow "committee-man" Evelyn; like him also he had predominant interests in the Eastern counties through properties and family connections,<sup>21.</sup> and both had connections with London. He was probably also an ex-officeholder, as an attorney at the Court of Wards.<sup>22.</sup> Like Rolle he appears to have been interested in the fate of Ireland as he was sent over early as a parliamentary commissioner with express orders to try to establish a parliamentary "party" there.<sup>23.</sup> His spread over the subjects dealt with by committees resembles that of his two colleagues and reflects his similar background.

George Peard came from a provincial legal background, his family having been long active in legal affairs in Barnstable in the south-west; he followed the tradition by practicing locally and becoming deputy Recorder.<sup>24.</sup> He was apparently recognized to be antagonistic to the royal family<sup>25.</sup> and his enthusiasm for the general policies of reform was reflected in his substantial financial contributions to the war-effort<sup>26.</sup> in the early months of the war. His committee activities were specialized along similar lines as his colleagues except that he also participated in the prerogative courts which reflected his legal training, and on London defence which mirrored his business interests and residence there.

Sir Thomas Widdrington was a well-known lawyer from Northumberland, who had an early distinguished career as Recorder of York and Berwick; his relationship with the Fairfaxes and his general interest in northern affairs<sup>27.</sup> made him a useful expert on local matters. At the same time he was reputed to be a great legal figure in the Commons and in 1639 was made Ancient and Bencher at Gray's Inn, which reflected his stature and importance in law.<sup>28.</sup> His distribution over the various subjects covered by committees naturally followed his interests and included both Scottish affairs and the problems of financing the king's army, as well as such legal and administrative categories as petitions and defence.

William Cage, like several of his colleagues on committees, was an important provincial legal figure, as Alderman and Portman of Ipswich and attorney for his town.<sup>29.</sup> He also acquired

other useful administrative experience as J.P. and commissioner on various local matters. Even more pertinently, as erstwhile captain of the local trained bands, he was one of the few men with first-hand knowledge of the control of local militias which made up the first and only troops on which Parliament could depend in the early days of <sup>the</sup> war. He also had connections with the radical London clothworkers and was sufficiently wise to the ways of organized opposition to be sent to represent his county's grievances against the iniquities of the arbitrary rule to the City. Like most of the other "committee-men" he also had previous parliamentary experience, and his substantial private income made him eager to support the war in Ireland for the profits it would return.<sup>30.</sup> Although he died before the religious differences of the Presbyterians and Independents became hardened, he appears to have been at least an Erastian if not an active Separatist, as his objections to the tightening of episcopal control of local parishes and his failure to quell the riots against the local bishop would indicate. All these background interests are reflected in his distribution over committee subjects: - his legal training was useful in matters concerning petitions; his knowledge of shipping as a port burgess was applied in committees on naval affairs; his military experience was put to the test in defence committees; his general background in administrative matters was relevant in the problems of finance and disbanding the northern army; his general opposition to the policies of the crown was reflected in his work on the committees on parliamentary privilege;

his Irish investment made him participate on Irish affairs; and finally his open stand on the abolition of the bishops' powers made him an obvious choice on the early committees of religion which were more concerned with destroying the hierarchy than with substituting a positive form of church settlement.

John Crew also came from an eminent legal family with a strong parliamentary background,<sup>31.</sup> and he followed the tradition by becoming himself a well-known lawyer and early parliamentarian. Although from Northamptonshire he also held land in Essex and the east and he had some experience in administration of estates and county affairs.<sup>32.</sup> Some aspects of his activities in the House and his background show affinity to the Peace Party; he voted against Strafford's attainder and spoke against the motion to commit Palmer for his protestation against the publication of the Grand Remonstrance;<sup>33.</sup> and he was related to two stalwarts of the later Peace Party, D'Ewes and Parkhurst.<sup>34.</sup> However, his open-handed contribution to the finances of the war (unlike the timorous excuses of his kinsmen), as well as the stand he later took make it unlikely that he belonged to the genuinely pacific element.

John Wilde was an old Parliamentarian, with six previous sittings to his credit at which he had been openly critical of royal policies. Like his colleague from Ipswich he was an influential country lawyer from Worcester for which he acted on various occasions and in 1640 became its Recorder.<sup>35.</sup> He had other county experience as J.P. and commissioner on various administrative matters. His experience in county administration and legal training probably helped him to become one of

the Deputy Lieutenants for the county which in itself would have provided him with further experience in the training and responsibilities of the local militia. His later lay membership of the Westminster Assembly<sup>36.</sup> probably testified to his early Separatist leanings which were exhibited in his stand on the religious committees; his opposition to the encroachments of the crown in earlier Parliaments was reflected in his activities on the privilege committees; his administrative and legal background helped to interest him in the defence and finance committees. Unlike some of the other "committee-men" Wilde was active in the House as reporter from committees and conferences on matters relating to Ireland, Puritan measures against bishops, legislation against recusants and so on. His noteworthiness to B'Ewes as a diarist lay therefore in his capacity as "committee-man" par excellence, being chosen for his capability and enthusiasm to speak for the committees on which he sat.<sup>37.</sup>

Sir Edward Hungerford was another Wiltshire man of legal training and a long history of parliamentary activity as well as county administration.<sup>38.</sup> Like some of his colleagues "committee-men" he had previous administrative experience in the days of the court administration, and had been, among other official positions, the Receiver of the Duchy of Cornwall.<sup>39.</sup> His large and widely spread estate gave him practical skill and potential and his connections with wealthy London interests made him share similar interests with others considered here. He had been an active Puritan and his family had clashed with

the Laudian administration which gave him every reason for helping to break down the trappings of the temporal power of the clergy. His interest in the local county train bands gave him another important interest for work on committees, while his family ties with Warwick which connected him to the leading members of both Houses gave him the right orientation as a committee-man to co-operate with the reform group.

Sir Robert Harley, from Herefordshire, was experienced both in Parliaments, having sat in the House since 1604, and in administration through royal office, having got the lucrative Mastership of the Mint through his father-in-law Sir Edward Conway, then Secretary of State and client of Buckingham. Apart from these august functions he also interested himself in local affairs, and at one time acted as Deputy Lieutenant for his county as well as being a captain of the train bands. In Harley's case there is good evidence of opposition to the Crown even before he lost his office under the royal administration. He came up against the rigours of arbitrary rule in his brush with the Council of the Marches which defended Welsh interests against those of his own western county, as well as pitting the staunch royalists of Wales against his own incipient Puritanism. Unlike many of his parliamentary colleagues he was known in 1629 already as a religious extremist from his speeches in Parliament at that time, as well as through his Calvinist wife. Laud's ensuing administration could only have exacerbated his hatred of the bishops. The dominant position he held in the minds of Members as an extreme Puritan is

testified by his appointment "at the head" of the committee to destroy superstitious and idolatrous monuments in Westminster Abbey and St. Margaret's in 1643,<sup>46.</sup> a course of action which he continued to pursue during later years.<sup>47.</sup> His ample and useful experience and background for administration and committee work is reflected directly in his specialization on certain subjects; his military and administrative training in the county interested him in matters of national defence; his training as a fiscal expert is reflected in his participation on finance committees, and also in part in the problems of paying the armies in the north; his religious fanaticism shows up in his activity on committees of religion, and even more on those dealing with vengeful measures against recusants; and his legal training and general opposition to the crown was put to good use in dealing with the petitions which were sent in to Parliament, and in the quasi-legal justifications of the Nineteen Propositions.

Sir William Lytton from Hertfordshire had previous experience in Parliaments, as well as coming from a family of local distinction in whose tradition he followed by being J.P., sheriff, local commissioner on various matters, and Deputy Lieutenant of his county.<sup>48.</sup> He also had local military training and probably saw some service while abroad. He belonged to an involved kinship system which related him to St. John, Sir Oliver Luke, as well as to Barrington, and therefore gave him some connections with the political opposition group, although he was certainly only on its periphery, as his very brief connection with the Virginia Company shows.<sup>49.</sup> His family



ramifications also included some lucrative ties with London trading interests.

