



**A TRANSCENDENT LEBANESE IDENTITY:
MORE THAN A MIRAGE?**

Minerva Nasser-Eddine
BA[Hons], MA, Grad.Dipl in Bus.Ent.

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Politics Department
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
The University of Adelaide

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
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
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11 The Middle East and Maghrib in 1988.

Source: A History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani,
Faber & Faber, London, 1991.



Source: Hezbollah Born With A Vengeance by Hala Jaber
Columbia University Press, NY, 1993.

Glossary

Nobility	<i>zuama</i>
Noble/Lord	<i>za'em</i>
Learned	<i>Ulama</i>
Fertile Crescent	<i>Al Mashreq</i>
Taxes	<i>jizya</i>
North Africa	<i>Al Maghreb</i>
Gulf	<i>Al Khaleej</i>
The Arab Nation	<i>Al umma al-Arabiyya</i>
Government House	<i>diwan amire</i>
Resurrection	<i>Al Baath</i>
Ignorance	<i>jahiliya</i>
Authenticity	<i>turath</i>
The World of Islam	<i>Dar il Islam</i>
State Nationalism	<i>Qatreya</i>
Arab National identity	<i>Qawmiyya</i>

Abstract

Comprising both theoretical and empirical components, this thesis attempts to convey how the conceptualization of interests, identifications, boundaries, historical forces and tensions in the pre-20th Century Arab world persist today among new forms of internationally recognized states and regional organisations. The central actor is Lebanon and the thesis examines its progress towards becoming a 'nation-state' with its own unique culture and identity, and its aspiration to be politically and economically independent. In reality, however, the interests held by other nation-states concerning Lebanon's geo-strategic position often results in their resistance to Lebanon's independent political development.

This study investigates contemporary resonances in the new globalised era of identifications and conceptions of political boundaries, which originally appeared in pre-20th Century Arab world. This thesis argues that within a 'supra-nationalising' 'Middle Eastern' or regional entity, neither national identity nor nationalism have disappeared as cultural and political phenomena. Rather they persist and manifest in variable forms at popular and elite levels. The basis for the region's fragmented or only partial unity, is due primarily to the failure of the decolonisation project, of which, post-war Lebanon stands as a quintessential case in point. Lebanon is torn between primordial indices and on the other hand balancing a delicate confessional equation, and remains geo-strategically entwined in the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Conversely it exhibits a desire to drive the region into the globalised era of competition, freedom, democracy and development.

Declaration

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan and photocopying.

Minerva Nasser-Eddine

December 24, 2003
Date

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INTRODUCTION

"...The only way out is by thinking, rigorously, *about* our pasts".

- Leela Gandhi

Comprising both theoretical and empirical components, this thesis attempts to convey how the conceptualization of interests, identifications, boundaries, historical forces and tensions in the pre-20th Century Arab world persist today among new forms of internationally recognized states and regional organisations. The central actor is Lebanon and the thesis examines its progress towards becoming a 'nation-state' with its own unique culture and identity, and its aspiration to be politically and economically independent. In reality, however, the interests held by other nation-states concerning Lebanon's geo-strategic position often results in their resistance to Lebanon's independent political development.

This study investigates contemporary resonances in the new globalised era of identifications and conceptions of political boundaries, which originally appeared in pre-20th Century Arab world. This thesis argues that within a 'supra-nationalising' 'Middle Eastern' or regional entity, neither national identity nor nationalism have disappeared as cultural and political phenomena. Rather they persist and manifest in variable forms at popular and elite levels. The challenge Arabs face is to reconcile their primordial, Arab and state identifications with the emerging regional and global ones. The basis for the region's fragmented or only partial unity, is due primarily to the failure of the decolonisation project, of which, post-war Lebanon stands as a quintessential case in point. Lebanon is torn between primordial indices and on the other hand delicately balancing the interests of groups primarily identifying by religious affiliation. Conversely it exhibits a desire to drive the region into the globalised era of competition, freedom, democracy and development.

This thesis will argue that it is imperative that a nation-state create and maintain a cohesive inclusive national identity to successfully achieve decolonisation. It is with the consideration of these aforementioned challenges that examination of the question of political identity emerged as an important factor in the future shaping of the 'Middle East' and particularly the Arabic speaking nations. Is a national [Lebanese] or regional ['Middle Eastern'] identity desirable? If so, why? What effect does it have on the individual, community, nation and ultimately the region? And does globalisation impact on the overall development of political identity? And more importantly why is this important to Lebanon, Arabs or the region?

What role have colonial constructs played in aiding political culture in Lebanon and the region? In turn, what impact has these social and political constructs had on countries such as Lebanon?

This thesis has several aims. The first is to consider the development of political identity in the 'Middle East', particularly within the Arabic speaking countries, and how the concept of multiple identities affects an individual's private and public attitude towards political issues. A second aim is to examine the relationship between this development of identity and globalisation and how global processes influence post-colonial nation building. Finally, the Lebanese case study informs the examination of these issues by exploring whether a cohesive decolonised political identity exists in post-war Lebanon. If this proves not to be the case, could a decolonised Lebanese national identity emerge in the 21st Century out of the current political system and the multiplicity of identities found in Lebanon? The thesis aims to highlight the complexities of national identity formation in the 'Middle East' with particular focus on Lebanon.

The 'Middle East': What's in a Term?

The region commonly known as the 'Middle East' is vast and sparse in its definition and composition. Scholars, governments, and non-governmental organisations have their own definition excluding and including certain countries. Such definitions vary according to politics, economy, culture and geographic location. The definition that will be adopted throughout this research encompasses twenty-three states or representation, three of these being non-Arab – Israel, Turkey, and The Islamic Republic of Iran. The Arab states are: the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, Iraq, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, The Arab Republic of Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Palestinian representation, Sudan, Djibouti and Mauritania.

In addition, the region has been further divided into sub-regions. Three of which hold prominence: *Al Khaleej* (the Gulf), *al Mashriq* (the Fertile Crescent), and *al Maghreb* (North Africa).

Some definitions of the 'Middle East' region commence with Egypt and expand eastward including the three non-Arab countries. While other definitions selectively include and/or exclude Sudan, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Malta and the newly independent countries of Central Asia as being an integral part of the 'Middle East'.

Throughout this research the initial definition of the 'Middle East' given will be utilised unless otherwise indicated. This definition, like all definitions, is to some extent arbitrary. The area defined in this way is consistent with the definition given by the United Nations and the Arab League. These twenty-three countries can be justifiably constructed together, because they have a shared common history and geography, and in most cases shared language, religion and culture.

The region has historically been one accustomed to occupation, colonisation, imperialism and domination; some of the major players have been: the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians, the Turks, English, French, Italians, and now the Americans. It has seen many Empires and peoples arise in this vast geographic area. Some of which are: the Sassanids, the Umayyads, the Abassids, the Fatimads, the Mamluks, the Pharoahs, the Phoenicians, the Caanites, the Ayyubids, and the Ottomans. All contributed to the nature of the region, and its identity, as well as to the sciences, and the arts and philosophy as we know them today.

The region is the birthplace of the three major monotheistic religions -- Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Its geo-strategic location falls at the crossroads of three continents - - Europe, Africa and Asia -- which are rich with resources such as oil, natural gas, minerals and fertile agricultural land. The latter is found largely in *Al Mashriq*, which is now commonly known as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian lands and Iraq.

According to UN figures the population of the region in 1997 was 386.3 million people, of whom 252.4 million were of Arabic background.¹ Arabic is the language spoken by the majority of the population, and most identify with Arab culture and tradition. Most are adherents of Islam, although many racial and ethnic groups coexist in this area of the world, for example, Berbers, Copts, Armenians, Kurds, Christians and Jews, as well as

¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1999*, NY & Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 197-200.

many small Muslim sects. Geographically, almost 85% of the land mass is made up of desert and vast mountainous steppes, which is inhabited by approximately 5% of the total population by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes.

The term 'Middle East' has been adopted in the past eighty years to describe this region of the world. Initially the term was targeted towards countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as they were geographically located in the middle of the continent of Asia that is, situated between the Near East and the Far East in relation to Europe. The 'Near East' encompassed *Al Mashriq* countries, whilst the 'Far East' was reserved for the countries in farthest respect to Europe. As the British Empire expanded, notably after World War One, the term 'Middle East' slowly enlarged to encompass the area, as it is known today; as a result, the terms 'Near' or 'Far East' are rarely used.

Language is conditioning, and arguably so is the colonisation of culture. Metaphoric terms such as the 'Middle East', usually always has a bearing on the social and political reality, which in turn extends the arms of power, domination and control, and de-emphasises rival or alternative interpretations along the way.² With the creation of the Jewish state, Israel, the term 'Middle East' was applied commonly by Western and Israeli scholars, the media and governments. Many Arabist and Arab scholars (eg. Ahmad Bahaeddine, Mohammed Hossenian Heikal, Talal Salman, George Hawee, Abdullah Imam) refuse to use such terminology. They argue that use of the term submits to a Western Imperial construct, which conditions the Arab populace to 'misremember' the fact that the region is predominantly 'Arab' or 'Islamic'. By accepting this conditioning, the region's dominant cultural identity is being altered and subjected to Western cultural domination. Ibrahim Alloush argues, if the terms Arab or Islamic world/region are utilised, 'Israel' would not belong to either definition since it neither fits into the Arab world nor the Islamic world. According to Alloush the term is often used by, "mainstream media to dilute the essential identity [of] the region, and thus make room for what would have been recognized otherwise as nothing but a foreign occupation, physically and culturally".³

² Toine van Teeffelen's, "Metaphors and the Middle East: Crisis Discourse on Gaza", in *The Decolonisation of Imagination*, edited by Pieterse and Parekh, Zed Books, London, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1995, pp. 113-125, p. 14.

³ Ibrahim Alloush, "Yes, We Support Peace in the Middle East", *The Free Arab Voice Newsletter*, 21 March 1998. Reprinted from Arab Journal and Bir Zeit Society Newsletter.

Therefore, as a concept, the term 'Middle East' continues to be considered colonially imposed by many of the region's inhabitants. This is the case for a number of reasons. First, contemporary national borders were constructed in accordance with British and French colonial designs. The centralisation of Europe on the map indicates Europe's inbuilt fascination towards self-absorption and importance. As a result, enforcing the Oriental perception that the West is the creator of world civilisation.⁴ Hence, as conquerors, Europeans claimed themselves as the centre of the earth, while the vanquished were consigned to the periphery, and their lands and peoples dominated by Imperial colonising powers. The term and its construct, therefore, has connotations of European colonial domination of the region.

Second, Orientalists have long attempted to deconstruct the contributions the Orient has made to Western civilisation, by misconstruing and misrepresenting the peoples of the region as savages, regressive, despotic, etc. These derogatory labels imply subservience, wastefulness and incompetence.⁵ Such negative and stereotypical images of Arabs and Muslims regularly surface in Western discourse, which in turn has influenced the perceptions of upcoming generations, both regionally and internationally. By imputing negative qualities to the Arab identity, Orientalists as well as some Arab 'Westoxicated' regimes, have distorted indigenous Arab identity. One result is the weakening of personal pro-cultural national Arab or Muslim identity, and a shift towards a personal or state-national form of identification.⁶ On the other hand, others adopt the language of internationalisation and identify themselves as 'Middle Easterners' in anticipation of a new regional order emerging in the wake of peace in the region.

The colonisation of culture and Arab mentality via European colonisation, infiltration and misrepresentation has been successful to varying degrees. Since the beginning of the 20th Century Western governments have sought to infiltrate and diminish the Arab collective soul and identity. As succeeding chapters will indicate, Western culture, ideology, goods, expertise and capital flood the Arab market and considerably affect the Arab psyche. This

⁴ See J.B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power", *The Iconography of Landscape*, ed. D. Cosgrove and S. Daniels. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 277-312.

⁵ The word 'West' or 'Western' is intended to connote the prevailing political institutions and cultural values. It is not intended to refer to the West as a monolith.

⁶ This is not to imply that Arabists have not in turn reversed Orientalism into a form of Occidentalism, whereby the West is subjected to explicit over-generalisations and the politics of blame, as well as considered as a homogenic entity. For such readings see the works of Omar Talsallami, from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, Sudan; or Khomeini, Iran.

allows the continued domination of the region's markets and natural resources. By undermining traditional indigenous culture and political development the West is guaranteeing its own long-term domination of the area.⁷

Meanwhile, many Arab critics consider the use of the term 'Middle East', and most especially its promotion as a viable economic entity which emerged at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, as an Israeli-Zionist construct suited to the economic and political domination of the region. Such a blueprint exists in Shimon Peres' book *The New Middle East*, and is manifested in the 'peace' process to date. Considering Arab opinion of the term 'Middle East' and the perhaps coincidental title of Peres' book, many Arabs consider the term to be an imperial construct ready to dominate the majority of the region's inhabitants, supporting Zionist ideals. It is not only the title that provokes such views but the underlying vision of Israeli dominance outlined in the book's ideology.

Alternative terms [and constructs] that can be utilised are the Arab east (*al-mashreq al-'arabi*) and the Arab west (*al-maghreb al-'arabi*) which cover *al-'alam al'arabi* (the Arab world) or *al-watan al-'arabi* (the Arab fatherland or nation).

State boundaries have operated effectively in implementing and maintaining the colonial policy of the Europeans. Regional rulers themselves have often been complicit in maintaining these borders in order to legitimise their own rule. The production of the map, which represents space, enclosure, and borders, also administers a form of hierarchization amongst nation states and the intensification of colonial and imperial powers in the region.⁸ The arbitrary borders implemented by colonising powers at the end of World War One represented European national interests and a version of how this region of the world 'ought' to be, which ultimately further empowered 'Western' decision makers. Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct the Eurocentric formation and understanding of the world map so that the flaws of such discourse can be examined. If this is successfully undertaken, a form of 'decolonisation' of the map occurs, challenging colonial discourse and the concepts of 'sameness' and 'universal history'.⁹

⁷ See Alloush, "Yes, We Support Peace in the Middle East", *The Free Arab Voice*, March 1988.

⁸ Huggan, "Decolonising the Map", *Ariel*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 1989, pp. 115-131, p.115.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

This thesis will adopt Wilson Harris' theory calling for the deconstruction of the social text of European colonialism. By doing so, a path towards 'reconstruction' of post-colonial Arab culture emerges. Although colonial constructs of the past may seem inflexible and dominant, these very constructs can be utilised for the development of cultural transformation and as a medium for the revision of cultural history.¹⁰ Without post-colonial countries challenging colonial constructs, by either deconstructing or reconstructing them, these countries will remain a pawn in the larger Imperial structure of domination and manipulation. Throughout this study, it will be outlined how crucial it is for the concept of borders and the reconstruction of the region to be critiqued, if true peace and stability is to eventuate in the 21st Century.

This thesis will demonstrate how identifications chosen for themselves by people of this region, are being constantly challenged by domestic, regional and foreign players. Not only does the region have a long history of foreign intervention but modern day challenges include multi-lateralism, regionalism and globalisation, and threats to nation-state sovereignty.

The Challenge to State Sovereignty

Since the creation of the Westphalian state system national sovereignty has been desired and closely protected. However, sovereignty, in any particular country, is always subject to the pressures of the national interests of neighbouring states and other external factors. Nor have states fully administered cross-border monetary movements. Formerly colonised states rarely enjoy the sovereignty as promised by state independence. Globalisation is challenging traditional territorialism and hence state sovereignty. The rapid pace of technological development and especially the speed of transmission of information are making the most advanced nations unable to monitor every communication within and across its permanent borders. World money supply and exchange are determined by trans-border association or global companies rather than governments. States have come to the realisation that they single handedly cannot control the global space infiltrating their borders, let alone cover all trans-border relations.¹¹ Hence just as culture and identity are malleable, sovereignty has also proven to be pliant in the globalised era, urging some to offer new terms of reference for post-sovereign governance.¹²

¹⁰ Harris, *Explorations: A Selection of Talks and Articles 1966-81*, Mundelstrup: Dangaroo P, 1981.

¹¹ Sholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 2000, pp. 136-137.

¹² *Ibid.*, cites Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, MA: Lexington Books, 1989,

Multilateralism

With most nation states unable or unwilling to undertake unilateral actions, multilateralism has increasingly since the 1960s taken form as representative of the changing nature of states. Consequently, connectedness has transpired between local communities, provincial governments, inter and intra-state, regionally and internationally and all of which overlay, interact and interconnect with one another. With the multi-faceted nature of multi-lateralism and through the global reach of communications and finance, multilateral bodies have the ability to bypass communities, governments and states, while sustaining operations in accordance with their policies. This places further strain on the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty.

With accelerated globalisation came the establishment of multilateral bodies such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area), GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) just to name a few. All have highlighted a need to establish regional or cross-territorial projects transcending local laws and institutions, markets and supra-state identities. In some instances these multilateral organisations have to a certain degree acquired autonomy from states, while in other cases, such as the European Union (EU), regimes have required accountability from member states and this is reflected in institutions such as the EU Parliament, Central Bank and Court of Justice.

It is becoming increasingly evident that regionalisation and globalisation are interconnected and complementary.¹³ Technology, transport, communications, economic and financial markets and trans-border consciousness have all made this possible. In juxtaposition the advent of multi-lateralism and regionalism can also be viewed as protection against the negative aspects of globalisation, particularly the imposition of global cultures, capitalism, free trade and immigration through the existence of supra-state governance of the WTO (World Trade Organisation), IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank agencies. Regardless of the main instigating factors behind such multilateral movements it could not have been possible without local, national and regional participation and overall consensus of the collective will, particularly in the case of the EU.

¹³ Ibid., p. 147.

Regionalism in World Politics

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the resurgence of regionalism on an international scale. Many regional organisations were developed in the 1960s and were largely ineffective. However, they have suddenly found themselves being courted by non-member states and challenged by other regional entities.

Many proponents of regionalism today argue that each individual country needs to devise new forms of cooperation by setting aside the national ego, in order for competitiveness and regional success to triumph.¹⁴ Is the 'Middle East' politically mature enough to reach such a level and look towards encompassing their assets and resources to benefit the region as a whole rather than solely on individual and national interests?

The concept of regionalism today appears to differ from that of the 1960s and 1970s. Previously, there was greater emphasis on ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage and economic, political and organisational cohesiveness. This was most evident in the case for pan-Arabism. However, today the general success of the European Union demonstrates that the above 'natural' points of cohesion do not necessarily need to be present for a regional entity to be successfully established.

The most significant requirement for the success of any future regional entity is that "political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region is [as] critical: all regions are socially constructed and hence politically constructed".¹⁵ It is the ability to construct support for, and popularism towards, an entity such as the 'new Middle East', which will determine the success or failure of this concept being accepted by the region's inhabitants.

Andrew Hurrell divides the contemporary debate on regionalism into five broad categories: Regionalisation, regional awareness and identity, regional inter-state cooperation, state-promoted regional economic integration and regional cohesion.¹⁶

¹⁴ Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, 1995, pp. 331-358, p. 334.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-338.

Regionalisation largely depends on the economic and social interaction and integration of a given region generally referred to as 'informal integration' or 'soft regionalism'. Emphasis is placed on regional economic interdependence, economic regionalisation, intra-firm trade, regional networks, alliances and integration that work towards creating a trans-national regional civil society.¹⁷ Former Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, and many proponents of a 'Middle East union' are working towards such a definition of regionalisation, where emphasis lies on economic integration and interdependence.

Regional awareness and identity have proven to be difficult to ignore, whether through 'cognitive regions' or 'imagined communities' and have therefore become an important identifying point in many regional organisations.¹⁸ Emphasis lies on language, culture, shared history and religious traditions. Proponents of a common 'Middle East' need to work on the definition of regionalism and the concept of the 'Middle East' for it to become a successful entity. The perception of 'shared belonging' to the region needs to be developed. This perception can be defined against an external other – whether this is done on the basis of economic competition, political opposition or cultural superiority. The values and purpose of such an entity needs to be outlined. Also, myth making and historical rediscovery needs to be undertaken and created.¹⁹

Such an entity however will certainly have opponents due to the conflicting regional identities currently in force, and as outlined above, the term used to describe the region. Both sub-state and supra-state forms of identity will be challenged. This will take place on three distinct levels. First, the identity of the state will be threatened if advantages of joining a regional entity are not outlined early on and its national ego is perceived to be side-lined by a stronger partner(s). This has been demonstrated in past attempts at Arab unity. Secondly, Arab nationalists who have long envisaged such a union to take place between Arabic speaking countries will feel hostility towards a union enveloping non-Arab countries which have long been the enemy in their myth making process. Thirdly, perhaps even more hostile towards such an entity forming are the instigators of an Islamic *umma* who may consider forming such an entity with non-Islamic states as apostasy. This is especially

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

¹⁸ See Emanuel Adler, "Imagined Security Communities", Paper presented at 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1-4 September 1994; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, NY & London, 1991.

¹⁹ Hurrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-336.

the case where both Arab nationalists and Islamists have long considered Israel as the enemy in their myth making process and fought numerous wars against Israel. How this is to be overcome when working towards a common 'Middle East' is a crucial point and will be one of the main obstacles to be mastered towards attaining a successful union.

Regional inter-state cooperation involves the "negotiation and construction of inter-state or inter-governmental agreements or regimes' which can be both formally and informally institutionalised."²⁰ The debate continues regarding how much institutionalisation is necessary for a successful regional entity to function. Some argue that formal institutions are necessary but should be based on loose structures and regular meetings (APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum) rather than compulsory rules and conditions (EU). The purposes of such organisations vary from security to cooperating regional positions, to securing welfare policies and solving common social problems. In such a form of regionalism the state usually retains its role rather than being minimised by the central regional hub.²¹

Peres' blueprint for regionalism indicates its primary focus is on regional economic integration seeking the reduction or removal of trade barriers and the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and people within a safe and peaceful 'Middle East'. This is considered to be the first state of regional integration. However, what is more important is how successful this will be in developing regional cohesion and at some point in the future consolidated regional unity. Can the 'Middle East' play a role in defining relations between regional states and the international community, as well as develop policies to affect all sectors of public life within the region? If so, what is the 'end goal' of such an entity? Is the intention of this regional structure to form a new political community, or economic entity, or new regional superpower? And if any of these mentioned goals are selected, how do its supporters intend to bring about the necessary cohesiveness, trust and mutual relations in a region, which is full of decades long conflict, conspiracy theories, distrust and self-interest? In the immediate term, are the states composing the 'Middle East' politically mature to consider the development of a regional entity? What are the current dynamics which make-up their respective national political identities? How have past attempts of regionalisation panned out? Has a true post-colonial identity emerged in individual nation-

²⁰ Ibid., p. 336.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 336-337.

states allowing the progression towards regionalisation? This thesis seeks to answer the immediate term questions by examining, the dynamics of national identity construction in the Arab world, levels of political maturity and development, and to assess their success in the decolonisation project to date.

The Question of Political Identity

'Identity politics' tends to be articulated, constructed, invented and commodified 'top down', that is, by governments, and political, economic and social institutions. It is more formal, institutionalized and structured. The ruling elites attempt is "to mold collective identities, based on ethnicity, race, language and place, into relatively fixed and 'naturalised' frames for understanding political action and the body politic".²² The means justifies the political end. Closely linked to 'identity politics', if not at times overlapping is the 'politics of identity', which is more 'bottom up' in its application. Where locals "challenge, subvert, or negotiate culture and identity and contest structures of power and wealth that constrain their social lives".²³ It is more personal and communal in its outlook although malleable enough to be practiced in almost any social setting. The 'politics of identity' refers to "political practices and values that are based on subscription or ascription to various and often overlapping social and political identities.... Various political, economic and other social pressures that would mold collective identities based on ethnicity, race, language, and place are in reality contested and confounded by peoples' abilities to juggle multiple, often contradictory, identities".²⁴ Both the 'politics of identity' and 'identity politics' are related to one another, they do not exist in isolation from one another, and they manifest themselves on power relations.²⁵ It is with these notions that the following thesis will examine the level, strength and future development of the question of political identity in the region, and more closely within Lebanon.

Part One of this thesis will serve as an introduction to understanding the complexities of Lebanon's heterogeneous socio-political composition. This analysis is undertaken within the context of the creation of the modern 'Middle East' and the diversity found within the Arab world.

²² HILL Jonathan D., "Identity Politics and the Politics of Identities", *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, Vol 9, No 2, pp. 1-8, p. 1.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

²⁵ Ibid., p.4.

Arab political identity and culture has been affected by three prominent and broad identifications: primordialism (traditional, tribal, religious, sectarian, patriarchal and parochial forms of identity), Arab nationalism and state nationalism. These three identifications have, each, in turn, built onto existing variables and contributed to the formation of national identity. This overlaying of identities has consequently produced contradictory dynamics in nation building and inherently unstable foundations for the formation of any cohesive post-colonial national identity. This thesis argues that post-independent national identity in many Arab countries has been unsuccessful to date because of three underlying reasons, which are closely interconnected. These are based on the multiplicity of political-cultural identities in the region (particularly in the Arab world), international and intra-regional interference, and legitimacy problems in Arab politics.

Part One will be divided into three main chapters, commencing with a brief history of the creation of the modern 'Middle East', followed by detailing the prominent characteristics which have influenced, and continue to influence, the development of Arab national identity. Chapter 1 will seek to delineate the first of these three factors by examining conflicting socio-political characteristics within a historical context, and discuss their relevance to contemporary Arab political culture. In turn, this will highlight one of the major complexities of national identity formation in the Arab world and especially in the case of Lebanon. Chapter 1 will outline the ideological conflict between primordial, Arab, and state nationalisms and identities. During the time of independence, or directly after post-independence, a form of coherent and unifying national identity was invoked. However, in most cases this was not developed post-independence. Conflicting notions of national identity arose. This resulted in a form of neo-traditionalism in which political identity neither discarded its primordial characteristics nor fully developed. Instead of developing a post-national decolonised identity, an unbalanced, debilitating and destabilising paradigm emerged.

The second chapter will examine, why decolonisation has been unsuccessful in the Arab world by examining the failures of the construction of post-independence national identity. It will argue these factors have led to an overall crisis of legitimacy, i.e., 'the nation' is unsustainable due to the absence of a developed national identity. This section will demonstrate the importance of creating a cohesive national identity, especially in the case of Lebanon, which endured 17 years of bloodshed. Creating and maintaining a cohesive

national identity is fundamental to successful decolonisation. Such identity is required for successful passage to sovereignty, independence, development and full participation in the international community. Chapter 2 expands the thesis that post-independence national identity in many Arab countries has been unsuccessful to date because of three underlying factors: the contradictions raised by multiple regional political-cultural identities; regional and international intervention; and legitimacy problems in Arab politics. The second part of this chapter will outline the importance of strengthening national identity.

Chapter 3 will consider one of the fast paced challenges facing the region – globalisation. Particular emphasis will be on the Arab-Islamic perspective to this phenomenon which has been unexplored in Western circles because of language barriers. This chapter will seek to outline Arab thought and reaction to the worldwide phenomenon known as 'globalisation' and in particular cultural globalisation. The Arab-Islamic view, generally overlooked in the West, challenges the proposition that globalisation is culturally inclusive. In order to understand this phenomenon the changing face of the international political system needs to be briefly examined. Particularly how the political concepts of localism, statism, and regionalism are impacting on the overall acceptance, or rejection, of globalisation, how this impacts on notions of state sovereignty and national identity, and whether there is a possibility in incorporating these different levels of political nuances in the 'globalised' world we reside in.

Whilst Part One identifies the major components in the historical and current development of the politics of identity in relation to the Arab 'Middle East' and why the decolonisation project has failed in the Arab world, Part 2 of the thesis seeks to bring together such findings within the context of Lebanon. Particularly when analysing the failure of decolonisation, which contributed to the disintegration of this nation-state through 17 years of civil war.

Part Two of the thesis is composed of four chapters. It seeks to demonstrate that the independence, development and sovereignty of Lebanon and its citizens lie within its comprehension of history. Part 2 will provide an indication of how such changes can transpire. As a result, the true 'liberation', sovereignty and freedom of the Lebanese citizen will occur which will inevitably contribute to the success or failure of regional identifications such as being a 'Middle Easterner' from developing.

Chapter 4 will demonstrate that awareness of the political history of Lebanon especially the development of Lebanese national identity over the years will bring Lebanese society to understand its future. This chapter will demonstrate that the competing paradigms of identity within the Arab world, as outlined in Part One, encompass the vitality and contradictory nature of Lebanese national identity more explicitly than its Arab counterparts. Lebanon seeks to be independent, sovereign and unique. However, primordial factors and external influences are exceptionally pro-active in Lebanon, contributing to the violent and explicit failure of national identity construction. The purpose of this chapter is to outline two important aspects contributing to the contemporary development of Lebanese political and cultural identity. In order to understand the development and current debate about Lebanese national identity it is necessary to first analyse the historical process of its development, and secondly to acknowledge the main socio-political factors impeding the formation of such an identity. Therefore, what is called for is the re-examination of past notions of national identity and how they relate to post-war Lebanese national identity.

Chapter 5 analyses whether the knowledge gained from Lebanon's political history has indeed been noted in post-Taef²⁶ Lebanon, or whether the same mistakes are being repeated. This chapter will argue that in Lebanon's case the problem is not so much with the political system of consociational democracy *per se*, but more so with the distribution of power and infiltration of the political system by the political and/or religious leaders themselves. The political structure of the Republic will be closely examined. Political history in Lebanon has demonstrated there is little room for political reform if it is not in the interests of the domestic powerbrokers. Their continued stranglehold over political development suppresses real political competition, which in turn is detrimental to political reform and ultimately successful nation building. Ultimately, this leads to the question of legitimacy of the political infrastructure and framework and hence the leaders themselves.

Chapter 6 outlines survey results undertaken in Lebanon in 1998. This chapter will detail the results pertaining to Lebanese socio-political issues pre and post-war Lebanon. As noted earlier this thesis has several aims. The first is to consider the development of political identity in the 'Middle East' and how the concept of multiple identities affects an individual's private and public attitude towards political issues. Particular focus is to

²⁶ The 1989 Taef Agreement brought about the ceasefire agreement to Lebanon's long and bloody war. This thesis will focus on the socio-political developments within Lebanon during the time period of 1989 to 2000.

examine whether a cohesive decolonised Lebanese political identity could emerge in the 21st Century out of the multiplicity of identities found in Lebanon. A second aim is to examine the relationship between the development of political identity and globalisation, and how global processes influence post-colonial nation building. Finally, in view of global development and the increasing shift towards regionalisation, this thesis investigates whether a common 'Middle East' entity is possible in the immediate future considering the region's current political climate. With these questions in mind a survey was developed to gain insight into these issues in terms of how they related to Lebanon. This chapter analyses the results of this fieldwork. The results will indicate the extent to which a cohesive Lebanese national identity remains after the 17-year civil conflict and the Taef Agreement.

The basis of the questionnaire was to ascertain the thoughts of tertiary students pertaining to the dominant themes of this thesis: identity, nation building, globalisation and regional integration. Of particular interest was examining how students answered question one, which required them to select from a list of 27 different identities (ranging from religion-sect to political party affiliation to ethnic identification) their five most dominant identifiable identities. The exercise was undertaken to examine the fluidity of students' ability to adopt the concept of multiple identities and how this in turn reflected in their answers thereafter. In particular, whether nation-building and regional integration are difficult to attain within a globalised world and a state identifying with a multiplicity of identities.

Although this is a small sample, the results reflect the public perception and discourse of Lebanon and its citizens. Has the civil war tainted our perception of the Lebanese? Has a consensus been reached that Lebanese are not capable of identifying themselves along nationalistic lines? Will the Lebanese continue to be perceived as the regressive, tribal and the fanatical 'Other'?

Chapter 7 will analyse how past notions of national identity relate to post-war Lebanese national identity and its development. This chapter therefore seeks to outline some necessary starting points in creating a post-national identity in Lebanon. It will be divided into two segments. The first will cover the need for nation building components, the second the deconfessionalisation of the state to allow unity and inclusiveness of all its citizens.

National identity is forged by knowledge and memory. In order to think with our national identities and memories, a sustainable, cohesive, and inclusive construct needs to exist to nourish the existence of a nation-state. By "thinking, rigorously, about our past" we begin.

Part 1

In Search of Political Identity: The Politicisation of the 'Middle East' & its People

CHAPTER 1

The Dynamics of National Identity: The Creation of the 'Modern Middle East'

This thesis will examine the ramifications of regional identity and developments on Lebanese political and cultural identity. It is essential, therefore, to briefly outline the laborious and conscious quest of national identity construction amongst the region's inhabitants, in order to gauge comprehensively the internal dynamics of Lebanese national identity. This chapter provides a brief history of the creation of the 'modern Middle East' and its impact on contemporary Arab political culture and identity.²⁷

1.1 Domination of a Region: Ottoman Occupation & European Colonisation

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire began in the mid-14th Century and by the mid-17th Century had occupied or controlled most of the Arab world with ultimate decision making lying with the Ottoman Turks, not the Arab subjects. Nonetheless, limited local autonomous regions existed, such as in Egypt and Syria, which developed into territorial power groupings, and in some cases saw the emergence of influential Arab nationalist movements.

The spread of the Ottoman Empire was undertaken by systematic conquest. For example, Algiers was absorbed in 1520, Tunis in 1574, Damascus in 1516, while Baghdad was not integrated into the Empire until 1638. Ottoman control varied from region to region. For instance, Ottoman occupation was short-lived in Egypt but remained in *Al Mashreq*, excluding Baghdad, for almost four centuries. Ottoman provinces had to report directly to Istanbul and were deliberately isolated from the outside world. Like European colonisation, Ottoman occupation varied: ranging from direct control (the Syrian provinces of Aleppo,

²⁷ This study does not aim to give a detailed account of the socio-political history of the 'Middle East'. For detailed historical accounts see the vast literature available Barakat, Hourani, Salibi, Khalidi, Khoury, Antonious, Hudson.

Damascus and Tripoli; Jerusalem and Hebron in Israel, Sidon in Lebanon; the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and Egypt, particularly Cairo); to indirect control, which was most notable in the early 16th Century (Egypt, Hijaz and Jeddah, Yemen, Tunis, Algiers, and in later years Tripoli, Kabylia mountains, Sahara, Mzab oasis).

The defining socio-political factors during this period were predominantly based on primordial identification. One aspect of primordialism adheres to communal politics and/or the rule of nobility that continues today. This is not unique to the Arab world and can be found also, for example, on the Indian subcontinent. It needs also to be acknowledged that these conditions were present prior to the emergence of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the centuries-long enforcement and promotion of the rule of nobility and communal politics, particularly in the later years of the Empire, negatively affected Arab societies by integrating such factors into the public psyche, especially in heterogeneous societies such as Lebanon.

The Ottomans gained political legitimacy within their Empire and from the Islamic world by possessing all the holy sites of Islam. They maintained borders, and collected taxes on produce, urban-industrial activities, and individuals (*jizya*); a tax paid by non-Sunna inhabitants. While chiefly leaving everyone to their own community identifications.

Political integration was not achieved during the Ottoman Empire; the Empire was created from a mixture of nationalities, languages, religions and ethnicities, and was unable to achieve a coherent economic policy. The six centuries of Ottoman rule saw many changes, such as the inequality between Sunna Muslims and minorities (pre-1800), to the enforcement of the doctrine of equality (post-1800).²⁸ Another political development saw the transition of power from the Sultan's monopoly to an oligarchy of civil officials. This, in turn, gave rise to extended levels of competition for power and advancement and increased levels of corruption and bureaucracy, which have survived the vast changes in the region. These factors contributed to the internal decay of the Ottoman Empire, as did its failure to win the 'Great Game' rivalries, and blunderingly backing the wrong side in the

²⁸ For more detail see Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", pp. 61-81 in Hourani et. al., *The Modern Middle East*, University of California Press, Berkeley & LA, 1993.

First World War. The Empire became increasingly isolated internationally which advanced its demise and the European incursion of the Empire.

European contact with the Arab world largely began in the 18th Century through a number of indirect channels, namely: commerce, contact with local powers and Christian communities, and the establishment of consuls. More directly, Napoleon was battling the British in Egypt in the 1790s, the French occupied Algeria in 1830 and were keen to expand their Empire, while the British were initially primarily concerned with access to India and the Mediterranean (first by sea and land, and in later years by air). Like the French, the Italians and the Spanish were attempting to introduce settler colonisation in their new entities; this was mainly the case in *Al Maghreb*, impacting negatively on the majority of the region's indigenous population.²⁹ European nations began courting the Arab peoples and were planning to overthrow the 'sick man' of Europe by the early 20th Century, although this was not fully accomplished until after the conclusion of the First World War.

The 19th and 20th Centuries saw the formalised colonisation of the 'Middle East' by Europeans, especially the French and English. During the First World War the British and the French made a series of conflicting political promises to the peoples of the 'Middle East', and changed the region's geo-political map. Initially, the involvement of European powers was welcome. Most Arabs were willing to set aside the bloody history of the Crusades and accept European assurances of attaining independence, and systematically allowing for the development of Arab-state national identity in place of Ottoman-Islamic identity.

Numerous events, however, soured the development of these relations, in particular, the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. An agreement which divided the Arab east between Britain and France. Arabs considered this move by the Europeans as an act of deception. The McMahon correspondence of 1915 and 1916, which promised Arabs independence in

²⁹ For the impact of French colonisation on Algeria see Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, Penguin, London, 1961; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; Bugeaud, *France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society*, Tr. by Sullivan, Archon Books, 1983; Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon & the Psychology of Oppression*, Plenum Press, NY, 1985; Gifford & Louis, *France and Britain In Africa: Imperial Rivary and Colonial Rule*, Yale University Press, USA, 1971; Gordan, *The Passing of French Algeria*, Oxford University Press, London, 1966; Pickles, *Algeria & France: From Colonialism to Cooperation*, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1963; Roberts, *The History of French Colonial Policy 1870-1925*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1963; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, Indiana University Press, USA, 1992.

return for a revolt against the Ottomans by the tribes of Hijaz, was considered to have primarily benefited the Europeans, by replacing one foreign power with another. The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the spoils of the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire -- France's share was modern day Syria and Lebanon, and Britain's share consisted of Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. A little over a year later, the Balfour Declaration was announced, which many Arabs considered as the final stages of Western domination of the region, promising Jews from around the world a homeland in Palestine.

Although some benefits did arise from colonisation, such as infrastructure construction, literacy, improved health conditions, and a taste of political liberalism, the overall result was a fundamental change to the traditional social, political and economic infrastructures. Most of the colonial political structures remain in place today, hindering development or, in some cases, causing underdevelopment.³⁰ On the economic front, for example, newly 'independent' Arab countries were still dependent on Western markets for manufactured goods, and continue to demonstrate such dependency.³¹

³⁰ Findlay, *The Arab World*, Routledge, London and NY, 1994, p. 34. A prime example of this will be illustrated in Chapter's 4 and 5. Lebanon's political system is based on the French imposed political pluralist system of confessionalism that not only bought about the underdevelopment of the political system but also its disintegration as reflected in the seventeen-year civil war.

³¹ For example, the following table outlines the export-import statistics of several Arab (oil producing and non-oil producing) countries and their reliance on foreign aid.

Country	Exports	Imports	External Debt	Economic Aid
Egypt	US\$7.3 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est.) Crude oil & petroleum, cotton, textiles, metal products, & chemicals	US\$17 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est.) Crude oil, machinery & equipment, foodstuffs, wood products, fuels.	US\$31 billion (2000 est.)	US\$2.25 billion (1999)
Jordan	US\$2 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est.) Phosphates, fertilisers, potash, agricultural products, & manufactured goods.	US\$4 billion (f.o.b. est.) Crude oil, machinery, transport equipment, food, live animals, & manufactured goods.	US\$8 billion (2000 est.)	US\$850 million (1996 est.)
Lebanon	US\$700 million Foodstuffs & tobacco, textiles, chemicals, precious stones, metal & metal products, electricity equipment & products, jewellery, paper & paper products.	US\$6.2 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est.) Foodstuffs, machinery & transport equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, textiles, metals, fuels, agricultural foods.	US\$9.6 billion (2000 est)	US\$3.5 billion (pledges 1997-2001)
Qatar	US\$9.8 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est) Petroleum products 80%, fertiliser & steel. 1996: US\$3752 m* 1997: US\$3949 m* 1998: US\$4137 m*	US\$3.8 billion Machinery & transport equipment, food, chemicals. 1996: US\$2868 m* 1997: US\$2790 m* 1998: US\$3069 m*	US\$13.1 billion (2000 est)	n/a
Syria	US\$4.8 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est) Petroleum 65%, textiles 10%, manufactured products 10%, fruit & veg. 7%, raw cotton 5%, live stock 2%, phosphates 1% (1998 est.)	US\$3.5 (f.o.b. 2000 est) Machinery & equipment 23%, foodstuffs/animals 20%, metal & metal products 20%, textiles 10%, Chemicals 10% (1998 est)	US\$22 billion	US\$199 m (1997 est)
UAE	US\$46 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est) Crude oil 45%, natural gas, re-exports, dried fish, dates	US\$34 billion (f.o.b. 2000 est) Machinery & transport, equipment, chemicals, food	US\$12.6 billion	n/a

Source: AME Info - The Ultimate Middle East Business Resource <http://www.ameinfo.com>

Furthermore, the formal creation of most states and borders in the region were designed as political tools for Western powers to exploit strategic or physical resources, particularly in *Al Khaleej* and *Al Mashreq*. The partitioning of the 'Middle East' had little regard for existing cultural entities, and hence fostered internal political instability due to unnatural border divisions. Numerous straight-line boundaries evidenced little regard for the cultural mosaic of the lands in question, as demonstrated by the borders of Iraq and Kuwait, Egypt and Sudan, Libya and Tunisia, and Syria and Iraq.³² The new state divisions divided former national groups such as the Kurds, and created political territories with heterogeneous mixtures, making it difficult for coherent relations between state and national identity to develop (Iraq, Lebanon and the Sudan).

The enforcement of unnatural boundaries upon the indigenous populations divided traditional ethnic, racial, and tribal groups, making future national cohesion a difficult and divisive task. The division of historic geographical entities also contributed to the economic underdevelopment of certain regions, thereby affecting the overall economic development of a given country. For example, the inclusion of Shi'ite dominated South Lebanon into 'Greater Lebanon' intensified the socio-economic gap amongst Lebanese citizens, while the creation of Kuwait landlocked Iraq. As a consequence, Iraq's economic development is in some respects subject to its neighbour's whims, an Iraqi grievance since Kuwait's inception, highlighted prior to and during the Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.³³

Such grievances, in turn, meant that the Arab states with the most unnatural boundaries were strongest in seeking independence and were powerful proponents of Arab and state nationalism. This was evident in the Arab East and, as will be demonstrated below, *Al Mashreq* became during the late Ottoman period the birthplace of modern day Arab nationalism. This political development was most evident after the Second World War when the European mandates were gaining independence and pan-Arab movements became more prominent.

STAT-USA on the internet. US Department of Commerce.

³² Findlay, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³³ This view was expressed by Iraqi officials, to the author on a field trip to Iraq in January 1994. Mr Mohammed Al-Duri, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and last Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations), Mr Chafic Sammarari, Ministry of Information, and Dr Al Eini, Politics Department, Baghdad University were a sample of Iraqis expressing such sentiments. Similar views have been expressed by Noam Chomsky, see Larissa MacFarquhar, "Life in the Left Lane", *Good Weekend*, June 21, 2003.

In addition, colonialism exemplified the strong feelings of distrust towards both non-Arab and Arab countries, although inter-Arab distrust is not a new phenomenon. It existed prior to Western colonialism - earmarked by tribal and primordial differences. The distrust, in turn, contributed to the political instability brought by Western intervention. These divisions, as well as others, were exacerbated via political, ethnic, geographic and economic differences in the modern 'Middle East'.

The artificial border divisions and the creation of Israel in the Arab heartland were the precursors of ongoing tension and conflict. For decades, the reality (as well as the pretext) of the creation of Israel in the land of Palestine diverted scarce physical and human resources towards the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than building and developing Arab nations politically, economically and socially. Political development and energy, human resources and state revenue were spent fighting this foreign implantation. This, to a significant degree, assisted in politically legitimising the Arab rulers.³⁴

Not only were Arab regimes forced to accept the reality of the new regional entity, but they also found themselves in a socio-political dilemma. That is, they realised that opposition by some segments of the community would arise if they were to directly accept or adopt Western socio-political ideas and constructs. On the other hand, by rejecting such constructs, there was the possibility of provoking other segments of society, which could act as an indirect catalyst for change within Arab society.³⁵ This highlights an 'inter-Arab' domestic problem, whereby ruling elites have been treading a fine line between retaining primordial traditional Arab political culture in juxtaposition to adopting more 'Western' liberal, politically modernising and democratic ideals.³⁶

The intensity of European colonisation of the Arab world differed according to the coloniser and its foreign policies, its patterns of control, the geographic location of the particular Arab state, and the effect on the social, economic and political infrastructures of Arab nations. This is further demonstrated in Hisham Sharabi's four typologies of European domination:

³⁴ Ibid. The concept of political legitimacy will be clearly defined and examined in Chapter 2.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁶ Future chapters will, however, demonstrate that both the regimes and external power brokers are primarily the key opponents of full democratisation and liberalisation because such changes would affect their power, interests and continued (direct and indirect) domination.

direct colonial domination, indirect rule in the form of protectorates, mandate relationships, and the 'exclusive' treaty relationship.³⁷

Direct colonial domination was most evident in Algeria (French), Libya (Italians), and Aden (British). Both Algeria and Libya were under direct colonial rule and exposed to unrestricted settlement by Europeans. Their indigenous communities were excluded from participation in the established governments and their basic rights were infringed, Aden, however, was not subject to colonial settlement. The French and British policy towards their subjects differed. The former considered it imperative to institute forced assimilation and maintain direct interference (with almost 1.5 million French settlers in North Africa by 1950). Britain, on the other hand, sought to exercise a less overt presence and did not have a policy of colonial settlement in the Arab world.

Upon Arab independence, former French territories retained a French-educated elite with few experienced administrators or technicians, while some of the former British territories had reasonably efficient administrative bureaucracies and trained civil servants.³⁸ However, this was not substantive; for example, the British courted their new subjects, particularly with selected prestigious families and wealthy merchants while the ordinary person did not always see or feel the benefits of British occupation. This was illustrated when Oman gained its independence and the British withdrew in 1971. The Omanis had little in the way of an educated work force or infrastructure, and had little political knowledge or experience beyond traditional ethnic practices.

The indirect and more flexible protectorate system of rule was implemented in Egypt, and Eastern and Western Aden by the British, by France in Morocco and Tunisia, and by Spain in Northern Morocco. Since the protectorate system considered foreign rule to be temporary and governmental, the political institutions of the territories were preserved within traditional forms of tribal government.

³⁷ Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, pp. 23-24.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Technically, in contrast, the Mandate System deemed the territories incapable of governing themselves, and therefore, were 'in need' of temporary 'guidance' towards self-rule and governance. This was largely the case in *Al-Mashreq*; which at the time was the most politically developed area of the Arab world. Although Sharabi argues that the indigenous leadership were able to practice certain political freedoms, this contention will be challenged in the following chapters that will argue that, in most instances, political 'freedom' was only permissible provided the Arabs endorsed European policy.

Sharabi's final typology encompassed the 'exclusive' treaty relationship as practiced by the British among Gulf States. Exclusive treaties were enacted between Britain and various families representing sheikhdoms in order to protect the territories. The British provided them with advice and aid, and handled their foreign relations via a 'Political Resident', 'Political Officers' and 'Political Agents'. Ultimately, these treaties were intended to protect Britain's economic, political and military interests in the area.

For instance, in order to protect its southern and western approaches to India, Britain secured an exclusive and privileged position along the coasts of Arabia in 1820 by signing anti-piracy treaties with the powerful families in the Gulf, from Bahrain to Ras al-Khayma (within the UAE and closest to Oman). Britain also worked toward closer ties with the Gulf territories as it feared the expansionist threat of Egypt's Mohammad Ali and his political leanings toward France. By 1853, the British made peace among the various Gulf entities, and in 1892 were given the exclusive right to administer the states' foreign relations in return for the titles of 'Emir', 'Sultanate' and 'King'. Therefore, although the local dynasties remained formal representatives of the Ottoman sultan they were 'protected' by foreign powers.³⁹

By the early 20th Century European domination was almost complete. Britain transformed its *de facto* occupation of Egypt into a *de jure* protectorate in 1914, Ottoman Libya was occupied by Italy in 1911, and the Moroccan Sultan had agreed to French protection in

³⁹ The act of establishing monarchs was maintained beyond the Gulf States, this was illustrated in well over half of the newly independent, or soon to be independent states, ie. Morocco, Tunisia (deposed in 1956), Egypt (deposed in 1952), Saudi Arabia (For instance, after extinguishing the domestic rebellions of Hijaz and Najd in the 1930s, Abd al-Aziz, better known as Ibn Saud, adopted the title of King of Saudi Arabia), North Yemen (deposed), Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya (deposed), Iraq (deposed) and Jordan.

1912. The remaining Arab provinces were divided among the British and the French; although most of the Arabian Peninsula was not subject to direct European rule.

The geo-political and strategic position of the region, as well as the benefits from commerce, trade, finance, industry and investments (to local governments, as well as towards the largely foreign owned and controlled public utilities), played a significant role in European interest in the Arab world. Also important was the export of the region's raw materials such as cotton, silks, wool, phosphate, energy, foodstuffs, including the benefits of investments, which were not reinvested in the region itself. Various forms of land confiscation took place in Algeria, Palestine, Egypt, and Tunisia, disrupting and in some cases replacing traditional local indigenous leaderships. Overall, European colonisation and interest in the Arab world was favourable to the Europeans, although certain regional minorities such as Christians, and Syrian and Iraqi Jews did play a dominant role in local and international trade.

By the time independence was sought and attained, European colonisation of *Al Mashreq* was minimal at the geo-political level in comparison to the colonisation of *Al Maghreb*. However, the legacy of Western influence and division of the region could not have been greater. This was demonstrated, amongst other factors, through the method of attaining independence. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria gained independence via national insurgency, whilst other countries achieved it by post-war settlement (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya), or negotiated agreement (Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan).⁴⁰

Although each country felt the impact of colonisation in differing ways, the above demonstrates the general comparative experiences of Arab countries in relation to regional domination by the Ottomans and the Europeans. Subsequently, each Arab state dealt distinctly with its own experiences of colonisation, according to its own internal political dynamics, economic resources and societal mix. Therefore, within this historical paradigm, emerging forms of political identity flourished locally, nationally, sub-regionally and regionally. It is within this context that Lebanon is examined as a case study. Lebanon is unique in that it is representative of most, if not all, the political and societal complexities

⁴⁰ Sharabi, op. cit. p. 43.

present in the Arab world. Unlike any other Arab nation, Lebanon is a microcosm of the region's state of affairs.

However, prior to entering into the affairs of Lebanon Part One of this thesis will examine the Dynamics of National Identity within an Arab regional context. Noted shared experiences that are representative of most post-independent Arab states.

1.2. Cultural Diversity: The Question of Political Identity

Ethnic groups exist in virtually all societies, whether as a majority or minority, or dominant and subordinate forms. They may also overlap any given boundaries of a nation state. Ethnic identification commonly arises from annexation, conquest or immigration resulting in one ethnic group becoming the dominant player by acquiring or being in possession of superior resources. Antagonism persists as one ethnic group fights to retain its position and others attempt to exceed theirs.⁴¹ It becomes a conflict of legitimacy between two or more groups.

Ethnic groups are bound by a sense of nationhood or shared destiny. They identify themselves along common descent, values, culture, territory, region, historical experience, religion, race, language-dialect, colour, social relations, and other primordial attributes that affirm the existence of a particular group through its uniqueness. Social mobility enters as a factor that destabilises ethnic unity, and at times results in closer links with other people of similar status, subsequently ensuing higher rates of heterogeneity and class stratification. The majority of ethnic groups are not monolithic but factional. However, their sense of shared destiny is reinforced when externally threatened. This in turn emphasises the relativity of ethnicity and national identity, and how the two may be reconciled when an entity is not composed of a dominant ethnic cleavage.

⁴¹ Peres, "Horizontal Integration and Vertical Differentiation Among Jewish Ethnicities In Israel", *Studies In Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering*, ed. by Alex Weingrod, Gordan and Breach Science Publications, New York, 1985, p. 42.

Almost every 'Middle Eastern' state has been affected by 'ethno-politics', which can be described as ethnicity dividing or separating a group or groups of people due to racial, cultural or historical characteristics and consequently forming political divisions in a struggle for political dominance. The remainder of this sub-chapter will demonstrate how ethno-politics has largely affected four areas of the political process: state formation, state legitimacy, mobilisation and state capacity, and state survival.

Since 1945 ethno-politics and conflicts have claimed some 16 million lives in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Although the Arab 'Middle East' comprises approximately 8% of the world population, some 25% of all the world's armed conflict since 1945 has been experienced in this part of the world.⁴² It is therefore important to acknowledge that the 'Middle East', whether as a predominantly Islamic entity or as an Arab dominant region, is not an ethno-cultural monolith, rather, it is one of the world's most multi-racial and multi-religious areas. Unlike any other country in the region Lebanon epitomises the region's mosaic of cultures. It is a unique Arab state in that it alone is home to the region's vast array of diversity and legally recognises nineteen ethnic and political cleavages. Thus, colonial state boundaries, conflicting ideologies, Arab rivalry and external provocation have been the basis of many of these conflicts within the region, including Lebanon, which in turn have affected the formation of national identity.

Unlike other cleavages such as class, occupation, and education, ethnic divisions are more complex than 'material-financial based' issues.⁴³ This complexity is challenging when examining the question of identity, which explores the very essence of the 'private' existential self and one's socialisation (in addition to being socialised according to status, ie. wealth, school, parental background etc), and how this in turn influences the 'public' political and cultural national identity of both the individual and the community at large.

This section will outline and examine the dominant forms of identification that have prevailed throughout the modern history of the 'Middle East', notably in the Arab world. It will argue that by neglecting to comprehend the multiplicity of existing identities Arab ruling elites have contributed to the failure of decolonisation to date. In addition, it will be

⁴² S.E Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in the Arab World", *International Social Science Journal*, June 1998, v. 50, no. 2, pp. 229-243, p. 229.

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

demonstrated how each form of identity has continually been controlled and exploited. In spite of this, each one of these forms of identification has experienced varying levels of popularity over time. Three phases in historical and identity time lines can be broadly recognised as follows:

Phase 1: The Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman periods were dominated by *primordial* forms of identification.

Phase 2: The 1914-1967 period witnessed open European colonisation, the creation of the modern 'Middle East' and the rise of sovereign nation-states. As a result, Western ideals, thoughts and structures infiltrated the region and modern day *nationalism* emerged as a powerful pillar of identity.

Phase 3: The Period of Disillusionment - 1967 to the present day. After the 1967 *Nakba*⁴⁴, and the death of Nasser in 1970, Arab nationalism began to lose momentum as the notion of Arab unity suffered the most decisive and visceral of blows. Many countries in the region began to place state nationalism (*Qatreya*) and development ahead of regional Arab national identity (*Qawmiyya*). *State-national secular identity* and the shift towards capitalist models became evident.

However, three conflicting and continuing developments have emerged during this period. On the one hand, state national identity has been strengthened and small indications of political liberalisation are taking place. Simultaneously, a sharp dichotomy is emerging in most Arab and non-Arab countries, some segments of society are demanding a shift towards *religious/sectarian* modes of identity, and, as a consequence, autocratic control by most regional regimes has increased.

⁴⁴ A word originally used by Dr. Costo Zureiq in 1948. In its broadest meaning it refers "to the total confrontation that has been developing since the early decades of this century between Zionism and the Arab countries in general and the Palestinian people in particular... This confrontation is labeled total in that it is comprehensive: it embraces economic, social, political, national, military and technological spheres of life". Dessouki, "Arab Intellectuals and Al-Nakba: The Search for Fundamentalism", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 1973, pp. 187-196, p. 187. Other variations of the definition and causes of the *nakba* include accidental and casual factors of the Arab disaster; the under utilisation of Arab strength and resources; external intervention and assistance to Israel; and lack of Arab coordination - politically and militarily. For further detail see Dessouki and Dr Costi Zureiq, *Ma'na al-nakba*, (The Meaning of the Disaster), *Dar al-'illm lil-Malayyin*, Beirut, 1967.

It is important to note that the socio-political identities outlined existed throughout the three phases and were not restricted to the indicated time frames. Rather, a multiplicity of identities has prevailed, and has mostly been ignored by past researchers, although utilised strategically by ruling elites and other interested parties. These identities (primordial, Arab or state nationalism) have never existed as entrenched pillars. They are moderately flexible and malleable, holding different degrees of dominance depending on historical and political circumstances.

This, in turn, will be indicated when outlining the three forms of identification by differentiation between 'high' and 'low' levels of participation and representation. 'High' levels are representative of the ruling elite's affiliation to certain forms of political or cultural identification that vary from country to country. For example, Libya (Gaddafi) identifies itself as pan-Arab and more recently as pan-African, Saudi Arabia as Islamic and monarchical, and the Jordanian ruling elite identifies itself along state identification and legitimises its monarchy via Islamic descendants. 'Low' levels are representative at the grassroots level of each respective nation-state. Conflicts of interest and opinion may exist amongst the ruling regime and/or at grassroots level. Together, these two spheres may not necessarily agree with the prominence of a particular identity at a national level. As a consequence, community and/or the ruling elite are divided as to the basis of national identity and cohesion, and therefore one needs to question whether a national identity and character exists in such circumstances.

1.2.1. Phase 1: Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman periods - Primordialism.

Primordialism is the most enduring phase of socio-political identification. It existed prior to the era of Islam and continues to play a significant role today. Primordial identity is generally defined as "existing at or from the beginning of time or origin". From a cultural perspective this includes customary traditions, folklore, the importance of kinship, family/clan/tribe, religious identification, blood, personal and sacred affinities, fealty and feudalism.⁴⁵ This section will categorise these primordial indices into three broad groups: traditional (customary traditions, folklore, ethnic, tribal and family-societal structures), feudal and religious. Religion, however, will be considered as both primordial and as a pertinent, contemporary political identity.

1.2.1.1 Traditionalism

a. Kinship

This category is composed of customary tradition, folklore, symbolism and superstition, kinship and ethnic loyalties. The social structure of such ties lies in a series of concentric circles. The outermost circle consists of the *qabila* (tribe) or '*ashira* (clan); then *hamula*, *fakhdh*, *batn*, or *far*' (sub-tribes); followed by the family, including both the *beit*, *ahl*, or '*aila* (extended family), and finally the *usra* ('nuclear' family).⁴⁶

The intricate strength of kinship ties and degree of primordialism depends on whether the person is of bedouin, peasantry or urban background. For example, the bedouin has strong ties with his or her tribe or clan, whereas the peasant has stronger links with the extended family. This is also reflected in cleavage-like ties to material possessions such as land and home ownership, which, in turn, influences the status of their identity. The concept of family honour and pride is significantly linked to social relations. The significance of family values and strong moral upbringing, consequently demarcate the ethos of social relations and status within any given social structure. The concept of honour is imbedded at all levels of social relations including the political level of communication.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For a more detailed conceptual analysis of the term see: Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil tie", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8, June 1957, pp. 130-145; Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, The Free Press, NE, 1963 pp. 105-57.

⁴⁶ Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture and State*, University of California Press, England, 1993, pp. 50-51.

⁴⁷ The impact of patriarchy will be considered in further detail in the following chapter.

The concept of kinship continues to play an important political and social structural role within Arab society. Patrimonial respect remains strong, a factor, which has impeded modern political development and national unity, especially where it conflicts with the personal and political interests of these elites. In cases such as Lebanon, Jordan and the Gulf states, primordial allegiance remains explicit and strong among the ruling elites and nobility, whereas in Iraq, Syria and Egypt, family oligarchies have declined since the 1950s and 1960s.⁴⁸

Through kinship, clan leaders and/or the elders of the community part-took in the role of advisers, conciliators and arbitrators to the extended family, and in most instances were the selected representatives in political matters at a higher level. However, the tribal-kinship structure is not to be mistaken as a monolith but should rather be seen as a complex array of alliances and relationships. This thesis will demonstrate that although the tribal structures have greatly diminished, the role of kinship and nobility in Lebanon continue to be a powerful political medium in contemporary Lebanese society. This was reinforced during the war years due to the sectarian nature of the conflict.⁴⁹

Although contemporary urban Arab society is not overtly influenced by custom, status, paternalism, fatalism or the superstition of the past, some societies are more affected by these phenomena than others. For example, many Gulf States are based on patrimonial monarchies, and continue to consult with and convey the ideas of tribal elders, as well as practice traditional customs. The Qatari Emir continues, for example, to personally meet with members of the community twice a week in the *diwan amira* (Government House) with little pomp or ceremony.⁵⁰ The development of strong leadership (exploiting kinship and religion), a monarch's personal reputation and the tradition of kinship within traditional societies such as these are highly legitimising and stabilising.

⁴⁸ Although in the case of post-Ba'ath Iraq there is an indication that the political vacuum is being filled by prominent Iraqi families represented in the Iraqi Governing Council.

⁴⁹ Tribal life in the 'Middle East' consists of segmentary groups linked by kinship and political equality of tribal members. Increasingly, tribal organisation and structures are diminishing although tribal cognitive values (solidarity or *asabiyya*, conceptions of honour, shame and revenge), customs and traditions (family lineages, pride in Arab tribal roots, and cousin marriage) seem to prevail. Judith Harik, "Shaykh al-'Aql and the Druze of Mount Lebanon: Conflict and Accommodation", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 461-485, p. 482 fn. 14.

⁵⁰ For further detail on the political and social customs of Gulf states see Liesl Graz, *The Turbulent Gulf: People, Politics and Power*, I.B. Tauris, London & New York, 1992.

However, what has become evident in these societies is the adaptation to material comforts and structures, alongside the continued maintenance of primordial belief systems and customary traditions. Therefore, such relations have neither become fully modernised nor detached from primordial loyalties. Many of these traditionally run countries, notably the oil rich sheikhdoms, have sought to bring structural modernisation and economic growth to their societies but are reluctant to encourage or see the masses modernise politically. As this will more than likely challenge their hold on power. Consequently, a post-national identity has not developed and large segments of the community remain excluded from the political process due to their gender, removal of direct kinship relations, or ideological opposition to the ruling elite. During the oil boom years this policy was mostly successful, however, this last decade has left much to be desired. Falling oil revenue and fluctuating economic circumstances, changing social demands and demographics, and increasing knowledge of the worth of liberal political structures has added pressure on many of these traditional monarchical governments in the area of social and political reform.

b. Ethnicity

Another traditional factor contributing to the failure of attaining a unified national identity, and which remains a dominant form of identification, is ethnicity. As outlined earlier, the 'Middle East' region is one of the most multi-racial and multi-religious areas of the world, and its long history is reflective of the tensions that ethnic divisions can pre-empt. Although ethnic divisions did not emerge as a consequence of European intervention *per se* they have nevertheless increased and been affected by external forces; a sample being CIA financial and military support to the Iraqi Kurds, Israeli support of the Lebanese Maronites, and Iranian support of the Lebanese Shi'ite.

As a result of external provocation and the failure of state policies to promote an inclusive national identity for all its citizens, not to mention the historical tension between some ethnic groups, it has been difficult to sustain a post-colonial national identity, minimise the importance of ethnic identification, or successfully deter ethnic tensions. In turn, persistent ethnic identification have, in some cases, obstructed state formation (Lebanon, Sudan) and their legitimacy and hence sustainability, which have ultimately affected state mobility and capacity (Iraq, Syria, Israel, Egypt).

1.2.1.2. Feudalism

Closely related, or in some cases overlapping the traditional social structure is the quasi-feudal system⁵¹ or the politics of nobility (*zuama*). Individuals, who have long owned, possessed and controlled the dominant modes of production, enjoyed political and social status, power and wealth. The title of *za'em* (noble/lord) is often applied to large landowners, capitalists, businessmen and contractors, merchants, politicians, military personnel, high-ranking managers and civil servants, professionals, religious *ulama* (learned), and important clan/tribal chiefs.⁵² The *za'em* is predominantly politically and economically orientated. The *za'em* either acts, as an intermediary between the government and the people, is part of the government or a member of a small group of people wielding social (local and/or national) power.

The existence of the *za'em* remains in many Arab nations today; some countries publicly hold nobility in high esteem and recognition (Lebanon, the Gulf states, and Jordan to a certain degree), whilst others do so implicitly (Jordan, Syria and Egypt, to varying degrees). This privileged elite has played and continues to play a major role in the internal politics of certain countries within the region, and contributing to their respective political (under)development.⁵³

1.2.1.3. Religion

The validity of tradition is based on custom and customary social relations, and is legitimised to some degree on moral and spiritual grounds, or within the concept of 'religious tradition'.⁵⁴ Traditionalists view equality and representation as peripheral or nonexistent. Islamists, for example, believe that questions of spirituality, morality, and salvation must be addressed by proper forms of government based upon Islamic law

⁵¹ The noted difference between European feudalism of the Middle Ages and 'Middle Eastern' feudalism is that the latter lacks the connection between the lord and the peasant, making it an impersonal relationship and one that was not equally or partially viable for the two parties. The 'Middle Eastern' landlord dominated economically, politically, socially and geographically, leaving little benefit to the peasant or land worker. See Hudson, *Arab Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977, p. 100; Xavier de Planhol, *Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2, pp. 460-462; Richard Antoun and Illiya Harik (eds), *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972, pp. 338-45.

⁵² Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", in *The Modern Middle East*, ed. by Hourani et al., University of California Press, Berkeley & LA, 1993, pp. 89-90.

⁵³ As the following chapters will demonstrate Lebanon is a significant case in point.

⁵⁴ Meibar, *Political Culture, Foreign Policy, and Conflict*, Greenwood Press, USA, 1982, p. 84; and Abu Rabi, op. cit., p. 116.

(*Sharia*). Modern day Islamic traditionalists reject most Western models of government, and believe Islam and tradition are sufficient to uphold the government, state and region.⁵⁵

Due to the dominance of traditionalists at the higher levels of society, many monarchies and traditional societies legitimise their power by invoking primordial factors. The Hashemite monarchy of Jordan, for example, legitimises its monarchical system by reference to the political tradition handed down from the Prophet Muhammad and preserved by the House of Hashemite. Similarly, the House of Saud legitimises its rule by referring to itself as the custodian of the two holy Muslim shrines – Mecca and Medina – while it invokes tribal loyalty and the preservation of the social order. It also accredits its lineage to the Muslim scholar and founding member of the Wahhabi Islamic school of thought, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Saudis and Hashemites are not alone in claiming lineage to the Prophet or significant Muslim scholars. For example, during the early 1990s former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein presented himself as a descendent of the Qurayshi tribe, claiming that his family lineage derived from Hussein, the son of ‘Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law with the intention of gaining domestic legitimacy amongst his highly religious Shi’ite populace and Muslims within the region.⁵⁶

Today, secular Arab (Iraq, Egypt and Syria to varying degrees) and non-Arab (Israel) governments are acknowledging the societal shift towards primordial factors in order to legitimise their own rule.⁵⁷ The challenge ahead for governments ruling in such uncertain times is to deter the regression of governance towards primordialism and the adoption of superficial religious overtones at the cost of political and economic development.

1.2.1.4. Primordialism today

Like many societies in the past (Europe) and present (China and other Asian countries), it is evident that attempts at overlaying the traditional and modern day ideologies have

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Poteh, “In the Service of Power: The Ideological Struggle in the Arab World During the Gulf Crisis”, *Conflict Quarterly*, Fall 1994, pp. 7-25, p. 11 cites Radio Baghdad, 23 August 1990; *FBIS*, 24 August 1990; *al-Dustur*, 20 September 1990.

⁵⁷ However, having said that, it needs to be acknowledged that is quite common internationally for the authority of tradition be invoked when a major crisis arises. Ruling elites and citizens re-examine their past and traditions to find a solution. Increasingly, smaller countries and community groups for whom the speed and negative ramifications of globalisation provoke anxieties are shifting towards cultural and political isolationism. This trend will be further examined below, and critiqued in greater detail in Chapters 3, 6 & 7.

largely been unsuccessful and produced inherently unstable and contradictory dynamics. The Arab world's continuing state of unease and awkwardness is positioned within the contradictory dichotomy of tradition and modernity. Being neither one nor the other. These countries have had no actual industrial revolution, no real formal separation of state and religion, and the inability to challenge or dismantle the existing contradictory social order. This contradiction has been exemplified on three levels -- by external interference, exploitation by nobility and ruling elites, and, the challenge of overcoming or rethinking tradition, customs, and myths.

The feudalistic, traditional and religious/sectarian forms of identification which had long beset the indigenous peoples of the region prior to the division of the 'Middle East' as we know it today, including the moulding of the social, cultural, and political institutions by Europeans, have contributed to the persistent weakness of the 'Middle East', and especially amongst Arab states. Problems of legitimacy in state formation and political reign, the monopolisation of the political and military infrastructure by certain ethnic groups or individuals, the politicisation and corruption of the bureaucracy, and the influence of modernisation have all affected national mobilisation, to some degree, in most Arab states. Some states have to date avoided examining national mobilisation due to the abundance of oil and resource wealth (Gulf States), due to a largely homogeneous ethnic population (Egypt, Syria), the tight-control by autocratic leaders (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia), and the role the West has played in hindering national or ethnic mobilisation (Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan).

Saad Eddin Ibrahim argues that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the introduction of Westernisation into the region led to the breakdown of the traditional organisation of ethnic groups.⁵⁸ Although it is true that social integration has been expedited and political and cultural consciousness has developed, it cannot be concluded that the breakdown of primordialism has affected every ethnic community or individual. Primordial identification continues to be deeply entrenched in the inhabitants' consciousness, especially amongst the region's ruralists, peasants, the illiterate, unskilled and religiously orthodox. Together they make up a significant percentage of the region's population. Class and education plays a central role in the enhancement of peoples' thoughts and beliefs. In the face of economic and political uncertainty, the underprivileged

⁵⁸ S.E Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, p. 7

and lower middle classes increasingly seek respite and consolation in religion and traditional symbolism.

Primordial identification continues to be an underlying factor regardless of 'high' or 'low' ethnic mobilisation within the region. Although in many respects such identification can be viewed as regressive and slowing the liberalisation of the nation-state, positive aspects of primordial identity exist within many developing countries, and are being revisited and promoted by segments of the community in the developed world. These positive aspects include: strong moral affiliations, solid extended family ties and respect which are extended to the elders and ultimately the state, high levels of generosity and communal sharing, and sense of security, as well as personal and community spirit at both a subconscious and conscious level. Hence, by selectively invoking controlled aspects of primordialism, and reassuring citizens of security and positive development, politicians have been successful in bringing about modern change and development, as seen in Egypt, Syria and Iraq during the revolutionary years.

However, the exploitation of primordial identification by the ruling elite and people of power and influence can also be damaging. The *zu'ama*, for example, have been renowned for their flexibility and ability to change their political identity and status in order to retain their positions (Lebanon, Jordan, and to varying degrees in Egypt, Iraq and Syria), while politicians have been able to invoke such traits to retain state legitimacy, mobilisation and survival of both state and ruler (Gulf states, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria and Jordan). The rule, or influence, of primordialism has impeded national political, social and economical development and at times promoted conflict.

The following chapters will argue various traditional and modern forces buffeting Arab society have yet to be adequately resolved or harmonized. This will be most evident in the case study of Lebanon, which illustrates a number of contradictions. Ties to nobility and sect-confession are denying true political liberation of the ordinary citizen or individual, as well as preventing a united Lebanese identity and nationalism from emerging among a post-war generation who are looking for political change and unity.

An additional impediment to political development is through Western foreign policies. Although the West has perceived itself as the promoter of liberal democracy, it has also

tolerated (and even supported) primordial forms of identification and/or non-democratic elites within the region as long as they did not interfere with or challenge Western national security and economic interests.⁵⁹

Traditional identity will continue to be an underlying form of identification amongst the majority of the region's inhabitants. Whether this is due to local, national or international pressures, it has become entrenched within the political, social and religious infrastructures, and within the psyche and socialisation of present and future generations. In addition, it has become part of the cultural consciousness, and cannot be easily ignored nor diminished within a national or regional context.

⁵⁹ The very countries, which bombed Iraq back into the stone-age during the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict, were the principle financial and military supporters of the regime for over a decade regardless of the human rights practiced by the regime because of its vital position. It was considered as a, 'Arab friendly' regime. When Iraq's interests began to conflict with US, and Western interests, it was attended to via harsh and debilitating means. By way of contrast, Amnesty International and US government Senate Committee's have outlined extensive abuse in 'Arab friendly' regimes, for example within Saudi Arabia, yet no reprimands have resulted or alternative forms of rule proposed as in the case of Iraq.

1.2.2. Phase 2: 1914-1967 Colonisation, Independence & Modern Day Nationalism.

Phase two symbolises the most challenging and controversial period in the 'Middle East', an interval in history when change was constant and rapid. European colonisation and foreign companies formally swept the region, enforcing colonial/imperial state structures on its inhabitants. Western forms of nationalism were adopted by the colonised. Calls for independence and unity were as diverse as the region itself. However, they were largely undertaken within an Arab context. Countries that gained independence through revolutionary means adopted variant forms of Arab nationalist political ideology, and this, in turn, influenced other Arabs.

1.2.2.1. The Emergence of Nationalism in the Arab world.

The Western concept of the nation-state is a relatively recent phenomenon in the 'Middle East', being largely imposed on the region (and much of the East) via Western colonisation and domination in the early 20th Century. By the 20th Century it seemed to encompass 'reactive' rather than 'proactive' doctrine, due to its constant challenge by external forces such as the Turkification of the populace by the Ottomans, Zionism and the creation of Israel, and the ongoing national interests of Western countries being served through direct and indirect colonialism.

From the First World War to the present, nationalism within the region has played a key role in state legitimacy and political development. This is not to suggest that nationalism was not observed or experienced prior to the arrival of European colonialism in the region, rather that the creation of the 'Middle East' by the European victors enforced Western concepts of the nation-state, impelling the region's inhabitants to identify themselves along their new identity formations as political nations.

Nationalism amongst the region's indigenous inhabitants largely developed via the spread of print media, the shift towards the secularization of society, travel to and from the region, the influence of foreign missionaries, a response to Turkish domination, and the impact of the intelligentsia. In the early-to-mid 20th Century Arab nationalism⁶⁰, and nationalism *per*

⁶⁰ If not otherwise defined, Arab nationalism is broadly defined as the promotion of the Arabic language, culture, history, customs, geography and peoples within a geo-political construct.

se, emerged and developed in the 'Middle East' region in a number of phases.⁶¹ Variants of nationalism were principally unifying rather than fragmented. A great deal of emphasis was on 'supra' notions of nationalism, such as pan-Arab ideals that were based largely on cultural and linguistic factors, with the potential of developing into political ideology. Arab nationalists, for example, called for the unity of *al-umma al-Arabiyya* (The Arab Nation) via the removal of Western imposed boundaries. In order to attain pan-Arab unity, it was argued that newly formed colonial mandates needed to attain independence first as individual nation-states, with the potential then of achieving unitary Arab governance in one form or another.

However, by the mid-1940s when the Arab fight for independence was at its greatest, the ideological conflict between supra-nationalists and state nationalists emerged causing prolonged friction between the two factions. The elites that ruled during the Mandate years promoted nationalism in order to partly retain their hold on power and its associated prestige. Naturally, however, the rulers, like the broader community, had the desire to emerge from centuries of Ottoman rule as free and sovereign citizens, but not within the supra-national structure being suggested by some Arab nationalists. State elites had a vested interest in retaining colonial territorial divisions, as evident in the 1943 League of Arab States meeting which rejected Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Said's, proposal for an Arab federation, instead endorsing the sovereignty and independence of Arab states. Thus, although the Arab League manifests itself on a pan-Arab mantle, ready to defend the 'Arab nation', it ultimately seeks to recognise the legitimacy of state borders.⁶²

Generally during this period, nationalism was considered as an avenue for overcoming primordial divisions via socio-cultural and political policies seeking integration, and as a means of becoming a sovereign cohesive nation within the international community. During

⁶¹Although an ongoing debate amongst scholars persist, disputing the origins of Arab nationalism. Scholars such as Zeine Zeine, Albert Hourani and A.L. Tibawi identified Islam and Islamic modernist intellectuals as major proponents in the development of Arab political consciousness. Whilst Zeine argues this developed more so upon the pan-Turkic policy of the Young Turks [Zeine, op. cit., p. 132.]. Hourani focuses on the linkages between the early success of Islam by its Arab instigators, and the role Islamist intellectuals and nobles played in the late 19th Century in promoting Arabism, especially after the Young Turks' alienation of the Empire's Arab populace. [Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", *The Modern Middle East: A Reader* ed. by Hourani, Khoury, & Wilson, University of California Press, Berkeley and LA, 1993, pp. 83-109.] 'Abd al-Aziz Duri, on the other hand, argued that the Arab nation had existed since the era of the Prophet Muhammad, and "gained momentum... when the Turks clearly displayed their inability to stand up to Europe, and similarly, when the Unionists introduced a grave provocation by opposing the Arab language and adopting a policy of Turkification". [Abd al-'Aziz Duri, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism", in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Khalidi et al, New York, Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 215.]

⁶² For further information on the role of the League of Arab States see Robert MacDonald, *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organisation*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 33-38.

the 1950s, the Arab world, which was dominated or influenced by ruling Arab nationalists, was associated with the anti-colonial and non-alignment movement. The doctrine of Arab nationalism has a twofold purpose. First, it serves to promote Arab nationalism and the virtues of a common destiny and policy through integrative cultural-political policies; and second, it is a way of negating external intervention, whether it be Turkism, Western imperialism and domination, or Zionism.

During the period leading up to independence, colonisers and emerging imperial powers tried to influence the region's various factions, which ultimately set the foundation for future instability and conflict in the 'Middle East'. Many were, and continue to be, attracted by its geo-strategic significance, namely as the gateway to three continents and possessing the major share of the world's energy resources. This was most notable in *Al Mashreq*. Its cities were the most historically established, developed and urbanised of the Arab region at the time. It bore the most influential intelligentsia, who were more receptive to European ideals and concepts. Together such factors precipitated their political astuteness, their opposition to accepting the replacement of one foreign rule with another, and the rejection of the establishment of Israel, which would inevitably entail the socio-political and physical dispossession of some of the region's Arab inhabitants. Therefore, in one respect, nationalism within post-colonial countries, especially within *Al-Mashreq* and *Al-Maghreb*, can be viewed as a form of re-territorialisation or repossession of land.