Sir John Holland of Norfolk was trained as a lawyer, and although he had little earlier parliamentary experience he came from a family of importance in the county, whose traditions he fulfilled by becoming a J.P., a colonel of the local train bands and a Deputy Lieutenant. He appears to have been a recognized Presbyterian from early on despite his Catholic wife. His administrative experience was considerable due to his own large and scattered estates as well as to his connections with the Earl of Arundel, his patron, for whom he acted as agent for many years.<sup>50.</sup> His activity on committees relates to his earlier experience; his Presbyterianism is reflected in his activities on the committees relating to Scotland, on religious affairs, and on recusants, the latter a sure sign of religious conviction; as a lawyer he acted on the many petitions which were the source for the Grand Remonstrance, and as a local military and administrative expert he was interested in matters of national defence; his knowledge of financial administration which earned him many places in the finance committees probably stemmed from his activities as estate manager and agent.

Sir Robert Pye of Berkshire and London had previous parliamentary experience and his legal training and county offices as commissioner and J.P. in several of the home counties all helped to form a useful background for his later committee activities. His career however centred about his appointment as Auditor of the Exchequer which he achieved through his

earlier connection with Buckingham. With his brother who became Attorney General of the Court of Wards <sup>51.</sup> he became legal and financial adviser to the Buckingham entourage in 1616, which provided him with important administrative experience. <sup>52.</sup>

On his way up the ladder of official posts he first became manager of the duties on imports from Merchant Strangers, then clerk of Patents, and acting Auditor of the lower Exchequer. <sup>53.</sup>

His zeal for financial reform manifested itself in his stand against assigning future revenues to specific items of expenditure. <sup>54.</sup> Although he apparently used his position to help the Villiers family out of loyalty after Buckingham's death, <sup>55.</sup> he seems to have felt the conflict between his personal attachment to his patron and the public interest already in the 1620's <sup>56.</sup> - a conflict which made it less unlikely for him to support the party of reform in Parliament. His apparent defence of Strafford's financial policies in Ireland which did not prevent him from ~~voting~~ <sup>voting</sup> for the Attainder later <sup>57.</sup> was probably due to anxiety about his own personal interests there as defender of Buckingham, <sup>58.</sup> and he certainly invested in the Irish fund in his own right in 1642. <sup>59.</sup> His kinship with Hampden which stood him in good stead in later years when his trimming became too obvious, complicated his earlier position. Aylmer suggests that he acted "as a member of a fluid and ill-defined but by no means negligible middle group in the Long Parliament who were hostile to Strafford and yet hoped for a general settlement with give and take on both sides . . . as an office-holder and crown creditor / he had his reasons- / for wishing for a middle-of-the-road solution." <sup>60.</sup> His activity on committees dealing

with defence, Ireland, petitions, and the Grand Remonstrance speaks clearly for his interests shaped by his varied and complicated background, which tended to fit him rather for administrative and financial work than for straight political issues. His ability in these fields was reflected in his appointment as Treasurer at Westminster for the poll-money in which capacity he was responsible for all disbursements of parliamentary funds.<sup>61.</sup> It must have appeared slightly ironical that an ex-office-holder of a lucrative crown position should now be devoting his energies to applying the skills previously learnt, gratis, for the benefit of Parliament. He was known on occasion to take up a political issue in the House, such as his speech to justify trusting the Scots in Ireland not to take advantage of their position there because Parliament still held the trump, namely the payments of the Brotherly Assistance.<sup>62.</sup> There is also some early evidence of his later trend to trimming, instanced by the Duchess of Buckingham's appeal to him to protect her,<sup>63.</sup> and later by his preferring of a petition of a Catholic priest who was a prisoner at the Gatehouse.<sup>64.</sup>

Rather than recapitulating the similarities and differences in the background of these "committee-men" the following Table illustrates their affinities:

TABLE OF BACKGROUND OF "COMMITTEE-MEN", 1640 - JULY 1642.

Name.	County.	Important local family.	County activity Parliamentary experience.	Parliamentary family.	Lawyer	Office-holder	Office-holding family.	Town origin	Merchant connections.	Estate manager.	Irish Adventurer	Military experience	Religious affiliation.	pre 1640 opposition to the crown.
Evelyn	Wilts.	X	X			X	X		X	X				X
Rolle	Cornwall London		X					X	X	X				X
Reynolds	Wilts.	X	X		X	X?	X	X	X	X				X
Peard	Devon	X	X		X		X	X	X					X
Widdrington	Northumb.	X			X		X							
Gage	Suffolk	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Crew	Northants.	X	X	X	X				X					
Wilde	Worcest.	X	X		X		X				X	X	X	X
Hungerford	Wilts.	X	X		X	X			X		X	X	X	X
Harley	Hereford	X	X		X	X			X		X	X	X	X
Lytton	Herts.	X	X	X	X				X		X			X
Holland	Norfolk	X	X		X				X		X	X		
Pye	Berks & London		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

The background of these men indicates clearly where their experience for the administrative work on committees came from. A large proportion of them had had experience at parliamentary procedure and possibly had sat on the early committees around which opposition to the crown first revolved. All but three were lawyers which gave them the only kind of technical education offered at the time. With the exception of Rolle with his London background, all had had experience in county administration, and many had even trained with the local militias. A disproportionate number, more than half, came from towns and cities although they also had ties with county affairs. Almost none were "mere gentry"—they either had merchant interests,

connections or other ties with urban affairs. The proportionally high interest in Ireland reflects their merchant and city backgrounds. Their administrative experience was in many cases highlighted strongly by their activities as office-holders of the crown which gave them the best possible training as administrators for the embryonic new government. The connection of Evelyn, Crew, Pye and Holland with the management of large and aristocratic estates provided more technical experience useful for subsequent financial problems. Before the meeting of Parliament most of them had taken a stand either directly in opposition to the policies of the crown during the years of arbitrary rule or on religious opposition to Laud and Arminianism, which assured their general support of the policies of the reform leaders as well as giving them good reason to participate in the machinery which was being built up to rid the nation of the iniquities of non-parliamentary rule.

#### The Royalists.

Having looked at the men who formed the core of the administrators on committees who had not committed themselves to any political line, it now appears necessary to examine briefly the behaviour of some of the "political" activists on committees.

The later royalists, although the smallest "group" nevertheless are most important because their participation on committees measures effectively the support on which Pym could base his policies during the early months. Their rather sudden disappearance from the lists indicates best the kind of issues

over which they were not prepared to compromise. While they were in accord with the opposition in bringing about the fall of the instruments of personal rule their participation on committees reflects not only their keenness but also the strength of their personalities in reaching positions of importance in the Commons without being part of the wholesale organization of Pym and his associates who controlled the policy.

Culpepper was by far the most active of the future royalists on committees. His general ability in debate to state the arguments put by others <sup>65.</sup> would in any case have made his a good committee man, but general ability is unlikely to have been his sole justification for attending 78 committees. He was an active campaigner for reform until the middle of 1641, and until then his future royalism cannot of course be taken into account. In this capacity of critic of the king his attendance at most of the committees cannot be regarded as one of opposition. Of the twelve subject groups he attended, six deal with matters related only to the period up to the middle of 1641, such as the Strafford and the Remonstrance <sup>66.</sup> committees. In other groups where he was an "activist" such as Religion, Privilege and Finance, he did not participate after August 1641, with the exception of one committee on <sup>67.</sup> December 14th on the king's breach of privilege of the House of Commons in taking notice of a bill before it had passed the Houses. This was a constitutional complaint much more typical of the earlier period, and Culpepper's presence on the committee could well be ascribed to his earlier zeal for constitutional

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reform. The only subject groups in which he may have acted in opposition to the majority of the men on the committees were the ones on defence, and the king's trip to Scotland. In the latter group he attended at five committees. Whether he seriously believed the times to be critical and co-operated with Pym to set up an elaborate alternative to the king's government in his absence, or whether he participated by now as a critic of the position taken by Pym's supporters cannot be estimated with certainty. However his frequent appearances as manager and reporter of the conferences with the Lords would indicate that he was still in accord with Pym over the issue, as it is unlikely that a dissident voice would be used in putting the Commons' case to the Lords.<sup>69.</sup> Similarly, as a committee member to help draw up the instructions to the members who were despatched to Scotland he would hardly have argued the minutes of the memoranda sent to the Commissioners.<sup>70.</sup> It may be significant too that Culpepper did not apparently support Hyde and Falkland when they moved that the business of Scotland should be left to their own Parliament.<sup>71.</sup> On the whole then even his presence in this group of committees can be interpreted as being due to his role as critic rather than supporter of Charles. In the group on defence he sat on nine committees, including the Close Committee of seven to which he was added in his capacity as a local member and for only specific business. His presence at later committees in this group also indicates at first an inclination to support the defence measures, when they were not pointed irrevocably in the

direction of the king. For example, the defence committee of August 14<sup>th</sup><sup>72.</sup> was still officially concerned with the invasion scare. He was not on the committee to petition the king against his choice of evil councillors,<sup>73.</sup> and in fact went on record as saying that this cannot be asked by right.<sup>74.</sup> As there is no report from the committee to prepare the ordinance for putting the trained bands in readiness and securing the papists, we cannot be sure if Culpepper still helped to draught it or whether he was by now actively against the parliamentary radicals.<sup>75.</sup> However by December 3<sup>rd</sup><sup>76.</sup> when the House voted that it would act alone if the Lords did not co-operate, it is likely that Culpepper with his concern for constitutional forms did not any longer go along with the parliamentary leaders, and he was certainly against the settling of the militia under a Lord General,<sup>77.</sup> thus essentially safeguarding the king's right to choose his councillors and to dispose of the militia. On the former committee, his position as last member named in a group consisting entirely of Pym's intimates could however have been due to a mistaken notion of what its recommendations would turn out to be. There was no reason why, if a member was elected to a committee thinking that he approved of the subject, he might not change his mind, and in fact prove to be against it once he realized that he had misjudged the purport of the matter committed. In some cases, as has been shown, such as Holles on the Strafford committee, people left a committee to which they had been named if they found that they were against the mainstream of opinion. His mistake here, if



such it was, could have been due to thinking Pym said what  
 D'Ewes had recorded him as saying,<sup>78.</sup> which is very different  
 from what was recorded in the Journals.<sup>79.</sup> D'Ewes says the Comm-  
 ons "being the representative bodie of the kingdom" should  
 join with those Lords who "are moore carefull of the safetie  
 of the Kingdome, they being but private persons and having a  
 liberty of Protestation, shall joine with them to represent  
 the same to his Majestie". The Journals record that the House  
 "being a Representative Body of the whole Kingdom and their  
 Lordships but particular persons and coming to parliament in  
 a particular capacity, that if they shall not be pleased to  
 consent to the passing of those acts . . . then this house  
 together with such Lords that are more sensible of the safety  
 of the Kingdom may join together and represent the same to  
 his Majesty". Although both versions impinge on the rights  
 of the Lords to consent to legislation, the former version at  
 least appears to suggest that the bills would then stem only  
 from the Commons and those who protested from the Lords, and  
 not, like the second version, discounting at the same time  
 the rights of the majority of the Lords.

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Culpepper still appeared on December 31st 1641 on a  
 committee to consider how the kingdom can be supplied with  
 gunpowder and arms, and again on January 12th 1642. On the  
<sup>81.</sup>17th he must have acted as critic of the king as he appeared  
 on a committee to petition the king about the breach of priv-  
 ilege after the attempted arrest of the five members, when,

in order to be consistent in his dislike of arbitrary action, he was likely to have objected strongly to the king's blunder. In view of his complete disappearance from the committee lists after this time I think it is likely that right towards the end he did act in a half-hearted and critical fashion towards parliamentary policy until he decided that he could no longer participate in the affairs of the House, but that his earlier attendances were nearly all in the capacity of active supporter of reform.

From this account of a very active royalist we can generalize to some extent about the behaviour of the other committee activists who shared his general political attitude, especially as their inactivity varies according to the degree of disapproval of the reformers' policies generally. After Culpepper the other most active royalists were Whistler (43 committees), Hyde (42), Falkland (41), Dering (32), and Belasize (27). All these men had agreed to some extent to the earlier steps taken to limit Charles' power and potential. In any case Culpepper, Hyde and Falkland were friends and evidently conferred about their views and positions which made for a similar approach with some significant differences. On the committees dealing with the constitutional reforms of the first half of 1641 they were all active: none were "Straffordians" and all voted for his attainder, despite Falkland's early modest demur.<sup>82.</sup> On the destruction of the prerogative courts there was no need for caution and their agreement with Pym's party was absolute. They also participated on the committees

which dealt with the settlement of the army in the north, which carried only by hind-sight the implications of rehearsal to army administration for the parliamentary forces of later months. They also felt sufficiently opposed to the Court to sanction the work of the anti-recusant committees which were concerned with destruction of the vestiges of catholic prestige in the county, and at least Falkland and Dering were opposed on principle to episcopal power of any pervasive nature. As none were sycophants or courtiers in the uncritical sense, they supported Parliament and the work of the committees on Privilege in the manner described for Culpepper, except Whistler who remained to sanction the Militia Ordinance and did not withdraw from Parliament until after the outbreak of war. All six of these royalists were active members on committees relating to the framing of the Grand Remonstrance, both in the committees directly aiding the Close Committee, and on the ancillary committees dealing with petitions which were used to feed material to the co-ordinating centre, and the ones which collected material for condemning the work of the prerogative courts. None of them however sanctioned the use made of the Remonstrance when it was finally drafted. Falkland complained of the too harsh treatment given to the bishops in the final document,<sup>83.</sup> Hyde admitted to the facts of the Remonstrance but quibbled at the inferences drawn from it, and Culpepper disliked the procedure of excluding the Lords from participation in drawing up the document and publishing it

for the nation to see. On the whole their objections were only to the tone of the document and the political use to which it was to be put, none of which could have been obvious to the participants on the earlier committees until the actual time of the Remonstrance being read in the House.

The only issue on which this group was not united was religion, which also produced some undercurrents among the reform group. Falkland was moderate in his condemnation of bishops,<sup>84.</sup> and shared with Pym a desire to see them merely deprived of their temporal power rather than abolished root and branch. Hyde, his best friend, on the other hand, thought the bill to deprive them of their seats in the Lords was unconstitutional and voted against it, affecting surprise at the other's stand.<sup>85.</sup> Far more extreme than this mild erastianism was Sir Edward Dering, who later followed the king. But in 1641 he actually introduced the bill for the "utter abolishing" of all church officers - the Root and Branch Bill so much resented by Hyde who hindered its implementation by his management of the Committee of the Whole which he was chairman.<sup>86.</sup> These splits are reflected in the attendances of these royalists on committees relating to the destruction of the church hierarchy. Dering and Falkland acted on them until April 1642, although Falkland could not be depended upon for a consistent anti-episcopal line.<sup>87.</sup>

The attitude of the royalists to the king's departure for Scotland is reflected in their attendance at the concomitant committees. Culpepper's motives for co-operation have been

suggested, and Falkland appeared at one with Pym's policy of restraining the king from leaving London. It was he who moved that the king should be asked to defer his departure;<sup>88.</sup> whether because he believed that there was a genuine danger of the king forming his own party in Scotland, or because he supported Pym's politically astute line of heightening the atmosphere of crisis in order to facilitate the radical measures of the committee set up to administer the country in the king's absence, we cannot tell. However he was unlikely to have been closely enough associated with Pym's plans to co-operate with him consistently on such policy matters, and he actually undermined the earlier effect of his motion by meeting the hot news of the Scottish "Incident" with incredulity and glibly suggesting that Scottish affairs should be left to the Scottish Parliament.<sup>89.</sup> This isolated example serves as a warning in trying to ascribe to the committee attendances of the royalists any basic sympathy with the views of Pym and his colleagues, and supports the view that agreement between them was coincidental, impermanent and unpredictable.

Despite their appointment to the Privy Council, Falkland and Culpepper did still appear on odd occasions on committees which were designed to promote the strength of the parliamentary acting arm, although, as we have seen, these occasions could still nominally appear to be related to the theoretical threat of foreign invasion. It is significant that Clarendon who was closely associated with the promotion of his friends,<sup>90.</sup> never mentions their role in possible opposition to the king.