Variants of nationalism (religious, pan-Arab, confessional-sectarian, state, dynastic-monarchical) are evident and far ranging amongst Arab nation states, yet nationalism and political development within the 'Middle East' have been problematic, although not distinct, on three fronts. First, and as described above, the region, particularly the Arab world, has historically been divided along primordial-ethnic and socio-political cleavages within natural geographic areas. Such divisions have remained, to varying degrees, regardless of the different forms of nationalism which have persisted throughout the centuries right through to the present. Although diversity is not generally disadvantageous, it has proven to be problematic to many pan-Arab, state and religious-confessional nationalists over the decades, which have attempted to enforce the theory of 'sameness', 'unity' and 'homogeneity'. The failure to suitably acknowledge the region's social and political diversity and heterogeneity will be examined, particularly in relationship to its impact on uniting a newly independent nation.

Second, during the Ottoman period nationalism was largely directed at a supra-level rather than within a micro-national context, that is, nationalism at a state level. Although some autonomous regions did arise, economic and political allegiance and centralisation remained with Istanbul and was not as disruptive as European colonisation. Besides, the division of natural geographic areas and ethnic groups, European colonisation enforced economic, social and political structures that were foreign to the region and its inhabitants. These disruptive changes uprooted and questioned the political and social consciousness of the indigenous inhabitants that were largely based on primordial identifications. On the one hand, the indigenous population were forced to accept these changes, and were encouraged to leave traditional practices behind, for example within the context of the separation of religion from state. In contrast, they were to commence identifying themselves and show allegiance to the political entity they suddenly 'belonged to' -- courtesy of the European powers -- which at times dictated the adoption of historical identifications to assist in state-building.

Consequently, the final aspect of the trilemma evolves from the question of modernisation, which has divided the region into two distinct groups, the progressive/modernists and the conservative/traditional forces. The progressive forces consider worldly ideas and models as tools for the economic, political and social development of the region, while the conservative forces opt for traditional ideas and models due to their certainty, familiarity, past success, and religious inclinations which are considered to be based upon divine revelation. But even within these two groups distinctions prevail. For example, although modernisation and development are prominent and notable within Gulf States such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the ruling elites have maintained and applied traditional ideas and models. A prevalent view - which has subsequently emerged - contends that 'conservative' Arab intellectuals have impeded the process of change, because they equate change with modernity and modernity with Westernisation.⁶³ It is within this conflicting paradigm that this thesis will seek to examine whether the conflicting political identifications emerging since the 19th Century in the Arab world (although not unique to this region) can coexist and develop a unique, post-colonial, modern and worldly identity.

Regional dynamics were complicated by the establishment in 1948 of a Jewish entity, the State of Israel, in the Mandate of Palestine. The majority of Arab-Islamic inhabitants of the

⁶³ Abu Rabi, "Secularisation, Islam, and the Future of The Arab World: A Derivative Discourse", *Islam and Modern Age*, Vol. xxlii, No. 2., May 1992, pp. 114-127, p. 115.

region did not accept the dispossession of Palestinian-Arab land to compensate European Jews for their suffering during the Holocaust. Within this context, a campaign for independence commenced and Western notions of nation-state and imposed borders were questioned, as was the creation of a Jewish homeland in the Arab-Islamic world.

Hence, the process of decolonisation commenced. Each political entity's attempt at decolonising the nation was undertaken by creating a common national identity via broad based Arab and exclusive state nationalism. By the mid-20th Century most 'Middle Eastern' countries had attempted to grapple with the issue of nationalism and national identity on three levels: regional (Arab, Islamic, Turk, Persian), state (Lebanese, Egyptian, Israeli, Turkish, Algerian, Kuwaiti etc.) and primordial (ethnicity, race, language, culture, religion, sect, tribe, clan, family etc.). Many Arab governments did so within the greater context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From the outset with the creation of the nation-state, conflicting and violent forms of nationalism emerged. Consequently, each paradigm is both exclusionary and inclusionary of groups and/or individuals from full membership of the political community. In turn, developing into diverse, and sometimes conflicting dichotomies of political and cultural identification.

Since the 1970s, a small group of 'Middle Eastern' specialists have been writing about these various forms of nationalisms.⁶⁴ These include traditional-indigenous notions of nationalism, pan-Arab ideals, modern-Western notions of state nationalism, and regionalism, all of which make up the mosaic of political identity within the region and within nations such as Lebanon. Regardless of the type of nationalism, however, contemporary studies of nationalism in the 'Middle East' have predominantly focused on Islamic/religious revivalism, which seems to be the most dominant form of existing or emerging nationalism in the region, notably after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ See Kamal Salibi, Saad El Din Ibrahim, Paul Salem, Richard Augustus Norton, Michael Hudson. These few academics have combined political theory and practice, and examined development in Arab politics within a sociological realm that had long been a missing link in understanding the real dynamics of nationalism in the Middle East, particularly within the Arab world.

⁶⁵ This is most evident in the large array of publications that have increased substantially after the 1979 Iranian revolution. William Shepard breaks down the Islamic movement into five categories: secular; Islamic modernism, radical Islamism, traditionalism and neo-traditional. Research on Islamic revivalism-nationalism can subsequently be divided into such categories. For further reading see: Immanuel Sivan, Patrick Bannerman, Hrair Dekmejian,

Although at the forefront of political identity construction there is an evident rise in religious political affiliation, it is incorrect to assume that the region is being consumed by this phenomenon. Despite the grassroots popularity of Islamic groups - such as Algeria's FIS, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Lebanon's Hezbollah, or the Gaza Strip's Hamas or Islamic Jihad - the Islamic world stands as divided as ever, and is not the homogeneous unit portrayed by some sectors of Western media or academia.⁶⁶ In fact, the rise in popularity of such groups, has only been examined, until recently, by a minority of academics as a strategic challenge to the incompetence of their respective governments in meeting the basic economic and political needs of their citizens, and further raising the issue of political legitimacy in these particular countries.⁶⁷

This shift towards primordial identification is not surprising. With the introduction of the nation-state in the 'Middle East' region, the prospect of ethnic conflicts emerging has been greater. During the Ottoman domination of the region, ethnic communities who were willing to comply with the state authorities were to a certain degree protected and tolerated. However, the pressures of a nation-state, particularly in its emerging years in the region, required the state to reflect European aspirations of a single nation and people regardless of the unnatural divisions imposed on some.

Such pressures exacerbated tensions among various ethnic groups in the region for most of the 20th Century. From the mid-1940s to the early 1970s, this was rarely acknowledged by academics writing in the field of 'Middle Eastern' politics and society. Such neglect can be attributed to the following three reasons. First, Western and European scholars have been heavily involved in analysing the region through the broad paradigms of Marxism and Liberalism, markedly within the context of the Cold War paradigm; which during this period focused greatly on the non-alignment movement of developing nations and their need to break away from their colonial pasts.

Khurshid Ahmad, Michael Salla, Ayubi, Akbar S Ahmed, Mohammed Ayoob, Youseff M. Choueiri, Ozay Mehmet, Montgomery W Watt, Hugh Leach, Chandra Muzaffar, Bruce Lawrence, Eric Davis, John Esposito, Fouad Ajami, Francis Fukuyama, Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Samuel P Huntington, Bernard Lewis.

⁶⁶ With the end of the Cold War some American commentators felt a need to replace the fear of the 'Red Peril' with the 'Green Peril', this was most notable in the works of Daniel Pipes, Francis Fukuyama, Bernard Lewis, notably his 1990 article in *Atlantic Monthly*; and Samuel P Huntington's, "Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. For an anti-thesis see Leon T Hadar, "What Green Peril?" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 27-42.

⁶⁷ Some academics support the idea that the Islamic revival is class based (Ayubi, Leonard Binder, Richard Mitchell, Henry Munson), some suggest it is socio-economically and politically inclined (Ayubi, Habib Boulares, Bryan Turner, John Donohue), and others argue it is a reaction to modernisation and post-modernisation (Akbar Ahmed, Dekmejian).

Second, most literature has predominantly dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the wealth of the Gulf States rather than examining the underlying social composition of these societies.⁶⁸ Third, scholars of 'Middle Eastern' background themselves were careful in not attaching importance to the study of ethnic politics in the region for fear of being considered a 'backward' society when most of the world during the onset of the Cold War was either expanding or strengthening the concept of state nationalism and emphasising unison. There was also concern about what repercussions might result from reporting these research findings. By depicting the composition of Arab countries as heterogeneous it would have highlighted differences rather than cohesion, which would have been a blow to the myth of Arab 'sameness' advanced by Arab nationalists. In addition, it would have struck at the united geo-political front advanced by the Arabs throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶⁹

The bulk of the region during the 1950-70s was experiencing the ramifications of colonialism and the emergence of newly independent states. During this period the world also witnessed the suppression of ethnic issues and conflict by political masters as the territorial status quo was consolidated. The major concern in the Arab world during the 1950s and 1960s was the desire to seek unity among its population in their newly independent states, and to work towards modernisation of the nation state via collective participation and equality. It was a period of radical and profound change in the region.

⁶⁸ By undertaking a general search on the 'Middle East' or the Arab world on any given respectable library catalogue the results are quite extensive, but largely focus on the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the region's wealth. Upon undertaking such a search a sample of what was found is as follows: *Blood, Oil and Sand*, by Ray Brock (London, 1952), *Arabs, Oil and History: The story of the Middle East* by Kermit Roosevelt (London, 1949), *The Middle East: A Handbook* ed. by Michael Adams (London, 1971), *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey*, ed. by Peter Mansfield (London, 1973), *Arab Strategies and Israeli Responses* by Yehoshafat Harkabi (New York, 1977), *Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence: The Case of the US and Israel* by Abraham Ben-Zvi (Tel Aviv, 1984), *Prospects for Peace in the Middle East* by Abba Eban (London, 1988). More recent titles include: *The Middle East: 2000 years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day* by Bernard Lewis (London, 1995), *Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security* by Bassam Tibi (USA, 1998), *The Middle East at a Crossroad* by Abdel Meguid Ahmed Esmat, (London, 1991), *Prospects for Peace in the Middle East* by Anthony Parsons (London, 1993), *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* by Richard B. Parker (Indianapolis, 1993). The customary few pages or chapter may be written about 'Arab culture and people' or religion but no in-depth analysis is demonstrated.

⁶⁹ Esman & Rabinovich, *Ethnicity, Pluralism & The State In the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1988, p. 4. This was exemplified in 1994, when Professor Saad El Din Ibrahim, Head of the American University of Cairo's 'Ibn Khaldun Centre', called for a conference entitled 'Minorities in the Arab World'. Political and religious leaders, as well as Egyptian intellectuals from all persuasions rejected the notion and consequently the conference topic shifted to focus on countries other than Egypt. Although on a recent (4/02/2001) Lebanese weekly program, *Hiwar il Umr* (Dialogue of Age), Ibrahim stated that the Egyptian government allegedly could not guarantee the safety of prominent conference participants, and therefore preferred that the conference be postponed or shifted to an alternative venue, hence, it being held in Cyprus.

1.2.2.2. The Emergence of Arab Nationalism.

Arab nationalist ideals such as those upheld by Ibrahim al-Yaziji became the basic tenets of future nationalists and emphasised the importance of casting off the yoke of the foreign occupier and ridding the nation of bigotry and fanaticism.⁷⁰ It was their belief that the *first phase* of Arab nationalism -- which Arabs experienced in advance of Ottoman occupation and during the inception of Islam -- should be revived, in order to recapture their former status and reinstate themselves as significant contributors to world civilisation.⁷¹

Most pan-Arabists believe the 'Arab nation' itself stretches from the Atlantic shores of Morocco, to the Persian shores of the Arabian Peninsula, to the borders of Turkey and the Mediterranean. The strong will to overcome foreign occupation and develop a post-colonial national identity according to Arab cultural principles, led to the evolution, survival and expansion of Arabism through shared heritage and common cultural identity. The Arabs' sense of shared history was promoted and re-examined nostalgically. There was a collective call to utilise their rich resources and strengthen the bonds of unity through historical links such as a shared geography, religion, language⁷² and culture, as well as similar physical characteristics. In spite of this, they did not promote themselves as a race, since the Arabs are an amalgamation of races and do not practice racial exclusivity.⁷³

⁷⁰ Some Arab nationalists promoted Arabism in terms of its linguistic and cultural richness, which reflected an anti-Ottoman stance: Najib 'Azuri (d. 1916), 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Arisi (d. 1916), Salah al-Din al-Qasimi (d. 1916), 'Umar Fakhuri (d. 1946). Meanwhile, others promoted pan-Arabism through its secularist, anti-colonial and imperial ideals: Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d.1902), Rifa'a El-Tahtawi, Boutrous Bustani, Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Nasif Yazeji, Sati' Al-Husri (d. 1968), Abdul-Rahman Kawakebi, Gamal Abdel Nasser (d. 1970), Najib 'Azuri, Michel Aflaq (d. 1989), Zaki al-Arsuzi, Salah al-Bitar and George Habash, just to name a few. These thinkers became popularly associated with such ideals, and set the foundations for future Arab nationalist movements.

⁷¹ C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origins of an Ideology" in Hourani et al, *The Modern Middle East*, op. cit., p. 381 citing Ibrahim al-Yaziji's essay, '*al-'Ulam 'inda al-'arab* (The Sciences among the Arabs) and his poem '*Tanabbahu wa istafiqu* (Awake! Awake!) in 'Isa Mikha'il Saba, *al-Shaykh Ibrahim al-Yaziji, 1847-1906*, Nawabigh al-fikr al-'arabi, 14, Cairo, Dar al-Ma'arif, 1955, pp. 49-50, 71-74. Through works such as Ibrahim al-Yaziji's essays, '*al-'Ulam 'inda al-'arab* (The Sciences among the Arabs) and '*Syria*' in 'Isa Mikha'il Saba, *al-Shaykh Ibrahim al-Yaziji, 1847-1906*, Nawabigh al-fikr Al-'arabi, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1955, pp. 49-50, pp. 93-95; Michel 'Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al-Ba'th* (In the Cause of the Ba'th), Beirut, 1959. Revised and expanded edition, Beirut, 1963, and *Ma'rakat al-masir al-wahid* (Battle for the One Destiny), Beirut, 1958; Salah al-Din Bitar, *al-Siyasa al-'arabiya bayn al-mabda' wa'l-tatbiq* (Arab Politics between Principle and Practice), Beirut, 1960; and Sati' al-Husri, *Yawm maysalun* (The Day of Maysalun), Beirut, 1947; *Ara' wa ahadith fi'l-wataniya wa'l-qawmiya* (Views and Addresses on Patriotism and Nationalism), Cairo, 1954; *Difa' 'an al-'uruba* (Defence of Arabism), Beirut, 1956; *Al-Iqlimiya judhuruha wa budhuruha* (Particularism, its Roots and Seeds), Beirut, 1963.

⁷² Although Arabic is the language and symbol of common Arab heritage to Arabic speaking people, it has developed (some would argue become corrupt) over the centuries to accommodate the changing use of the language. Arabic comes in two main forms - classic or written Arabic, and colloquial or spoken Arabic which in turn is further divided into the numerous spoken dialects. The former is used by a minority (scholars, religious *ulama*, the educated, literature, written communication and formal public occasions) while the latter is used by approximately 80% of Arabs. Today, there has been the development of simplified or modern Arabic in the daily press and media, which falls between literary and colloquial Arabic, and also incorporates the use of foreign terms.

⁷³ Hudson, op. cit., p. 34 and Sylvia Haim (ed), *Arab Nationalism: An Anthropology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964, p. 174.

Nevertheless, the shared sense of belonging, of community, and mutual interests, grievances and hopes were emotively utilised by Arab nationalists, with the belief that the Arab nation was in a state of being and needed continued elevation. Within this context, the general consensus in the Arab world suggests that the Arab populace view themselves as largely homogeneous, although this homogeneity is sufficiently fluid to encompass many ethnic and religious differences.

These very issues reformed and legitimised the Arab nationalist movement that, in turn, gave rise to the ideologisation of pan-Arab thought. Arab nationalist ideology multiplied and in some instances, Arab intellectuals competed for the development of their own particular form of Arab ideology. For instance, debate revolved around whether state sovereignty should be acknowledged or erased, and whether Westphalian principles should be endorsed or ignored.

Pan-Arabism evolved into two dominant parallel modes: first, in the popular form of 'Nasserism', and second, the more structured and European influenced ideology of Ba'athism. 'Nasserism' married revolutionary nationalism to the personality cult of the charismatic Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. It combined a program of socialist reform with an affirmation of Egypt's place at the heart of the Arab world. It held the belief that the combined Arab world's resources would unify all Arabs and restore their power. Nasser gave priority to Egypt's Arab character, although he portrayed Egypt variously as Muslim, African, or Afro-Asian, dependent upon which served his particular purpose. But it was precisely that ambiguity which made Nasser all things to all Arabs, and permitted Egypt to become a bridge to Arab nationalism, via its geographic proximity linking the Arabs of Asia and Africa.⁷⁴

Ba'athism, on the other hand, tended to be more ideologically stringent. Its founders were Sorbonne-educated Syrians, originating from minority sects, who filled their spare time debating great Western philosophers. They chose to call themselves *Al Baath*, meaning resurrection; their ideas were 'revolutionary' in principle. For example, the 1947 Ba'ath Party constitution stipulates that their goals could not be achieved "except by means of revolution and struggle. To rely on slow evolution and to be satisfied with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten these aims and to conduce to their failure and loss". The

⁷⁴ See Abdul Nasser's *Philosophy of Revolution*.

creation of a single Arab nation was of greatest importance; *Al Baath* believed that all differences among Arabs were "accidental and unimportant" and would "disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness". By contrast, socialism was regarded as "a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself".⁷⁵

Both Nasserism and Ba'athism sought to restructure Arab societies from the bottom up and to totally transform the Arab condition -- economically, politically and socially. This was to occur through the creation of an Arab commonwealth and the redistribution of Arab wealth.⁷⁶ Henceforth, Arab nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s was successful on a number of fronts: one, it was able to confer a sense of legitimacy on the Arab polity; two, transform political identity in the Arab world and successfully mobilise support; three, brace political instability in the short-term; and finally, enhance state survival and legitimacy with varying degrees of success.

Arab nationalists such as Nasserists, Baathists and Syrian Socialist Nationalists desired to build a unified Arab nation that defied Western intervention, and to undo the injustices inflicted upon the Palestinian people via the creation of Israel. Meanwhile, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War rivalry in the region was occurring on an international front and at a regional and domestic level. Internal and inter-state politics were also contributing factors to the development of the contemporary 'Middle East'. Events such as the 1958 Lebanese civil war, the southern secession in the Sudan, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, and the divisions between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews in Israel, demonstrated continuing ethnic tensions in the region.

The *second phase* of Arab nationalism began with the First World War, which brought about the end of Ottoman rule. The Western concept of the nation-state, and sometimes the mechanisms of 'parliamentary democracy', was overlain uneasily upon the staunchly traditional, even feudal, models of regime rule and social order that they thinly veiled. Some ethnic minorities and the average Arab benefited from the post-Ottoman period due

⁷⁵ Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity", *Daedalus - Journal of the American Reading of Arts and Sciences*, Summer 1993, pp. 171-207, pp. 186-7 quoting Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1962, pp. 233-41.

⁷⁶ Faksh, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

to its immediate modernisation and openness, although many supporters of the Islamic nation considered the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire as a blow to Islam.

The transition from primordial to modern forms of national political identification was neither linear nor uniform.⁷⁷ Although the transition to modern political identification was on the surface rapid and accepted, authorities did not succeed in diminishing primordial affiliations, nor attempt to adopt the two cohesively. As a result, individuals often had two or more forms of political-cultural identification - public and private - and these contrasts were continuously projected onto the wider sphere of 'public' political identity and culture.

This period also witnessed the decline, or management, of ethnic issues and conflict in the region through the overall consolidation of the territorial status quo. Despite the ethnic fragmentation experienced by a number of Arab countries as a consequence of colonialism, there was a short, yet successful, attempt at political pluralism, when minorities were integrated into the political elite and most other aspects of civil society during the mandate years.

With the division of Arab provinces between French and English administrations after the First World War, the Arab nationalists' forces became fractured and their capacity to articulate and implement a coherent Arab nationalist policy disappeared. As each state entity began to formulate politically, mandate 'states' began to concentrate efforts to secure their own independence prior to attaining the concept of a united Arab homeland.⁷⁸ Therefore, the definitions of nationalism had to be refined in order to fit the prevailing circumstances. These circumstances included the creation of Israel and the definitive European opposition towards the development of an Arab stronghold, which had become evident from the treatment of Faisal, the outcome of the Arab Revolt, and the Europeans absconding from past political promises. This, in turn, promoted the call for state nationalism amongst some segments of the community who preferred state independence and sovereignty over a pan-Arab ideal. Consequently, two conflicting paradigms emerged, pan-Arab ideals versus state nationalism, which were to cause upheaval in some countries

⁷⁷ Esman & Rabinovich, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁷⁸ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987. p. 6.

in relation to the formation and development of a cohesive national identity. Lebanon was a primary example.

The *third phase* of Arab nationalism arose in the post-colonial era and remained strong until 1967. Regardless of the division of the Arab world into twenty states, most Arab constitutions or declarations of independence stipulated that while they were "independent sovereign states" they nonetheless constituted 'one Arab nation'. This was exemplified in the Ba'ath party motto, "from the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the Arabian Gulf, one Arab nation with an immortal mission".⁷⁹ Such pan-Arab ethnic consciousness was reinforced with the establishment of institutions such as the League of Arab States in 1945, which confirmed the independence and sovereignty of Arab states but aimed to work towards implementing levels of cooperation, integration and unification among the wider Arab nation when the right time arose⁸⁰; although neither a timeline or process was identified.

1.2.2.3. The Failure of Arab Nationalism.

Since the creation of the 'modern Middle East', there has been a desire to redefine and reconstruct the colonially imposed structure. However, the results showed otherwise; independence did not alter or redraw the imperially drawn borders, and although the Arab League promoted pan-Arabism, its focus was largely on upholding state sovereignty and the principles of non-intervention. Article 8 of the Charter stipulated:

Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as the exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.⁸¹

In practice however many neighbouring governments have violated Article 8, some more discreetly than others. Examples of inter-state intervention are recognised in the case of, for example, Syrian intervention in Lebanon, Egypt in Yemen, Iraq in Kuwait, Iraq in Lebanon and Egypt in the Sudan. A number of factors can be attributed to these inter/intra-Arab interventions.

⁷⁹ Mahmud A. Faksh, "Withered Arab Nationalism", *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 425-438, p. 426 citing Michel Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al-Ba'th*, 3rd edition, Beirut, Dar al-Tal'a, 1963.

⁸⁰ For further information see S.E. Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building In the Arab World", *International Social Science Journal*, June 1998, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 229-243; p. 5 citing A Sarhal, *Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and the Arab Countries*, Beirut: El Baath Publishing Centre, 1980.

⁸¹ Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 183, quoting J.C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd edition, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1979, p. 736.

First, individual national interests have surpassed the broader principles of Arab unity on the 'high level'. Contributing to this has been the prominent and public Arab rivalry among states (Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya) in vying for the pan-Arab leadership mantle. For example, under the tutelage of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, Syrian nationalists endorse the concept of 'Greater Syria'. This geographical construct encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Iraq. As a result such conflicting ideologies and objectives divided Arab nationalists, as well the broader Arab community, into competing and at times hostile camps.

On the other hand, those opposed to pan-Arabism remained hostile, whether openly or more covertly, to Arab unity proposals. The oil rich Gulf States particularly fell into this category, fighting any proposal of sharing their natural wealth with oil-poor Arabs, as exemplified in the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Nationalists of all persuasions consumed their energies fighting one another, whether directly or indirectly, and did little to further promote and develop Arab nationalist sentiment and ideology. This fact, among others, as will be outlined below, undermined pan-Arab ideology and contributed to its failure.

Second, although pan-Arabism was a significant goal of revolutionary states (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya), Arab governments' priorities during the 1950s and 1960s were to create a state national identity unifying its population, and working towards modernisation of the nation state via collective participation, equality, and socio-economic and political development.

Third, whilst the Arab-Israeli conflict and Cold War rivalry in the region was occurring on the public front, internal politics within regional countries was also a contributing factor to the development of the contemporary 'Middle East'. Events such as the 1958 Lebanese Civil War, the southern secession in the Sudan, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, and the divisions among Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews in Israel, all contributed to the development of ethnic politics in the region, the deconstruction of the colonially imposed map, and to the short and long term effects of state formation and state legitimacy.

Fourth, although this period witnessed the disintegration of colonisation and the direct withdrawal of European powers, their departure was less complete in other areas, most notably, in the region's oil production, and their ongoing geo-political and strategic brinkmanship via Cold War rivalry. This was evident in numerous violent episodes during the 1950s, for example: the overthrow of Musaddiq of Iran after he attempted to nationalise the Anglo-American oil company; the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956, which witnessed the failure of the English, French, and Israelis to reassert their dominance of the region; the 1958 Iraqi revolution, marking the end of the monarchy and British rule; and the 1967 Six Day war.

These historic episodes and the question of the legitimacy of borders, nation-states and governments spurred Arab nationalist thought, anti-imperial tendencies, as well as inter/intra Arab divisions. This led to the added belief that some borders were considered more legitimate than others. There was a tendency that the predominantly homogenous societies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia had less of a concern with the legitimacy of borders than largely heterogeneous and nationalist societies such as Iraq and Syria. Over the years this has been reflected in their respective ideologies and practices, that is, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party affliction in relation to the creation of Kuwait as a state, in which the Iraqi government considered Kuwait as its nineteenth province.

In addition, Arab governments that have close associations with Western powers are to varying degrees regarded as more subservient to Western and personal interests rather than to fellow Arab brethren, which further incites divisions between the ruling elites and regional inhabitants.⁸² The division of the Arab world into separate states only reinforced the suspicion that this only served the interests of Western powers who feared Arab unification and power. As recently as a decade ago, this view was repeated in Amman by, one hundred leaders and representatives of different movements and organisations throughout the Arab world. They stated that foreign intervention in the Gulf was intended 'to block the historic movement towards [the realisation of] Arab unity - a program [for] which Iraq has been intensely [working] in the aftermath of the Gulf war [the Iran-Iraq war]'.⁸³ According to Arab nationalists, this was reflected in the creation of Israel, in a geo-

⁸² AbuKhalil, "The New Arab Ideology? The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 22-36, p. 36.

⁸³ Podeh, op. cit., pp. 7-25 cites Text of JANDA conference communique as broadcast on Radio Baghdad, 19 September 1990, *FBIS*, 20 September 1990, p. 15.

strategic area that is considered as a means of keeping the Arabs from uniting due to the creation of the Jewish state in the Arab heartland.⁸⁴ Hence, borders, the question of political legitimacy, the creation of Israel and the constant threat of external intervention have all contributed to the legitimisation and evolving popularisation of Arab nationalist ideology over the years.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of Arab nationalism was its inability to coherently implement a revolutionary secular ideology in a deeply religious and primordial society. Despite the diversity of the region's inhabitants, the majority continued to identify with the dominant religion, Islam, which could also be attributed to the incoherent relationship between state and religion practised by the Nasserists and Ba'athists. Initially, Arab nationalists utilised broad societal values and policies targeting mutual community benefit, rather than individual values. This was not problematic in itself as the majority of Arab nationalists had a very close association with socialist ideological, political and economic practices, and were able to collectivise these practices, as well as mobilise capital towards attaining pan-Arab ideals, therefore further entrenching state survival. However, as Arab states progressed in their policies of modernisation and capitalism, these very societal features (socialist orientated policies) became problematic for contemporary politicians when they attempted to capitalise on the policy of the open market, and water-down the benefits of a welfare or socialist state. This shift away from state-run economics, corruption and over-bureaucratisation has not been an effortless task, nor one without controversy.

Primordial societal dispositions can also be linked to Arab political cultural ties with Islam, whereby the community, or *ummah al-Islami* (The Islamic Nation), is placed before the individual. Many 'traditional' Arabs view individualism as a Western modern concept, which is incompatible with traditional Arab-Islamic culture and Arab customs of generosity, hospitality, and communal sharing.

Primordial and traditional affiliation also have a tendency to be concerned more with symbolic rather than with phenomenal values. Phenomenal values, which were representative in pan-Arab ideology, tended to express desirable end states and modes of behaviour that are tangible, material and concrete. While the belief systems within Arab

⁸⁴ This point will be expanded upon in Chapter 2 when outlining external influences in the region.

political culture does not always possess these properties relying instead on "God's will", symbolism and primordial patriarchal concepts of honour, reputation, trust, and generosity. Primordialism is more representative of terminal, societal, and symbolic values that, in the long term, contributed to the failure of pan-Arab ideology as a credible socialist political structural ideal. This was most notable when pan-Arabist leaders themselves dishonoured the application of Arab nationalist policies and turned to autocratic methods of governance to secure their political longevity; both Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and Syria (Hafez al Assad) are archetypal examples.

In addition, and more problematic, is the ideological conflict between the Western concept of secularism and state, which Arab nationalists were espousing, and the Islamic belief that politics and religion are inseparable. Arab nationalists focused on the cultural and linguistic aspects of the political identity of state, society and citizenship, and therefore favoured a secular pan-Arab ideology. A number of Arab countries reflected this in the process of modern state building. For example, state constitutions entitled full citizenship to place of birth, regardless of religion, race or creed. This was clearly undertaken to reflect pan-Arab ideology, to ease the concerns of minorities and secularists, and to allow full integration of non-Muslims into the polity.

Yet additional articles stipulated that 'Islam is the state religion'. This could be due to a number of reasons. First, by separating themselves from religion Arab nationalists feared they would lose a large segment of the population's support; and second, such a statement reinforces the fact that *Shariah* (Islamic Law) would be the main, although not the only, source of legislation.⁶⁵ The affinity between Arabism and Islam was therefore emphasised, which in turn, marks Islam as a national religion and a major component of Arab nationalist ideology. Consequently, many non-Muslim minorities feared that despite the advocacy of secularism by Arab nationalist thought, the ideology had Islamic religious underpinnings, which was to varying degrees attested to by secularists and non-Muslim minorities such as the Christians of Lebanon and Iraq, and the Copts of Egypt.

The fear was that restrictions would be enforced on non-Muslim minorities by the, inclusionary largely Muslim dominated ruling elite. In Egypt, for example, no Coptic churches can be built and no structural changes within churches can be made without the

⁶⁵ S.E. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 5.

specific authorisation of the President. This was highlighted in 1991 when President Mubarak signed a presidential decree to allow the orthodox Coptic Church in Mit Barrah (in Manufiyya) to renovate its bathroom.⁸⁶

By embracing secularism, an inherent contradiction arose between Arab socialist political ideology, religious thought, and primordial affiliation. Arab nationalists attempted to compromise by incorporating the significance of the two ideologies in forging political-cultural identities. For example, Arab nationalists such as Sati' al-Husri cited the Prophet Muhammad as a 'noble Arab Prophet', and emphasised the affinity between Arabism and Islam. Such nationalists attempted to turn Islam into a national religion, thereby becoming a foundation of Arabism.⁸⁷ However, most countries which experienced such policies were caught between the dichotomies of traditionalism and modernism, neither separating the traditional aspects from political culture nor embracing secularism wholeheartedly within the political sphere, and therefore creating a sense of political and developmental stagnation and in some respects regression.

Another factor that contributed to the deficiency of Arab nationalism, while not unique to this ideology, is its ability to inflict exclusiveness and subordination on its potential support base. Arab nationalists stated that anyone perceiving themselves as Arab were included as fully fledged members of the 'Arab nation', regardless of ethnic origin, religion or sect. However, as Saad Eddin Ibrahim argues, it was exclusionary in the sense that it would not recognise non-Arab nationals or cultural groups as autonomous entities in their own right; though, as individual members of society they would be treated as equal 'Arab' citizens under the law.⁸⁸ According to figures used by Ibrahim the numbers of this excluded cleavage of 'non-Arabs' living in the region numbered some 20 million people in 1995.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ See Presidential Decree No. 157 published in *al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyya*, May 2 1991, and cited by AbuKhalli, op. cit., p. 36.

⁸⁷ Faksh, op. cit., p. 427, citing Sati' al-Husri, *Ara' wa Ahadith fil-Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah*, Cairo, 1951; *Ara' wa Ahadith fil Wataniyyah wal-Qawmiyyah*, Cairo, 1944; *Qustantin Zuraiq, Al-Wa'i al-Qawmi*, Beirut, 1949; Michel Aflaq *Dhikra al-Rasul al Arabi*, 2nd edition, Damascus, 1943.

⁸⁸ S.E. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 232. For more information see proceedings of the Constituent Conference of the Baath Party by Michel Aflaq, *For the Cause of Baath*, Beirut El Tali'a Publishing Centre, 1978, p. 121. For more information about the Ba'ath attitude towards minorities see M Dandeshley, *The Arab Socialist Baath Party: Part 1: Ideology and Political History*, Beirut El Talia Publishing Centre, 1979, pp. 92-95.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

The creation of the nation state and the adaptation of Arab nationalist ideology marginalised ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, Armenians, Berbers and Nubians. The Arabisation of these minorities also took place, sometimes successfully (Morocco) and other times less so (Algeria, Kurds, Sudan). In most cases, these ethnic minorities were socio-economically, culturally, linguistically and geographically repressed. The repeated utilisation of the following statement, or something similar in nature, underpinned the transition from a voluntary model of community to an enforced one:

Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be the best result of ignorance -- then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived -- then we must awaken him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness -- then we must work to limit his selfishness.⁹⁰

Statements such as this, as well as indoctrinated practises in turn, undermined the popularity and success of Arab nationalist doctrine.

An additional factor which weakened the attainment of Arab unity, while maintaining the continued dominance of Arab national identity, was the consequences of Ottoman and European colonisation and domination, and the ethnic and religious fragmentation of the Arab world. Together they have served as a major force distracting governments from developing the nation state. Some governments have expended extensive human effort and financial resources on fighting minorities and political opposition. Whether these conflicts are fought explicitly (Sudan and Iraq) or implicitly (Egypt) they have entailed the exhaustion of physical and monetary assets. In addition, the levels of dependency on former colonial powers and Western nations have further affected the success of national identity formation.

The militarisation, autocratisation, corruption and bureacratisation of pan-Arabist regimes and its ideology also contributed to the failure of Arab nationalism due to the question of political legitimacy of these regimes.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Kramer, op. cit., p. 181, quoting Sati' al-Husri in William Cleveland's, *The Making of An Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 127.

⁹¹ A point which will be examined in Chapter 2.

Just as there were supporters of this political persuasion, opponents also existed. Respective governments on the basis of Arab nationalist ideology and policies implemented major education campaigns. Not all citizens were convinced by its romantic ideal based on cultural symbols, appeals to the emotions of many of its inhabitants promoting Arabs are a homogenous entity, its involuntary recruitment drive, or its socialist tendencies.

Many of the former elites and wealthy minorities were less infatuated with this form of identification because of the conflicting nature of pan-Arab policies with their personal and traditional interests. Those who were not persuaded by the benefits of Arabism found much of their political power and influence diminished, and in some cases private property was nationalised via purchase or confiscation. Marginalisation of this small but significant elite led to the reinvestment of their capital in countries outside of the region, and in some cases their migration, which affected, to some degree, Arab nationalists' mobilisation of capital and investment, as well as non-Arab perception towards pan-Arabism.

Thus the lack of development and the corruption of pan-Arab ideologies and practices were experienced at many levels and within various spheres contributing to the failure of Arab nationalism and the subsequent abating of Arab identity. In summary, the major points contributing to the failure of Arab nationalism were:

1. Most governments, although paying lip service to the principles of Arab nationalism and the implementation of socialist policies, were in reality, advancing their own parochial agendas.
2. The question of political legitimacy and growing autocracy of Arab regimes.
3. The inability or unwillingness of Arab regimes to solve intra-Arab conflicts.
4. The priority of state political identity emerging within individual Arab states.
5. The regimes' attempt to shift focus from the significance of the Palestinian problem towards their own occupied territories and internal matters.
6. The shift towards religious-sectarian identification.
7. The lack of initiative demonstrated by Arab nationalists through their inability or lack of desire to further develop pan-Arab ideology. Instead they depended merely on Arab historic circumstances, symbolic and romanticised notions of shared history and identity.

Regardless of the international and regional opposition to political Arab national identity, Arab affiliation has comprehensively developed and focused on the issue of identity, so much so, that Arab national ideology has been labeled as 'identity mania', in addressing questions such as 'who are we?' Problematic however – and which contributed to its subsequent failure -- has been Arab nationalism's deficiency in addressing 'what are we going to do?' and 'how can we do it?'.⁹² This very loophole contributed to its loss of support over the years, and its inability to cope with the increased internationalisation of world politics. A Moroccan scholar, Bin 'Adb al-'Ali, observed that the 'identity' mania present in the region amounts to 'a pathological obsession with identity':

What is more, this search for identity is only manifested at a static level of reaction and emotion. It is not the outcome of an actual engagement in a real act of constructing the self through interaction with the other, but is a purely theoretical issue, concerned merely with 'displaying ourselves to the other' in endless, repetitive letters of 'introduction'.⁹³

8. The failure of Communism, and the end of superpower rivalry for hegemony in the region marked the end of the Soviet Union arming and financing the pro-Communist camp in the Arab world. The end of this era left the Arab allies (as well as other groups/states internationally) politically and strategically vulnerable, and no longer providing them with the political, military and economic aid. This in turn, made the Arabs reassess their public behaviour, particularly within the international arena and the development of domestic policies in the post-Cold War era.

9. External intervention.

10. The lack of economic, political and social progress during the pan-Arab period.

11. The failure of the 1958 United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria which disintegrated officially in September 1961.

12. The emergence of the 'politics of disillusionment' and exhaustion with the decades-long state of war. Challenging components encompass: globalisation and the ascendancy of capitalism, continued external intervention, internal discontent, and the emerging 'peace' agreements between Israel and some Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority.

Despite these challenges, Arab nationalism and socialism brought many advantages to the populace. First and foremost, it gave the Arabs an identity shaped by shared time,

⁹² Foley, *Ideas that Shape Politics*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & NY, 1994, p. 8 of 10 pages.

⁹³ Foley, *Ibid*, citing Bin 'Abd Al-'Ali, 'Abd al-Salam (192), *Hawas al-Hawiyya*, (Identity Mania), *Al-Hayat*, 23 November 1992.

space and history, collective memory, territory and civilisation as well as drawing on nostalgic memories of past and future dreams.⁹⁴

Second, through the spread of literacy, the growth of the Arabic press and reliance on radio and television to broadcast the message of Arab nationalism, the ruling elites at the time could generally control political discourse and influence its citizens in an effective manner whether it was through the adoption of pan-Arab language to veil domestically inclined policies (Jordan and the Gulf states), or by being swept up in the pan-Arab euphoria (Yemen, Morocco).

Third, in the early years, pan-Arab socialist policies reflected more equality in the distribution of wealth and social reform. Redistribution measures such as land reform, nationalisation of foreign and upper class assets, provision of equal opportunities and the adoption of meritocratic systems of employment were put into effect; universal open and free education and health systems were offered in most Arab countries. Real social change was taking place although political reforms were still tightly controlled. Despite this latter flaw, many of the poorer, middle class and intelligentsia were attracted to Arab nationalism, the concept of social justice⁹⁵, and identified with a collective Arab identity. Many Arabs considered 'Arabism' as an integral sub-structure of their identity, and in many cases this superseded their religious, sectarian, traditional or ethnic identities.⁹⁶ Finally, amongst the majority of the population there was hope that the combined wealth of the Arab nations would bring much prosperity, prestige and power to the region; almost reflecting on the Arabs' former days of golden opportunity and discovery.

Arab identity and nationalism continues to persist today although more in the 'low politics' than the 'high politics' part of the dichotomy. The Western media and many 'Middle East' experts seem to ignore, or overlook, the fact that Arab public opinion differs from the ruling elite, and this was evident during the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict and the signing of numerous 'peace' accords between the Palestinians, some Arab states and the Israeli government.

⁹⁴ Barakat, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁹⁵ Whereby, people are entitled to basic social rights, food, housing, clothing, security, etc, and thereafter any surpluses, be distributed in a fair and equitable way for all citizens.

⁹⁶ S.E Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

The actual force of Arab public opinion is yet to be determined, and, over the past decade has been reaching boiling point. The reaction of many Arab citizens to regional events indicates that state borders are not as permanent as leaders would like to think they are. The sympathy towards the Iraqi populace for its suffering under harsh economic sanctions, the double standards in international condemnation towards Arab violations of international laws and conventions whilst ignoring other violations of international law, and the fixation with Arab military capabilities is indicative of Western fears of Arab political and military power. Meanwhile, non-Arab or Arab 'friendly' states' capabilities and violations of international and humanitarian laws are downplayed. It remains to be seen for how much longer the Arab populace is prepared to accept these domestic, regional and international setbacks, as well as cope with government corruption, bureaucracy and incompetence.

Although all of the aforementioned external and domestic components are sufficient to test any form of political ideology, they have not easily uprooted a popular form of nationalism and identity. Arab nationalism has strong roots, and this has been historically and periodically reinforced. Some would argue that Arab nationalism was surfing the 'last wave' of nationalism⁹⁷ and proclaim the 'death' of Arab nationalism⁹⁸, yet it could be argued these observers are merely confusing 'the failure of a particular discourse of nationalism with the failure of nationalism', or suggesting that the death of a person implies the death of an idea.⁹⁹

It is within this context that, with the resurgence of regionalism internationally and the challenge of globalisation, Arabs may find it in their best interests to re-consider their common links and shared destiny if a viable 'Middle Eastern' entity is to successfully emerge. In order for this to be successful however political national identity and sovereignty of the nation state need to be addressed. The support base for Arab identity continues to be strong while the desire and need for state sovereignty remains, as is the case with the European Union. A new form of Arab nationalism could develop in a different framework than it did in the mid-20th Century by learning from past mistakes and focusing instead on its rich diversity of human and natural resources.

⁹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, NY & London, 1991.

⁹⁸ Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978-1979, pp. 355-73.

⁹⁹ Gelvin, "Modernity and its Discontents: On the Durability of Nationalism in the Arab Middle East", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, pp. 71-89, p. 73.

Current Arab nationalists are more realistic about the prospects of Arab unity. Their ideas are no longer based on a utopia or an illusion. They are well aware of the difficulties and obstacles in attaining full, or partial, Arab unity. It is now acknowledged by some Arab nationalists that freedom of movement and speech, democratisation, and tolerance of minorities and sects are integral to the success of future Arab unity, and have learnt from previous mistakes that Bin 'Adb al-'Ali potently outlined.¹⁰⁰

However, whether Arab nationalists will have another chance of applying their ideology largely depends on the desire of regimes to move towards democracy, political pluralism and fair and equal elections, as well as the organisation of Arab nationalists themselves. If proponents of Arab nationalism are given a fair chance to participate in the political process, and they apply a well planned political agenda, then it would not be unreasonable to expect them to regain political support, particularly from the lower and middle classes who still largely support the concept of Arab identity and hold significant voting power. This is especially so if Arab nationalists are able to promote democracy, and not revert to autocratic forms of government. Although, whether such an outcome will arise is purely speculative, as proponents of Islamic theocracy have argued the same points and their experimentation with any form of liberal democracy have not always been exemplary; Iran post-1979 is a case in point.

Inevitably, the disillusionment with Arab nationalism left an ideological vacuum. Increasingly, this seems to be filled by religious allegiance or other primordial ties. Although this is not exclusively found in the Arab world, as demonstrated in the post-Cold War era in the former states of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia.

In reality most, if not all, of these current forms of nationalism are not new but are reawakening after decades, if not centuries, of hibernation or containment. This shift emerged after the 1967 Arab defeat. The noticeable gap between, the radical (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria) and moderate (Jordan, Gulf emirates) Arab state's, produced an Arab Cold War that highlighted the deficiencies of the applied form of Arab nationalism. In addition, there is the underlying assumption that if one political identity (Islam) is supplemented by another (Arab nationalism), then it is no longer viable or is powerless to resist the new force; leading to the assumption that Arab society is passive or

¹⁰⁰ AbuKhalil, op. cit., pp. 27-29.

undeveloped. However this is a false assumption, especially considering that Arab societies, and individuals, continue to be divided about these very political identifications that have dominated their pasts and regulate their present. Therefore to assume that the emergence of a new political identity will clear an individual or society of past affiliations is incorrect.¹⁰¹

A resurgence of a variant form of a primordial pan Arab-Islamic nationalism should not be discounted, especially considering Arab inhabitants' reactions to Israeli and Western aggression on fellow Arabs, as was witnessed in the many protests and frustrations expressed during the bombing of Iraq, or against Israeli aggression in Lebanon or towards the Palestinians. These examples suggest shared Arab interests and sympathy for fellow Arabs persist, despite the restrictive internal security infrastructures and media control of many Arab regimes. Although, some of these protests may have been state sanctioned, this demonstrates the necessity of Arab regimes to allow an outlet for controlled protest, rather than having their authority publicly challenged and uncensored by the international community. To dismiss the power of the people, who may not adhere to Arab nationalist ideology *per se* but are frustrated with the plight of fellow Arabs and the political leanings of the region generally, is both dangerous and naive.

¹⁰¹ Fouad Ajami coined the phrase "the end of Pan-Arabism" in 1978, which has since been adopted by others. See Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978-79, pp. 355-73. However, this is not to say a new variant could not re-emerge as As'as AbuKhalil and Faysal Darraj have argued. See AbuKhalil, "A New Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 22-36; and Darraj, *Al-Qawmi al-Arabi fi zaman al-qutriyya al-tabi'a* (The Arab Nationalist in the Era of Subservient Regionalism), *al-Hadaf*, January 20, 1991, pp. 12-13.

1.2.3. Phase 3: 1967 to the Present Day -The Period of Disillusionment.

Since calls for independence first emerged, the third phase of popular political-cultural identification, state nationalism has had a latent following. However, it did not emerge substantially until after the 1967 *nakba*. The political vacuum arose due to the 1967 defeat and the failure of Arab nationalism to solve any of the region's considerable economic, political or social problems. Contradictory policies towards state and regional problems further contributed to the failure of government initiatives and long-term development. This period also witnessed the emergence of state national identity, autocracy, and minority ethnic/religious political identity. These factors came to affect almost every Arab state upon the withering status of Arab nationalism. These two factors however, did not emerge comprehensively until the latter part of the 1970s and the early 1980s.

For many post-colonial countries the 1950s through to the 1970s were largely a period of repossessing their own identity by questioning and revisiting their historical roots. Many countries were considering the issues of citizenship, nationalism, secularism and reformulating their religious beliefs and identification. Since the 1970s, political development has focused on social and economic growth and development, the strengthening of civil society, and the issues of citizenship and state national identity. However since the 1970s, the salience of ethnic politics in the region also came to affect almost every state in one form or the other. In some cases the conflicts which arose were at the very essence of the country's political existence -- such as the collapse of the confessional system in Lebanon, the Sunni revolt against Alawi-dominated Syria, the Shi'ite and Kurdish revolt against Sunni-dominated Iraq, the Coptic and Berber issues in North Africa, the increasing presence of Palestinians in both Jordan and Lebanon, and the widening ethnic and racial divisions among Israeli Jews. Simultaneously, with the immediate failure of Arab nationalism other forms of national identity have (re)emerged, some of which are based on state and sub-regional identification.

The shift from *Qawmiyya* to *Qatriyya* became more evident in the late 1970s, when the individual state system and national interests were seen as more important than attaining a unified Arab nation.¹⁰² Nation-state building dominated the attention of the ruling elites.

¹⁰² Although state nationalism existed in the Arab world prior to the 1970s, this author is suggesting that in many cases state nationalism during the period of colonialism was considered by many ruling elites as a means of attaining independence, and in some cases as a means of reaching the broader and more desirable goal of pan-Arabism. When independence was gained, the ruling elite began to personalise its rule as it conflicted with the broader ideal of pan-Arabism. The failure of the 1967 war was a turning point on two fronts. First, it undermined

Cultural ministries began rewriting the history of their respective countries, focusing on ancient civilisations and peoples such as the Mesopotamians and Phoenicians, and the Pharaonic era.¹⁰³ Arabs began identifying themselves as 'Iraqis', 'Egyptians', 'Lebanese' etc. Despite the domestic challenges presented by religious and ethnic groups, the focus predominantly remains on individual nation-state identity and sovereignty with underlying allegiances to both primordial and Arab national identity. This, in turn, has caused underlying tension between the different forms of political identities and affiliations, as well as limiting the potential for a solid decolonised national identity.

Simultaneously, socialist tendencies were slowly being replaced by IMF and World Bank reforms, and a move toward free market orientations. Another political force, which strongly emerged was the politicisation of religion, particularly political Islam. Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, it has been increasingly evident that a struggle is emerging between liberal state secular modernists and traditional religious forces in the region. The secular regimes of *Al Maghreb* and *Al Mashreq* continue to have the upper hand with their control of the tools of government and symbiosis with the political elite. Whether this can continue indefinitely is unclear.

Other forms of identity which were in existence prior to this period have also re-emerged since 1967, most notably the concept of sub-regional and ethnic identification which in some respects is both challenging and accommodating this dichotomy between the growing strength of both secular modernists and religious forces.

Although both Arab nationalism and Arab political-cultural identity continued to be dominant amongst the majority of Arabs, by the 1970s, the Arab world experienced growth in the young, literate urban population which supported the expansion of democratic socialist tendencies. Calls for the implementation of social justice, equal distribution of wealth, national strength and genuine independence emerged, and this involved each government owning and running its respective state resources and utilities. With the loss of

the future revival of pan-Arabism, and secondly it promoted the concept of state nationalism. In the past three decades there has been a notable shift in state domestic policies. The shift in focus has been on nation building through economic, social and political reforms rather than centralising its policies purely on military development and at the cost of its own society. Although military expenditure continues to remain high in comparison to other developing world countries, it nevertheless, has declined substantially over the years.

¹⁰³ An interesting article addressing this matter was written by Amatzia Baram, "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4, October 1990, pp. 425-448.

the remainder of Palestine to Israel, as well as the occupation of further Arab lands (the Syrian Golan Heights, Egyptian Sinai Desert, and Jordanian East Bank), the Palestinian cause took a step backwards whilst the Arab states were digesting their losses.

As a result, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) asserted itself under the new Fatah leadership, realising the Arab states were not going to, and were unable to, provide military support for the Palestinian cause. With the death of Nasser, 'Nasserism', Arab nationalism and socialism began to lose its appeal and was gradually replaced by a shift towards quasi-capitalist ideologies, economic rationalism and state nationalism, as well as the strengthening of the internal security apparatus and autocratic rule.

Sadat's peace with Israel turned Arab nationalism around unexpectedly. Although Egypt was ostracised for many years for making peace with Israel, Egypt was in some respects admired by opponents of Arab nationalism for its ability to leave the Arab mantle while still pursuing national interests. Other Arab states, such as Jordan and the Gulf states in particular, furtively followed Egypt's path. Arab national destiny began to be replaced with 'Syrian', 'Jordanian', 'Lebanese' or 'Iraqi' national interests.

In some respects, by positioning themselves as sovereign independent states within their colonially drawn boundaries they in turn, whether knowingly or not, were legitimising Israel in spite of having so long denied and fought against that country. That is, by promoting a unique national state identity and acknowledging the *fait accompli* of their respective state borders the Arabs accepted the creation of the modern 'Middle East' and thereby unambiguously recognised the existence and perhaps legality of Israel as part of this entity.

The inconsistency did not stop here. By the late 1970s and early 1980s it became increasingly evident that the same leaders who were endorsing Arab nationalism and making the symbolic transition to state nationalism, liberalism and democracy were themselves increasingly autocratic and reliant upon the dictates of one-party and/or one-man rule. This could be considered in light of the question of political legitimacy of rulers such as Syria's late President Hafez al Assad, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, and up until recently Iraq's former President Saddam Hussein, who have rhetorically secured their

positions and longevity. Due to the failure of past political ideologies and the continued lack of political reform many within the region's polity are experiencing bouts of disillusionment, cynicism and nihilism.

The desire for change and irrespective of its benefits or costs to the wider community was witnessed in the considerable support attained during the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by an orthodox Shi'ite revolutionary movement in 1979. This had repercussions throughout the Islamic and non-Islamic world. Although most regimes feared and condemned this act, it nonetheless caused many Arab and Islamic countries to make a superficial yet public shift from socialist and liberal political identification towards an outward and more accommodating view of political Islam and religious identity for fear of reprisals from an increasingly disillusioned, vocal and militant underclass.

Such a political shift had repercussions on Egypt especially after the assassination of Sadat by *Jamaat al-Jihad*. Initially President Mubarak had worked towards encouraging Islamists to become involved in mainstream politics and also institutionalised Islam by means of increased religious consciousness and observance. There was also the proliferation of Islamic institutions, social welfare services, and the media. These led to a new form of dress by many students and professionals in the middle and upper-middle classes. However, by the late 1980s-early 1990s, Mubarak's policy failed to effectively co-opt or curtail Islamic opposition. So the regime commenced targeting both religious extremists and moderates.¹⁰⁴ Like Egypt, many Arab regimes embodied the stark contradiction of the autocratic secular state they represented, within an autocratic 'religious' shell.

The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988), was not only a 'real politik' war, it was also a symbolic conflict on three dimensions. First, it personified the long and intense conflict between secularism and religious identification; second, it typified the ongoing theological conflict between the Shi'ite and Sunna; and third, it upheld the centuries-long hostility between the Persians and the Arabs. The first two dimensions have persisted both explicitly (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Palestinian territories, Iraq, Algeria) and implicitly (Syria, Qatar) and have considerably impacted on state development and legitimacy.

¹⁰⁴ Esposito and Voll, Chapter 8, "Egypt: Governmental, Populist, and Extremist Islam in Conflict", *Islam and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, NY, 1996, pp. 173-191.

Since this period many countries in the region have had a contradictory political platform. Political history suggests that Arab leaders have a tendency to remain in power for life but outwardly convey a semblance of democracy by holding 'elections' and other democratic principles to confirm their reign. Upon 're-election' they undertake a process of legitimising their rule by conforming to and promoting the most dominant political identity of the day – Arab nationalism, state nationalism, primordial-religious identity. In reality, however, although aspects of these ideologies are adopted selectively, autocratic rule continues to dominate many political situations of the Arab world today.

This is reflected in the economic, political and social dissatisfaction of many inhabitants today. Dissatisfaction became glaringly obvious when attempts at political liberalisation proved farcical, with 'elections' or political reforms found to be invalid (Algeria 1992, Kuwait), as a result of vote rigging and/or voter manipulation (Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon). Modernisation and the extensive reach of satellite television and the internet have further illustrated to the region's citizens the undemocratic and autocratic nature of the regimes. State controlled media and information can no longer control the minds of citizens with the same omnipresence or intensity as in the past, suggesting that a quiet shift is taking place in the underlying political orientation of the region's inhabitants.

The changing international political scene also adversely affected the 'Middle East'. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Arab elites were politically and strategically vulnerable and unable to counter Western influence, demonstrating that reliance and dependency on the Soviets was doomed to failure in the long-term. Military assistance, political support and economic aid were undermined, leaving Arab elites with the need to reassess their international role. For example, the Syrian position during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict demonstrated the Syrian government's acknowledgment of the changing international relations due to the lack of political alternatives, and hence their willingness to partake in the anti-Iraq coalition.

These international changes also reconfigured the power equation in the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, in conjunction with the strengthening of Israel via consistent US support, and the military and political undermining of Arab states through a lack of Soviet military aid and support. This confirmed the foresight Nasser possessed in the 1950s, when the Cold War was at its peak. He argued that reliance on either superpower was neither essential

nor rewarding, and that Arab independence, regional understanding and dialogue were the only way to achieve and enhance post-colonial relations and development.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the post-Cold War era gave rise to the polarisation of a unipolar world. States that were traditionally dependent on Soviet support found themselves as less credible players in both regional politics and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. This forced them to acclimatise to the international realpolitik or take a step back.

As well as the political challenges, regional governments have also been afflicted by the world economic downturn. Poor economic circumstances have exacerbated dissatisfaction towards the ruling elites. This was noted, for example, in the 1995 World Bank Report entitled *Claiming the Future*. It found that some 260 million people of the 'Middle East' region exported fewer manufactured goods than Finland's population of five million. In real terms, wages in 1995 were no more than what the average wage earner was obtaining in 1970. Private capital and investment disproportionately bypassed this region, with a mere 1% invested there, whilst per capita income has fallen by approximately 2% per year.¹⁰⁶ This is especially evident in the Gulf States as a result of declining world oil prices since the 1980s.¹⁰⁷

Corruption and lack of accountability is rampant in the Arab world. For example, it is estimated that between 18 and 30% of the revenue from petroleum exports was not reported in budgets in some Gulf states.¹⁰⁸ The bulk of this money is invested overseas. In fact it has been reported that an estimated \$350 billion of private Arab capital has been deposited and invested abroad by wealthy Arab business people. This is one area where real reform is needed. Government embezzlement needs to cease, and the regulation of local capital investment needs to be more prudent in order to stop the secret overseas investment of state funds. By failing to do so the nation, its citizens and its future will suffer

¹⁰⁵ This was noted a memorandum Nasser wrote after meeting with John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, 11 May 1956. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 39.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* Although, per capita income is also a rather unreliable measure when 2-5% of the world's population own about 90% of wealth.

¹⁰⁷ From 1984 to 1994, real per capita GDP fell from \$12,740 to \$7,140 in Bahrain; \$22,480 to \$16,000 in Kuwait; \$6,892 to \$4,915 in Oman; \$31,100 to \$15,070 in Qatar; \$11,450 to \$6,725 in Saudi Arabia, and \$27,620 to \$14,100 in the UAE. Byman & Green, "The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies", *MERIA -- Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1999, 17 pp, quoting Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance", *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 1997, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 133-148, p. 143.

economically, politically and socially and contribute to the cyclic exploitation of Arab resources.

Over the years this has become more evident in the widening paradigm between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' throughout the region. Economic rationalisation, depleting oil funds, greed, tighter aid budgets, depleting foreign reserves, demographic explosion, and laggard reforms are contributing to the strengthening of state national identity over collective Arab identity. These developments have also become evident in traditionally wealthy nation-states such as the Gulf monarchies. Consequently this will impact heavily on the traditional dynamics of socio-political and economic relations in such states, especially amongst citizens who have known nothing but extravagance and wealth.

1.2.3.1. State nationalism

It is against this backdrop that many within the ruling elite began demanding change in politics, particularly in state political culture and identity. The shift and development of *al-dawlah al-qatriyya*, the territorial state or state national interest, has been positive in terms of bringing about the forced examination and development of state national political identity.

Increasingly, state governments are utilising many educational tools to strengthen and transpose this new form of national identity, that is, orientating it towards state rather than regional identification. One particular tool being adopted by governments, or state cultural ministries, is the reversion to their respective ancient histories. In particular, referring to pre-Arab and pre-Islamic glory to illustrate their richness, longevity and unique history and culture.

For example, the Syrians have highlighted their ancient pan-Arab civilisation, in particular the notion of 'Greater Syria', the Jordanians ancient identifications with Nabatean Petra and Roman-Umayyad Jerash, and the Lebanese their Phoenician civilisation.¹⁰⁹ There has

¹⁰⁹ For a more in depth outline to the utilisation of ancient identifications by contemporary Arab governments see Amatzia Baram's article, "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4, October 1990, pp. 425-448. For example, in 1987-88 Iraq embarked on an extensive campaign of archaeological excavations and reconstructions, including the creation of archaeological museums to highlight the connection between the ancient civilisations of Mesopotamia and modern Iraq.

been intense focus upon historical architecture, the arts, poetry and prose, and in recent years there has been a greater allocation of state funding to archaeological digs and restorations of antiquities.

Ancient history and culture is being utilised, and in some cases Arabised by modern day governments to afford legitimacy to state national identity. This is helping them to escape from previous Arab identifications, and assisting states to differentiate themselves from neighbouring and regional countries by promoting individuality and uniqueness. Many are feeling the desire to break from the immediate past and the conceptual prison formulated to restrict its citizens to think, be and act Arab, which in turn restrained them from the capacity or freedom to explore alternative forms of identification or the concept of multiple identities.

One such underlying development reflecting this change is evident in the cultural sphere, namely between Arab popular culture and state national culture. Increasingly, debates have revolved around whether *Maghrebi* singers have the right to sing *Khaleeji* songs and whether *Mashreqi* singers could sing *Maghrebi* songs and vice versa, because of the differences in dialects and word usage. Although this is not to suggest that people are becoming overly preoccupied with state nationalism, as the debate does not transcend to this level, it is, however, a new divergence from the past. Formerly, most Arab singers were promoted as 'Arab', and worked towards promoting the Arab ideal and common culture, such as the great Egyptian singer Umm Kalthoum, whereas in recent years they are being promoted as 'Kuwaiti', 'Lebanese' or 'Egyptian' artists.

On another front, there have been small but vocal segments of the community who are calling for the formal language of Arabic to be replaced by the national/regional dialect in question, e.g. that the *Khaleeji* dialect replace classical Arabic; Egyptian dialect replace classical Arabic, as advocated by Sali'ma Musa, while Lebanese thinker Saed Aqal has stated that there is no such thing as an Arabic language, only, for example 'Lebanese'. Such ideas are not new to the region and have long been promoted by a small segment of society. Nevertheless, it illustrates the argument that language is a conditioning tool. It remains to be seen how far liberals will go in promoting state nationalism through cultural and political policies. However, what is increasingly evident is the discourse in the Arabic language and culture that has been pseudo-creolised through classical, spoken and

dialectic Arabic as well as foreign languages, be they English, French or Russian. Hence, through Christian missionaries, Arab travellers, Ottoman and European colonisation, imperialism, government policies, and currently globalisation, Arab culture is becoming hybridised and it is not known at this point in time how this will affect the long term viability of the Arabic language and culture.

On a political front, the post-Gulf conflict period re-emphasised the shift that has taken place over the decades, whereby state interests and priorities continue to replace the past commitment to collective Arab gain and development. This was also recognised in the inability, or non-desire, of Arab states to find a political solution to this major inter-Arab dispute. Similar, but less historically changing, precedents were set when the lack of coordination in support of fellow Arabs in international situations such as the UN imposed economic and trade embargo on Libya for harbouring two Libyans suspected of bombing a US airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 were evident over the decades, and led Arab nations to the state they had arrived at in August 1990.

Since the 1980s many states have openly adopted the 'Sadat model' of politics. That being so, setting state based interests ahead of pan-Arab interests which have included breaking with the tradition of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict multilaterally by signing bilateral agreements with Israel (Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco).

State national identity and interests increased substantially since 1991, particularly when PLO Chairperson, Yasser Arafat, signed the Oslo Accords with Israel in September 1993. An immediate consequence was that the Jordanians followed suit. The decision by the PLO and the Jordanians to unilaterally discuss peace with Israel rendered multilateral collective Arab negotiations with Israel impossible. Instead, each state privately discussed 'peace' with its long time foe. Although Oslo and subsequent agreements did little to regain occupied Palestinian lands. Under the quiet pretext that it had now been adequately dealt with the Palestinian problem, was overlooked by fellow Arabs. This was reflected in the withdrawal of the UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism, and the lifting of the ban on Israeli produced and manufactured products. Other occupied lands were given greater prominence, as did the further promotion of state sovereignty, independence, and identity.

Only Iran and a handful of Arab governments – Syrian, Lebanese, Libyan and Iraqi – have maintained a public stand on this issue, refusing to enter any agreements with Israel unilaterally, insisting that Israel abide by all UN Resolutions, demanding its unconditional withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands, and questioning the validity of the region's colonially imposed map.

In spite of this, it can be argued that if Syria is able to obtain the full return of the Golan Heights, it would be happy to deal unilaterally with Israel, regardless of the Palestinian situation. By satisfying Syria, the Lebanese government will in all likelihood follow its lead.¹¹⁰ This demonstrates how far personal and state national interests have come to take precedence over common Arab sentiment, and is further reflected in Arab League meetings that have taken place since the start of the 1990s. Although many Arab leaders spoke the language of pan-Arabism, their domestic policies and conduct of foreign affairs demonstrated otherwise. With this commenced the era of Arab leaders facing two opposing audiences (domestic and international), which remains today to varying degrees and was demonstrated in the second *Intifada* (2000) meeting of Arab League members. Domestic audiences were appeased with mass government sponsored fundraising exercises for the Palestinians, as well as the rhetoric of assisting in the 'liberation of Palestine'. While, on the other hand, the majority of Arab leaders yielded to international pressure to 'demonstrate restraint', fearing the political and economic ramifications. Overall the meeting, like many before, had failed to achieve any substantial points of action or result.

The willingness of the majority of Arab governments to agree to the less than comprehensive and just 'peace' agreements disgusted many of their citizens and those still advocating pan-Arab aspirations. Cynicism increased amongst many inhabitants. By recalling the events of 1948, 1967 and the sacrifices made since in the name of Arabism many felt their lives and destiny were abused by Arab leaders who manipulated them and the development of their respective countries for little more than further political and

¹¹⁰ To demonstrate the development towards state national interest rather than broader Arab interests the Syrian position in Lebanon is a case in point. Although publicly Syria's presence in Lebanon is conjured as a 'brotherly Arab act' for a neighbour (Lebanon) in need of its assistance during civil unrest, in political realist terms it is considered as a stronger political entity taking advantage of its power over a weaker and divided neighbour, which can be considered as a vassalage. Syria's position in Lebanon is generally considered as the reward Syria gained from participating in the Gulf conflict alliance; a free hand in Lebanon. Therefore any sense of loyalty to Arab nationalism supersedes state nationalism and personal interests as indicated in Syria's position in both the Gulf conflict and the domestic situation in Lebanon, hence Lebanon's general compliance with Syria's political policies.

personal advancement. Consequently, these events and actions have divided the Arab populace. While apathy and disillusionment among Arabs continue to rise, some segments of the community have sought to encourage their respective governments to promote their political and cultural rights and due process, whilst others have turned to religion and other primordial beliefs.

1.2.3.2. Islamic Political-Cultural Identity.

... the Green Peril is described as a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of Western values and threatening the national security of the United States.¹¹¹

The emergence of Islamism on the international political and cultural scene has brought with it misunderstanding and misperception. In fact, since its inception back in the 7th Century, the Judeo-Christian world has largely misunderstood, fought and been intolerant towards Islam or its adherents. Similarly, the Islamic world has misunderstood the non-Islamic world and in some instances categorised it as dominating, sinful, corrupt and immoral. All sides have been misconstruing the other for their own political purposes and advancement. The reality is that dialogue cannot be attained without all sides being prepared to shatter the overpowering portrayal of ignorance of 'the Other', and overcome the fear that each has fabricated of 'the Other' over the centuries.

It is overwhelmingly evident that throughout every religion and faith there exist devout followers who identify themselves solely along religious or sectarian lines. The 'Middle East' region is the cradle of such devotees. It is a historically significant area, being the birthplace of the three major monotheistic religions. More recently, with the promotion of faith as a private and public form of identification, this has contributed to a growing number of people identifying themselves purely or predominantly along religious lines.

With the struggle of many political Western secular ideologies, and the politics of disillusionment sweeping the region as a whole, the number of people identifying themselves personally and publicly – whether politically and/or culturally -- along religious lines is increasing. This is evident not only amongst Muslims, but also among Christians, Jews, and many other significant religions and ethnicities around the world, such as, for

¹¹¹ Hadar, "What Green Peril?" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 27-42, pp. 27-29.

example, within the former Yugoslavia, Burundi, India, Kashmir, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Chechnya.

However, religious identification is not a new phenomenon nor in all likelihood will it disappear as a dominant political identity. Since about 33 AD, and after the reformation and the disestablishment period in Europe, Christians ability to separate religion into private and public domains has not always been non-controversial or a peaceful matter. Thus such difficulties need to be acknowledged when discussing the separation of state and religion in non-Christian domains. However, unlike the Western world, which has worked towards the separation of Church and state, the Muslim world inextricably maintains such links. In most instances, Islam continues to be interpreted by the religious orthodoxy, invoking the links between state and religion, advocating that Islam provides a framework for society. With this belief, as well as the intensity of Islamic leaders and groups in attracting followers, there has been an increasing fear amongst locals, regional inhabitants and internationally of 'Islamic fundamentalism'¹¹² emerging as the new international uncontrollable ideological threat; replacing the once feared 'Red Peril'.¹¹³

The force of political Islam is unknown, and its variant beliefs are even more alien to the non-Islamic world. Islam's religious ideology will continue to be misconceived if Orientalist and sensationalised media reporting continue to promote fear and ignorance. Some, high-standing independent Muslim clerics may have contributed to this misunderstanding and tarnished the true nature of Islam. The roots of this renewed ideology needs to be understood to be comprehended. In addition its variances across the Islamic world needs to be closely examined, and how it may impact on the political and cultural identity construct of any given individual, nation-state, and region.

a. Diversion towards Islamic political-cultural identity.

According to Islamists, Arab nationalists blundered by breaking the link between Islam and the Arabs during the time of the Arab Revolt. It was said that the nationalists stood against fellow Muslims (the Turks) and 'conspired with the infidels' (the Europeans), thus departing

¹¹² This author takes 'fundamentalism' to mean rigid and extreme religious orthodoxy based on literal reading of Scriptures and consequent restraint upon liberal social change.

¹¹³ This has also been increasingly evident in literature emerging from Israel under the guise of the 'terrorist threat'. See Peres, *The New Middle East*, Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*.

from religious solidarity (Islamic *asabiyya*). In turn, the dismemberment of Ottomanism and religious solidarity bought about the failure of Arab nationalism, as well as the promotion of non-Islamic practices.

This is further emphasised in the Islamic interpretation of the *nakba*, which argues the Arabs reverted to *Jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic paganism) resulting in the denigration of the Islamic religion and contributing to Arab political disasters such as the Palestine experience and the creation of the modern 'Middle East'.¹¹⁴ Proponents of this school of thought argue that the importation of Western models of thought, such as secular nationalism, ultimately bought about the destruction of Arab society, concluding:

... if the 1948 *nakba* symbolised the failure of Arabic liberal thought, the 1967 *nakba* symbolised the defeat of the Arab socialism. *Al-nakba*, therefore, is not a defeat of the Arab nation or the Arab armies but a symptom of the failure of imported western ideological trends such as secularism, liberalism, socialism, nationalism, because all of them are in contradiction with the basic principles of Islam.¹¹⁵

As with many supporters of Islamic identity, the European-based United Muslim Students Organisation insists that the only solution to the ills of modern society lies in the return to Islam. For, "Islam, and Islam alone, as a religion and a civilisation is the only condition for our existence and survival as a nation and a culture".¹¹⁶ Tibawi adds that the application and adherence to Islam would give Arabs a purpose, pride, strength and courage to fight Western and Zionist infiltration.¹¹⁷

During the heyday of Arab nationalism, Arab national theorists such as Nasser and Michel Aflaq believed Islam needed to be studied and understood, particularly in relation to its contributions to the history of the Arab nation and Arab identity. However, they could not conceive of Islam as an all-embracing system. Rather, they believed that religious groups in the Arab world should study the legacy of Islam and "should take pride in it and deduct

¹¹⁴ For further information see Dr S al-Munajjid *A'midat al-nakba: bahth ilmi fi asbab hazimat khamsa huzayram* (The Pillars of Disaster: A Scientific Study of the Reasons of the Fifth of June Defeat) Beirut 1967.

¹¹⁵ Dessouki, op. cit., pp. 189-90. For further reading see Muhammed J Kishk, *al-Qawmiyya wa al-ghazw al-fikri* (Nationalism and Ideological Conquest), Kuwait Maktabat al-Amal, 1967, and *al-Masrkisiyya wa al-ghazw al-fikri* (Marxism and Ideological Conquest), Kuwait Maktabat al-Amal, 1969, pp. 103-120.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 190 quoting *Ma ba'ad al-nakbatayn* (After the Two Disasters), European United Muslim Students Organisation, Bonn, 1968, pp. 1-3.

¹¹⁷ Tibawi "Towards Understanding and Overcoming the Catastrophe", *Middle East Forum*, XLIV, 3, 1968, p. 36.

lessons from its glorious achievements in the fields of ethics and knowledge, and thus come closer to each other and struggle anew as one man in the battle of their single destiny".¹¹⁸ Thus, Arab nationalists in the past attempted to incorporate Islam as a primary, but not sole, element of Arab ideology and nationalism.

Ironically, although Arab nationalism attempted to consolidate all segments of the community under the banner of Arab nationalist thought, and utilised past historical events to glorify the golden period of the Arabs, they ignored the fact that the very period they sanctified and publicised was considered by Shi'ite Muslims as their most disastrous and darkest days. Shi'ite heroes were martyred by the same Sunni Caliphs glorified in Arab nationalist history. This isolated a large number of potential supporters, and also conflicted with the Shi'ites' concept of Islamic Shi'ite nationalism, an ideal, which had been supported after the success of the 1979 Iranian revolution.¹¹⁹

Islamists, on the other hand, regarded Islam and any form of nationalism as mutually exclusive. Traditionalist-Islamists believed that Islam is all-embracing and cannot, and should not, be separated from the state. The link between state and religion amongst Muslims is a normative belief system, a social phenomenon and an integral part of historical reality. Reversion to secularisation cannot arise according to Islamists.

Islamist theoreticians such as Hassan al-Banna, Said Qutb, Mawlana Mawdudi and Hassan al-Turabi contend that the Arab and Islamic world has become morally corrupt, and politically, socially and economically weak. The teachings of Islam have been undermined and replaced by Western ideals. Pan-Arab nationalism was considered as a Western inspired ideology, and therefore a form of pre-Islamic *jahiliya* (ignorance).¹²⁰ They believe there must be a return to the true tenets of Islam in order for Arab-Islamic society to return to its former state of glory, which is considered to have been between the 8th and 17th Centuries AD.

¹¹⁸ Anabtawi, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

¹¹⁹ Kramer, op. cit., p. 193.

¹²⁰ Sayyid Qutb, *Al-Mustaqbal li-batha al-Daen*, (The Future will show the Rebirth of Religion), *al-Ittihad al-Islami al-Alami lil-Munazamat al-Tulabiya*, Kuwait, 1971, p. 137.

Many Islamists view Western models of materialism, liberalism, socialism, capitalism, communism, and other *ism's* as seriously flawed ideologies inappropriate for Muslim societies. Such thoughts were expressed by some of the most significant contemporary Islamic thinkers, ranging from Jamal al-din al-Afghani, Hassan al-Banna', Muhammad Iqbal, Mawlana Mawdudi, and Said Qutb.¹²¹ Capitalism is thought to 'breed selfishness, cruel individualism, and greed' and is 'bound to create a climate of loneliness and isolation ... deep tension and depression, resulting in domestic instability, criminality, corruption on a large scale, and a deeper fear of insecurity'.¹²² Mawdudi believed that secularism left open a vacuum for the introduction of immorality, human indecency and unethical behaviour, and that it was inconceivable to have secularism without these factors, while democracy signified polytheism and blasphemy.¹²³ By contrast, for Islamists such as Egypt's Said Qutb, Arab nationalism signified the 'spiritual decadence' of the Arab Islamic community. Prior to Qutb's execution and during his police interrogation, he announced that Arab nationalism had 'exhausted its role in universal history' and it was time that Islam replaced all Western forms of national ideology.¹²⁴

With 'flaws' such as these, traditional Islamists conclude that it is not surprising that little 'progress' has been made in the Arab-Muslim world. This view implies that Islam provides a 'better' existence for most people. For example, Mawdudi goes as far as comparing a true Islamic state with totalitarianism, as it is within a state's right and duty to exert maximum government control based on Islamic morals and religious principles applied to almost everything. Attempting to reassure his readers, he adds, Islamic totalitarianism 'did not suppress individual liberties just as the limitation placed on popular sovereignty by Islam did not suppress human freedom but rather protected it'.¹²⁵ For this reason, it creates little opportunity for a dictator emerging since everyone is supposed to be representative of

¹²¹ For further information on Al-Afghani see Nikki Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal Al-Din al-Afghani's*, trans and editor, Berkeley University of California Press, 1983, pp. 73-83; Al-Banna's thoughts can be found in Hassan al Banna, "The New Renaissance" in *Islam in Transition*; Iqbal's thoughts in John L. Esposito, "Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, p. 185 and p. 188; Mawdudi's beliefs are outlined in Charles J Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, p. 118; and Qutb 's views are detailed in Yvonne Y Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, p. 71.

¹²² Muhammad Abdul Rauf, *The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1978, p. 17.

¹²³ Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in Esposito's *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, Oxford University, NY, 1983, pp. 99-133, p. 113; and Ahrari, "Islam as a Source of Conflict and Change in the Middle East", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 177-192, p. 183.

¹²⁴ Kramer, op. cit., p. 192 quoting Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 30-32.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 120.

God, and therefore no one may become an absolute ruler as they are going beyond their assigned role as Caliph. Any Caliph who went beyond his entitled powers would be acting against the popular vicegerency, and would be 'held personally answerable to God'.¹²⁶ Dubious assurances have been made by proponents of such thought, that past excesses of autocratic behaviour, will be contained.

There is also a tendency for Islamists to blame any alien form of *ism* as the main cause of current ailments in the Islamic-Arab world. However, no alternative political paradigms are proposed other than implementation of Islamic law and practices.

Subsequently, blame for the ills of Arab-Islamic societies have been placed on the colonising powers rather than on subsequent post-independent leaders. Leniency is granted towards former rulers because they had become puppets of Western powers.¹²⁷ Or, it is said, some leaders became 'Westoxicated', struck with love of the West. These leaders in turn encouraged the 'Westoxication' of the masses, for example, Ali Shari'ati wrote, 'one must buy western culture the same way one buys western products'.¹²⁸ Some Islamists believe that the lead of the 'Westoxicated elite' (and implicit Western control) disrupted the Islamic substructure and therefore subjected Muslims to the ills of the Western world. These ills include: political authoritarianism, public and private corruption, concentration of wealth, mass poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, urbanisation and the breakdown of the traditional family, religious and social values.¹²⁹

b. Attraction to Islamism.