On the whole then it is true to say that the most active of the royalists confined themselves to attending committees in the early part of the period and to topics on which they were in agreement with the reforming groups. There is therefore little evidence of the presence of any on committees in the capacity of obstructionists against the changes sought by the majority. It seems to be generally true, as remarked by the constitutional writers of the period that appointment to a committee implied approval of its subject matter. Those royalists who differed from their colleagues and agreed, however tenuously, with some of the reform leaders' policies, remained active on committees longer than those of a more conventional hue. The unanimity of feeling within the committees makes an interesting contrast to debates in Committees of the Whole House, where all were present, whether for or against. Clarendon says that he was appointed to chair a committee for the Whole for the extirpation of episcopacy by his enemies who hoped to stop him from speaking against the measure in this way.<sup>91.</sup> The same does not appear to have happened on the select committees.

#### The Political Opposition.

A quick look at the other "political" activists is worthwhile. John Glyn heads both the list for the number of committees attended and the distribution among groups of subject headings, being present in 15 of the 17 groups, which was a very wide coverage of interests. Glyn was obviously one of

the ablest people in the House, on whose support Pym counted, and whose career<sup>92.</sup> shows how dexterous he was at political manoeuvring. His wide spread over the range of committee groups mirrors his activities in the House. He was not "connected" with Pym in the way Barrington and Hampden were through family ties and earlier association, but was a purely political ally who agreed with enough of Pym's attitudes to be a trusted colleague.<sup>93.</sup> It is interesting that he was noted by Clarendon as an active leader of the affairs in the Commons only at the time of the division between Parliament and the army, although then he made up for his earlier omission of Glyn from his list<sup>94.</sup> by labelling him post facto as "notorious from the beginning". Gardiner also hardly mentioned Glyn in the description of political events in the House; his great service to the leading group then appeared to be through his overwhelming diligence and ability on committees, especially during this early period. Barrington on the other hand was connected with Pym through the colonizing schemes, as well as being related to him and to Hampden, Warwick, and Bedford. He was thus practically born into the position of supporter of the reforming group. An interesting feature of Barrington's political activity which indicated both his importance in the House at large, and his firm support for Pym's views, was his frequent employment as teller between October 1641 and January 1642.<sup>95.</sup> In almost every case he appeared as a staunch supporter of Pym's faction, acting with others of the same group against largely royalist tellers, especially on orthodox matters where there was no

question of a party split. For example, he acted with Purefoy as teller in favour of a petition to the king to stop the making of five new bishops,<sup>96.</sup> with Irby in favour of including an article to the Scottish Commissioners in relation to the removal of evil counsellors,<sup>97.</sup> with Lumley on a vote that the bishops had brought popery into the church,<sup>98.</sup> and on all the divisions in relation to Palmer who had represented the minority in the House against the signing of the Protestation,<sup>99.</sup> as well as on several others.<sup>100.</sup> In one case he clearly acted on the side of moderation against the extremists, taking Pym's position, and acting with Sir John Holland for the Noes on whether convicted priests should be executed, which was affirmed by the religious extremists Haselrig and Sir Samuel Rolle.<sup>101.</sup>

Barrington never took a leading part in debates and was not accounted a "front bencher". His position as teller was no doubt due to being regarded as a completely "safe" Pym man on all party issues, and Clarendon's disregard of him as a political figure obviously reflects his lack of a public image.

Pym himself was one of the most active attenders at committees of all varieties, specializing naturally at those which had important political business to pursue. He shared with the non-political "committee-men" many of their distinguishing features; he had legal training, with a great deal of administrative experience in his county and elsewhere as J.P. and commissioner,<sup>102.</sup> in addition he had experience as an office-holder of the crown as Receiver of the Revenues of Hants,



103.

Wilts and Gloucestershire; he was of course known to be in opposition to the crown's policies in the 1620's; he had had parliamentary experience; and his widespread connections with trading and Puritan interests through the colonizing ventures of the 20's and 30's put him at the centre of a core of families who provided the mainstay of opposition in the early months of the Long Parliament. In fact it was his closeness to Bedford which provided the link with his many supporters in the Commons. It is significant that Clarendon in describing this obvious leader of affairs in the Commons should have made him the paradigm of an administrator rather than a political manipulator, a role which he left to Hampden; "Mr. Pimm was looked upon as a man of greatest experience in Parliaments, where he had served very long, and was always a man of business, being an officer in the Exchequer, and of a good reputation generally, though known to be inclined to the Puritan party; yet not of those furious resolutions against the Church as the other leading men were and wholly devoted to the Earl of Bedford, who had nothing of that spirit".

104.

Holles, always described by contemporaries as a leader of the popular party, although specifically excluded by Clarendon as one of Pym's closet associates has been included in this section as a supporter of Pym, despite his opposition once war began. Erle was "connected" to the reforming group through the Fiennes family. Although mentioned by Clarendon as one of the leading supporters of Pym and having the doubtful honour of being next in line for impeachment after

106.

the Five Members bestowed upon him, <sup>107.</sup> he appeared to be mainly active in the House as an expert on military matters rather than a real politico. <sup>108.</sup> Hampden's actions seemed completely in accord with Pym, with whom he was also related. He was considered to be something of an eminence grise behind Pym <sup>109.</sup> who was certainly the most prominent man in the House. The extent of his influence over Pym would be impossible to assess. There were also times, such as over the vote on bishops, and on the Oxford Treaty, when they appeared not to be in full accord, although the differences on these issues were possibly procedural rather than fundamental. <sup>110.</sup>

St. John the later leader of the War Party, was very much one of Pym's inner circle, gaining his reward by his appointment as Solicitor General in January 1641. This was the first step in the implementation of the Bedford plan, which was to make the reformers the closest advisors of the king. As we have seen, this plan did not eventuate, but the selection of offices had been done very much on the "inner circle" basis. Clarendon noted that he was rumoured a natural son of Bedford; the family connections of those right at the centre of the opposition faction were apparently well-known to contemporaries. <sup>111.</sup> Apart from his relationship with Bedford he was also related to the Cromwell and Barrington families through marriage. <sup>112.</sup> It is not surprising that being at the centre of the interlocking families who made up the opposition clique <sup>113.</sup> he was also a share-holder in the Providence Island Company,

and that he should have built up his reputation as a lawyer through the management of Bedford's legal business, which provided him with administrative experience, as well as more spectacularly through handling Hampden's Ship Money case.

Nathaniel Fiennes was certainly closely connected with Pym through the colonizing ventures as well as politically through his father Lord Say and Sele and he was in any case a leading member of the House of similar convictions as Pym. It is significant that Clarendon does not mention his activities in the House but rather his background, namely his Puritan leanings due to his Calvinist education, and his fulfilment of his father's ambitions. Marten became known later as the fiercest of all the War Party men, a Republican and a theist. His contempt for Charles and the Crown did not appear in the open until his clashes with Pym over the peace negotiations in 1642-3, and no doubt while Pym was pursuing a direct attacking policy he had Marten's whole support.

Gerrard who became the Treasurer at Wars, and thus a very active administrator, was connected with Pym through the colonizing ventures as well as being related to St. John, one of the known radical leaders, and through him to the Barringtons and the whole clan of Eastern gentry, as well as being a well-known London lawyer. But he had also been an active officeholder under the Crown, as Clerk of the Duchy of Lancaster Court, and later as Master of the Rolls. He was therefore a central cog in the machinery of committee government, having the necessary contacts and administrative experience to be a useful and

politically reliable activist. Strode was better known at this early stage as a fire-brand than Marten, which is indicated partly by his inclusion among the famous Five Members, and partly by Clarendon's notice of him as "one of those Ephori who most avowed the curbing and suppressing of majesty" early in the sitting of the Long Parliament; although Clarendon did not differentiate his political radicalism from Pym's, he bracketed him together with the other radical, Haselrig, and ascribed base motives to them; "writing of the Five Members he says: "Sir Arthur Haslerigge and Strowde were persons of too low an account and esteem; and though their virulence and malice was as conspicuous and transcendent as any men's, yet their reputation and interest to do any mischief, otherwise than in concurring in it, was so small that they gained credit and authority by being joined with the rest, who had indeed a great influence."<sup>120.</sup> After the outbreak of war it was at first consistently Strode and Haselrig who went beyond Pym's policy of negotiating with the king by objecting to any proposals being sent.<sup>121.</sup> Hotham was regarded as a leader of the parliamentary opposition as we saw, and is difficult to classify due to his later change of allegiance. In any case he was trusted by Pym to take up his high military appointment in the North, late in 1642.

Haselrig, already noted as one of the early fire-brands in the Commons, was also related to the kinship group which made up the core of the opposition party through Lord Brooke.<sup>122.</sup> His pre-1640 activities tied him to the leaders, having openly opposed to the power of the prerogative courts, and joining the

Saybrooke project which formed one of the focal points of early organized opposition.<sup>123.</sup> Clarendon consistently refers to him as a "tool for his party", "an absurd, bold man, brought up by Mr. Pimm, and so employed by that party to make any attempt".<sup>124.</sup> This was in connection with bringing in the bill of attainder against Strafford; again, "as has been said before, [ he ] was used by that party, like the dove out of the ark, to try what footing there was"<sup>125.</sup> - this time on the Militia Bill. But in view of his extremist line it is unlikely that he would have acted merely as a tool for the Middle Party.

The younger Vane's background and experience differed from that of the other leaders' by having been brought up in court circles due to his father's exalted place as well as by his residence in New England; but it was probably on ideological grounds rather than out of sheer envy of Strafford's title of his father's estate of Raby<sup>126.</sup> which drew him close to Pym, and his experience at first hand of the colonizing ventures gave him the necessary contact with the well-integrated group.<sup>127.</sup>

Sir Philip Stapleton was not at first tied to the Eastern connection by previous contact, and belonged to a distinct Northern faction of related reform leaders,<sup>128.</sup> Hotham and Cholmley - "they who were most active and had most credit" according to Clarendon,<sup>129.</sup> and who joined together to condemn the local branch of the prerogative courts, the Court of York. It was through their stand against the administration of Strafford in the north that Stapleton first came within the orbit of Hampden whom he

grew to admire, and through him possibly to Essex to whom he remained the most loyal friend. It was because of his northern prestige presumably that he was given the signal honour of accompanying Hampden on his mission to keep an eye on the king in his sojourn in Scotland.<sup>130.</sup>

Edmund Prideaux became later associated with the extreme radicals, but little is known of his earlier political stand. He does not appear to have had any earlier ties with the opposition group of the Eastern counties, although his zeal for reform was well enough known for him to have had the defence of the strategically important Exeter left to his personal care.<sup>131.</sup> D'Ewes saw him as the exponent of a "western faction" at the end of 1643 when those who had rallied behind Pym split up for a time to become prey to more particular interests. As a supporter of Waller in his western campaign he did not necessarily come into conflict with those who supported Vane, who was said to be the spokesman of the northern faction.<sup>132.</sup> He was certainly a later confidant of Vane and St. John with whom he took the radical line at the Uxbridge negotiations.<sup>133.</sup>

Fairfax ceased activities in the House on a large scale after the outbreak of war to take up his celebrated command in the North. Before that time he supported Pym; his later history indicates his affinities with the more active wing of the Middle Party, if not with the War Party, on whose support the backing of his army and the northern interests depended, against the claims of Essex who was supported by Pym personally. Certainly

as an uncompromising military leader he represented the aspirations of the War Party in the early years of the war.

Mildmay was an anomalous figure in the Commons, having been the recipient of a very lucrative post with the court as Master of the Jewels, being known to have defended the king's policy on all but religious matters in the 1625 Parliament,<sup>134.</sup> and worst of all, having been the recipient of the gold and silver thread monopoly.<sup>135.</sup> Clarendon recalls bitterly that Mildmay and Whittaker were noted by the king to have escaped censure from the Commons in their attacks and expulsion of monopolists,<sup>136.</sup> and he hints at the explanation of Mildmay's later radicalism: ". . . [they] had been most scandalously engaged in those pressures, though since more scandalously in all enterprises against his majesty". The suggestion is that it was Mildmay's fear of being brought to book by Parliament that threw him into the arms of the radicals.<sup>137.</sup> However, it is quite as possible that his anti-Arminianism of the 20's threw him into opposition to the policies of the crown, a fact which, Aylmer argues, exonerates him to some extent from the charge of being "the worst type of rapacious scoundrel".<sup>138.</sup> Yule on the other hand does not appear to put much faith in his genuine religious zeal and refers to him as a "fellow traveller",<sup>139.</sup> ascribing to him the speculation which Aylmer doubts.<sup>140.</sup> There certainly appears to be no doubt about his early religious extremism as the stand he took during the period before the outbreak of war shows; he wanted to have the jurors who spared the catholic priest Goodman's life punished by Parliament;<sup>141.</sup> he called for the declaration of delinquency

on Sir Percy Herbert for being a papist who had borne arms;<sup>142.</sup>  
 he was for the removal of all idols and images from churches;<sup>143.</sup>  
 and wanted to have all papists removed from the army.<sup>144.</sup> But at  
 the same time he changed his line on Strafford, at first voting  
 against the Attainder, and later enthusiastically seconding  
 Pym's proceedings.<sup>145.</sup> This may be understood in terms of learn-  
 ing to act according to his new duty as a Parliamentarian.<sup>146.</sup> But  
 it is less clear why, as an ex-beneficiary of the crown's policy,  
 he should have joined his radical colleagues in speaking person-  
 ally with contempt for the king in 1642.<sup>147.</sup> His usefulness to  
 Pym and the radicals on the other hand was obvious; his wealth  
 was an asset to the prosecution of the war,<sup>148.</sup> and his copious  
 experience at financial administration and court procedure was  
 useful on committees, as well as on state occasions, when the  
 fledgeling "foreign office" had to turn out to meet foreign  
 ambassadors to gain international prestige; on such occasions  
 Mildmay would act as Master of Ceremonies.<sup>149.</sup>

The Goodwyns, although probably not related to the famous  
 eastern kinship group, were nevertheless closely associated  
 with Hampden who was a neighbour of Arthur's and to whom the  
 latter wrote a well-known eulogy.<sup>150.</sup> The connection with the  
 inner circle of leaders is also obvious in Robert's closeness  
 with Barrington, whose interests, although not an Essex man him-  
 self, the former promoted at Westminster when Barrington was  
 busy in the county.<sup>151.</sup> Arthur's inclusion on the Committee of the  
 Grand Remonstrance is a sure sign of being an "insider", and  
 the family's interests in Ireland and their activities there



further puts them into the syndrome of Pym's associates.<sup>152.</sup>

Whitelock was an eminent lawyer who supported Pym in his middle-of-the road policy after the outbreak of war, although he tended to veer towards the Peace Party in the negotiations and was suspected of foreknowledge of the Waller plot.<sup>153.</sup> A compatriot of Hampden, he had been a legal counsel to him ~~in~~ on the Ship Money case, and had certainly supported the erastian and anti-prerogative moves of the earlier period. Perplexed by the apparently contrary behaviour of Whitelock at the peace talks where he invariably appeared as the friend of accommodation, Clarendon ascribes his continued support of Parliament to his wealth and the fact that his properties all lay in the parliamentary sphere of influence.<sup>154.</sup> His friendship with Essex and Fairfax also must have helped to determine the line which he later took.<sup>155.</sup> D'Ewes, who tended to identify his own views later with the wealthy Whitelock,<sup>156.</sup> put the latter in the same category as Holles, suggesting that he veered about in his alignment after the outbreak of war from "formerlie [having] beene verie opposite against an accomodation" because his house in Bucks had lately been plundered, which evidently affected his appreciation of the meaning of war.<sup>157.</sup> There is no doubt that during the earlier period he was a thorough supporter of Pym and his group.

Irby and Mountford were both associated with Pym's party though probably more peripherally. The former was related through Warwick to the eastern gentry connection, and had<sup>158.</sup>

family interests in the colonial ventures,<sup>159.</sup> as well as holding the reputation of a leading spokesman against arbitrary rule in his county. The latter also had interests in the Providence Island venture which tied him to the inner reform group,<sup>160.</sup> his interest in Ireland was typical of his political affiliation,<sup>161.</sup> and his religious extremism was shared with many of his colleagues.