'Islamic fundamentalism' emerges in the midst of moral and political decline as a true ideology of salvation for the frustrated, alienated petty bourgeois mass and its proletarian extension.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam", Donohue and Esposito, *Islam in Transition*, Oxford University Press, NY, 1982, pp. 252-260, pp. 256-60.

¹²⁷ See Esposito's, *Voices of Resurgent Islam* and El Amin, Nafissa Ahmed, "Sudan: Education and Family", in *Change and the Muslim World*, eds. Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan, Syracuse University Press, NY, 1981, p. 88.

¹²⁸ Shari'ati, "Return to the Self", in *Islam in Transition*, p. 305.

¹²⁹ Esposito, p. 12 "Contemporary Islamic Revivalism: A Movement or A Moment?", by Abdulwahab Saleh Babear, *The Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. xxxvi, No. 1, 1993. pp. 5- 23.

¹³⁰ Bresheeth, *The Gulf War & The New World Order*, Zed Books, London, 1991, p. 207.

Economic and social dislocations combined with the anxiety of modernity, the exploitation of Western ideologies, the breakdown of the former Soviet Union, and the crisis of the Left, led to a political vacuum which was filled by Islamists advocating Islamic ideology. Algerian-born Mohammed Arkoun, Professor of Islamic Thought at the Sorbonne in Paris, believes: "Social dislocations in the Muslim world have created a yearning for dignity—usually the poorer, unemployed and those unhappy with politics".¹³¹ Hence, the move towards Islam which (like many religions) offers people a sign of hope, salvation, equality, and long-term stability; a refuge for the disenfranchised.

The politics and identity of disillusionment among the younger generations emerged with the partial failure of Arab nationalism and increasing sense of social dislocation. An increasingly significant sector of society has found salvation in pursuing religious political identification. This was notably the case in overpopulated and poorer countries in *Al Maghreb*, such as in Algeria, Egypt and the Sudan, and among segments of the *Al Mashriq* populace, such as Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

The disillusioned seem to be largely drawn from those most affected by the economic, political and social dislocations of the past half-century. Those experiencing the economic burden were more aware of the social injustices within their respective countries, as well as throughout the region. The benefits of economic, political and social institutions were considered out of reach and only serving a traditional minority. Thus, many citizens are revisiting/reinterpreting their cultural heritage, its authenticity (*turath*), and the past. The quest is for philosophers and intelligentsia who upheld reason, stability, progress and equality in both the private and public spheres in the hope of finding old solutions to modern problems.¹³²

The disillusioned seek a new 'Salaheddine' to resolve their difficulties. Religious social movements are increasingly attractive because they offer people the health, education and social welfare that they expect governments to provide. In this way, religion and other primordial factors are being revived, and attracting many to the conservative and traditional aspects of primordial identity.

¹³¹ Walsh, "The Sword of Islam", *Time*, June 15, 1991, p. 28

¹³² Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance", *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 1997, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 133-148, p. 140.

Thus, Islamic groups have emerged in the wake of rapid economic development and the dislocations brought by modernisation. Across the region, rapid urbanisation has placed a heavy burden on government capacity for provision of services and employment. This phenomenon has also undermined traditional familial social welfare networks. The number of urban poor has rapidly increased, due to aspirants from poor rural areas failing to find employment in the cities. The visible difference between the urban rich and the urban poor has become starkly apparent. Various forms of corruption are commonplace, as is nepotism and cronyism. Alongside the failure of Arab nationalism, this has created fertile ground for Islamic groups calling for equity, honesty and justice. This call has struck a chord with many, especially when religious-confessional identity has long been a significant aspect of an Arab's political identity.

Initially it was the rural and urban poor who were more likely to be attracted to such forms of political-cultural identification. However, individuals from the lower and middle upper class strata, as well as the intelligentsia, are adopting a political Islamic identity.¹³³ As a significant segment of the middle class became embittered due to socio-economic restructuring, they have turned to traditional Islam and alternative political groups. Islamists have also gained support from some of the intelligentsia, particularly those disillusioned with the politics of the Left, the corrupt ways of the ruling elites and the continued restrictions on their intellectual developments and freedom. There has been an excessive 'brain drain' of skilled professionals, while those who remain and do not conform to the ruling elite agendas find themselves on the periphery and, in some cases, supporting Islamic groups, as was the case with Algeria's FIS.¹³⁴

In response to the Islamist challenge, religion is increasingly being manipulated to legitimise regimes and their policies. In 1979 Sadat sought to obtain support from Islamic scholars in the quest to make peace with Israel compatible with Islam. Soon after, Cairo's *Al-Azhar* University Mosque was issuing *fatwas* supporting Sadat's stance. Similarly, Saddam Hussein utilised passages from the Holy Quran to justify his invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent conflict. On the other hand, Egypt's (state sponsored) Grand Mufti,

¹³³ Eric Davis, "The Concept of Revival and the Study of Islam and Politics", in Barbara F. Stowasser (ed), *The Islamic Impulse*, Croom Helm, London, 1987, pp. 37-58; Haifaa Jawad, "Pan-Islamism in the Middle East: Prospects and Future", *Islamic Quarterly*, Vol. xxxvii, No. 3, 1993, pp. 207-221; Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 158-177; Henry Munson, *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*, Yale University Press, 1988, pp. 95-104.

¹³⁴ Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, op. cit., Chapter 7, "Algeria: Democracy Suppressed", pp. 150-172, particularly pp. 167-170.

Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, issued a *fatwa* justifying the use of non-Islamic and Islamic military force against Iraq.¹³⁵ Despite the contradiction between Arab Ba'athism and Islam Saddam Hussein also decreed that the religious words '*Allah wa Akbar*' (God is Great!) be added to the Iraqi national flag. In other words, present day governments are, somewhat ironically, increasingly covering the bankruptcy of their own leadership by cloaking themselves with the banner of Islam. They expostulate Allah's support for their supremacy, while seeking to reap the benefits of secularism.

Just as primordial Arab and state nationalist identification has helped the people of the region in many ways, religious identification has also brought benefits. Political choice is lacking in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab world. Increasingly civil society is becoming frustrated with the one-man one-party political system that has been prevalent for decades. The internet, and satellite TV programs, have demonstrated to many the alternatives to autocracy and the incompetence of their respective regimes.

The challenge political Islam poses to Arab regimes may, on the one hand, be a blessing in disguise. It may give rise to political reform such as in Jordan. Rather than banning Islamist political parties or independents with an Islamic agenda, the Jordanian government encouraged them to participate and voice their agendas. Subsequently, the Islamists won 32 seats in parliament. However, only half were re-elected for a second term in office. Participation by radical groups and/or individuals in parliamentary democracy highlights lack of support for their policies. As they find their equilibrium level of support, political tension is reduced and simultaneously reform and openness is promoted.

Allowing full participation of religious or sectarian groups in the political system is more effective than repression. It forces candidates to demonstrate and perhaps implement policy, rather than criticise and offer band-aid solutions to significant contemporary problems. Islamic groups who have been successful at grass roots social welfare assistance, such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, would need to address national policies. By doing this, they would be forced to moderate their policies to retain popular support, or else retain the very dictatorial methods that they rallied against when out of power. This dilemma is exemplified by Iran's current ideological battle between the orthodox and reformist Muslim clerics. One seeks to maintain, the other to reform, the orthodox

¹³⁵ *Al-Akbar*, 20 August 1990.

interpretation of *Sharia*. Questions regarding the level of permissible democracy, the treatment of non-Muslims and other minorities, and the interaction with the international community cannot be avoided by any political party, which wants to be taken seriously in the region.

An examination of the programs of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jordan reveals that 'fundamentalists' rarely address contemporary economic and political issues with specific proposals.¹³⁶ For example, on administrative reforms, the FIS calls for 'reforming the administrative organisations to run things and to guarantee the operations of services and the insurance of rights, and to eliminate the obstacle of bureaucracy'.¹³⁷ Similarly, in the Hamas constitution's On Social Welfare, two articles (20 and 21) are entirely devoted to extolling the cooperative nature of Islam, and the sections conclude with the following: '... When this spirit (of cooperation) overwhelms, love will deepen and cooperation and mercy will (exist), and ranks will be strengthened in confrontation with the enemies'.¹³⁸

In summary allowing opposition groups and individuals to openly discuss policy alternatives will force current regimes to be more accountable to their constituents. Although these alternatives may reveal inefficient and impractical solutions, the exchange of ideas in a public and democratic forum brings broader community participation and develops a truly representative and cohesive national identity.

On the other hand, the shift towards religious and primordial identification within mainstream politics has several negative ramifications, which can be outlined as follows:

1. Religious dogma and sentiment in Iran, Afghanistan pre- September 2001, Algeria, Gaza Strip, South Iraq and Lebanon has been politically abused by men whose aim is to subordinate the citizenry. There are particular implications for women.¹³⁹ In fact, variations

¹³⁶ Yafa li-d-Dirasat, *Ath-Thawra-l-Islamiyyah fi-l-Jaza'ir: An-Nass al-Kamil li-l-Barnamaj as-Siyasi li-Jabhat al-'Inqadh al-Islamiyyah* (The Islamic Revolution in Algeria: The Full Text of the Political Program of the Islamic Salvation Front, Cairo, Yafa, 1991, p. 15.

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 13.

¹³⁸ Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) of Palestine, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. xxii, No. 4, Summer 1993, pp. 122-134, p. 129.

are specific to education, the status of women prior to the application of Islam as a ruling ideology, and the elite's interpretation and application of Islam.¹⁴⁰

2. Islamists are quick to criticise Arab nationalists for neglecting to incorporate Islam into their form of identification. However, Islamists do not take into consideration the approximate 18 million people in the region who do not fit within their pan-Islamic ideal.¹⁴¹ Political and civil liberties may therefore be constrained and jeopardised by exclusionary politics.

3. Similarly, Islamists have not deterred the widening of Islamic sectarianism. Although the International Islamic Convention, which is held every second year, calls for the unification of all Muslims, the historic division between the two main sects (Sunni and Shi'ite) remains explicit. An illustration of this internal tension is the fact that, during the Lebanese civil war, there were more intra-religious/sectarian killings amongst Muslims and Christians than between the two religions.¹⁴²

4. Throughout the region's history, whether in the pre-or-post Islamic era, poverty, illiteracy, nepotism, disease, economic inequality, political and social authoritarianism flourished long before Western infiltration. Therefore the scapegoating of colonised powers as the only factor to blame for present ills obscures reality.

5. Most Arab governments have been able to maintain stability due to strong security services, and the consequent environment of fear. In the case of Western allied states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and other Gulf emirates) such actions are often overlooked or accepted, in the name of 'stability', by the very Western nations, which

¹³⁹ Although the status of women varies from one Islamic country to the next, for example women in Iran and the Gaza Strip-West Bank fare better than their counterparts in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Algeria, Saudi Arabia or the Sudan.

¹⁴⁰ The manipulation of Islam further empowers privileged sectors, which is of course, prevalent among other religious cleavages, as exemplified in moves like the banning of contraception by the Catholic Church or the ordination of female priests.

¹⁴¹ S.E Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, p.231.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* p. 232, citing K Packradoni, "Toward Ethnically Egalitarian Arab Societies", paper submitted to the conference on the UN Declaration on Minorities' Rights and Peoples of the Arab World and the Middle East, Limassol, Cyprus, 12-14 May 1994, p. 4. Again the Muslim death rate was not exclusive to Sunni (Muslim) and Shi'ite (Muslim) cleavages fighting one another but high amongst inter-sectarian fighting, for example, Shi'ite (Amal) versus Shi'ite (Hezbollah).

espouse freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. However, despite valid Islamist criticism of authoritarian power, there is little evidence that Islamists would eschew autocratic and repressive tactics; Iran being a case in point.

6. Barakat argues that Orientalists 'see society as a product of religion rather than the other way around'.¹⁴³ However, considering the enormity of traditional and religious significance on the polity, especially amongst the Arab peasants, working class and lower middle class, it is argued here that religion and society are mutually reinforcing. Religious interpretation and implementation has frequently reflected power relations, particularly within patriarchal paradigms. The socialisation of society has taken place over the years via the patriarchal interpretation of religion, which has often restricted female emancipation and equal participation within society. This development has commenced in the private domain and is often maintained through the public sphere.

Religion in the 'Middle East', and Arab world in particular, is multi-layered and multi-faceted. Publicly, most Arab countries' constitutions declare Islam the official religion. Religious holidays have become national holidays. The government maintains the mosques and other significant religious institutions. Religion is an integral part of the education curriculum and the legal system. This illustrates the nation-state's part in controlling religion and yet maintaining societal links and practices to reflect religious norms, values and behaviour. In contrast, religion has largely been separated from Government in the West, although Christian assumptions still underlie much of the discourse.¹⁴⁴

Many Arab generations have been affected by the socialisation of tradition and religion and are unable to distinguish the effects of religion on society. They cannot avoid it politically, economically, socially or regionally, especially in countries such as Lebanon. Arab migrants also continue to be products of their initial socialisation despite many years of living in the diaspora. They often continue to hold, promote and believe in the traditions

¹⁴³ Barakat, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ For example, the role of the United Kingdom's monarchy in the Church of England, the paper bills of the USA, which have 'In God We Trust' printed on it, and the Australian Federal Parliament's practice of opening a parliamentary sitting with the prayer 'Our Father'.

and religious knowledge they obtained from their homeland, and will continue to raise future generations in accordance with this belief system and these identifications.

7. Religious orientations in the political field tend to be more conservative and affiliated to *dar il Islam* (the World of Islam) rather than being broadly international or global in their political relations. By isolating themselves from the non-Islamic world they are bound to encounter difficulties in a period in which international political relations, economics and technology are closely interlinked. By closing their markets and espousing isolationism this may, in fact, encourage external infiltration and domination into the uncharted markets and rich natural resources the region offers. Regardless of what form of political structure it engenders, it cannot be denied that Islam is a basic substratum of Arab-Muslim identity. What is not clear, however, is which form Islam will finally take in contemporary Arab Muslim society.¹⁴⁵

Public policy in the Arab world towards the practice and importance of Islam varies from country to country, for example the doctrine of Islam practiced in Taliban Afghanistan varied radically from Islam practiced in both Saudi Arabia (conservative) and Egypt (liberal). Will a more open liberal democratic political structure be at conflict with Arab-Muslim identity? If so, will it be detrimental to the development of national identity formation in individual countries and thus regionally? What are the political alternatives to successful nation-building in the 'Middle East'?

1.3. Conclusion

In 1928, Nazira Zayn al-Din wrote a challenging book entitled *al Sufur wa al Hijab* (Unveiling and the Veil) regarding the right of Muslim women to remove their veils while remaining a part of the Islamic faith. Her words are pertinent today. She wrote that veils exist metaphorically in Lebanon and the Arab world as: 'a veil of cloth, of ignorance, of hypocrisy, and of stagnation'.¹⁴⁶ In conclusion, therefore, this chapter argues that without the 'veils' being challenged and replaced, the 'Middle East', and the Arab world in particular, will remain a regressive and non-competitive entity, vulnerable to external

¹⁴⁵ Donohue, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹⁴⁶ Zayn al-Din quoted in Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance", *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 1997, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 133-148, p. 134.

exploitation and unable to adequately address domestic politics and economic development or deal with modern dilemmas of pluralistic or multiple identity.

This chapter has discussed the competing paradigms of identity, which exist in the Arab world. Each paradigm's ideology is both exclusionary and inclusionary, thereby affecting its popularity, its effectiveness and its definition of a political community. The three major forms of identification examined above (primordialism, Arab nationalism, and state and religious identification) have failed to include all citizens.

Since the inception of the modern 'Middle East', Arab governments, in particular, have failed to clearly differentiate between religion and secularism, and between *Qawmiyya* and *Wataniyya* when forging their politico-cultural identities. Many Arab regimes continue to utilise the concept of Arabism and pan-Arabism, stressing their secular state national identity, acknowledging their ancient – pre-Arab and pre-Islamic – histories, as well as their identification with religion, in particular Islam. In turn, an inept attempt to mix these forms of identification has arisen, with little success, or scope for development and modernisation, due to the autocratic nature of most regimes. This leaves the Arab nation-state unstable and lacking cohesion. It remains divided over its past and present which will no doubt impact on its future conception and formation of political culture, identity and nation building.

It has been argued that political identity constantly evolves and deconstructs itself. No single political identity ever dominates the political and national arena. Yet no point has been reached where all are simultaneously equally significant. Internal, external, transnational, transitional and diasporic factors all play a part in manipulating these spaces and constructs. It remains to be seen whether and how a combination of these major forms of identification can emerge into a progressive, non-conflicting and compatible multiple-identity hybrid, particularly in heterogeneous countries such as Lebanon. The question therefore, is whether a decolonised national identity can be reconstructed which acknowledges the multiplicity of identities present in any given Arab society, in order to foster regional stability, political and social progress and global competitiveness.

CHAPTER 2

The Dynamics of National Identity - Recent Historical Developments-

2.1. The Failures of Post-Independence: National Identity in the Arab World.

The previous chapter demonstrated how a multiplicity of identities have continually been controlled and exploited by political forces. The three major forms of identification have each failed to include all citizens, although the official agenda may state otherwise. Another factor, closely associated to the multiplicity of identities, is the failure to comprehensively implement political ideologies. National identity has not developed cohesively and ultimately decolonisation has failed.

Five prominent issues that have contributed to contradictory policies in the region and ultimately advanced the failure of the decolonisation project are: neopatriarchy, Eurocentricism and the act of mimicry, nativism, external intervention, and the question of political legitimacy.

2.1.1. Neopatriarchy:

Halim Barakat's theory on neo-tradition provides a method of examining the overlaying of traditional and contemporary identifications. According to Barakat, the conflict between the tribal-rural-urban cleavages continues to disrupt the process of national, social and political integration. He argues that, although many traditional barriers and dogmatic views have begun to disappear, there has been a new recognition of longstanding forms of tradition and the creation of 'new' norms that have contributed to existing divisions. Barakat attributes this to the contradiction between ancient disparities and modern dependencies and contends that any attempt at integration has resulted in coercion and incompetence.¹⁴⁷ Although sound compromise can be found between traditional and modern elements of socio-political relations through an ongoing tailoring of national culture and identity, at times the contradictory elements of established and newly 'created traditions' continue to exist and have proven to be most problematic to Arab governments.

¹⁴⁷ Barakat, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

This quandary was examined initially by, Hisham Sharabi who coined the term 'neopatriarchy' to describe it. The concept according to Sharabi "occupies the space between traditional patriarchy and modernity".¹⁴⁸ He believes that patriarchy¹⁴⁹ is not only the dominant form of authority but has also been manifest in authoritarian political regimes; which reflect similar problems in Arab culture and society.

Most Arab societies have done little to replace or develop traditional and patriarchal social structures. Thus, with the inception of modernisation, the combination of traditional and modern factors led to inconsistencies and conflicts within Arab society and culture. Neopatriarchy, in particular, has had debilitating effects on society, economy and politics and has been exclusionary in nature. Although initially patriarchal dominance originated in the home, neopatriarchy has come to infiltrate public affairs, belying the outward appearance of organised political systems and decision-making processes.¹⁵⁰

Sharabi defines neopatriarchy in terms of social fragmentation. That is, family/religion/ethnic group/tribe rather than the civic society or nation-state constitutes the basis of social relations. In this situation, traditional patriarchal authoritarian organisation rather than cooperation and equality govern socio-political relations. The practices and policies of plurality, diversity, egalitarianism and openness are rarely upheld or encouraged in the Arab world; instead, there is absoluteness and isolation. Social practices are based on formalised rituals, customs and symbolic traditions that lack spontaneity, innovation and creativity. By failing to break down this patriarchal society and by continuing to maintain traditional political dominance and limitations to modernisation, Arab society in general remains dependent on tradition, primordialism and patriarchy. Thereby, the process of modernisation has been distorted and inverted.¹⁵¹

Neopatriarchy arises in several ways. The most prominent is when it is selectively implemented in a top down fashion, by elites and regimes, often in the service of their own power, rather than in the interests of genuine modernisation or development. It can also be

¹⁴⁸ Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, Oxford Uni Press, UK, 1988.

¹⁴⁹ Patriarchy is defined by Sharabi as "a universal form of traditional society" in contrast to modernity, which "occurred in its original form in Western Europe". *Ibid.*, pp. 3 & 7.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

imposed in autocratic ways without basic freedoms or democracy and by regimes that are Western client states, unpopular with the general Arab populace. Therefore, even otherwise desirable Western modern ideologies such as feminism are open to the charge of association with 'imperialism' because of the way they appear to be imposed. Genuine debate and comment at the local level (similar to the engagement of dialogue and debate over Islam) is often quashed by the regimes to protect their own power and to silence critics and critical thought. In the case of advancing the rights of women there are multiple interests in quashing both debate and progress. On the other hand, there have been attempts to advance the rights of women within Arab society, for example, the Emir of Kuwait attempted to grant Kuwaiti women the right to vote in 2001. Parliament rejected it. Whilst the role of women in Iraq [up until recently] and amongst Palestinian communities have proven to be more advanced, literate, skilled and active participants in civil society than the role of women in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Yemen, or regional areas of Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In many instances, critical thought from within is labeled as coming from 'outside' and considered a threat to the 'Arab' and/or Islamic way of life and identity. Such a reaction is largely dependent on the particular regimes, elites and the vested political, economic and religious interests that define them.

The ruling elite's direct response can be partially attributed to the form of political dependency whereby it is "... cast in the image of the father, while citizens are cast in the image of children. God, the father, and the ruler thus have many characteristics in common. They are the shepherds, and the people are the sheep...".¹⁵² This socio-political structure of the absolute dominant patriarch is central to personal and domestic development, policies and organisation, while the community generally remains dependent and coerced by the father/ruler (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Gulf states, Libya, Egypt and Algeria all to varying degrees).

Dependency has emerged as a consequence of Arab societies' socialisation and this has negatively affected economic and political development. Socialisation is not restricted to childhood but found to be an ongoing process resulting from new experiences and developments, whether they are private or public in nature. Therefore, 'desocialisation' and 'resocialisation' are recursive in nature. In most instances primordial factors constitute the most dominant agency of socialisation, although schools, peers, the mass media, political systems, ideological movements and parties, and globalisation do affect an individual's

¹⁵² Barakat, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

socialisation. The combined forces of these agencies may be contradictory in nature; that is, at times reinforcing childhood socialisation while at other times re-examining and repudiating it.¹⁵³

Economically, the enduring dependency is contributing to the underdevelopment of Arab countries and widening the disparities between the privileged and the deprived classes within and between, Arab societies. This is compounded by the fact that Arab nations are locked into the global capitalist economic system that underpins control of the region's natural resources. This, in turn, compounds the question of political legitimacy of many Arab regimes. All of these factors have distorted the development of many countries and given an illusory concept of independence, sovereignty, national identity and consciousness.

Therefore, the dependency dynamic is multi-layered and emerges on a domestic-local level amongst families, clans and tribes. Then it spreads throughout towns, institutions and the ruling elite. Bilateral and regional relations are inherently affected. For example, variations of dependency rest on a country's political and economic standing which, in turn, is collectively dependent on the global economic system, and consequently affects the region, state, community and the individual. Therefore, the distorted duality of neopatriarchy and dependency stagnate real social, economic or political development and consequently underpin the legitimacy of both the ruling elite and its nation-state construct.

Neopatriarchy was advanced by European colonisation. The former colonisers left the Arab ruling elites the tools and structures to regulate the lives of their citizens, via a structure Sharabi termed 'etatist patriarchy':

what made *etatism* so natural to neopatriarchal society is the fact that the former was essentially nothing but the medieval sultanate in modern form. For the distinctive characteristic of *etatism*, like that of the sultanate, is personalised (legal and extralegal) power, which finds expression in the coercive and suppressive apparatus of the state and derives its legitimacy not from some formal (constitutional or even traditional) sources, but from the reality and possession of power. In this kind of polity the ordinary person is a passive entity, a subject not a citizen, with no human or civil rights or power to influence decisions concerning society as a whole.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁵⁴ Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, pp. 65-66.

This contradictory nature of Arab society subsequently has limited public involvement in strengthening the vital functions of any given state. The contradiction accordingly contributes to the confrontational nature of the state; ruling elites being perceived as hostile and autocratic rather than inclusionary, democratic and efficient. Society, in turn, has become disempowered, angry, disillusioned and apathetic to the exclusionary and repressive nature of governments.

Consequently, the Arab world has reached a crossroads where it is unable to cope with the inner (social) conflict and also the pressures of the external world.¹⁵⁵ It drifts in and out of primordial and religious defensiveness, hence the Islamic revival, in order to find or regain control of its destiny. However, as will be outlined below, it is not necessarily via primordial affiliations that Arab societies will gain the freedom, dignity and liberation they have long desired. On the contrary, the remaking of society needs to be achieved via the decolonisation, legitimisation and democratisation of society and the nation-state.

2.1.2. Eurocentrism and the Act of Mimicry.

An additional complication to the problem of multiple identities and the distorted duality of neopatriarchy, is the concept of mimicry which arose as a result of colonisation. The consequences were twofold. First, a division within the indigenous society took place. Secondly, a form of cultural imperialism was [and remains] imposed on society through the institutions and structures left behind. This imperialism was enacted through elites who have been prepared to subconsciously and consciously reinforce foreign belief systems.

The pertinaciousness of European ideals in the 'Middle East' of European ideals has been made possible through the negative imagery of the Arab world through Western Orientalist domination of media, which has influenced how the region's political structures, society and economies are perceived. Consequently, Western thought, imagery and practices have demonstrated dominance of power and knowledge of the 'Other'. This process has been facilitated by the distilled images conveyed by 'Western' mass media that have often

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. Also see Boullara, *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought*, State University of New York Press, USA, 1990, pp. 89-90.

created a barrier between the developed and developing countries; a process termed "cybernetic colonialism".¹⁵⁶

The Eurocentric and Orientalist understanding of 'the Other', in this case the Arabs and Muslims, has left the populace in a state of disarray for decades. Edward Said potently describes this in both *Orientalism* and *Islam and the West*, arguing that the region and its inhabitants have long been a subject of both fascination and abhorrence to the Occident.¹⁵⁷ The assumed inbuilt superiority of the Occident over the Orient has over the years successfully dehumanised and desensitised many people in the Orient and led them to question their traditional culture and psyche in conflicting ways. This domination of discourse has been done in subtle and institutionalised ways.

This state of psychological repudiation is reflected by Fanon's analysis of the inferiority complex that has developed amongst the former colonised. A complexity has arisen due to the colonial policy of degenerating indigenous cultures and victimising the alienated through 'psychological violence' (though often colonisers would encourage aspects of the culture that suited their interests). 'Psychological violence' refers to those who have consciously or subconsciously adopted colonisers' traits and become strangers unto themselves. A conundrum having rejected their own indigenous culture, while never quite achieving acceptance in their adopted Occidental culture. The alienated colonised individual has become 'the Other' in his or her own country and seeks to imitate or become the coloniser or 'become white', believing that 'White' opens many personal, socio-economic and political opportunities. However, upon reaching this point, they realise that their goal is unattainable.¹⁵⁸

According to Said, the Orient served an integral purpose in the development of European civilisation and culture. The Orient, which was defined to encompass Algeria and Lebanon, was used as a point of comparison to highlight the superiority of Western culture, its

¹⁵⁶ Sid Ahmed describes cybernetic colonialism in the following manner: "Cybernetic colonialism differs from traditional colonialism in that the latter, which used force overtly, fed feelings of resistance and combativeness in its victims, while the former, which wields force by remote control, so to speak, feeds feelings of frustration and despair". Sid Ahmed, "Cybernetics Colonialism and the Moral Search", *New Perspective Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 15-16.

¹⁵⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin Books, UK, 1991, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵⁸ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, translated by Charles Lam Markmann, Grove Press, New York, 1968, p. 38.

institutions, bureaucracy, scholarship, doctrines, creativity and way of life. Whereas the West has freedom of thought and action, the Orient did not and this enabled the West to promote itself as a more enlightened alternative. Thus, there is a fundamental link between culture and colonialism. The notion of Orient, as a collective representation and construction of discourse in the West developed during the colonial period and led to the perpetuation of Eurocentric, racist, imperialist and stereotyped views. The Occident viewed the Orient through its racist paradigm albeit dressed up as a philosophy of superior civilization, paternalistically and successfully projected the image of its backwardness, degeneracy and inferiority compared to the West. In other words, Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine developed by the West and successfully maintained by the West as a result of its superior economic and political dominance.

Fanon's writings on colonialism in Algeria, for example, showed how the colonial process was strongly rooted in the socio-economic and political climate created by the French. Benevolent paternalism in the form of systematic exploitation led to feelings of inferiority amongst the colonised people. People were divided into two classes: the inferior (colonised) and the superior (the colonisers). The theory of French colonial rule (involving both assimilation and association) and the denial of indigenous culture was based on the revolutionary doctrine of the equality of all peoples once they had adopted the superiority of French culture and civilisation.¹⁵⁹ The goal was for a 'Francophied' elite, separate from the indigenous masses, which would act as instruments or agents of the colonial regime.¹⁶⁰

Fanon places great importance on language and discourse and a mechanism for either uniting or alienating communities. As he points out: "... For it is implicit that to speak is to exist absolutely for the *other*".¹⁶¹ This view is supported by Jinadu, who perceived the role of language as a vehicle for educating future generations, a symbolic form of continuity, a method for influencing thought and action and a facilitator and regulator of people's interactions.¹⁶² Thus, when the colonised adopts the language of its coloniser, and begins to mimic the coloniser's culture and behavioural patterns, the colonised begins to reject

¹⁵⁹ Jinadu, *Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution*, KPI, London, 1986, p. 21.

¹⁶⁰ Cauter, *Fanon*, Fontana/Collins, London, 1970, pp. 46-47.

¹⁶¹ Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁶² Jinadu, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

their own culture in preference to the colonisers. This way the coloniser succeeds in achieving cultural and political domination.¹⁶³

Said takes the notion of language and knowledge further. As outlined in *Orientalism*, the study of Orientalism has exposed the reciprocal relationship between colonial power and knowledge. Postcolonial theorists have found that upon returning to the colonial scene there exist two main narratives - the first narrates the power of the Orient while the second exposes the counter-narrative of the colonised. It is crucial that both narratives are considered and to acknowledge that "postcoloniality derives its genealogy from both narratives".¹⁶⁴ Said in turn questions the narratives, available knowledge and the power such knowledge brings. He fears that this power when in contact with knowledge can promote further discourse and "seductive degradation of knowledge" through Occidentalism, and in an attempt to right past wrongs.¹⁶⁵

Similar fears are found where the ruling elites of non-Western developing nations forego their traditional culture in favour of mimicking Western ideals and forms of identity. This thwarts viable alternative modes of self-development and nation building. In most instances, the use of this knowledge by the ruling elite corrupts their rule and wields their power in undemocratic and superior ways.

Colonised people seeking education in Western institutions further facilitate this process, whether in their native countries or overseas. Such intellectuals are educated in Westernised modes of thought and logic.¹⁶⁶ While many return to their native countries and still speak their native tongue, they have been affected by the foreign education and experiences. This in itself is not inherently negative. Moreover, increasingly in today's globalised world it becomes more difficult to separate the local from the global. In spite of this, in many instances the gap has widened between colleagues and compatriots when they return. This was particularly evident during the pre and post-colonial period when they

¹⁶³ See Fanon, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4, pp. 168-199.

¹⁶⁴ Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction*, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1998, p. 22.

¹⁶⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

¹⁶⁶ As Chapter 7 will outline, the recent phenomenon of globalisation has also reinforced the infiltration by Western culture; affecting the thought of many intellectuals, as well as the ordinary person, within developing world countries.

took up positions amongst local elites. Many were enmeshed by the desire to mimic their educators and belittle the importance and significance of their local culture and society.

However, it is here that Homi Bhabha argues that a subversion of mimicry may arise amongst the colonized stating:

The ambivalence of mimicry – almost but not quite – suggests that the fetishized colonial culture is potentially and strategically an insurgent counter-appeal. What I have called its 'identity-effects' are always crucially *split*. Under cover of camouflage, mimicry rearticulates presence in terms of its 'otherness', that which it disavows. There is a crucial difference between this *colonial* articulation of man and his doubles and that which Foucault describes as 'thinking the unthought' which, for nineteenth-century Europe, is the ending of man's alienation by reconciling him with his essence. The colonial discourse that articulates an *interdictory* otherness is precisely the 'other scene' of this nineteenth-century European desire for an authentic historical consciousness.¹⁶⁷

That is, an added dynamic of confusion arises amongst the colonized via the "*splitting* of colonial discourse so that two attitudes towards external reality persist; one takes reality into consideration while the other disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates 'reality' as mimicry".¹⁶⁸ Resulting in uncontrollable paranoia, encompassing feelings of neither being accepted nor rejected, and yet, holding no real authority to challenge past representations nor confirm them. Consequently the colonized have no resolution of being either here or there.

Although the colonised attempted to resist this continued domination [whether tangible or otherwise] and sought to gain independence through an authentic local culture, this was not followed through. At the time of colonisation the colonised had little, if any, avenue of dialogue with the colonisers in relation to policy and cultural influence. This was often the case during periods of de-colonisation, particularly at the time of independence and especially amongst countries that fought to gain independence. However, where independence was gained peacefully a genuine dialogue between indigenous and coloniser culture may have existed, and real attempts at finding a new post-colonial identity could have emerged. For example, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan adopted the political functions of the British and attempted to consolidate it within its indigenous and Palestinian cultural and political identity. Although it may have had the potential to succeed, the

¹⁶⁷ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London & NY, 1994, p. 91.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

inequality between the rich and poor widened. Three conflicting ideological divisions emerged within former colonies. One group sought to maintain colonial culture and its accompanying structures; a second group desired a return to pre-colonial culture, while the third sought to create a new post-colonial identity.

The first group's desire to 'mimic' and maintain colonial structures and culture served to maintain a form of dependence on colonial structures. This limited legitimacy and viable grounds for the creation of a post-national identity. The second group, which sought and continues to seek, to return to pre-colonial culture is also problematic considering the physical and ideological changes which have taken place, the interconnectedness of the international community and the dependency on modern concepts, technology and comfort. Invoking ethnic, religious and parochial views will not lead to the emergence of a cohesive post-national identity due to the divisive and exclusionary consequences for example, Iran after the 1979 revolution, and Afghanistan under the Taliban. The third group, which sought to create a new post-colonial identity, still has the potential to succeed. This will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

Like Africa, the Arab world was affected by the values and political culture of Europe which became "inscribed deeply in their imagination"¹⁶⁹, thereby contributing to the creation of a 'new' Arab. The 'new' Arab was particularly influenced by the Western concept of nationalism and worked towards freeing the colonised through the process of decolonising the Arab mind of Ottoman and European influence.

The revivalism of Arab culture and Arab identity was considered an integral part of the struggle for independence and liberation. Certain primordial factors were adopted, appealing to a sense of historical continuity and legitimacy in the call for Arabisation. However, many other primordial factors, outlined earlier, were inconsistent with modern notions of state, freedom and social democracy. As independence was gained and the process of decolonisation intensified the forces of primordialism, neopatriarchy, the exclusionary nature of political ideologies and external interference contributed to the failure of the decolonisation process and the marginalisation of the 'new Arab' by traditional forces in Arab society.

¹⁶⁹ Ahluwalia, *Politics and Post-Colonial Theory: African Reflections*, Routledge, London and New York, 2001, p. 21.

2.1.3. Nativism:

The third factor contributing to the failure of decolonisation is the return to 'nativism'. According to Fanon, the ability to return to 'pre-colonial' circumstances is not possible because no *pure* pre-colonial culture exists.¹⁷⁰ Although this thesis will demonstrate that many primordial pre-colonial features remain in contemporary Lebanese society and continue to impede the formation of post-colonial identity, these very pre-colonial features have themselves been affected by colonialism and other external factors. Therefore, pre-colonial culture has changed from its 'original' state. This reinforces the point made earlier that post-colonial culture and development has affected many pre-colonial socio-cultural issues due to the consequences of colonialism and not merely by natural evolutionary means.

Said argues that desire for a return to 'nativism' or 'tribalism' is the only remaining obstacle in attaining liberation and achieving democratic, free and fair internationalism. He believes political-democratic progress in most former colonised nations is based on nationalism and nativism. 'Nativism' is considered as regressive and viewed as a way of resisting the decolonisation of nationalism. Accepting the path of 'nativism' "is to accept the consequences of imperialism, the racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by imperialism itself".¹⁷¹ The adoption of nativism reinforces the Oriental stereotypes that have been propagated about the Occident.

Thinking beyond 'nativism' does not necessarily mean abandoning national identity. Rather, if one views local identity as non-exhaustive, "and therefore not being anxious to confine oneself to one's own sphere, with its ceremonies of belonging, its built-in chauvinism and its limiting sense of security"¹⁷², then nativism can be overcome. Said argues after colonialism, new social transformations ought to take place challenging rigid boundaries and identities and bringing about the emergence of 'post nationalism'.

The alternative to nativism is "the possibility of a more generous and pluralistic vision of the world", in which imperialism continues to play its part as the dominator, while leaving the

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁷¹ Said, *Culture & Imperialism*, Vintage, London, 1993, p. 276.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 277.

opportunity for other possibilities, namely, "liberation, and not nationalist independence", or using Fanon's words: "a transformation of social consciousness beyond national consciousness".¹⁷³ Therefore, both Fanon and Said believe that there is a need to move beyond the concepts of national consciousness and the rigid boundaries controlling such concepts. For decolonisation and liberation to succeed, there needs to be a re-examination of knowledge, especially regarding the politics of identity within the framework of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history.

Overcoming nativism in practice has proven not to be so trouble free. Primordialism and the 'natural' factors disunifying segments of society have remained prevalent within many 'Middle Eastern' countries particularly Arab countries.

2.1.4. External Intervention

The fourth factor that has contributed to the failure of decolonisation has been the magnitude of external intervention in the 'Middle East'. More acutely than most other regions of the world, political and social developments here are intricately linked to Western national interests, due to the "Middle East's" large oil reserves and pivotal geo-strategic location. The 'Middle East' remains the region of the world where US military presence is expanding in the post-cold war era. Although many states are under the auspices of US control and influence, whether it be, politically, economically or strategically, some states remain outside this fold and have been subjected to physical attack, moral vilification and imposition of sanctions (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan).¹⁷⁴ Western interests are enforced, by undermining attempts at Arab unity or mutual agreement. Meanwhile the US militarily, politically and economically supports Western satellite regimes.

The following will outline Western historical interests in the region, and the significant role pursued by the West in maintaining the region's divisiveness and its dependency on the West.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

¹⁷⁴ Garfinkle, "The US Imperial Postulate in the Mideast", *Orbis*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 15-29, p. 16.

Attempts to oppose a common Arab union first emerged in 1801 during the Napoleonic campaigns. Opposition, however, did not publicly transpire until 1833 and was endorsed by the English. The setting was Mohammad Ali's call to establish an Arab empire.¹⁷⁵ Having established a stronghold in Egypt, Mohammad Ali and his forces were threatening one of the world's most important trade routes, one that was vital to English commerce and trade. With Ali's sights set on Constantinople, Russia was given a pretext to intervene preemptively, as none of the other powers could tolerate or would defend Constantinople as Russia. Thus, England feared the emergence of an assertive Arab empire -- replacing a compliant Turkish one -- and the possibility that Russia might no longer be restrained from intervening. This was reflected in a letter written by Lord Henry Palmerston, England's Foreign Secretary, to the British Minister:

His (Mohammad Ali's) real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be.¹⁷⁶

It was not merely fear of Russian hegemony that had moved Palmerston to oppose the growth of Ali's powers, but also the fear of an Arab challenge to the strategic status quo.¹⁷⁷ Ali's forces had created an empire that stretched from the southern borders of Turkey to the Sudan. It was within this context Palmerston revitalised Napoleon's idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in order to create a human buffer to restrain Ali, and any future Arabists, from uniting the Arabic speaking world.¹⁷⁸

Although, at this time the Arabs themselves were politically mobilised behind Ali's concept of an Arab empire, a precedent had been set for Western stymieing of any such entity emerging.

During the 1830s national Arab solidarity was not a united movement. Various religious, sectarian, tribal and ethnic cleavages had either supported or opposed Mohammad Ali's

¹⁷⁵ This is despite the fact that he was not of Arab but rather of Albanian descent.

¹⁷⁶ Antonious, op. cit., p. 31, quoting Sir Henry L Bulwar, *Life of Palmerston*, Vol II.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

¹⁷⁸ The point that Napoleon first endorsed the concept that a Jewish state in the Arab heartland be created may in fact be recorded as the first Western leader supporting Zionist ideology. See Heikal, *Secret Channels*, Harper Collins, London, 1996, p. 16.

call for the establishment of an Arab nation; divisions that would be repeated throughout the region in decades to come, creating a fertile ground for external intervention and domination.

For example, under Ottoman rule, Sunna Muslims alone were granted the privileges and status of full citizenship, whilst Christians, Jews and heterodox Muslim sects were treated accordingly. Although the discrimination was not entirely negative and was beneficial in some cases, for example, they were exempt from serving in the military, and some had a great deal of ethnic autonomy as long as it posed no challenge to Ottoman rule. Each sect, therefore, reacted to Mohammad Ali and his son Ibrahim's call for unity based on self-interest. The Christians and other minorities, saw it as a chance to overcome the inequality accorded them under Islamic law, as had been the case for the inhabitants of Egypt who were then under Ali's reign. By contrast, most Muslims believed that the restoration of the Caliphate into Arab hands and the establishment of an Arab empire would strengthen their predominance. However, the inherent opposition between these two aspirations weakened the call for unified support.

Western opposition to most Arab movements, however, became most notable from the early 20th Century onwards. Western policy therefore targeted this 'Achilles heel' of the inherent ethnic and political cleavages in the region. Some of the most public acts of external intervention in the region are illustrated below and they demonstrate the key argument that external intervention has played a significant role in undermining the successful creation of a post-independent national identity in many countries in the 'Middle East'.

After the Second World War, the international community witnessed the deteriorating hegemonic power of Great Britain and France and the political and economic growth of the US. The US began to replace British interests with American interests. Oil and access to its abundant and cheap supply became- and continues to be - a necessity for industrial countries. A 1953 government paper confirmed the importance of 'Middle Eastern' oil, and the need for American oil companies in the region to work in parallel with the US government.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Miller & Mylroie, *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf*, Times Books, New York, Toronto, 1990, p. 182.

The US has taken initiatives to eliminate or weaken any internal (Arab or Persian) or external nationalist challenges to US dominance and control over the oil rich region. One way of protecting its interests was by enhancing and protecting Israel, which was viewed as a barrier to Arab nationalism. The US itself was prepared to "use force, but only as a last resort, either alone or in support of the UK" to ensure its access to oil and to maintain its interests notably against the Soviet Communist threat at the time.¹⁸⁰ By 1953, US foreign policy had been formulated in two papers. The first, NSC No. 5428 stated:

- a) that we should move continuously towards the depth of the Middle East with the aim of reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a necessary introduction for a stable Middle East';
- b) to move continuously and energetically to build the northern tier in the Middle East and have it connected through security arrangements with the heart of the Middle East (Arab world).

The second paper, NSC No. 5401, declared:

United States policy is to keep the sources of oil in the Middle East in American hands and defend them at all costs, and deny them to the Soviet Union, even if this led to a confrontation or to the destruction of these resources by the Americans themselves.¹⁸¹

These papers reinforced the Eisenhower Doctrine¹⁸² and justified US military intervention in the 'Middle East' against Arab nationalists that might weaken US economic interests.

Two major aims of US, and Western European policies since the mid-20th Century were maintaining security interests in the 'Middle East' and fighting the threat of Communism. An international effort to create a 'Northern tier' against Communist aggression in the region

¹⁸⁰ N. Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, 2nd edition, Vintage, London, 1992, p. 184, cited undated sections of NSC 5801/1, "Current Policy Issues", "Issues arising out of the Situation in the Near East", mid to late 1958; NSC 5820/1, 4 November 1958. US and UK relations had entered a new stage, in November 1945 it is documented that Harry Truman called the heads of American missions in the Middle East to Washington and sought a 'more active policy' in the region. He argued that the American government would "look with sympathy upon the efforts of certain countries in the Near East to extricate themselves from commitments which they were forced to make before the beginning of the Second World War to various great powers, giving these powers special positions and privileges which detract from the full independence of these countries". (Heikal, *Cutting the Lions Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986, p. 9) However, with the end of the Second World War and the commencement of the Cold War the US needed the British as much as the British needed the Americans to fight Soviet aggression in Europe, Asia and most importantly the 'Middle East'.

¹⁸¹ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986, pp. 37-38

¹⁸² The Eisenhower Doctrine was effectively a declaration of America's intention to fill the political position of Britain in the region and additionally offering up to \$200 million per annum to assist with the development and independence of 'Middle East' states, suggested that armed American forces may be available to protect cooperative states "against overt aggression from any nation controlled by international communism". Heikal, *ibid.*, p. 216, quoting a message Eisenhower sent to Congress on 5 January 1957 which otherwise became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

first arose in 1954 when under the encouragement of US offices, Turkey and Pakistan first signed a 'friendly cooperation' agreement. By February 1955 Iraq became a signatory and it henceforth became known as the Baghdad Pact.¹⁸³

The Pact was to commit Arab and regional countries in an unequal alliance of foreign troops under the pretext of fighting Russian communist aggression as a northern defence frontier. However, this alliance was to "provoke a fatal division in the Arab world and do more than anything else to aggravate suspicion between Egypt and the West".¹⁸⁴ Some Arab countries, particularly Egypt, felt that Israel posed the real threat to the region, while Iraq believed that the Soviet Union and its ability to infiltrate Arab countries was the primary enemy. The British and American endorsement of the Pact only increased Arab suspicions towards their real motives.¹⁸⁵

The 1956 Suez Crisis, the failed CIA-backed coup against Syria's President Quwatli in 1956, the flooding of CIA dollars (estimated at not less than US\$250 during the 1950s) and Soviet arms in Beirut in order to destabilise the Lebanese government, "to teach the Palestinians a lesson, to push the Arab world into a hornet's nest and to pave the way to Geneva"¹⁸⁶ (forcing the PLO to go to Geneva and accept a proposed solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict) were some events of the 1950s which increased popular Arab suspicions regarding Western interests in the region. US intervention continued through the 1960s, for example, the 1967 Six Day war which saw it openly support Israel and take a more bias leaning towards Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Nixon administration however aimed to limit its direct influence, and promoted US interests via the notion of shared hegemony. US allies Iran and Saudi Arabia, the bastions or the 'twin pillars', were to assure continued access to oil and became regional 'police

¹⁸³ Britain, Pakistan and Iran soon after became signatories. Although the US did not become a formal member it sent observers and participated in security planning. However, the Pact disintegrated when Nuri Said, a major proponent, was killed in the Iraqi revolution and the Hashemite monarchy was deposed.

¹⁸⁴ Heikal, op. cit, p. 52

¹⁸⁵ For further information about the Baghdad Pact see Mohamed H Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986.

¹⁸⁶ As, shared by 'the Ambassador of a major country' to Kamal Joumlatt. Joumlatt, *I Speak for Lebanon*, Tr. by Michael Pallis, Zed Books, UK, 1982, p.8.

forces'. However, these countries failed to guarantee the US administration that weapons would not be used later to threaten American interests.¹⁸⁷

This concern was evident during the oil crisis of the 1970s that followed the third Arab-Israeli war, where Saudi Arabia came to the forefront of international affairs. OPEC oil producers controlled the flow and price of oil and obtained larger shares in the profit stakes.¹⁸⁸ While this was initially beneficial to the Arabs economically and politically, the West realised how dependent it was on Gulf oil. 'Never again' became the popular notion in the US policies. US President Jimmy Carter described US dependence on oil as the "moral equivalent of war".¹⁸⁹ A number of Westerners were angered by OPEC actions. This anger was illustrated in crude and Orientalist perceptions of Arabs in the media and other public forums. There was disbelief that a mere 4% of the world's population could control 70% of the world's discovered oil reserves.¹⁹⁰

The Carter administration declared the Gulf region a 'vital interest' and created a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in order to assert US military strength in the region. No country in the region, however, was willing to take the political risk of hosting the headquarters of the Strategic Central Command of the RDF, which was finally located in Florida.¹⁹¹ The force was deployed for the first time to bolster the Iraqi war effort against Iran in 1987. One of the American goals in 1990 was to demonstrate to the Gulf states, the importance of an American military presence, which they had repeatedly refused to countenance in the past. Nevertheless, much to the dislike of Arab nationalists, it was announced after the Gulf

¹⁸⁷ Miller & Mylroie, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-87.

¹⁸⁸ The profiteering was immense for Western companies during the years 1948 and the founding of OPEC in 1960. The exploitation of oil producers was at its peak \$22.2 billion of profits were unfairly split between the local government and the oil companies. The locals got \$9.4 billion, while the oil companies obtained \$12.8 billion. *Ibid*, p. 184.

¹⁸⁹ Safty, "Dateline Iraq: Confrontation, War, and the Great Game of Balance of Power", *International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 431.

¹⁹⁰ *The Age*, 11 August 1990. "The undercurrent is that the Arabs basically have no right to the oil that geological accidents happened to place under their feet". Chomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 196. Blatant Orientalist comments were and continue to be implicitly and explicitly stated in today's media, towards both Arabs and Muslims and little has been done to redress this issue.

¹⁹¹ The RDF lacked credible support from the beginning for a number of reasons. The timing itself was regarded as unpromising to say the least, at a time of Arab intolerance towards any outside power attempting to occupy the region. Secondly, the Americans did not clearly and publicly state their objectives, most notably to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were not certain whether US deployment was geared towards the Soviet Union's attraction to the region, radical Islam, or towards the protection of oil reserves from any force, or rather, a mixture of all three. The outcome was that US bases in the region were not granted the US had to rely on US ships in the surroundings. Freedman & Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1993, p. 5.

conflict, that an undisclosed Gulf state was now hosting RDF headquarters.¹⁹² Bush's actions during the build-up to the conflict and through it, reflected the principles of the Carter Doctrine which stated:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military forces.¹⁹³

By invading Kuwait, Iraq had 20% control of the world's proven and recoverable oil reserves, which was of considerable concern to the US, prompting it to militarily prepare itself to resist Iraq's challenge and justified its actions by reiterating the above doctrine. The global significance of the event is reflected in the following figures, which show the larger industrialised countries' reliance and dependence on Gulf oil.¹⁹⁴

American senators and congresspeople frequently reinforced comments such as the following:

Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.¹⁹⁵

Hence, America and its Western allies were concerned about the economic impact the possible restriction and control Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would have over world oil supply. Gulf capital and investment was also at stake. It has been conservatively estimated that the Gulf oil producers have invested US \$1 trillion of its petrodollars in the industrialised developed world.¹⁹⁶ Such a loss would further undermine these economies. Thus, one of America's global objectives was to determine the continued control of 'Middle Eastern' oil reserves, as acknowledged by the Eisenhower doctrine years earlier. It was

¹⁹² Safty, op. cit., p. 433 cited Alain Gresh "Modeler dans la guerre un ordre de paix au proche-orient?", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 1991.

¹⁹³ Acharya, *US Military Strategy In the Gulf*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 55, quoting Department of State Bulletin, February 1980b.

¹⁹⁴ The 'Middle East' is said to contain up to 66.3% of the world's known oil reserves in comparison to the US, which only has 4%. The US alone purchases 25.6% of the world's oil output and imports more than 45% of its oil, 25% of it from the Gulf states. Abrahams, *The New Lord: From the Gulf War to the Recolonisation of the Middle East*, Counter Attack 3, London, 1994, p. 23.

¹⁹⁵ Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power*, Touchstone, New York, 1992, p. 773, cited *New York Times*, August 16, 1990, p. 14.

¹⁹⁶ Becker, "US Conspiracy to Initiate the War Against Iraq", in Clark & Others (eds), *War Crimes*, Maisonneuve Press, Washington DC, 1992, p. 81

argued that if the West allowed Iraq's challenge to go unheeded, the rest of the Gulf monarchs and Western allies such as Jordan and Egypt would have witnessed a similar fate to that of Kuwait.

The Gulf Conflict and its ramifications remain the most notable event in contemporary 'Middle Eastern' history. It divided the Arab populace and its full consequences remain to be seen. The outcome of the Gulf conflict was made possible due to post-1967 events, some of which included:

1. The ongoing neutralisation of Egypt from the wider Arab-Israeli conflict via the Camp David accords.
2. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its intended goal to destroy Palestinian nationalism and resistance. This was in addition to Syria's role where a suspected hostile deal had been struck between Israel and the US to allow Syrian domination of Lebanon.
3. The use of Western aid guidelines to subordinate nation-state internal needs with broader regional relations. For example, Egypt was 'influenced' to sign a protocol of cultural cooperation with Israel that deemed it to be a criminal offence in Egypt to oppose the Camp David accords. This, in turn, saw the incarceration of hundreds of Egyptian intellectuals, journalists and opponents of Camp David.
4. The Israeli bombing of Iraqi nuclear plants in 1981, which was possible by the use of US intelligence pictures.
5. The destabilising of nations by inciting hostilities amongst minorities, for example, the CIA in aiding Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq.
6. The reconnaissance of Arab states' internal communications. On one occasion the CIA intercepted Egyptian communications leading to the arrest of four Palestinian guerrillas who had allegedly been responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. As the plane they were travelling on was transporting them to Tunis for trial US Navy F-14 fighters intercepted the plane and forced it to land at a NATO airbase in Italy. The four accused were abducted and then released by Italian officials.¹⁹⁷
7. The frequent use of economic sanctions (Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria), the fight against 'terrorism', and the increasing infiltration of the World Bank, IMF and other international conglomerates forcing domestic Arab political economic restructuring.

¹⁹⁷ Safty, op. cit., 125; Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987, p. 87.

8. The military (Gulf states, Egypt) and financial (Egypt, Jordan) support of particular regimes to stabilise and maintain US-Western interests in the region.

Increasingly, it is becoming evident that Western, notably US, interests are maintained by tolerating ideological differences when Western interests are not threatened, regardless of whether the subject country is violating international laws and conventions. This has been almost consistent throughout the years in the case of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt; regimes which regularly abuse human rights and international laws.

The purpose of these examples of external intervention particularly in the Arab world demonstrates the added complexity for post-colonial nations in attaining a post-national identity. The US government's ruthless prosecution of strategic interests in the 'Middle East' compounds the problem for many regional governments, especially when their domestic policies conflict with US policy and interests. In addition, the autocratic nature of many regional governments, whether US friendly or otherwise, does not compel development of a post-national identity if there is little threat to their own leadership. Although such a strategy may have been successful for the last few decades the future does not necessarily reflect such optimism. Changing needs amongst the region's citizens motivate a thirst for reform, accountability and liberalism. Foreign powers and regional political leaders have been ignoring these changes taking place at grassroots level, maintaining the assumption that decades old policies can be recycled in the new millennium. Poverty, economic stagnation, political regression, social oppression and US domination are contributing factors to these changes. Double standards, in the political arena and underlying Orientalist behaviour are fuelling the desire for rapid change.

For example, the terms 'fundamentalist' or 'fundamentalism' are frequently employed by Westerners to describe opponents of Western domination in the 'Middle East'. Whilst any orthodox religious person would claim their respective religion encompasses and has the ability to instruct all facets of daily life, very rarely is the term 'fundamentalist' applied to Jewish Orthodox followers or Christians. For instance, Baruch Goldstein, an Orthodox Israeli settler and a Jew from New York, committed the Hebron massacre killing more than 29 innocent Palestinians because they were Arabs. He was not considered a religious fundamentalist by authorities or the media. Yet, the Egyptian who instigated the Giza massacres was automatically labeled a fundamentalist. Selective reporting and vilification

of Arabs and Muslims continues to dominate talkback radio, print media, television, Hollywood productions, the education sector and public policies due to ongoing misperceptions, misrepresentations and Orientalist ascendancy.

It is increasingly evident that the West tends to overlook, or in some cases endorses, Christian or Jewish orthodoxy and yet preaches secularism to Muslims. For centuries, Islam has been viewed as a threat to the non-Islamic world through its largely misconstrued perspective of globalisation and its division of the world in *Dar il-Harb* and *Dar il-Islam*. Its understanding, perception and portrayal are more than often negatively stereotyped and based on ignorance. When support for an Islamic regime arises it is usually the case that the regime fulfils US national security interests. If political developments, whether democratically inclined or otherwise, arise to hinder Western interests, the West or their regional supporters lack tolerance. This was the case in Algeria in 1991 when the US and many Western governments supported the Algerian government's cancellation of the second round of voting and applied a state of emergency because initial results indicated the political Islamists represented through FIS were to win overwhelmingly. As Abu Khalil correctly noted, "support for democracy should not be qualified in cases where one does not like the choice of the public..."¹⁹⁸

It is because of these Western double standards imposed upon the region, particularly on the Arabs and Muslims, that hostility towards anti-Western rhetoric and inconsistency is gaining strength and organisation. In turn, the West, notably the US, should not be surprised when citizens emerge as hostile threats to Western national security, for example amongst angry rock wielding Lebanese citizens protesting outside the US Embassy in Beirut on February 17, 2000. They were protesting against the open US support of Israeli aggression on Lebanese infrastructure. Ten days later the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was violently attacked in the West Bank upon completing his lecture at the Bir Zeit University. Jospin had described Hezbollah, in fighting against Israeli occupation and aggression of South Lebanon, as terrorists. The inability of Western powers to remain neutral or act as fair intermediaries in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict is encouraging dissent. Furthermore, incidents over the years suggest that the Western powers are too modestly opposing strong pressure to change. The stifling of democracy is accepted at times as the price for 'stability' in the region despite the repression, violence and injustices inflicted upon

¹⁹⁸ AbuKhalil, "The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Autumn, 1994, pp. 677-694, p. 693.

the innocent. This has been evident in the numerous examples given which indicate that Western powers do not actively pursue or encourage democracy *per se*. Rather, they aim for stability and the cooperation of strong regimes, regardless of whether they are less than democratic in their rule. The maintenance of Western national interest is their first priority regardless of its cost.

2.1.5. The Question of Political Legitimacy

Closely tied to these aforementioned factors and consequently affecting the successful development of post-colonial identity is the question of political legitimacy in the region, in particular amongst Arab countries.

Without political legitimacy any given individual, government, party or opposition group cannot anticipate stable or productive governance. Although traditional forms of governance could be enforced using duress, such a relationship between the ruler and the ruled could not be optimised nor maintained in the long term. Many political theorists argue that, without supporting governmental process (procedures for collective choice to arise), common beliefs, values and compatibility with the broader community, any given political representative lacks legitimacy and cannot act with any degree of authority.¹⁹⁹

Today many Arab countries face the problem of political legitimacy due to the autocratic nature of regimes, their isolationist restrictions on information and political participation, dangerous and erratic behaviour, their dependency and circulation of rumour, conspiracy theories, misinformation and obscurity, fear and insecurity. Political legitimacy in the Arab world is also influenced by domestic political and cultural dynamics and regional and external interference.

In the period of decolonisation assassinations, *coups d'état* and revolutions were frequent. This reflected the slender legitimacy accorded to the political processes and structures at the time. Even now, when most of the above methods of political change have dramatically

¹⁹⁹ Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1977, pp. 1-30; Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, Tr. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited by Talcott Parsons, Oxford University Press-Doubleday, New York, 1947, pp. 124-26; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber*, Doubleday, New York, 1960, pp. 294-95; David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley, New York, 1965, p. 278; Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, pp. 183-85; Robert M. Maclver, *The Web of Government*, Macmillan, New York, 1947, pp. 4-5.

declined, the question remains whether contemporary Arab regimes are more politically legitimate than when they first gained power? Or, in fact, hold more political legitimacy than their predecessors? Although many Arabs have become accustomed to the incompetence of their respective governments, not all segments of society have come to accept or consider their respective leaders as legitimate representatives.

Currently, the broader Arab-Israeli conflict is not afforded the importance it was once given by Arab domestic and foreign governments, although the conflict still dominates discussions in the League of Arab States meetings.²⁰⁰ One could argue, however, that in previous years there was just as much hot air, grandstanding and cynical manipulation of the issue for domestic and regional consumption rather than adopting serious diplomatic solutions. However, despite this, many segments of the Arab populace continue to suffer, for example the Palestinians, and the Iraqis who endured over twelve years of UN imposed economic sanctions. Anger continues to mount against the injustices they suffer. Their respective political leaders are held partly to blame. They are considered weak, incompetent and unnecessarily intensifying their suffering by the lack of initiative, action, and/or compromise.

In addition, the symbolic structures of democracy, social injustice, unaccountability, corruption and pervasive underdevelopment continue to undermine the legitimacy of Arab rulers. Despite decades of political speeches and government sanctioned media stories and images advocating Arabism, democracy, social justice and equality, the reality is quite different from the utopia portrayed. Although the Arab world has made some economic, social and political progress over the years - and as will be discussed later - the problem of political legitimacy persists.

The problem of political legitimacy cannot be attributed to the character or norms of Arabs. This problem that has persisted in the Arab world since independence, is also found amongst many newly independent modern entities. Dankwart Rustov outlined three prerequisites for political modernity: authority, identity and equality. Rustov argues it is with

²⁰⁰ For example, in March 2001, at the Arab summit held in Amman Jordan, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called on Arab states to mobilise their armed forces to liberate the Palestinian territories, rejecting any deals with Israel. In a speech read to the Arab summit in Amman by Iraq's deputy President Ezzat Ibrahim, Saddam told Arab leaders to build "an army of men as concerned to sacrifice themselves as the Zionists are concerned for their lives." He added: "We do not agree to any deals on Palestine, all of Palestine from the Jordan (river) to the Mediterranean, including Jerusalem, is its crown." AFP 27 March 2001.

these three factors legitimacy is attainable.²⁰¹ Any given political entity must have a system that is representative and inclusive of all its citizens in order for a communal sense of community and nation to arise. If segments of society dispute territorial boundaries or national identity, ruling parties will lack the political authority required for successful governance. Of equal importance is the problem that arises when the political structure excludes certain segments of society, creating problems of inequality and under-representation and a lack of democracy, social justice, liberty and freedom.

Most Arab nations, particularly Arab regimes, have yet to possess the structures or ambitions required for successful governance. This has only served to perpetuate the impression and myth that the Arab world is dysfunctional in terms of its social mobilisation.

During the 1950s through to the late 1960s, authority and legitimacy were achieved through Arabism regardless of the multidimensionality of pan-Arabism amongst Arab states and the multiplicity of identities found among Arabs themselves. Since the 1980s, Arab identification has been maintained, although in diminished form, whilst the contradiction in identities has become more complex due to the changing nature of the international political and economic system. State interests are often incompatible with those of neighbouring or regional countries (Syria and Lebanon, Syria and Israel, Syria and Turkey, Iraq and Kuwait, Egypt and the Sudan, Bahrain and Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saudi Arabia and UAE, UAE and Oman, UAE and Iran, Libya and Tunisia). These international tensions provoke hostilities along economic, financial, political, social and ethnic lines.

It can be argued that the question of legitimacy has been one of the dominant reasons why post-national identity and lack of real political and economic development has occurred. Over the decades although political reforms have emerged, as small and symbolic as they have been, they have not developed at the pace many liberalists had hoped resulting in the apathy and migration of citizens, and the continued stagnation of the political systems and civil society within many Arab nations. The very social and economic hardships faced by citizens has highlighted the question of legitimacy, but leaving people too poverty stricken to apply any real pressure on governments.

²⁰¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernisation*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1967, Chapters 2-3.

Hudson outlines three schools of thought regarding how modernisation affects the spheres of politics, economics and society [and hence legitimacy]. They are: the 'transformationist school', the 'mosaic' model and the social mobilisation model.²⁰²

The 'transformationist' school anticipates the complete displacement and overhaul of primordial tendencies through ongoing social revolution and change. Both Hisham Sharabi and Manfred Halpern argue that through revolution and the displacement of traditional beliefs with 'rational' modernising structures and thought, a new 'revolutionary worker' or 'professional middle class' will arise to represent, build and move forward and hence legitimise the new ruling elite.²⁰³ Based upon the revolutions that occurred in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, it appears that the revolutionaries did initially succeed in transforming the polity from traditional to modern structures. This successfully challenged the foundations of the existing political structure. However, contrary to their respective political ideologies, the 'ongoing revolution' did not persist beyond the transitional process. They replaced and then began to replicate the role and stature of their predecessors, thus the question of legitimacy remained unresolved.

The 'mosaic' model continues to emphasise primordial and parochial loyalties. According to this view, legitimacy and authority are attained through forced assimilation and reconciliation. Proponents of this model dispute that social revolution is necessary in order to attain socio-political development. It is argued that primordial particularism will persist regardless of modernisation or revolution because it is so deeply rooted among communal and individual loyalties.²⁰⁴ In the countries that have undergone modernising revolutions, the transformation towards modernisation and attaining legitimisation has not been theoretical. Evolution of a post-national identity to accommodate all its citizens has failed. It is true that a national identity needs to evolve and cannot be written down and duly applied overnight, however, in the Gulf states where diversity as well as homogeneity exist, and modernization has emerged at a rapid pace there remains continued exclusion of segments of society within the polity and civil society which has deepened the divisions

²⁰² See Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16.

²⁰³ Hisham Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-81; Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, Chapter 2.

²⁰⁴ See Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States", in Geertz (ed), *Old Societies and New States*, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963, pp. 105-157; Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict", *Public Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1973, pp. 49-78.

amongst citizens and demonstrated the failure of a national identity being sustained and/or promoted. This has been highlighted in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia post-September 11, 2001.

The third model, social mobilisation, is based upon the Weberian tradition that conceives of a transition from primordialism towards secularisation of society and its structures.²⁰⁵ Although this has to varying degrees occurred in some countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria), the problem outlined by Sharabi, namely, 'neopatriarchy', has also arisen. Partial modernisation has in some of these countries generated pressures on significant primordial affiliations that have long been a source of cohesion in Arab society and this has impugned the perceived legitimacy of ruling elites. It may, however, in the long term be the trigger to the development of social consciousness, which is encouraged by proponents of the third model. However, the sudden transition from primordialism to modernisation may disrupt society, especially when primordial affiliations are an integral aspect of life for the majority of the region's inhabitants. As will be considered below, however, a variant of the social mobilisation model is a more practical alternative to bring about the required changes in the Arab world and the formation of political legitimacy of its apparatus and elite. Thus the social mobilization model may be used as the theoretical basis for desired political and social action and development in the Arab world.

Before examining this issue, the political legitimacy of any given leader, regime or structure can be accepted or rejected depending on personal, ideological and structural formations.²⁰⁶ For example, in the case of Kuwait, a patrimonial monarchy, the family of Al-Sabah and their current ruler are legitimised primarily through the monarch's personal reputation and the ideological structure is legitimised through a religious Islamic orientation. The structure is based on a combination of tribalism and democracy allowing some community participation, but the final decision making process is left in the hands of the Al-Sabah family and cabinet. Although non-members of the Al-Sabah family and women are increasingly calling for more equitable representation and participation, dissent in Kuwait has not, however, been overwhelming as is the case in Algeria, Egypt or Iraq. It is significant to note that on a regional level Iraq [pre-2003] did not accept the legitimacy of

²⁰⁵ See Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communications*, Wiley, New York, 1953; Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, No. 3, September 1961, pp. 493-514.

²⁰⁶ See David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Wiley, New York, 1965, pp. 302-303; Hudson, op. cit., pp. 16-30..

Kuwait as a political entity and instead considered it as its 19th province. This view has been reiterated throughout the history of the modern 'Middle East' and during the British-led creation of the Gulf monarch states. It is a view shared by many Iraqi citizens, yet the Arab League and its representatives acknowledge the political legitimacy of Kuwait and its rulers. The Arab populace, notably, in poorer, oil-free countries, do consider Kuwait and other oil-rich countries as less legitimate because of their wealth and indifference to the poverty experienced in other Arab states. The differences in views highlight the divisions amongst and within government as to the legitimacy of respective governments and borders that make up nation states.

On the one hand, the question of political legitimacy dominates politics and on the other hand legitimacy of political borders dominate regional issues. Although the two are very much intertwined, it can be argued that, the latter is used by some governments to defer debate about the former. By questioning the political legitimacy of borders of a neighbouring or regional state in turn questions the very legitimacy of its own border constructs and ultimately its government.

In *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, Hudson argues that Arab regimes cope with these pressures in two ways:

One formula, in which traditional autocratic authority combined with diffuse nationalism and the ethos of development, is followed by the modernising monarchies. The other, in which autocracy clothed in modern democratic norms and buttressed with more militant nationalism and a commitment to social equality as well as development, is practised in the Arab republics.²⁰⁷

In the past, these regimes found legitimacy through their dependency on traditional-religious ties, other primordial factors, various political-economic accomplishments and especially through facing external threats. The endurance of Zionism, the broader Arab-Israeli conflict and Western hegemony, have contributed to the legitimacy and socio-economic development of the region, most notably for countries at the forefront of the conflict (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians).

However, just as these issues have contributed to legitimacy to varying degrees they have also hindered development and the concept of authority due to its contradictory duality. On

²⁰⁷ Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

the one hand, patriarchy, primordial and restrictive self-interested notions of governance are enforced, and on the other hand, liberal, secular, democratic, and legal frameworks are propagated, that is, ostensibly promoted.

In cases such as Syria and Iraq, the response to this conflicting notion of authority and legitimacy was the militarisation of the ruling elite within a bureaucratic socialist institutionalised structure. Most citizens initially did not see the growing militarism in a negative light. Rather, many were of the belief that the armed forces "could rise above the 'selfishness' of the sect and clan, enforcing discipline on the nation".²⁰⁸ Elizabeth Picard examines the contemporary intervention of the military in Algerian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi politics, finding that in the early years (1956):

...armies were ... deemed to operate mainly at a national state level and consequently to have the capacity to reinforce their country's cohesion ... (They would) prescribe a new citizenship and ... encourage such values as secularism and political participation.²⁰⁹

Unfortunately, currently "the hegemony of armed forces... freezes political debate ... (and) has created an immobile and oppressive society".²¹⁰ The increasing militarisation of the ruling elite, the absence of real democracy, the extensive use of coercion has led to the rise of the highly developed one party autocratic-military apparatus. Political pluralism has been compromised in most states, and there has only been a nominal and arbitrary accommodation of minority ethnic or political groups. Justification of these restrictions is attributed to the pretext of the constant threat of war - with Israel, the West and its allies. Increasingly, however, minorities, political opponents and the public have become impatient with this approach. It has reduced the capacity to mobilize political support and capital.

Furthermore, under the guise and pretext of Arab nationalist ideology the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'athist elites have used their positions to enhance the status of their respective ethnic cleavages. For example, increasingly, the Alawite minority of Syria has strengthened its reign, whilst the Sunni minority in Iraq up until recently, particularly the Takriti clan, have

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Elizabeth Picard, "Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State", pp. 551-578, in Hourani, Khoury, & Wilson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East*, University of California Press, Berkeley & LA, 1993, p. 552.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 568.

continued to hold power for almost twenty years, both under the guise of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. The preservation of one-man rule is found in most Arab states. For example, prior to his death King Hussein of Jordan ruled for 45 years, the King of Morocco 38 years, Libya's Gaddafi has ruled for 30 years, Mubarak of Egypt for almost 20 years and succession in the Gulf states has remained within the family lineages. In turn, the longevity of an Arab leader's reign produces discontent especially when little collective reward is shared, and political and personal advancement is evident amongst the ruling elite and their associates.

On the other hand, some of the region's polity are stuck between the Scylla of secular authoritarianism and the Charybdis of religious rule. They must either accept the autocracy and restrictions upon liberties they have now, or accept the greater personal, social, political and economic restrictions of Islamic rule.

Numerous internal insurgencies have also arisen at various stages in the majority of 'Middle Eastern' states due to the repressive nature of these regimes. This simultaneously strengthens internal state security but undermines the legitimacy of the ruling regimes.

In conclusion, the following decade will give an indication of the path these autocratic nations will follow. When the older and longer serving rulers pass away or are deposed, not only will the legitimacy of the regimes be challenged, but also the legitimacy of the state as we are currently bearing witness in Iraq.

The whole concept of national identity and regional identity will be challenged. Arab countries that pass on governance via inheritance, or by personally selecting their sons (it is always a son) as their successors are approaching new crossroads in the 21st Century. In the past, the region focused on state building. However, in the next couple of decades many countries may experience the opposite. State deconstruction could be a possibility because of the fraudulent nature of the current regimes and boundaries of the Arab and regional nation-states. Despite the unstable, undemocratic, and unsuccessful alternatives that may arise, and while the nation state boundaries will come under increasing internal pressures, the nation state system is likely to remain entrenched *per se* but offer itself in a differing form in heterogeneous countries across the 'Middle East'. After a long period of

instability and bloodshed a political structure such as cantons within a pseudo-federalist system may emerge as one alternative if state cohesiveness and inclusion are not promoted in the near future.

2.2. Constructing Post-National Identity

As previously outlined, attaining a common national identity has in many cases been a challenge for the nation-state, notably within the context of a decolonising and/or ethnically heterogeneous entity. The problem and challenge of attaining post-national identity revolves around the crisis of legitimacy that arises due to the perceived unsustainability of many nation states. This section seeks to examine the importance of national identity in 'decolonising' the mindset of the inhabitants, deconstructing the existing political forms and 'liberating' the inhabitants within the context of post-colonised construct, especially in the case of Lebanon. It will be suggested that the creation and maintenance of a cohesive national identity is a fundamental criterion in an entity's successful decolonisation and its passage to freedom, sovereignty, independence, development and participation in the international community.

Prior to discussing this, however, the concept of national identity needs to be examined in terms of its components and in order to avoid past problems when reconstructing post-national identity.

2.2.1. The Question of National Identity

Throughout the world the issue of national identity was a burning one in the 20th Century. The rise of nationalism, regionalism and globalism has contributed to a surge in national identity and people are increasingly questioning their affiliations and loyalties. As the past decade has shown this has not been confined to peripheral states, but also occurs in industrialised Western nations. As Triandafylidou points out:

..national identity is defined not only from within, namely from the features that fellow nationals share in common but also from without, that is, through distinguishing and differentiating the nation from other nations or ethnic groups. National identity becomes meaningful only through the contrast with others.²¹¹

It, therefore, becomes evident that national, ethnic and racial identity are cultural productions of a public identity which allows us to question how we perceive ourselves and how others perceive us.²¹² Many social scientists would agree that national culture and

²¹¹ Triandafylidou, "National Identity and the 'other'", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1998, pp. 593-612, p. 593.

identity is both malleable and mobile. It is being constantly moulded because individuals within a community are continuously dealing with change and have to reinterpret their identities and culture in conjunction with such changes.

National identity has been seen as a notion worth fighting or dying for. Yet identity is not a fixed concept, it does not have a set definition utilised by all theoreticians or individuals in any given country. Although a national identity can theoretically unify and be representative of its nation, in many cases the official term utilised by the ruling elites cannot be enforced upon its citizens nor considered to be inclusive of them all.²¹³

There is no unanimous definition of identity. Whilst some definitions focus on individual identity as a way to delineate the unique characteristic of any particular individual or object, the concept can also be considered at a group or community level, as in terms of racial, linguistic, or cultural similarities.

Erik Erikson refers to private-individual identity as "the ego identity composed of sameness, individuality and uniqueness". By contrast, collective-ethnic identity is defined as "related to that which the individual shares in common with some other men [sic] along with whom he is set off from still others by the possession of certain attributes".²¹⁴ Otto Klineberg's definition is one "which is set off from others by physical type (or race), by religion, language, or national origin, or any combination of these".²¹⁵ Other social scientists see the importance of descent (Glazer and Moynihan), common origin and common culture, suggesting that a distinction needs to be made between group and individual identity.

At a more theoretical level, however, two dominant schools of analysis have emerged in the examination of the notion of identity. This ongoing theoretical debate regarding ethnic

²¹² Fox, "Introduction", *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*, Richard G. Fox (ed.), American Anthropological Association, USA, 1990, p. 4.

²¹³ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London & New York, 1994, p. 51.

²¹⁴ Herman Simon N, *Jewish Identity*, Second Edition, Transaction Publishers, USA, 1989, p. 673, quoting Erikson, *Childhood and Society*.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, quoting Klineberg, "The Multinational Society: Some Research Problems", *Social Sciences Information*, 1967, pp. 81-99.

and religious solidarities and weaknesses can be found between the 'primordial-cultural' and the 'instrumentalist-rational' schools of thought. The primordialists consider the notion of identity to be natural, unchanging, immutable, fundamental, essential and unitary. They argue that ethnic and religious solidarities are deeply rooted in historical experience and in the socialisation of identity, thereby affecting ethno-national political behaviour.²¹⁶ Primordialists argue that ethnic and religious cultures, social structures and loyalties ought to be considered as stable continuing realities and therefore a form of historical continuity is in existence.

On the other hand, the instrumentalist-rational school considers identity to be changing, restoring, recapturing, constructing and reconstructing throughout history, as a result of historical processes. They "emphasise the adaptive and opportunistic quality of communal identity and solidarities".²¹⁷ This school of thought emphasises the flexibility of ethnic and religious solidarities through material, security and status needs and their ability to adapt to environmental pressures. According to this view, a great deal of diffusion takes place, with new members entering and old members exiting from the community. Continuous construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of identity and memory take place.²¹⁸

Although the instrumentalist-rationalist school of thought is sound in theory, specifically where culture and identity can and are regularly influenced by conflicting historical, social and political influences, this does not appear to be the case in Lebanon. As this thesis will illustrate, in the case of Lebanon, such deconstruction and development of national identity has not been as adaptable to internal or external pressures due to the country's inherent historical complexities.

²¹⁶ Esman & Rabinovich, "The Study of Ethnic Politics In the Middle East", *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State In the Middle East*, ed. by Esman & Rabinovich, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1988, p. 13, and Frisch, "Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34., No. 3, 1997, p. 357.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²¹⁸ According to the instrumentalists when collective identities through class and occupation for example serve practical needs then ethnic cleavages may disappear, some instrumentalists even suggest if ethnic and confessional solidarities no longer provide the security, status and material rewards they require then their rates of survival have diminished. Gillis, John R., "Memory and Identity: The History of A Relationship", in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Gillis John R. (ed), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 3.