### The Peace Party

The later Peace Party also contributed to attendance at committees, in the persons of Selden, Maynard, D'Ewes, Pierrepont, Palmes, Grimston and Cholmley. It is probably not true to say that these men formed a group, but rather that their later antipathy to Pym's policy stemmed from various but unco-ordinated reasons. Certainly Selden, Maynard and D'Ewes were all noted lawyers and all took an anachronistically legalistic attitude to the changes which rocked the constitution so profoundly at this time. But Selden was an urbane Erastian, hated Presbyterianism, baited the Assembly of Divines with his taunts about their jure divine,<sup>162.</sup> and even advocating toleration for catholics.<sup>163.</sup> Despite his obvious dislike for fanatic Puritanism he joined the reform group in their colonizing ventures with the implied anti-episcopal criticism.<sup>164.</sup> He probably had no qualms in providing the necessary legal sanction for the revolutionary steps of 1642, and his distribution over committees subjects indicates his usefulness to Pym in his legal capacity, specializing as he did on matters involving petitions, the prerogative courts, parliamentary privilege, the trial of Strafford,

and, because of the need to justify and legalize an alternative government in the king's absence, on the committees relating to the king's visit to Scotland. His later pacifism did not interfere with his legal sanctioning of the militia bill and the Nineteen Propositions.

Gardiner thought of Selden, Maynard and D'Ewes as confused legalists who longed for peace once war had broken out because they were "startled by every illegality"<sup>165</sup>. However, their dislike of war must have had deeper causes than their dislike for illegality, as there was generically no difference between sanctioning the measures of 1642 and the ensuing practical steps by which war became an actuality. Maynard was certainly a confirmed Presbyterian and Puritan before the break,<sup>166</sup> and his actions in regard to Strafford's Attainder and the bill to make taking the Protestation obligatory in 1641 indicates a deeper attachment to the policies of the reform leaders than his later stand indicates. In any case all three remained with little equivocation on Parliament's side despite the qualms of conscience their attitude occasionally gave them. Maynard's speeches during this period indicate his legal interest but their frequency also reflects the active role he played in the events of 1641-2.<sup>167</sup>

D'Ewes' views, which emerge throughout his extensive notes and which have been referred to frequently in reference to specific issues, indicate his dilatory attitude towards the reform cause. On religious matters there was no compromise with him, and it was probably his Root and Branch views which

reconciled him to the parliamentary cause, despite his early troubles with the leaders of that "faction". However, he voiced many qualms about the activities of the "fiery spirits" among whom he counted anyone who was more radical than himself or who disagreed with him, making no distinctions between the moderates and the radicals. Despite his shocked dismay at the radical demands for control of militia and executive he never appeared to falter in his general loyalty to the parliamentary side, although his orientation towards peace is manifest from the first weeks of war. Nevertheless he did not appear to balk at the Militia Ordinance except to quibble about the effectiveness of an Ordinance as opposed to an Act.

Pierrepoint who features consistently on committees during the present period as well as after the outbreak of war, will be studied later in connection with his attitudes to the peace negotiations. Before the outbreak of war he may have been more radical than in his later attitudes although we have no specific information about the line which he took in relation to Pym's policy of the early months. He was certainly one of the wealthy members of the Commons,<sup>168.</sup> an attribute which disposed some who were earlier against the king to favour peace for the sake of their property once war broke out. Together with Whitelock and Holles, D'Ewes described Pierrepoint as having been "verie opposite to an accomodation" but who supported the start of negotiations in November 1642.<sup>169.</sup> Clarendon on the other hand commended him for his earlier moderation, as being "most solicitous upon all opportunities for peace"<sup>170.</sup> as commissioner at Oxford and stressed

the evident relation of wealth to "moderation". ~~His later change of line at the time of Uxbridge when he was again commissioner need not concern us here.~~ D'Ewes' reasons for Pierrapont's change of line in November 1642, namely, that his brother Lord Newark had taken sides with the king, hardly seems adequate. Although not known to have adhered to Pym's faction, Whitelock's commendation of him as 'acting with deep foresight and prudence' would tend to indicate that ~~his line~~<sup>he</sup> was more pacific than D'Ewes' backward-looking comment would indicate.

Sir Hugh Cholmley and Sir Guy Palmes were both renegades from Parliament in later years, despite their radical connections, and they acted with extreme moderation during the early period of the Long Parliament. Both were prominent northern gentlemen; Palmes was friendly with the Fairfaxes and the Wentworths and other militant northern families, and had been an extremely outspoken critic of monopolies, recusants and forced loans; one might have expected him to follow Pym's line, if not actually to go beyond the moderate attack on the king's prerogative. In fact he tempered his criticism even at the time of the Strafford trial, and although he was not a "Straffordian" he evidently did not participate in the affairs of the House much after 1642 and was finally disabled in 1643, without, at the same time, becoming active for the other side. His northern colleague Cholmley played a far more active part in the affairs of the House in the early days, and later made a spectacular change over to the king, by handing over Scarborough Castle gaining the governorship and administration of it in return.

He appears to have been wealthy like Pierrepont, and his connections with famous northern families especially the Hothams influenced his political line. Clarendon suggests that it was this factor which kept Cholmley in the field for Parliament until his defection which was associated with that of the Hothams, and his role in the north closely followed that of his more famous military colleague, to whom he had been parliamentary emissary at Hull in 1642. <sup>176.</sup> Apart from his wealth and mines which were all in areas under royalist sway during the early years of war, Cholmley's Anglicanism would have thrown him into the arms of the king. His initial support for reform stemmed from his years of struggle against Strafford in the North and his stand against Ship money. <sup>177.</sup> Quite clearly it was his activities in this field which made him at first appear sympathetic to the reform party and Clarendon suggests that the leaders were clever enough to exploit his stand for their own purposes, extending the hatred against one man into an attack on the whole institution of royal government. <sup>178.</sup> Certainly his service on committees was most concerned with northern matters and the abolition of the prerogative courts. He was sent with his friend Hotham and neighbour Stapleton on commission to the north when the king was carrying out his dubious business in Scotland. <sup>179.</sup> He and his neighbours came out in defence of Hyde when he was under the virulent attack of the opposition at the time of the Protestation <sup>180.</sup> in a matter relating to the Council of the north. <sup>181.</sup> With only specific grievances against the royal administration and without the driving force of Puritanism to tie him to the

reform policy he was an example of the kind of supporter who at first hinged his grievance to the general reform movement until he saw that it was carrying him into areas which conflicted with his own views and the safety of his property. His usefulness to the leaders of reform despite his lack of real enthusiasm, was demonstrated by his participation on committees where his special position gave him importance and authority.

By background Grimston could have belonged to the more radical inner group as he owed his election to the Long Parliament to the Earl of Warwick who was also Barrington's patron.<sup>182.</sup> He co-operated with the latter in the wartime government of Essex and appeared one of the most enthusiastic of local committee-men.<sup>183</sup> During the war he busied himself almost exclusively with county affairs, but during the early period he contributed his share in attending committees. He may have felt that his administrative duties in the county were less against fundamental and legally constituted authority than the activities at Westminster and may have stayed away a good deal in later months for political reasons.

#### The Interests of the Politicos and the Administrators.

In examining the most frequent attenders at committees something has been said about the individual distribution of members over the range of subject-matter dealt with by the committees. In order to make some estimation of the role which the parties played in the whole aspect of government by committees it is necessary to look at the distribution of each of the political groups, including also the "committee-men" administrators,

over the whole range of subjects covered by committees. This should enable one not only to see which matters were of prevailing interest to each of the groups, but also to illustrate the mode of operation of each of the groups in exerting pressure on the business and politics of the House. To facilitate this, tables have been drawn up showing the distribution of interests of the most active men on committees. In drawing up the tables, all members attending approximately 26 committees or more have been listed. This yielded about twice as many "administrators" (14) and Middle Party men (14), as royalists (6), Peace Party men (6) and War Party men (7). It is necessary to keep this in mind when considering the percentage which each group represented of the whole list.

First of all, to compare the activities of each "party" within the committees grouped into subject matter. We see that the Middle Party and "administrators" each made up 20% of the defence group, whereas the War Party had a comparatively greater membership there than either, considering that its 6 activists made up 12% of the total attendances. The Royalists' and Peace Party's participation was far smaller. We have seen that the royalists virtually stopped attending after January 1642. It is worth observing that on the main constructive front before the outbreak of war, namely the building up of a system of defence (compared to the dismantling processes at work in the committees relating to the northern armies, to the prerogative courts, to religion, etc.) the most militant wing of the Commons took the



lead. If we assume that the War Party and the "administrators" backed Pym's policies in most matters relating to defence, we see that he had the co-operation of a majority of the most active members. Those most active on the Navy committees seem to have been very much a Middle Party group, perhaps because of the liaison between that party and the Earl of Warwick, as well as because of their active interest in maritime enterprises through backing the colonizing ventures and Irish enterprises. Finance, one of the administrative matters dealt with by the committees, was managed in equal strength by the "administrators" and the Middle Party. It may be interesting to note that the work of the active "administrators" was spread in similar proportions on some committee groups, because, as we shall see later, their support became vital to Pym's continued success in the House; and this presupposed a partial similarity of aims and interests.