As with nationalism, the notion of national identity is forged by knowledge and memory. In order for a sense of sameness to arise over time and space, a sustainable memory needs to develop so it can become a core component of an individual or group identity. Although neither memories nor identities are fixed, they do represent or construct reality - either subjectively or objectively - in that people are constantly revising their memories to suit their current identities.²¹⁹ Gillis wrote that "identities and memories are not things we think *about*, but things we think *with*".²²⁰ As a consequence, identities can affect one's politics, social relations and history. Such identities can be used and abused, affecting not just one person but also others through social interaction and political manipulation/influence. There is a need to understand these memories in order to discover their historical significance and how they have created and sustained national identity over the years.

Generally governments and opposition representatives throughout the world speak of protecting and enhancing national identities by the preservation of heritage and tradition, the introduction of language legislation, promotion of cultural festivals and the preservation and encouragement of the arts and sports-people who represent them globally. The identity of a person, group, community or people must have a number of criteria that define them as different and/or unique. These criteria may include language, religion, place of living, race, occupation and social position, gender, age or a combination of several factors.

In order to formulate a sense of community, the members need to have a common sense of distinctiveness and belonging. However, many points of natural heritage, including landscape and history, art and antiquities, legend and language and archaeology and architecture, have become homogenised despite the historical and traditional detail these events may have within the (de)construction and/or (re)construction of a nation.

Unlike history, heritage is considered as 'unshared' possession, which is special, distinct and exclusive. This exclusiveness is considered by many as a deterrent to outside intervention, in the sense that heritage is accessible and inclusionary of insiders, but inaccessible and exclusionary to foreigners.²²¹ A unique heritage is reinforced by the

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

memories of their respective country's former glories, its sacrifices, heroism, uniqueness and contribution to world civilisation. By forging a sense of national identity, national governments are able to influence the things that their citizens selectively know and remember.

The art of memory making and recording is increasingly popular among many nation-states, bureaucracies and individuals. Today, with the speed of communication transmission and travelling time, our sense of distance has changed dramatically. This has influenced record keeping in many ways. The rapid pace of modernisation has forced people to record, objectify and preserve their memories. Citizens and governments find it increasingly necessary to record private and public historical memories whether in the form of a diary, family genealogies, archives, biographies or national monuments such as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which remembers "...everyone by remembering no one in particular".²²² The materialisation of such memories, in some cases traumatic and brutal, can be symbolised by an entity such as the Tomb, or other dedicated monuments or statues. As a result, such 'public' national memories can be shared by people who have never seen or heard of one another, but who become united by shared history. Public memories can be developed and promoted via the nation, which becomes an entity which is bound in time through retracing its historical origins and which assumes a specific identity as a result of its spatial, temporal and cultural boundaries.²²³

During times of national reconstruction, many countries may experience periods, which call for forgetting, rather than remembering, as was the case in Germany and Japan following the Second World War. However, where a country has experienced rapid developments and old traditions no longer offer valid answers or solutions to social and political problems, the ruling elite may find itself having to employ its efforts in restructuring past memories and histories according to a current and future agenda. Hobsbawm, Ranger, Fanon and Said have observed that such periods often stimulate the creation of new cultural forms that replace the antiquated older traditions.²²⁴

²²¹ Lowenthal, David, "Identity, Heritage and History", in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Gillis John R. (ed), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 49.

²²² Gillis, op. cit., p. 11.

²²³ Handler, Richard, "Is 'Identity' A Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?" in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Gillis John R. (ed), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 29.

²²⁴ Zerubavel, Yael, "The Historic, the Legendary, and the Incredible: Invented Tradition and Collective Memory in Israel", in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Gillis, John R. (ed), Princeton University Press,

The invention of 'new' traditions legitimises the emerging social and political elite. In some cases, their success depends largely on the ruling party's ability to reconstruct the past into a form that is acceptable to the majority of citizens. Nevertheless, there is, however, a potential for only partial success or failure if these 'invented' traditions deviate too greatly from 'genuine' tradition, heritage and history from the point of view of the citizens.

Importantly, one needs to question whether it is politically wise for a country, which is reconstructing its national identity such as Lebanon, to 'forget' its immediate history in order to successfully rebuild its shattered nation and identity. With the world becoming more global and history becoming more publicly shared through telecommunications, can events such as the long civil war in Lebanon, or internationally significant events such as Hiroshima be forgotten? Or is it necessary for the formation of 'collective suffering' to acknowledge the past in order to move onto the future? A heritage of tragedy may well be more effective than one of triumph, as Renan wrote over a century ago, arguing that "suffering in common unifies more than joy does ... Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties and require a common effort".²²⁵

At the same time, new memories require a form of collective forgetting, or as Benedict Anderson has suggested, 'collective amnesia'. Renan believed that communal identity may also require forgetting many shameful episodes, disabling tragedies and conflicting loyalties requiring a form of collective amnesia and editing each nation's past.²²⁶ Making some memories accessible to consciousness while blocking others may be necessary in order to avoid painful memories.

However, blocking the memories of an upsetting past may limit understanding of that particular historical period. It is necessary that social scientists, historians and ruling parties concede the errors made by colonialists and successive rulers. Without confronting such a

Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 106 cites Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

²²⁵ Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 50.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

period, national culture and identity may remain *under*-developed because it has not had an opportunity to confront and engage with its full history and deal with it appropriately.

Consider the position of people who were formerly subject to colonization and the argument made earlier relating to Orientalism. Such imagery needs to be challenged and reconstructed otherwise the following may result:

This colonialism colonises minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within colonised societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all. In the processes, it helps to generalise the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds.²²⁷

If such confrontation does not take place in post-colonial countries, the colonisation of the mind and spirit continues. The former colonisers continue systematically to negate the cultural differences and value systems of the colonised. If this continues, this relationship of the superior (former coloniser) continues to exert itself on 'the Other' via power and knowledge and will be notably decisive in any ensuing power struggles between the dominator and the dominated. It is therefore necessary to decolonise the mind in order for all remnants of colonialism to be removed and to reconcile the long conflict between the Other and the 'Self' in order for true liberation to take place.

Some former colonised countries, notably those in the 'Middle East' region, have systematically adopted a form of 'postcolonial amnesia', whereby they sense the urgency of erasing many of the memories of colonial subordination or highlight their role in creating current boundaries, instead preferring to focus on a new chapter in the nation's history (Gulf states, Lebanon). Upon Lebanon's independence in 1943, the ruling elite attempted to 'forget' how the state of Lebanon was established and was content with the system that was enforced by both the Ottomans and the French. As will be outlined in Chapter 4, the ruling elites deluded themselves and the Lebanese public by believing that the political system enforced by the French was the solution for the newly independent state. By doing so, they continued to enforce the burden of colonialism, which in turn was one of the major reasons for the outbreak of the sixteen-year civil war and the failure of decolonisation.

²²⁷ Gandhi, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

The continued utilisation of colonial structures and the suppression of colonial memories cannot bring about the emancipation of a nation nor liberate it from its colonial burdens. The current ruling elite in former colonised countries need to demystify 'colonial amnesia' and revisit, remember and interrogate their colonial and post-colonial pasts, so that precolonial pasts can be examined with vigour. Upon understanding these two theoretical and historical time-lines, nations in turn can contribute to the real development of a postcolonial state and comprehend its true contribution to the nation's history.

Generally, colonisation forced the intellectuals to re-examine themselves, their society and history. This brought about an unprecedented level of self-consciousness and concern about their identity,²²⁸ leading to a degree of decolonisation. Thus, colonial infrastructures and beliefs were replaced with the indigenous 'old' and the 'authentic', but within a new form of consciousness allowing the 'decolonisation of imagination' to take place. This was a task that involved an awakening for the colonised, the creation of a national identity and a shift away from racist perceptions and negative representations. The legacy of colonialism and Western imperial domination has resulted in the continual recycling of racist depictions of 'non-Western' cultures or the Orient, which affect the bilateral relationship between any given two nations of West-East orientation. Such representations of 'the Other' function as yard sticks – constituting "boundaries between self and other, us and them, normal and abnormal".²²⁹

In the case of Lebanon, large sectors of its community initially supported independence. Colonial pasts were being examined and the national call for unity was announced. Upon independence, however, efforts towards common nation building were foregone. Although peace was sustained for years, the instability of the structure in place contributed to the overall failure of decolonisation, as manifested most strongly in the sixteen-year long civil war.

Since the 1989 ceasefire, the Lebanese have had another opportunity to decolonise and build the foundations of a new and strong state. But this will be largely dependent on its ability to avoid the mistakes of the past. There will be a need for memories to be revisited

²²⁸ Pieterse and Parekh, "Shifting Imaginaries: Decolonisation, Internal Decolonisation, Postcoloniality", in *The Decolonisation of Imagination*, ed. by Pieterse and Parekh, p. 2.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

and a need to become 'modernised' in order to acknowledge the conflicting representations of the past and utilise different memories as a basis for the development of national identity.

Nation building needs to be an inclusive process. In the past, it was largely the dominant male elites who contributed to nation building and consciousness. However, recently 'symbols of the lost past', ie, ethnic minorities, feminists, youth, the handicapped, the elderly and homosexuals have contributed to the revision of national memories and identity. This has been most notable in the establishment of civil society groups throughout the world and non-governmental organisations, which represent the interest of these groups. Their success will ultimately depend on their political achievements in changing public policy and hence the overall development of national identity and nation building.

Although history is becoming increasingly global through its instantaneous deliverance and shared experiences, it is simultaneously becoming more localised from the perspective of private, local and national identities. However, although local and ethnic celebrations have become more democratic and representative, they have also become more burdensome - economically, socially and personally. It becomes increasingly noticeable that life can no longer be viewed along a single homogeneous time line. Governments and citizens are self consciously aware that through globalisation and borderless entities, multiple identities and memories are increasingly evident, notably amongst those who travel on a regular basis. As a result, multiple representations of the past are more readily accepted and knowledge is no longer restricted to compulsory historical time frames and space. This demonstrates that the way we view history itself has changed. That is, although new generations continue to seek the roots of their historical and national identity, they are going about it in a different manner.

A new consciousness developed along these methods is needed to examine post-colonial national culture and identity. The answer lies in the combination of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial culture. It is an ongoing process, which requires constant analysis dependent first on a revolutionary struggle and then on education. Participation is dependent on all segments of society contributing to the restructuring of society and its advancement. By withholding this participation, decolonisation fails.²³⁰

It is only through such a struggle that the liberation of the human race occurs. This exercise does not only awaken the colonised but also educates the coloniser or dominator of their perpetrating role and outlines their role as a "... victim of a delusion".²³¹ This aspect of Fanon's work has had a profound impact on the development of Said's concept of liberation. Said has outlined two factors necessary for total liberation, first "to know the Orient outside the discourse of Orientalism, and to represent and present this knowledge to the Orientalists - to write back to them".²³² However, like Fanon, Said disputes the assumption that pre-colonial culture has been left unscathed by Orientalists and instead argues for the necessity of challenging the "hegemonic nature of dominant culture as well as 'the sovereignty of the systematic method'".²³³

Therefore, dominant culture should be challenged on two fronts. The first involves the return of all geographic territory and attaining political sovereignty from external forces, whilst the second involves the reconstruction of culture and identity.²³⁴

The reconstruction of cultural identity could occur in three possible ways: First, by becoming a 'native informant' and accepting imperialism wholeheartedly. Second, by becoming educated and aware of the past, yet moving beyond it in order to develop constructively. Third, by attempting to move beyond post-colonialism by returning to the pre-colonial self. By taking the latter course the result would be the entrapment of nativism, which may include degenerating post-colonial culture into 'chauvinism and xenophobia'.²³⁵ Whereby there stands a risk of Occidentalism forming.

Said does not oppose the concept of nationalism *per se* rather he considers it as a vital and necessary transition from imperial domination. However, he does not believe that the solution lies with pre-colonial culture and identifications. It is necessary to think beyond local-national identities and utilise the community's sense of multiple identity to its

²³⁰ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin Books, 1963. Translated by Constance Farrington, p. 157.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

²³² Ahluwalia, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²³³ *Ibid.*, quoting Said, "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 4, pp. 673-714, p. 673.

²³⁴ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 252.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

international advantage. Said calls for the abandonment of rigid identities purely based on race, culture or geography and a shift towards "a decolonised culture where consciousness and conscious activity will be liberated".²³⁶

It is with this thought in mind that Fanon has been reconsidered by academics such as Said and considered a 'global' theorist. Said develops Fanon's theory further into one of 'worldliness' by resolving the conflict between the Occident and the Other with their eventual integration and tolerance towards one another on an international level. People are urged to re-examine history in view of "all subjugated men and women" and then examine nationalism as a natural progression commencing at a local point and ending on an international level via the endorsement of multiple identities. This begins by resisting the cultural dominance of the Occident by the Other, then by utilising the strength of the Other to reconstruct the relations between the self and the Other, and finally to work towards bringing the self and Other together.²³⁷

Said argued that this progression is interlinked and is a three stage evolutionary process. The first level requires the restoration of the nation itself through the use of symbols, myths and imagined solidarities. Second, it is crucial to revisit previous writing and understanding of history and seek to breakdown the discourse of the Orient (the Other) and the Occident. In so doing, it is necessary, not only to re-examine local-national history, but also to consider the broader history and relationship that exists between different cultures (what Said has termed the 'voyage in'). This is necessary to make "the conscious effort to enter into the discourse of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalised, suppressed, or forgotten histories".²³⁸ This final stage encompasses the shift from separatist nationalism towards the international community, endorsing human liberation for all people and nations.

Said argues that the concept of identity is crucial to successfully deconstruct the post-colonial world of the Other and the Orient. It is necessary to reexamine an individual's and nation's identity because it is these very notions which constitute identity, which also

²³⁶ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 46.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

²³⁸ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 261.

transmit such knowledge.²³⁹ Said rejects the notion that culture and identity can be examined within the limited structure of itself and without any acknowledgment of outside forces and events. He also rejects the notion that any one particular group has a more privileged position from which to address such issues.²⁴⁰ Therefore, it is by understanding identity and culture of ourselves, and the broader community, that we are able to attain true liberation.

2.2.2. The Failure of Decolonisation in Lebanon.

True liberation of the region's inhabitants, in this case the Lebanese, has yet to be attained. This is regardless of the impression given that peace is being made within the region and many are accepting the borders and the notion of nation-states, which allow them to identify themselves along such entities. Although the above analysis gives the impression that the region's inhabitants are becoming more realist about regional political actualities, upon closer examination, a country such as Lebanon is fragmented, fragile and explosive. In the case of Lebanon the project of decolonisation has failed because of external manipulation, the effects of colonialism, lack of political legitimacy and the primordial and confessional divisions which are reinforced through its political system. As a consequence, the fragile Lebanese state disintegrated into a violent upheaval for over sixteen years, fragmenting its sensitive balance or consociational democracy.

Lebanon is currently headed along the same path it just emerged from, that is, it is heading toward internal conflict and/or instability. At fault is the continued refusal to re-examine the vices of the confessional system and the role of nobility within Lebanese society during the immediate ceasefire. The Taef Agreement (1989) virtually reinstated the previous political system, along with many of its former players. Twelve years on, the same political problems exist. Development and progress is slow, health, education and government structures remain incompetent, while Lebanon's youth and intelligentsia continue to migrate due to the limited employment, financial, political and social security opportunities.

With this in mind, Gelvin argues that nations are not "natural and eternal entities merely awaiting political realisation or their 'awakening from slumber'. Rather, nations and

²³⁹ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 47.

²⁴⁰ Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered", *Race and Class*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 1-16, p. 15.

concomitant national identities are constructed..."²⁴¹ Initially the construction of the Lebanese nation and its national identity were being sought by key Lebanese figures. Post-independence, however, the construction process ceased, and this contributed to state disintegration.

Prior to independence, Lebanese authorities successfully convinced their populace that independence was worthwhile. Upon attaining independence, these same authorities did not work towards overcoming societal divisions, or to construct a common national Lebanese identity. Instead, and as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the political structure of confessionalism, created by the Ottomans and endorsed by the French, was reapplied. Many traditional political nobles retained their positions along sectarian lines, while ordinary Lebanese citizens remained pawns on the chessboard manipulated and activated in time of need by their respective political/religious leaders. The ability to change this setting, that is 'awaken them from their slumber', arose again in the early 1990s when peace was returning to Lebanon and the opportunity arose to undertake a national campaign to develop and reconstruct national identity. However, to date, no new path has been taken.

2.2.3. How to Achieve Decolonisation:

Gelvin asserts that many 'Middle Eastern' scholars continue to accept, unchallenged, the historiography of nationalism in the region. In particular, they accept the premise that most specialists "continue to identify Arab nationalism as the paradigmatic nationalist ideology which, all else being equal, would command the loyalty of the ethnically Arab inhabitants of the region".²⁴² Whilst territorial or sub-regional nationalisms and ethnic or religious based nationalism's are commonly viewed as "a truncation of a true Arab identity, a 'false consciousness', and born from the frustration of Arab aspirations".²⁴³

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that by accepting the historiography of nationalism and political identity in the region alone, the state of political affairs in each country and the

²⁴¹ Gelvin, James "Modernity and its discontents: on the durability of nationalism in the Arab Middle East", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, p. 73.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 74 cites Muslih, "The Rise of Local Nationalism in the Arab East", in Rashid Khalidi *et al.* (eds), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 167.

psyche of the region's inhabitants will remain in a state of 'colonisation'. The 'colonisation of political thought' has been an enduring phenomenon from Ottoman times to the present. That is, the region's inhabitants have had a number of identities imposed on them: a broad Ottoman-Islamic colonial identity; then one based on European colonial constructs, followed by a pan-Arab identity; and a state national identity, in some countries according to Islamic ideals.

The problem is that inhabitants of a country or the region are not given opportunity to consider the multiplicity of political options or identifications available. Rather, they are generally forced to accept political constructs and ideologies put before them, initially through colonial-imperial forced constructs and then the illegitimate rule of their respective political leaders. As a consequence, no real process of decolonisation of political thought, nationalism or consciousness has developed over the years to truly 'liberate' the Arab inhabitants. Individual nations, such as Lebanon, are yet to construct a common and unifying identity to assist in the process of nation building.²⁴⁴ This has been the case because of the combination of primordialism, regional and state political identity, regional and international intervention, neo-patriarchy and the legitimacy problems dominating the region.

In order for any form of common regional union to materialise in the 21st Century, whether it be amongst the Arab 'Middle East' or encompassing the whole region, the 'colonised' thought process needs to be challenged and overcome. Specialists and nationalists need to re-examine and reconsider the representation of the nation-state and nationalism in the region, in particular the Arab world, for real liberation to succeed. Without a sustainable national identity a crisis of legitimacy arises which in turn questions the durability of a nation.

And the day oppression ceases, the new man is supposed to emerge before our eyes immediately. Now, I do not like to say so, but I must, since decolonisation has demonstrated it: this is not the way it happens. The colonised lived for a long time before we see that really new man. - Albert Memmi²⁴⁵

As the above paragraph suggests, liberation and political freedom do not come about with the raising of a national flag or reciting of a national anthem. Instead, most of the countries,

²⁴⁴ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁴⁵ Gandhi, op. cit., p. 88.

which were once colonised have yet to find, or have taken a number of decades to become, free and sovereign citizens.

Many newly independent states did not realise the intensity of the impact of colonialism on their country and their citizens until long after independence. The economic, cultural, psychological and political damage inflicted by colonial occupation continues to bear its scars today, although different countries within the region have experienced various forms of colonisation and are therefore at different stages and apply assorted techniques to decolonise.

Fanon, Said and writers such as Memmi insist that the impact of colonialism and imperialism does not end with the period of occupation. Both Fanon and Said are ambivalent regarding the national elites and seek to disband the nationalist parties in favour of a more decentralised political rule. Believing that true liberation cannot take place without the total liberation of mind, body and soul of the colonised, it is not enough to be physically free of the colonisers.²⁴⁶ He argued that there is no need for the colonised to seek the recognition of the colonizer. Rather they must understand the historical complexities of colonisation. Upon doing so the colonised can work towards creating the 'whole man', or as Said stated: "Rather than see itself as, or in the image of, the master, the slave is now urged to see itself *beside* the master".²⁴⁷

The theoretical importance of Fanon and Said to Lebanon lies with their thoughts on the issue of domination, notably the domination of power and knowledge, whereby the path towards true liberation can only be achieved via the re-examination of a nation's past, its history and its path to salvation. This is the only method to transcend the era of colonial occupation.²⁴⁸ To attain these two closely interlinked goals, mimicry and nativism need to be overcome.

²⁴⁶ Said, *Culture & Imperialism*, p. 252.

²⁴⁷ Gandhl, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁴⁸ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 38.

According to Fanon, one stage in overcoming the ramifications of colonialism is to find freedom in and through violence and by obtaining change from the top to the bottom.²⁴⁹

Fanon admits that decolonisation is a violent and an extreme phenomenon and goes on to describe it in the following manner:

...decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men. Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete and absolute substitution. ... The extraordinary importance of this change is that it is willed, called for, demanded ... Decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is obviously, a programme of complete disorder.²⁵⁰

Fanon believes that attaining decolonisation through violence is necessary and the only way to help 'create' the new person and undertake a complete overhaul of the remaining colonial infrastructure. For Fanon, violence is not just a means to an end in itself. Rather, it brings about freedom, dignity and self-realisation for the colonised.²⁵¹ Fanon stated that colonial structures cannot be successfully broken down unless it is through violent struggle of the people or through the action of the deprived and the colonised in breaking the regimes' grip on power.²⁵² Much of Fanon's writings on colonisation were based on his personal experiences in Algeria. Fanon's description of violence was largely targeted towards colonies that went about achieving their independence through bloodshed and physical violence to eject the coloniser as a ruling elite and as a settler. Lebanon did not experience the settlement of French citizens as Algeria did and therefore Fanon's need for violent struggle is not altogether applicable to Lebanon.

Fanon's thoughts are relevant to Lebanon, however, in the importance of re-examining the past and the role of 'psychological violence' in contributing to the formation of identity. The term 'psychological violence' is understood as the unconscious or conscious attempt by the coloniser to alienate sectors of the indigenous population from their traditions and values with the perceived understanding that such values are both inferior and regressive.

²⁴⁹ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 68. Fanon focuses upon the diminished psychology of the colonised and believed that once the natives realised their humanity they would begin to sharpen the weapons with which they would secure their victory. This was to be attained via decolonisation, a progress of complete disorder, whereby "the last shall be first and the first last" resulting in a decisive struggle. Fanon went on to state that during the colonial period people are called upon to fight against oppression. After national liberation they are called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment. It is here that Fanon adopts a Trotskyist ideal of an ongoing never-ending contest. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.27.

²⁵¹ According to Fanon, in order for the white settler to succeed in his/her new environment he/she must abort to violence to assert their oppressive system, whereas, the native uses force as a "cleansing force". Nursey-Bray, "In the Thought of Frantz Fanon", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18, 1, 1980, p. 158.

²⁵² Gendzier, *Frantz Fanon - A Critical Study*, Wildwood House, London, 1973, p. 55.

Examples of this process include imitation of the language, dress sense, actions and speech of the coloniser, a process referred to as wearing 'white masks' or 'mimicking' former colonisers.

One of the tests ahead for Arab governments is their ability to cope with the myriad of multiple identities in the post-colonial and post-national era. To succeed, the cause needs to be conceptualised in terms of ongoing processes of 'construction' and 'negation'.²⁵³ The challenge ahead for Arabs lies with their ability to operate within and beyond the discourse of Orientalism. This is to be attained by negating past falsehoods about their identity and culture, and rendering them obsolete via the process of 'voyaging in'.²⁵⁴

It is necessary therefore to reconstruct the relationship between the superior and the inferior or the dominator and the dominated through challenging the existing universal discourse.²⁵⁵ Both Fanon and Said consider this point as a vital component of nationalist independence and liberating consciousness.²⁵⁶ By attaining social consciousness the traditionally dominated are a step closer to liberation; without it, it is highly likely that "decolonisation merely becomes the replacement of one form of domination by another".²⁵⁷ By universally accepting the unification of self and Other, the world is one step closer to attaining a liberated existence, where the dominant and the dominated work together.²⁵⁸

2.3. Conclusion.

Therefore, in conclusion this chapter provides several hypotheses. It has demonstrated how important national identity is in legitimising and sustaining the decolonisation project. It is not possible to develop national identity or nationalism in a former colonised society if the citizens of that society are not truly free and liberated, as has been the case in the 'Middle East' region. It has shown how the 'Middle East' has been impressed by imperial

²⁵³ Handler, "Is 'Identity' A Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?" in Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 27.

²⁵⁴ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 47.

²⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁵⁶ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 313.

²⁵⁷ Ahluwalia, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 49.

and Eurocentric influences and how these have affected almost every sphere of its existence. It has further shown how political, social and economic disparities within and amongst states has contributed to the failure of the decolonisation project to date.

Second, it is also concluded that true independence does not exist if the process of decolonisation remains. Although in many respects Arab states have achieved physical independence from former colonisers, colonialism continues to affect the culture, identity, consciousness and Self of the region. The continued domination of culture and knowledge by the West reinstates colonial and imperial tendencies amongst developing nations, leaving little room for the process of decolonisation to successfully endure these ongoing pressures. Both 'pre-colonial' and 'colonial' culture has been affected. The result has been the fundamental transformation of perceptions or memories in both cultures within the period of decolonisation, which has affected the outcome of attaining a post-national identity and political liberation of the nation and its inhabitants.

It has been argued that it is only through the re-examination of nationalism and national identity via the process of decolonisation that a merging of the Self and the Other arises. When this understanding between the former dominator and dominated emanates through the interconnectedness of globalisation, the regressive structures of colonialism and Eurocentrism will be challenged. Therefore, by accepting the multiplicity of political identities that are to emerge among humans on all levels, liberation of the human and social consciousness may succeed.

Finally, the chapter suggests that the sovereignty and liberation of a person lies within the knowledge and understanding of her/his past. It is only through the cultivation of one's political history, culture and identity, and identification and status within a post-colonial era, that the real development of a post-colonial society take place.

CHAPTER 3

The Dynamics of National Identity

-Localism, Statism, Regionalism and Globalism-

Globalisation is the dominant feature of our times and we have no prospect of reversing it, even if we wish to. What we do have to do is devise ways of managing it better. We have to somehow maximise the benefits and to protect those who are in danger of becoming victims.²⁵⁹

This chapter will seek to outline Arab thought and reaction to the worldwide phenomenon known as 'globalisation' and in particular cultural globalisation. The Arab-Islamic view, generally overlooked in the West, challenges the proposition that globalisation is culturally inclusive. The previous two chapters outlined the local and regional impact on the construction of national identity, this chapter will seek to examine the influence of globalisation on notions of state sovereignty and national identity, and whether there is a possibility in incorporating these different levels of political nuances in the 'globalised' world we reside in.

The following chapter will be divided into two sections. The first will examine the concept of globalisation. The second will examine the Arab and regional reaction, and how this may impact on political identity in the Arab world and Lebanon in particular.

3.1. Globalisation

Globalisation has become a buzz-word in the past two decades. The term peppers everyday discussion of economics, culture, changing society, public policy and politics, whether international or local. The impact of information technology, whether it is through the Internet or satellite programs, or the flooding of the markets with consumer products and the impact of American culture, these features of globalisation have had a profound impact on the international community. The majority of the earth's inhabitants have been

²⁵⁹ Secretary-General Annan speaking at the High-level General Assembly Dialogue on Globalisation, 18 September 1998, Press Release SG/SM/6706

touched in one form or another by this phenomenon, leading to the claim that the world is becoming 'one' or akin to a 'global village'.

The inter-connectedness of globalisation gives a sense of truth to such terminology and its promotion – where the local and the global are connecting and reciprocating knowledge from, and of, one another. Without doubt if globalisation is applied as stated by its proponents it would offer astounding opportunities for international progress in developmental issues and living standards. Linked together, world forces could confront and work towards eradicating world problems for example poverty, disease, pollution, terrorism, money laundering, fraud and working towards environmentalism, conservation, and technological advancement.

Many supporters of globalisation claim that all countries will reap the rewards of such policies through improved food sustenance, medicine, education and financial incentives. Western liberal practices will improve the welfare and well being of developing world citizens through democracy and social justice and economic reforms such as free markets, free trade, privatisation and restructuring of debt and taxation systems.

Undoubtedly, with globalisation there has been an increased awareness of other cultures and societies, as well as economic and political cohesion among nation-states. Such cohesion has brought about positive consequences resulting in cultural regeneration, communications, decentralisation of power and economic development in traditionally closed states in the Arab world such as Syria. Although it seems idealistic to imagine us living in a global society respecting diverse cultures, languages, peoples of different race, gender and creed, the reality is that globalisation also has many negative connotations. Outlined below are the massive disparities globalisation engenders.

Liberal accounts consider globalisation as creating great prosperity and the universalisation of values, resulting in material advantages for theoretically everyone. Regardless of the magnitude of world trade figures, the growth and spread of foreign direct investment and the expansion of international capital flows, the fact remains that globalisation is not benefiting everyone. The spread of globalisation has been uneven and detrimental to many within poor socio-economic spheres. The gap between the rich and

poor is widening daily and the international community is becoming embroiled in consumerism at both a local and global level regardless of its ability to sustain such a way of life. Consumerism has become a feature of globalisation which is being sustained by trans-national corporations and some governmental institutions that wield economic and political power and thereby engaging most, if not all, members of society in one form or another.

At the moment, for many of our contemporaries, globalisation is a universe that is being built without them, while the majority know it mainly through its negative effects. Despite the public perceptions that globalisation brings the world together, regardless of difference, through common humanity and binding interests, in the past decade there has been a noticeable shift with a growing current indicating that globalisation is mainly prompted in the interests of corporations and governments in the 'West', particularly the US.

One issue that immediately becomes evident is the homogeneity of a phenomenon that applies to goods, services, capital and also, though unequally, to people. Everything occurs as if globalisation were in some way 'uninhabited'. When globalists reflect on differences it is usually in three different ways: indifference; negativity, that is, it is perceived as a threat to world 'stability' [such as religious or nationalist identity]; or differences in interpretation relating to human rights and cultural relativism.

Critics of globalisation observe this as a new phase of Orientalism, a more dangerous and vigorous way of constructing 'the Other', a new form of imperialism to suit the language of the 21st Century and in many ways the 'Americanisation' of the world. The homogenisation of globalisation and the diffusion of its benefits bring with them the risk that whole countries, even whole regions, will be excluded and become more impoverished. This is particularly true for parts of Africa, where the risk that the poor will become even poorer is exacerbated by the fact that the more advanced countries tend to concentrate development aid in poor countries that show willingness to mobilise all their resources, regardless of the social and political ramifications. This exclusionary practice is ravishing traditional social structures and their sense of security.

It is clear that we have entered the age of global society, whether we are dealing with the movement of goods or capital, the dissemination of information, protection of the environment, population control, suppression of trans-national crime or the fight against terrorism. Henceforth, these issues exist on a global scale and can be grasped only very imperfectly at the level of the nation state. But at the same time, the world is being torn apart by new conflicts which are taking place not so much between states as within nations. Today wars are often not fought by agents of sovereign states but waged by political organisations, irregular armies, ethnic or tribal militias and other bodies that may not owe allegiance to any sovereign state. Ironically, therefore, there are two conflicting paradigms emerging in today's international era. The first is the shift towards globalisation and the second shift is to fragmentation.²⁶⁰

In addition, globalisation has demonstrated that politics, the economy and culture cannot be totally separated from one another. Rather everyone of these spheres is affected by the others. Although one cannot argue that globalisation is purely Western or American, it can be said that the homogenisation of values and practices are predominantly Western in origin. Increasingly, Western political, economic and social institutions and ideologies are being enforced on non-Western countries and institutions. Thus, prior to analysing the ramifications of globalisation on the Arab world and beyond, the term itself needs to be examined.

Scholte outlines five broad definitions, some of which overlap: First, globalisation has been viewed in terms of 'internationalisation', which entails cross-border relations between countries on economic and communicative lines.²⁶¹ Second, globalisation has been defined as 'liberalisation' of economic trade and financial barriers encompassing 'economic integration'.²⁶² 'Universalisation' encompasses the third definition, that is, the global sharing of ideas, discoveries and practices. For example, Roland Robertson defines globalisation as "the crystallisation of the entire world as a single place", with the accompanying "intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole".²⁶³ It can be

²⁶⁰ Hirst & Thompson, "Globalisation: Ten Frequently Asked Questions and Some Surprising Answers", *Surroundings*, Vol. 4, Autumn, 1996, pp. 47-66.

²⁶¹ Scholte, *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction*, MacMillan Pres Pty, London, 2000, pp. 15-16.

²⁶² Sander, "Multilateralism, Regionalism and Globalisation: The Challenges to the World Trading System", in H. Sander and A. Inotai (eds), *World Trade After the Uruguay Round: Prospects and Policy Options for the Twenty-first Century*, London: Routledge, pp. 17-36.

²⁶³ Roland Robertson, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*, Sage, London, 1992, p. 8

viewed as the dual process of the “compression of the world” in terms of the interconnectedness between societies and “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”, i.e. the noticed recognition of the world as ‘one world’.²⁶⁴ The fourth school of thought defines globalisation as ‘westernisation’ or ‘modernisation’, to be interpreted as ‘Americanisation’ and the domination of local cultures and sovereignty. In this sense it may be considered as a modern form of colonisation or imperialism.²⁶⁵ Finally, globalisation has been interpreted by some as ‘de-territorialisation’.²⁶⁶ That is, geographical borders, distances or places no longer confine social, cultural, political or economic exchanges within and between states or regions.²⁶⁷

Despite the differing schools of thought a consensus can be reached that with globalisation the world has witnessed the reconfiguration of power between the local and the global. This, in turn, has inevitably seen a greater compression of the world through factors such as international trading links through multinational organisations. Other factors for which globalisation has been responsible, are:

1. Advances in information technology and telecommunications means that corporations, businesses and organisations are no longer confined to the realms of the nation state. These enhancements have allowed contact with previously remote places with considerable ease and results.
2. Closely linked to the above point is the cross-border human interaction (pre-September 11, 2001, approximately 1.5 billion commercial airline passengers travelled annually), which was made possible with advances in transportation and the low cost of travel to most parts of the globe.
3. The predominance of trans-national corporations (TNCs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) which has seen the movement of people from continent to

²⁶⁴ Robertson, p. 8.

²⁶⁵ Spybey, *Globalization and World Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996; Taylor “izations of the World: Americanisation, Modernisation and Globalization”, in C. Hay and D. Marsh (eds), *Demystifying Globalization*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 49-70; Schiller, “Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era”, *Critical Studies in Mass Communications*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1991 pp. 13-28; Khor, “Globalization: Implications for Development Policy”, *Third World Resurgence*, No. 74, October 1996, pp. 15-21.

²⁶⁶ Held, et. al, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999; McGrew (ed) *The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997.

²⁶⁷ Scholte, *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction*, MacMillan Pres Pty, London, 2000, pp. 15-16.

continent and the movement of capital, technology and skill regardless of borders which had previously impeded such movements.

4. The global reach of world markets, products and sales.

5. Digital cash transfers, global credit exchanges and currencies, the global financial-exchange markets, banking, shares and bond dealing. It is estimated, for example, that \$450 trillion of foreign-exchange turnover is transferred annually.

6. The increasing concern for the sustainability of the environment for future generations has raised issues of biodiversity, recycling, conservation and the world eco-system to the international arena.

The combination of these six factors has contributed to the emergence of the notion of a 'global village'. The factors are interconnected economically, financially, politically, socially, culturally and geographically-environmentally. Although the focus of this chapter is predominantly on cultural-political globalisation it is impossible to avoid the effect of economic and capital globalisation, which is extensively interconnected to all spheres of globalisation and its inherent expansion. The last decade particularly has demonstrated how capitalist social relations played a fundamental role in who will prosper and who will suffer in this 'new world'.

3.1.1. Economic-capital globalisation

The 'world economy approach' to globalisation deals with the theory that the world is one, regardless of the fact that the systematic features that support this theory, notably that of the capitalist system, incorporates limited parts of the world. These theorists undermine the cultural dictates of society in many non-Western and non-capitalist systems, leaving it almost reductionist. On the other hand opponents, such as post-colonialists, argue that, if activated, the current global system will become more pluralistic than universal, allowing the periphery to diffuse the dominance of the Western capitalist system and leading to the true representation and equality of all competitive markets, regardless of the type of economic system adopted.

However, what has been emerging is the clear utilisation of Western orientated economic systems and ideals to successfully compete amongst Western orientated markets. The

1990s boom of Asia's markets is a case in point. Understandably such competition between markets brings about the interaction of cultures and the need for cross-cultural understanding when it comes to work ethics and other cultural practices. But also evident is the global hegemony of Western ideals and practices being forced upon weaker nation states, in addition to conflict over commercial advantages, territory, sovereignty and culture.

Competition and conflict over these economic and political advantages have been increasingly sought through trans-national actions in the last few years. Trans-national organisations and strong political economies have been able to dominate economic organisations and force people to become participants in fulfilling their goals and objectives. This results in the eventual outcome of cultural hybridity and in most cases, the de-culturation of societies regardless of the cosmetic 'cultural' and community tactics such trans-national corporations may adopt in order to apply their ideals.

The capacity for such success partially lies in the shift of the world's capital to individuals and TNCs rather than individual states or unions. Consequently, this shift has limited the ability of individual nations to control or defend their financial domains and it is becoming almost totally reliant on the stability of the world financial markets. For example, at the end of 1992 international daily transactions of currency trading was estimated at US\$1 trillion, having increased by 50% over the three years up to 1992. Meanwhile, the foreign exchange held by all of the world's central banks is estimated as US\$1 trillion, the same amount traded daily.²⁶⁸

Hence, those who benefit most from globalisation are wealthy individuals, TNCs or MNCs.²⁶⁹ Their main objective is to open up world markets and utilise the natural wealth and resources of developing countries to their individual/corporations advantage and profit margins rather than to benefit any country. This is targeted through the realms of free trade, with no or little restrictions, tariffs, barriers or conditions. Capital or financial

²⁶⁸ Goonatilake, "The Self wandering between Cultural Localisation and Globalisation", pp. 225-239, pp. 227-228 citing Greenhouse, "Greenspan sees risks globally", *New York Times*, 14 October 1992 in Pieterse and Parekh (eds.), *The Decolonisation of Imagination*.

²⁶⁹ Multinationals are suited towards producing a whole product in any given country while trans-national corporations produce parts or components of any given product in various countries which are then shipped to a second country for total assembly. Although ownership of many such companies is trans-national and are no longer restricted to the West, many have originated from such countries.

globalisation is the co-ordination of corporations and individuals beyond the border state in order to monopolise and gain from such markets.

With individuals and corporations controlling the resources of any given nation state they have the ability to affect domestic state affairs and pressure governments to legislate against protectionism and towards free trade without giving consideration to the internal ramifications of such policy changes. For example, the Guatemalan government was forced by a powerful trans-national corporation to repeal a law that protected infants and prohibited the American company for children's food, Gerber, from falsely claiming through its media campaigns that its food is better and more nutritious for infants than a mother's milk. Another case in point is the Thai government being forced to annul its production of low cost medication that treated AIDS patients out of fear of US opposition. Other examples are the monopolisation of 60% of the world banana trade by 3 companies; or that the most powerful MNC's and TNC's, which rose from 7000 to 26 000 between 1973 and 1993, with foreign direct investment growing from \$68 billion in 1960 to \$2.1 trillion in 1993, control between one and two-thirds of world trade.²⁷⁰ While, cross-border bank credits to non-banks increased 30 fold in a two decade period (1970s to 1990) from \$54 billion to \$1.7 trillion; and global foreign exchange turnover increased from \$18 billion per day in 1977 to \$1.3 trillion a day in 1995.²⁷¹ Another example is the fact that the number of billionaires in the world has reached 358, which, when combined, equates to the wealth of approximately 2.5 billion poor today. In the meantime, 20% of the world's population owns more than 70% of the world's wealth and enjoy 86% of the world's consumption while 20% of the people consume only 1.3%.

These problems are not just found in developing countries but also increasingly becoming common amongst developed nations. For example, between 1980 and 1993 the number of American employees who lost their jobs in 500 companies amounted to 4 million individuals. Simultaneously, the wages of directors and executives of these companies increased sixfold. Also in the US, 95% of the national wealth lies in the hands of 5% of the population. While internationally millions go to sleep hungry, live below the poverty line and others at the line of poverty.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Edward S. Herman, "Globalisation In Question?", *Z Magazine* April 1997. p.9.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Ali Baghdadi, "Globalisation: The New Invasion of the Third World - A Critical Analysis", translated by Maha Abu Ghosh, FAV- Free Arab Voice, Internet newsletter, 7 January 2000.

With these vast and rapid changes occurring, there has been a tendency for a form of passive revolution to emerge amongst citizens of the developing world. Such a 'revolution' has been viewed as the passive conformation to global pressures through policy conditions enforced by international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Although considered by many such countries as the tools of imperialism that demonstrate ignorance and/or arrogance towards policy proposals on the country and its citizens, many have been forced to accept the policies enforced by their respective countries. Without popular support, these changes tend to be authoritarian in nature and enforced upon existing political and economic structures with the full backing of trans-national elites. These trans-national elites have a tendency to mimic trans-national practices and ideals related to the West rather than those of their home countries or indigenous citizens, who they now regard as regressive.

3.1.2. Cultural Globalisation

Using their economic power these elites and powerful super-nations successfully infiltrate the cultural constructs of other societies. Prior to entering this debate it is necessary to define the meaning of culture.

There are two basic definitions: *the first* encompasses culture as "the shared values and meanings with which individual subjects interact with one another in a given historical period".²⁷³ This definition considers the general makeup of the development of modernity with the acknowledgment of the uni-linear historical development. Different historical periods have witnessed the shift from traditional to modern cultural traits, resulting in their current state. Thus shared values and meanings are developed over time.²⁷⁴

The second definition "regards culture as a 'practice' rather than a state of being", in which values and ideals are "constructed and exchanged within a given space".²⁷⁵ Culture consists of significant practices which are defined in a relational way, "that is, in order for different terms to have a meaning, they carry differences as a relation between them".²⁷⁶

²⁷³ E.F. Keyman, "Articulating Difference: The problem of the Other in International Political Economy", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 75.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

In addition to these two definitions, Roland Robertson coined the term 'meta-culture' which seeks to address "the varying links between culture and social structure and between culture and individual and collective action".²⁷⁷ Much attention is given to the "deep rooted, implicit assumptions concerning relations between parts and wholes, individuals and societies, in-groups and out-groups, and societies and the world as a whole".²⁷⁸ This results in the variant exposure of culture, which delimits its meaning and the way it is invoked, applied and practiced.²⁷⁹

The 'global-human' condition – the role individuals, societies and the system of societies and humankind interact -- plays a fundamental role in understanding this globalisation process by formulating the appropriate inter-world behaviour among states, societies and individuals.²⁸⁰ That is, the 'compression' of the world into a mode of interconnectedness. Therefore, when an international crisis arises or a multi/trans-national company takes an executive decision today, tomorrow it may have ramifications in another country half way across the globe. This was demonstrated after the closure of Sheridan Manchester factory outlet in South Australia and its decision to relocate to an Asian country due to low tariff incentives and labour costs, more than two dozen workers (and their respective families) were affected by the closure.

Robertson argues that the development of the inter-world behaviour will enhance the 'plurality' of the international community through the acceptance of various civilisational, regional, societal and identifiable forms of identity. Such diversity is a positive notion that is underpinned –by a shared global culture".²⁸¹ He adds that in the past opponents of modernity, considered modernisation as a way of imposing Western universalistic discourse upon the world, while globalisation compels dominant cultures "to interact, relate and listen" to once silenced cultures and nations.²⁸² This in turn appropriates a reciprocal relationship of acceptance of 'the other', creating a new sense of global culture.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

²⁷⁷ Robertson, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 55, 77-78.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 70.

²⁸² Mike Featherstone, "Global and Local Cultures", in J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, L. Tickner (eds.), *Mapping the Features: Local Cultures, Global Change*, London and NY, Routledge, 1993, p. 169.

'Global culture' according to Robertson, is formulated when:

the culture of particular societies are, to different degrees the result of their interactions with other societies in the global system. In other words, national-societal cultures have been differently formed in interpenetration with significant others. By the same token, global culture itself is partly created in terms of specific interactions between national societies.²⁸³

He also argues that national societies are engaged in a continuous learning process that articulates their own components of nation and culture and also sustains and develops a 'sense of identity'.²⁸⁴

However, in politically and economically weak states this sense of shared learning and development is a weak component. International bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) weaken their resolve further by enforcing 'structural adjustment programmes' and neo-liberal economic policies such as monetary and fiscal deregulation, industrial legislation, social policy reconstruction, welfare state deregulation and imposing privatisation.²⁸⁵ Consequently, many states are forced to adjust their domestic economies to the pressures and competitiveness of the world market resulting in the infringement of state sovereignty. It is all too common for these societies to lose their own sense of nationalism, sovereignty and national identity because they are being forced to adopt cultural and economic policies foreign to their domestic markets and undertake major structural changes to resemble capitalist societies, which are traditionally foreign to their systems and way of life. It is all very well arguing that the economic, social and political spheres of any given society are interlinked but independent of one another as does Robertson²⁸⁶ but in reality the global economy is exceeding all trans-national borders and producing political effects on the independence and sovereignty of any given nation state regardless of their world status (for example, along the divide of the Developing-Developed world, North-South, East-West divide).

²⁸³ Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ To demonstrate the extensive shift towards privatisation it has been recorded that by 1992 more than 80 countries had privatised approximately 6800 previously-owned enterprises, mostly monopoly suppliers of essential utilities. Hoogvelt, *Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1997, p. 138 citing D. Sandberg, "The Pirate Privateers", *New Internationalist*, September 1994.

²⁸⁶ Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Because of this inability to differentiate between developed and developing countries and people of diverse cultural backgrounds globalisation has effectively blurred distinctions between nations, cultures and regions. Inter-cultural studies have demonstrated this emergence of subordinates through the 'hybridisation' and 'creolization' of societies that are not neatly packaged and differentiated into cultural and material divisions of 'us and them' components.²⁸⁷

The global shift is moving toward 'cultural synchronisation' or a 'monoculture' whereby attention is focused on one view – Americanisation. The McWorld of popular culture based on consumerism, the CNN-isation of the mass media, with little value placed on cultural diversity.²⁸⁸

Hence, it is easy to get carried away with the positive aspects of globalisation, but it is naive to think that there are not negatives associated with it. The global system, could produce a culturally homogenised world, contrary to the notion that plurality is positive within the autonomous bodies that make up a society.

This concern also leads to two possible threats: first, what Serge Latouche has termed the influence of "the techno-economic megamachine" which has the ability to desensitise members of the international community's individual culture. This de-culturalisation of people is taking place due to their exposure to Western culture and practices.²⁸⁹ With globalisation and particularly the West's influence there is a tendency to compartmentalise all socio-economic practices rather than comprehend that in many non-Western nations economic, social and cultural practices tend to be intertwined and complementary to one another. Amongst Westerners economics is becoming a substitute for culture. Other cultures are becoming a Western replica devoid of almost all sense of identity and place of 'the Other'.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁷ Scholte, op. cit., pp. 23-24. For further reading see Hannerz, 1987; Nederveen Pieterse, 1995; Blaney and Inayatullah, 1994; Shapiro, 1994; Scholte, 1996b, 1999c; Shapiro and Aiker, 1996; Linklater, 1998.

²⁸⁸ For proponents of such a view see Hamelink 1983, Tomlinson, 1995; Levitt, 1983: 93; Guehenno, 1995: 57, Brown, 1995.

²⁸⁹ Serge Latouche, *In the wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post Development*, p. 24.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

Today we have world media via satellite TV. Images of war, destruction, human disaster and tragedy daily images making local events into international news, regardless of how distorted these images may be. In many countries the internationalisation of the state has taken place with cultural and market links that affect the domestic market.

Robertson does not consider the influence or impact of westernisation on developing world countries. He does not recognise that global capitalism underpins Western cultural ideals and conclusively becomes a form of Western domination. Also absent is acknowledgement of the way culture interacts with capitalism.

Thus Robertson's sense of 'global culture' may seem like an ideal component to enter the new millennium, yet beyond the surface of such an ideal it has the ability to dilute the potency of 'national belonging-ness and national identity'. This in turn creates a form of crisis for the legitimacy of national societies, state structures and an individual's identity. With this crisis brewing, many nation-states are compelled to, on the one hand, strengthen national identity practices and utilise the symbols, practices and rhetoric to enhance this important component of nationhood. Yet on the other hand, nation-states have to remain active participants in the global world. A new form of legitimisation of nation building, identity and existence is underway in order to configure the new power structure on an international scale. National identity therefore becomes an even more deeply contested phenomenon amongst different groups within societies who compete with one another to mould the national identity.

In recent years, that the capitalist elites in many nations have successfully monopolised the direction of nationalism and national identity. By doing so, these classes have been successful in furthering their global interests while legitimising themselves within the wider community and therefore being almost the sole benefactors of such a shift.

The above criticism does not negate the fact that the West is to blame for many of the ills of developing world countries, nor the belief that the 'West' holds monolithic views regarding Islam. It does not assume that culture is a non-developing construct. As discussed in earlier chapters, culture is constantly developing and reshaping itself. The movement of people, the enhancement of technology through travel and

telecommunications, and the insurgency of trans-national corporations who employ people from all countries and locate them internationally, are all factors conducive to allowing outside influences to change the malleable concept of culture within any given country. Of concern is the ability for these once prominent borders to be overcome with such fluidity. Non-Western societies are quick to mimic a culture of 'Americanisation', that is, jeans, hamburgers, and pop culture without considering the long-term implications of such an outcome.

Having acknowledged that globalisation does not necessarily equate in a monolithic manner with westernisation, it is difficult not to highlight the Western cultural presuppositions that have become part of the international system. Cultural norms and practices exhibited in state, company and community behaviour have originated from the West. It is within this framework that globalisation allows domination by the Western capitalist, liberal world order, values and practices.

For example, many within the international community have adopted the social practice of materialism to its optimum. The *maximise* principle, that of "maximum results and enjoyment, minimum costs and effects in attaining them" has been dominant amongst 30-40 year professionals in many parts of the world, more especially in developed nations.²⁹¹ Efficiency, progress, competition and individualism are the ideas of the present. Standing is determined in the market place; rewarding those who achieve the maximum results with the least effort and punishing those who do not. This change in ideals is indicative of decline of socialism since the early 1980s.

This leads to the central underpinning of globalisation theory that is the relationship between the local and global. Cultures have a tendency to "select, incorporate and syncretise the ideas from other cultures in such a way as to particularise the universal".²⁹² In the past such a relationship existed, but largely for a privileged few. Currently, however, thanks to modern technology, an individual from a small and remote rural village in Egypt for example may be able to keep track of their stocks in New York via a Japanese laptop through a French owned ISP. It has become almost a natural state of being that such

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁹² Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

relations are a basic part of human interaction and relations. The way these relations are developed are undertaken on a basis of inclusion and exclusion, or elimination of particular cultural practices and ideals. This, in one form or another, leads to notions of universal and shared cultural practices, inevitably tying the the local and global together to form the basis of global relations.

This nexus Robertson argues is "the particularisation of the universal and the universalisation of the particular" which he believes is indicative of the contemporary condition of globalisation.²⁹³ That is, the particularisation of the universal encompasses "the idea of the universal being given global-human concreteness", while the conclusion to be drawn from the latter is that there is no limit to the "particularity, to uniqueness, to difference and togetherness".²⁹⁴

Robertson writes:

the culture of particular societies are, to different degrees, the result of their interactions with other societies in the global system. In other words, national-societal cultures have been differently formed in interpretation with significant others. By the same token, global culture itself is partly created in terms of specific interactions between national societies.²⁹⁵

Just as globalisation has its negatives, so does the local-global configuration. Some Arab theorists, as will be discussed shortly, do not believe that globalisation is composed of the interaction of various cultures but is rather viewed as the West, America in particular, dominating global affairs. Globalisation critics have argued against the phenomenon on three levels: one, the concept of a 'one world' system; two, the idea that the world is culturally, socially, politically, economically or militarily equal; and three, the impingement of national sovereignty and uniqueness by homogenising the view of the world.

It may be a common view, but globalisation impacts on states differently. There is a general sense amongst many theorists in the developing world that globalisation constitutes a new form of colonialism. In view of this, the second part of this chapter will

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

examine how Arab intellectuals have reacted to globalisation in the Arab world. There is an assumption by some Western intellectuals that within the Arab and Muslim world globalisation is largely equated to 'Americanisation'. Although a segment of Arab intelligentsia do concur with such thoughts it is incorrect to assume that there is consensus on this issue.

3.2. Alternative views on globalisation: Arab-Islamists' thoughts

So how do Arab intellectuals react to globalisation? The rest of this chapter will examine seven Arab schools of thought towards this new phenomenon. These schools include: the Islamists, supporters of globalisation, Marxists, opponents of globalisation, liberals, Arab nationalists and modernists.

3.2.1. The Islamist School of Thought - *Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, Nawef El Mousawee, Ahmad Kamal Abou ElMajad*

The Islamist school of thought has many contributors such as Nawef El Mousawee and Ahmad Kamal Abou ElMajad. One of the main critics of globalisation however is Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine. Shamseddine is one of the most senior Shi'ite religious leaders and Head of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council, which is based in Lebanon. He wrote a paper entitled "Islam and Globalisation: How they Reflect on One Another". This paper was presented at a Conference on "Globalisation and Issues of Cultural Citizenship" in Egypt, in April 1998.²⁹⁶

Shamseddine argued the nation-state has become weakened by globalisation, it no longer has the ability or the power to fully control culture, politics and the mass-media. This is especially the case if the nation-state is split along religious, sectarian, racial or ethnic cleavages, as this weakens the nation-state and forces participation within the superpower structure. Paradoxically, he believes that this may be one of the numerous goals the world's superpowers are attempting to achieve.

According to Shamseddine, globalisation of economics and trade means opening the way for foreign multinationals to gain undue domestic power. This is seen as a threat to morality

²⁹⁶ Globalisation special, Part 2, *El Telegraph*, July 15, 1998.

and family values to which the Islamic tradition gives so much credence. Shamseddine believes globalism promotes the destruction of morals, the very foundation of Arab-Islamic culture and education. Accordingly, by being receptive to globalisation Muslims will be accepting the moral decay of Islamic culture and identity due to the effect on education, culture, developing nations and its citizens.

He goes on to state that Muslims view economic superpowers as moving and controlling globalisation. According to Shamseddine the West is composed of a Christian-Jewish alliance. Globalisation is therefore against Islam, its adherents, Arabs and in favour of Israel. He states that this is the case even in cultural matters, using Salman Rushdie and Tasmeen Nissrine as examples. Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*, and the furore which followed its release, demonstrated that in the late 20th Century the freedom of the artist was more sacred than religion. Many Muslims viewed Rushdie's novel as ridiculing Islam. Many devout Muslims felt that Rushdie had no right to poke fun at and twist into obscenity some of the most sacred symbols of Islam. Western intellectuals argued that as an artist, Rushdie had the right and even duty to go wherever his imagination led him in his writing. Yet until the 1960s *Lady Chatterly's Lover* was regarded as morally repugnant under British law for daring to depict an affair between a married member of the gentry and a worker on the estate. For a long time after Oscar Wilde's conviction for homosexual acts, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* was seen in a similar light. Then why was the Rushdie affair seen as incomprehensible in the Western world?²⁹⁷

Shamseddine believes that "the Arabs and Muslims are against globalisation because they see that globalisation is against them, they do not discard globalisation as a matter of rejection or fundamentalism". He adds that, "it is not only the Arabs and Muslims who are against globalisation." The Europeans generally and notably the French, consider globalisation as "Americanism", a point which the cleric agrees with. On the other hand, he believes that the Americans are seeing this as the 'new world order' or as 'American (dominated) world'.²⁹⁸ Europeans are defending their position by stating that Americanism needs to be stopped because globalisation is in fact spreading the cultural-educational systems of the United States in a form of cultural and economic imperialism. He cited an example of French condemnation of American cultural domination, by citing Jacques Lang,

²⁹⁷ Ali A Mazrui, "Islamic and Western Values", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997.

²⁹⁸ Globalisation special, Part 2, *El Telegraph*, July 15, 1998.

the French Education Minister, in Mexico whilst he was attending a UNESCO International Conference and stated that all "educated people of the world should unite together against the occupation of American education and culture".²⁹⁹

Shamseddine poses the important question as to how Muslims are to defend themselves from globalisation. He believes that as a Muslim a person should restrict him or herself from falling into the ills of globalisation. Islamic civilisation, Muslim beliefs and traditions should not give in to American culture, yet he also states that one should not cut oneself off from the international community. Muslims should defend their economic, political, cultural and religious interests and not be swayed by others. Once the Muslims are secure - within these spheres - they will be able to participate as equals in the international arena. This can only occur when all Muslims agree with one another and are able to form an Islamic entity or *ummah al Islami* (the Islamic nation).

Shamseddine claims that Muslims are split into three schools of thought regarding globalisation:

1. Some Muslims say they support globalisation 100% and want to ignore, or rather forget, all personal-cultural value systems they have accumulated over the years and become 'global' (in other words Western) in their thoughts and behaviour.

2. The second group of Muslims reject globalisation outright and take the isolationist stand of retaining the parameters of the nation state or amongst other nations of familiarity and nothing beyond. Shamseddine doesn't see this as a solution. He doesn't believe that Muslims should be confined amongst themselves, but states that isolationism is a procedure of the past.

3. The third group of Muslims are of the view that they strategically utilise the positives of globalisation that will enhance their identity and stature, yet reject factors that melt away the identity of the Islamic people. However, Shamseddine does not believe that this is a viable option as the flooding of 'Middle East' markets with satellite dishes and Western television programs, does not allow governments or the people to censor what is

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

considered impermissible for Islamic morals and identity. He adds that this is also the case in the simple task of consuming and purchasing goods. With the concentration of advertisements predominantly focusing on American or Western made goods power. Shamseddine believes that the consumer in the Arab-Islamic world is not just purchasing goods but also being influenced by the advertising and the goods themselves, which in turn makes them more susceptible to the influences of globalisation.

Shamseddine's solution is to defend and to strengthen Islamic identity. He argues that there is a need to progress and develop in all national spheres, that is, politically, scientifically, culturally, economically, industrially, agriculturally, through education and the exchange of information through means such as the internet. By failing to do so an *intifada* (or uprising) will occur. Progress depends on the capabilities of the people and the nation. He adds that the Islamic world should create its own form of globalisation to counter Western globalisation. So if it happens that Muslims are to take the 'positives' from globalisation they will no longer be dependent on the American-Western interpretation and products but have a more compatible Islamic view. At present however the person in the developing world affected by globalisation is only to be viewed as the dominated and not the dominator. That the Islamic civilisation, as others, is being moulded into the Western one is largely due to the result of the domination of the information super highway by the West, who in turn control the difference between the media and the reporting of the truth. Although, the media and the internet are dominated by American and Western facilitators this criticism is a simplified one which does not acknowledge the benefits the internet has contributed to voicing the concerns and views of people within the Islamic world and amongst those suffering oppression from state forms of terrorism. The internet for example has advanced the knowledge and reality of Palestinian hardships internationally.

Shamseddine believes there is a purpose to globalisation. The purpose is to create a new person, a person that is a creation of the media, a slave to consumerism and one with the characteristics that were outlined above with the *maximine* principle. Selfishness, greed and competition are now considered important human factors in survival. He goes on to outline the inequality of globalisation economically, through information and technology, education, culture and security.

Shamseddine views globalisation as being controlled by 20-25% of the world's population while the remaining 75-80% are the ones being controlled economically, politically and

culturally. This minority has the capability of controlling people via the media, communication, information and technology. They control the economic market as well as the raw products of produce around the world they are able to play the stock markets to the detriment of millions of people and control world capital. It is a world of the powerful versus the weak. He believes the goal of this minority is to get rid of any forces opposing this worldwide phenomenon through the demonisation of the opposing groups of people to make them accept this new force. He labels this as a new form of the "White Man" and utilises Nietzsche's terminology of "power is to the most powerful".

Although, Shamseddine is correct in his analysis that a small but significant minority own and control the world's capital, Shamseddine's views this as a 'conspiracy'. As though it was the capitalists who created globalisation as a construct, controlling and dictating its extensive web, seeking to dominate every aspect of everyone's existence. He gives little acknowledgement that not only are the citizens of the developing world feeling the consequences of the changing global system but so too many are within the developed world. In fact his criticism should be directed more towards MNC, TNC and the US military industry complex which do not discriminate against individuals of a certain class, race, religion or gender.

TNCs have played a fundamental role in breaking down the boundaries that have existed between geographic spaces: if colonialism and imperialism centred around a particular set of countries containing a similar cultural practice, the main feature of trans-national corporations is that ownership and origin of such companies is no longer restricted to the West. Companies from a wide range of countries participate in the globalising economic process, engaging in a trans-national economic practice and taking advantage of the greater freedom of movement in the global capitalist system and the almost universal submission by states to the interests of such corporations. It is not so much their geographic location that is the issue, but rather that they participate in a trans-national practice and that such a practice constitutes the fundamental element of the global capitalist system, unbound by the state system, seeking the best possible profit margins, attaining economic power and have little regard for the international labour force, let alone the culture of any given nation.

Of the 100 largest trans-national corporations, one-third of their assets are abroad and 40 of them do more than half their business overseas. The bulk of their overseas production services foreign sales (rather than sales back to the home market), but these sales could have been supplied from home facilities, which continue to be displaced by those invested abroad. The number of TNCs rose from 7 000 to 26 000 between 1973 and 1993; foreign direct investment grew from \$68 billion in 1960 to \$2.1 trillion in 1993 and their operations have become more integrated, which is reflected in the increase in intra-firm trade - in the early 1970s such trade was estimated at about 20% of overall trade; by the early 1990s it had arisen to a third and even more for US TNCs.³⁰⁰

The sums that now move across borders are enormous and can easily overpower national monetary authorities. Cross-border bank credit to non-banks increased 30 fold between the early 1970s and 1990 (from \$54 billion to \$1.7 trillion). Global foreign exchange turnover increased from \$18 billion per day in 1977 to \$1.3 trillion a day in 1995 and the ratio of foreign exchange turnovers to export rose from 3.5 to 64. Official foreign reserves, dwarfed by these trading volumes, are now insufficient to allow counter-speculation against exchange rate fluctuations.

The process of globalisation is by no means complete. National states still retain a certain amount of autonomy, but corporate global perspectives and decision making are widespread, whilst financial market integration is now very great. These institutional developments and processes have increased the relative power of capital in both labour management bargaining and in government policy making. There may not be a clearly defined new class of international capitalists, but operating through their leverage of national states and translated into rules imposed by the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation, trans-national capital is exercising some kind of loose hegemonic power.

Shamseddine concludes that globalisation does not care about the culture of 'the Other'. If 'the Other' culture is not a threat to globalisation then it is left alone, and eventually 'the Other' culture is converted into folklore as a means of keeping them happy and occupied through peaceful means and inverted pressure. If, however, 'the Other' culture is against globalisation then globalisation will attempt to break it apart through any means possible.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ Herman, *op. cit.*

This is mainly done through legal terminology and international legal conventions. Shamseddine uses the example of the United Nations' Peking and Egypt International Women's Conventions. At the Egypt convention the Catholic Church and the Islamic nation representatives unified in their protest that the international community was assisting in breaking up the family unit by promoting a female's right to contraception and means of birth control. Other examples Shamseddine used were the issue of human rights and the protection of religious and ethnic minorities. He believes that such conventions are becoming intrusive in people's personal lives and are undermining the credibility of the nation state.³⁰²

Although Shamseddine's conclusions cannot be dismissed he again uses the word globalisation as though it is a homogenous controlled entity and not one that is multi-faceted, multi-levelled and not controlled by any given individual, group of people or states.

Shamseddine does not overlook the West in its modernisation and technological capabilities and developments over the decades but rather commends them for such advances. However, he also states that one must acknowledge its vices such as the effect of drugs, homelessness, poverty, wars and conflicts. He adds that the problem lies with the West viewing 'the Other' as the 'Orient' and itself as 'the Occident'. When the West sees 'the Other', whether Muslims or non-Muslims, it sees itself as being the Occident which created globalisation to destroy 'the Other' in the name of progress. 'The Other' feels accepted by the Occident and happily takes what is being offered, until the recipient realises that metaphorically what is actually being consumed is a poisoned cake. The recipient is happy until he/she realises she/he's been poisoned. Thus, 'the Occident' which created globalisation did so in order to destroy 'the Other' in the name of progress and in the form of a poisoned cake.³⁰³

World civilisation is living in deprivation via food control, trade and economics, and the wealth of a minority is increasing dramatically while the rest of the world's populace live in poverty. The Occident continues to tie the hands of 'the Other' in sectors such as education, technology and development. Third World nations are being restricted to such

³⁰¹ Globalisation special, Part 3, *El Telegraph*, July 16, 1998.

³⁰² *Ibid.*

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

uses, e.g. satellite launches can be seen as dual purpose, i.e. defence-intelligence gathering and/or educational, and hence stopped initially from progressing or being launched.

Shamseddine states that, the bulk of the world population is living in deprivation. This is confirmed in a recent UN Report, where it is stated that 3 Americans earn more than 48 countries in the developing world, that the richest person in the world, Bill Gates, earns \$84.7 billion per annum (p.a), while the Wilton Family earns \$81 billion p.a. and businessman Warren Buffett earns \$56 billion p.a.. Shamseddine also claims that the 84 richest people in the world have more money than the 1.2 billion people in China. The combined earnings of these 84 richest people is \$8.2 trillion in total. Gates alone has enough money to cover the education and health costs of all the people on earth. Furthermore it was outlined in this report that one person in the US or the UK spends as much as 50 people would in a developing nation. While the richest 225 persons in the world have an annual income that is equivalent to that of half the world's population.³⁰⁴

Ahmad Kamal Abou EIMajad, a prominent Islamic thinker, equally criticises both Arabs and Muslims alike for their mimicking of Western behaviour and immoral behaviour. His thoughts are very close to those of Karl Marx in the sense that although globalisation is being considered as a new phenomenon it has been present since the dawn of the economic system, and the divisions of politics and culture internationally.

EIMajad relies on Marxist theory in claiming that globalisation was an inevitable transition of the capitalist system forcefully going ahead through the overwhelming propaganda of media and politics rather than through a learned or educational manner. He argues that no substantial solution or policy has been discussed in finding a solution to the worlds' weak and deprived. Instead, immorality, crime and other associated factors are predominating in today's changing society. One way of overcoming this decay within society is to return to religion, which supplies societies' moral codes and practices. He outlines Islam's demands on its adherents.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

1. The difference between the truth of religion and the radical thoughts of religion.
2. The correction of the meaning of Islam, *jihad* and origins of *dawa*.
3. The affirmation of democracy and freedom within Islam.
4. Interrelations amongst Muslims themselves.

Simultaneously he calls for the civil unrest between and amongst Arabs and Muslims to cease, and adds, "that we are not as flawless as we demonstrate ourselves to be". Rather Arab-Muslim society lie, cheat and are immoral in their lifestyles as much as non-Arabs-Muslims trick, plunder and behave generally.³⁰⁵ El Majad believes that the answer to the ills of society lie in Islam.

3.2.2. Advocates of Globalisation - Henry Hamati (writer), Dr Oussama El Bazz.

Henry Hamati claims that globalisation is wrong because of its desire to culturally homogenise the international community. He argues that by nature human beings are clearly international in nature and history. Backing such thoughts lies in the elements of human culture, which are international in nature. Private culture once existed but is now considered as dead culture due to its ineffectiveness in affecting human culture. Thus there is no need to say that a nation has a private culture except to say that there was a culture that died because it did not affect human culture, which is international in spirit. International human culture is material, intellectual and spiritual in nature and has been in existence since the creation of civilisation. International culture cannot be viewed as opposed to national society because human culture has generally been responsible for the creation of nations and not any one particular nation. The history of any nation is the history of the development of culture and politics, which is an integral part of world culture. Economics since the first generation of industrialisation and trade has been international in nature, in addition it bore the foundations for the modern day General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) agreement.³⁰⁶

Dr. Oussama El Bazz, who is the adviser to the President of the Egyptian Republic Hosni Mubarak believes that at present the Arabs do not have alternative directives to cultural globalisation nor an appropriate response to it. El Bazz believes the present responses to

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

globalisation by Arabs can be categorised into two positions. The first, which he discounts, is that globalisation is a reality, one needs to accept it and the Arabs ought to be part of it. The second of these responses is that the solution is within tradition and therefore the Arabs must return to their past and isolate themselves from the rest of humanity.³⁰⁷

El Bazz believes one must return to the roots of the problem. People began to speak vigorously of globalisation when the disintegration of the former Soviet Union took place. Fukuyama's 'triumph of liberal democracy' descended upon the world and Americanisation became inevitable as America became the sole military and political superpower. Thus spreads American pop culture such as casual clothing such as jeans, t-shirts, hamburgers and the flooding of Hollywood movies. However, he believes that people are forgetting that although these cultural icons do move from country to country they do not bring with them civilisation and that the soul of civilisation is not brought about through spring water, hip hop music or burgers and fries.

El Bazz believes that the Arab world, as well as other cultures such as those in Asia, has the ability to participate and contribute and most importantly, to influence the course of globalisation it does not necessarily have to be Americanised or Easternised.³⁰⁸

3.2.3. The Marxist View - *Dr Ismail Sabri Abdullah*

Dr. Ismail Sabri Abdullah, the former Egyptian Minister of Urban Planning, who at the time of the conference in 1998 held the position of President of the Third World Movement, examines globalisation from a Marxist view. By using this theory he links the issues of economics and globalisation. He believes that globalisation is a product of our society and because of this it is not to be seen as an occupying force. Rather people can control it, it can be examined, traced to its origins and a way can be found to conquer it.³⁰⁹

According to Abdullah globalisation is composed of interlinking factors: economics, politics, society, a collection of lifestyles not tied to any particular state or government.

³⁰⁷ Amr Nassif, writes on "Globalisation: Issues of Culutural Citizenship" Conference held in Egypt, April 12-16 April, 1998. *Al Safir*, April 16, 1998.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Globalisation special, Part 3, *El Telegraph*, July 16, 1998.

Abdullah adds this issue is a social issue that is being influenced by economic movements that are being instigated by multinationals in order to overcome the restrictions of the nation state. He believes globalisation is strong enough to force nation states to negotiate the future economic well being of a nation through multinationals.³¹⁰

We are experiencing changing times at a rapid pace. Capitalism is imperialistic. Abdullah believes that we cannot state whether it is bitter or sweet as we are living the present that cannot be destroyed. Globalisation is not a religion or ideology, market forces keep it going and promote it.

Abdullah also focuses on the TNCs and states they are the ones that control this system and consider the whole globe their market. Within these trans-national companies he outlines how they are a force within themselves. Security has become internally based, correspondence is done via email and fax, the court system is rarely used as disputes are negotiated, money doesn't go through Reserve Banks as every financial transaction can be undertaken electronically. Amongst the 500 largest companies there are 425 in three divisions between America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and surrounding countries and every company has between 132-140 branches around the world. Every company relies on a central computer hub in order to minimise workers and avoid the creation of a bureaucracy as occurred in the former Soviet Union. Efficiency and profitability drive the whole process.

This is why, according to Abdullah, the current global system opens up new paradigms. He uses the example of Vietnam. Because trading into Vietnam was important to these companies, they forced the US government to rekindle links with Vietnam without the issue of American POWs being fully resolved. Abdullah predicts that Cuba will also be relieved of its sanctions because these companies wish to exploit Cuba's market. The multinationals in many cases have more power than domestic governments to determine the future of a country. Abdullah concludes that people today are experiencing post-imperialism or global capital which is undermining the nation state.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

3.2.4. Opponents of Globalisation – *Dr Jalal Ahmad Amin, Faleh Abed Jabbar.*

Egyptian Dr. Jalal Ahmad Amin is targeting people who are seduced by globalisation and view it as something wonderful. Such people hold globalisation in high regard because they view Western civilisation as increasing the nations' GDP and contributing to technology. Amin is concerned that these same people do not acknowledge the negative factors of globalisation, which undermine culture. They forget, for example, that Cable News Network (CNN), like other news stations, decides what people can watch and what they ought to be concerned about and what not. Amin believes the real crime and injustice of globalisation is the advancement of technology, which is increasing the frustration of the ordinary person. Each development and advancement in technology is imposed on the people whether they like it or not. The creation of the consumer society will induce people to consume more and waste more, which will eventually result in the disintegration of local cultural identity. At present it is just the manufacturers of the consumer products who are benefiting according to Amin. He also considers the advancement of technology has occupied the mind of the average person.³¹¹

Amin is concerned at people's careless attitude towards the increasing gap between the haves and have-nots which technology is creating. He is also concerned about the blatant disregard of individuals within this system and uses the example that in Egypt every individual is known by a number. Every minute detail of the citizen is centrally recorded. The value and the ability of the citizen is not considered unless he or she becomes 'globalised', that is, achieving international Western recognition. For example, Naguib Mahfouz upon winning the Noble Prize for Literature was recognised by the Egyptian government and its people. However, prior to this award he was not considered worthy of acknowledgment despite his contributions to many projects, some of which aided the poor in Egypt.

Amin stands with all people, despite their political affiliation, who stand against globalisation. He states that nationalists consider globalisation to be depriving the Arab people of the concept of an Arab nation. Marxists consider it economic colonialism. Religious thinkers believe that globalisation is against religion and morality. Therefore, the solution is to have all these schools of thought unite in battle against globalisation, "or else we will have an inner enemy within our self".³¹²

³¹¹ Ibid.

Faleh Abed Jabbar, an Iraqi participant, on the other hand, is against the Arabs who either consider globalisation to be a negative or positive issue. He argues that globalisation has created a debate between thoughts of ethnicity and nationalism. This has assisted Islam within the context of its origin, e.g. that Islam considers it is a nation that has no borders, as does globalisation. It is not possible to have a world system without the presence of a strong national country as the centre, as the state is the one institution that implements agreements and conventions. Jabbar believes globalisation is a human creation and "it is like a human history which is open towards all schools of thought".³¹³

3.2.5. The Liberal View - Dr. Hazim Al Bab'lawe

Dr. Hazim Al Bab'lawe feels that social scientists are in conflict over globalisation because it creates a problem between civilisation and culture, as they think of the individual in humanistic terms whilst economists are thinking of globalisation as the economy and market. He goes on to dismiss the theory that citizenship will disappear with the continued onset of globalisation. He feels this is an exaggerated claim, because the history of cultural civilisation indicates that citizenship will in fact strengthen rather than weaken.³¹⁴ He takes a similar stand to Huntington in the sense they both believe that "modernisation and economic development neither require nor produce cultural westernisation. To the contrary, they promote a resurgence of, and renewed commitment to, indigenous cultures".³¹⁵ At the individual level, the movement of people into unfamiliar cities, social settings and occupations breaks their traditional local bonds, generates feelings of alienation and anomie and creates crises of identity. Religious representatives and groups, as well as nationalists, frequently enhance the economic wealth and military power of the country as a whole and encourage people to have confidence in their heritage and to become culturally assertive. As a result, many non-Western societies have seen a return to indigenous cultures. It often takes a religious form, and the "global revival of religion is a direct consequence of modernisation".³¹⁶

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid. & Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6, Nov/Dec 1996, p. 37.

³¹⁶ Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6, Nov/Dec 1996, p. 37.

3.2.6. Arab nationalist view – Dr. Paul Salem, Issam Naimen, Wageh Elkaourathani, Alfadal Shalak.

Mr. Saed Yassin acknowledges the danger of globalisation, but does not believe that this necessarily means that one is rejecting globalisation. Yassin believes it is necessary that Arab thinkers expand Arab culture into broader horizons. As Arabs they cannot consider entering the 21st Century when little, or no sense of civil society or democracy exists within the Arab political and social systems and high rates of illiteracy and poverty continue, while technology throughout the world is developing at exceptional rates. He believes that Arab thinking is still behind in the study of globalisation and that Arab thinkers are too quick at either eliminating globalisation or accepting it, whilst Western thinkers have not made up their minds and are continuously studying its benefits and its vices from various angles. Yassin states that humanity is experiencing many dramatic changes and that one needs to understand the implications across the economic, political and culture spheres, especially for the Arabs. He believes the Arabs should coexist and utilise their resources, technology and people power to overcome the ills of globalisation.

Alfadal Shalak notes that the Asian economic boom of the 1990s was successful because it utilised Asian language and culture to understand the technology of the West in a simple way. As a consequence, these events have not diminished Asian culture, but rather increased its standing. This means that globalisation in the world economy does not mean progress/modernisation of just one universal culture. There is not one culture that is unable to understand the latest technology if given the necessary knowledge and skills. In the 1950s there was a common conception that Europe was the centre of modernity and intellectual thought and that anything close to it in its thinking was progressive and anything far from its thinking was considered regressive and retrospective in its outlook. However, according to Shalak, Ataturk's thoughts were more radical, as the, numerous movements in the Arab world and the Islamic world were affected by Turkish movements.

After this came a period when economics was based at the central hub and with sub-centres distributed around it, these links would divide the centre and the periphery. In the past the economic centre was able to position itself from the periphery, as the periphery was less developed, and the thought was that until it develops it needed to remain isolated. In Shalak's opinion there is no one that can be isolated any longer as everyone is a participant in the world. As material and intellectual consumers two choices are available: One, the community either succumb to their conditions and continue shifting toward the

periphery (in terms of world power) leaving them with little cultural relevance. Or alternatively, use the roots of this new theory and develop it in its own way, understanding, and within the context of their own culture. The real choice isn't between accepting or rejecting globalisation but the emphasis is rather on how much the Arabs can produce and work towards achieving their own goals. That is, rather than being a subject to other conversations Arab should become the topic of the subject.³¹⁷

However, even with this thought process in the Arab world they will continue to be under-resourced. For example, if a tyre factory is built in Lebanon the inhabitants may continue to import tyres from the US and Japan which are cheaper (because of low tariffs) and of better quality. The local factory will in turn operate at a loss, so how is the local industry, especially one that is recuperating from a 17-year war, supposed to compete on such a world market?

Shalak uses the examples of the Asians and their ability to compete in the world and reinforce their own status and culture. Whilst Arabs are scared of the ramifications of globalisation, he goes on to state that this is a reflection of Arabs weakness and their inability to stand against the people outside of this region. The Arabs are unable to enter the new century, as they do not have enough confidence in their identity, history or future.³¹⁸ He finds it inexcusable to fear globalisation because it is a sign of the weak. He thinks that if the Arabs fight globalisation with Arabism then in due course Arabism will become the path towards globalisation via technology and knowledge and become modernised without fearing it. For without technology and education Arabs will lose everything. He doesn't see Arabism as a feature of the past but rather a collection of thoughts and strengths for the future. One needs to acknowledge the past in order to incorporate it into the present and the future and not rely only on past victories and status. It is important to keep abreast of the latest developments and not forget historical events. The Arabs' capacity to ignore the knowledge of the past and present has led to their downfall, the failure of past attempts of Arab nationalism and surrender to Israel. Shalak believes that globalisation will allow Arabs to reach enlightenment and they should not continue to sit and argue about Arab culture and fear its loss.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Globalisation special, Part 3, *El Telegraph*, July 16, 1998.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Wageh Elkaourathani, on the other hand, believes that new discoveries and systems in today's age reflect an expansion to something quick and wonderful on the stage of world economic movements, especially with the speed and sophistication of trans-nationalism. He thinks that through the movement of money and its proper investment towards the poor and developing countries globalisation can have a positive effect. What he is concerned about however is the conglomeration of the world's finances amongst such a small group of people and companies. The question that needs to be posed according to Elkaourathani is how to utilise the positive aspects of globalisation for the development of the people who are in most need of such assistance.

Secondly, communication, international media, science and technology affect a nation's culture and the individual. It is considered as:

something wonderful for the expansion of globalisation or for a new angle or a faster angle. Nevertheless it is present and we are living it, we are within it and must enjoy and participate in the sharing of the information and media and communication. If we don't do this we will continue to accept it but live on the periphery and be affected by silly things that are conveyed in both its positives and negatives.³²⁰

3.2.7. School of Modernisation Theory -Hisham Kassem, Dr Antoine Messara

Dr Antoine Messara, a Lebanese writer, says that previous studies abide by the notion that modernisation gets rid of the nation-state and forces the person to integrate into global society. Messara thinks that civilisation is not a mould of homogeneity and is not flexible. Rather modernisation strengthens both the individual and the community, it strengthens the relations between the individual and the community. It is possible that it creates differences between – citizenship, cultures, ethnicities and tradition. This is what Huntington calls the 'clash of civilisation' Messara believes that that thesis is a consequence of modernisation in the present and the future through globalisation.

Messara believes that globalisation does not eliminate culture or citizenship, which differs from society to society, but rather strengthens and at times provokes tensions or conflicts between the two. Unrestrained market ideology brings domination of the weak, yet this domination does not completely overpower culture. However, this dominating culture

³²⁰ Ibid.

weakens the influence of local intellectuals thereby creating a perception that such local cultures do not have prominence or importance, resulting in an explosion against cultural imperialism. How may it explode? It may do so through violence, radicalism or isolationism.

He doubts that future wars will be fought with non-conventional weapons. He does foresee, however, wars occurring among smaller nations and ethnic conflict, implicitly supported by the great nations, as in Lebanon.

Messara believes that that globalisation gives birth to economic, political, and social inequality, favouring the rich. Ironically, in international magazines we see pictures of the poor looking for food in bins and rubbish tips yet simultaneously within the same magazine only a few pages over one views the social events of the rich and famous and how money is "frugally" spent on petty things like a doll house for a dog for instance.

Globalisation will create a war amongst fixed cultures, as occurred in the former Yugoslavia. It is also evident how education, modernisation and globalisation are affecting behaviour at the family level within urban and rural environments. Freedom, independence and individuality are commonly practiced notions amongst and within families. This very notion of individuality results in the disintegration of the family. According to Messara this contributes to the richness of society.

Messara set out eight dangers of globalisation³²¹:

1. Domination – there will be a sense of arrogance, even dictatorship. There is also the possibility of dictatorship in language, but Messara does not consider this an obstacle to attaining globalisation, although technological lingo and know how will be inhibiting to some.

2. A sense of cultural homogeneity.

³²¹ Globalisation special, Part 1, *El Telegraph*, July 8, 1998.

3. Social exclusion - due to technological advancements, lack of financial or educational means. There will be increasing information or educational gaps between the haves and have-nots.

4. The fear of the unknown - this occurs, as culture knows no borders. Although American and Western pop culture may be widespread and although the people in the developing world begin to mirror their Western counterparts their mentality and way of life still reflects their own culture and belief systems.

5. The disintegration of society as relations becomes impersonal and one is referred to as a number or picture.

6. We consciously begin to think about issues that hold little substance rather than deep intelligent sub-consciousness thought. For example, do you like this brand of washing powder or this one, leaving others to do more serious thinking for us.

7. A universal legal-political homogeneity: for example, an international judgement resulting in one universal definition of terrorism. Although this may be the ideal, it provokes problems. While some may see people as 'terrorists' others may see them as 'freedom fighters', as is in Israeli occupied South Lebanon or the Palestinian territories. Homogeneous, uncritical thinking about these issues does not mean justice for all.

8. Electronic international banking and information distribution, although they look like mere technological advances, are quite profit orientated. The use of the Internet, for example, promotes big business. Large companies push the Internet in order to promote their products, under the guise of promoting education.

Messara believes that cultural globalisation will take hold in developing countries because it allows people to gain knowledge on their own without the infiltration of a third person or nation. Information and information technology will be the liberating force for the Arab world as it is a democratic revolution, whereby the pyramid will be turned upside down, whereby it will be the force of the people dictating government policies and not vice-versa. Globalisation will result in totalitarianism and through this information revolution will emerge a democratic revolution. He indicates that many current political and religious movements are utilising tools of information technology to their advantage in order to enhance the new wave of political movement. How to benefit from this information revolution without falling into its dangers? In the Arab world the governments are attempting to put barriers in a

borderless world while national culture is regressing and becoming obsolete. He believes we cannot create an ideology for people to follow but need to find an appropriate path to deal with this rather than just being a consumer society. We need to be a consumer society as well as a productive society where there is equal participation.

Lebanon is made up of minorities that have religious rights and the country plays a role in assimilation amongst relations with family and people. The Lebanese identity, whether Maronite, Sunna or some other, is a fixed identity, yet one based mutual benefit and obligation. Lebanese identity can be considered as a large building site, in the parts are benefiting from one another. The French believe in promotion of their distinct culture as a way to combat globalisation. Messara argues as Arabs they should respond like the French in order to prevent the strength of globalisation overwhelming Arab culture and identity.³²²

3.3. Lebanese thoughts:

3.3.1. Lebanese intellectuals

Lebanon has traditionally been receptive to external ideologies, culture and practices, which have added to its dynamics and diverse identity. The impact of French colonisation on Lebanese education, culture and politics has been extensive. However, in recent decades, particularly from the 1990s onwards, American culture has been rapidly seeping into Lebanese popular culture and much to the distaste of the French, has been replacing francophone practices.

The world's first valet parking McDonald's store was opened in Beirut in 1998 and other symbolic American fast food chains dominate Lebanon's small geography such as KFC, Sub-way, Burger King, Hardy's, Baskin' Robbins ice-cream parlours, Hardrock Cafe and Planet Hollywood, just to name a few. American popular cultural icons such as music, movies, dress and speech are increasingly becoming evident amongst Lebanese youth. American education systems are preferred to Lebanese or other foreign run institutions, whilst English is slowly replacing French language and popular culture. Signage throughout

³²² Ibid.

Lebanon is increasingly bilingual, that is, Arabic and English. Francophones within Lebanon and elsewhere are concerned with this development and have vowed to maintain pressure in maintaining French language and culture. For example, in 1998 a French Minister expressed concern when he noticed that signs to the new Beirut airport omitted French directions. Soon after his visit, instructions in French were added to the existing roadside signs. It is within this competitive environment of cultural existence and dominance that the Lebanese are fighting three cultural contests, a contest between Arab, French and American-Western cultures. This is in addition to their own domestic and regional problems. The quest of nation building and identity is being challenged internationally by globalisation. These added pressures will determine the path post-national countries such as Lebanon will take.

Whilst in Lebanon undertaking fieldwork in 1998 I interviewed leading academics and politicians on the phenomena entangling the world. The majority viewed globalisation with concern, seeing it as modern day imperialism gripping the developing and the developed world due to international American hegemony.

Armenian Patriarch Aram I acknowledges that globalisation affects all societies but what differentiates some societies from others is how strongly they resist the shortfalls of globalisation. Aram I does not believe that Lebanon fits this category. This is because Lebanon is directly exposed to the effects of globalisation, due to its lack of a unified political, cultural, spiritual and moral identity and affiliations. By not resisting globalisation, Western domination of Lebanese cultural, moral and political development has ensued. Lebanon has a strong mosaic of identities which pull in different directions resulting in the lack of cohesion. Countries such as in Syria, Iraq and Egypt, on the other hand, have strong Arab identities do not face the same challenges as the Lebanese.³²³

US dominance was a concern to many being interviewed. For example, Linda Mattar, a Lebanese feminist, said:

in the past we had colonialism of foreign troops occupying you but today we have occupation of a different kind, we have economic and cultural and intellectual occupation regardless of how you try to fight it as it infiltrates through technology.

³²³ Interview with His Benevolent Armenian Patriarch Aram I, April 13, 1998 St Elias, Lebanon.

The give and taking isn't taking place on a bilateral basis but rather a unilateral one and isn't one benefiting the developing world countries.³²⁴

Although segments of Lebanese society have in the past sought to shift away from traditional Arab culture there was uneasiness about American desire to replace Lebanese identity with something it is not, namely an excessively Western one. They desire to be sovereign, different, unique, 'Lebanese' and yet part of world affairs, excluding the development and inclusion of a 'mono-culture'.³²⁵ Adnan Amine, Director of the Lebanese Education Centre, argues that:

the more contact we have with other cultures we simultaneously build up our own identity. This may initially have a negative effect on our culture but in the long term our identity will become more crystallised, and there will be an acceptance of other cultures, other languages, cultural, technology etc. But I don't think there will be a fusion of cultures, however, cultures and subcultures will be respected, tolerated and maintained.³²⁶

It is perhaps with the challenge of globalisation entering Lebanese domains that a unified Lebanese national identity may in fact emerge. The Lebanese intellectuals interviewed also expressed their fear that Lebanese youth are freely encompassing American-Western pop culture, traits of immoral behaviour, and illicit drug taking. They feel insecure and unable to determine their future, whether it be in education, employment or marriage because of domestic, regional and international uncertainty. For example, increasingly Lebanese youth are attending tertiary and technical institutions and yet, like in many other countries, are graduating with little employment prospects and insufficient education-skill credentials to emigrate.³²⁷

Technological know-how is needed for a geographically small country such as Lebanon to become the 'Hong Kong' of the 'Middle East' and to be able to compete on world markets.³²⁸ However, as Nidal Al Ahmadi argues:

³²⁴ Interview with Linda Mattar. Beirut, Lebanon.

³²⁵ Gina Shammas, Lebanese-American business woman, Public Relations consultant. Interview with Dr. Faydoun, Sociologist at the Lebanese University.

³²⁶ Interview with Adnan Al Amine, Director, Lebanese Education Centre.

³²⁷ The IT discipline was particularly singled out in this instance because of computer and software restrictions coming into countries such as Lebanon. Interview with MP, Jamil Shammas. Beirut, Lebanon.

³²⁸ Interview with MP, Jamil Shammas. Beirut, Lebanon.

..we are not allowing it [technology] to assist us. We are allowing it to dominate us. It is ruling us. Technology is necessary, and we need it, but we as Lebanese are treating it incorrectly. We are not taking advantage of opportunities, e.g. as mobile phone users we run to buy the newest model, however, when we return to the psychology of it all, we as Lebanese think incorrectly, as it is all a matter of showing off, that is, what kind of phone one carries rather than examining it to see how we can do better. See our ignorance?³²⁹

The Lebanese need to find a way to incorporate technological know-how to become competitors in cultural domination, sovereignty and state sanctity via national unity:

By allowing the domination of our computer and TV screens with pornography, drug taking, conflict a number of people are being effected emotionally, mentally and killing the soul of nationalism. However, if we use this technology for education and progress, as we can't censor these negative programs, it is not in our hands, also the same case in media such as TV, we are asking for much to be censored on our media because they are regressive, we need monitoring and education of these issues and have the youth be interested to what is happening in their country. Overall, technology doesn't help with sovereignty or a future of a country, it only helps those intellects who are able to see the positives and the negatives from them. The government needs to move on these issues and help to enforce and implement them and not let these negatives overcome the country and its wellbeing.³³⁰

When asked whether Western satellite programmes negatively affect the cultural traditions and thoughts of developing world countries and notably the Arabs, the current Lebanese Minister for Education, Ghazi Al Aradee replied:

Yes! Yes absolutely this is a major problem we are facing. It is another world and they are trying to change your identity, your principles, your way of thinking, your culture, your civilisation etc. They put near you so many points of view and visions but only theirs is right and reiterated. For example, the occidental man is clean, brave, strong, right etc, while the Arab man is less than human. There are dangerous times ahead and we need to use our media, satellite TV channels, Internet etc against Israel in future battles, which will be technological, scientific and information based.³³¹

³²⁹ Interview with journalist, Ms. Nidal Al Ahmadi.

³³⁰ Interview with Linda Mattar. Beirut. Lebanon.

³³¹ Interview with Ghazi Al Aradee. Beirut, Lebanon.

3.4. Conclusion

The future of Lebanon within the current globalised era will require its government and inhabitants to determine their role and space within this phenomenon. To add to the complexity of such a decision Lebanon's multitude of problems (domestic and regional) will need to be considered. However, like most countries in the world Lebanon will need to re-examine its relations with the local and global communities.

The seven schools of thought outlined above have demonstrated differences, although in some instances overlapping factors do exist. It is evident in some of these scholarly outlines, that some matters have been over-simplified and grossly generalised. However, this chapter has offered a useful introduction and insight into the various schools of thought that are currently being debated within Lebanon and the Arab world. It has also contributed to the ongoing debate between the developed and developing world, including internal debates within these countries. The task ahead for Lebanon and other Arab nations is to make these views widely accessible to international forums and contribute to the development of globalisation in an effective, contributory and poignant manner. Language alone has proven to be an obstacle. Many Lebanese contributors in the globalisation debate choose to communicate only in Arabic. This, with the inability, or lack of organisation, in translating their views and making them widely accessible to the non-Arabic speaking world withholds valuable Arab contributions to this ongoing debate. Perhaps, with the emergence of regionalism in the world the Arab-'Middle East' region will consider the economic, political and social benefits of combining their natural resources and economic infrastructures to not only contribute to the newly emerging interconnected system but also be an integral player.

Part 2

Lebanon: The Precarious Republic

The Sovereignty of Man Lieth Hid in Knowledge - Foucault

Chapter 4

Lebanon, *Zah'rat il-Sharq* (The Flower of the East)?

*Lebanon is not a country. Lebanon is a phenomenon.*³³²

*Lebanon has been described as a microcosm of the Middle East, representing its wide-ranging conflicts, contradictions, and problems.*³³³

This chapter will demonstrate that the competing paradigms of identity within the Arab world, as outlined in Part One, encompass the vitality and contradictory nature of Lebanese national identity more explicitly than its Arab counterparts. Lebanon seeks to be independent, sovereign and unique. However, primordial factors and external influences are exceptionally pro-active in Lebanon, contributing to the violent and explicit failure of national identity construction.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline two important aspects contributing to the contemporary development of Lebanese political and cultural identity. In order to understand the development and current debate about Lebanese national identity it is necessary to first analyse the historical process of its development and second, to acknowledge the main socio-political factors impeding the formation of such an identity. Therefore, what is called for is the re-examination of past notions of national identity and how they relate to post-war Lebanese national identity.

³³² Salman Masalha, Arab-Israeli poet and columnist, private email, March 1, 2001.

³³³ Ali Hillal Dessouki, "Security in a Fractured State: The Conflict in Lebanon", in *Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, Part ii*, Adelphi Paper, no. 230, London: IISS, 1988, p. 14.

4.1. The Historical Development of Lebanese National Identity.

The following section focusing on pre and post formation of Lebanon will not seek offer a detailed account of the historical genealogy or chronology of Lebanon and the intricate details of the war years.³³⁴ Rather, it will seek to examine the debates, which have been in existence since the creation of Lebanon regarding its political face and identity - internally, regionally and internationally - and to analyse the progress and future of such a debate.

To understand the roots of Lebanese national identity it is crucial to highlight significant political and historical developments. It is necessary to examine the direct influence of Ottomanism on current day Syria and Lebanon, and how its subsequent disintegration and loss to the Europeans led to the formation of these two states. By revisiting this historical period it will pave the way to a better understanding of contemporary Lebanese national identity. In addition, it will highlight Lebanon's similarity to the rest of the Arab world, which has been affected by primordial factors, political identifications and influences.

The conundrum afflicting Lebanese society in terms of obstacles to a harmonious national identity remains multileveled but interlinked. Two equally significant and contributing factors are: the role of external (regional and international) intervention and the fundamental disagreement among its citizens over the very historicity of the Lebanese nation-state.

³³⁴ An extensive list of publications have successfully undertaken this task in the past. For an examination of pre-1975 Lebanon see *Politics in Lebanon* (1966), edited by Leonard Binder and *The Precarious Republic: Politics of Modernisation in Lebanon* (1968) by Michael Hudson. Both were written when Lebanon's experiment with Consociational democracy was functioning and closely examine Lebanon's socio-political and economic divisions and how they relate to its political structure. For an examination of the delicacies of regional politics on Lebanon and its development see Elie Salem's, *Modernisation without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience* (1973), while David and Audrey Smock's *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (1975), examines the socio-political divisions of Lebanese civil society and its makeup. Lebanon pre-1975 has been a topic of interest for many academics, journalists and lay person alike, each giving personal accounts or analysis of the war in Lebanon. For an academic analysis see Kamal Salibi's *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (1976), Walid Khalidi's *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (1979) and Farid El Khazen's *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976* (2000), for more general or journalistic accounts see David C Gordan's *The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy* (1983), Robert Fisk's, *Pity the Nation* (1990), *Lebanon: Fire and Embers - A History of the Lebanese Civil War* (1993) by Dilip Hiro, and William Harris', *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars and Global Extensions* (1999).

One segment of society, the political right, largely affirm the Lebanese state, while the political left, dispute it and some deny it to a certain degree.³³⁵ Some segments of the political right have been major proponents of Lebanese nationalism, due to their astute political maturity and connections with the outside world. They aspired towards gaining exclusionary visions of Lebanon as a modern continuation of Phoenicia, Hellenised and Westernised, and a home for persecuted religious minorities, particularly a Christian safe-haven in a dominant Muslim region. The political left on the other hand, regarded Lebanon's national and political development within the broader paradigm of Arab-Islamic history, whether through Arab national ideology or pan-Islamic religious ideology. These ideologies have become blurred and inconsistent at times even to the most fervent supporter.

The post-Taef period demonstrates that in fact these two diametrically opposed notions of Lebanese history have not been accepted or reconciled in any way. In order for this to take place the Lebanese need to, as the historian Kamal Salibi has persistently argued, "reach a consensus on what makes of them a nation or political community, and this can only be achieved if they manage to agree on a common vision of their past".³³⁶ This important fact will be examined at a latter stage of this chapter, but first, a brief outline of Lebanon's history.

The territory known as 'Lebanon' today has been invaded and occupied by many empires and countries, the most prolonged and consequential being the occupation by the Ottoman Turks that lasted almost four centuries. Its geographic surrounds were the birthplace of the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Canaanites, the Phoenicians and many others. Phoenician independence ended in the 6th Century BC with the Persian conquest of geographical Syria. By the 8th Century BC Alexander the Great had taken over the region. With his death came the fragmentation of his empire, resulting in the territory of present-day Lebanon becoming part of the Hellenistic Seleucid kingdom. During the 1st Century BC the territory came under Roman

³³⁵ Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence In Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East*, Published by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, USA, 1983. This author will differentiate between the two major political factions as the political right and the political left rather than the Christian and Muslim paradigm, which many have adopted over the years. This is largely the case because the polarisation has not been as black and white as some authors have insinuated. This is notably evident during the 17-year civil conflict within Lebanon. Many were led to believe by Western reporting of the conflict that the antithesis was a confessional war between Christians and Muslims and not a multifaceted war with broader ramifications. It needs to be clearly stated from the onset that not all Arab nationalists were Muslim and not all Lebanese separatist/nationalists were Christians.

³³⁶ Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, IB Tauris, London, 1993, pp. 17-18.

occupation. This continued until the 4th Century when Roman rule was transferred to Constantinople. Byzantine rule prevailed dating until the 7th Century AD when Arabs conquered the area.

Various Islamic empires or caliphates controlled all or parts of geographical Syria up until Ottoman occupation (1379-1922). They were the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750); the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258); the Fatimid caliphate (909-1171) the Seljuk sultanate (1058-1157); the Ayyubid sultanate (1183-1250); and the Mamluk sultanate (1261-1517). During the Ottoman period a great deal of autonomy was granted to the area of Mount Lebanon in particular. The outcome of the First World War saw the further disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the secret agreement between the French and English to divide the lands of the 'Middle East'.

Lebanon was historically part of the Syrian Fertile Crescent or geographic Syria. It was bound by Turkey in the North, Iran in the East, Arabia in the South, and the Mediterranean in the West. With the end of the First World War came the geographic division of Greater Syria. Lebanon became a French mandate. Lebanon's small but significant territory, its multi-religious nature and its historic ties with the outside world continued to attract many external powers to Lebanon's geographic proximity, and unwillingly forced it into the Arab-Israeli wars, although it did not formally participate on either side. Lebanon suffered from these wars both indirectly and directly - affecting its political, demographic, economic and social entities.

The history of the Syrian Fertile Crescent is full of richness and encompasses a wealth of invention, which has assisted the Western world - ranging from the alphabet, medicine, the sciences, law, the arts, literature and spirituality. It was also a diverse religious and sectarian breeding ground. With Roman occupation emerged variant forms of Christian orthodoxy such as the Melchites, Monophysites, Monothelites and other sects that were considered as 'heterodox' confessions of the Christian faith. Mainstream groups were the Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Similarly within Islam, sects also emerged ranging from the Sunna, the Shi'ites, Ismailis, Druze, Imami (Twelver) Shi'ites, Nusayris, Alawites and others. Apart from the Armenians all these groups have historically spoken Arabic and shared Arab culture and traditions to varying degrees.

Although some geographic areas have been historically inhabited by ethnic cleavages there have also been notable movements in ethnic settlement within geographic Syria, as the following examples will illustrate. The Druze first emerged as a small yet strong minority occupying large segments of Syria, notably the southern parts of Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, the Sahel area of Baadba and a considerable part of Beirut.

The Maronites were originally from the Valley of Orontes (beginning in modern day Lebanon and crossing north through Syria, Turkey and turning westward encompassing parts of the Mediterranean coast). However, when the Byzantines took control of the Valley in the 10-11th Centuries the Maronites inhabited northern Lebanon and settled in Mount Lebanon. By the end of the 11th Century the Crusaders arrived in Syria and most of the Maronites rallied around them, whilst the Druze sided with the Sunni Muslims fighting the 'infidels'.

The Shi'ites originally inhabited the strategic mountainous region of Kisrawan, though by 1305 the Sunna had secured this region, displacing many Shi'ites. However, like various external interventions throughout Lebanese history, the arrival of the Ottomans in 1516 resulted in yet another demographic shift. The Sunna dynasty preferred Maronites as their chief political agents, which resulted in the Maronites migrating to this region from the northern regions of Mount Lebanon, while the Shi'ites were pushed southwards.

For roughly four centuries (from Ottoman occupation in the early 16th Century until the First World War) feudal competition and antagonism characterised the politics of Mount Lebanon. This rivalry was both cross-sectarian and intra-confessional and not solely Druze-Maronite in nature. Competing local, regional and international rivalries contributed to the transformation of the political, social, economic and demographic factors of each community. This was in contrast to other Ottoman provinces such as Egypt that had experienced a stabilising tradition of strong central authority, whilst Lebanon's stability was based on feudal relations and its power structure.³³⁷

³³⁷ El Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976*, IB Tauris Publishers, London & NY, 2000, pp. 115-116.

Increasingly, the demographic and territorial expansion of the Maronites by the mid-19th Century saw them constituting the majority of the Mountain, including traditional Druze strongholds. With it came the political, social and educational strengthening of the Maronites, which was predominantly successful due to the organisation, strength, size, wealth and centralisation of the Church and its Patriarch. The Maronite Church was in a position to rival any lordly Maronite family. Political influence and power was also gained by the Maronites with the conversion of the *Imara* (quasi-feudal chieftains); this was most notable during the Shihabi *Imara* when the Sunni amirs converted to Christianity. In addition, the Maronite community's relations with the West, its wealthy and active pursuits in trade and commerce and domination of the higher echelons of education enforced their ascendancy.

In contrast to the social change and development encompassing the Maronite community during this period the Druze community's political and social positions were deteriorating. The Mamluk dynasty favoured the Druze as political allies, and utilised their sound fighting skills to secure the hinterland of coastal ports and their stand against the Crusaders. In turn, Mount Lebanon remained Druze dominated until the collapse of the Mamluk dynasty in 1516, although between 1590 and 1633 Fakr al-Din II, Ma'nid Emir of the Chouf, established an autonomous region larger than modern day Lebanon, which included the Bekaa and parts of Syria such as Palmyra.

Fakr al-Din promoted relations with European powers, and set an example of religious co-existence. He was generous to local Christian communities and developed a quasi-feudal socio-economic land system with the Maronites. By doing so, he inadvertently reduced the influence of the Shi'ite Hamada *zu'ama* in Kisrawan and strengthened the Maronites territorial holdings, as well as their commercial, cultural and political power. This naturally challenged Ottoman power and ultimately led to the execution of Fakr al-Din in 1633. After this episode Druze strongholds in numerous regions began to dissolve due to Druze resistance to Ottoman policies and interference. Ottoman military expeditions suppressed Druze political power and influence. The Ottomans began to challenge traditional Druze entities by replacing Druze chieftains with non-Druze amirs. Consequently, most local political positions were passed onto Sunni or Maronite (Shihabi) rule, ending decades of Druze reign by the Fakr al-Din-Mahn dynasty. Quasi-feudalships remained a prominent force in the development of the region until 1861, when they were formally integrated into the newly established political system.

Consequently, Druze traditional territorial strongholds began to weaken and lessen over the years. Unlike the Maronites, Druze power was not centralised by one religious institution or individual but rather diversified to a number of lordly Druze families. Without a central directing force working towards the improvement of the Druze as a community, the Druze community's social, economic and political standing began to diminish.

This uneven political representation was reflected in the mid-19th Century, with the enforcement of the *mutasarrifiyya* (administrative) political structure that arose as a climax to these and other, changing socio-political and economic factors. The lead up to this new political system saw the intervention of European powers within the Lebanese fold, in addition to regional political interference.

During a period of two decades, three civil conflicts arose in the mid-19th Century. These were to transform the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and its political structure. The violent outbreaks of 1841, 1845 and 1860 witnessed the collapse of the *imarah* system, the attempted deconstruction of the feudal system and the strategic, political and economic loss of the Druze stronghold of the Mountains. French, British and Russian intervention during this period inflamed communal problems amongst the Lebanese population. The sectarian incitement of the conflict contributed to the historic crisis of 1858-60, which has consequently influenced 20th Century Lebanese politics.

Four major factors contributed to this conflict. They were: the emergence of class differentiation -- notably the dissatisfaction with domineering landlords and the continued exploitation of peasants; intra-regional and/or local hostilities; tension between central state power and regional autonomy; and external provocation and interference. Each class, communal and regional group reacted differently to the transpiring civil strife. For example, it was a common occurrence for people from the same religious or sectarian group but from different regions of Mount Lebanon to have reacted differently to their fellow worshippers. This was due to the allegiances people held towards local traditions, leadership, means of livelihood, geographical locations and sense of place and belonging to these regions or townships.³³⁶

³³⁶ Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*, Centre for Lebanese Studies & IB Tauris, London, 1994, p. 6.

Hence, these factors played a large part in influencing the nature of this civil conflict. It was not based solely on the sectarian divide as so often reported by both Lebanese and non-Lebanese academics.³³⁹ Prior to this episode religion played a relatively minor role within Lebanese history and it is well documented that Druze landlords encouraged Maronite migration to Druze territories and supported land development by the Maronite Church. It was common among clanspeople that to be distinguished from others was not through sect but rather through one's allegiance and loyalty.³⁴⁰

Consequently, this conflict gave birth to several ideological trends, which have been enduring to Lebanese politics. These are: the emergence of secular forms of national identity (Lebanese, pan-Arab and/or pan-Syrian), the common utilisation of religion or sect by the political notables to enhance their own political standing; and class stratification.

The civil wars of 1840-1860 commenced as a struggle for political, economic and social acceptance and justice. Feudal warlords, however, soon steered the inhabitants' grievances into religious and confessional based hostilities. By 1860 the war reached its climax and within a short period of a few weeks over 100 000 people were displaced and more than 10 000 massacred. This conflict of twenty years was a bloody precursor of what was yet to come in Lebanon. It succeeded in further strengthening the concept of communal identity and consciousness; created new and bitter memories which were to be passed on from generation to generation of Lebanese around the world, reinforced the Maronites' urgency in attaining their own independent sovereign nation and became the 'starting point' of Lebanese political thinking.³⁴¹

By 1861 the conflict was resolved, although the Druze military victory did not equate to political victory. The *mutasarifiyya* was established. European intervention, the establishment of a committee of Great Powers and Istanbul's determination to maintain its borders and sovereignty worked towards compensating the Maronites, at the cost of the Druze politically and socio-economically, and contributed to Maronite nationalistic ideals of creating a 'Little Lebanon'.

³³⁹ See William Harris, *Faces of Lebanon - Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 1996;

³⁴⁰ Fawaz, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁴¹ Salibi, *The House of Many Mansions*, p. 129

The *mutasarrifiyya* was a political system protected by European colonial powers, which was to last until 1915. A non-Lebanese Catholic governor was selected to administer this political entity, assisted by a Maronite dominated Administrative Council established to run the *mutasarrifiyya*. It consisted of twelve representatives elected by the sheikhs of the Mountain: four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shi'ite and one Sunni. This form of confessionalism was to become a basis of future political structures within Lebanon. The Council was run as a collective secular political leadership, it had limited powers and its members were drawn from 'former' feudal families (Shihabs, al-Khazens, Karams, Joumblatts, and Arslans) and the inclusion of new ones (al-Khourys, Chamouns, Franjiyyas). Therefore these families retained their positions of political, religious and traditional commercial sectors of influence, by either fully integrating themselves into the new political structure, or infiltrating the administrative bureaucracy of the new system.

It was thought that the *mutasarrifiyya* assisted the Maronites in setting the foundations for an independent Christian Mount Lebanon, making them demographically, politically and economically dominant.³⁴² Moreover, the Maronites considered Mount Lebanon as their homeland and saw the *mutasarrifiyya* as a means to an end to attaining their own independent state. However, the Ottomans were not willing to renege all political power of the region to the ethnic cleavages or feudal families, nor willingly accept their supremacy. Rather, an Ottoman governor was appointed to oversee the activity and everyday running of the *mutasarrifiyya*. This in turn further assisted in developing a quasi-national consciousness amongst the *mutasarrifiyya* inhabitants.

Although sectarian disorder remained controlled until the 20th Century, the Ottoman system of cantonisation, exclusion and the subjugation of minorities remained instilled against non-Sunna cleavages. It weakened the notion of a future 'Lebanese' nationhood emerging. In its diverse ethnic society, a society, which predominantly held onto narrower notions of political belonging based on primordial chauvinism. Although Western influence and colonisation has provoked the sectarian and ethnic divide amongst Arabs and other inhabitants of the region, this study will argue that the seeds of ethnic conflict were initially

³⁴² In 1865 the population of Mount Lebanon was given as 266 487 - comprised of 220, 496 Christians and 45, 991 Muslims. The distribution of the six main sects was: Maronites - 171, 800; Greek Orthodox - 29, 326; Druze - 28, 560; Greek Catholics - 19 370; Shi'ites - 9, 820; Sunna - 7, 611, Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, p. 24, note 3. By 1896 population growth increased to total of 399, 530 comprised of 319, 296 Christians and 80, 234 Muslims: Maronites - 229, 680; Greek Orthodox - 54, 208; Druze - 49, 812; Greek Catholics - 34, 472; Mutawallis - 16, 846; Sunna - 13, 576, Figures from Cuinte, V, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, Paris 1896, pp. 202-11.

sown during the Ottoman period when the *millet* policy was enforced against non-Sunni inhabitants and through the implementation of other divisive policies such as the *imarah* and *mutasarrifiyya* systems.

The *millet* system emphasised and instilled religious differences. By allowing minorities to control their religious, educational and charitable affairs, marriage, divorce, inheritance and the collection of taxes they were able to preserve their cultural identities that emphasised their individuality. Although this can largely be viewed as positive and progressive in attaining political and cultural pluralism, minorities suffered unequal treatment via deliberate exclusionary tactics. For example, religious minorities had to be distinctly dressed from Muslims, were periodically denied opportunities in higher administrative posts and could not serve in the armed forces. Many non-Sunni individuals, including non-Muslims, therefore practiced *taqiyya* for fear of persecution and/or discriminatory reprisals.

By 1864 the legal basis for the *mutasarrifiyya* were provided, allowing citizens to maintain the autonomy of their *mutasarrifiyya* and enjoy its privileges, while the rest of geographical Syria was subject to direct Ottoman rule. The *mutasarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon provided its inhabitants with political and economic autonomy. However, this only reinforced their attitudes of superiority, distinction and exclusiveness from surrounding administrative *sanjaks*, which were to later become part of 'Greater Lebanon'. The Maronites, in particular, felt that the race was now on to maintain their special autonomous status. As a precaution, European powers were courted for protection, security and economic advancement. Eventually Western domination of the region and the disintegration of the Ottomans further changed the political balance.

Historians have interpreted the *mutasarrifiyya* favourably over the years. Its achievements have been listed as the realisation of Maronite distinct communal identity, which led to national aspirations³⁴³ and the creation of a multi-confessional political arrangement bringing about security and harmony amongst its multifarious inhabitants along the lines of political pluralism. It was also noted for its high rate of development, prosperity and stability

³⁴³ El Khazen notes that as early as the 1830s Maronite clerics and intellectuals were referring to the Maronite community as a nation (*al-Umma al-Maruniyya*), and cites Mouawad & Kawwal (eds & tr.) of Father Nqula Murad, *Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite*, Paris, 1988; K. Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon*, Beirut, AUB, 1959; A. Lubbus, *Tawajuh al-Ikhiros al-Maruni fi Jabal Lubnan (1842-1867)*, op. cit., p. 36.

and as well as a basis of modern administration and creating a sense of competing nationalism.³⁴⁴ Although these points can collectively be viewed as positive accomplishments there were negative ramifications to such a political system.

First, the *mutasarrifiyya* system was a colonially imposed construct, interposed by the Europeans (notably the French) and enforced by the Ottomans. Second, the system reinforced the geographical regional-provincial divisions. Maronites dominated Mount Lebanon, coastal cities (Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli) were headed by Sunni Muslims and to a lesser extent Orthodox Christians, while the region's peripheries such as Ba'albak, Hirmil and the hinterlands of Sidon and Tyre were dominated by the Shi'ite lords. Third, although it looked efficient and fair on paper the political system in fact forcibly divided people along confessional lines, regardless of the fact that identification along confessional lines was not a prominent form of identification at that time.

Fourth, it contributed to the division among Lebanese citizens in the early 20th Century by endorsing the concept of Lebanonisation or Balkanisation as opposed to nationalism whether it was in the form of a multi-sect inclusionary Lebanon, Arabism or Greater Syria.

Fifth, it has been regularly stated that the *mutasarrifiyya* was successful in breaking down the supremacy of the feudal system.³⁴⁵ Upon closer examination, however, it becomes evident that the Ottomans and European supporters played right into the hands of the notables, that is, the notables threatened instability if they were not incorporated into the new political system.³⁴⁶

The Administration was therefore forced to incorporate some of the former feudal leaders into the Administrative Council or face the prospect of revolt. Consequently, due to the very incorporation of these people the new political system did not change much in its internal

³⁴⁴ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, Caravan Books, NY, 1993 edition, p. 116-119.

³⁴⁵ See Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics In Lebanon", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1968, p. 256

³⁴⁶ Dawud Pasha, the first Mutasarrifiyya governor had no less than 16 feudal emirs or sheikhs appointed to the Administrative Council and such a policy was reflected in future Administrations. See Salibi, *A Modern History of Lebanon*, pp. 111-112 and Laila Fawaz's book, *Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*, Centre for Lebanese Studies & IB Tauris, London, 1994.

political workings, nor did it challenge the feudal structure at its core. Rather, both the Ottomans and Europeans were responsible for transforming the survival of the dominant notable families from a primordial system of feudalism to a quasi-feudal political system based on 'secular confessionalism' and bureaucracy, thus contributing to their power, making them more dangerous and undeniably sowing the seeds of future political turmoil. The language of the notables also changed. They spoke of 'reform' and 'independence', yet their principal purpose for participating was personal and based on community-sectarian pride.

Sixth, this system in turn set the foundations for the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact, which effectively endorsed the reinforcement of traditional primordial forms of identity dressed in a cloak of modernity and national political development.

As stated earlier, the *mutasarrifiyya* system lasted until 1915. From 1916 the Sykes-Picot agreement was enforced and the newly created autonomous mandates were born. Although some segments of society preferred or endorsed European colonisation, the majority of the Sunna population did not accept it. With the bulk of the Arab 'Middle East' populace being adherents of Islam, the Ottomans had the religious factor to exploit, while the French were scrutinised, distrusted and largely viewed as occupiers and protectors of Christianity, leaving its rule largely unstable. Such instability was primarily fuelled by French policies of 'divide and rule' and its historical role dating back to the Crusades. This was largely undertaken by, inciting sectarian divisions, and working towards cantonising the occupied lands amongst religious and ethnic minorities.

The French incited sectarian divisions by favouring minorities and promoting sectarian based minority enclaves within the *mutasarrifiyya* and mandate rule. These policies, as well as judicial and administrative developments, contributed to the obstacles nationalists were facing in promoting independence and unity. The French, whether consciously or not, were impeding the process of political integration by restricting the groups from cooperating and intermingling with one another. Furthermore, the French seized control of Muslim institutions and worked towards debasing symbols of Arab and Islamic culture and traditions and economically debilitated the areas of Syria and Lebanon by geographically separating their natural boundaries. Many of the non-Maronite inhabitants were not in

favour of a French Mandate. Some preferred a British Mandate, others an American one and others still hoped for an independent Syrian state under the tutelage of Faisal.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement demonstrated that although all five entities were artificial creations and run by imperial powers, both Lebanon and Palestine were to be differentiated from the other countries in an exclusive way; Palestine came into this fold after a Jewish state was established within Palestine. All five states are equally artificial. However, only the Lebanese sought to legitimise their political entity, national identity and validity so shortly after its inception. In fact, it wasn't until the 1970s that other countries began to re-examine their historical creation and state identity outside the paradigm of Arab nationalism. On the other hand, a powerfully organised Lebanese minority were all too enthusiastic in validating their new national identity.

It is quite ironic that Lebanon, one of the first states in the region that attempted to resolve the question of national identity, continues to be torn over its identity, sovereignty and legitimacy in the 21st century, while most other neighbouring states have come to deal with their given state boundaries and structure and accept and develop their state national identity.³⁴⁷ However, it must be acknowledged that Lebanon is unique in more ways than one. It is notably so because of its small, mosaic collection of ethnic and sectarian cleavages (in all nineteen legally acknowledged groups), its relatively open, multiparty confessional system and the ongoing international and regional intervention in its domestic affairs. Moreover, Lebanon's neighbours are largely homogeneous ethnic societies, autocratic, have a single party or monarchical system, are demographically stronger and are more resilient to international and regional interference enforced on Lebanon over the years.

By 1919 it was evident that 'Lebanese nationalism' largely equated to Maronite exclusiveness or religious *asabiyya*. The Maronites' ongoing pursuit for the enlargement of the mountain, its independence within the confines of a state and the establishment of a French mandate were representative of this,³⁴⁸ although France's move in 1920 did not satisfy Maronite nationalists.

³⁴⁷ Salibi, *House Of Many Mansions* , pp. 31-32.

³⁴⁸ Beydoun, 'Lebanon's Sects and the Difficult Road to a Unifying Identity', *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 19, 1998, pp. 18-21, p. 19.

In 1920 the French annexed various Ottoman provinces and created a 'State of Greater Lebanon'. When 'Greater Lebanon' was born on September 1, 1920, by the historical proclamation of the French High Commissioner of the Levant, General Henri Gouraud, this act startled Christian expectations and hopes. This larger entity drew new population groups into the fold (Akkar, Bekaa, Tripoli and Beirut) and further divided the natural geographical confines of 'Greater Syria'. The state of 'Greater Lebanon' included Mount Lebanon, coastal towns and surrounding districts of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Jabal Amil in the south and the Beka'a Valley in the east. Today this 10 400 square km area continues to stand as the state of Lebanon.

The new state was to be governed by a French official and assisted by a representative of the Advisory Council who was nominated by the High Commissioner. The country was to be divided into four sanjaks (administrative divisions): North Lebanon, the Bekaa, Mount Lebanon and South Lebanon, while the major municipalities of Beirut and Tripoli had independent status. The Maronites, although still forming the largest single community, were not stronger in any one of the provinces. Demographically they were closely followed by the Sunni community and trailed by the Greek Orthodox, Shi'ite, and Druze.³⁴⁹

When 'Greater Lebanon' was first established and confirmation of a French mandate in this area was realised, it was divided along sectarian lines and rejected by most communal cleavages, including the Maronites. With the creation of 'Greater Lebanon' through the incorporation of non-Christian regions into their once dominant domain, it limited their ability to create an independent Christian enclave. The Maronites saw this move by the French as a sellout to their cause, regardless of the fact that Picot promised the continued safeguarding of Christian interests. The non-Maronite establishment on the other hand, viewed it as a victory over both the Maronite attempts to establish a Maronite-Christian dominated state on illegitimate national aspirations, and also the continued colonial, regional and Western infiltration of the region. The definition of Lebanon's borders became a factor in 1958 and 1975 in the relations between the Maronites and the non-Maronite communities. The broader colonial construct of Lebanon and the region was questioned and challenged by some segments of the community.

³⁴⁹ Beshara, "Evolution of an Idea: The Quest for Lebanon's Independence - 1920-1943", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 15, 1997, pp. 9-13, p. 10

On the eve of World War One, Christians formed 79% of the Mountain's population and generally Catholics constituted 84% of the Mountain's Christians. At that time Christians made up one-fifth of Syria's entire population, which was approximately 2.5 million. Beydoun, 'Lebanon's Sects and the Difficult Road to a Unifying Identity', *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 19, 1998, pp. 18-21, p. 19.

Changing political circumstances and re-examination of political tactics, however, gradually saw some opponents of French rule accept the concept of 'Greater Lebanon'. For example, the Shi'ites were further drawn into the new political structure when mandatory authorities recognised the Shi'ites as an Islamic sect (*madhab*) with full rights; a status that was never accorded to them under Ottoman rule.³⁵⁰

With the promulgation of the 1926 Constitution the separation of Syria from this newly created entity was in full effect. Some opponents accepted it as a *fait accompli*, whilst others used this turn of events as further grounds for unsatisfactory and unacceptable obstacles to full Syrian-Arab unity and this remained a division well into Lebanese independence in 1943.

In addition, the incorporation of regional centres into 'Greater Lebanon' in 1920 created a new power hub between the communities. No longer were Druze-Maronite relations a matter of consequence; the power shift that emerged on a 'national' scale as opposed to a regional-provincial one was between the Maronite and the Sunna communities. Besides a small Sunna community who resided in the Mount Lebanon region during the *Imara* and *mutasarrifiyya* periods, Sunna and Maronite relations were minimal.

The Maronites were accustomed to being the dominant group in the *mutasarrifiyya* arrangement, while the Sunna community were the privileged group under Ottoman rule. Within this new power structure both groups needed to accept the changes in their political weight and significance, especially as they were the two dominant demographic communities within the 'Greater Lebanon' composition. This proved to be a difficult transition because the Maronites were seeking the fulfilment of their national aspirations through political Maronite communal nationalism, while the Sunna majority favoured the national shift from Ottomanism to Arabism, with Damascus as its capital [not Beirut].

Lebanon's first modern constitution was meant to be temporary. Its basis revolved around the power sharing principle of 'confessionalism'. Initially the intentions were honourable. Michel Chiha, the principal author of the constitution, recommended that the positions be equally distributed amongst the different cleavages within Lebanese society until a non-

³⁵⁰ Beydoun, *op. Cit.*, p. 20.

sectarian based political system could be developed and implemented. However, the 1926 Constitution only reinforced and effectively gave the former Ottoman *mutasarrifiyya* system legal and political legitimacy. It did not solve any of its longstanding problems regarding notable stronghold, or the unequal social and economic differences amongst the autonomous 'Lebanese' regions. It further legitimised the French colonial outpost and the 'temporary' political system of confessionalism became further ingrained within the political, social, educational and economic entities over the decades, giving Maronites exclusive political predominance for years to come.

The expansion of the borders of Lebanon created a sense of misplacement. Each community looked at the others differently. Rural/urban divisions intensified. Differences arose with the contradictory concepts of what the new Lebanon ought to entail and what it once stood for. Such divisions were propagated through the geographic enclosures and stratification of the isolationist social systems. These developed and enveloped each confessional community's beliefs and values, communal consciousness and interests.³⁵¹

Interaction between the communities characteristically took place through commercial and economic transactions rather than through social or cultural exchanges. Each community was largely self-contained: the Druzes and Maronites in Mount Lebanon, the Shi'ites in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, the Sunna in the coastal areas and the Orthodox Christians in parts of Beirut and North Lebanon. As the seventeen year civil war demonstrated, these geographical borders only intensified, crossed, merged, blurred and were redrawn to a varying degree by massive population movements between the geographic-confessional areas which further intensified the cantonisation of the country.

The geographic additions to 'Greater Lebanon' further strained relations between the Lebanese and Syrian entities, notably with the annexation of Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley. This has remained an open wound for the Syrians and has been most noted in Syrian political speeches and references. Similarly, just as these sensitive issues marred relations in the infancy of these two states, it was revisited during the 1975 Syrian intervention in Lebanon and its presence continues in Lebanon today.³⁵²

³⁵¹ Abul-husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 1998, p. 6

The strengthening of economic and educational integration during the early 1930s amongst the majority of Christian communities in Lebanon further promoted this division between the two states and the two ideologies. The aim by the Christian cleavages was to oppose the broader attempt at national integration along pan-Syrian and pan-Arab lines. Almost simultaneously, however, there was more of a consensus towards the creation of an independent Lebanese entity by the Muslim constituents. With both factions feeling jilted by the French colonisers there came a point of realisation that the French were first and foremost looking after their own national interests prior to either faction. In addition, domestic, regional and international developments related to the Second World War contributed to the changing relations between the Sunna and Maronite communities, who by the early 1940s were getting closer.

Rather than demanding the reintegration of Muslim districts into Syria, the Muslims began to negotiate with the Maronites to retain Lebanon's 'Arab face' in return for its independence. It was agreed that Lebanon's foreign policy was not to seek union with any of its Arab neighbours, including Syria, nor seek Western, particularly French protection.³⁵³ Beshara al-Khoury, leader of the Constitutional Bloc, agreed to this new political strategy, claiming Lebanon's internal stability would be enhanced by including the Muslim populace and weakening external Arab-Muslim interests in subverting Lebanon's stability.³⁵⁴ With the outbreak of the Second World War and the watering down of France's regional and international position, negotiations ceased until after the War. By 1943 the Lebanese National Pact had been agreed upon. It was a comprehensive oral agreement encompassing the following:

First, it was a personal understanding between the two architects of the agreement.

Second, it laid the foundations of the independent Lebanese state, according to which

1. Lebanon would be a completely independent republic.

³⁵² For further background reading see Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, Croom Helm, London 1985, Cornell Uni. Press, Ithaca 1988, pp. 177-99; Meir Zamir, "Faisal and the Lebanese Question, 1918-1920", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 404-426.

³⁵³ For further information see Riad al-Solh's October 1943 speech in Parliament, which embodied the principles of the National Pact, in *Middle East Forum*, Vol. xxxiv, No. 1, January 1959.

³⁵⁴ Beshara, "Evolution of an Idea: The Quest for Lebanon's Independence - 1920-1943", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 15, 1997, pp. 9-13, p. 11.

2. Lebanon would be an Arab country whose only official language was Arabic, though with its heterogeneous population it would maintain cultural links with the Western world.

3. Lebanon would cooperate with the Arab world and would join the Arab community only on condition that its sovereignty and territorial integrity would be preserved and honoured.

4. Lebanon's administration would be conducted according to confessional criteria in order to ensure that each community would have a fair share in governing the country.

Third, the inter-Lebanese agreement, when put in the regional context of pan-Arab relations, was in essence a plea for the preservation of the territorial status quo in the Middle East.³⁵⁵

This political agreement was to be enforced within Lebanon's delicate sectarian balance. In view of the results of the first and only census taken in Lebanon (1932), it was decided that a ratio of 6:5 of Christians to Muslims was representative of the demography at the time. Whether this distribution reflected the true demographics at the time is questionable. Perhaps, as suggested by Khalidi, the political left yielded to the Christian weighted ratio irrespective of either party's true demographics in order to allay Christian fears of being engulfed by the Muslim majority and ease Maronite susceptibilities.³⁵⁶ Such confidence making measures may also have been accommodated by the outcome of the National Pact, describing Lebanon as an 'Arab face' and by becoming a member of the League of Arab nations.

However, despite the agreement of the National Pact there was much dissatisfaction on both sides of the divide. Even among the first executive representatives of the state, discomfort was noted regarding the Pact's inception. For example, Emile Edde, the first Lebanese president, was known for his opposition to Lebanon's incorporation into the Arab-Muslim world. He preferred and worked towards the attainment of a Christian homeland within the territory of Lebanon, while Arab nationalist participants had opposite feelings and each faction held onto their views. Stability in Lebanon did not last three decades after the signing of the National Pact.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁵⁶ Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 36

The 1943 National Pact or *Al-Mithaq al-Watani* orally consecrated confessional differences. President Emile Edde and Prime Minister Riyad al-Solh, the architects of the Pact, sought to immobilise these confessional differences rather than invoke them. By recognising the legitimacy of these confessional cleavages it was thought that a unified national identity could be formed through the procedure of reciprocal interests, mutual consent and reason. The goal was to reconcile the traditional and more modern elements of political development within Lebanon.³⁵⁷ The architects themselves, however, were sceptical of its long-term existence and urged future political policy makers that the *Mithaq* was only to be considered as temporary. Between 1920 and 1975 Maronite authority was instilled constitutionally, institutionally, politically, socially, economically and financially which in turn provoked further hostility in the changing demographic and political climate.

There are various reasons for the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war. As the conflict progressed and evolved in nature so did the reasons, but the three most enduring themes which were revisited time and time again were those of: reform of the political system, the national identity of Lebanon and Lebanon's sovereignty.³⁵⁸ To varying degrees and different stages of the war external influence and intervention, intercommunal tension, intra-sectarian conflict, Palestinian armed resistance, demographic changes, social inequities and changing international political domination all contributed to the intensity of the seventeen year long conflict.

The level of national disunity emanated from Lebanon's varying ideals of national identity that demonstrated the irreconcilable differences between Arabism and Lebanonism due to international and regional developments that affected the stability of the nation and its ability to reconcile these two ideological cleavages. One segment of society, the Arabists or political left, felt neglected, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s when Arabism was at its peak within the region. They also felt that the Lebanese nationalists - the political right - were not willing, or able, to consider the grievances of Arabists within Lebanon or the region. The political right felt the political left, were reneging on the National Pact. Yet paradoxically, Lebanon was envied for its pluralism, openness, liberalism and democracy, which attracted Westerners and Arabs alike, while on the other hand it was considered as the playground of Western and regional interests because of these very elements. All in all,

³⁵⁷ Khalaf, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-61.

³⁵⁸ Abul-husn, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

it made Lebanon the place where much of the Arab-Israeli conflict and external intervention was and continues to be, acted out.

The fragility of the state political structure was the original cause of the conflict, allowing the above factors to have such a destabilising and decapitating affect on the state structure. Without effectively strengthening the institutions of the state system and working towards disintegrating the primordial system of feudalism, the state structure will continue to be fragile, weak, divisive and prone to conflict and instability.

Upon independence the state did not attempt to dissemble particularistic allegiances for national unity and character, therefore diminishing the prospects of a civil society and a unified, common national identity emerging. Instead a communal society has emerged as opposed to a civil society. Affiliation and allegiance is linked to confession and ethnicity rather than within an extensive state and civil community paradigm. Prior to the civil war in the late 1960s, in the early 1970s civil society began to develop. Lebanon's socio-economic, educational, professional associations and unions, sport and youth organisations, media and political parties and organisations began to take root within the modern Lebanese state structure and challenging communal interests. However, this progress was short lived and rapidly dissolved when the war increasingly developed into a sectarian-communal aspect of the long conflict.

The provincial and thereby confessional divisions further contributed to the disintegration of civil society and at a time when civil society logic and contribution was most needed. Instead, communal ties were reorganised to assist one group against the other rather than to contribute to a nation's interests collectively. With the end of the war and the implementation of the Taef Agreement the consolidation of civil society did not re-emerge, nor was it encouraged to re-establish and assist with the reconciliation process. Although professional organisations and unions and youth associations have begun to flourish, the potential of their success and contribution to nation building is limited. This is especially the case in the period of the Lahoud presidency. Since Lahoud's inauguration in 1998, there have increasingly been severe restrictions on civil liberties and parliamentary independence, due to the expanded and unconstitutional role of the Lebanese and Syrian security apparatus'.

4.2. Social-Cultural Factors Impeding Lebanese National Identity: The Nature of Lebanese Society

*Sectarianism has developed through a long historical process, having been reflected in the structure and functioning of the Lebanese political institutions since the 1840s. It has become rooted in the political culture of Lebanese society.*³⁵⁹

Lebanese society maintains traditional forms of identification regardless of its public images of modernity, liberalism and democracy. Regardless of its political history a number of socio-cultural factors have also impeded the development of Lebanese national identity.

Unlike any other Arab state in the region, Lebanon has been most influenced by direct external factors and this may explain its retention of traditional affiliations and identifications over the decades. Traditional, tribal, familial and clan associations remain prominent, as does the rule of nobility through religious-sectarian and/or political-economic affiliation. These indices are the most distinguishable national characteristics and forms of identification amongst Lebanese people. The defining cultural traits that are most basic, typical and enduring are categorised into five factors: the politics of traditionalism and primordialism, the politics of nobility, the politics of legitimacy, accountability, cronyism and nepotism, the politics of faith and the politics of intervention.

1. The Politics of Traditionalism and Primordialism

Lebanese society is characterised by its religious diversity, and the significance attached to nobility, clans and families. These factors are interlinked with a dominant hierarchical and patriarchal family structure. Like elsewhere in the Arab world, although to varying degrees, tradition and primordialism continue to contribute to the formation of Lebanese identity and remain an integral part of Lebanon's national character.

As most countries begin to feel the impact of modernisation and globalisation considerable pressure is being placed on the family structure. Lebanon, like most Arab countries, still has a tendency to be family orientated. Family loyalty, extended family relations and the concept of 'family honour' still take precedence amongst most individuals. This continues

³⁵⁹ Adelphi papers, "Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict", Adelphi Paper 243, London, 1989, p. 4.

to be witnessed today where rival families, or clans, keep up the issue of blood feuds in order to restore family honour, credibility and social status, regardless of the legal implications. 'Honour crimes' in Lebanon are legalised. Article 562 of the penal law gives a male murderer a special excuse if he is a father, a son, a brother or a husband.

Kinship and the family unit is a dominant social unit within Lebanese society. An individual's position within society depends a great deal on his/her respective family's standing. Family ties and obligations are compelling and binding not only to one's immediate family, but also the extended family, and even to one's village, town or city and political socialisation as will be further demonstrated below.

Like most Arab societies, Lebanese society is set "genealogically according to a system of patrilineal descent from a common male ancestor".³⁶⁰ Although Lebanese society is becoming educated, with an increasing number of females pursuing higher education, the patriarchal structure is strongly enforced. This has a profound impact upon personal development and goals, as well as state progress. For example, rules regarding the burden of proof concerning adultery still discriminate between men and women. The sentencing of a woman would range between 3 months and 2 years while a man will be sentenced to between 1 month and 1 year in prison. It was only since the early 1990s that women's testimony and business relations were equal to that of men.³⁶¹ Despite favourable reports of Lebanon's political progress in comparison to its neighbours, patriarchy is entrenched within its citizens' psyche and many women are struggling to break the glass ceiling of male patriarchy within professional institutions.

Also notable in small-medium townships and villages and to a certain degree amongst uneducated individuals in established cities, daily actions and language are used in the context of tradition and cast in religious language, reference and symbolism. Superstition, concern about community reactions to one's actions and constant referral to *Allah* (God) through common sayings such as *insh'allah* (God Willing) or *bi isn Allah* (with God's permission) have all been carried through over the centuries and become part of common

³⁶⁰ Abul-husn, op. cit., p. 16.

³⁶¹ Women's Rights Club at the American University of Beirut - Pamphlet

usage. Reliance on primordial national characteristics and identifications has impeded a cohesive, strong and stable nation-state from emerging.

Another impediment can be attributed to the historic gatherings and settlements of sects throughout Lebanon. In most instances, ethnic distribution can be identified in particular geographic areas, brought about by the cantonisation of the region by Ottomans, its further entrenchment by Europeans and the effect of the Lebanese war. For example, the mountains of northern and central Lebanon, as well as East Beirut, are predominantly Maronite dominated. The south and east of Lebanon and the southern part of Beirut, is predominantly Shi'ite. Those who live in Mount Lebanon to the east and south of Beirut are Druzes; whilst West Beirut, together with Tripoli and Sidon, are vastly Sunna. Orthodox and other minority sects are located in the coastal regions and the cities. As a result of the confessionalisation of the Lebanese state, each regional-communal entity developed its own independent social system, asserting its own beliefs and values, interests, communal-regional identity and stratification of society and class - and at the cost of national unity and long-term stability.³⁶²

This is one of the main reasons why it is difficult to examine socio-political factors affecting Lebanese society separately, as can be easily undertaken in other countries. The various political systems that have been forced upon the Lebanese, especially since 1850, have forced its citizens to relate to one another collectively and individually along combined primordial, communal, regional-provincial and class identifications rather than along national means. Whereas in countries such as Syria, Egypt or Iraq, although these identifications do exist, they have been controlled to be of secondary significance, whilst state identifications are of primary importance.

2. The Politics of Nobility- Modern Day Feudalism:

As noted earlier, Lebanese politics is kinship orientated and the history of modern Lebanon particularly demonstrates this with the domination of its political scene by no more than thirty families. These families characterise the factions and rivalries amongst Lebanese. Traces of kinship are found within the Legislature and the Executive. The position of Prime Minister, for example, has been dominated by four Sunni families, namely the Solhs,

³⁶² *Ibid*, p. 6.

Karamis, Yafis and Salams. So much so that 31 of the 35 cabinets formed between 1943-1964 have rotated among these four families.³⁶³

Links of kinship are not just common amongst the Sunna but also found among the other sects. It has been going on for the past two centuries. For example, the same political families have dominated Lebanese politics either prior to its inception or since, such as: Edde, Shamoun, Frangieh and Gemayel (Maronite), Jumblatt and Arslan (Druze), and al-Asad and Hamadah (Shi'ite). These families have provided Lebanon with its traditional social structure of nobility (*zu'ama*), and contributed to its feudal character.³⁶⁴

These families have affected Lebanon's political history. Together they have been united on the basis of class and politics, rather than primarily divided along ethnic, religious, or regional cleavages. Rivalry and competition has emerged to maintain their name, power and status and it is through such prominent figures that the Lebanese political scene has been dominated and sustained by these families. Obviously, within the history of Lebanon many prominent families have been replaced by stronger nobles, who in turn determine the distribution of social, economic and political power, and may be more conspicuous in some groups than in others.

During Ottoman rule communities within Mount Lebanon were not divided so much on religious grounds but rather over the hierarchical politics of nobility that cut across religious lines. Most often villages were confessionally mixed, yet a barrier existed between the elite and the common people - a notion that was reinforced by language, marriage alliances, land holdings, wealth and outward appearance. Traditional identification with kin, village/town or region was favoured above a broader form of national identification - a form of identification that continues to exist not only in Lebanon but throughout the Arab world.

³⁶³ Khalaf, op. cit., p. 248.

³⁶⁴ Habib, "Social pluralism, political confessionalism, and cultural development in the Second Republic", *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995. pp. 6-15, p. 7. This author will be using the terms nobility/ feudalism/ *zu'ama*/ and *assabiya* [For further information on this term see Abul-husn, pp. 9-28.] interchangeably and are to be understood as a group of people whether for instance landholders, politicians, intellectuals, religious representatives holding significant and influential positions within Lebanese society and having a strong bond with supporters.

The *zu'ama* were influential in contributing to divisions. In the past (pre-1850s) social rank in Lebanon was determined by local society and economic status. The shift from communal to confessional divisions was strongly apparent during the 1858 peasant uprising. The *zu'ama*'s strategy became one of portraying their respective communities as stable and orderly. The reality was these very 'nobles' were using religious discourse, in order to distract attention from the socially explosive events which were threatening their own corrupt ways.³⁶⁵ Rather than viewing the 1858 revolution as socio-economic repressed peasants uniting against their landlords -- regardless of religion or sectarian affiliation -- it became a conflict reported on as a religious divide. Many historians have omitted the fact that this was the first time that the 'common people' questioned the role of the *zu'ama* and rebelled. Historians emphasise the later development of the conflict, which did, in fact, become religious in nature. Similarly the civil war in Lebanon during the 1970s was reported within a Christian versus Muslim paradigm when in fact it was more complex in nature and was in large part a consequence of the conclusions taken during the mid-19th Century conflict in Lebanon.

The conflicts, which arose between 1840 and 1860 illustrated the fragility of the concept of confessionalism within a politically and religiously divisive country such as Lebanon. It not only portrayed Lebanese society as intolerant of other religions and sects, it also overlooked the real nature of inter-religious or inter-sectarian fighting which has been evident since 1840.

The main conclusions of the 1840-60 conflict should focus on three factors. First, the initial uprising by the peasants was not religiously orientated but based on class stratification and how the feudal leaders and European powers manipulated it as a confessional conflict. This generated complex, protracted and violent struggles among the nobles, peasants and religious leaders for years to come.³⁶⁶ Secondly, the question arises when one considers what led the 'common people' to revolt and how their demands were extinguished, whether such a climate exists for future revolts? Finally, the introduction of sectarianism in the 1840-60 crisis placed a burden on the narrative of national history amongst its future

³⁶⁵ For example, Bashir Ahmad's tactic to pose as the champion of the Roman Catholics in Kisrawan, whilst local confessional opposition towards him was increasing. See Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, Caravan Books, Delmar, NY, 2nd edition, 1993, pp. 80-105.

³⁶⁶ Makadisi, "The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon", *MERIP*, June 1997, pp. 1-6, p. 3.

political and religious leaders, resulting in the inability to achieve 'closure' amongst its citizens.

It can be said that the political structure of the *zu'ama* or nobility largely originated during the Ottoman era. The *zu'ama* have been successful in retaining power and prestige by "assuming the roles of mediator, allocator and arbitrator".³⁶⁷ The *za'em*, usually male, acts as a mediator between his/her constituents and the government. As an allocator, the *za'em* distributes favours, jobs, material benefits as well as becoming a modern day employment agency. The *za'em's* role as an arbitrator usually arises when inter-communal rivalries emerge. By providing economic and social betterment to their constituents they are able to ensure their political support and hence their survival, in exchange for such benefits. As will be demonstrated below, the *zu'ama* system has infused itself throughout the Lebanese socio-political structure and continues to be a significant obstacle to the formation of national identity.

The *zau'ma* structure is multi-leveled and is not necessarily politically dominated. For example, one aspect may entail power primarily from the *za'ems* relationship with his/her town/district/region, at another level is on the *za'ems* connection with the central state political system. A common denominator as outlined by Arnold Hottinger entails the exchange of economic, social and administrative aid for the political support and loyalty of their constituents, supporters and clientele.³⁶⁸

At another level, especially since 1850, Lebanon's political nobles are closely linked to their respective religious leaders. This was especially the case amongst the Maronite Christians. The difference between the Maronite sect and the other groups within Lebanon is that the notable Maronite feudal families did not hold the same status as their Muslim or Druze counterparts. Rather within the Maronite group it was the Patriarch who wielded the political opinion of the Maronite community most strongly. Religious authorities alone command large sums of money and property, as well as play a major role in the development of their citizens' spiritual and political lives. For example, in the *qadha* (district) of al-Matn in the Mount Lebanon region, the Maronite Church in 1963 owned

³⁶⁷ Habib, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁶⁸ Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective" in Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon*, New York, Wiley and Sons, 1966, pp. 86, 89-98.

approximately one million square metres of land and 45 public institutions.³⁶⁹ This is considerable since the total area of Lebanon is approximately 10 400 square kilometres. Thus Church ownership far outweighs individual-group ownership, as well as impacting on the overall social, political, economic and religious development of the region.³⁷⁰

Feudalism was protracted throughout the 1970s during Lebanon's civil war. There was a cosmetic shift from 'secular' quasi-feudalism to one based on communal religious lines, thus reinforcing the politics of confessionalism to a new level and legitimising existing and new noble families along confessional lines. The institutionalisation of nobility with a sectarian face within the new bureaucratic political structure of war and disorder, saw corruption flourish, poverty increase and basic social rights controlled by the *zu'ama*. For example, employment, housing, education and public utilities were not available purely on the basis of being a Lebanese citizen but had to be gained via appealing to the *zu'ama* who were parliamentary/political/sectarian representatives. Therefore, the role of prominent political and social leaders within Lebanese society had and continue to have, the ability to make or break an individual's livelihood depending on the citizens' views of their sectarian leader and how much allegiance one is willing to show.

The manifestation of the *za'em-z'i'lm* (clients) or lord-fealty relations continue to be deep and far reaching, touching everyone's lives as well as government and private institutions and bureaucracies. This structure is based on individuality and/or communal attainment rather than national ideological unison. The *za'em* is ascribed his/her prestige usually via lineage. They tend to sustain their prominent position by protecting the interests of their followers.

This brings us to another national characteristic, which pervades Lebanese identity. It is closely linked to the *zu'ama* structure and within the broader confines of kinship associations. Fealty, or the faithful adherence of the personalised relationship between follower and leader, recognises the obligation of a *za'em* to the loyal supporter. This 'relationship' is sustained by the system of political obligations of loyal followers and dependents in return for fulfilment of need. Fealty is a remnant of feudalism, where almost

³⁶⁹ "Kisirwan wal-Matn al-Shamali", *al-Hawadith*, Beirut, No. 335, April 12, 1963, p. 14.

³⁷⁰ Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, "Party Politics in the Lebanese political System", in Leonard Binder (ed) *Politics in Lebanon*, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 1960, pp. 149-150.

the whole fabric of society is affected by this causal relationship. Fealty helps create a group of loyal followers, as well as being instrumental in sustaining cohesion, solidarity and stability of local communities and broader society.³⁷¹ It was the very challenge of this relationship and the class stratification it endorsed, which contributed to the 1860 and 1975 civil conflicts within Lebanon.

This was illustrated during the latter part of the civil war when almost all the political parties, blocs and fronts were closely identified with sectarian groups and were largely unconcerned with the broader concept of national identity. Rarely have Lebanese elections taken place on an impersonal basis, rather longstanding feuds between extended families, communal factions and political rivals have traditionally mobilised and divided electoral support. Personal and parochial rivalries take precedence over serving the national cause and promoting a unified, stable and strong society. Therefore, the very prolonged existence and endorsement of the *zu'ama* contribute to the fragile nature of Lebanese politics and its ultimate path to disintegration if it remains communal and personal in nature.³⁷²

It is argued that the absorption of the feudal families into the new governments, whether into the *mutasarrifiyya* or the later Lebanese governments, was functional in order for a sense of political continuity and stability to be maintained. Salabi adds that consequently a 'new breed' of political leadership arose, resulting in the development of a more bureaucratic style of leadership rather than being feudal in nature.³⁷³

Although on the surface this theory is correct it would have been more tangible for new members of society to have been affiliated into these new government bodies in order for new and future political representatives to phase out the prominent families. It would also have been more efficient to develop the Pact further, in order to develop national identity and maintain long-term stability of the nation, a point which will be elaborated on in the following chapter.

³⁷¹ Khalaf, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³⁷³ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, *op. cit.*, p. 117; Khalaf, p. 250.

In order for these traditional power-sharing families to maintain their positions in society they needed to adapt new political structures of accountability, democracy and lessen their own political strongholds, or risk being replaced by others. Their language is customised to suit the new political environment and so has the exterior coat of the 'new' political system. The most prominent ruling families have been able to manipulate their old techniques to suit changing times with the full endorsement of former colonial powers. Thus, although change took place on the surface with the adoption of modern day law making institutions and tools, the internal business of running the nation state continued to revolve around traditional *zu'ama* self and communal interest. Nothing has been done since independence to truly liberate the Lebanese citizen and establish a true basis of national reconciliation and identity. This was especially evident in the civil war itself, is particularly representative in present day political alliances and oppositions and through the political procedure itself.

3. The Politics of Legitimacy, Accountability, Cronyism and Nepotism:

As an extension of the negative factors of nobility, one of the problems with Arab political order (closely linked to the question of political legitimacy) is its unwillingness to bring about true democratic change, as the results would, in most cases, mean their eventual loss of power. Subsequently, the Arab 'Middle East' is constantly being fed with rumour, insecurity, fear of the unknown and alleged conspiracies (usually Zionist, eg. *The Protocols of Zion*) to bring down the Arab peoples and keep them from developing and progressing, in order to retain the reigns of power.

At the other end of the spectrum are regional leaders who have been willing participants in liberalising their societies but not necessarily their democratisation.³⁷⁴ There needs to be a marked shift away from communal and patriarchal society in order to achieve a freer, more liberal and democratic Arab world which includes a defined cooperation between government and civil society.³⁷⁵

Ultimately the question of political legitimacy pertaining to the nation-state, its borders and political representatives has influenced Lebanese nationalist thought and identity

³⁷⁴ Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East* - Vol. 1, F.J. Brill, Netherlands, 1995, p. 5.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

formation. It is therefore inconceivable to find an appropriate solution to Lebanon's political problems if the very issue of political legitimacy is in question.³⁷⁶

One of the main reasons force has extensively been used in the Arab world (and most of the developing world) is that political legitimacy has failed in many cases. In most cases, they lack the legitimacy of being elected officials and are unable to confidently implement domestic policies due to the lack of popular mandate and having limited economic flexibility with which to implement policies. This problem is widespread throughout the Arab world, regardless of political systems or persuasion. Lack of political legitimacy further undermines the uniformity of Arab political culture. In the case of Lebanon, the question of political legitimacy is multi-leveled. On the one hand, the 1943 political system disintegrated in the civil conflict of the 1970s as the political left, questioned the political legitimacy of a state structure which favoured one segment of society over another regardless of changing demographic and political ideals. At another level, the political legitimacy of quasi-feudal families has not been closely examined or scrutinised because of the very make-up of the political system, which divides society along sectarian lines. When an individual or political bloc poses questions relating to quasi-feudal families status and true representation of their 'constituents' they are quickly condemned for 'threatening national stability and unison'. Although in most cases such attempts do not follow such a deceptive agenda, democratic opportunities to question alternative political representation and structures are limited.

The practices of cronyism and nepotism have further contributed to the question of political legitimacy, as has the traditional concept of *wasta*, which has over the decades become a form of institutionalised corruption. *Wasta* refers to "both the act and the person who mediates or intercedes. The *Wasta* seeks to achieve that which is assumed to be otherwise unattainable by the supplicant".³⁷⁷ The act and request of *wasta* is widespread across Arab society. *Wasta* tends to cut through duplication and delay, yet it has negative effects on the economy due to its hidden costs and then acts toward becoming culturally entrenched and more difficult to invalidate.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁶ Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven & London, USA, 1977, p. 6.

³⁷⁷ Cunningham & Sarayrah, *Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society*, Praeger, England, 1993, p. 1.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 2-3.

People are often reluctant to speak of their *wasta* involvement, especially public figures as the act implies personal powerlessness and disrespect for law. Overall there is a deep-seated reluctance to address *wasta* and actor-comedian Doureid Lahham, otherwise known as Ghawwar, has comically addressed this. His movies-theatre productions often portray the incompetence, red tape and bureaucracy found in Arab society and demonstrates how *wasta* infiltrates Arab culture and remains a powerful force in personal, local and state decision making.³⁷⁹

While some acts of *wasta* are legal and moral, some are illegal or questionable under existing laws. *Wasta* may be doing 'a favour' for a friend, family member, fellow townsman and/or worshipper or colleague. Ultimately, however, *wasta* is a form of nepotism, cronyism and corruption. Although the results may, on the one hand, "soften the rigidities of bureaucracy, enhances system legitimacy, and strengthens family and friendship bonds, on the other hand, it overrides the rule of law, created a mindset of dependency, and destroys the will to achieve. Widespread *wasta* renders justice questionable and inefficiency inevitable".³⁸⁰ Therefore, as long as *wasta* is widely practiced and encouraged within the family unit and upwards, it will continue to be a practice undertaken in the 'Middle East' as a normal way of life.

Within Lebanon itself the act of *wasta* is widespread at both a high and low level and practised both openly and discreetly. Due to the political system of sectarianism each government position and sanctioned organisation is required to devise employment strategies along confessional breakdowns. Each person applying for a position, whether it be employment, or placement in a tertiary institution, is required to obtain backing from their communal *za'em* or political allies. Whether one wishes to consider this as the further endorsement of the system of *wasta* or acceptance of the dynamics of the political system is irrelevant. The end result perpetuates the position of the quasi-feudal system through parliamentary and political requirements and reinstates the confessionalism regardless of the merit of any given individual. Therefore, at this high level of *wasta* enforcement, an individual is ultimately pressured into his/her new position as a representative of his/her *za'em* and communal links, rather than working for the good of the nation collectively.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 3.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 6.

4. The Politics of Faith

Religion, sect and confession are the most prominent forms of identification within Lebanon because they are reinforced by the political system daily through its cemented identification along confessional lines of political identity. By carrying through the above argument that the combined factors of kinship and nobility continue to play a major role within Lebanese society the following section will outline how this equation of structured identification – *zu'ama*, religious and political divisions - have interrupted Lebanese national political development

With the forced movement towards the politics of confession emerging in Lebanon since the mid-19th Century, evidence indicates that most sects naturally moved towards religious solidarity in order to protect the status of their community. A natural reaction and instinct is displayed when an individual or a group of people are in danger. There is a tendency to unite amongst those of similar beliefs, ways, customs and ethnicity. As a result, the sect of *taifa* (confession) became the quasi-nation defined against other *taifas* (confessions)".³⁸¹ In most cases this was represented through prominent communal families and religious notables and reinforced through Lebanese political parties and factions. Most parties and factions in Lebanon belong to, are affiliated with, or sympathise with, a particular sectarian segment of Lebanese society.

With the exception of approximately 6% of the Lebanese population (Armenians and Kurds) the common Lebanese ethnic background is Arab. Communal differentiations as well as inter-communal divisions have been along the lines of non-Muslims and Muslims. There are variances in custom, historical tradition and social behaviour. However, there is a strong sense of shared Arab culture and historical experiences. Each communal group supported or opposed these ties to varying degrees, depending on their historical links and status to the region, their gain or loss to such affiliations and their present and future confessional roles.

As a result, varying degrees of affiliation arose which can be broadly categorised into 'the status quo' group, which endorsed 'Lebanonism' and the 'reformists', who espoused variants of 'Arabism-Islamism' but sought changes to the Lebanese political system. Each had an extreme variant ranging from secularism to religious fundamentalism and chauvinist

³⁸¹ Makidisi, op. cit., p. 2.

exclusiveness to broadly based inclusiveness. Each confessional group's position depended on its communal leader or leaders at the time. It was not unusual for changes to take place in their positions, particularly during the 17-year civil war to accommodate the changing political circumstances and alliances, which therefore indicated that neither sect nor ideology dominated their overall decision making process but rather depended largely on their divergent interests.

Therefore although the following will briefly outline the political ideology of each group and the communal breakdown of its support base, it needs to be stated that neither ideology nor communal-political support base was unchangeable.

i) The Status Quo Coalition³⁸²:

This coalition was largely fearful of losing their privileged status and endorsed the 1943 National Pact in its entirety, arguing that it had functioned successfully for thirty years. The influence of Khomeinism and Iran was extreme within Lebanon and particularly amongst the Shi'ite segments of society. Due to the fear of Lebanon's pluralistic power sharing confessional system being replaced by Islamic fanaticism, segments of the Christian sector advocated 'Lebanonism' within the guise of Christian religious fanaticism, eg, the Lebanese Forces proposed splitting Lebanon into cantons in order to safeguard the minorities within Lebanon and eventually gain their decades long desire to have an independent Christian state. However, this was not deemed the remedy by the majority, who proposed that a united secular Lebanon remain within the application of the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Taef Agreement.

The political parties, factions or personalities which endorsed either an independent Christian Lebanon or at least the status quo agreed upon by the 1943 National Pact were the Phalangist Party, Lebanese Forces, National Liberal Party, Al-Tanzim, Guardians of the Cedars (predominantly Maronite followers). The prominent personalities were Pierre Gemayel, former president Camille Chamoun, former president and founder of the Marada militia Suleiman Frangie and head of the Order of Maronite Monks, Father Charbel Kassis.