On Petitions the relative strengths of all groups was about the same. This reflects the unanimity of the active members of the House on the early reform measures, as the petitions represented the grievances which had accumulated over the years of non-parliamentary Government. As one would expect of the London committees, the more conservative members did not participate, and comparatively there was more representation from the radicals. This was due to the liaison work with the City lying in the hands of the London burgesses dominated by Pennington, a fierce War Party adherent, whilst the conservative elements

in the City were not approached, except on one occasion by Hyde and his friends, to co-operate with Parliament's schemes. On religion the distribution of the most active members was comparatively equal, just as it was on petitions, and for somewhat similar reasons, although the figures here tend to disguise the disapproval of the majority of the royalists of the later religious changes. On the committees relating to the prerogative courts, the royalists and Peace Party were comparatively far more active, indicating an initial and legally orientated zeal for constitutional reform. Both groups contained a majority of active lawyers, whose interests in the Common Law made them eager for reform and abolition of the prerogative courts. From the comparative lack of participation by the other groups in these particular reforms one might also deduce that they were not yet organized as well at this early stage as later coherence of action seems to indicate, or else that while the prominent lawyers (who later became less enthusiastic) took the lead, neither the Middle Party nor the "administrators" were needed to fulfill those early reforms. The former deduction however is not confirmed by the attendance figures on the Remonstrance committees which ~~were~~<sup>were</sup> also related to the early work of the Long Parliament. This was certainly a field where the Middle Party showed active participation, together with the royalists, indicating that Pym's nucleus of leading members were well enough organized to initiate and participate in this central and critical issue. As we have seen, the royalists played a large part

at first, but later when the Remonstrance began to take the form of an actual indictment of the king they ceased to support it. Their strong initial support, like their activities on the groups relating to petitions and prerogative courts, shows their critical attitude to the evils of the personal rule. However, the comparatively small contribution of the "administrators" and the War Party might be explained by an early lack of organization of these groups.

Activity on Recusants committees, shows a fairly even spread over the groups, indicating a unanimous policy and enthusiasm in persecuting the catholics, presumably as much for their possible political threat as for their religious activities. The greater bulk of the work was carried out by the more conservative groups once again, stressing the general popularity which this form of indictment of the court carried with it.

Privilege proved a group with very large membership as befits a matter of concern to all members. The fairly equal spread of activity among the various parties indicates that the matter was regarded as fundamental to the early programme of reform and therefore of general interest to all. The work of the committees on the King's Army was dealt with by more Middle Party men and royalists, and relates also to the early activities of Parliament. Since the active royalists on committees were all early critics of absolute government, they were also in favour of disbanding the army. Their co-operation with Pym on the matter can be well understood, even if their

motives were different. As we saw, they were as anxious to take the northern army out of the king's hands as were the opposition. But in addition they were also concerned to remove a source of antagonism against the royal policy by disbanding the ravenous and wasteful forces billeted on the poorer northern counties. On the other hand, Pym's party treated the issue of disbanding as a safeguard of parliamentary existence. The complete lack of co-operation of the radicals on this phase of committee work was due to the fact that Pym entrusted this matter of high policy more to his immediate intimates rather than to his more peripheral supporters. Similar factors came into consideration in the group of committees on Scotland, where once again, the "administrators" were relatively less active, and the royalists seemed to co-operate with the Middle Party, as joint critics of the king's northern policies. The changing situation of September 1641 when the king made his trip to the north, and the potentialities of alternative central control at Westminster were first seriously explored meant that both the "administrators" and the War Party became more active, together with the Middle Party. Activity on the Irish committees was shared in comparatively equal measure by the Middle, War, and "administrators" groups, due to the political implications of anti-court action there, as well as to the colonizing activities of the more active radical parliamentarians.

On the Strafford committees the Peace Party and royalists were far more active, both because of the legal element in both groups and because like some of the other early legislation, the impeachment of Strafford was of interest as much to the later conservatives as to the radicals, and could safely be left to them to be executed. As a contrast, the group of committees relating to the nineteen Propositions right at the end of the period under discussion here no longer contained any royalists, - who had dropped out of active roles by that time - nor even any Peace Party men, some of whom would have had serious scruples about the position taken by Pym's followers on that issue. It was left to the most enthusiastic proponents of a strong line with the king to undertake the committee work on this issue.

The patterns of participation in active roles of the various "parties" in the different subjects under committee treatment is fairly clear. On matters of political importance during the early part of this period, the later royalists and the Peace Party men predominated, both because the early issues were all constitutional and therefore of interest to the large legal contingent in both these groups, and also because Pym probably felt that so long as the reforms could be enacted without pressure from his own supporters there was no reason to dominate the committee activities. On matters of immediate political importance after the middle of 1641, the Middle Party, sometimes together with the War Party, dominated, almost to

the exclusion of the royalists, but also without such support from the "administrators". The latter however came into their own on straight administrative matters, such as finance and defence, and on political matters which required lengthier negotiations and a great deal of unity of policy over the period. It was here that the "administrators" no doubt gave Pym's group the necessary support needed to implement its policies through the action of the committees. It would appear from this study of the most active men on committees, that Pym could count on the support of the War Party in matters of political crisis, while relying more on the "administrators" to sustain him on issues requiring a degree of continuity and experience for which they were eminently suited.

#### Comparative Strength of Parties on Committees.

Some further general observations arise out of a survey of the most active committee members during this period. If we look at the political loyalties of the members on the list (subject to the cautions mentioned at the beginning of this section) we find the following distribution of numbers among the first 50 names, roughly corresponding to those examined in the break-down of party activity in the tables, of all who sat on 26 or more committees, and as a contrast, the top 100 names, of all on 8 or more committees:

	Adminis- trators	Middle Party	War Party	Peace Party	Royal- ists
50 most active men on committees	14	15	8	7	6
100 most active men on committees.	23	23	14	11	14
		184.			
		185.			

The figures indicate the overall strength of the Middle Party on the committees, which has been noted throughout in considering the composition of committees in detail. It indicates the importance which Pym and his supporters must have attached to action through committees. The figure is even more significant when we consider that the 36 men named by Hexter as being connected with Pym in this special political way formed such less than 10% of the membership of the House before the exodus of the royalists. Not only do they form 30% of the 50 most active committee men, but their committee record of 948 nominations forms 40% of the total committee attendances of the 50 men considered. When the support of the War Party for their policies is included there is no doubt that they had a strong majority on committees, and with the support of the "administrators" they swamped the nominations.

Although their strength among the most active committee men is great, the decline of their influence when taking a larger number of committee attenders is also obvious from these figures, as out of the 100 committee members noted, they only form 23%, while the comparative strength of the royalists is increased. Even then, the combined strength of the royalists and Peace Party only formed 25% of the total. We might infer from the decrease in influence of the Middle Group among the lesser attenders that Pym's influence and the enthusiasm of the leading members of his group meant that they could dominate the leading positions on committees, but when it came to the less illustrious names, the other interests in the House felt themselves at liberty to compete with committee nomination.

In this chapter the degree, extent and distribution of Pym's influence over the management of committees has been discussed. This study of committee nominations has broadly supported the earlier considerations devoted to the subject-matter dealt with by committees and provides a comparative measure for the influence of the various groups to be found in the pre-war House of Commons. The direct conclusions of this work are tautologous to some degree - that the most enthusiastic members for reform took the brunt of the work done by the committees which became the weapon of organized opposition and positive construction of policy. But the implications entailed in the conclusions are more interesting. As we have seen, a study of this kind illuminates the extent of Pym's control not only over the policy of the Commons but of the methods employed to implement them; the degree of co-operation which went into making the opposition a unified and workable alternative to the existing government; the channeling of members into appropriate positions commensurate with their political enthusiasm and administrative ability; and the seeking and winning of the active co-operation of a group of men who did not publicly declare their political affiliations but who were ready to lend their administrative skills in order to make Pym's government a real alternative to Charles' unparliamentary rule.