³⁸² Abul-husn, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

The communal groups endorsing the status quo position were predominantly Maronite dominated. Other Christian sects in present day Lebanon, in order of their numerical strength are the Greek Catholic, the Armenian Orthodox, the Armenian Catholics, the Protestants, the Syrian Catholics, the Syrian Orthodox, the Chaldeans, and the Latins. Of these the Greek Catholics by and large identified themselves politically with the Maronites. The Armenians, who constitute approximately 3% of the population, generally maintained their neutrality. The other Christian sects were too small to have a significant political impact.³⁸³

Maronite Catholics: (Approximately 21% of the Lebanese population in 1990)

The Maronites have been present in northern Mount Lebanon since the 7th Century. They are followers of the Monothelite forms of Christianity. Although short-lived, in the 12th Century when the Crusaders ruled the coasts of Syria, a minority of Maronites clergy accepted the supremacy of Roman Catholic doctrine by joining the Roman Catholic communion.³⁸⁴ The founder of the community was Yuhanna Marun (d. 707), although this sect was named after Saint Marun who died in 410 AD. Historically the Maronites are an isolated and rural people. It was mostly through Western penetration, missionary and trade infiltration that they emerged from their isolation.

The Maronites constitute about one half of the Christian population. The Maronites claimed to be descendants of the Maradaites [possibly of Armenian stock]. The Maradaites were a warrior group who fought against the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus. It is with this claim that the Maronites utilised the defence to their national political identity, regarding themselves as non-Arab, superior to the Islamic culture, society and religion and opposing any form of assimilation into the Islamic or the Arab world.

The Patriarch and the Maronite Church contributed to this ideology of Maronite identity through its historiographic writings, infiltration amongst the people and particularly through domination of the education system. The claims within these historical texts were not always out to substantiate the facts in a scholarly way but rather as a sense of claiming the uniqueness of their ethnicity. Such writings were dedicated to a strong sense of ethnic

³⁸³ For furthering reading see R. B. Betts, *Christians in the Arab East*, Athens 1975; Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*.

³⁸⁴ Salibi, *The House of Many Mansions*, p. 96.

unity and the inculcation of Christian based values and beliefs, which constructed their conception of themselves, their community and their surroundings. They would use their alleged historical 'links' to the ancient nationality of Maradaites and the Phoenicians as a basis to their claims to an independent non-Arab Christian polity and against Arab nationalists' claims to a united Arab homeland.³⁸⁵

However despite the Maronites' assertion that there is a continuum between medieval Phoenicia and modern Lebanon and the Maronite people, there is no indication this claim is correct. Supporters of Phoenicianism assert they were the original inventors of the alphabet. However, no written, oral or historical evidence remains to substantiate such a claim, nor the claim that, besides geographically, Phoenicia is present-day Lebanon with 6000 years of national history. It has been convincingly argued by Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi that the bulk of the indigenous groups found in Lebanon can be traced back to migration from the Arabian peninsula settling in the region between the 5th and 11th Century AD. Also, there is no historical evidence linking the Phoenicians to the Maronite Lebanese via a unique linear relationship.³⁸⁶ Rather, what has emerged is the creation of a myth to substantiate the dreams of the Maronite community in endorsing their historical existence to a romanticised medieval entity, which once existed as their own.

As has been noted earlier, Maronite emigrants, members of the Maronite community within Mount Lebanon and the Maronite Church were vocal in creating, promoting and financially backing the Lebanese national movement and the establishment of an independent Christian enclave in the region. They lobbied and coordinated their support from foreign governments and public opinion.³⁸⁷ These efforts resulted in the birth of 'Lebanonism'.

'Lebanonism' was simply Maronite nationalism, composed of a fear of persecution, assertion of Phoenician mythology and an attachment to the West. Emphasis was on Christian ideals and the concept of an eternal Lebanon. This was regardless of its exclusiveness and isolation of individuals-communities who did not conform to such an ideal or confession. The Maronites demanded an independent Maronite Lebanon by

³⁸⁵ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, pp. 6-7.

³⁸⁶ See Salibi, *The House of Many Mansions*, particularly pp. 167-181.

³⁸⁷ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p.5.

emphasising the differences between Judeo-Christianity and Islam. They adopted the notion that Lebanon has for centuries existed as a refuge for persecuted minorities and emphasised the point that they are not ethnically Arab. Ethnic identification was preferred as either 'Phoenician' or 'Mediterranean'. They also tirelessly worked towards becoming pro-French in every way in order to gain their political support and fulfil their desire to be the 'natural leaders of an independent Lebanon'.

ii) Reformists

As stated in the previous chapters Arabism emerged in the second half of the 19th Century and was especially popular in the mid-20th Century. The Arabic language, its culture and civilisation were factors of commonality to be used as unifying factors.

Elements of pan-Arabism in Lebanon were noted in the mid to late 19th Century, although stronger leanings towards this political ideology emerged in the 1920s when the geographic boundaries of Lebanon expanded into 'Greater Lebanon'. Masses of unwilling Muslims were brought into this new Christian-dominated entity. Many felt they were detached from the historic geography of Syria and the broader Arab world and felt suspicion towards the Western backed Christian mandate. These grievances were carried throughout the 1950s and 1960s with the influence of Nasserism and Ba'athism and persisted throughout the war.

Along with endorsing variants of Arab-Islamic identity the 1978 civil war also differentiated the Maronite-Christian "Status Quo Bloc". The aims of the 'revisionist bloc' were:

extensive political reform to ensure a more equitable distribution of scarce resources and the secularisation of the representative system. They also sought restructuring of the balance of power between the three branches of government, the reorientation of the institution of the army toward more distinctly national aims, and the alignment of the military with other Arab armies in defence of the Palestinian cause.³⁸⁸

The "Revisionist Bloc" was composed of the Lebanese National Movement, the Palestinian resistance and the Muslim establishment (which included the Sunni, Druze and Shi'ite religious organisations, although the Amal movement did not formally join the Lebanese National Movement). There were six major parties and ten groups and organisations. They

³⁸⁸ Abul-husn, op. cit., p. 4 citing Delury, ed. World Encyclopedia, p. 617.

were: the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), *Murabitoun*, Communist Action Organisation, Communist Party of Lebanon, *Ba'ath Party-Iraq Wing*, *Ba'ath Party-Syrian Wing*, Nasserite Corrective Movement, Nasserite Forces Council, Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), *al-Majlis al A'la*, Popular Nasserist Organisation, Union of Working People's Forces and National Confrontation Front.³⁸⁹

These groups either were purely Lebanese based (PSP) or regionally encompassing (SSNP, Nasserites, Communists). Generally, all perceived Lebanon as an Arab state, some worked towards it being part of Greater Syria, others to become part of the Arab unified world, which was a political dream in the 1950-60s. It wasn't until the 1970s and later that a point of consensus was reached in making Lebanon a distinctive nation, which was neither representative of extreme 'Lebanonism' nor vastly 'Arabist'. Pluralism was advocated, being neither advantageous to the Maronite-Christian community nor disadvantageous to the non-Maronite community. Institutionalised power sharing was demanded.

The communal groups supporting the revisionist were the:

Greek Orthodox (approximately 300 000 adherents in 1990), the second largest Christian group in Lebanon. Geographically scattered and found in, Beirut, south of Tripoli and the Matn area. They historically identify themselves with the Arab world and therefore had tense relations with the Maronites, although they required the safeguarding of their interests in the creation of the new Lebanon. During the 1975 war the majority of the Greek Orthodox sided with the revisionist bloc while the ruling elite sided with the Maronites.

The Druze represent approximately 6.5% of the country's population (or 250 000) and as outlined earlier have a historical political role in Lebanon.

The Druze faith originated in Cairo during Egypt's Al-Hakim bi Amrallah's reign, (966-1021). The basis of their beliefs, are *Tawhid* (the unity of God) and reincarnation. The transmigration of the soul is necessary to elevate an individual's quest for knowledge of the unity of God. Druzism carries elements of neo-Platonism, Gnosticism and

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19

Manichaeism. Like other Muslim minorities, the Druze differ in their interpretation of the Islamic doctrine. They are properly known as *Muwahidun* (Unitarians), but have obnoxiously been termed Druze by an eponymous follower named Nashtakin al-Darazi, who was later found to have exploited the faith for his own gain.

The Druze have strategically been placed in the central part of Mount Lebanon for centuries. During the 14th and 18th Centuries the Druze were the dominant sectarian group in Lebanon's social and political order. National Druze representation is largely through two families, the Joumblatts and the Arslans. Although other Druze MP's do have their own support base, most do return to either dominant fold when political and religious duty calls.

They fought for independence with the Maronites, but have been strong opponents of the confessional system despite what was demonstrated throughout their role during the civil war and through the Progressive Socialist Party's political apparatus. The majority of Druze, were of the revisionist camp, although a small faction aiding Faisal Arslan sided with the Lebanese Forces who were aiding the Lebanese status quo.

The Shi'ites in 1990 made up approximately 35% of the Lebanese population. It is increasingly growing into the largest demographic group in Lebanon. As in most Arab states where Shi'ites are found the attitude towards this sect remains largely hostile. As a result, their state of poverty and underdevelopment worsened and reached exploding point as the civil war in Lebanon began.

Historically the Umayyads, the Abbasids, Ayoubides and the Mamluks, which led them to disperse from their regions of northern and central Lebanon to southern and eastern Lebanon, have persecuted the Shi'ites. Whilst other communities with more economic and political clout continued to prosper and reap the advantages of development and progress, Shi'ite infrastructure only deteriorated. The Shi'ites were not incorporated into the state central system until 1920 and often enough were marginalised socially, economically and politically. Social mobility was poor. They were largely exploited peasants, underrepresented and the least educated group within Lebanon with high illiteracy rates and poor health standards. The Lebanese government since 1943 has continued this

legacy and largely neglected its public obligations to those living in the south of the country.

It wasn't until 1967 when the Shi'ites gained a sense of communal identity through the official representation by the Lebanese Shi'ite Higher Council, *Majlis al-Shia al-Aala*, of which Imam Mousa Al-Sadr was appointed President. With decades long neglect emerged the political and social undercurrent of discontent and protest, which was eventually presented by three militaristic political factions - *Harakat al-Mahroumin* (Movement of the Disinherited) (1974), *Amal* (1975) and *Hezbollah* (1985). It was notably the work of Al-Sadr who mobilised the community and gave a voice to their grievances. As a result the Shi'ite movement questioned the Maronite domination of power and sought to change the political system by restoring balance to the confessional system through the changing demographics.

It was only in the early 1980s that traditional Shi'ite feudal lords were directly challenged. For example, Kamel Al-Assad, of the prominent Al-Assad family, who had become speaker in the House of Deputies was a vigorous opponent of Mousa Al-Sadr's plight to attain Shi'ite rights.³⁹⁰ With Al-Assad and fellow Shi'ite prominent families ignoring the plight of their confessional community and not upholding their rights in parliament and government bureaucracies, their role as *zu'ama* diminished. This was especially the case when *Hezbollah* and other Islamic associations, with the financial backing of Iran, began to build schools and educational institutions for Shi'ite citizens, provide affordable health care, rebuild their homes after Israeli bombardment, *provide* basic infrastructure and utilities such as electricity, repair sewers, dig wells, provide welfare payments and social assistance to the needy and religious guidance. In other words, then provided almost everything a modern government should provide or cater for all its citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, colour or gender.

With the emergence of these liberating Shi'ite groups the traditional system of nobility within this confession diminished. Prominent bourgeois families such as the Al-Assads were deemed less worthy of allegiance than the religious hierarchy. Amongst the Shi'ites the structure of religious achievement became very much tied to social religious achievement. The higher one was along the religious hierarchy the higher one's status

³⁹⁰ Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with A Vengeance*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1997, p. 163.

became. It will be interesting to see whether the new Shi'ite leaders will take up the role of their former Shi'ite nobility or whether they decide to transcend primordial traits and work towards the 'liberation' of the whole of Lebanon through continuous challenge to the political system. Whether this can be done in a secular way [exceptionally hard considering they espouse Shi'ite doctrine] is another issue and one of major concern to many non-Shi'ite citizens today.

The Sunna made up approximately 24% of the Lebanese population in 1990. They have had a favourable position within Lebanese history because of their allegiance to the Mamluks during the Crusades and to the Sunna Ottoman rulers. They were duly rewarded for their allegiance. Furthermore, the migration of the Sunna from Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkoman and Kurds all increased the Sunna numbers and increased trade in the urban centres of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. Therefore with the creation of the modern state of Lebanon the Sunna political status diminished from being the ruling majority to the ruled minority, while their access to government resources diminished. Thus it was not surprising that the Sunna saw the French as modern day crusaders who tore them away from motherland Syria and the broader Arab-Islamic world, subverted on Woodrow Wilson's principle of self determination and reneged on European promises to the (predominantly Sunna) Arabs.

Although the Sunna denomination accepted the 1943 National Pact as *fait accompli* and made their best of the situation, the people themselves were never really satisfied with the outcome. They hoped that future political developments would correct yesterday's wrongs. The noble Sunna families of Solhs, Karamis, Yafis and Salams maintained their positions within the new political system and importantly within their families, clan, region and sect. However, in the post-civil war period new noble Sunna families have emerged, e.g., that of current Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri and former Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss.

This breakdown of communal identities demonstrates another essential factor in Lebanese political identity, that is, the pluralistic nature of Lebanon's religious makeup and its impact on the political process. Habib argues that, traditionally, religious groups are "the primary social organisations through which political stability has been maintained and

challenged"³⁹¹. It may be argued, however, that class structure has been more of a political stabiliser in the past than has religion. It was not until the onslaught of the civil war that religious or sectarian groups began to play such an important role in the nation's stability. It is in this respect Lebanon begins to resemble the religious-ideological segments of European Consociational democracies.³⁹²

There are only a few mainstream political parties that claim to have no ethnic or confessional orientation. They are the Communist Party, the Syrian National Socialist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

Generally, the political parties are aligned with a particular sectarian group within Lebanon they are used as a sounding board for the grievances of that particular communal cleavage. In turn, these parties expect party loyalty from their supporters and indeed members of their particular community. Although officially independent from the church, mosque or *majlis*, political leaders and parties have cordial relations with each respective religious institution.³⁹³ Most of these political groups manifest at least one primordial factor: kinship, confession or sect. These primordial links therefore reinforce the division of Lebanese society, pressurising the legitimacy of the central government and complicating national unity prospects.

It has become apparent that in most instances these political party agendas are more focused on preserving the sectarian system than advancing the party ideology, or working towards establishing a national identity. The politicisation of communal identity succeeded through the socio-economic and political strength of each communal 'family'. Lebanese stratification has always been based and/or depended on inter-communal inequalities. The disproportionate entitlements were by-products of the primordial system of nobility, which has been carried through over the centuries. The very noble-fealty relationship endorses positions of power and subordination within particular communities. Hence, this very disproportionate distribution of power has maintained primordial and traditional consciousness.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Habib, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁹² Ibid., p. 8.

³⁹³ Abul-husn, op. cit., p. 19.

5. The Politics of External Intervention:

Lebanon is a geographically small entity with a small population. It has long attracted regional and international intrigue, which ultimately has been to the detriment of the country's stability. Although some periods in Lebanon's history have seen the formal request of external intervention, generally it has brought about instability and contributed to the disintegration of the nation-state. French, British, American, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, Iranian, Libyan and Iraqi interference has been taken place in Lebanon's modern history alone. Foreign interference during the civil war highlighted the magnitude and conflicting nature of the various community interests, leaving the Lebanese to pick up the pieces and deal with their ongoing influence on Lebanon's political system and its domestic affairs.

French and European intervention

History demonstrates that questionable and strange alliances are formed to accommodate and endorse the concept of 'national purity', integration and strength. This is no different in Lebanon. Many of Lebanon's groups have historically attempted to establish connections with external powers in order to preserve their political interests and stature. For example, the Maronites welcomed the Crusaders in 1099 AD, established a union with Rome in the 12th Century, sought French protection as early as 1204 and required American protection in 1958. Western support has been forthcoming due to the East-West (Christianity-Islam) divide and geo-political interests. The Western world and Europeans have long emphasised the Orientalist perception of Arabs and in particular Muslims being of subordinate stature to the citizens of the "civilised" and "progressive" Christian world. It is with such a rationale and the need for strategic markets that colonisers legitimised their intervention in the region.

Anti-French sentiment by the pan-nationalists emerged with the Europeans' policy of promoting xenophobia and the 'alleged threat' Islam poses to the 'Christian civilised world'. Hostility to the French was most strong because of its colonial practice of 'Frenchifying' its colonial subjects, as was evident in Algeria and Tunisia. French Christian missionaries who had been working for centuries in non-Christian countries with the goal of promoting Christian ideals and 'civilising' the Other founded such colonial policies. Accordingly, there was fear amongst the Lebanese that the French would affect their religious, cultural, political and economic lives by establishing a Christian state in the heartland of the Arab-

³⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 47.

Islamic world.³⁹⁵ This fear was documented in European foreign correspondence. Simultaneously the Muslims were convinced that the French were working towards making them a minority in their own land.³⁹⁶

As history demonstrates these fears were not totally unfounded. The French have long been supporters of the Christians within Lebanon, beginning with the Charlemagne era, through to the Crusades. Relations were strengthened in 1535 when the French took on the role as a protector of Christians in the Levant through the 1535 Capitulations.³⁹⁷ The relations with the Maronite community were particularly strengthened when in 1649 Louis XIV, through the appeal of the Maronite patriarch at the time, granted France's patronage to this minority. Such links continue to be maintained until today. In the mid-19th Century when European competition for new colonies was in force, French policy developed as the protector of the Maronites. French protectionism also supported establishing a Christian state within Lebanon and became a way of infiltrating the region and enforcing its Francophonism, as well as securing its vast financial and economic interests in the Levant.³⁹⁸ The outcome of the 1920 San Remo Conference further confirmed France's stronghold and historical links to the region with its granting of Syria as its newfound territory.

There was envy amongst the various sectors of society, along sectarian lines. The ability of the Christian, notably Maronite, community in strengthening ties with the Europeans and getting closer in attaining an autonomous Christian state that was both economically and politically viable challenged the political status of each confession. Annexation of Muslim-dominant areas confirmed Muslim fears that the Christians had strong external allies backing their cause. Leaving them behind to deal with the further widening of educational, political, economic and social differences between the two communities. Maronite strongholds in the strategic Mount Lebanon area and Beirut made Muslims further aware of their own weakness and at times contributed to their disorganisation. This insecurity and

³⁹⁵ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, pp. 28-29.

³⁹⁶ FO 371/1507 50279/33672, no. 984, Const., 21 November 1912, Lowther to Grey; and FO 371/1522 54463/52330, no. 79, Beirut, 4 December 1912, Cumberbatch to Lowther. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 29.

³⁹⁷ Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 16.

³⁹⁸ For example, French banks and businesses had invested heavily in the Ottoman Empire and before World War 1, 63% of the Empire's public debt was in French hands; whilst the French monopolised of the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian public railways and had extensive interests in ports, gas, chemical plants, electricity, silk cultivation and other industrial sectors.

caution towards Western powers, was carried on after independence and magnified during the civil war.

Although France attempted to remain a politically significant player in Lebanese affairs, the prevailing international circumstances after the Second World War, its new international status, the Cold War and changing national interests significantly limited France's foreign policy intervention in Lebanon. However, it has successfully, although less authoritatively, remained both morally and politically linked to Lebanon over the years via its historical alliances.

Jewish and Israeli intervention

As well as the French supporting the Maronite Christians, the Maronites also had the support of and provocative alliance with the Jewish establishment. This secret alliance between the Maronites and the Jews arose prior to the establishment of the Israeli state and strengthened over the years. Collaboration between the political right and the Zionists was for a number of years suggested but since the early 1980s such collaboration was exposed.³⁹⁹

The endorsement of one another predominantly emerged on the basis of two religious minorities seeking protection in independent enclaves within the Muslim dominated 'Middle East'. Evidence of meetings between Lebanese and Israelis first emerged prior to the commencement of the Lebanese civil war. Many meetings as well as speeches endorsing one another's right to existence have been documented. . For example, an event in Beirut organised by the Lebanese Jewish community recorded the words of the Lebanese Patriarch Arida declaring, "his support for Jewish settlements in Palestine and identified the Jews as 'brothers of Lebanon's Christians' in terms of their destiny and goals".⁴⁰⁰ According to the memoirs of the first Israeli ambassador to the US, Eliahu Elath (Epstein), the Maronite Patriarch expressed his desire to see 'friendly relations' between these two communities as he saw that the presence of a Jewish state in Palestine was

³⁹⁹ For further detail see Jonathan C Randal's, *Going all the way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon*, New York, Viking Press, 1983, Robert Fisk's *Pity the Nation*; and Edmond Melham, "The Historical Roots of the Zionist Project in Lebanon", *MEQ*, Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995, pp. 16-19, p. 16.

⁴⁰⁰ See Badr al-Haj, *Al-Juzur al-Tarikiwa li al-Mashru' al-Suhyuna fi Lubnan* (The Historical Roots of the Zionist Project in Lebanon) Beirut: Dar Musbah al-Fikr, 1982, p. 49.

necessary 'for the security of Lebanon and for protecting its independent position within unfriendly Muslim states'.⁴⁰¹

Lebanese President Edde, on the other hand, was the first person to offer congratulations to Dr. Weizmann in Paris when word came through of the recommendations of the Peel Royal Commission Report.⁴⁰² Allegiance between the two grew when Eliahu Sasson, a representative of the Jewish Agency, met with President Beshara al-Khuri and discussed the prospect of cooperation between a 'Maronite' Lebanon and a 'Jewish' Palestine. Al-Khuri was said to have seen the presence of Shiites in South Lebanon as an obstacle and danger to relations between these two states. So much so, that he suggested that the South be ethnically cleansed and replaced with Maronite Lebanese immigrants from America.⁴⁰³

Moshe Sharet, a former Israeli foreign minister and prime minister, exposed a 1954 proposal by David Ben-Gurion to encourage:

...the Maronites ... to proclaim a Christian state ... The creation of a Christian state is ... a national act; it has historical roots and it will find support in wide circles in the Christian world... In normal times this would be almost impossible. First and foremost because of the lack of initiative and courage of the Christians. But at times of confusion or revolution or civil war, things take on another aspect, and even the weak declares himself to be a hero.⁴⁰⁴

Ben-Gurion allegedly had the support of Moshe Dayan and such a proposal was to be achieved by finding:

an officer, or major, and either win his heart or buy him with money to declare himself the saviour of the Maronite population.... Then the Israeli army will enter Lebanon, will occupy the necessary territory, and will create a Christian regime

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 47, cited by Edmond Melham, "The Historical Roots of the Zionist Project in Lebanon", *MEQ*; Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995, pp. 16-19, p. 16.

⁴⁰² Edde was reported to have said: "I have the honour of greeting the first President of the Jewish state that is about to be born". Then, Eliahu Elath recorded, "both men raised glasses in honour of the future friendship between the two neighbouring states possessing common ideals and interests". Ibid, pp. 68-69, cited by Melham, p. 17.

The Commission, headed by Earl Peel, was appointed on May 18, 1936 to investigate the causes of unrest in Palestine. Eight months later the Commission recommended that Palestine be partitioned into two states (one Jewish and one Palestinian-Arab) and Jerusalem remain under British rule. However, this partition plan was rejected by Zionists, non-Zionists, and Palestinians.

⁴⁰³ Melham, op. cit., p. 18 citing Badr Al-Haj, p. 24.

⁴⁰⁴ Livia Rokach, *Israeli's Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett's Personal Diary and Other Documents*, Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980, pp. 24-25, p. 28.

which will ally itself with Israel. The territory from the Litani southwards will be totally annexed to Israel.⁴⁰⁵

Although General Saad Haddad only carried through this threat in a proxy way, that is, through the creation of the South Lebanese Army in 1969, there was the prospect of such an alliance transpiring on a grander scale. For example, the founder of the *Kata'ib* or Phalangist Party, Pierre Gemayel, in 1954 threatened the political left that "the Christians were ready when necessary to cooperate with the devil itself {Israel}" if their terms were not seriously considered.⁴⁰⁶

The idea of creating permanent refuge for minorities of the 'Middle East' was not new. For example, on August 5, 1947, the Maronite Archbishop Ignatius Mubarak of Beirut sent a memorandum to the UN Conciliation Commission on Palestine in which he demanded that "Lebanon as well as Palestine should remain permanent homes for the minorities" in the Arab world, thus endorsing the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and a Christian state in Lebanon.⁴⁰⁷ Despite the condemnation of Mubarak's actions he continued to stand his ground and call for the creation of a Jewish state because "the civilised, Westernised Jews and Christians shared a similarly precarious position in the Middle East and that the best defence for a Christian Lebanon lay in a Jewish Palestine". Moreover, that positive relations between "the two progressive peoples of the Middle East, namely the Jews and the Christians, would benefit the whole Eastern Mediterranean".⁴⁰⁸

Israel's first PM, David Ben-Gurion, also encouraged the destruction of a multi-religious Lebanon, to be replaced with a Christian state, because "the establishment of a neighbouring religious state would secure the safety of the theocratic state of Israel".⁴⁰⁹ Such an alliance grew yearly between the Phalangist and the Israeli entity. Begin admits that from 1975 to 1982 the Israelis spent \$10 million (some have suggested \$250 million) of their American military loans on Phalangists militia training, uniforms and military

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 28, and Selim Nassib with Caroline Tisdall, *Beirut: Frontline Story*, Pluto Press, London, 1983, p. 14.

⁴⁰⁶ Barakat, op. cit., p. 7, citing Pierre Gemayel, *Lubnan waqi' wa muraja* {Lebanon: Reality and Hope}, Beirut: Manshurat al-kaa'ib al-Labnaniyya, 1970, p. 32.

⁴⁰⁷ Yamak, op. cit., p. 151.

⁴⁰⁸ Melham, op. cit., p. 17 citing Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the early Zionist Imagination. 1900-1948*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994, pp. 62-63 & p. 31.

⁴⁰⁹ Nassib & Tisdall, op. cit., p. 14.

stockpiling.⁴¹⁰ There was hope amongst the Israeli-Maronite-American alliance during the civil strife in Lebanon that their combined alliance would force the PLO and the Syrians out of Lebanon, successfully fight pan-Arabism and establish a Christian dominated state. Hence Israel and the Christian politicians allied themselves, segregated from the rest of the region on the basis of 'persecuted' minorities requiring a 'safe haven'.

In *realpolitik* terms this alliance was also part of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. It gave Israel an avenue of pursuing its military strategy outside of Israel and with the support of regional parties, such as the Maronites and 'Lebanese Forces' within Lebanon. Incursions into Lebanon, under the pretext of retaliation for Palestinian attacks, increased in frequency, deeply embroiling Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereas it had initially remained neutral. The onslaught of the civil war and Syria's entry into the domestic Lebanese situation further ensnared Israel in Lebanese politics. Israel aimed to further weaken Palestinian and Arab resistance to Israel and to support the political right. It armed, trained, protected and provided for the Lebanese Forces and the armed militia in South Lebanon, which was later to become Israel's proxy army (the South Lebanese Army) in occupied South Lebanon after its 1978 invasion. The clash between Syria and Israel came to a head in 1981 when Syria began to deploy its missiles into the Beqaa Valley and supported Palestinian resistance in South Lebanon. By June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, occupying Beirut for three months in an effort to break Palestinian resistance once and for all and curtail Syria's power.

Israel has attempted unsuccessfully to formulate an agreement between themselves and the Lebanese government to formally end the state of war between these two neighbouring states. However, Syria has curtailed the success of any such agreements emerging due to its strategic use of Lebanon as its initial line of defence. Its control of South Lebanese military incursions demonstrates this. Despite Israel's withdrawal from the majority of South Lebanon in 2000 border incursions remain. Until a real and comprehensive peace is attained between Syria and Israel, Lebanon cannot escape the fact that it will remain sandwiched between these two powerful neighbours which will continue to exploit Lebanon's domestic insecurities for their own purposes.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Syrian Intervention

As outlined earlier, Syria has long held Lebanon as part of its natural and historic geography and has maintained a grievance since the creation of 'Greater Lebanon' in 1920. Although since independence Syria has come to terms with the creation of the new 'Middle East' it has never formally recognised Lebanon as is customary with the exchange of protocols and diplomats. The late Syrian President, Hafez il Assad, preferred to consider their relations based on "*sha'b wahid fi baladayn*" (one people in two countries).⁴¹¹

Syria first entered the Lebanese civil war in 1976 as the commander of the 30 000 strong peacekeeping Arab Deterrent Force as per an Arab Summit decision. For a short period it was successful in enforcing an uneasy peace between the Lebanese factions and border incursions in the South. However, by 1982 Syria was feeling isolated. On the Arab-Israeli front the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords were being finalised and Israel was strengthening its alliance with the political right in Lebanon. Syria developed its strategy by reviving its own alliances with the Palestinians and the political left, as well as aiding Hezbollah. With this, a quasi-political alliance also emerged between Syria and Iran, united in their desire to reverse Israel's occupation of South Lebanon. The inter-Arab and inter-faith conflicts also heightened and prolonged the conflict, as shown by Syria's presence in Lebanon, Syria's hostility with Iraq and the inter-faith tension between the Shi'ite and Sunna Muslims which bought Iran into the multilevel fold.

Syria's strategy denied most Lebanese attempts at gaining external support and successfully stopped intra-communal fighting that was dominating Shi'ite energies. By 1987 Syria had over 35 000 troops deployed in Lebanon and controlled approximately 60% of Lebanon's territory.⁴¹² General Aoun challenged Syria's power in 1989. However, neither Syria nor the political left accepted his claim to Lebanon's presidency, which opened the way towards agreement to the 'Document of National Reconciliation'. This was called for by the Arab League, produced by Syria and endorsed by Saudi Arabia. By 1990 the US was working towards compiling an anti-Iraq coalition, which included Arab states. A covert deal was undertaken whereby in exchange for participating in the anti-Iraq coalition, Syria was given the green light to dominate the resolution of the Lebanese political crisis and to dissolve Aoun's power by force.

⁴¹¹ Ellis, "Lebanon: the Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1999, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1-2 of 15.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, p. 7 of 15.

With the signing of Taef in 1989 a number of treaties and binding agreements encompassing military, social and economic relations have emanated. Syrian security presence (both physically and behind the scenes) has been felt in Lebanese domestic policy ever since. However, how long its autocratic and repressive handling of this subordinate vassal state will be tolerated is another issue, considering the increasingly vocal calls of opposition towards Syrian policy and its infringement on Lebanese sovereignty.

Palestinian Intervention

Of the 780 000 Palestinians who fled Palestine in 1948 to neighbouring states, approximately 200 000 reached Lebanon and by 1967 had reached approximately 400 000. The Palestinians were considered a threat to the delicate sectarian balance, while the political right viewed Palestinian resistance fighters and other foreign participants, as infringing upon Lebanese sovereignty.

Three main reasons emerged why these Palestinians were not integrated into Lebanese society. First, by granting them legally permanent status it would compromise their return to Palestine; second, there were limited economic resources to provide for more people, and finally, any population changes would shift the delicate sectarian equation in place since 1943. Hence, one reason why census distribution has been postponed by the Maronite establishment is that the majority of Palestinian refugees are of Sunni confession, whilst Lebanese groups have grown demographically, especially the Shi'ite population.

Palestinians viewed Lebanon as more open and tolerant than other Arab governments in hosting resistance groups and individuals, particularly in the post-1967 era. Thus they established military training bases and maintained them until their expulsion in 1982. Prior to this, however, the Palestinians exacerbated the divisions between the political left and right within Lebanon to their own advantage, regardless of the cost to Lebanon. The Palestinian refugee camps remain armed and military no-go zones for the Lebanese Army and since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993 Palestinian anxiety has remained focused on the decision makers view regarding their future. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government remains adamant in refusing responsibility for the Lebanese Palestinian refugee problem, which will undoubtedly be a politically sensitive issue that will arise in the near future.

US Intervention

Since the early 20th Century the US has maintained a consistent interest in the developments of the 'Middle East', including Lebanon. The US found the militancy of the Palestinians and the political left in Lebanon as a threat to its interests and its allies in the region. By using Lebanon as a base for its intelligence and propaganda operations it hoped to curtail these communities through covert operations.⁴¹³ Less covert actions were witnessed in 1958 when the US Marines were dispatched to Lebanon under the guise of "maintaining law and order" although its intentions were widely interpreted as curtailing pan-Arab sentiments.

Like its role during the Iran-Iraq conflict, the US successfully played the two sides by transferring its support from one faction to another after analysing new military and political developments. For example, initially it sought to back the political right in 1975. By 1976 it had lost faith in the political right and began to advocate political reforms and redistribution of power to complement Lebanon's changing demographics.⁴¹⁴ However, by the early 1980s its support for the political right was reinstated. In 1983 the US redeployed its forces, militarily aiding the political right. Within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the US supported Israeli attacks against Lebanon and remains to maintain its support regardless of its position as the 'peace broker' since 1991 at the Madrid Conference.

US domination of Lebanon and the region remains. It was exemplified in the US Ambassador to Lebanon, David Satterfield, and meetings with all Lebanese ministers, parliamentarians and the president. He also publicly commented on the context of his meetings and the attitude Lebanon should take towards Israel, as well as domestic policy. This public politicking by the US representative was increasingly resented by the Lebanese. Lebanese media outlets were satirically comparing Satterfield to former Ottoman and French governors traveling the country and exhibiting their paternal intimidating arrogance. If the US maintains such a public position within Lebanon and continues support for Israel despite violations of international law and conventions it will fuel to the anti-US sentiment, which has been swelling since 1990.

⁴¹³ As'ad AbuKhalil, "Lebanon: Key Battleground for Middle East Policy", *Foreign Policy in Focus*, February 2000, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 1-2, p. 1.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

4.3 Conclusion

the only lesson history has taught us is that man has not yet learned anything from history - (the ubiquitous anon)

As indicated by the brief historical analysis given of the development of Lebanese national identity it becomes evident that there are major problems within the Lebanese political and social systems. These are

1. Traditional and primordial factors continue to encompass daily life in Lebanon.
2. The politics of nobility continues to play a major role in Lebanon's political and economic progress.
3. External intervention persistently provokes instability and division amongst the Lebanese.

This chapter has demonstrated that the concept of nation-state has not been firmly rooted in Lebanon's political culture. Nor has the political system itself evolved in a way to assist in these developments. A 'nation' is reality only if it governs itself; nation-states need internal legitimacy to promote stability, external security and economic efficiency.⁴¹⁵ Past and present Lebanese governments have done little to legitimise the state of Lebanon and project a national political identity. National culture does not exist as a rigid construct that is neither mobile nor malleable. Rather, it is constantly being developed and re-analysed, which in turn produces national culture.

⁴¹⁵ Connolly on John Herz analysis of territorialisation, in Connolly, "Democracy and Territoriality", pp. 49-75, p. 63 in Ringrose & Lerner (eds), *Reimagining the Nation*, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993.

CHAPTER 5

Lebanon's Precarious Balance of Power: A Government of Men or of Laws?⁴¹⁶

*Lebanon as a polity is archaic, inefficient, and divided; it is also liberal, democratic, and - in general - orderly.*⁴¹⁷

*... while the (Lebanese) nation is projected as inclusive, stable and democratic, sectarianism is depicted as exclusionary, undemocratic and disordered.*⁴¹⁸

This chapter will examine more clearly the notion of Lebanese political identity and Lebanon's political system, which has further entrenched the rule of nobility and confession into the Lebanese psyche. As stated in the previous chapter, the Lebanese socio-political system, the ruling elite and external intervention have deprived the Lebanese of a stable, productive and progressive state and ultimately held back political and social development. This will be substantiated further through a comparative analysis of the 1926 Constitution, the 1943 power sharing formula *al-Sigha* created to complement the *al-Mithaq il watani* or National Pact and the 1989 Taef Agreement.

Out of this, a key question arises: whether the Taef Agreement has truly become a blueprint for real political restructuring and development [facilitating the decolonisation of Lebanese national identity], or whether it maintains the precarious balance of power of the past through its endorsement of historical consociational arrangements and primordial associations.

Lebanon is a Republic its system is unicameral and is based on a political-confessional pluralistic model otherwise known as a 'consociational democracy'. Consociational democracy is a competitive communal system. Although designed to be equitable to all

⁴¹⁶ "The system has sometimes been described as a government of men rather than of laws; often one heard, even before 1975, the lament *ma fi dawla... ma fi hukume* - there is no state, there is no government". Gordon, *Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation*, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p. 77.

⁴¹⁷ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernisation in Lebanon*, Random House, NY, 1968, p. 3.

⁴¹⁸ Makdisi, "The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon, *MERIP*, June 1997, pp. 1-6, p. 1.

prominent minorities, it has been for Lebanese groups a zero-sum equation, that is, one confession's loss was another's gain.

The Lebanese Republic was established in 1926 and supplemented in 1943 by the 'National Pact', as duly applied on Lebanon's formal date of independence. It has been stated that the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 and the power sharing 'formula' (*al-Sigha*) devised in 1943 to complement the National Pact (*Al-Mithaq il Watani*), considered the political system of confessionalism to be an interim political arrangement. It was largely considered at the time [by its creators as well as its critics] as limited in scope, and inherently dangerous if considered as a permanent fixture within the Lebanese political system.⁴¹⁹

In fact, contrary to the connotations the name carries the 'National Pact' did not endeavor to create a genuine basis for national unity or identity. Rather the Pact legitimised a system of political elitism based purely on confession. Hence, to be Lebanese –meant to be defined according to religious affiliation. There could be no Lebanese citizen who was not at the same time a member of a particular religious community".⁴²⁰ The 1932 census determined the ratio of distribution within the system of confessionalism, which found that the Christians exceeded non-Christians by a ratio of six to five. This in turn became the primary basis of interpretation and implementation of the 1943 National Pact, regardless of the demographic changes for almost five decades.

In order to address the above factors the following chapter will accost three main points: one, the theoretical concept of consociational democracy; two, pre-Taef Lebanon – an examination of its political apparatus and its deficiencies; and finally, post-Taef Lebanon.

5.1. Consociational Democracy

Prior to comparatively analysing the various national political agreements and written formulas of political governing and state making in Lebanon, a brief theoretical outline of

⁴¹⁹ Salam, "De-confessionalising the Call for De-confessionalisation", pp. 1-3, p.1. <http://www.lcps.com.lb>

⁴²⁰ Makdisi, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

the consociational democratic model of governance will be undertaken in order to understand it within the Lebanese context.

The term 'consociational democracy' derived from Johannes Althusius's concept *consociatio* in his publication *Politica Methodice Digesta* (1603), and was further developed by Arendt Lijphart in *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (1977). Lijphart formulated the consociational democratic model as a conflict management system for segmented societies and as an alternative to majoritarian politics. Majoritarian systems focus on the concept of individualism and political parties, or representatives are legitimised by the majority vote. Whilst consociational models are traditionally group focused, based on primordial groups such as ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious or regional segments of heterogeneous societies. Each solidarity group is usually represented in the way of confession, race, party, movement or individual. In turn, respective communities are represented within the main political apparatus. Consociational democracy aims to ensure each group obtains a share of proportional representation relative to its size and in some cases vote. Group interests are negotiated, compromised and implemented by the ruling elite on behalf of the groups through 'amicable agreement' and 'elite accommodation'.⁴²¹

This model can be considered as elitist in its procedure and application. Group interests tend to be preserved while the 'representatives' maintain control over their 'subjects'.⁴²² Milton Esman, who considers the rules of the game as 'anti-majoritarian', repeats such thoughts. While Lijphart, on the other hand, describes it as both "an empirical and a normative model".⁴²³ The system legitimises democratic pluralism based on communal divisions, promoting peaceful coexistence, accommodation and consensus. Theoretically, these agreements are supposed to leave no group a winner at the expense of another.⁴²⁴

⁴²¹ Esman, *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1977, pp. 14-15.

⁴²² Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis and the Limits of Consociational Democracy", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. V, No. 3-5, Spring/Summer 1976, pp. 109-122, p. 111.

⁴²³ Esman, op. cit., p. 15, Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1977, p.1.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

Lijphart considered that majoritarian democratic models failed to take into account that citizens encompass multiple forms of identity, which do not necessarily concur with the definition adopted by the ruling body politic.⁴²⁵ He emphasises that this is especially the case when individuals and groups are affected by historical and past memories, as well as prejudice towards other groups, which affects national consensus. As outlined in the previous chapter clearly this is the case in Lebanon, and also experienced in Ireland after the 'Good Friday Agreement'.

The consociational democratic model according to Lijphart can be viewed as a stepping-stone to majoritarian democracies. He argues by establishing a form of political consensus and power sharing among pluralistic societies these very societies will politically develop to a point where political pluralism is no longer necessary to differentiate through such rigid models. The natural progression will be towards majoritarian and more competitive forms of democracy rather than the disintegration of the state into autonomous regions.⁴²⁶

Lijphart and Eric Nordlinger studied consociational democracy, focusing on established, stable industrialised, historic European entities. Nordlinger also compared Lebanon and Malaysia with European consociational democracies. Lijphart argued that the European examples are of importance to diverse developing world countries because they demonstrate that stability and democracy is attainable in pluralistic and deeply segmented societies, although he rarely attempted to apply such models to newly independent or developing states.⁴²⁷

Some smaller European democracies such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium applied this democratic model for over fifty years (1917 to the 1970s) while Austria did so for a shorter period (1945-1966). Collectively they found political stability within this system, although they have since retreated from this form of democracy because of its

⁴²⁵ Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis and the Limits of Consociational Democracy", p. 111 cites Lijphart "Typologies of Democratic Systems", *Comparative Politics I*, Vol.1, April 1968 Reprint No. 298, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley; and "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1969, pp. 207-25; Eric A Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Harvard Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 29, January 1972.

⁴²⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy In Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, New haven & London, 1977, p. 52.

⁴²⁷ Lijphart, *Democracy In Plural Societies*, p. 16.

superfluous nature. These European countries demonstrated how consociational democracy can be stabilising and an effective system of government, especially within culturally multifarious countries.⁴²⁸ The consociational model seems ideal for newly developing heterogeneous countries.

Lijphart lists six important factors for the success of consociational democracy:

1. Distinct lines of cleavage.
2. Multiple balance of power.
3. Popular attitudes favourable toward a grand coalition.
4. An external threat.
5. Moderate nationalism.
6. Relatively low total load on the system.⁴²⁹

In *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Lijphart outlines an additional four characteristics of consociational democracy. One, government by a grand coalition of all significant representatives of a particular country's groups. This can be represented through a cabinet in a parliamentary system, a 'grand' council or committee, or coalition of top office holders in a presidential system. Two, the application of 'mutual veto' or 'concurrent majority' rule for added minority protection. Three, political and administrative proportionality in all public sectors and policies. Finally, a high degree of autonomy for each recognised group to administer its internal affairs.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁸ For further details see Lijphart, *Democracy In Plural Societies*.

⁴²⁹ Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis and the Limits of Consociational Democracy", p. 112, cites Lijphart "Typologies of Democratic System", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1968, Reprint no. 298, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley; and "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, Vol. xxi, No. 2, 1969, pp. 207-225.

⁴³⁰ Lijphart, *Democracy In Plural Societies*, p. 25.

Nordlinger also lists similar conflict regulating proposals for successful consociational democracy to emerge:

1. Stable coalition.
2. Proportionality.
3. De-politicisation.
4. Mutual veto.
5. Compromise.
6. Concessions by the stronger to the weaker.⁴³¹

Both scholars concluded that a heterogeneous nation with the above prerequisites would be successful in developing its historical process of structural and political development via peaceful and democratic means. Lijphart concluded that the application of all the above elements and a combination of others would work towards restraining majority rule by:

the sharing of power between the majority and the minority (grand coalition), the *dispersal of power* (among executive and legislature, two legislative chambers, and several minority parties), a *fair distribution of power* (proportional representation), the *delegation of power* (to territorially or non-territorially organised groups), and a *formal limit on power* (by means of the minority veto).⁴³²

Throughout the various case studies utilised by Lijphart it is demonstrated that each country differs from the next in finding suitable political arrangements appropriate for each state's particular situation. For example, the Swiss needed to find an appropriate equation to cater for language and religious differences; the Belgians on the other hand had to deal with three main cleavages - religion, region and language.⁴³³ Many critics of the consociational democratic model, including Lijphart himself, agree "successful consociational democracies are rare, doubtless because the conditions that help to make them workable are rare". He adds, that one of the main concerns about consociational

⁴³¹ Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis and the Limits of Consociational Democracy", pp. 112-113 cites Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Harvard Centre for International Affairs, Occasional Papers, No. 29, January 1972.

⁴³² Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1984, p. 30.

⁴³³ For further information see Lijphart's, *Democracy In Plural Societies* and *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*; Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988.

democracy is its potential failure in retaining political stability due to the model's "indecisive and inefficient characteristics".⁴³⁴

There has been much criticism of the consociational model of democracy. These will be discussed below within the context of the Lebanese case. For Lebanon the model would have worked successfully on a short-term basis by establishing adequate democratic procedures and ensuring the participation of all major players within Lebanese society. However, as will be further demonstrated, both the politics of the nobility and external intervention undermined democracy and the stability needed to balance national and community interests. Ultimately the result was the collapse of the consociational model of democracy in Lebanon during the 1970s. Furthermore, with the rigidity of this model and its application, Lebanon's political apparatus continues up to this day to cause waves of discontent amongst the majority of its citizens.

5.2. Lebanon's Political Apparatus.

The 1926 Lebanese Constitution

The Lebanese Constitution was promulgated on 23 May 1926. The Constitution reflected Lebanon's sectarian mosaic. It created executive and legislative chambers. Although the Constitution informally institutionalised confessional pluralism it did not specify any particular method or ratio of proportional representation. Most of the seventeen legally recognised sects at the time had the ability to be represented. They were not restricted to the unwritten political 'arrangement' whereby the President is Maronite, the Premier Sunna and the Speaker of Parliament Shi'ite. For example, for a short period, on two occasions a non-Maronite President ran for Parliament and successfully retained the presidency (Charles Debbas, 1926 and Tero Trad, 1943; both were Greek Orthodox). On the other hand, it was not until 1937 that a Sunni (Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab) was elected for Premiership for the first time, while the Shi'ite gained the mantle of Speaker of the House of Representatives after 1943.

⁴³⁴ See Lijphart, *Democracy In Plural Societies*, p. 51.

The President who with the aid of the Ministers exercises his/her authority holds the executive power. The President is elected for six years and is only eligible for re-election after an interval of six years, although this was breached on two occasions (Bishara al-Khoury (1947) and Elias Hrawi (1996)). The Legislative authority is vested in the Chamber of Deputies. A two-thirds majority may amend the Constitution, while a three-fourths majority is required of the Council of Ministers to oppose such an amendment.

Although Articles 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the Constitution provided for equitable representation of component sects within the executive, legislative and bureaucratic branches of power, the 1943 National Pact designated the Maronite community higher positions of power than any other confession due to the demographic majority they wielded since the 1932 census.

Hence, a great deal of political, military and bureaucratic power was wielded by the Christian Maronite group and particularly by one man who was largely unaccountable (with the exception of constitutional violations and crimes) to Parliament, which provided ample scope for abuse. For example, Article 18 gave the President the power to propose legislation; Article 53 permitted the President to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and any other minister; Article 55 empowered the President to dissolve parliament, Article 57 the power to veto legislation and Article 76 the ability to propose amendments to the Constitution. In addition, the President was given the power to summon Parliament to special sessions. These decrees bordered on the line of misuse of power. This is especially the case when the President directly represents a particular minority group (Maronites-Christians) above national interests.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁵ Abul-husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 1998, p. 24

By constitutionally installing sectarianism within the executive, legislative and bureaucratic domains, as Article 95 had achieved, future power divisions were instilled legally and further cemented by the oral power-sharing formula of the 1943 National Pact.⁴³⁶ Hence, the political system of sectarianism that was supposedly a temporary arrangement became a permanent fixture with only elusive acknowledgment toward its future 'de-confessionalisation'. As a consequence intra-communal loyalties and identities were further entrenched into the political system, adversely affecting the development of the Lebanese political system. This also deterred a national culture and identity from emerging amongst the majority of Lebanese inhabitants due to primary loyalty towards confession before nation.

The 1932 Census

On the Lebanese Front in the Palestine war of 1948 a Maronite Lieutenant found a Greek Catholic platoon in a state of complete inactivity despite the unabating and still vigorous exchange of fire.

"Sergeant", bellowed the company commander, "don't your men know that this is war? Why aren't they fighting? If they do not take up their arms at once, I shall have you and them executed as deserters!"

"But one of our men was just killed, sir. We are therefore waiting for three Maronites, two Sunnis, two Shi'is, two Greek Orthodox, and one Druze also to be killed before we resume fighting".⁴³⁷

A national census was undertaken in 1932. It was to be Lebanon's first and last census. The 1932 census results were used as rigid quotas, at the ratio of 6:5, in favour of the Christians.

⁴³⁶ Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution states: "As a transitory measure and for the sake of even justice and concord, the communities shall be equally represented in the public post and in ministerial composition, without damage to state interest resulting therefrom".

⁴³⁷ Anecdote illustrated by J.C. Huewitz, "Lebanese Democracy in its International Setting", Binder (ed.) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 213-238, p. 213.

The results of the 1932 census were as follows:⁴³⁸

Religion/Sect	Number	Percentage of population	Total
Christian			52%
Maronite	226 378	29%	
Greek Orthodox	76 522	10%	
Greek Catholic	45 999	6%	
Armenians	31 156	4%	
Others (Jews, Latins, Protestants, various Eastern Christian groups)	22 308	3%	
Islamic			48%
Sunni Muslims	175 925	22%	
Shi'ite Muslims	154 208	19%	
Druze	53 047	7%	
TOTAL	785 543	100%	100%

The 1932 census results have since been used as the relative proportion each confession constitutes in the Lebanese state and henceforth determined their share in the political, social, military and civil employment arena. As the above anecdote demonstrates the sensitivity of demographics is all encompassing in Lebanon's public identity and determines their communal status. Issues arising from the composition of the demographics have to be tiptoed around in order not to provoke anxieties or rivalry amongst the groups.

Record keeping has also been dominated and maintained by the Maronites, largely to retain their favourable political status. Over the years they have controlled the vital registration system and have never disclosed or published data on the birth and death rates of various sects, nor the number of citizens registered by religion. Consequently, the

⁴³⁸ McDowall, *Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities*, Minority Rights Group International, Britain, 1996, p. 11.

majority of published statistics on population size and religious composition are largely based on estimates that have unknown margins of error.⁴³⁹

The 1943 National Pact (*al-Mithaq al Wafani*)

Upon cancellation of the French Mandate in Lebanon in 1943 a new power sharing formula was created to complement the existing Constitution. The Constitution together with *al-Mithaq il wafani*, an unwritten political agreement, provided for the collaboration of all elements of Lebanese polity on the principle of consociational democratic pluralism, dividing the two main executive powers amongst the Maronites and the Sunna and proportionally to other confessions based on the 1932 census. It also, as outlined in the previous chapter, founded an agreement between the Lebanese nationalists and the Arab nationalists on the identity of Lebanon. The hope was that all citizens regardless of political orientation, religion, or confession were able to unify within the confines of Lebanese national identity.

The outward appearance of the National Pact guaranteed a democratic pluralistic set-up. Political rights and privileges were tied to a consociational form of democracy requiring ongoing dialogue amongst the multifarious groups representative of their demands and interests within the political, judicial and administrative sectors of society.

⁴³⁹ Faour, "The Demographics of Lebanon: A Reappraisal", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, October 1991, pp. 631-643, p. 631. For example, some figures demonstrate that between the periods of 1922 and 1951 Christians were growing at an increasing rate while Muslim growth rates were declining!

5.3. Problems with the Lebanese Political Structure

The National Pact and the new political formula had both critics and supporters. This controversy added to the tensions already faced by the already fragile system of consociational democracy.

Some critics believed the National Pact perpetuated the precarious balance amongst Lebanon's confessions, legitimised the divide of the community along sectarian lines in order to preserve the status quo and immobilised political development. Another way would have been to politically develop Lebanon's society and its political foundations to transcend religious divisions for the greater good of the national interest and unity. On the other hand, supporters of the National Pact assumed the distribution of power to all confessions. The unprecedented arrangement to compromise between Arab nationalist and Lebanese separatist demands, it was hoped, would lead to the formation of a unique Arabised-Westernised national Lebanese identity. Clearly they did not foresee the cementing of political identity and development along sectarian-fealty lines, making political development almost impossible.

The events of 1958 and 1976 demonstrated the fragility of the political system, while its precariousness was further illustrated when national unity was called for without incorporation of the National Pact.⁴⁴⁰ The following section examines Lebanon's consociational democratic model in light of the 11 factors listed by Lijphart and Nordlinger as prerequisites for successful consociational democracy. By doing so a methodological process will be outlined demonstrating why this model of democracy has failed to evolve into a stable, equitable power sharing arrangement satisfactory to all Lebanese groups, ultimately demonstrating how the decolonisation process in Lebanon failed. This will bring us to post-1989 Lebanon and particularly the Taef Agreement. The Taef Agreement will be investigated in order to determine whether the creation of a post-national Lebanese identity is attainable at all.

⁴⁴⁰ Yamak, "Party Politics in the Lebanese Political System", in Binder (ed.) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 143-166, p. 148.

The Failures of Consociational Democracy in Lebanon:

5.3.1. Distinct Lines of Cleavage.

When Lebanon's heterogeneity is discussed there tends to be a sense of astonishment at how such diverse sets of peoples are ever at peace! However, it has been found that only an estimated 9% of all countries can claim homogeneity from an ethnic perspective, whilst up to 40% of countries are divided into at least five major ethnic components.⁴⁴¹ Keeping such statistics in mind, it is less surprising that Lebanon consists of diverse groups capable of peaceful coexistence.

The 1960s was known as the development decade and the "politicization of pluralism".⁴⁴² Since the late 1980s and the break up of the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, bloody ethnic conflicts have emerged internationally, e.g., in the Balkans, The Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Chechnya and recently in Indonesia. These conflicts and their outcomes demonstrate that ethnic diversity and ethnic pluralism are re-emerging as contentious issues within international political relations and developments.

Since its inception the Lebanese constitution has acknowledged its diversity, rather than cloaking it with false statements of ethnic homogeneity and forced policies of integration, as was the case in several post-colonial countries.

As noted earlier, although all 17 groups were recognised as part of the Lebanese state, the state entity meant different things to different people. For some it meant a 'Maronite home'; others a 'Christian refuge'; a secular Lebanese state; and for others still a temporary entity until a broader unifying Arab structure emerges, unifying all Arabs. All of these views were representative in various nationalist movements and parties and among different religious loyalties.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ Smock & Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism*, Elsevier, NY, 1975, p. 2 cited Walker Conner, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying", *World Politics*, Vol. xxiv, April 1972, p. 320.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁴⁴³ Hourani, "Lebanon the Development of a Political Society", in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 13-29, p. 28.

Most confessional representatives, whether religious or political, further defined their communal identity and basis of identity along such lines. The Ottoman system of feudalism, the European support of cantonisation, the French institutionalisation of confessionalism and the eventual 1943 National Pact integrated the role of feudal families into the confessionalised political system. They became representatives along distinct confessional divisions, segmenting Lebanese society with the high degree of autonomy accorded to each group.

Criticisms

The political implications of such a move have been far reaching. Rather than working toward a united, proportionate and strong nation the Lebanese have been successful in adopting confessional identity as a basis of competition and friction, creating a confrontational setting amongst its groups and disrupting any real formula for nation building from emerging. Such individuals have operated purely on the means of zero-sum and increased security and benefits, although theoretically, within a consociational democracy the equilibrium of power and mutual, balanced gain is sought.

Individual security is mostly gained from communal cohesion and community strength that, in the long term, considering Lebanon's current power structure, reinforces the *zuama-zilm* paradigm. This power structure has been successfully maintained over the decades. When it has been challenged, as in the 1840-1860 period and again in the 1970s, no lasting change has been invoked. During both conflicts divisions were perpetuated along the lines of communal interests and identity, which contributed to communal distrust and challenged the stability of the 'grand coalition'. Despite the departure or diminishing political power of some prominent families, some of the traditional ruling elite was able to maintain their overwhelming political influence to varying degrees and retain the distinct lines of confessional segmentation within Lebanese society and their spheres of influence.

Such spheres of influence have further been entrenched within the Lebanese power structure because of the segmental autonomous nature of consociational democracy and past political influences on Lebanon. Unlike majoritarian forms of democracy where development and distribution is implemented in most cases equally or at least in the

majority of its population, this is not the case in consociational democratic systems, which have a tendency to allow segmental autonomy to develop permitting minority-segmental rule over certain 'dominant' areas. Lijphart argues that consequently when such conditions arise they are best controlled by the 'grand coalition' principle, whereby decisions, by means of proportional representation, are made by all segments of society based on common interests and development. Each autonomous segment executes its own decisions while the grand coalition delegates rule making and application.⁴⁴⁴

The problem with this theory in Lebanon's case revolves around the fact that the existing regional-communal regions, which have been created and recreated since the Ottoman period and until the outcome of the recent civil war, are not equally proportionate in all sectors of development, whether infrastructurally, administratively, financially, educationally, socially or politically. While some parts of Lebanon mirror wealthy modern Mediterranean sea resorts, other parts of Lebanon have no clean running water or sewerage infrastructure. These disproportionate rates of development within Lebanon escalated over the years due to the unequal distribution of power and hence finances and have equated to religious-sectarian modernisation warfare between the varying sects, classes and regions.

The system of consociational democracy would have been more effective and less violent three decades later if real efforts were made in post-independent Lebanon to undo the injustices of past discrimination and disregard of poverty-stricken areas. That way the concept of all segments participating in the grand coalition as relatively distinct and yet contributive players -- politically and economically -- would also have been realised, strengthening measures of accommodation and mutual benefit.

5.3.2. Multiple Balance of Power

Lebanese democracy differs from majoritarian democracy, making it a distinctive form of democracy. One of the positive aspects of consociational democracy is the freedom and ability of all minority groups to be represented in the state's affairs, thereby permitting a multiple balance of power. The 1943 National Pact symbolised such representation

⁴⁴⁴ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 41.

among the various groups through the distribution of power and political institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies and the Executive pertaining to demographics. Lebanon's political system seeks to provide every group the necessary protection and security, and to accommodate their minimum interests along proportional distribution via representation and policies.

Criticisms

Unlike majoritarian democracy, consociational democracy is undertaken along the lines of community interests rather than individual interests. Consequently, its functional capabilities as a political system are limited and to some degree imitate the *mutasarrifiyya* structure during the Ottoman occupation. The main goal of such a system is to maintain, preserve and safeguard the status quo and the stability it brings, constraining political progress. By politically and socially inspiring the masses with new and progressive ideas one is risking instability if it conflicts with the existing system, therefore constraining democracy. The main benefactors of such a system are the *zuama* privileged elite through their stronghold on political, economic and social development.

This in turn has produced tension, as some segments of Lebanese society have demonstrated to be more progressive than their respective leaders. Their desire for real progress and the eventual restructuring of the current political model has proven to be in conflict with the ruling elite, which has preferred to maintain the status quo. This is, despite the progressive language and thought adopted by the ruling elite and *zuama* who approach restructuring the political system with caution. They have demonstrated their willingness to block such developments if in conflict with their own self-interests.

The delicate procedure of maintaining the balance of power amongst such a large number of representatives contributes to the atmosphere of distrust amongst communal groups in Lebanon. This results in some segments redefining their demands and self interests to new levels of rigidity and non-compromise, contributing to less tolerance, negotiation and agreement. Consequently, deception becomes a norm within the relations of Lebanese, amongst religious groups and within them also. As Haddad wrote, "each thinks the actions

of the other are tactical, solely intended to play for time to allow one to improve one's position".⁴⁴⁵

Another point of contention is the political system's reliance on the 1932 census as a formula for distribution of power. Some consider that more privileges have been granted to one community (the Maronites) at the expense of others. Others argue that the 1932 census results are outdated, resulting in unfair political representation and power distribution. And indeed it is extraordinary that national power-sharing arrangements today should be based on 70-year old statistics! A third group feel that to attain a genuine political balance of power there needs to be equal representation of Muslims and Christians in the parliamentary system.

5.3.3. Popular Attitudes Favourable Toward a Grand Coalition

Lijphart's 'government by a grand coalition' incorporates all significant representatives of a particular country's groups. This can be represented through a cabinet in a parliamentary system, a 'grand' council or committee, or coalition of top office holders in a presidential system. Within the Lebanese case study it is practised at three levels: the executive (President and Cabinet), the parliamentary system and the administrative system.

Criticisms

With the integration of the existing ruling elites and *zuama* in the post-independent political structure the possibility of the formation of a grand coalition became more feasible and enduring. The use of 'alliances' amongst confessional politicians largely assured their dominance on the political scene for years by representing their personal interests and the confessional communities they respectively represented and therefore reinforcing the system of confessionalism to new levels. The formal and official transition of the *zuama* to political ruling elite endorsed their hold on their respective communities. They maintained their alliances in the form of political coalitions upon independence. Internal rivalry certainly did exist, as did the mutual understanding to retain the reigns of power and jointly gain from such an alliance. In general circumstances when a 'grand coalition'

⁴⁴⁵ Haddad, *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors*, Praeger, Washington, 1985, pp. 10-11.

disagree they subsequently yield the unwritten and yet powerful provision of mutual veto (one created for added minority protection). In the case of Lebanon this resulted in state governance being totally immobilised and contributed to the country's civil strife which consociational democracy is in theory supposed to prevent.

Opponents of consociational democracy and the 'grand coalition' theory view such an officially sanctioned alliance as creating an obstacle to any real opposition forming or developing to significant proportions. Lijphart disagrees with this criticism, arguing that consociational democracies are best representative of pluralistic societies. He says that the grand coalition theory does not rule out opposition, especially when a parliamentary system of some sort exists, where criticisms can be expressed.⁴⁴⁶

Although Lijphart's argument may be correct in less fragmented societies, in the case of Lebanon it is very rare that true independents emerge from the electoral system. Since its inception the Lebanese political system has done little to practice the separation of powers as outlined in the Constitution. In a number of cases [the executive and parliament have coincided or overlapped], making it difficult to obtain the dichotomy of government versus opposition and therefore highlighting the deficiencies of poor governmental performance. Lijphart proposes that in such a predicament it is necessary to mobilise new [democratic] anti-regime parties. He adds that because the consociational democratic system bases its proportional representation on the electoral system it is relatively easy for new parties to gain a voice in the political system.⁴⁴⁷

Succeeding with a new political party in Lebanon is not easy, however. Three obstacles stand in the way: first, filling the criteria of forming a new political party is not a straightforward or simple process. The laws in place date back to the Ottoman period. They give the government the capacity to ban or disband political parties with little grounds for reprieve. Secondly, running for elections is a costly process which most in the community cannot afford to undertake. For example, in the 1998 local municipal and mayoral elections it has been estimated that approximately US\$200 million was spent by

⁴⁴⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p.p 25-31.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

candidates.⁴⁴⁸ Finally, being elected and making the necessary changes to the political system is equally challenging. The grand coalition represented in Cabinets and the Chambers over the years have included members or representatives of significant *zuama*, who have been able to alienate most political opponents and dominate political, economic and social policy decisions.

Unless a *za'em* is aiding, backing, or involved in a 'new' political party, success is unlikely. Usually a person/party running for elections has to align him/her/themselves with a running slate [a list of candidates forming one ticket] or form one amongst fellow sympathisers. Without the endorsement of existing politicians or parties, the newly founded party or independent will not, in all likelihood, gain the votes required to enter parliament. A most recent example was the failure of outspoken MP Najah Wakim to re-run for office in the 2000 parliamentary elections due to the rivalry of his political opponents and their ability to block someone's re-election by their control of 'political slates'. On the other hand, if they do succeed they will not be able to bring about the required changes and will, in most instances, be considered as political outcasts because of their opposition to the political system, which in most cases is interpreted as 'anti-state' by political opponents.

5.3.4. An External Threat

As outlined in the previous chapter the threat of external intervention did not make the political elite closer but rather enhanced the differences amongst the political and religious groups.

Criticisms

Over the decades Lebanon has experienced regional wars within its geographic perimeters. As a small, fragile country it has endured a strange experience of grand regional warfare.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ *Al-Anwar*, May 24, 1998.

⁴⁴⁹ ADELPHI Papers, "Lebanon Dimensions of Conflict", Adelphi Paper 243, London, 1989, pp. 32-33.

The 1958 and 1975 wars within Lebanon demonstrated Lebanon's battle to maintain political 'neutrality' as outlined in the National Pact in the face of regional ideological pressures on Lebanese society. The main Lebanese political players preferred to be insulated from the regional changes but were not always successful in doing so. Internal pressures were also a contributing factor to its failure. Lebanon during the 1950s-early 70s was the cultural hub of the 'Middle East' and particularly the Arab world. Although politically incompetent, the Lebanese intelligentsia illustrated variations of Lebanese political development and national identity. [It was rare that "the political man and the intellectual ran parallel to each other" let alone converged. During the run-up to these two conflicts "political Lebanon became an embarrassment to intellectual Lebanon", forcing the 'political Lebanon' to re-examine their indifference to the new wave of regional political ideology. They paid lip service to political developments without necessarily endorsing them with actions or belief.⁴⁵⁰

The broader Arab-Israeli conflict being played out in Lebanon also contributed to the collapse of the Lebanese political structure. Although initially the Lebanese tried to remain neutral in this conflict three dimensions contributed to the collapse of the Lebanese state: one, the political stand of Lebanese factions; two, the insurgency of Palestinians within Lebanon and their eventual creation of a 'state within a state' and three, the occupying role of Lebanon's neighbours (Syria and Israel) within Lebanon. This in turn overstretched the alliances formed amongst Lebanese political elites and made Lebanon a state neither sovereign nor independent.

5.3.5. Moderate Nationalism

A factor that contributed to Lebanon's independence was its inhabitants' desire to gain freedom from its French colonisers. A moderate form of common Lebanese nationalism was provoked. Hassan Saab writes:

All other deeper problems of Lebanese life and society were subordinated to this overwhelming concern. Deep social issues could divide and the pressing need was for unity behind the overall goal of national liberation.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism", in Binder (ed) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 245.

Criticisms

The major problem, which arose after independence, was the ruling establishment's failure to work on further developing the notion of Lebanese national identity. There was too much emphasis on zero-sum gain rather than mutual gain for the nation, while individual security was provided largely through communal strength and cohesion. Each communal-political cleavage reflected the lack of national cohesion.

Simultaneously and closely linked to this was the comprehension of the new political status of prominent Lebanese groups. The Druze were faced with a highly diluted political status and turned towards invoking Arab nationalist patriotism within a Lebanese structure, the Sunna Muslims were coming to grips with their new political position and their ability to transform it to their advantage, while the Christian Maronite establishment felt that Lebanon was 'their' country and that they had to retain their 'positions' within it by all possible means. External intervention at the time did not assist in easing such pressures. Hence, the original forms of moderate nationalism were not carried through in post-independent Lebanon.

The pre-independence fervour of nationalism could have been further developed with the utilisation of cultural elements such as language, tradition and shared history. The segmented historical nationalism of the Maronites and the Druze, as well as Arab national sentiments could have been combined to form a unique Lebanese national identity. As was soon discovered it was not merely enough to have the creation of a state, a national anthem, a flag, Constitution and institutions to demonstrate independence. National sentiment and unity was needed to make it an enduring and solid nation.

This is further reflected in the annual celebration of Lebanese Independence Day. One needs to pose the question "Are Lebanese really free and independent and if so, from whom?" This is most notable when each group within Lebanese society views foreign intervention differently. For example, some segments of the Lebanese community consider Lebanon's alliance with Syria as an occupation while others do indeed see it as

⁴⁵¹ Saab, "The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics", in Binder (ed) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 271-282, p. 276.

a necessary alliance bringing stability to Lebanon. It therefore becomes a highly contentious matter with many overlapping challenges, and where the term 'independent' [in a world where sovereignty is being challenged] becomes even more precarious.⁴⁵²

Even more problematic is the further entrenchment of confessionalism within Lebanese politics. Understandably, at the time it was decided that a complete and sudden break from traditional Lebanese politics would have been injurious to the formation of institutionalised Lebanese politics, therefore such a system was recommended on a temporary basis until a more pragmatic, stable and secular alternative could be reached. However, three decades later and prior to the onset of the war in 1975, when the National Pact and viability of the political system were being debated, no action was taken to any of the suggested proposals. While *Al-Mithaq* until the war years has been successful in restraining the emergence of confessional extremism, it has simultaneously prevented or failed to propose secular democratic alternatives from emerging as a replacement to consociational confessional democracy.

The Lebanese system's failure can be attributed to the lack of consensus on national unity and the absence of cohesion among its citizens.⁴⁵³ The political participants have largely endorsed the failing system over the years due to the lack of an alternative system. As a consequence of Lebanon's political stagnation and the confessionalisation of its society, a prominent civil society has yet to be fully developed in Lebanon. Thus national consensus remains a precarious notion in Lebanon. Until the cessation of the war in 1989 national consensus has a tendency to surface in a negative form of mutual rivalry, distrust, suspicion and self-serving.

The most obvious absent prerequisite is its members' capacity to withhold their political allegiance to the nation-state when they feel that their interests, whether in the form of individual or group (confession, primordial, or locality) are being threatened. This was evident during the war years and became evident in post-war Lebanon during the discussion of introducing civil marriage services as an alternative option to religious ceremonies, as well as during the local and national elections. For example, the 1998

⁴⁵² Salame, "The Republic of Lebanon: How 'National' Is Independence?", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 15, 1997, pp. 14-16, p. 16.

⁴⁵³ Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon", in Binder (ed), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 283-327, p. 287.

local elections not only witnessed the reinstatement of Lebanon's patriarchal society with only a few females running for council and mayoral positions, but also saw family rivalry at its worst in many districts throughout Lebanon. One episode in Ghazieh saw physical altercations between the Khalifeh family and the Gaddar family which required the army's intervention.⁴⁵⁴ Prominent politician Talal Selman was quoted as saying after these elections:

the results of the municipal and mayoral elections in Mount Lebanon... revealed dangerous flaws in our political system... In our fragmented country, the electoral process has become a democratic veneer covering the cancer of confessionalism, which has now spread to become a deadly epidemic of sectarianism.⁴⁵⁵

The deep rootedness of primordial identity in Lebanese society has contributed to the lack of an integrated civil society and sense of belonging to a broader unified national society and identity. What is more remarkable is the extent to which the primordial factors have survived and affected public decisions. In some respects these factors have been reinforced by modernisation and urbanisation.⁴⁵⁶

The Lebanese political party system itself has yet to develop into agencies, which totally integrate or represent voters' needs. When party identifications do exist it is mainly due to confessional affiliation rather than party-ideologue identification. For example, although multi-confessional base parties were established in the 1950s, by the 1970s most of these parties became confessionally orientated, regardless of how 'nationalistic', multi-confessional, secular and democratic their ideologies and constitutions were. This is illustrated in the Progressive Socialist Party, the Phalangist/Democratic Party, Armenian Hentchak Party and Hezbollah.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, the political process is confined by with the government's strict limits on the establishment of political parties. If such parties are not representative of the ruling elites interests and/or considered to be "injurious to the political system", there is little or no avenue for appeal. In rare cases when parties do emerge, such as the

⁴⁵⁴ "Celebration in Sidon explode into Violence", *Daily Star*, 10 June 1998.

⁴⁵⁵ Talal Selman, *As-Safir*, May 28, 1998.

⁴⁵⁶ For further reading see Yamak, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147.

Communist Party, they are organised outside the framework of the National Pact and yield little political power within the current political structure.

The Lebanese political structure under the National Pact was largely tailored to the needs of the aristocratic sector of Lebanese society, giving them the political legitimacy and enabling them to exert power in almost all spheres of society. Besides customary lip service most Lebanese politicians have given little credence to and have failed to contribute to national sentiment or identity, especially when it may conflict with their personal interests and states.

5.3.6. Low Total Load on the System

Salem argues that the competitiveness of Lebanese confessional, communal and pluralistic society has contributed to the modernisation of the country with little government intervention due to the constant rivalry of the groups. He further argues that this is demonstrated in the educational, professional and financial success of its people. He uses the Maronite and Armenian communities as such examples. The Maronites and their émigré community have contributed to their modernised progressive success in Lebanon, while Armenians have responded to their refugee status by establishing light industries and training their community into a skilful work force within a period of one generation and subsequently legitimising their status within Lebanon. According to Salem this is largely the case because of the walls of jealousy erected by the communal groups against one another and against the intrusion of the central government, which is seen as not always being truly representative of all groups.⁴⁵⁷

Criticism

Although conclusions are correct for the two groups (the Maronites and the Armenians) used in this case study, it does not encompass Lebanon's other 17 recognised groups. The Shi'ites, for example, were and continue to be the most poverty stricken group within Lebanon. During the Lebanese conflict and the subsequent invasion of South Lebanon by the Israeli Defence Forces, hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites and Palestinian refugees

⁴⁵⁷ Salem, *Modernisation Without Revolution*: , Indiana University Press, Bloomington & London, 1973, p.24.

fled to Beirut. Their destination became known as the 'belt of misery'. Many displaced persons made homes of bombed Beirut homes and buildings. They endured the daily bombings and had little international or governmental assistance.

When the Shi'ites and other South Lebanese residents were able to return to their liberated lands after twenty-two years of occupation, they were demonstrated to be in dire need of government and international assistance for the underdevelopment and destruction which the South experienced after two decades of fighting and decades of neglect. In comparison, the Christian (mainly Maronite) regions were immune to most of the fighting over seventeen years of civil destruction due to their geographic isolation from the epicentre of the battlefield. They were able to continue to develop, modernise and improve their standards of living and industry, allowing them to be a low total load on the system as outlined by Salem.

Even if the war and occupation did not take place the disproportionate levels of development would still have existed. Some sectors of Lebanese society could not have competed with other sectors without a degree of governmental or international aid to balance the gross inequalities and underdevelopment of particular regions. Unlike the Maronites, the Shi'ites did not have the extensive capital, knowledge, skilled workers or émigré communities to assist them in developing and maintaining their dominant regions. Also, it wasn't until the 1980s that the Shi'ites became an organised political force. Prior to that, strong Shi'ite representation for the South was limited and any request for government assistance may have been sidelined or considered as governmental interfering, and therefore avoided.

5.3.7. Stable Coalition

Despite the 46 different governments since 1964 (or an average of less than eight months per cabinet) and the appointment of 22 different cabinets between 1964 and 1979, Lebanon's form of democracy was stable for five decades prior to the war and a decade after the war.⁴⁵⁸ Political coalitions have traditionally been maintained due to the support of the ruling political elite over the years. However, as the civil war demonstrated such

⁴⁵⁸ Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy" In Binder (ed) *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 192.

stability is not guaranteed, especially if this dominant ruling elite discourages real political development. The reality of the situation challenges democracy within Lebanon and how far its citizens are willing to question the current system of a stable coalition and hence nation-state, as opposed to more equitable and representative forms of democracy which may be initially unstable. This leads Clovis Maksoud to describe Lebanese democratic system as "a democracy of default and not one of conviction".⁴⁵⁹ A study of the system and its implementation demonstrates how true this is.

Criticisms

There are numerous questions raised when applying this criterion to the Lebanese context to the notion of stable coalition. First, no timetable was set for de-confessionalising Lebanese political and civic society. As discussed earlier, the ruling elite imposed a conformity that paralysed the capacity for initiative and deterred healthy opposition from emerging.⁴⁶⁰ Due to the confessional system in place an individual is not free to participate and integrate fully into national society and government because the individual's sectarian-confessional community and political representatives cannot be circumvented.

Although this in turn may be considered as affecting individual liberty, consociational democracy supporters never claimed to focus on individual rights as majoritarian democracy does. Rather, its target is to produce more homogenous and self-contained elements within pluralistic societies in peaceful coexistence, creating a sense of stable democracy. Nevertheless, this in turn may contribute to social inequalities through the exacerbation of regional, social and political imbalances. In some cases these differences become more pronounced in cantonised or federally organised democracies, which in turn affect the attainment of stability through any means.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹ Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab nationalism", in Binder (ed) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 239- 254, p. 240.

⁴⁶⁰ Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy" in Binder (ed.) *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 187-212, p. 188; Muir, "South Lebanon - Cordon Sanitaire", *Middle East*, No. 105, 1983, pp. 14-18.

⁴⁶¹ Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab nationalism", p. 240.

Lijphart replies to his critics that peaceful coexistence is the best and most realistic option for heterogeneous entities where there is an uneasy ability to slip into instability and a 'non-democratic' process.⁴⁶² This is continuously being challenged in the case of Lebanon. As outlined in Najah Wakim's controversial book, *Black Hands* a great deal of important political decisions are taken in Cabinet and amongst Ministers, with little or no room for Parliamentary debate and/or consultation, leaving little to be said about accountability and open governance. Furthermore, there has been an increase in intra-sectarian schisms within the Lebanese political system. Politicians and high-ranking civil servants have blithely accepted the emergence of militias, corruption, fraud, political manipulation and widespread cronyism and nepotism. With many in the upper echelons of society undertaking these practices, what example are they setting for the rest of society?

5.3.8. Proportionality

Consociational democracy promotes pluralism through the system of proportionality. This is undertaken by recognising and integrating the cleavages rather than working towards abolishing or weakening them.⁴⁶³

Both the principle of mutual veto and proportionality are aspects of the grand coalition principle. Proportionality serves two important functions. It seeks to allocate civil service appointments and scarce financial resources to the various groups allowing equal division amongst all sectors of society. By comparison, a majority rule system focuses on a 'winner-take-all' attitude, with a smaller percentage of interests benefiting. The equation of proportionality also contributes to the success of governance by aiding the decision-making process, realistically representing pluralism. However, it does not eliminate majority-minority confrontation in decision-making bodies because segmental strengths and weaknesses are part of the consociational democratic model.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶² Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 48-49.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

Proportionality further differs from majoritarian rule in its use of parity and its deliberate over-representation of each significant group regardless of its size within a given society. This gives them the potential to reach equal status to the largest group within a state structure, as is the case in the British model. Both parity and minority are used to provide added protection to smaller segments of society. Parity is also used as a double-edged sword, in that it can be adopted as an alternative to proportionality. This is the case of a plural society being divided into unequal proportions, resulting in the failure to eliminate the majority-minority confrontation in decision-making procedures because of the mere reflection of group strengths.⁴⁶⁵

Criticisms

One, the practice of proportionality customised by the consociational model may provoke problems in administrative efficiency. For example, recruitment into the civil service in majoritarian democracies is usually undertaken along the lines of merit and competitive criteria, although it can be argued that this is increasingly not the case in Australia or the UK. Within a consociational model and especially in the case of Lebanon, such placements are usually undertaken according to membership of a certain group and regardless of merit or competitiveness. Therefore it is quite common to see unqualified people working in the public service merely because of the proportional quotas enforced since Lebanon's inception. This, in turn, has further institutionalised the *za'em-zilm* paradigm, corruption, incompetence and red tape within the Lebanese civil service.