APPENDIXPARTY AFFILIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY.

An interesting side light on the division of people in the Long Parliament into parties is a short debate which arose out of a disputed election where there was a doubt whether only the Corporation or the whole citizenry had the right of returning the burgess for the town. <sup>187.</sup> The issue debated was whether the poor should have a voice in elections. Those who spoke for the poor were: Cholmley, D'Ewes, Hotham, Hayman, Bagshaw, Whistler, and John Coucher. Those against were Maynard, Fleetwood and Crew. It is a great pity that the major figures did not contribute to the debate as it would have been most illuminating to see whether radicalism on religious or constitutional grounds had a democratic basis. From the list of speakers given however, we can see that there is certainly no clear division of radicals versus conservatives in the sense in which these terms applied to stands on the issues of the day. Of those speaking for the poor only Coucher, as a weaver and Worcester Alderman, might have been speaking with any real involvement, although as an Alderman himself he might just as well be identified with championing bureaucracy in government. Sir Peter Hayman was the only radical named, and he spoke for the poor. His supporters however, were the eventual royalists Whistler, Hotham and Cholmley, as well as Bagshaw, who was for the king from the start, and D'Ewes, a most "conservative" Peace Party man. Of those against the poor, Maynard, as a fellow lawyer and leader of the Peace group, stood opposed to

D'Ewes, but was supported by Fleetwood, a Receiver of the Court of Wards and later active in the Protectorate, and by Crew a country lawyer and committeeman, and a firm supporter of Pym. The spirit of the Putney Debates was still far from splitting the important political groups of the day.

TABLE I

MEN MOST ACTIVE ON COMMITTEES FROM NOVEMBER 1640 TO JULY 1642.

Name.	Total No. of committees	No. of groups	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Royalists	Administrators	Name.	Total No. of committees	No. of groups	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Royalists	Administrators
Olyn	118	15		X				White	25	4					X
Barrington	111	14		X				Strangways	24	4				X	X
Pym	104	12		X				Wheeler	24	4					X
Holles	89	12		X				Pennington	24	5	X				
Erle	88	11		X				Vassall	23	4					X
Hampden	85	12		X				Coke H.	22	4		X			
Culpepper	78	12				X		Palmer	21	4				X	
St. John	71	10	X					Luke	19	3		X			
Selden	69	11			X			Masham	19	3		X			
Fiennes N.	61	11		X				Lewes	18	3			X		
Marten	60	8						Crane	18	3			X		
Evelyn	58	9					X	Wray C.	18	2		X			
Holle J.	57	8					X	Hayman	18	3	X				
Gerrard	56	9		X				Ingram	17	2					
Strode	55	8	X					Strangways	17	3					X
Reynolds	53	8					X	Whittaker	17	4			X		
Hotham	52	9		X				Capel	17	3				X	X
Perd	51	8					X	Kirton	16	2				X	
Maynard	51	7			X			Ayscough	16	2		X			
Widdrington	49	7					X	Anderson	16	3					
Cage	47	9					X	Corbett J.	16	4		X			
Crew	45	7					X	Moore H.	14	2					
Whistler	43	6				X		Waller	14	3			X		
D'Ewes	43	7			X			Merrick	13	3					
Hyde	42	7				X		Clotworthy	13	3		X			
Haselrig	41	6	X					Green	12	2					X
Vane Jr.	41	7	X					Worley	12	2	X				
Falkland	41	8				X		Rouse	12	2		X			
Pierrepoint	40	7			X			Vane Sr.	12	3	X?				
Stapleton	38	6		X				North D.	12	2					
Palmer	38	6			X			Cromwell	11	3		X			
Prideaux	37	6	X					Dalston	11	2					
Fairfax	37	7		X				Noel	11	2					
Wilde	36	6					X	Partridge	11	2			X		
Hungerford	36	6					X	Bagshaw	11	2				X	
Harley	36	7					X	Venn	11	2	X				
Mountford	35	6		X				Soames	11	2					
Lytton	35	7					X	Whitehead	11	2					

TABLE I (cont.)

ACTIVISTS NOVEMBER 1640 - JULY 1642(cont.)

Name.	Total No. of committees	No. of Groups	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Royalists	Administrators.	Name.	Total No. of committees	No. of Groups	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Royalists	Administrators
Goodwyn A.	35	7		X				Potts	10	2					
Whitelock	34	6		X				Ashburnham	10	2				X	
Holland J.	34	6					X	Rudyard	10	2			X		
Rigby	34	5	X					Hutchinson	9	2	X				
Dering	32	5				X		Hill	9	2					
Goodwyn R.	32	6		X				Vowell	9	2					
Grimston	29	6			X			Seymour	9	2				X	
Pye	27	4					X	Wentworth	9	2	X				
Belasize	27	6				X		Lisle	9	2					X
Cholmley	26	4			X			Broxholm	9	2					
Mildmay	26	5	X					Owfield	8	1					
Irby	25	3		X				Smyth	8	2					

TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION OF THE "PARTIES" OVER SUBJECTS DEALT WITHIN COMMITTEES NOVEMBER 1640-JULY 1642.

(lists taken from the 50 most active members on Table I).

Administrators

Name.	Defence	Navy	Finance	Petitions	London	Religion	Justice	Recusants	Privilege	Kings Army	Scotland	Ireland	Scottish Visit	Stafford	Adjournment	Remonstrance	19 Prop-ositions
Evelyn	X		X	X			X	X			X	X				X	X
Holle	X		X	X		X		X			X	X					X
Reynolds	X		X	X		X	X	X			X						X
Perd	X		X	X	X	X	X	X									
Widdrington	X			X		X	X	X		X	X						
Cage	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X					
Crew	X		X	X		X				X	X	X					X
Wilde	X		X			X		X			X	X		X			
Hungerford	X		X	X		X	X				X	X					
Harley	X		X	X		X	X			X		X					X
Lytton			X	X		X	X	X			X	X					
Holland	X		X	X		X	X				X						
Pye			X	X								X				X	

% of Commit-  
ee-men among  
activists

%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
20	10	25	14	16	20	12	20	15	10	17	20	27	0	20	15	22	

Middle Party Group

Glyn	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Barrington	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Pym	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X
Holles	X		X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X
Erle	X		X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X			X	X
Hampden	X		X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X			X	X
Fiennes	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X				X	X
Gerrard	X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X						X
Hotham		X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X				
Stapleton	X							X		X	X						X
Mountford	X		X	X		X	X	X									X
Goodwyn	X		X	X		X				X	X						X
Whitelock	X			X				X					X	X			X
Goodwyn J.	X		X	X		X	X	X									
Irby				X		X		X									
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
20	60	25	13	16	20	20	20	22	25	25	20	33	25	40	40	40	

TABLE II

War Party Group

Name.	Defence	Navy	Finance	Petitions	London	Religion	Justice	Recusants	Privilege	Kings Army	Scotland	Ireland	Scottish Visit	Stafford	Adjournment	Remonstrance	19 Prop-ositions
Marten	X		X	X		X			X	X	X						X
Strode	X		X	X					X		X		X				X
Haselrig	X		X	X		X					X						X
Vane Jr.	X	X			X						X		X		X		X
St. John	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X			X			X
Prideaux	X		X	X	X	X		X					X				
Rigby	X		X	X		X			X								

% of "committee-men" among activists	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	12	10	12	8	16	10	6	5	7	0	4	10	17	12	0	8	20

Peace Party Group

Selden	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	
Maynard	X		X	X		X			X					X		X	
D'Ewes	X			X		X	X		X		X		X				
Pierrepoint	X		X	X		X					X	X					X
Palmer			X	X		X		X	X				X				
Grimston				X			X	X	X				X	X	X		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	5	10	6	7	0	8	20	11	10	7	4	4	10	25	20	15	4

Later Royalists

Culpepper	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X
Whistler			X	X		X	X		X				X				
Hyde			X	X		X	X	X		X				X			
Falkland	X			X		X		X	X				X	X		X	
Dering				X		X		X	X				X	X			
Belassize				X				X	X	X	X		X	X			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	3	0	6	7	0	8	20	11	8	10	8	2	20	20	0	25	4