Two, due to the segmental nature of consociational democracy there is a tendency for a multiplicity of governmental, administrative and social units to arise within each groups confines, making it a costly system to run.⁴⁶⁶

Three, due to its nature of not being accountable to its citizens it has lost its flavour of being indeed a democratic system, let alone one representing the sectarian groups as prescribed. Instead the system has largely endorsed the *zuama* alliances and little else. The inflexibility of the consociational system within Lebanon has lead to its internal

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

disintegration as was reflected in the 1975 war. The enforcement of the inflexible confessional proportionality system and the highest offices allocated to the Christian groups within Lebanon left little room for the smooth transition of predictable demographic changes to the 1932 census ratio. Therefore from the onset, segments of the Lebanese community felt that a fixed majority-minority equation was enforced and not one of flexible proportionality. These factors all led to a form of stagnation of the Lebanese political system and most attempts to debate or negotiate new alternatives were viewed in mutual distrust and communal self-centredness, which ultimately led to Lebanon's violent contention.

5.3.9. De-Politicisation

Criticisms

First, some elected Chamber of Deputies members tend to seek approval constantly from an elected President rather than forming an independent policy to the one being proposed. In many instances the Deputies do not explore and utilise the powers granted to them under the Constitution. Ghassan Tuani has termed such a role as the 'orphan complex', and argues that with a skilful or cooperative President the Premier can consequently manipulate this complex to the ruling elite's advantage by procuring public expenditure, electoral favouritism and other devices while the Deputies accept such tactics.⁴⁶⁷ This was the case during the Hrawi-Hariri administration. During the Lahoud presidency the Premier, Cabinet and Deputies have been less influential due to the militarisation of the state.

Secondly, the ruling political elite is not only to blame for Lebanon's precarious political process but the constituents are equally at fault. The politics of sectarianism is usually accepted because no alternative process is known. Furthermore, with the rigidity of the political system and the confessionalisation of the state and its people, Lebanese citizens have largely become apathetic, detached and depoliticised from the political process. Usually individuals are influenced by, their family, clan, village, sect and region. Mostly, through little choice of their own, an individual is influenced by confessional deliberation that impacts on almost every facet of their lives and their relations with others. Although

⁴⁶⁷ Kerr, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

desiring change and adaptation of more democratic processes, they have almost accepted that their fate lies in the hands of political *zuama*, whether they are religious or political representatives of their respective confession.

Increasingly within Lebanon and the broader Arab world there is a sharpening sense of alienation due to the dehumanising and depersonalised traits of modern mass society, which is consequently witnessing the reversion to primordial 'tribal' alignments as an alternative. Ironically, such identification was never really absent to begin with in Lebanon, yet there is an increasingly evident public reversion to primordial or 'tribal' alignments as an alternative to 'secular' politics. (Although Lebanese politics is very much confessionalised, many political participants do not like to consider themselves along such lines. Rather, preference may be given to identification on political party orientation, although in most cases members are affiliated to the party because of its roots to a particular confession or political *za'em*). This fact was especially evident in the first decade of post-war Lebanon and amongst the Lebanese diaspora internationally. The Lebanese war transcended all kinds of physical borders and differentiated people's inter-relations based on an individual's religious, political and geographic roots, doing little to assist in the de-politicisation of its community's affiliations.⁴⁶⁸

5.3.10 Compromise

Allied closely to the factor of de-politicisation is that of compromise. The consociational model is praised for its ability to produce stability, harmony, integration and forms of compromise to varying degrees. This is necessary when candidates need to gain votes from members of both their own and other sects.

Criticisms

Overall, however, due to the confessionalisation of the political system, the *zuama* dominate political developments within Lebanon and speak for their constituents along religious and primordial lines resulting in Lebanese society revolving around an 'empty

⁴⁶⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 149.

centre'.⁴⁶⁹ Despite the fact that Lebanon has representative institutions such as the Parliament these institutions are powerless in bringing about real change. In the past, parliamentarians conduct debates and make decisions but the implementation of such decisions revolve around the *zu'amas* interests and their compatibility with such decisions. Usually if such decisions are contrary to the interests of the *zuama*, many obstacles arise and outright opposition is voiced until such proposals are scrapped or quickly withdrawn from the public arena. Confessional or political interests are always represented to the degree that "the interest is gratified in relation to every other interest must remain fixed".⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, no decision can be made which will affront any one of the major players, who have a high stake in the existing 'proportional' arrangements. Thus this impasse, which has existed to varying degrees since the creation of the Republic of Lebanon, has led to the frustration of the Chamber of Deputies and the regression of healthy parliamentary debate and democracy.

Usually the process of negotiation and compromise therefore takes place outside parliamentary procedures and outside the public arena rather than within parliamentary institutions where theoretically it should take place. Consequently, the Lebanese Parliament in most cases cannot initiate or interpret anything beyond the retention of the existing conditions, while the majority of the public have, traditionally been institutionalised to identify themselves by primordial and confessional classifications and not within the broader concept of Lebanese national civil identity.⁴⁷¹ Therefore, the pressure to bring about change has not been forthcoming from all angles. Meanwhile, the political elite has become "an end in itself and continued to dominate the debate and set both the boundaries for and the agenda of action in the entire country".⁴⁷² The negative aspect to it is its immobility, reliance on *wasta* and the inability to propose or make real changes to the system without compromising the existing political system.

⁴⁶⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*.

⁴⁷⁰ For example, take the South Australian Lebanese community estimated to number 10000 people. As the civil war in Lebanon progressed, religious cleavages in association with related political parties, became more prominent. In the first few years after the cessation of the conflict political and religious segmentation continued to be practised and identification amongst Lebanese continued to be along sectarian or geographic lines, something that used to be shunned in the past. It is only since the mid-1990s that an attempt to gather the groups together as Lebanese has been attempted and even then there are religio-political differences. At one stage it was quite common to have several Lebanese cleavages celebrating Lebanese 'national' day in isolation from other Lebanese groups, rather than as a true nationalistic and patriotic occasion celebrated by all Australian-Lebanese.

⁴⁷¹ Shils, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility" in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 1-11, p. 3.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

5.3.11. Concession by the Stronger to the Weaker

Lebanon in some ways is a perfect reflection of the world system in that, although many players are dominant, they are never strong enough to control the entire system. The central government itself (which is not always made up of the nation's *zuama*) is dependent on the support of the *zuama* who demand sizeable rewards. Caution is practiced, while the *zuama* watch their own self and community interests by endorsing locality, family/clan, sect, history, economic, and political power to yield their rewards.

However, since the creation of Lebanon there has been an ongoing process of concessions (by force or compromise) from the stronger to the weaker parties within Lebanon. For example, non-Sunna, especially Christian, grievances were acknowledged during the French mandate and post-independent Lebanon and reflected as noted earlier in the political system. Upon independence, however, the Christian minority, in fear of losing their status within an almost Muslim dominated state, would not discuss alternative power sharing arrangements amongst others sects. This was maintained until the 1989 Taef Agreement. Prior to that, Lebanon experienced the confrontation of the 'centre-periphery' series of relations.

The periphery (especially the Shi'ite Muslims) during the war years challenged their underdog status and worked towards becoming more prominent players within the power structure. Generally this can take place geographically, politically, socially and economically. In the case of Lebanon the Shi'ites were challenging their suppressed position from all four levels. To date, such confrontation has been addressed in the above manner, that is, in the language of tribalism and primordialism and with continued references to centuries of deprivation and mistreatment due to their religious affiliation. Their goal is to overcome such discrimination and deprivation and contribute to political participation in Lebanon and its decision making process. However the problem that arises is the zero-sum mentality amongst Lebanon's groups. One group's gain is considered as another's loss. The spirit of concession, more equal distribution of benefits and the notion of a Lebanese community does not exist within Lebanon, so the application of this notion complex.

Hudson argues that strong primordial affiliations emerge and are mobilised into the Lebanese political system to participate as autonomous communities for their own security, future and in defence of their own identities. It is only when these identities are secure that non-primordial interests, which are common in Western democracies, can emerge successfully.⁴⁷³ In the meantime, the Lebanese state structure does not serve the broader public interest and therefore has been unable to win broad political legitimacy. Each group within Lebanese society is represented by one form of *za'em* or another. They are mutually suspicious of political institutions and fellow groups, believing others will not protect their local self-interests.

Thus not only does the consociational democratic model within a Lebanese case study warrant criticism, but it has also been outlined why it, along with the numerous tools and institutions running Lebanese society in collaboration with its political elite, has been unsuccessful.

In summation the failure of its political system can be explained as a result of several factors that can be listed as:

- Inevitable due to its social, cultural, political and economic structures
- The socio-economic and political disparities between communities, regions and classes
- The forced migration and misplacement of a large segment of its inhabitants to the capital Beirut
- Demographic changes
- Lack of political and economic reforms
- Rivalry and conflict within Lebanese leadership
- The proliferation and militarisation of parties, factions and organisation leading to armed conflict

⁴⁷³ Hudson, *Prekarious Republic*, p. 23.

- The parochial tendencies of political notables and representatives rather than adaptation of modern, liberal and progressive notions of governance
- An increasing sense of alienation due to the dehumanising and depersonalised traits of modern mass society consequently witnessing the reversion to primordial 'tribal' alignments as an alternative
- Challenging of the centre-periphery equation
- The inability to deal with political and socio-economic change
- External interference and the effects of regional conflict on Lebanon
- The misapplication, exploitation and perversion of the political institutions by the political and religious *zuama*
- Self interests over community-national interests
- Exclusion of alternative leadership
- Corruption, nepotism, cronyism and bureaucracy
- The lack of civil society⁴⁷⁴

Most, if not all of these factors, point to the realisation of the continued domination of the strong (*zuama* - political and religious elite) over the weak (citizens), although they demand change, have not been able to break the stronghold of these traditional and powerful rulers. These powerful forces within Lebanon have largely contributed to the failure of the consociational model of democracy and its development.

As the eleven points above demonstrate there are problems with the consociational democratic model within a Lebanese case study. In most cases the favourable conditions needed for the success of consociational democracy are either too frail or entirely absent in the Lebanese context. The use of veto power leads to a deadlock in negotiations or endless compromise, preventing the possibility of real political progress and development

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

from taking place and subsequently resulting in the disintegration of the political system itself. The power structure and the ethnic-religious schism prevented the natural evolution of a common national political identity and culture from emerging. This resulted in weak central political institutions and the strengthening of political and religious *zuama* within the system, who in turn resisted any real change and made the system workable only for a small minority. This will inevitably led to the state's eventual breakdown.

When considering the experiences of Lebanon and other nations who have applied the consociational model of democracy (Sri Lanka and Nigeria), it is evident that each country must create its own version of consociational or pluralistic democracy and not attempt to mirror textbook models. Each country needs to customise its own model. This brings us to the third point being examined within this chapter. Has the Taef Agreement developed the pre-existing political structure by setting the foundations for the development of the Lebanese political system and commenced the shift away from consociational democracy, or has it retained the political system and its inconsistencies?

5.4. The Taef Agreement: The Agreement of National Understanding

During the build-up towards the war and throughout its duration the political system was questioned. Naturally the various political-religious groups differed in their criticism of the existing order and whether they called for its preservation, reinterpretation, modification, or abolition.⁴⁷⁵

The Maronites' view of the National Pact varied at times. For example, in 1975 they expressed their genuine adherence to the spirit of the Pact that provided them a safeguard.⁴⁷⁶ Additionally, they accused the Muslims of violating it by affiliating themselves with the Arab world and supporting Palestinian presence in Lebanon, which accordingly superseded any sense of Lebanese sovereignty. In early 1977 the Maronite

⁴⁷⁵ Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations - Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration", *World Politics*, Vol. 5, 1953, p. 61; Hass, *The Unity of Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1957, p. 5.

⁴⁷⁶ This was expressed in a memorandum to the Chamber of Deputies dated 7 November 1975 emerging from the Permanent Conference of the Superior-Generals of the Eight Monastic Orders of Lebanon.

parties rejected renegotiation of the Pact. They called for the status quo ante, that is, prior to Palestinian arrival in Lebanon. New evidence indicates that there was some consensus for real political change in the late 1980s amongst a coalition of Christian Organisations otherwise known as the Lebanese Front.⁴⁷⁷

On the other hand, Sunna Muslims' position varied between more equitable political participation between Muslims and Christians. They argued that the National Pact no longer suited the present situation in Lebanon and it was time to re-examine the 1943 Agreement; whilst others still argued for more radical change.⁴⁷⁸ The Shi'ite and Druze called for the renunciation of the Pact and the implementation of real measures of reform that accounted for their past (Druze) and present (Shi'ite) political clout.⁴⁷⁹ Leaders of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) called for radical constitutional and political change.⁴⁸⁰ In the final intervening years of the war such sentiments were largely maintained and there was unanimous agreement that a new national agreement needed to be discussed and enforced.

What most of the above problems indicate is the continuous return to the root problems of Lebanese politics, that is, the confessionalisation of the state and its people over a long period of time. The essence of the political, administrative, judicial and civic systems in Lebanon is confessionalism. In turn this has diluted the effectiveness of modern political

⁴⁷⁷ ADELPHI Papers, p. 12. The Lebanese Front, originally called Front for Freedom, was established in January 1976. It was a coalition of Parties and organisations. Most of its members were of the Christian denomination. It included the Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars, al-Tanzim, the Zghartan Liberation Army (withdrew in May 1978) and other organisations and independent Christian personalities. The Lebanese Front passed a number of resolutions which were not publicised until December 24, 1980, one of which concerned the 1943 National Pact. The document entitled "The Lebanon We Want", indicated that revision of the 1943 political formula was necessary in order to avoid friction amongst the Lebanese community. It was proposed that a decentralised federal or confederal structure become its replacement, a decision which was much more of a modification opponents to the Pact were proposing at the time. Whether this decision was sincere or a political deterrence strategy, ie. an attempt to eradicate demands for political change by either preserving the Pact and hence the state, as it stood or accepting partition of the country under the banner of political decentralisation, is yet to be fully known. ADELPHI Papers, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷⁸ Statements by the Higher Muslim Council on 30 November 1975, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. V, Nos. 3-4, Spring/Summer 1976, pp. 261-264; and by the Islamic Assembly formed in the late 1970s by traditional Muslim leaders, on 6 August 1976, in *al-Watha'iq al-Arabiyya*, pp. 547-548.

⁴⁷⁹ Statements by Deputy President of the Shi'ite Muslim Higher Council, Mohammed Mahdi Shamseddin, in *Middle East Report*, 17 August 1985, pp. 16-18 and by Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Mohammed Abu Shaqra in *Middle East Report*, 9 June 1988, pp. 11-12.

⁴⁸⁰ See interim programme of the LNM in *Al-Safir*, 19 August 1975, statement by the late Kamal Joumlblatt on 31 March 1976, in Laila Itani's, *Harb Lubnan - Suwar, Watha'iq, Ahdath* (Lebanon's War - Pictures, Documents, Events), Beirut: Dar al-Masira, 1977, pp. 185-186.

institutions, retarded the development of a civil society and threatened the stability of the state itself.⁴⁸¹ As will be demonstrated below, Lebanese politics in post-war Lebanon marks the resurrection of the confessional state in Lebanon, the same kind, which initially led to the Lebanese civil war itself.

Throughout the almost two decade long civil war many conflict resolution proposals emerged.⁴⁸² Yet none were able to stop the fighting except the 'Agreement of National Understanding' popularly known as the Taef Agreement. This section will not seek to understand why this agreement has been successful over others. Others have sought to account for it.⁴⁸³ The question now examined whether any of the above grievances [instilled in some sectors of the Lebanese community as far back as 1943] have been rectified or whether this new political agreement has in fact broken new ground.

The seventeen-year civil war that ravaged Lebanon has had vast and permanent repercussions for the Lebanese polity. These repercussions are additional to the scars amassed over the years and from previous conflicts. Towards the end of the battle it became evident the war had lost a great deal of influence and was almost meaningless. Like past civil conflicts in Lebanon the most recent one was stopped because there was an international decision to do so. For example, in 1860 the Europeans were external brokers, in 1958 US Presidential envoy Robert Murphy played an important role and in 1989 the Arab League, the UN, the Americans and Russians were deciding players in the cessation of the conflict.⁴⁸⁴

The Taef Agreement terminated the war and gave social, political and legal engineers the necessary tools to re-examine Lebanon's process of nation building and conflict resolution. A new power sharing formula between the prominent Lebanese communities and different militia chieftains was accepted via peaceful means.

⁴⁸¹ For further information see Ralph E Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration and Efficiency", in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 167-186, particularly pp. 172-178.

⁴⁸² For further detail on such proposals see Abul-husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*.

⁴⁸³ See Abul-husn, Collings, Adelphi Paper.

⁴⁸⁴ An interview with Elias Khoury, "Politics and Culture in Lebanon", *Beirut Review*, Issue no. 5.

However, upon examination of the Taef Agreement it becomes evident that although an important document it is not entirely innovative in addressing Lebanon's political problems.⁴⁸⁵ Lebanon's political problem revolved around three major issues. One, to reform Lebanon's power sharing arrangement as outlined in the National Pact; two, the question of Lebanon's national identity and finally the question of Lebanon's sovereignty and the issue of foreign troops within Lebanon. Throughout the attempted conflict resolution period it was evident that there were two main groups contesting these issues: those advancing reform and those protecting the status quo. The former demanded social and political variations to the existing system and the latter fought for the preservation of the system.⁴⁸⁶ Throughout the years of conflict these two major groups, as well as third parties, submitted proposals of potential conflict resolving alternatives.

By early 1989 with the escalation of the war and its new developments involving General Aoun there was more pressure on international mediators to resolve the conflict once and for all.⁴⁸⁷ The Vatican, France and the United Nations Secretary-General all offered their offices and services in an attempt to find a peaceful resolution. The successful contender was the League of Arab States. The League created a six-member ministerial committee, chaired by Kuwait and including foreign ministerial representatives from Algeria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. A three-month time frame was issued for its members to meet with leaders of factions, government and religion and to understand

⁴⁸⁵ For example, former Prime Minister Saeb Salam's proposals were very much part of the final text of the Taef Agreement. These proposals were initially unveiled in a memo dated October 31, 1983 at the National Dialogue Conference held in Geneva amongst some traditional family and confessional representatives as well as the Syrian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Abdul Halim Khaddam and Saudi Arabian minister of state, Sheikh Mohammad Ibrahim al-Masoud, two figures who later played a considerable role in the outcome of the Taef Agreement. For further detail see Abul-husn, pp. 94-95. Also the Tripartite Agreement of 1985.

⁴⁸⁶ Although generally this grand alliance consisted of the main power brokers it is important to note that it was exactly that, an alliance. In reality internal divisions on how far proposed changes should go demonstrated these divisions clearly. For further details see Abul-husn, Chapter 6, "Conflict Resolution: The Taif Accord", *The Lebanese Conflict*, pp. 91-129.

⁴⁸⁷ In March 1989 General Aoun declared war on the Syrian's demanding their total and complete withdrawal from Lebanon. He imposed a naval blockade on the illegal ports in west and south Beirut. The el-Hoss government took similar actions by blockading the ports of the Christian enclave. Battles ensued between the warring factions within Beirut and Aoun's actions did indeed internationalise the Lebanese conflict resulting in the Arab League's Tripartite Committee which resulted in the Taef Agreement. Aoun rejected the proposals put forward by the Committee and dissolved parliament in protest of deputies who had approved the Taef agreement days earlier. Despite this intimidation the deputies elected a new President, Rene Mouawad who in turn appointed Salim El-Hoss as Prime Minister. Just over two weeks later President Mouawad was assassinated and the battle ensued between the two opponents. The threats, intimidation and tension continued until October 13, 1990 when the Lebanese army with the assistance of Syrian troops and airforce bombed Aoun out of his headquarters in the presidential palace at Ba'abda. Aoun escaped to the French embassy and successfully sought asylum. Stability was gained in Beirut and the full conditions for the ceasefire were activated. Aoun continues to be an outspoken political opponent to all Lebanese governments. He still maintains a healthy following in Lebanon and throughout the world amongst the Lebanese diaspora, although it has gone through various phases of popularity in the past decade.

their demands. Upon reaching the deadline they were to report their findings to the League. King Hassan II of Morocco initiated an Arab League summit in Casablanca in May 1989 to discuss and act upon the report and to bring about a peaceful and enduring resolution.

Subsequently a Tripartite Committee was appointed to mediate in the conflict. It consisted of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria, including the countries' respective monarchs (King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz and King Hassan II) and President Chazli Benjedid of Algeria. The Committee's goal was twofold: to bring about a ceasefire and follow it through with peaceful deliberations under the auspices of the Arab League. Like most ceasefires the one enforced was short lived. However, the Tripartite Committee's plan of action gained international, regional and local credibility and endorsement.

The Committee's peace plan called for an immediate cease-fire; the formation of a Lebanese security committee to supervise the ceasefire; the lifting of the Syrian-backed land and sea blockade of east Beirut; the reopening of Beirut International Airport; the enforced embargo on arms shipments to all factions and the gathering of the Lebanese parliamentarians outside Lebanon to discuss the "Document of National Reconciliation" drawn up by the Committee.⁴⁸⁸

The Document of National Reconciliation or Taef Agreement that was agreed upon and signed with minor amendments on October 22, 1989 provides for the balancing of communal interests and a redistribution of power and authority. It is divided into two parts and addresses a number of issues. The first section deals with internal political reform, while the second part deals with mechanisms for ending the war and relations with foreign armies in Lebanon.

Although supporters of the Taef Agreement insist that there are no-winners and no-losers at the conclusion of the long war, upon examination of the Agreement it becomes evident

⁴⁸⁸ Abul-husn, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109. For details of the proceedings and outcome of the conference see Theodore Hanf, *Coexistence In Wartime Lebanon Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation*, London, IB Tauris and Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993.

that the reformers have been victorious in achieving some of their demands, particularly the shifting in executive power and authority. There have been new and significant constitutional changes that have led some commentators to label post-1989 as the birth of the 'Second Lebanese Republic'.

The statement of general philosophy is reaffirmed, particularly reinstating the fact that Lebanon is a state encompassing a variety of communities that depends on peaceful coexistence. Other principles such as Lebanon's independence, unity, sovereignty and its liberal and democratic ways are outlined. Its identity is reasserted as an Arab one and importantly a dominant principle is proclaimed: "There shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of communal existence' (*al aysh al mushtarak*)".⁴⁸⁹ Hence the very stability and existence of Lebanon as a state is dependent on the political system of coexistence. And any political party, individual or authority that moves against the spirit of this pact, or is incapable of protecting or reinforcing it, will be disbarred from civil and political legitimacy. Coexistence is the key to the stability of the nation.

Executive authority has shifted away from the President and towards the Cabinet, prescribing that the President no longer controls the government. The President is now viewed as the 'symbol of unity of the nation', as the protector of the country's integrity and independence, custodian of the Constitution and the overseer of the functioning of the institutions, stripping him of his former powers. The position of President now symbolises the representative of the political and moral authority of the state rather than being the direct strategist in political activities and everyday management of government.

The President's revised powers include: the President may preside over the Council of Ministers but does not have the right to vote. Second, although given the title of the 'supreme commander of the Higher Defence Council' the actual authority, is wielded from the Cabinet rather than by President. Third, the President no longer has total control in the choice of the Prime Minister, who now needs to be selected in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies. Four, all decrees continue to be signed by the President of the

⁴⁸⁹ Part Two, Taef Agreement.

Republic, subject however to the approval of the Prime Minister. This major change has appeased opponents of the old system, which argued that the power structure was structured to favour the Christian groups and especially the Maronite sect. Now it can be acknowledged that a large amount of the executive authority lies in the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister has the right to call the Cabinet to meetings, while the President may chair such meetings but is unable to vote. The Speaker's position is also strengthened with its central involvement in designating a Prime Minister and the extension of the Speaker's term by an additional two years, to four years. By distributing the power to the Council of Ministers it is argued that all communities can claim representation to the highest executive body of state regardless of sect, thereby defusing inter-communal tensions.

The number of Deputies increased from 99 to 108 (although further constitutional changes took place in 1992, increasing the number of parliamentarians to 128) and they are represented equally by both Christians and Muslims and not according to the 1932 ratio of 6:5 in favour of Christians. The Deputy positions were divided in the following manner: Sunni 27 seats, Shi'ite 27 seats; Alawi 2; Druze 8; Maronites 34; Armenians (Orthodox & Catholic) 6; Greek Orthodox 14, Greek Catholics 6 (8), and other Christians 4 (2) seats. Similarly the ministerial portfolios are equally divided between the two major communal blocs. Parliamentary powers have also been strengthened. For example, under the new system, it is practically impossible to dissolve Parliament unless there is a Parliamentary consensus to do so.

The creation of a Senate (which was first envisioned in the 1926 Constitution) with limited powers was proposed. The Senate was to be established and represented by "all the spiritual families", and its powers "confined to crucial issues". A Constitutional Council court to "interpret the constitution and observe the constitutionality of the laws" as well as settle constitutional disputes which may arise. The Courts are also to ensure "the principle of harmony between religion and state", to "ensure the judiciary's independence" and the election of a Higher Judiciary Council by the judiciary body. Increased levels of administrative decentralisation were proposed, as was added emphasis on civil society

participation in local councils overseeing local affairs via increased administrative powers. There was also the proviso for a new electoral law, with the redrawing of electoral districts on the basis of a *mohafazah*, i.e. larger electorates, encompassing vaster communally mixed electorates. It was suggested that the existing electoral districts be dissolved and replaced by five large governates (Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, North Lebanon and South Lebanon). It was argued that the new system could assist in depoliticising the decisions of the central authorities.

The 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact both asserted that sectarianism is only transitional. The Taef Agreement goes one further by proposing steps to abolish the crippling system. The Taef Agreement earmarks the proposed end of political confessionalism with the recommended establishment of a national council composed of the President, Prime Minister, Chamber of Deputies, speaker, political, intellectual and social notables set to overcome this debilitating state and to be sponsored through long term governmental developmental projects and a methodological plan of enforcement. In principle, the Agreement also proposed the need to phase out confessionalism within the political system and abolish the requirements of sectarian qualification for lower ranked government positions, the army, judiciary and public enterprise, although such quotas were retained for more executive and higher ranked positions.⁴⁹⁰ Steps were also proposed to eliminate the mention of religion on identity cards. These have since been implemented.

Administrative decentralism was also identified calling for a "single and united state with a strong central authority", increasing the power of governors and district administrative officers towards strengthening local council administration and representation and to ensure local participation in the election of a council. It called for the recognition of the administrative division, which "emphasises national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people and institutions".

⁴⁹⁰ For example, posts that are reserved for Maronites include: the Commander of the Army, the Directors of Military Intelligence and State Security, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Chairman of the Conseil D'etat, the President of the Military Court of Appeal. Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, p. 86.

Part Two of the Agreement considers the internal security of Lebanon and provides for the dissolution of the militias and collection of their arsenal, as well as the reintegration of the militia to civilian life, or their enrolment in the army or the internal security forces. Importantly, the priority is for the state to "extend its authority over all the territory of Lebanon by means of its own forces", although Syrian forces "shall assist the legitimate Lebanon forces".⁴⁹¹

Part Two also deals with foreign presence in Lebanon, notably Israeli and Syrian. It seeks to have Israel conform to UN Security Council Resolution 425 and other resolutions related to Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese lands. The Syrian-Lebanese relationship is outlined in the Agreement. It defines the assistance Syrian troops are to provide Lebanon in the initial two year period, to help maintain law and order and until the endorsement of the reforms by the constitutional bodies. It is only then that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was to be scaled down and redeployment (rather than withdrawal) to the Be'kaa Valley in eastern Lebanon was to commence. Both governments would supposedly decide upon the size and stay of the forces at a later date, and "if they so desire" may include the Tripartite Arab High Commission to determine the concluding agreement between these two countries.

There was much emphasis on the 'special' and 'distinctive' relations Syria and Lebanon share. These relations were strengthened through history, kinship and common strategic interests and solidified with the cooperation and coordination of these two countries. The establishment of "privileged relations" between Syria and Lebanon are to be extended "in all areas".

Criticisms

Without doubt there has been much constitutional headway since the 1943 National Pact. The Taef Agreement has certainly theoretically improved Lebanon's political arrangements. However, there have also been some failures as well as the misapplication

⁴⁹¹ Part Two (D), Taef Agreement.

of the Agreement that causes concern for the long-term stability and sovereignty of the state.⁴⁹² They can be outlined in the following points.

One, in some respects the Taef Agreement, like the National Pact before it, imposed another *fait accompli* on the people of Lebanon, giving them little input, means of participation or basis for intellectual debate. Understandably in war situations the above factors cannot always be conformed to. However, ten years since the Taef's implementation the ruling elites continue to discourage and overturn any suggestions of a national forum emerging in accordance with the Taef. There is the continuous undermining of civil society participation and development. This is in some ways reflected in the Agreement itself, which maintains proportional representation of all Lebanon's major groups via its traditional representatives, although it does not provide a platform or mechanism for social integration incorporating political, economic and cultural levels.⁴⁹³

Two, within post-Taef Lebanon there is a real chance of political immobility occurring. The Cabinet now wields the power the President once had regarding decision-making. The government needs to obtain majority consensus from Cabinet for most political decisions. Therefore there is a real possibility of disagreement arising, especially when civil war hostilities are still fresh in the minds of the Lebanese, resulting in the paralysis of executive authority and the eventual immobility of the State. Previously, the President had enough power to force the continuation of minimal government decision-making and hence ensuring continuity and stability.

Although no major problems have arisen, this criticism does not always carry strength, considering the circumstances that have increasingly prevailed since the Presidential election of General Emile Lahoud. Increasingly the Cabinet has been immobilised by the President, internal security forces and Syrian intelligence influencing the decision. Syrian influence is felt through covert intimidatory means (phone tapping, by intelligence services 'tailing' Deputies until important Parliamentary decisions have been 'taken'), or more

⁴⁹² For a more detailed view on the Taef not being implemented fairly see Albert Mansur, *Al-Inqilab 'ala Ta'if* (The Coup Against Taef), Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1993.

⁴⁹³ Habib, "Social pluralism, Political Confessionalism, and Cultural-Development in the Second Republic", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995, pp. 6-15, p. 6.

explicitly such as publicly summoning the Prime Minister, Speaker or Cabinet members to Damascus.

Three, there is also concern that the new power wielding Prime Minister, who is still represented by the Sunna, has possibly replaced the power once wielded by the Maronites. If this concern materialises then there is an added possibility that hostility may arise between these two sects and among other groups in the future. Thus, rather than overcoming favouritism towards one particular sect at the expense of the others, it may in fact be in the process of shifting it from one group (Maronites) to another (Sunna). The same can also be stated about the role and influence of the Speaker of the House.

This power struggle has in turn been reflected since the Taef Agreement in the formation of the 'troika', or 'three Presidents' (The President of the Lebanese Republic, the Premier and the Speaker of the House). It has no constitutional legitimacy or origin, but is a consequence of the post-war security context. It is an on again-off again alliance which at times became a very public showdown between the three and more than usually results in the 'troika' being summoned to Damascus for peace to be restored. Since the election of General Lahoud there has been a marked demise of the troika equation that in most instances has not been to the liking of Prime Ministers Hoss or Hariri. The Premier has been the loser in most circumstances, although in some instances Berri's position has also been tenuous.

Syrian interference has manipulated these relations to its advantage and at times used its power to isolate one party of the troika in favour of the other(s). This was most evident during the 1998 Presidential elections and its subsequent selection of a Prime Minister. Prime Minister Hariri had lost favour with the Syrians. This was poignantly demonstrated when Syria inadvertently told Hariri not to trouble himself to come to Damascus seeking its support for Lebanon's Premiership. The Syrians, however, openly invited Lahoud, Berri and other Parliamentary members who favoured the selection of Salim el Hoss as Premier.

Four, Lebanon lacks the political consensus in its aim and prioritisation of attaining national integration. Without national consensus Lebanon will remain an unstable

paralysed country, failing to attract and maintain the confidence of not only its own inhabitants, but regionally and internationally also. This needs to be done in a integrative and sincere manner and not as a bandaid solution as has been the case throughout the history of Lebanon.

For example, in post-Taef Lebanon the ruling elites produced an image of unison in order to facilitate the acceptance of the new national agreement and facilitate an image of integration and national unity. Former President Hrawi even went as far as suggesting that there had been no civil war within Lebanon but rather "only a war of others on our territory".⁴⁹⁴ Myth creation has long been a basis of historical rootedness in national identity creation. However, the ongoing use of these myths will only work towards creating a basis of superficial reconciliation. The denial of other factors, which contributed to the 17 years of war, will be detrimental to national identity or real reconciliation in the long term. Instead it will reproduce the same circumstances that were in existence upon independence and evident prior to and during the civil war.

Traditional nobles, as well as the new post-war political heavy men, will continue to dominate the political scene if no real political change through the Taef Agreement and future understandings is enforced by the will of the people. Without the re-creation of a common and unifying national identity and policy towards attaining harmonious national integration, communal division and conflict will continue to be a problem in Lebanon for decades to come.

Fifth, closely related to the above points, is the sense of exclusion within the new political process. One exercise adopted by the government to reconcile its citizens and to create another form of national integration was to promote the Taef Agreement on the basis that there were no winners or losers in the civil conflict. It was an attempt at reassuring the Christian population that the constitutional changes would not reduce them to second-class status, or promote intolerance towards their confession as feared by some Christians. However, despite all the reassurances it is evident that fear is instilled within

⁴⁹⁴ Quoted from *Al-Hayat*, October 11, 1993. Some other myths and legends that have been invented to patch over the differences of the war, such as the myth that the militias did not represent anyone but themselves, are dealt with by Joseph Samaha, *Qada'an, la Qadar fi-Ihlaq al-Jumhuriya al-Thaniya* (By Decision, Not by Fate: On the Morals of the Second Republic), Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996, pp. 27-38.

the Christians and smaller non-Christian minorities by the new power wielding Muslims. For example, these changes are considered to have jeopardised the Christians' former political, religious and social standing within Lebanon and the region. Some Christians, in turn, have considered this, as the beginning of *al-ihbat al-Masihi* (Christian frustration).

This frustration was enforced with the boycott of the first post-war parliamentary elections. In 1992, many of the Christian Maronite voting population boycotted the elections in order to show their disapproval of the new 'reconciliatory and national unifying' agreement. It was not only boycotted by some Christian factions, but also by opponents of both the Taef Agreement and Syrian presence in Lebanon. Little was done to transform the proposed Taef reforms to electoral law. Many felt the elections were dominated by Syrian influence and corruption, accusing its neighbour of rigging the elections to favour its supporters and defer the enforcement of the Taef, which required Syria's withdrawal of the majority of its troops and the redeployment of remaining numbers. As a result, the 1992 elections produced unprecedented electoral results and very poor voter turnout, as low as 5% in some areas and a dismal 20% turnout in Beirut. El-Khazen termed the results of the 1992 electoral process as 'negative elections' due to its uncompetitive nature and its boycott in some (notably Christian) areas. This resulted in the election of both strong and weak candidates through 'negative electioneering'.⁴⁹⁵

Boycotting important political events and elections is not a new concept in Lebanon. The Sunna population boycotted the creation of Greater Lebanon and the French Mandate that in a short period consequently further marginalised their former political status. The Maronite boycott of the Taef Agreement and the 1992 election saw considerable political loss on their part, although the true extent of this loss is yet to be fully comprehended. Some commentators have questioned whether their decision to boycott has affected them politically in the medium-to-long-term period, particularly with the absence of prominent political representatives who have previously been defeated (Amin Gemayal), ousted (Michel Aoun), or jailed (Dr. Samir Geagea). This debate became public when some well-known Christians (Aoun, Dory Chamoun, Raymond Edde, and Amin Gemayel) called for the boycott of the 1996 parliamentary elections, whilst others (Harb, Shammass, Murr) argued that it was counterproductive.

⁴⁹⁵ El-Khazen, *The First Post-War Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon*, Centre for Lebanese Policy Studies, internet article, pp. 25-26.

Opponents to a Maronite-Christian boycott of elections argued that with the sudden disappearance of a Maronite voice or strong political representatives, their positions within Lebanese society were being compromised and manipulated by other groups. In comparison, the Shi'ite electorate in 1992 turned out in unprecedented numbers and Hezbollah succeeded in becoming the largest bloc in Parliament by winning a total of 12 of the 27 seats allocated to Shiites, which may have been as a consequence of the Christian boycott.⁴⁹⁶ Strong efforts were made by Hezbollah's political rivals to prevent such a victory from repeating itself in the 1996 elections.⁴⁹⁷

In turn, non-Muslims, liberal Muslims and secularists alike have expressed fear regarding the growth in numbers and power of the Muslim community, a political movement that is being aided by both Syria and Iran. In politics, such alliances are in the habit of appearing and disappearing frequently and the long-term success of any Islamic movement, or any political movement generally, is its ability to produce comprehensive viable alternatives to current government policies and attain political consensus. It is crucial that such movements propose alternative policies that will strengthen economic, political and social spheres and will benefit and be inclusive of all sectors of society.

At present the Islamic groups in Lebanon, or regionally, do not have alternative democratic and non-violent platforms that have gained overwhelming support from constituents. The divisions amongst the Muslim groups and within each sect itself are complicating the issues further. Another obstacle facing the Islamic movements in Lebanon is its ability to practice Islam within Lebanon's state political procedure considering its highly heterogeneous and large non-Muslim communities. Notwithstanding, non-Muslim minorities and secular Muslims in Lebanon are concerned about the growing strength of some segments of the Muslim population, particularly the Shi'ite. Although not unfounded, substantive fear is unwarranted due to domestic, regional and international interests in deterring an eventuality such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In addition, unless a total transformation of the region's political situation arises, for

⁴⁹⁶ Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon's Conundrum (Peace Situation in Lebanon)", *Arab Studies Quarterly* (ASQ), Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1999, 41 pages, pp. 3-4 of 41. For further reading on the emergence of the Shi'ite groups see Norton, "Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon", *Current History*, February 1986, pp. 58-62, 88-89.

⁴⁹⁷ See Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon's Conundrum (Peace Situation in Lebanon)", *Arab Studies Quarterly* (ASQ), Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1999, 41 pages, p. 4 of 41.

example, unification of an Islamic entity, it will be very difficult for a large minority to reign a heterogeneous country such as Lebanon.

Six, the issue of de-confessionalising the state remains a sensitive and slow process. The Taef Agreement moved to de-confessionalise the political and civil societies and their respective institutions through the proposed creation of a Senate. The Senate is said to comprise of the 'spiritual families' of Lebanon -- interpretation: the political and religious *za'ems* of Lebanon. Although the task ahead is to find alternative methods of de-confessionalising the state there is no references to making it a secular one. A decade has passed without a serious attempt at debating, let alone creating the hallmarks of the proposed Senate, which is an indication in itself that it holds little importance or priority to the present ruling elite and external parties as will be demonstrated later.

The problem that will most probably arise with this new institution is the continued representation of the very political movers in traditional and modern Lebanese society. There seems to be little in the Agreement to ensure that civil society groups, academics, intellectuals and ordinary individuals will be involved or participate in such a challenging experiment.

Furthermore, with the continued monopolisation of the political future of Lebanon by the ruling military elite and Syrian interests, there is little indication that true and successful change will emerge. This is despite the fact that some of the recent promoters of de-confessionalisation of the state have been the traditional proponents of political and religious nobility. That is, proponents of retaining the status quo.

Seven, regional factors and external intervention have diminished the possibility of the successful secularisation of the state. Although the Taef Agreement has attempted to deal with some of the pending questions that have been of major concern to political opponents in the past, one of the major criticisms of the Agreement and its ability to succeed is inextricably linked to regional developments. Lebanon's internal security and political development is in great part reliant on the behaviour, actions and decisions of Israel and Syria, regardless of the separation of these matters in the Agreement itself. The

two segments of the Agreement are separated, however "they are basically articulated within a single scheme that must be implemented in its entirety for the Lebanese crisis to be definitively resolved".⁴⁹⁸

Within the Agreement Syria is described as a friend, where historical, cultural, social and political elements link the two countries together. There is no reference to a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, only 'redeployment'. Due to the very usage of questionable terminology and the exclusion of a set time frame many opponents of the Taef Agreement fear that the Syrian presence in Lebanon will be ongoing. In order to ease the concerns of opponents, the Tripartite Arab High Commission issued a communique reiterating its determination to "help Lebanon emerge from its crisis" and "to restore the sovereignty of the state"⁴⁹⁹. It repeated the agreed provisions of the Agreement requiring Syrian redeployment after two years of initial engagement and reassured opponents that the Commission is willing to serve as an intermediary during Lebanese-Syrian negotiation over the duration and size of its troops.

The Lebanese MP's who were disheartened by these provisions had little room to negotiate the future sovereignty of their state. Ironically, these very MPs accepted their nation's fate on the basis that the treaty needed to be accepted or rejected as a whole and not in segments and in turn they smothered the national will of the people who they were supposedly representing. Such situations are appropriately termed the "abduction of national will".⁵⁰⁰

Three interlinking factors contributed to the abduction of Lebanese sovereignty by the Syrians and will subsequently play a pivotal role in Lebanon's internal security and future direction. First, the Arab guarantee mentioned above, was more declarative than definitive, relying on the willingness of both states to agree to their involvement. However, it has since been revealed that the issue of Lebanese-Syrian relations were, determined by Syrian-Arab negotiations prior to the proposal and signing of the Taef Agreement.

⁴⁹⁸ Mailla, "The Ta'if Accord: An Evaluation", pp. 31-44 in Deirdre Collings (ed.) *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London, 1994, p. 37.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38

Therefore, the reassurances the Tripartite Arab High Commission gave opponents of the Agreement were purely superficial.

Secondly, during the Gulf War Syria took advantage of the inter-Arab divisions and hastily signed a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination with Lebanon on 22 May 1991 and the Pact of Defence and Security on September 1, 1991. These two pacts were signed with the exclusion of the Tripartite Arab High Commission. They also managed to intertwine the future of these two countries regardless of public opinion and went against the spirit of the Taef Agreement itself.

Also at the height of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Lebanese parliament was hurried along to pass the constitutional proposals contained in the Taef Agreement and ratified them on August 21, 1990. One month later the President promulgated the new constitutional amendment. Less than one month later General Aoun was ousted from the Presidential Palace Baabda and went into exile in France. This was accomplished by, the combined forces of Syria, forces loyal to President Hrawi, Dr Samir Geagea's forces (Lebanese Forces) as well as Elie Hobeika's militia. Soon after roads were opened, militias disbanded and heavy arms were confiscated. An armistice was declared and deputies were appointed, thereby normalising relations in Lebanon.

Thirdly, the dramatic events of 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the unprecedented retaliation by coalition forces [including Syria] hastened developments in Lebanon. Syria was a country, which had long been considered as anti-West and listed as supporting terrorist actions and organizations. Thus Syria had been viewed with hostility by the West, and particularly by the US. It was therefore of great significance that the anti-Iraq coalition consisted of strong Arab support and participation. For their contribution the Syrians were publicly rewarded in Western aid and given a free hand in Lebanon, as long as it did not impinge upon Israeli and US security and national interests.

Therefore, and quite paradoxically, the success of the Taef Agreement is largely dependent on the compliance of two external powers, which are not signatories to it -

Israel and Syria.⁵⁰¹ Israel is bound to UN resolutions to withdraw from occupied Lebanese lands and offer appropriate compensation for its actions, while the Syrians are kept in tow by a mere promise given to the Tripartite Arab High Commission. Without goodwill and compliance with such matters the internal situation in Lebanon cannot be truly resolved.

The events of the last few decades and particularly the last decade have demonstrated the fact that Lebanon is being used as the last frontier of the Arab-Israeli battlefield until Syria and Israel resolve their differences. Prior to the resolution of this conflict and the consideration of the security and national interests of each regional player, Lebanon will not be able to develop politically, economically or socially. It is not in Syria's interests to have a strong, politically stable, independent sovereign neighbour [Lebanon] while the Golan Heights continue to be occupied by Israeli forces. Syrian interests in Lebanon will remain, as long as, Lebanon is viewed by Syrian politicians, and Ba'athist ideology, as part of geographic Syria.

Since 1967, Syria has successfully avoided any direct Israeli aggression and has fought all its battles in Lebanon and along its frontiers. Until Syria has been able to successfully guarantee Israel's compliance with UN resolutions requiring it to withdraw from all Arab occupied lands, it is highly unlikely that Lebanon will be released from Syria's tight grip.

Since the late 1970s Syria's presence in Lebanon has had a windfall in exploiting the Lebanese economic situation to its advantage. With the high number of Syrian labourers in Lebanon (estimated between 1 and 3 million), the 'free market' and trade of goods guaranteed by the 'agreements', Syria has been flooding the Lebanese economy at the expense of Lebanese agriculturalists, labourers, financial markets and post-war redevelopment. Since the death of the late Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad, Syrian presence in Lebanon has lessened and the 'Lebanon file' has been set aside, for the short term until Bashar Al-Assad is assured of retaining the reigns of power his father once wielded. However, with the economic warfare taking place against Syria and Lebanon for their uncompromising stand against Israel it will be interesting to see how long the migration of Syrian workers into Lebanon can be held back, and how long the Lebanese

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

people can endure the economic hardships being enforced upon them during these trying times.

5.5. Conclusion

It can be concluded that in the short term the Taef agreement "reinforced confessionalism by reforming it".⁵⁰² At this stage it is too early to say whether the Taef Agreement will implement real change considering that most of the proposed reforms have yet to be discussed, let alone implemented. Due to this lack of implementation Taef is being justly blamed for perpetuating decades of political power dominated by Lebanon's *zu'ama* and new political warlords who emerged from the 17-year war.

However, real blame ought to be directed towards two major forces, the first being the political and religious *zu'ama* who have dominated the political arena in post-war Lebanon. They have been hostile to any real change occurring. Post-war Lebanon continues to witness an incongruous relationship between the state and religious authorities through the maintenance of the political system of confessionalism. The second and more potent force is Syria. It has been instrumental in the militarisation of governance in Lebanon and openly deterred the full implementation of the Taef Agreement. Together these two forces have thwarted development of Lebanon's civil society and political processes. Most importantly, they have left historic inter-confessional problems unresolved which will continue to obstruct any real attempts at nation building.

Although the maintenance and retention of the historic confessional system is appropriate for both the modern day Lebanese *zuama* and the regional players it is not appropriate for the long term stability and durability of the state itself, or the region. It is highly likely that internal conflict will recommence if this issue is not constructively resolved. If unresolved, Lebanon will remain submerged in political paradoxes, which affect and intertwine sectarian relations, economic reconstruction and distribution, political development, social relations and foreign intervention.

⁵⁰² Asmar, Kisirwani & Springborg, "Clash of Politics or Civilisations? Sectarianism Among Youth in Lebanon", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (ASQ), Fall 1999, Vol. 21, No. 4, 35 pages. p. 1 of 35.

In fact Lebanon is presently subject to foreign intervention and tight control by the internal security forces. Consequently, this is affecting national reconciliation, political progress and reforms, implementation of democratic principles, free political competition, civil society development and its sovereignty. What becomes clearly evident upon examining the Taef Agreement is its failure to win Lebanon's independence and sovereignty; instead "Lebanon's peace was achieved at the price of its independence".⁵⁰³

Within Lebanon such developments are not taking place as past traditions are being deliberately ignored. Instead the government is approaching Lebanon's political system within a modern liberal democratic construct. Upon scratching the surface, such a political setting is not sustainable. The reality remains that kinship, the noble-fealty relationship, confessional and sectarian loyalties, other traditional affiliations and external intervention have more weight than the concept of nation, state or political ideology. In turn, this has produced disillusionment, apathy and frustration amongst its citizens and especially its youth. Real and rapid change is needed or the current ruling elite place at risk the fragile cease-fire - and ultimately their own hold on power.

⁵⁰³ Maila, op. Cit., p. 41

CHAPTER 6

Survey Results: Lebanese Issues

6.1 Overview

This thesis has several aims. The first is to consider the development of political identity in the 'Middle East' and how the concept of multiple identities affects an individual's private and public attitude towards political issues. A particular focus was to examine whether a cohesive decolonised Lebanese political identity could emerge in the 21st Century out of the multiplicity of identities found in Lebanon, that is, is a Lebanese or 'Middle Eastern' identity desirable? Why? And what effect it may have on an individual, the community, and the nation? A second aim was to examine the relationship between this development of identity and globalisation and how global processes influence post-colonial nation building. Finally, in view of global development and the increasing shift towards regionalisation, this thesis investigates whether a common 'Middle East' entity is possible in the immediate future considering the region's current political climate. With these questions in mind a survey was developed to gain insight into these issues in terms of how they related to Lebanon. This chapter analyses the results of this fieldwork. The results will indicate the extent to which a cohesive Lebanese national identity remains after the 17-year civil conflict and the Taef Agreement.

6.2. Hypotheses and Predictions

Based upon the research on Lebanese national identity discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, a central aim of this study was to determine how a sample, of Lebanese youth today feel about the issue of identity, particularly political identity, in a globalised era. A number of general predictions were made.

First, it was predicted that despite the seventeen year Civil War, the respondents would continue to identify themselves along religious/sectarian lines and other primordial forms of identification. This would be irrespective of gender or religious-sectarian affiliation and would be more strongly observed among students from Muslim backgrounds because of the close link between Islam and the administration of the state.

Second, with the end of the war and the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, with tragic events such as the 1996 Qana massacre, there would be some renewed form of national identity and even optimism towards a united Lebanese future. This would be despite the persistence of significant economic problems, new political struggles and the ramifications of a long and tiresome war. It was predicted this trend towards a belief in a unified identity would be most strongly observed in the Lebanese University and the American University of Beirut, even after controlling for the influence of religion and gender.

Third, considering the region's political climate, Lebanon's political history and past cases of external intervention in Lebanon and the region, only a small number of respondents would accept the notion of a 'Middle Eastern' identity. It was predicted that support for a common 'Middle East' entity, which includes the three non-Arab states (Turkey, Iran and Israel), would not be endorsed, especially among non-Christian respondents. At the same time, it is recognised that variations due to religious orientation will also shift according to institution and gender.

6.3 Methodology

6.3.1 Target Population

Ideally, it would have been beneficial to undertake a random sample in so that the findings could be generalised to the population as a whole. However, after taking into consideration the time, cost and obstacles that would be involved, it became necessary to narrow down the target population. It is also important to recognise the difficulty of continuing research in this area when the issue of security remains paramount within Lebanon. As a result, the sample involved tertiary students drawn from several of Lebanon's leading universities and where security issues were not of primary consequence.

The decision to focus on tertiary students was justified, on the grounds that they experienced seventeen years of civil war and are living with the consequences. In addition, they will be the future political and social leaders of Lebanon. This makes them a valid sample population for gauging opinion concerning Lebanese national identity, globalisation and the future of the region. However, due to the religious and sectarian differences

prevailing in the different universities selected, it is important that some background be provided concerning the Lebanese higher education system and also the potential variations anticipated.

The Lebanese University System

Lebanon has eight universities, of which one is publicly run (Lebanese University- LU). The remaining seven are privately operated: Beirut Arab University (BAU), American University of Beirut (AUB), University of Saint Joseph (USJ), University of Saint Esprit - Kaslik (USEK), Notre Dame University (NDU), Lebanese American University (LAU), and Balamand University (BU). The various universities can be divided into four distinct groups. The ones selected for this study are highlighted in bold below. As can be observed, three universities based upon the American system were selected and one representative of the Lebanese system.

1. The American system (**AUB, LAU, BU, NDU**):

This is based on a Board of Trustees that exercises absolute authority and performs a legislative role, comprised of a president and vice-presidents. The president wields the most power, followed by academic ranks - deans, department chairpersons and so forth.

2. The French system (USJ and USEK):

A prominent feature of these universities is the patronage of a religious order, which determines the overall policy of the university and its formal representatives in the form of a President, general secretary and University Council.

3. The Egyptian-Arab system (BAU):

On a hierarchical scale the BAU is represented by the Egyptian Minister of Education, followed by, the Higher Council of Alexandria University. The Egyptian-Arab system allows academic authorities more control over the universities' direction than in the American or French systems.

4. The Lebanese system (**LU**):

Is represented by the Lebanese government and the Minister of Higher Education. Since the war of 1975 there has been some confusion in the decision making process between the branch Director and the University Council.

A brief historical background of the Universities selected:

1. American University of Beirut:

In 1866 the Syrian Protestant College, which was later renamed the AUB, was founded by American Presbyterian missionaries. It has one campus, which is located in Hamra, Beirut. It is a private, non-sectarian, independent university. It was the first institution of higher education built in Lebanon. It is represented and chartered by a Board of Trustees, residing in New York.⁵⁰⁴

2. Lebanese University - West Beirut campus

The Lebanese University has seven satellite campuses: Mt. Lebanon, Tripoli, Bekaa, Sidon, Aley and East and West Beirut. It is Lebanon's only publicly run university. It opened in 1951 but did not begin to operate efficiently until 1959.

3. Notre Dame University - Louaize campus

NDU campus is located in a coastal area 15 km North of Beirut. It is a private, Lebanese, non-profit, Catholic institution which adopts the American approach to education. The University's mission is to promote "universally accepted humanistic, ethical and spiritual values, of enhancing intellectual inquiry and intensifying awareness of human integrity and solidarity".⁵⁰⁵ NDU was founded by the Maronite Order of the Holy Virgin Mary, in 1695, originating as a school. By August 1987, the Lebanese Republic granted the institution the right to operate as an independent university, functioning on two satellite campuses.

4. Lebanese American University - Beirut campus:

The LAU, formerly known as the BUC, was founded by the American Presbyterian Church as a school for girls during the Ottoman period. In 1927 it became the American Junior

⁵⁰⁴ For a comprehensive article on the origins and functions of the AUB see Ahmad Oweini, "Stress and Coping: The experience of Students at the American University of Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1996, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 69- 81.

⁵⁰⁵ As promoted on the University's website: <http://www.ndu.edu.lb>

College for Women (AJCW) and by 1948-49 this program was expanded into a university level institution under the name of Beirut College for Women (BCW). In 1973, the BCW began accepting male enrolments and was renamed the BUC and by 1975 men were eligible to enrol in all programs. It has three campuses in Beirut, Byblos and Sidon, with a large number of international students from over 50 countries.

These four universities were chosen because in each, English was the main language used in teaching. They were also the most recognised establishments outside of Lebanon with relatively good education standards in relation to the other smaller privately run institutions.⁵⁰⁶ Although the LU is financially deficient and lacks capital, it was selected mainly due to the fact that 56% of higher education students enrolled in the period 1994-1995 were enrolled at the LU.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, it was important to include students from LU in order to enhance the representativeness of the sample.

In undertaking the survey using specific universities, it is acknowledged that many independent institutions may vary in their social, religious, political or domestic-regional persuasions. This is particularly so for NDU, which has a distinctive geographic location (Louaize) and a particularly high enrolment of Christian students (97% of respondents identified themselves as Christian). Thus, an attempt was made to enhance the representativeness of the overall sample by also including the LU campus in West Beirut, where 87% of responses were obtained from non-Christian students (6.66% did not identify any religion and the remainder identified themselves as Christian). By doing this, it was expected that the over-representation of Christian students at the NDU, would counterbalance the under-representation of this religious group at the LU West Beirut campus.

However, as a social scientist my purpose was not to undertake the questionnaire via the selection of students purely on their religious-sectarian affiliation, or in any way attempt to reinforce these divisions. It was nevertheless necessary to comprehend and acknowledge how the political system of confessionalism has affected every aspect of Lebanese civil society and reinforced its diversity. As a researcher, therefore, I needed to be conscious of

⁵⁰⁶ Although, the University of Saint Esprit - Kaslik is highly regarded, particularly for its law school.

⁵⁰⁷ Adnan El Amine & Therese El Hachem Tarabey, "Students and Graduates", Chapter 11, pp. 505-570 in Adnan El Amine (ed), *Higher Education In Lebanon*, Summary paper given by the author during our 1998 interview.

this and attempt to obtain a sample reflective of most, if not all, ethnic groups in contemporary Lebanese society.

6.3.2. Sampling

The data for this survey were based upon a convenience sample undertaken in April and May 1998 (NDU, LAU, AUB), while a small sample was also obtained with the assistance of a student union representative (the Lebanese University) in September, 1998. Overall, 400 questionnaires were distributed to these four universities. Attempts were made to select individuals as randomly as possible on university grounds. Criteria for eligibility entailed the respondent be a student of the visiting institution. Each respondent completed the survey individually. Two hundred and nine surveys were returned, giving an overall return rate of 54%.

6.3.3. General Survey Design

The questionnaire was piloted and modified in both Australia and Lebanon and administered by the author in all but three institutions, the LU distributions were undertaken by a Lebanese Student Union Representative.

The survey comprised three main sections. In the first section, respondents were asked questions pertaining to national identity, culture and tools assisting nation building. The second section focused on the Lebanese political system of confessionalism and related religious matters. The final section centred on globalisation and the prospect of attaining a common 'Middle East' entity. (To view a sample survey See Appendix 2)

The majority of the questionnaires were presented within the multiple-choice format, i.e. structured questions. However, a few short answer questions, otherwise known as 'open ended' or 'free response' questions were included. The questionnaire asked four basic types of questions which were intricately related to the others, these being; questions of fact, opinion and attitude, and self-perception. Overall, 29 questions were asked:

- 5 directly on the issue of identity;
- 2 on national culture;
- 1 on the obstacles withholding national unity;

- 2 on the April 1996 Qana massacre, which took place in South Lebanon by Israeli forces;
- 7 questions on the current Lebanese political system;
- 1 on the issue of multiple identity and colonialism;
- 2 related to religious identity in the region;
- 3 on globalisation;
- 4 on the concept of achieving a Middle Eastern identity; and
- 1 on the future of Lebanon and the region.

The basis of these questions was to ascertain the thoughts of tertiary students pertaining to the dominant themes of this thesis: identity, nation-building, globalisation and regional integration. Of particular interest was examining how students answered question one, which required them to select from a list of 27 different identities (ranging from religion-sect to political party affiliation to ethnic identification) their five most dominant identifiable identities. The exercise was undertaken to examine the fluidity of students' ability to adopt the concept of multiple identities and how this in turn reflected on their answers thereafter. In particular, whether nation-building and regional integration are difficult to attain within a globalised world and a state identifying with a multiplicity of identities.

6.4 Results

6.4.1. Associations Between Background Characteristics

There was a significant association between gender and institution, $\chi^2(3)=15.13$, $p < 0.01$. A significantly greater proportion of men were sampled from AUB (79%) compared with the other three institutions (50% for NDU, 65% for LAU, 47% for LU). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that there were also significant age differences across institutions, $F(3,205)=6.27$, $p < 0.001$. Post-hoc comparisons showed that respondents from the AUB were significantly younger than those from the other universities ($p < 0.05$). However, the magnitude of the difference was small (only 2 years) and unlikely to have significantly influenced attitudinal responses. Males were also found to be significantly older, $t(206)=2.97$, $p < 0.01$, but again this difference was very small (< 1 year).

Eight religious groups were identified in the survey. The frequency and percentage of the sample endorsing each is summarised in Figure 5.1. As indicated, 50.3% identified themselves as Christians, 44% were Muslim, atheists made up 0.5% and 5.2% did not provide a response.


Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1: Percentage of people in total sample (n=209) identifying themselves with each confession/religion

6.4.2 Identification

A key aspect of the questionnaire was to assess the importance of multiple identity and its relation to national identity within the sample. Question 1 of the survey required respondents to indicate 5 of their most dominant forms of identification from a list of 27 identifications. In order that higher scores on Question 1 equate with stronger ethnic identification, items were rescored so that 5 represented the most dominant identity for each respondent and 1 the least dominant (ie. of the 5 most strongly identified). A score of 0 was recorded for identities not selected. Thus for the 27 possible identities, each respondent could score 0 (no identification) up to 5 (most dominant).

Figure 6.2.**Figure 6.2:** Mean of the 27 forms of identity in relation to Question 1.

The results in Figure 6.2 present the mean ratings for the 27 forms of identity. The five most dominant forms of identification were identified, by undertaking t-tests for related samples (with protected alpha). Results show that Lebanese was rated more important than all others. 'Middle Eastern' and Lebanese Arab were almost rated the same, but were significantly higher than Arab Lebanese, Maronite and Phoenician. Arab Lebanese, Maronite and Phoenician ratings did not suffer significantly. Phoenician (Mean 1.07) and all those above were significantly higher than all other identities listed. However, Phoenician was not significantly higher than Aounist or Sunna (Means 0.83 and 0.85 respectively).

The results show that the most dominant identities in Question 1 were not purely primordial, but were instead based upon national-political identification. Many were willing to identify themselves primarily as Lebanese Arab and Arab Lebanese, while others were willing to identify themselves more broadly as 'Middle-Easterners'. This is inconsistent with the prediction that primordial divisions would be the dominant form of identification among the students. It provides tentative support for the themes raised in the previous two chapters, namely, that Lebanese youth may be exhausted by the prohibitive and

regressive nature of primordial identification and are looking towards change, rather than reinforcing the confessional divisions of their forefathers and present day *zuama*. No doubt, if the survey was distributed to less educated members of society the results would have been different and may in fact reflect the thoughts of previous generations.

Nevertheless, the fact that 'Maronite' featured in the top five forms of identification shows that primordial forms of identification are still significant among many young Lebanese people.

Another noteworthy result is the relatively high ratings according to Phoenicianism. Of the 209 respondents, 53% identified themselves as Christian (Catholic, Christian, Maronite, Orthodox Christian) and 46.5% identified themselves as Muslim (Druze, Muslim, Sunna, Shi'ite). For those who identified themselves as 'Christian', 25% considered 'Phoenicianism' as a prominent (top five) form of their personal identity. Not far off, were students who identified themselves as 'Muslims', 20% of whom identified themselves as Phoenician in one of their top five identities.

These results are almost equally found across all four institutions, although NDU does record a higher rate of identification towards Phoenicianism, which highlights the importance Christians hold towards this centuries old form of identification. As argued in the previous chapters, Christian dominant political parties have long espoused ancient history and genealogical links with classic periods. This approach attempts to enhance their political legitimacy, uniqueness and appeal to contemporary national sentiments. Therefore, the above results highlight how the students of NDU in particular have been influenced by their past and present education to indicate such strong affiliation with an ancient form of identification in contemporary Lebanese society. These results also demonstrate that this form of identification is no longer espoused solely by Christians but also among Muslims. This finding, along with other prominent national identifications, can be a basis in constructing a common and unifiable national Lebanese identity in post-Taef Lebanon.

6.4.3. Identification by Gender.

Identification scores for each of the 27 categories were compared across gender using Mann-Whitney-U tests for 2 unrelated samples. Compared with women, men were found to identify themselves significantly less strongly as 'Middle Eastern', Arab Lebanese and Catholic. Although this result could be due to chance as a result of the large number of analyses undertaken, taken at face value, it suggests that women are more likely to identify themselves as a 'Middle Easterner' than men.

6.4.4. National Political Identification by Religion.

In order to examine political identification by religion, this variable was collapsed into two main categories: Christian and Muslim. The results are outlined in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Significant analysis of national political identity by religion.

Identity	Christian M (SD)	Muslim M (SD)	T-value	Nature of Difference
Arab Lebanese	0.58 (1.13)	2.20 (1.92)	7.30**	Muslim higher
Lebanese Arab	1.17 (1.55)	2.66 (2.05)	5.70**	Muslim higher
Lebanese	3.89 (1.77)	3.15 (2.06)	2.66**	Christian higher
Aounist	1.20 (1.66)	0.53 (0.99)	3.48**	Christian higher
Socialist	0.40 (0.87)	0.97 (1.36)	3.43**	Muslim higher
Progressive Socialist	0.22 (0.76)	1.05 (1.64)	4.48**	Muslim higher
Amal	0.16 (0.59)	0.76 (1.35)	3.93**	Muslim higher
Hezbollah	0.27 (0.94)	0.93 (1.42)	3.83**	Muslim higher
Ba'athi	0.15 (0.62)	0.51 (0.88)	3.26**	Muslim higher
Communist	0.20 (0.71)	0.74 (1.31)	3.52**	Muslim higher
Marxist	0.30 (0.90)	0.72 (1.22)	2.74**	Muslim higher
Clan/Tribe/ Family	0.46 (1.10)	1.05 (1.56)	3.10**	Muslim higher
Palestinian	0.27 (0.94)	0.61 (1.18)	2.23*	Muslim higher
Kurdish	0.18 (0.72)	0.46 (0.83)	2.47*	Muslim higher

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

The above table indicates all but two identifications (Lebanese and Aounist) were higher amongst Muslims than Christians. As outlined in the previous chapter, the results are illustrative of traditional political affiliations and identifications among the political left and Muslims. By contrast, Aounist party affiliation was initially representative of a segment of the Maronite community and their associated grievances. It was only in the later years of General Aoun's exile that he and his supporters publicised their cause on a Lebanese nationalist platform.

What is interesting and reflective of Lebanon's political history is the continued dominance of Christian identification with Lebanese *qatari* identity, whilst Muslims continue to give Lebanon an Arab face, whether it be through identification as a Lebanese Arab or Arab Lebanese. Regardless of the years since independence and the war, the results from this small sample highlight the ongoing division between those endorsing Lebanon's Arab face and those promoting state national Lebanese identity.

However, if national political identification were analysed in terms of four categories Christian, Druze, Maronite, and Muslim⁵⁰⁸, the results would vary. Accordingly, ratings for each of the 27 categories were compared across these 4 religious-sectarian groups using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and are illustrated in the table below.

⁵⁰⁸ The variables Druze and Maronite were added in addition to the religious division (Christian and Muslim) as they were the two most dominant sects identified in relation to others.

Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Significant analysis of national political identity across the 4 religious groups.

Identity	F-value	Post-hoc analysis of direction of difference
Arab Lebanese	14.39***	Muslim + Druze > Christian + Maronite
Lebanese Arab	10.06**	Muslim & Druze > Christian & Maronite
Lebanese	5.45**	Muslim < Christian + Druze
Aounist	5.47**	Christian > all the rest
Socialist	3.51*	Christian < Druze + Muslim
Progressive Socialist	19.62***	Druze > all the rest
Amal	4.96**	Christian < Druze + Muslim Druze > Maronite Muslim > Druze
Hezbollah	5.19**	Muslim > Christian & Maronite
Ba'athi	3.54*	Druze + Muslim > Christian Druze > Maronite
Communist	5.64**	Druze > all the rest
Marxist	2.98*	Druze > Christian + Maronite

*p<0.01 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

A summary of the significant results provided in Table 6.2 indicate that Christians tended to identify themselves more strongly as Aounist or as Lebanese (as opposed to Lebanese Arab or Arab Lebanese). The Druze affiliation was also more strongly associated with being Socialist, Communist, Marxist and Ba'athi compared with the other religious groups. By contrast, Muslims identified themselves more strongly as Arab, Socialist or Hezbollah.

The main distinguishing feature of the two tables, however, is the finding that those who identified themselves as Lebanese were more likely to adhere to a Maronite or Druze affiliation. This supports the importance of minorities in Lebanon, namely, how there can be support for a state-based national identity which at the same time subsumes smaller sub-identifications, rather than being immersed in a broader, largely homogeneous regional

identity. It may also reflect Lebanon's traditional reputation for being the safe haven for a conglomeration of minorities in a largely Muslim dominated region.

6.4.5. National Political Identification by Institution:

Given the relationship between age, gender and institution, any relationship between gender, age, religion and national identity could be confounded by: (a) Variation across institutions and/or (b) The variance shared between gender, age and religion. To resolve this problem, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was undertaken with each of the national identities as the dependent variables. The 4 institutions (coded into $k-1=3$ dummy variables) were entered as predictors on the first step of the analysis to control for institutional variations and gender, age and religion were entered on the second step. The results are summarised in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Significant predictors of national identification by Institution.

Identity	Predictor	Beta	t-value	Effect
Middle-Eastern	Gender	-.15	-2.02*	Women higher
	LAU	.24	2.53*	LAU lower
Arab Lebanese	Gender	-.21	-2.99*	Women higher
Lebanese Arab	LAU	-.11	-2.09*	LAU lower
	Christian	-.24	-2.03*	Christians lower
Lebanese	-	-	-	-
Phoenician	AUB	-.24	-2.06*	AUB lower
	NDU	-.28	-2.00*	NDU lower
	Christian	.29	2.29*	Christian higher
	Maronite	.20	2.13*	Maronite higher
Maronite	Druze	-.19	-2.34*	Druze lower
	Muslim	-.28	-3.25**	Muslim lower
Orthodox	Muslim	-.27	-3.18**	Muslim lower
Catholic	Muslim	-.26	-2.99**	Muslim lower
Sunna	Maronite	-.19	-2.17*	Maronite lower
	Christian	-.35	-3.04**	Christian lower
Shi'ite	AUB	-.36	-3.50**	AUB lower

	NDU	-.33	-2.63*	NDU lower
	Muslim	.36	3.83**	Muslim higher
Druze	AUB	-.23	-2.43*	AUB lower
	Muslim	-.47	-6.26**	Muslim lower
	Maronite	-.27	-3.59**	Maronite lower
	Christian	-.49	-4.19**	Christian lower
Phalangist	–	–	–	–
Lebanese forces	LAU	.24	2.50*	LAU higher
Aounist	Christian	.42	3.76**	Christian higher
Socialist	NDU	-.35	-2.65	NDU lower
Progressive socialist	AUB	-.27	-2.69*	AUB lower
	Muslim	-.27	-3.37**	Muslim lower
	Christian	-.22	-2.10*	Christian lower
Amal	LAU	.19	2.04*	LAU higher
Hezbollah	–	–	–	–
Ba'athi	AUB	-.22	2.00*	AUB lower
Syrian Socialist	–	–	–	–
Communist	AUB	-.43	-4.10**	AUB lower
	NDU	-.43	-3.40**	NDU lower
	LAU	-.28	-3.05**	LAU lower
Marxist	NDU	-.35	-3.61*	NDU lower
Clan/tribe	AUB	-.27	-2.50*	AUB lower
	NDU	-.38	-2.94**	NDU lower
Syrian	–	–	–	–
Palestinian	–	–	–	–
Armenian	–	–	–	–
Kurdish	–	–	–	–

* p < .05 ** p < .01

The above results confirm traditional political-religious affiliation with particular institutions (eg. Shi'ite identity will be lower at the NDU, or clan/tribe/family affiliation will be lower amongst AUB respondents). This affiliation will also highlight the general distribution of political identification within tertiary institutions (eg. LAU respondents identifying with Hezbollah). Interestingly, respondents from LAU identified themselves less as 'Middle Eastern'. It would have been anticipated that as a private, American education institution

and with a high rate of international student enrolment, the LAU would have endorsed such a political identification.

6.4.6. How the respondents perceive the identification of fellow Lebanese

As a variation to Question 1, the respondents were asked how they perceive the majority of Lebanese society identifying themselves as a community, as opposed to their personal identifications as had been required of them earlier.

The survey data responses were converted into scores: The first listed identity was given a score of 5, the 2nd 4, the 3rd =3, 4th=2, 5th=1. Identities not mentioned were given a score of 0. The summary of results to Question 2 are as follows: A total of 22 identities were identified by respondents and compared across gender, the four religious groups and the 4 institutions. Women emphasised the importance of tradition/family ($\underline{M}=2.09$, $\underline{SD}=1.63$ vs. $\underline{M}=1.29$, $\underline{SD}=1.58$), $t(206)=3.52$, $p < .001$, and were also more likely to rate politics as more important ($\underline{M}=2.62$, $\underline{SD}=1.62$ vs. $\underline{M}=1.92$, $\underline{SD}=1.79$), $t(206)=2.83$, $p < .01$. Christians were more likely to identify religion as the major identifying factor in Lebanon ($\underline{M}=4.18$, $\underline{SD}=1.46$ vs. $\underline{M}=3.51$, $\underline{SD}=2.04$), $t(210)=2.80$, $p < .01$, and also the region ($\underline{M}=1.62$, $\underline{SD}=1.79$ vs. $\underline{M}=1.13$, $\underline{SD}=1.68$), $t(210)=2.00$, $p < .05$. Students from AUB were less likely to emphasise the importance of race ($\underline{M}=0.27$, $\underline{SD}=0.82$ vs. $\underline{M}=0.84$, $\underline{SD}=1.37$), $t(207)=3.76$, $p < .001$, but were more likely to emphasise state nationalism ($\underline{M}=1.06$, $\underline{SD}=1.47$ vs. $\underline{M}=0.60$, $\underline{SD}=1.18$), $t(206)=2.44$, $p < .05$. By contrast, students from NDU were more likely to emphasise race ($\underline{M}=0.97$, $\underline{SD}=1.42$ vs. $\underline{M}=0.49$, $\underline{SD}=1.10$), $t(206)=2.51$, $p < .05$. These students were also less likely to emphasise region ($\underline{M}=0.51$, $\underline{SD}=1.08$ vs. $\underline{M}=0.88$, $\underline{SD}=1.39$), $t(206)=2.21$, $p < .05$. The five most dominant responses are listed in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3 Respondents perception - The five most dominant forms of identification.

These results reflect the true nature of initial thoughts on Lebanese national identity and particularly how, it is, perceived by fellow Lebanese and others. Reflecting on one of the hypotheses of this research, it was expected that primordial identifications (religion, sect, ethnicity) would be most prominent in the various forms of identity offered yet Question One results demonstrated this to be largely incorrect. A large number of students personally identified themselves along nationalistic and patriotic lines. It is interesting that these students were able to personally identify themselves along nationalistic identifications, yet could not view fellow Lebanese as identifying themselves along these same affiliations. Instead, primordial identifications were dominant.

Although this is a small sample, the results force one to examine the public perception and discourse of Lebanon and its citizens. Has the civil war tainted our perception of the Lebanese? Has a consensus been reached that Lebanese are not capable of identifying themselves along nationalistic lines? Will the Lebanese continue to be perceived as the regressive, tribal and the fanatical 'Other'?

6.4.7. Multiple identity

To follow up to the questions on identity, students were asked whether the concept of multiple-identity is an obstacle to national unity. Although 58.5% answered 'yes', almost all the respondents had little difficulty in listing five forms of identification as requested in Question 1. Students from LU were significantly more likely to believe (77% vs 55% for other universities) that multiple-identity was an obstacle to national unity ($\chi^2(1)=4.76, p<0.05$). This may be the result of LU students, or the institution itself, believing more strongly in a homogenous national identity at the expense of a form of multiple identification.

6.4.8. Existence of Identity.

Student confidence in the existence of a common national Lebanese identity was poor, with only 23.9% believing that it existed. This is despite the fact that a significant number identified themselves as Lebanese, Lebanese Arab or Arab Lebanese early on in the questionnaire. University analyses showed that students from LU were significantly less likely to believe (4% versus 27% for other universities) that a Lebanese identity already existed, $\chi^2(1)=5.25, p<0.05$. Students from AUB and NDU were significantly more likely to believe that a national identity existed, 29% versus 13% for the rest of the sample, $\chi^2(3)=15.13, p<0.05$. No one of the Druze religion believed that a national identity existed ($\chi^2(3)=6.76, p<0.01$), compared with 24% for the rest of the sample.

These variables (institutional affiliation) were entered into a logistic regression analysis (log linear likelihood ratio as the test statistic) with responses to Q4 (1=yes, 2=no) as the dependent measure. This analysis yielded a model with only one significant predictor (AUB). Students from AUB were 11 times more likely (compared with other students) to have agreed that a national identity existed.

The results indicate that majority of students do not feel that a national Lebanese identity exists because of the very heterogeneity and plurality within Lebanese society, as based on the various religious/sectarian groups and the political system. When asked about Lebanon's national characteristics the responses can be divided into two categories: negative and positive. The following negative factors were identified: religious and political affiliation, mentality, negative human characteristics, lack of consensus and unity, no national characteristics exist or they are merely hybrids of Western and Arab nations. The

positive characteristics were identified as: tradition/folklore, highly intelligent, positive human characteristics, patriotic, mentality, history and destiny. These indicators alone highlight the diversity of views amongst this small sample of respondents, and this is indicative of Lebanon's dilemma.

6.4.9. Development of National Culture

When asked about the consistency of national culture 59.3% of the respondents considered it as malleable, mobile and in a constant state of change, while 34.9% considered it as rigid, stable and immobile. Similar results are obtained in (Q7) which asked respondents whether the existing national cultural characteristics were immunised against change; 43.3% answered yes and 56.7% no.

6.5. Contentiousness of Key Socio-Political Issues.

Considering the convoluted confessional political system in Lebanon, the participants were also asked to rate the contentiousness of key socio-political issues as obstacles to achieving national unity. Identifying issues as highly contentious (HC), contentious (C), a little contentious (LC) and not an obstacle (N). Almost half of the respondents 49.5% considered the concentration of job appointments in the public sector to people other than through individual merit as Highly Contentious, 34% as Contentious, 12.2% a Little Contentious, and 4.3% Not an obstacle. Interestingly less than half (45.3%) considered confessionalism as Highly Contentious, 20.6% as Contentious, 22.9% a Little Contentious, and 11.2% as Not an obstacle. Confessionalism was more contentious among students from the AUB, $\chi^2(3)=12.20$, $p<0.05$.

Mentality and way of thinking was considered as a Highly Contentious obstacle to achieving national unity by 46.4% of the respondents, 33.2% considered it Contentious, 12.8% a Little Contentious, and 7.7% Not an obstacle. Also, these factors were more contentious among Christians ($\chi^2(3)=8.70$, $p<0.05$).

Customs and traditions were considered as significant but less of an obstacle to national unity as illustrated in the following results: 23.8% considered it as Highly Contentious, 26.4% as Contentious, 26.4% a Little Contentious, and 23.3% Not an obstacle. Both the

AUB ($\chi^2(3)=10.51$, $p<0.05$) and NDU ($\chi^2(3)=10.52$, $p<0.05$) viewed them as less contentious.

Regarding sought after sector's of employment this issues was considered as more contentious among LAU students ($\chi^2(3)=10.27$, $p<0.05$). Overall, 3% of the respondents marked it as Highly Contentious, 33.7% as Contentious, 30.8% a Little Contentious and 8.1% Not an obstacle.

High degree of affiliation to religious sectors rated significantly among respondents, 69.3% considered it as Highly Contentious, 23.8% as Contentious, 5.8% a Little Contentious, and only 1.1% identified it as Not contentious. Christians considered it as more contentious than non-Christians, $\chi^2(3)=8.25$ ($p<0.05$).

On the other hand, the degree of sedentary life to national unity was considered as Highly Contentious by 14.4% of the respondents, 31.7% as Contentious, 36.1% a Little Contentious, and 17.7% Not an obstacle. The degree of sedentary lifestyle was rated, more contentious by students from LAU ($\chi^2(3)=11.74$, $p<0.05$).

The level of education was rated as Highly Contentious among 24.9%, 33.9% considered it as Contentious, 21.7% a Little Contentious and 19.6% Not an obstacle.

An inability to cope with problems and crisis and handle them positively was considered as problematic, with 44% rating it as Highly Contentious, 31.5% as Contentious, 17.9% a Little Contentious and 6.5% Not contentious.

An obstacle delaying national unity was indicated when asked about the lack of democracy: 60.7% considered it as Highly Contentious, 22.4% as Contentious, 8.2% a Little Contentious and 8.7% Not contentious.


Not surprisingly, many felt that external intervention was wreaking havoc in national unity. This was notable as 70.3% considered it as Highly Contentious, 14.1% as Contentious, 9.9% a Little Contentious and 5.7% not contentious. Interestingly, external intervention was rated, more contentious by students from both the AUB and NDU, both registering $\chi^2(3)$, $p < 0.05$.

6.5.1. National Identity Formation

Considering the widespread condemnation and unifying factors of the tragic Qana massacre the respondents were asked whether the Qana massacre in April 1996 marked the beginning of a new Lebanese national identity. A total of 59.4% indicated yes, and the remainder no. However, 60.2% considered this national feeling as short-lived.

Students from AUB were less likely to believe that the Qana massacre had an effect (49% vs. 65% for other students) ($\chi^2(2)=5.21$, $p < .05$). Students from LU were also significantly less likely to agree (20% vs. 56%) ($\chi^2(3)=6.20$, $p < .05$). Women were more likely than men to believe that the massacre had had some effect (69% vs. 54%) ($\chi^2(3)=4.32$, $p < .05$). Finally, Maronites were less likely to emphasise the importance of the massacre (29% vs. 63%) ($\chi^2(3)=9.24$, $p < .01$). Logistic regression undertaken using these results yielded a model with two significant predictors: Maronite and AUB. Students from AUB were twice as likely to say that the massacre had no effect, whereas Maronites were 4.21 times more likely to say it had no effect.

Figure 6.4.



NB: Percentages do not add up to 100% because of missing data and/or small rounding errors

Figure 6.4. Political Characteristics of a Lebanese State

6.5.2. Desirable Characteristics of a Lebanese State.

This question allowed the respondents to give more than one response, which indicated that a democratic and secular political structure was overwhelmingly supported. Women were significantly more likely to believe that Lebanon should be democratic and secular (77% versus 57% for men) ($\chi^2(1)=8.48$, $p<0.01$). Christians were also significantly more likely to share this view (79% versus 55% for others) ($\chi^2(1)=11.94$, $p<0.01$), whereas Muslims were less likely to believe this should be so, (52% versus 69% for others) ($\chi^2(3)=4.38$, $p<0.05$). Students from NDU were also more likely to see this as the desirable state for Lebanon (75% vs. 59%) ($\chi^2(1)=4.75$, $p<0.05$).

A logistic regression analysis was conducted with responses to Q11a as the dependent measure and the significant variables as predictors. This analysis yielded a model with only one significant variable as predictor: gender. Specifically, women were over twice as likely to believe in a democratic and secular Lebanon.

Students from LAU were more likely to believe that Lebanon should be socialist and secular (27% versus 7%) ($\chi^2(1)=12.15$, $p<0.01$). Students from AUB were more likely than other students to believe that Lebanon should be capitalist (19% versus 4%) ($\chi^2(1)=11.45$, $p<0.01$). Men were also more likely to endorse a capitalist State (12% versus 4%) ($\chi^2(1)=4.37$, $p<0.05$). Muslims were more likely to believe that Lebanon should stay the same (10% versus 3%) ($\chi^2(1)=4.12$, $p<0.05$).

6.5.3. Confessionalism

Such results were further strengthened when asked (Questions 13 to 16) about the issue of confessionalism. Lebanon's political system is based on the system of confessionalism, a system that demands that power be distributed according to sectarian affiliations. When asked whether Lebanese confessionalism is a form of political plurality, almost 59% replied in the affirmative; yet, 51% felt that the system of confessionalism is an unfair system, 75% felt that confessionalism is regressive and 72% did not think that Lebanon should be divided along confessional lines.

Throughout the questionnaire the respondents continuously stated that the root of Lebanon's problems lies in its political system and that Lebanon will remain divided unless such a political system is changed. It could be argued that this is reflected in 87.5% of the respondents who support the 1998 cabinet decision to introduce civil marriage services in Lebanon.

When asked whether Lebanese confessionalism is a fair system: 2.6% of the respondents said yes, 51.8% said it was unfair and 45.6 stated it has had both positives and negative features. Since only 5 respondents believe confessionalism was fair, this analysis was confined to a comparison of 'unfair' versus 'fair and unfair' responses. Women were more likely than men to believe that confessionalism was unfair (44% versus 59% for men) ($\chi^2(1)=3.74$, $p<0.05$). Students from LU were less likely to see confessionalism as unfair (32% versus 57% for other students) ($\chi^2(1)=5.85$, $p<0.05$). By contrast, students from AUB were more likely to see it as unfair (63% versus 48%) ($\chi^2(1)=3.96$, $p<0.05$). These three variables were entered into logistic regression. This yielded a model with only one significant predictor: LU. Students from LU were 2.75 times more likely to rate confessionalism as both 'fair and unfair'.

The majority of respondents (75.1%) consider Lebanese confessionalism as regressing the progress and development of the Lebanese state, while the remainder (24.9%) considered it as enhancing. Students from the AUB were significantly more likely to say that confessionalism was hindering progress (92% versus 67% of other students) ($\chi^2(1)=15.23$, $p<0.01$). By contrast, students from LU believed that it was enhancing progress (46% versus 21%) ($\chi^2(1)=8.21$, $p<0.05$). People with a stronger Middle Eastern identification (Q1) were also more likely to say it was enhancing Lebanon. Logistic regression undertaken using Q15 (Yes/No), showed that being from the AUB was associated with a 4.75 times greater likelihood of being negatively disposed towards confessionalism, whereas students from LU were twice as likely to believe that confessionalism was enhancing the country. Each unit increase on the Middle Eastern identity scale (Q1) was associated with a 1.33 times greater likelihood of rating it as advantageous for the country.

When asked whether Lebanon ought be divided along confessional lines, 28.3% said yes, and 71.7% stated no. Students from the AUB were less likely to believe in division along confessional lines (18% versus 34%) ($\chi^2(1)=5.46$, $p<0.05$), whereas students from NDU were more likely to believe in division (38% versus 23%) ($\chi^2(1)=4.59$, $p<0.05$). Maronites were more likely to believe in division (50% versus 26% for others) ($\chi^2(1)=4.36$, $p<0.05$). Interestingly, having a stronger Hezbollah identity (Q1) was associated with greater endorsement of division. Irrespective of the general consensus amongst the Shi'ite community, who have traditionally been underrepresented along confessional lines. A logistic regression analysis undertaken using these predictors and Q16 (yes/no) as the dependent measure showed that being from AUB was associated with a 6.05 greater likelihood of saying 'no' to confessional division.

6.5.4. Civil Marriage Services

A high number of respondents (87.5%) agreed with the 1998 cabinet decision to introduce civil marriage services in Lebanon. Christians were significantly more likely to agree with civil marriage services (94% versus 84%) ($\chi^2(1)=4.64$, $p<0.05$), whereas Muslims were significantly less likely to agree (71% versus 94% for other groups) ($\chi^2(1)=4.64$, $p<0.05$). People who identified themselves more strongly as Aounist were also more likely to endorse civil marriages. Logistic regression conducted using these predictors and Q17 (yes/no) as the dependent showed that being Muslim was associated with a 5.9 times greater likelihood of disagreeing with civil marriages.

6.5.5. Religious affiliation

Participants were asked whether religious identity is increasing in Lebanon, the Arab world and the 'Middle East'. 76.4% considered it as rising in Lebanon, 80.9% in the Arab world, and 65.9% in the 'Middle East'. Maronites were significantly more likely to believe that religious identity was increasing in the 'Middle East' (90% versus 63% for others) ($\chi^2(1)=5.83$, $p<0.05$). People with strong PSP identification were also more likely to believe that religious identity was increasing in the Arab world. However, no other significant associations were obtained. Again the two significant minorities (the Maronites and the Druze) have expressed their views and perhaps fears that religious identity is not only significantly increasing in Lebanon but in the region also which brings about anxiety on their part as to what the future holds for them respectively.

6.5.6. Socio-Economic Factors

The majority of respondents, 84.4%, did not feel that enough is being done to eradicate poverty in the Lebanese class, health, education and economic sectors.

Students from AUB were less likely to believe that enough was being done (6% versus 21% for other students) ($\chi^2(1)=7.68$, $p<0.01$), whereas students from NDU were more likely to believe that enough was being done (23% vs. 12% for other students) ($\chi^2(1)=4.65$, $p<0.05$).

In relation to whether national unity can exist alongside such gaps of inequality, 76.1% considered it to the negative. People who identified themselves more strongly as Aounist and Phoenician were more likely to disagree. Both these variables were entered into a logistic regression analysis with Q21 (Yes/No) as the dependent measure. Only the Phoenician identification remained significant in the model. Each unit increase in Phoenician identity was associated with a 1.33 times greater likelihood of the person saying no to this question.

6.5.7. On Regionalisation

The hypothesis expected many of the respondents to be against the concept of a broader 'Middle Eastern' identity and the formation of a structure that encompassed the three non-Arab states -- Israel, Iran and Turkey -- with the broader Arab world. It was anticipated that

more flexibility existed towards former arch-rivals than among forefathers. In most respects this hypothesis was proven correct. Equally insightful, however, are the divisions which exist amongst the younger generations sampled regarding such a prospect of a common 'Middle Eastern' unit emerging.

One of the questions (Q. 25) posed to the students was whether they would consider identifying themselves as 'Middle Easterners'. 54% stated that they would. This was the opposite answer to that given by politicians and other prominent members of Lebanese society. Only one of the thirty-five interviewed gave a positive answer to such a possible form of identification or system from emerging, as will be demonstrated in further detail below. Although the comparison demonstrates an unequal sample of respondents it also highlights the differences between the current Lebanese leaders and its future ones.

Students from LAU were more likely to say yes (73% vs. 50%), $\chi^2(1)=5.59$, $p<0.05$. People who identified themselves more strongly as Progressive Socialist (Q1) were also more likely to say yes. Logistic regression showed that only the former remained a significant predictor when both variables were entered together. Being from LAU was associated with a 2.63 times greater likelihood of saying yes.

When asked in what circumstance would respondents would consider themselves as 'Middle Easterners' (Q. 26) the gap closed somewhat: 16.5% answered politically, 35.4% answered culturally, 16% economically, 12.3% psychologically, 11.8% 'all of the above', and 21.7% indicated 'other'. The 'other' alternatives specified were 56% geographically, 25% under no circumstances and 6% without Israel. This result can indicate that possibly the students didn't comprehend the term 'Middle East' when first asked about it in the previous question, or did understand it but with the full belief that such a union cannot take place with the inclusion of the non-Arab countries and notably Israel. This conclusion can also be drawn from the high amount of respondents who indicated that they would consider themselves as 'Middle Eastern' under cultural circumstances.

Political identification was associated with stronger Lebanese Arab identity (Q1). Males were less likely to identify themselves culturally (30% vs. 44% for women), $\chi^2(1)=4.23$, $p<0.05$, whereas Christians were more likely to identify themselves this way, (45% vs. 30%

for other groups), $\chi^2(1)=4.54$, $p<0.05$. Students from LU were more likely to identify themselves economically (33% vs. 13%), $\chi^2(1)=7.76$, $p<0.01$. Psychological identification was less likely to be endorsed by those with Marxist or Lebanese Force identification. Students from LU were also more likely to say 'all of the above' (27% vs. 9%), $\chi^2(1)=7.43$, $p<0.05$, whereas students from AUB were less likely to say this (6% vs. 15% for other students), $\chi^2(1)=3.90$, $p<0.05$. Christians were less likely to say 'all the above' (4% vs. 16%), $\chi^2(1)=7.01$, $p<0.05$, whereas Muslims were more likely to give this response (22% vs. 8%), $\chi^2(1)=8.24$, $p<0.05$.

Logistic regression analysis conducted using Q26e ('all of the above') as the dependent variable, yielded a model with two significant predictors: AUB and Christian. Specifically, students from AUB were 4 times less likely to say 'all the above' (multiple identity). Christians were 6.7 times less likely to provide this response.

Regarding the structure of such a political system emerging in the future, 44.8% expected it to be democratic, yet 19.3% felt that autocracy would be the political norm, 13.2% socialist and 14.6% Other. The response obtained demonstrates that future generations have little confidence in such a future political entity. 23% expected it to be a dictatorship, 23% that it would be religious and/or Islamic in nature, 18% as political theory X, 18% don't believe it will happen, 12% Communist/Marxist and 6% won't accept it. Therefore it seems from this sample of results that if such an entity were to arise it would largely be expected to be democratic, yet the realms of autocracy, dictatorship and religion are real threats to such a viable entity.

Christians were significantly more likely to see it as democratic (54% vs. 40% for other groups), $\chi^2(1)=4.00$, $p<0.05$. No other significant results were obtained.

When asked further about the political structure and what form it would take (Q. 28), 38.7% indicated it would be best to 'leave it to the future', 16% as complete unity, 13.2% as common borders with state sovereignty, 9.4% as a federation, approximately 7.1% as a confederation, and 7.5% as 'other'. The 'Other' response constituted 70% 'don't want it', 10% as a republic, 10% as democratic and 10% as city status. The outcome of this question seems to have had the students confused or apathetic to the political structure of

such a regional formation, with 42% desiring to leave it to the future and 70% of the 'other' answers suggesting they don't want such an entity. Did they fear that state sovereignty and independence would be nullified in such a structure and therefore opposed it?

Students from AUB were more likely to envision a complete unity (13% vs. 4% for other students), $\chi^2(1)=5.10$, $p<0.05$. Christians were less likely to envision a Lebanon with 'common borders with state sovereignty' (7% vs 17% for other groups), $\chi^2(1)=5.54$, $p<0.05$. Finally, men were less likely to say 'leave it to the future' (33% vs. 49%), $\chi^2(1)=5.27$, $p<0.05$.

These results indicate that although open to the prospect of the formation of a 'Middle Eastern' entity emerging, the students are divided regarding whether it should encompass Israel (with little hesitation it seems to include Iran or Turkey). As the questions progressed requiring more details as to the kind of regional structure attainable, more students indicated they did not want such an entity forming. Interestingly, if this were to be broken down into religious specifications it demonstrates that Christians are of the same belief towards this entity as Muslim students are. Therefore, this sample of students indicates that the commonly held myth that Lebanese Christians are supportive of Israeli-Jewish alliances is gratuitous in this case.

6.5.8. On Globalisation

When the students were asked direct questions about globalisation, that is, whether cultural globalisation threatens Lebanese national culture (Q. 24) the answers were almost equally divided, with 48% answering yes, and the remaining 52% answering no.

Question 23 asks the respondents whether they felt that globalisation is a negative or positive phenomenon. Twenty seven (27) percent of the students felt that globalisation is positive, 15% negative, while 58% thought it had both positive and negative factors.

Men were significantly more likely to have a negative attitude towards globalisation (20% vs 8% for women), $\chi^2(2)=6.85$, $p<0.05$. There were also a number of significant variations by national identity (Q1). Socialists were more likely to be negative, progressive socialists

and Amal were more likely to be positive, i.e. as compared with 'positive and negative'. Logistic regression conducted with Q23 recoded as a binary variable (positive vs. negative or both) revealed two significant predictors: socialist and progressive socialist identity. Each unit increase on the socialist identity rating was associated with a 1.6 times greater likelihood of being negative, whereas unit increases in progressive socialist identity were associated with a 1.45 times greater likelihood of being negatively disposed.

A cross tabulation of questions 23 and 24 showed that $\chi^2(2)=10.76$, $p<.01$. Of those who believed that the effects of globalisation were negative, 69% said that cultural globalisation threatened national culture compared with 31% who were not negative.

As a follow up to this question, students were asked whether cultural globalisation threatens Lebanese national culture. The response was almost equally divided, 48.2% considered it as threatening Lebanese culture while the remainder (51.8%) did not.

Students from AUB were less likely to see globalisation as a threat (35% versus 55% for other students), $\chi^2(1)=6.95$, $p<0.05$, whereas from LU were more likely to see it as a threat (75% vs 44%), $\chi^2(1)=9.37$, $p<0.05$.

These results, amongst others, indicate that the respondents are cautious toward globalisation. On the other hand, they seem to accept the progressive aspects of the phenomena such as openness and greater democracy, freedom of information and the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Yet, and as demonstrated in the previous chapter, they reject the instability it brings internally; for example, foreign workers and ownership, one sided information infiltration and Western dominance. As indicated in the sample responses, Lebanon, like most developing countries, is concerned that globalisation may bring about global cultural homogenisation and the lessening of its unique Lebanese or broader Arab national identity.

6.6. Conclusion

Events such as the bloody confessional conflict in Lebanon have undoubtedly affected the personal experience and history of the identity of every person in Lebanon. This is indicated in the survey results above. This, in turn, makes it difficult to dislodge such forms of identification in post-war Lebanon, especially amongst the younger generations who knew nothing but conflict and bloodshed.

The findings of this investigation demonstrate a convergence of socio-political thought amongst Lebanese students regardless of sect.

The first hypothesis to be dispelled by the findings of this survey and that needs to be taken up by social scientists is the younger generations identification along nationality and national sentiment, that is, identifying themselves as 'Lebanese'. This is despite the fact that many feel that a Lebanese national identity does not exist. In fact, identification along national and regional formations rated higher than primordial, religious or sectarian identification. Current and future governments need to focus on this, and upcoming, generations in order to build a stable patriotic form of national identity that overrides sectarianism and division within the community. The challenge ahead for policy strategists will be to overcome the myth that fellow Lebanese identify themselves first and foremost along sectarian and primordial formations. There is a need to actively pursue a public education campaign and promote projects and events to strengthen, maintain and enrich community sentiment and nation identification.

The results show that the most dominant identities in Question 1 were not purely primordial, but were instead based upon national-political identification. Many were willing to identify themselves primarily as Lebanese Arab and Arab Lebanese, while even more were willing to identify themselves as 'Middle-Easterners'. This is inconsistent with the prediction that primordial divisions would be the dominant form of identification among the students. It provides tentative support for the themes raised in the previous two chapters, namely, that Lebanese youth may on the one hand be exhausted by the prohibitive and regressive nature of primordial identification. On the other hand they are being influenced by the positive attributes of globalisation and seeking change rather than reinforcing the confessional divisions of their forefathers and present day *zuama*.

A second considerable finding is the confirmation that the problems highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, particularly the areas that outlined the vices of the Lebanese socio-political system, are problematic to the current generation of Lebanese youth. In order to attain success in the above education campaign the government needs to simultaneously demonstrate its active pursuit of stamping out corruption, nepotism, cronyism and work towards finding real, appropriate and tangible social, political and economic policies to rectify the issues of concern which were highlighted throughout the survey results.

The issue of multiple identity created an interesting response. Although when asked whether the concept was an obstacle to unity, the majority, answered to the affirmative. Yet, there was little difficulty in identifying five different forms of identification (Q.1) by the majority of the recipients. Nevertheless, the fact that 'Maronite' featured in the top five forms of identification shows that primordial forms of identification are still significant among many young Lebanese people.

Another noteworthy result is the relatively high ratings according to Phoenicianism. Of the 209 recipients, 53% identified themselves as Christian (Catholic, Christian, Maronite, Orthodox Christian), and 46.5% identified themselves as Muslim (Druze, Muslim, Sunna, Shiite). For those who identified themselves as 'Christian', 25% considered 'Phoenicianism' as a prominent (top five) form of their personal identity. Not far off, were students who identified themselves as 'Muslims', 20% of whom identified themselves as Phoenician as one of their top five identities.

Therefore, the questionnaire results demonstrate, as do the daily developments in Lebanese society, identity can be constructed for individuals by primordial influences, ideology or discourse, or it alternatively can be asserted by the individual. Throughout Lebanon's precarious political history, individual identifications could have been explored within certain parameters. Like any state, Lebanon has experienced the introduction of new identifications which have challenged the status quo. However, despite these waves of identification and external factors infiltrating Lebanon's borders and challenging Lebanon's security, political, administrative, economic and social institutions, it has been able to retain its political structure. Until these dominant structures are challenged and deconstructed by the will of society the true liberation of the Lebanese citizens will not transpire.

CHAPTER 7

The Art of Myth Making

In Lebanon's case the problem isn't so much with the political system of consociational democracy *per se*, but more so with the distribution of power and infiltration of the political system by the political and/or religious leaders themselves. Political history in Lebanon has demonstrated there is little room for political reform if it is not in the interests of the domestic powerbrokers. Their continued stranglehold over political development suppresses real political competition, which in turn is detrimental to political reform and ultimately successful nation building. Ultimately, this leads to the question of legitimacy of the political infrastructure and framework, and hence the leaders themselves.

This cycle of political instability and under-development is tied to the failure of de-colonisation within Lebanon. Lebanon remains politically functional with its strong perceived links to primordial identification and application and yet it is operational under the modern political functions and agencies of democracy. As argued earlier it is not necessary to have an 'either-or' system but it is crucial for the Lebanese to discover and create a post-national identity and political system which is functional, progressive and representative of all its citizens and not earmarked as either primordial, colonial or Western in nature but identifiable as independent, sovereign and 'Lebanese'.

This chapter therefore seeks to outline some necessary starting points in creating a post-national identity in Lebanon. It will be divided into two segments. The first will cover the need for nation building components, the second the deconfessionalisation of the state to allow unity and inclusiveness of all its citizens.

7.1. Nation Building

No one wants to eliminate the other. No individual, no political trend and no single community can rule this country. This country can be ruled only by the consensus of all.

- Rafik Hariri¹

Despite the numerous factions and sects dividing Lebanese society, political reality and history demonstrates the accuracy of the above passage. This insight illustrates the urgency for consensus towards nation building. In order for this to arouse nationalism, a sense of shared history and a community of sentiment need to be invoked.

Although it is accepted that culture and identity are not stagnant but regularly re-forming, a formula of common national history is needed to keep a nation cohesive. The Lebanese will first have to reach a consensus on what makes them a nation or political community and this can only be achieved if they manage to agree on a common vision of their past. A deterring factor is the inability of the various factions to agree on an official national version of Lebanese history from emerging.

Choosing to avoid the interpretation of past events or controversial issues will only cause more problems in the country's long-term future and stability. It is necessary to undertake an honest appraisal of Lebanon's long history - from the least controversial to the most controversial. No country in the world today has a period that has not been tarnished by some kind of controversy. It is necessary that the truth of Lebanon's history be re-examined in order for reconciliation to commence, a sense of closure to arise among its inhabitants and ultimately a sentiment of cohesive nationhood to emerge.

It is unrealistic to expect the 'escape' from history and societal integration of a newly independent state to take place within one generation, specially considering that it took European nations centuries to find a unifying nationalistic outlook from its body politic and reflected amongst its citizens. However, the problem within Lebanon is that the attempt at integration has been riddled with primordial, as well as domestic and external political manipulation, which in turn has promoted mutual segregation rather than national integration. These divisions have not only been persistent in the first generation of independence but also evident in future ones and more so in

¹ Mona Ziade, "Hariri's mea culpa: 'We'll do things differently'", *Daily Star*, August 21, 1998.

post-Taef Lebanon due to the ramifications and nature of the civil conflict. It is within this context a formula for national integration and cohesiveness needs to be developed in post-Taef Lebanon in order to secure its future longevity, security and independence.

K. Deutsch lists three components which allegedly ensure a healthy and cohesive political community: First, the ability of its members to communicate with one another, second, the readiness to share a common political culture and third, the need to demonstrate greater loyalty to the main political, administrative and cultural institutions than to any other political authority.² In the case of Lebanon, the majority of its political and social leaders did not adopt these three components. This was especially evident during the 17-year conflict, but also has been evident, to varying degrees, since the inception of the Republic. For example, during the 1992, 1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections and durations in office, it was evident that the Lebanese continue to demonstrate more loyalty to their political-religious *za'ems* than to the central political institutions and democratic practices.³

Historically it has been demonstrated amongst newly independent nations, attaining national assimilation is a slow and tedious process. Social mobilisation will assist assimilation to a certain degree but when mobilisation is undertaken at a rapid pace assimilation tends to lag behind.⁴ Deutsch adds, when the processes of mobilisation:

..have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will be precipitated into politics with their old languages, their old outlook on the world and their old tribal loyalties still largely unchanged; and it becomes far more difficult to have them think of themselves as members of one new nation.⁵

² K. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations - Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social integration", *World Politics*, Vol. 5, 1953, p. 61; EB Haas, *The Unity of Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1957, p. 5.

³ Habib Camille H., "Social pluralism, political confessionalism, and cultural development in the Second Republic", *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995. pp. 6-15, Harik Judith P and Khashan Hilal, "Lebanon's Divisive Democracy: The Parliamentary Elections of 1992", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 41-53; and Lebanese newspapers during June 1998.

⁴ Lijphart, 'Ethnic Conflict in the Western World', pp. 46-64, p. 49 in Esman (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict In The Western World*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997, quoting Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, p. 73.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

This has been especially reflected within post-war Lebanon, which had sustained *quasi*-cantons of political and sectarian cleavages for well over fifteen years. The Lebanese political community has failed to sustain itself, let alone create a sense of community, which in turn has contributed to a weak nation-state and the 'malintegration' of its citizens. The primordial, traditional, sectarian and external factors listed above have all contributed to the weakness of this state, intensifying differences, miscommunication, conflict and the failure of the nation-state. Reconsideration of culture, nation and identity is necessary. The dichotomy between these concepts has long been in existence, but how they have developed needs to be publicly examined and resolved. The challenge ahead is to overcome old tribal and political loyalties and replace them with mutual feelings of national sentiment.

There is a need for emphasis on the notion of Lebanese community, which will ultimately share a common set of values and seek a common state idea, regardless of its ethnic makeup. It ought to be founded on shared political values and culture, social and cultural integration, community solidarity and loyalty. Emphasis is on common culture, values and symbols. Otherwise states such as Lebanon, and most formerly colonised countries, have 'malintegration characteristics'. Where, in the past, their main goal was to unify in order to be free from colonial domination and gain independence, once this was achieved however little was done to carry it through and reach national consensus on the political, social and economic fronts. Consequently, primordial, ethnic, religious, political and economic cleavages exacerbate the divisions and result in long-term instability, political and developmental stagnation or underdevelopment and social and cultural disintegration.⁵¹⁴

This is what arose in Lebanon. Lebanon's internationally recognised geographic borders, national anthem and flag, administrative bureaucracies and other state symbols have not been sufficient to create a nation state unifying its inhabitants. Social and cultural integration is crucial for the creation and success of a 'community of sentiment'. A community that seeks unity through solidarity and not division, mutual sympathy and loyalty, as opposed to aversion and hostility.⁵¹⁵ Common culture, values and symbols are indicators of social community and integration, as opposed to ethnic division that in most cases leads to ethnic segregation, intolerance and conflict. It is necessary for every nation

⁵¹⁴ Klot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 54-74, pp. 54-55.

⁵¹⁵ D. Easton, *A System's Analysis of Political Life*, John Wiley and Sons, NY, 1965, pp. 171-89.

state to retain and emphasise the gelling factors of nation building and cohesion in order to sustain its successful endurance.

7.1.1. Invoking National Sentiment

*We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, it is a passion. It is not necessary that it be a reality. It is a reality by the fact that it is a good, a hope, a faith, that it is courage. Our myth is the Nation, our myth is the greatness of the Nation! And to this myth, to this grandeur, that we wish to translate into a complete reality, we subordinate all the rest.*⁵¹⁶

Nationalism is based on the political belief that, a particular community of people *represent*, a natural embodiment who should be *represented* through an independent and sovereign geo-political entity. It may be argued that: "national identity ought to be accorded political recognition".⁵¹⁷ In order for any nation-state (and/or political entity) to exist its citizens and the state as a whole need to distinguish themselves from other communities and states. Whether such a distinction takes place on racial, religious, linguistic, cultural, geographic, historical or political levels these attributes are usually highlighted as unifying factors. In the event a nation-state is feeling threatened by 'significant others', that is, ethnic minorities or immigrants, or when other nations are perceived as a threat or a challenge to the nation (whether imagined or real), it is defined or redefined in order to highlight its authenticity and sovereignty. Therefore, the reinvention of nationalism and national identity is an ongoing phenomenon and one that cannot be neatly compacted into immutable and rigid categories.⁵¹⁸

The immediate challenge for the Lebanese is to invoke a sense of nationalism amongst its citizens. Nationalism and the advent of a nation-state has never been a simple task, and Mark Twain's comment that: "No tribe, however insignificant, and no nation, however mighty, occupies a foot of land that was not stolen", cannot be further from the truth. Most nation-states had to fight to secure their survival and independence. As a result, 'significant others' were more than usually alienated and marginalised by the state's ruling elite who won dominance through the bullet or ballot. Other challenges to the nation-state have

⁵¹⁶ Benito Mussolini, 1922, quoted in H. Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, New York, 1935, p. 218.

⁵¹⁷ Ted Honderich (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 1995, p. 603.

⁵¹⁸ Triandafylidou, "National Identity and the 'other'", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1998, pp. 593-612, p. 594.

come in the form of animosity towards historical claims and/or failed national projects. This is categorically evident in the 'Middle East' region and amongst many countries internationally. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, Lebanon is no exception.

It is through historical recollection and/or memory that national sentiments can be expressed through genuine belief, instigated to repel external influence and occupation and utilised as a unifying tool by governments. Ruling elites have been known to adopt nationalistic policies to overcome internal divisions and resist change. They have shaped both the national identity and character of their citizens by invoking patriotism, national sentiment and a sense of historical and socio-cultural 'uniqueness'. In one form or another, the creation of a 'myth' occurs to invoke and maintain a historical and/or genealogical chronology that endures over time and invokes national consciousness.

The use of sentiment, imagery, symbolism and living memory have long played a role in the politics of nationalism and the creation of national consciousness and character; whether it be through the use of the pyramids for the Egyptians, or the Star of David and the Holocaust for the Israelis. These symbols and living memories assist in constructing the nation. Ruling elites or those vying for the reign of power utilise traditions, myths, history, symbols, customs and institutions to forge modern nations and national identity. However, this cannot be done without a degree of manipulation through recombining or reinterpreting them to match their goals.⁵¹⁹

In some instances extreme cases of nationalism and historical manipulation-myth making are found. One such example is found in Egypt. Salama Musa, a secularist Copt, born in 1887 and influenced by Lebanese Christian thinkers in Cairo, wrote his own beliefs on secularism, human and cultural evolution, the East, and the West.⁵²⁰ He was an instigator of Arab cultural denial and argued that ethnically and culturally there was no difference between Egyptians and Europeans.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁹ Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?", pp. 16-17.

⁵²⁰ As a starting point Musa thought the East was backward and corrupt whilst the West was riding the path of enlightenment. His goal was to change his readers' minds in abandoning the East and its traditions and culture for Western civilisation. He wrote: 'Although the sun rises in the East the light, however, comes from the West.' Ibrahim, "Salama Musa: An Essay on Cultural Alienation", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, October 1979, pp. 346-357, p. 348 quoting Musa's, *Al-Adab li al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 1958, p. 12.

⁵²¹ For example, he once wrote: "...It is true that though the Arabs who, during their expansion and rule in Asia,

Musa rejected Arabic culture on the grounds that it was parochial, unable to meet modern conditions and was foreign to the Egyptian mind. Arabic and its culture "suppress(es) our Egyptian nationalism; those who indulge in it become orientated towards the Arabs, admire the heroes of Baghdad instead of becoming imbued with the Egyptian spirit and history".⁵²² Because of this, Musa urged Egyptians to put the Arabs and their culture out of their minds altogether: "We are superior to them and a thousand years ahead of them."⁵²³

Thus, Musa argued that if Egyptians have to study Arabic culture then it must be as a specialised subject like archaeology but not as a national heritage. Instead of Arabic, he urged Egyptian writers to create a pure Egyptian culture, to use colloquial Egyptian as the medium of expression, to reflect on their own life and create a culture that corresponded to the Egyptian spirit.⁵²⁴ Musa rejected the notion that Egyptians are Arabs, he argued Egyptians were non-Semites and are Pharaonic.⁵²⁵ He therefore, sought to invoke ancient historical identifications and to ignore modern affiliations, based on part-historical and part-myth, to construct a separatist independent Egyptian socio-political identity.

Anderson and Smith argue that the construction of the nation depends on human agency and imagination as a historical invention, rather than depending on the evolutionary explanation that was both necessary and beneficial to the development of human society.⁵²⁶ However, in view of Musa, Anderson and Smith's theories, it needs to be questioned how natural and historical evolution has taken place over the years. Without the introduction of new species within the natural process of evolution some crucial flora and fauna would have been eliminated, as the reverse has also happened. Similarly, historical events and societal evolution have been affected by conflict, cultural exchange, assimilation, integration, historical manipulation and imagination. It is difficult to totally separate the process of natural human cultural and historical evolution with that of human intervention and manipulation. Almost every action taken and development achieved reacts

became mixed with other 'non-European' peoples, Egyptian blood became unfortunately mixed with Oriental, but (nevertheless) we remained European in our features and outlook." Ibid., p. 349 quoting Musa's *al-Yawm wa al-Ghad*, Cairo 1928, pp. 231-232.

⁵²² Ibid., p. 353 Quoting *al-Tathqif al-Dhati*, Cairo 1960, 4th edition, p. 126 also '*al-Lugha wa al-Adab al-Arabiyyan*', p. 13.

⁵²³ Ibid., quoting *al-Yawm wa al-Ghad*, Cairo 1928, p. 235.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., pp. 353-54 quoting *al-Yawm wa al-Ghad*, Cairo 1928, pp. 126 & 251.

⁵²⁵ Adding, Egyptian Muslims have pure Egyptian blood as they did not intermingle with the Greeks and Romans as the Copts did. Ibid., citing *Misr Asl al-Hadara*, Cairo pp. 8-9

⁵²⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

to a past result, which will affect the historical evolution of any given subject matter. It may not be of long-term significance but it may nevertheless affect a minority of people who will carry it through as an integral part of their memory and impact on their identity and interpretation of a historical past. It is with the combination of natural historical evolution and human intervention that nationalism succeeds in legitimising its innovations. Therefore, how far nationalists go in 'inventing' and 'manipulating' traditions and history is important.

Smith, on the one hand, questions the use of 'invented traditions' as the concept of tradition connotes continuity, a linkage with past beliefs and practices.⁵²⁷ In contrast, Hobsbawm argues nationalists' ability to use invented traditions such as the nation state, nationalism, history and national symbols "rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation".⁵²⁸ In addition, Hobsbawm argues that to create and stabilise modern societies and class structures, there needs to be the creation of a 'superstructure' in the form of 'invented traditions'. Such 'invented traditions' will be created in order to fill the gap left behind by old traditions and assist in essential rates of social and political mobilisation and industrialisation. To create a sense of belonging adopting traditional language to provoke national tendencies, introduce new values and most importantly to maintain the current political and social order uses a form of persuasion.⁵²⁹

However, Hobsbawm's confidence in the simple replacement of old traditions with 'invented traditions' is questionable regardless of the 'traditional language' used to enforce such values. This has been evident throughout the decades in the Arab world. For example, Kuwait physically reflects the achievement of modernity and progress, whilst its political addresses consist of 'invented traditions' regarding societal and political progress. However, regardless of its capital wealth and development, the thinking and actions of many of its citizens and the ruling elite themselves is distinguishable on primordial 'native' factors such as tribal importance, religion, cultural traditions and superstitions. Thus, although they have been successful in 'inventing traditions' of Kuwaiti nationalism and reflecting social cohesiveness, internally and amongst political opponents these 'invented

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12 quoting Hobsbawm, Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 13-14.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

traditions' are considered as the reinforcement of the al-Sabah reign with little incentive to bring about true representation of Kuwaiti society.

Kuwait is not alone in this instance. In fact, many countries throughout the region have high rates of industrialisation and modernisation, yet its relativity to social and political mobilisation has not been undertaken on an equal footing. While aspects of old tradition have been utilised by Arab elites to provoke national tendencies, such rhetoric is expressed in many Arab speeches throughout the region which reflects 'invented traditions' such as historic tendencies towards democratic ideals, equity and social justice within a national context, but in reality much of the old primordial traditions continue to be displayed and enforced. In the post-colonial Arab world such pretexts have been evident and a form of 'tribalism' has developed amongst the ruling elites. Hence, in order for all round development to take place the concept of 'tribalism' or 'nativism' needs to be interjected in order for a 'real' form of national identity to be formulated. By doing so, an individual will in turn be one step closer to liberation, constructive and cohesive nation-building and ultimately a post-national identity.

In order to attain this the Lebanese need to develop and sustain a sense of cohesive political community by agreeing upon a common historical vision. Lebanon is in an awkward situation, as it has not had the natural processes of solidarity, homogeneity or a unified past which makes the task all the more challenging. Nations such as Egypt, Iraq or Syria are able to honour mythical ancestors or legendary heroes, whilst nations such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan are able to invoke tribal descendancy to religious or reigning figures. In both instances these nations may distort history and invoke national sentiment more easily, regardless of its historical accuracy, than for instance deeply heterogeneous nations such as Lebanon. The challenge is to create a historical myth which will not be historically objectionable or offensive to one or more groups and which will stabilise, unite and represent a nation at large. By invoking common sentiment, shared interests and realisation of their shared history with the acceptance of not repeating, or at best avoiding, historical wrongs, heterogeneous countries such as Lebanon can set foot on the path of successful nation building.

The problem with Lebanon since its inception has been that its primordial ties and loyalties have impeded national solidarity, the numerous religious and sectarian communities have

in effect acted as tribes vying for political power and representation. Power contests, ideological conflicts and cantonisation in Lebanon invited external interference and intervention over the years. Although primordialist factors have long been considered as impediments to national cohesiveness and solidarity they do not necessarily need to be viewed as detrimental to the overall stability of Lebanon.⁵³⁰ There is a need to develop a Lebanese identity that unifies its inhabitants along national sentiment and regardless of secondary identification and/or loyalties. This needs to be attained by fusing elements of traditional Lebanese identity into a modern, non-confessional pluralistic society. Lebanon has been successful in the past by adapting practices and ideals of other civilisations by merging them into traditional Lebanese cultural practices. Through effective political leadership and civil society participation the aim is to work towards a unified national identity which demonstrates its compatibility and coexistence with basic traditional Lebanese culture but without the strangulation and dominance of *zu'ama* elements of society.

Two spheres that affect the nature of the community of sentiment and assist in nation building are the education system and the media. The education system, amongst other things, is a major player in socialising children and youth on community integration and relations. In most cases it is towards a common national cause as opposed to calls for separatism and exclusiveness. The role of religious institutions also plays a major role in enhancing social integration and community particularly in ethnically diverse countries. The media and telecommunications, contribute to this sense of stability by emphasising strong integrative factors such as common values and language, as opposed to parochial, racist, or localist influence.

7.1.2. Education

One of the major problems which arose in Lebanon and contributed to its prolonged conflict in the 1970s was the very fact that upon independence the newly elected government of the Republic of Lebanon did not attempt to deal with Lebanon's multifarious history. Rather it sought to portray Lebanon as a peaceful coexisting nation of 17 legalised ethnic cleavages living in pluralistic harmony, when, in fact, its very foundations were hopelessly structured in quicksand. The only way of escaping this debilitating reality was

⁵³⁰ Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics In Lebanon", *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1968, pp. 243-269, p. 246.

through the groups pulling together to find a solid, long-term solution to stabilise their sinking nation. There were conflicting views as to whether Lebanon's territorial independence and its political system were legitimate, and the validity of the myths and creations being utilised. Due to their inability to agree on unifying and basic common national sentiments the failure of the decolonisation project submerged Lebanon's post-independent period.

The question is not of writing an alternative history alongside a traditional one but rather a question of re-evaluating national history from within, that is, questioning the assumptions and determinations upon which national historiography is founded. This is because history, like culture and identity, are ongoing processes that link the past with the present and strengthen social contracts. Such national histories are founded on enduring shared values, culture and symbols, which reinforce and perpetuate a nation's self image. Preservation of national historiography and political continuity can only be secured through negotiation, compromise and reconciliation of the past in order to attain the formation of bonds of natural solidarity and cohesion.⁵³¹ Thus, Lebanese history textbooks and education need to be all things to all its citizens. All views need to be included regardless of inconsistency.⁵³²

One of the greatest failures of Lebanese governments over the years was its inability to establish a unifying educational and cultural belief system. The Lebanese political, educational, media and cultural systems encouraged sectarian schisms and separatist trends among its diverse populace by reinforcing the stratified social mosaic of Lebanon. Other groups were more than often being referred to as 'the Other' which debilitated the ability for any real form of closure of past conflicts to arise, let alone notions of coexistence, harmony or a sense of community.

⁵³¹ Interestingly, George Houran recently examined Fakhr al-Din's political authority and found that it extended beyond the boundaries of contemporary Lebanon, which would undoubtedly propel Arabist views. In addition, he argued that al-Din's real political goal was to reunify historic Greater Syria and not Lebanon in its contemporary form Van Leeuwen, "Fakhr al-Din and his place in Lebanese National History", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 13, 1997, pp. 52-55, p. 55.

⁵³² "History in the Making" - Opinion, *The Daily Star*, 29/10/98.

Over the years almost every Lebanese ethnic and religious group had developed myths about the history of the country and their respective group history. One of the major problems in Lebanese political history is the inconsistency of these 'myths' and 'legends' resulting in contradictory historical analysis. For example, historians disagree on the status of 19th Century ruler Fakhr al-Din II. Lebanese nationalists consider Fakhr al-Din as the founder of the Lebanese state while Arab nationalists consider him an Arab hero opposing the tyranny of the Ottoman occupation.⁵³³ This public disagreement over such a prominent figure in Arab history demonstrates the complexity of Lebanese national identity.

Consequently, educational institutions and places of worship have in most instances socialised the younger generations into the mind-set of their respective religious communities. They did this by utilising sectarian and political accounts of historical events rather than within a national framework of commonality, tolerance and diversity. With education becoming more accessible, so was the disintegrating national factor becoming more widespread, contributing to Lebanon's identity crisis through these spheres. Lebanon was unable to sustain a common single Lebanese identity. Instead, it "supported and reinforced the development of a stratified social, religious and familial mosaic of Lebanon, all of which compete successfully with the state for the loyalty and identification of the citizens".⁵³⁴

With little government supervision of the private schools and universities, little change is expected. Such institutions continue to be the breeding ground for confessional divisions. In turn, reinforcing the stratified social mosaic of Lebanon rather than developing a broader national identity and contributing to nation building, which will ultimately work towards a unified state system rather than a cantonised one. The education system can play a vital role in formulating the notion of national consensus and unity by enhancing social homogeneity, mutual respect and social and cultural integration. This is why it is important that a national history textbook is written and taught in all school curricula (private and public) rather than encouraging sectarianism.

⁵³³ Habib, "Social pluralism, political confessionalism, and cultural development in the Second Republic", *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 7, Summer 1995. pp. 6-15, p. 8.

⁵³⁴ Kliot, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

At present three areas within the education system demonstrate its current state as affecting Lebanon's future because of the sectarian divide which has been institutionalised since the 1860s. First, illiteracy rates are differentiated along sectarian lines; second, student enrolment in both private and public schools is evident along sectarian lines⁵³⁵ and finally, levels of education are accorded to regional and hence sectarian difference.⁵³⁶

It is with this realisation in mind that the Hariri government in the mid-1990s set itself the task of rewriting national Lebanese history texts for the entire education system. A sensitive job, but one, that needs to be undertaken. It is true that not everyone will be satisfied with the outcome, especially when one sect's militia is considered as brave fighters while others may view them as terrorist. The lack of national heroes does not assist the task at hand. Nevertheless, the authors of this mammoth project cannot attempt to answer questions which are yet to be debated or maturely conceived, rather they need to pose such questions to the reader with all the information known about that particular incident and leave it to the reader to ponder over. If this task continues to be delayed and placed into the 'too hard basket' or glossed over in polite pleasantries rather than hard-hitting facts, then this "imaginary past will only create a fictional future".⁵³⁷

The question of how much history needs to be written and reviewed in the writing up of Lebanon's new history textbook has been a major point of controversy. The director appointed by the government to undertake such a project seems to be vying for an imaginary past as demonstrated in the statement that the history of Lebanon "must eliminate everything that creates conflict between Lebanese: in order to facilitate the healing process". He adds that: "only later, can we raise the truth dosage".⁵³⁸ However, by skirting the controversial issues it will only postpone the healing process further and may actually contribute to another conflict if these issues are not resolved earlier. On the other hand, taking the extreme view and utilising historical trauma to remember the crimes of

⁵³⁵ The disparity of education is also notable in regional divisions, which are therefore reinforced confessionally. The core of Lebanon (including Mount Lebanon and Beirut) has the most public and private school facilities and the highest proportion of students per population. The Shi'ite dominated areas of the Beqaa valley and South Lebanon mostly exist on the periphery of education results and live a largely rural and poor existence. The Sunna majority and Greek Orthodox inhabit the North Lebanon districts, which are the middle ground of education-literacy rate of enrolment to population indices.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-59.

⁵³⁷ Opinion, "Fictional future?" *Daily Star*, 24/09/98.

⁵³⁸ Quoted in *Time International*, January 15, 1996.

one group against another will only create a bitter cycle of victimisation, whereby the victim becomes the oppressor and justifies his/her actions through past trauma.⁵³⁹

However, leading academic and appointed committee member, Antoine Messara, asks that the discussion should be turned upside down until it focuses on one question:

Why is it that despite the multiplicity of religions, thoughts, ideologies that exist here and the long war these differences have engendered in the recent past, Lebanon has managed to survive as a nation?... The essence of renewal in writing Lebanon's history has to be in producing a book that encompasses all its communities, places the country within its national and Arab contexts, stresses the fundamentals of human rights and, perhaps most importantly, "strives to build a collective, national memory".⁵⁴⁰

It is on this basis that a national history needs to be constructed, out of which will emerge an enduring national identity. Past unifying figures such as Fakr al-Din, Bishara El Khoury, Riyad El-Solh and Kamal Joumlatt need to be revered, as do unifying traits such as: common language-dialect, culture (habits, different to other Arabic speakers, "sophisticated"), traditions (family loyalty, respect for elders), geography, history, diversity, and entrepreneurship. It needs to be acknowledged that despite the ongoing rhetoric during the war seeking the division of Lebanon along sectarian lines, when it came to making the decision, the territorial integrity of Lebanon was endorsed and this alone indicates that the potential for long-term understanding and stability is possible.

A starting point of commonality may in fact commence with one of the most divisive issues amongst Lebanese, that is, the ancient history of Phoenicia. Over the years the Maronites created a number of myths that assisted their calls for unity such as their exclusive historical links to the Phoenicians and Maradites. Although these allegations are dismissed by Arabists and Islamists alike and have been proven historically inaccurate⁵⁴¹, the

⁵³⁹ "Methods of Forgetting", by Edward Said, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue No. 400, 22-28 October 1998. <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/>

⁵⁴⁰ Nada Al-Awar, "Arguments could delay new history book for 2 years", *Daily Star*, 30/October, 1998

⁵⁴¹ In addition to Kamal Salibi's (*The House of Many Mansions*) antithesis to the Maronite genealogical claim to Phoenicianism, Antoun Saadee, founder of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party argued a valid point. He argues that if the identification of Phoenician is to emerge in today's age then not only can people of Lebanon who resided along the shores identify themselves in such a way but also and equally entitled are the Palestinian people to such an identity - due to the known name it was given as the 'land of Canaan'. He goes on to state that with the interbreeding of Phoenician Canaanites, the Aramo-Chaldeans and the Hittites genetically led to the Syrian people. He adds therefore, that "the Maronites, they being part of the Syrian people which is centred in the interior of Syria, are Syriac rather than Phoenician in their original tongue and in culture and blood". Saadeh, "The Maronites are Syriac Syrians", *MEQ*, Vol. 3, No. 10, 1996, pp. 20-21, p. 21.

suggestion of possible links with this ancient civilisation has drawn support from younger generations, as was demonstrated in Chapter 6 which outlines the survey results. Supporters of such identification are not restricted to students who identified themselves as Christians.

Therefore, it should not be dismissed that affiliation with ancient civilisation may be a commencing point in gaining ground for a national Lebanese identification. By understanding the full truth of one's history and accommodating such knowledge, the individual citizen can in fact be free and liberated from the colonial mind—set in which they are imprisoned.

Additionally, focus on post-war national sentiment needs to be embraced and focused on by the government as a merging point of Lebanese national identity development. Examples include: the 1996 Qana massacre which witnessed widespread condemnation of Israeli aggression on the UN base in South Lebanon - killing 192 innocent Lebanese victims; the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese occupied lands after 22 years; and less politically orientated events such as the Lebanese national basketball team, *Sarghess*, qualifying for the Asian Cup competition in 1998. These three events in post-war Lebanon demonstrated the citizens' pride and joy in being 'Lebanese' and it is memories of such events that need to be embraced in Lebanon's challenge to create a post-war Lebanese national identity. If we come to see tolerant open education in Lebanon which conveys diverse perspectives in its historical text books, involving dialogue of religious tolerance and understanding, then there is hope that emerging and future generations of Lebanese will escape much of the intolerance their forefathers were taught and inbred. Such generational progress, one would expect will be maintained.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴² In 1999, Education Minister Mohammed Beydoun Education Minister Mohammed Youssef suggested he was considering the introduction of education on the three major monotheistic religions for school children as part of the curriculum. In addition to the three major religions it is necessary that the Education Ministry incorporate teachings of the other significant religious-sectarian groups found in Lebanon in order to overcome the negative stereotypes and misunderstanding of each sect. Incorporating secular, religious and historical education of Lebanon will aid future governments in maintaining and sustaining national identity. Beydoun's suggestion had come after the controversial remark made that religious education should become compulsory in public schools, a subject which has not arisen since the 1960s when it was first banned. Beydoun was of the belief that religious education is necessary to promote understanding and the values found in each of them, whilst prayer and other religious rituals can be learnt by students "at home, at church or in a mosque." *Daily Star*, 11/01/1999.

7.1.3. Media

The media in Lebanon, as anywhere in the world, can enhance national stability and unison. However, judging by past action the media contributed to these divisions by increasing the schisms along confessional lines and opening Lebanese society to foreign influence. The mass media can also play a role in enhancing commonalities and endorsing national consensus by contributing to nation-building and highlighting the nation's values and symbols. Most media establishments in Lebanon are owned, or influenced, by parochial political-religious groups.

In the 1950s and 1960s Lebanon was the cultural and intellectual hub of the Arab world. In 1962 alone Lebanon had a total of 304 newspapers: 53 dailies, 152 weeklies and 99 periodicals. These publications were printed in various languages, ranging from Arabic, French, English to Armenian. The second half of the 1970s reduced the total to 134 newspapers: 111 Arabic, 15 English, four in French, four in Armenian.⁵⁴³ This vast number of publications led a Lebanese journalist in the mid-1960s to note that the country had too many dailies and that it "was all very well to have a diversity of points of view, but how could a cohesive public opinion exist without some common agreement on what was important and what was true?"⁵⁴⁴

This division went further with the use of electronic media - the radio and TV stations - and currently large-scale access to satellite channels and the Internet. With the onslaught of the 1975 civil war most militias and alliances developed their own broadcasting networks almost exclusively for propaganda purposes. With the implementation of the 1989 ceasefire the existence of some of these radio and TV stations continued, although these restrictions have been minimal on the *zu'ama*. Figures noted in February 1996 demonstrated the Lebanese Council of Ministers had reduced the number of licences from 60 to 4 and 150 to 10 respectively.⁵⁴⁵ The ownership of these stations in turn reflects the political monopoly of the *zu'ama*. FTV (Future TV) is associated with PM Hariri, MTV is associated with the Murr family (International Security portfolio), NBN associated with the Speaker of the House Nabih Berri, and LBCI (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation Broadcasting International); initially established by the Lebanese Forces and the late Elie

⁵⁴³ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 73, & Bustros p. 318

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁵⁴⁵ Marwan M Kraidy, "Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon", p. 394.

Hobeika, and has since been dominated with pro-Syrian Maronite government officials amongst its shareholders.⁵⁴⁶ *Al-Manar* TV is licensed to broadcast by Hezbollah.

In addition to these restrictions on broadcasting, journalists have been pressurised in their reporting. There have been examples of journalists being put in precarious positions during politically sensitive situations or considered as defaming members of Lebanon's ruling elite. For example, in 1996 five Lebanese newspapers (*al-Diyar*, *al-Kifah al-Arabi*, *Nida' al-Watan*, *al-Massira*, and *al-Liwa*) were charged with defaming Lebanese President Hrawi.⁵⁴⁷ *Al-Jazeera* satellite news station (Qatar) has felt the ramifications of reporting on the Arab-Israeli conflict and especially on Israeli developments that have proven to be politically sensitive. In December 1997, MTV was pressurised to cancel a live interview with exiled General Michel Aoun. The government banned the interview and upon doing so provoked mass protests on the street by Aounists as well as citizens opposing government infringement on civil liberties, which embarrassed the government, forcing it to overturn its earlier decree. In 1998, two Lebanese satellite news stations and political affairs programmes were affected when the government cancelled the only two licences for LBCI and MTV. This arose after these two channels aired an interview by controversial MP Najah Wakim who was exposing government corruption at the time. The channels did not resume broadcasting until October 1998 when the Cabinet reversed the decision.

Civil liberties need to be maintained. The 1990s, however, have witnessed the infringement of freedom of speech and reporting, for instance Lebanese journalists have been subject to new laws enforced by new regulatory statutes. For example, the 1994 Audiovisual Law has the power to suspend or close stations that violate pre-existing statutes that may be violated with the broadcast of "all programmes, news, photos or films which may disturb public order or provoke confessional discord or confessional or sectarian feelings"⁵⁴⁸; while the 1996 Decree 7997 banned stations from broadcasting news that sought to "inflame or incite sectarian or religious chauvinism".⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁶ Marwan M Kraidy, "Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon", p. 394.

⁵⁴⁷ Gary Gambill, "Freedom of the Press in Lebanon: Going... Going... Gone?" Americans for a Free Lebanon website, 1997, p. 1. URL: <http://www.afinet.com/special reports/pressfreedom.html>

⁵⁴⁸ *Lebanon Report*, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1994, p. 4.

⁵⁴⁹ Marwan M Kraidy, "Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon".

Such media outlets and/or government policies and decrees have supported and reinforced the development of stratified social, religious, primordial and political cleavages, by restricting both debate and change in Lebanon's socio-political system. Consequently leaving little room for free speech or representative reporting. As a result, Lebanon has failed to sustain a single or common Lebanese identity and nation-state through its cultural and educational systems. Every faction sought to attain its loyal followers' identificational support and patronage through these modern techniques and propaganda machines.⁵⁵⁰

For example, during the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon in June 2000 and the victorious marches into these liberated villages that soon took place, the nation's pride and glory was virtually reported hour after hour on most Lebanese TV stations. A sole TV station, LBC, took the decision to report this historic moment in hourly five minute intervals - unless the President of the Republic spoke, or Christian villages in the South were liberated - only then were regular programs interrupted. The LBC mostly interviewed Christian villagers and Christian reaction to the liberation. In between these intervals a basketball match who had the national Hikmi/Sargess 'Christian' team competing for its position on the premiership ladder was considered more important coverage. On the other hand, the LBC International, a satellite channel transmitting internationally via satellite and cable had ongoing coverage of the whole event. Interestingly the LBC Executives thought it was necessary to show selected scenes to its domestic Lebanese audience and yet a more comprehensive 'united' coverage to the Lebanese diaspora and the international community. It gave the impression that Lebanon was a country unified in its joy for the liberation of its land, while on the domestic front LBC viewed this victory from a sectarian and regional view rather than as a national victory to all Lebanese citizens.

Similarly, each TV station through the decisions of its owners-producers, demonstrated the sectarian divide underlying this political victory. Almost all of the major sectarian leaders, members of parliament and religious leaders visited fellow sectarian liberated villages. It was rare that a Druze MP would visit a predominantly Shi'ite liberated village, or a Shi'ite MP would visit a predominantly Christian liberated village and vice versa. Therefore, this historic event which was meant to be, or could have been taken up as an opportunity to celebrate a national political victory, instead witnessed fellow sect members-*zu'ama* revel in largely 'communal' celebrations.

⁵⁵⁰ Klot, op. cit., p. 60.

Therefore, the diversity of views being promoted through the media and its sectarian leaders endorsing them through their own actions and decisions, in turn further promoted fealty relations and communalism rather than national unison. It is questionable therefore whether a cohesive national identity and commonality can arise in such separatist culture.

7.2 Deconfessionalisation

Sectarianism has to be eradicated from the minds of the people before it can be eliminated from the texts. If we try to do the opposite, we will face a major disaster, with the country plunged into the situation of victor versus vanquished. The vanquished will try to free themselves from the situation through war, or will leave the country, making Lebanon a country of a uniform hue.⁵⁵¹

Imperative to the success of building a post-war national identity in Lebanon is the simultaneous deconfessionalisation of the whole nation. From the 1860s onwards confessionalism has become rooted in the political culture and psychology of Lebanese citizenry. If any effective change of deconfessionalisation is to take place it needs to be enforced initially within a sectarian framework such as the model of consociational democracy but without *zu'ama* domination.⁵⁵²

In 2000, MP's, religious and political representatives and members of the public called for the re-examination of the Taef Agreement in three main areas: One, to ensure the mobilisation and fairness in the political process; two, application of the Taef Agreement's proposals towards deconfessionalising the state and three, re-examining Syria's role in Lebanese affairs. Such developments first arose with the conclusion of the 2000 Parliamentary elections when MP Walid Joumblatt expressed concern over the pregnant stagnation of Lebanese political affairs, the need to amend some aspects of the constitution and the continued strengthening of Lebanon's internal security and their collaboration with the Syrian *mukhabarat*. Soon after the 'Maronites Bishops Memorandum' was released, calling for the exit of Syrian soldiers from Lebanon and serious consideration in deconfessionalising the state of affairs in Lebanon.

⁵⁵¹ Interview with retired General Fuad Malek, Monday Morning, 1997, <http://www.morning.com/1997/1331/9.html>

⁵⁵² Adelphi Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

This memorandum provoked an overzealous reaction from pro-Syrian supporters. These forces went as far as suggesting that the memorandum was forced on the Bishops by 'Israeli-Zionists and US forces', upon examination of the aforementioned document no such accusations seem warranted at this stage. As a consequence, many political factions and individuals have since submitted their own views, proposals and suggestions in reaction to these two statements.⁵⁵³

Soon after, five MPs with close Syrian affiliations signed a petition in Parliament calling for a committee to be established to bring an official end to sectarianism in politics. The petition was addressed to the 'troika' - President Lahoud, Speaker of the House Berri and Prime Minister el Hoss and cited Article 95 of the Constitution: "The Chamber of Deputies that is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to bring about the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan" requiring them to set up a National Committee headed by the President, the Speaker, Prime Minister and other members of Lebanese society. Many Syrian opponents questioned the timing of the petition and the petitioners' open affiliation with Syria. They argued that the petition was in fact instigated by Damascus and was a reply to the 'Maronites Bishops Memorandum' and a warning to the Christian establishment that if the Constitution and the Taef Agreement are fully enforced it is not necessarily always to the advantage of the Christians, particularly the Maronites.⁵⁵⁴

Lebanon's theoretical and actual political history has enshrined co-operation and inter-communal consensus at the institutional national level. Therefore, it will be difficult to break from tradition and not continue to practice communal balancing outside the parameters of the Constitution and the Taef Agreement. One of the major concerns is the influence of the war on political advancement and development. Abolishing confessionalism in Lebanon is going to be one of the most challenging factors in the stability of future governments and indeed the state collectively. The war that ravaged Lebanon sharpened confessional consciousness and allegiances and multiplied confessional practices and prejudices that cannot be easily forgotten or ignored in Lebanon's new political era. The effects of the brutal war will take between one and two

⁵⁵³ For further reading see the Lebanese newspapers of September 2000.

⁵⁵⁴ Zeina Abu Rizk, "MPs call for end of Sectarianism", *Daily Star*, 29/9/2000.

generations, if not longer, to overcome and for any real consensual attempt at deconfessionalising the state and peoples to be successful.

If it is to be enforced, on the other hand, obviously not all sectors of the community will hail such a move. Given the instability of the Lebanese political structure, violence could easily result. The special committee recommended to deal with this issue, by the Taef, will need to consider enlightening and practical methods of defusing sectarianism. It will need to involve all segments of society.

If recent events are anything to go by however, there is a real likelihood that sectarianism will not be truly challenged. This may be the solution for the *zuama*. However it endangers the long-term stability, prosperity and development of the Lebanese nation. Distrust, negative competitiveness and pessimism will endure and escalate the quasi-feudal-religious divisions as they did in pre-Taef Lebanon.

Some sectors of the community are pushing for the deconfessionalisation of the state. They are publicly attacked, as though the proposers are attempting to destabilise the communal understanding backed by the Constitution. They are also negatively portrayed as anti-state, provocative and backed by external 'enemies' of the state, the endorsement of confessionalism by Lebanon's political, administrative and social systems contributes to Lebanon's incompetence and produces highly frustrated and disillusioned youth.

Since the signing of the Taef Agreement in 1989 Lebanon seems to have been going through various phases of secular endorsement versus sectarian-religious identification. Not surprisingly, religion remains the a dominant form of identification within Lebanon, as the survey results had demonstrated. However, there has been fear that religion may encompass this pluralistic nation to suit its demographic majority, the Shi'ites. Lebanon does not envisage itself as an Iranian styled religious entity, something that was demonstrated by the Lebanese Shi'ite community itself. There seems to be a slow, but significant, turn towards the idea of a secular state being promoted but whether it is enough for real change to take place is yet to be seen.

Religious enthusiasts who claim that secularism is a Western political philosophy can take note that there are varying degrees of secularism, which can be adapted to suit domestic needs and values. There are three main secularist schools of thought: The first model is based on the total separation of religion and state with no adherence to religion; the second endorses the separation of state and religion, but relies on principles based on non-religious morality and endorses full liberty of faith and worship; the third places emphasis on collective religious spiritualism guided by non-religious morality with the endorsement of personal worship⁵⁵⁵, because such points of worship cannot be followed by all under a theocracy. A religious theocracy is exclusionary and conflictual, especially within a heterogeneous nation such as Lebanon. The major problem among some Islamic and Arab countries and intellectuals revolves around progress, modernity and secularism being equated with Westernisation. Lebanese and Arabs alike, need to be persuaded that secularism is "not Western or evil". Rather, it is rational, sound and a solution to many of the region's problems.⁵⁵⁶

Another problem that needs to be considered is, if deconfessionalisation is successful at some time in the future where will smaller minorities stand? Future administrations need to ensure that members of the smallest religious sects are not denied access to high-ranking positions in the civil service because of their minority status. Simply put, confessionalism needs to be replaced by professionalism and studied closely before any real proposals can be put forward and accepted.

Deconfessionalisation of Lebanese society will be an extremely difficult task to implement due to its continued reinforcement of such allegiances and practices. If undertaken in a sudden and forceful manner it will more than likely result in failure as it will only provoke a self defence mechanism in most groups and intensify confessional cohesion rather than defusing such tensions and promoting national unity. The call for deconfessionalisation in the past has been interpreted by the Christian group, particularly the Maronites, as an attempt to lessen their power, role and status within Lebanese society, as demonstrated in the enforcement of the Taef Agreement. With their diminished status there is also a fear that they will be persecuted in a minority Muslim environment, as is reflected to varying degrees in Arab states. How does one overcome this contradiction when almost all

⁵⁵⁵ Beshara, "Toward A Secular State in Lebanon!", *MEQ- Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 2 No. 7, Summer 1995, p. 4.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

groups within Lebanon are concerned that the current system does not reflect equality or proportional representation? And yet most groups, although they call for the abolition of confessionalism with varying degrees of secularisation, simultaneously and quite contradictorily call for a greater say in decision-making and fairer representation in state institutions by maintaining the basis of the current system.

There are long-term ramifications of maintaining the confessional system. One, the eligibility of high ranking government jobs being dependent on sectarian identity rather than merit and the continued loyalty to the 'sponsored' sectarian *zaem* rather than developing and encouraging national allegiance and loyalty. Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism will become further entrenched as a consequence. Two, it increases and maintains the power of the various *zuama*, who use their power for parochial purposes. Three, it continues to weaken national solidarity by segmenting groups against one another, therefore promoting instability and conflict. Four, fixed communal quotas will be enforced and therefore people are discriminated against because of their religious affiliation, which may in turn breed frustration, disenchantment and feelings of inequality and discrimination, as well as, contribute to competition and hostility among the groups.

Five, these factors will breed corruption, inhibit the promotion of accountability, impair efficiency and weaken the credibility of government institutions. The resulting condition results in a paradox of attaining Lebanese national unity in a multi-religious society where confession is entrenched within each citizen's psyche. Pluralism, democracy and progress has not been encouraged. Lebanon has long been a colonial creation endorsing the rights of a small minority, the ruling class, along the sectarian divide and within their own national interests.

Six, confessional competition for power amongst the various groups and will continue to replicate administrative structures into confessional powered fragments rather than building centralised government institutions. Finally, as the recent history of Lebanon has demonstrated, the continued adoption of confessionalism will contribute to the vulnerability of the state by attracting external powers, either via invitation or by force.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁷ Salam, pp. 1-2.

As one sect and/or faction seeks to out-power the other by seeking the financial, moral and military endorsement of external powers.

The Lebanese conflict clearly demonstrated that the political system is only as good as the manner in which it is practised. It is all well and good having the physical structure of the political institutions, constitutional documents, and national symbols but these attributes do not make a nation. There is a tendency to misuse political terms to describe a person or nation. For example, most former Lebanese public figures are publicised as modern, liberal, progressive, secular, and democratic, while in actual fact many have traditional, conservative, reactionary, religious and regressive traits. This contradiction is also highlighted in the description of Lebanon's political system. Although it is considered as one of the most democratic in the region it has also had cases of gerrymandering, corruption, voter manipulation and rigging, and electoral fraud over the years.⁵⁵⁸ The 1992 elections were no different, except they set an additional precedent for future elections; Syrian political manipulation and interference.

In reality, the modern Lebanese political system is a facade behind which true traditional political maneuvering takes place. As outlined previously, this is reflected within most political decisions and in political party procedures. Most Lebanese political parties and individuals may mirror the language, organisation and techniques of their Western counterparts and avoid carrying non-parochial titles, but in reality the internal business is mainly based on traditional communal power bases such as sect, family, clan or region. It has become evident over the decades that although weakened traditional bases of authority persist and with patchy adoption of Western ideologies and capitalist orientations, genuine confusion over authority and legitimacy penetrates Lebanon and the region. This has resulted in conflicting traditional and modern ideals and practices.

⁵⁵⁸ For example, Hariri's first time Premiership ended in disgrace with accusations of a lack of transparency by many leading, current and former, members of parliament. Nabih Berri, Najah Wakim, Walid Joumblatt and others have all accused the Hariri government of unaccountability. This is one of the reasons why Lebanon's national airlines (MEA) had made unprecedented losses. Other reasons relate to the maladministration of the airlines and overstaffing. Fares Bouez, foreign minister in Hariri's first term as Prime Minister, accused him of working outside of his portfolio by adopting the role of foreign minister in his international visits. Moreover, the government was also considered as incompetent and unconcerned for its citizens, eg, their inability to get Lebanese migrants working in the Democratic Republic of Congo out of danger when civil strife had arisen there in 1998. Instead the people in danger needed to rely on the Lebanese expatriate Abdel-Sater Ashour to organise their exodus. A similar situation arose in Sierra Leone in 1997.

Genuine efforts towards establishing and building on political culture, accommodation, and the national collective will are needed to make a strong and stable nation.

The future lies with Lebanon's youth although it is a segment of society that is becoming equally divided. Michael Young found that Lebanese youth are divided into two categories. One of them is sizeable and politically active in schools, universities and community organisations, championing human rights issues. Others are more politically persuaded or lean towards the political left, seeking to promote an equitable political and social welfare system. The two factions have often coincided in many political issues. The other category of Lebanese youth, the majority, is apathetic about the promises and counter promises given during the post-war period. The lack of opportunity, corruption, bureaucracy, lack of political, economic and social development further alienate these youth, many of whom seek to exit Lebanon. This division amongst Lebanese youth was clearly reflected in the survey results undertaken. Additionally, many experience a sense of 'dislocation' within their lives because of past and present governments' inability to move on from their political past and develop an equitable, accessible, representative, stable and strong nation-state.

There is a need for coexistence, mutual tolerance and understanding of Lebanon's religious sects, a call which was expressed at the Lebanese centre for Islamic-Christian studies at Balamand University at a conference held in Lebanon in August 1997, held by the Geneva based World Council of Churches. There is a need for the cessation of corruption and a need for accountability. Lebanon requires civil service reform, administrative decentralisation, political party reform and development, a strong state, effective institutions and a respect for the constitution and other laws. Lebanon needs to demonstrate efficiency and productivity, prevent harmful political speculation, stand above confessional and notable affiliation, dissolve intra-communal rivalry or confessional subdivisions and be more accepting of demographic changes. Ultimately Lebanon needs to re-examine its culture, identity and the concept of a Lebanese nation, particularly light of modernisation, regionalism and globalism.

Although still requiring reform, the resurrection of municipalities in 1998 was a positive move. It was encouraging to witness large segments of Lebanese society participate and encourage local representation, especially since local councils have long been considered as a breeding ground for future politicians. The enthusiasm was reflected in numbers.

Whilst only 600 persons stood for the 128 parliamentary seats, the municipal council elections were contested by 10 000 candidates.⁵⁵⁹ What was not so surprising, however, were the flaws highlighted by the political system, particularly demonstrating the entrenchment of sectarianism and primordialism at all levels of society. *Al-Safir* editor Tala Selman best summed it up in the following manner:

The results of the municipal and mayoral elections in Mt Lebanon .. revealed dangerous flaws in our political system ... in our fragmented country, the electoral process has become a democratic veneer covering the cancer of confessionalism (*ta'ifiyya*) which has now spread to become a deadly epidemic of sectarianism (*mathhabiyya*).⁵⁶⁰

Primordialism and confessionalism continued at a heavy cost. It was estimated that approximately US\$200 million was to be spent by candidates, on the first post-war municipal and mayoral elections!⁵⁶¹

7.3. Conclusion

Part Two of the thesis has demonstrated that cultural productions within Lebanon can be classified either as primordial, religious-sectarian or nationalist. There are multifarious forms of identity in Lebanon. They can both assimilate and reject one another, depending on the circumstances of the moment. Each one of these multiple identities discussed throughout these chapters are forms of cultural productions of public and private identity. The questionnaire results for example, allowed us to examine the different ways in which the sample of Lebanese citizens conceived themselves and how they believe others conceive them. Examining the past and contemporary national characteristics and identities of Lebanese citizens allowed us to process the development, alteration and integration of these concepts within Lebanese contemporary life.

Although the above seems to indicate that Lebanese society has largely been primordial and unchanging this is not fully the case. But what is apparent is that Lebanese society has been unable to release itself from its traditional cultural structures or integrate them successfully into modern political and societal infrastructures. One of the reasons for this is

⁵⁵⁹ "Karam Extends Invitation to Sabeh to Chair Meeting of Committee of Freedom in Lebanon", *Monday Morning*, 30/6/1998.

⁵⁶⁰ *As-Safir*, May 28, 1998.

⁵⁶¹ As reported in *Al-Anwar*, May 24, 1998.

political legitimacy and survival. Hence, "some political leaders have been willing to liberalise, but none have been willing to comprehensively democratise".⁵⁶² In order to achieve a freer Arab world, its citizens need to be able to express themselves and participate in the political system freely. The ultimate challenge ahead for the Lebanese is to establish nation-building myths in order to aid the creation of a post-war national identity. An identity that the Lebanese are both confident and secure with especially in face of new cross-border challenges.

⁵⁶² Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East* - Vol. 1, F.J. Brill, Netherlands, 1995, p. 5.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated the concepts of nation-state and national identity have not been firmly rooted in Lebanese political culture and identity. Despite the exterior manifestations of an evolving political system, Lebanon remains plagued by questions of political legitimacy, and its inability to develop 'identity politics' at a state level. Instead, the rule of nobility, external intervention, fixed political structures, confessional allegiances, and primordial loyalties remain entrenched in its political psyche and daily practices. In order for political progress to occur nation-states need internal legitimacy to promote cohesiveness, stability, protection of borders, economic efficiency, open, liberal and democratic political structures, and an identifiable inclusive national identity. Lebanon in 2000 has failed to achieve this and the project of decolonisation remains incomplete but attainable.

The thesis highlighted how external forces continue to play havoc in the development, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon as a nation-state contributing to its socio-political failures. This has been exemplified in the 1989 Taef Agreement. The Taef agreement reinforced confessionalism due to lack of enforcement. It was also demonstrated that post-war Lebanon continues to witness an incongruous relationship between the state and religious authorities through the maintenance of the political system of confessionalism.

The findings of the survey confirmed the disillusionment, apathy and frustration amongst its citizens and especially its youth. If change within Lebanon remains elusive the apathy amongst youth will only strengthen as the lack of opportunities, corruption, cronyism, nepotism, instability and alienation of society is maintained by the political elite. The sense of dislocation and alienation will challenge the government's ability to sustain the nation-state, which will further question the legitimacy of the ruling elite and possibly disturb contribute to the delicate equation which currently sustains Lebanon. There remains a real risk of internal conflict revisiting Lebanon if these problems are not addressed.

It has been demonstrated how Lebanon can move forward in its endeavours towards a liberated society by implementing changes within its political system, the media, education, and by implementing steps towards de-confessionalising the state. National reconciliation has progressed slowly, political progress and reforms have been largely symbolic, civil society continues to be stifled, and sectarianism remains strongly entrenched at all public and private levels. The long-term sustainability and durability of Lebanon is in doubt if these conflicting paradigms continue to develop unabated. It was argued that Lebanon's long-term sustainability cannot be retained in its current structure. Lebanon needs to implement its post-war political reforms in order to end its unstable, undemocratic and retrogressive way of living.

By creating a post-war national identity Lebanon will be more confident in its ability to face new-cross border challenges, whether in the form of hostile intervention or positive forces improving its socio-political, economic and cultural practices. Lebanon needs to fully develop its 'identity politics' at a state level and seek to reconcile it with the variant 'politics of identity' arising at the local level, in order for the successful formation of post-war national identity to develop.

It was demonstrated that liberal democracy as practiced in the 'West' does not need to fully replace the current political system of Lebanon, or any other Arab nations. It is not necessary to give up any known identity to conform to another, which is preferred because of undue political and/or economic pressure. This will only reinforce the centuries-long division of the Orient and the Occident, and continue the roll-on effect from colonial and imperial ambitions. What is required from the former colonized is the ability to apply open modern political functions and agencies of democracy without losing their own cultural identity, heritage and knowledge, which has sustained and developed them for centuries. The Lebanese, and Arabs, need to create a post-national identity, which is functional, progressive and inclusive and not ear-marked as tribal, colonial or Western in nature but identifiable as independent, sovereign and 'liberated'.

The primordialist-cultural school of thought [which focuses on ethnic and religious cultures, social structures and loyalties through historical continuity] may be of some merit

in the short-to-immediate term in making the transition from a primordial Lebanese structure to an evolving one. However, as advocated by the instrumentalist-rationalist school of thought, the long-term sustainability of Lebanon requires identity to be changing, restoring, recapturing, constructing and reconstructing throughout history, as a result of historical processes. The flexibility of ethnic and religious solidarities through material, security and status needs and their ability to adapt to environmental pressures is crucial. It is with the continuous construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of identity and memory take place that a sustainable notion of national identity and memory is forged.

As argued earlier, Lebanon needs to *demystify* its historical and 'colonial amnesia' and revisit, remember and interrogate their colonial and post-colonial pasts, in order for the real development of a post-colonial state to eventuate. Lebanon needs to combine its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial culture. It needs to remain on the wheel of identity cultivation and evolution. The Lebanese need to dominate their own space of power and knowledge. They can re-examine their nation's past, and progress to true liberation by resisting the pulls of mimicry and nativism. It is only then that successful regional or global identification can evolve.

Having acknowledged Lebanon's problems, the fact remains that despite all its obstacles, historical encounters and schisms, Lebanon has not fully disintegrated as a nation-state. This needs to be examined more closely in future research and by the Lebanese government, as the answers will be the necessary foundation needed to strengthen Lebanese national identity. As the survey results confirmed there are multifarious forms of identity in Lebanon, which can be accepted or rejected at any given time depending on the circumstance of any given moment. This is the beauty of the 'politics of identity'. Notions of identity that can be utilized in the public and private spheres do not have to be seen as negative attributes. Instead, by examining past and contemporary national characteristics and identities of Lebanese citizens, we can process the development, alteration and integration of these concepts within Lebanese contemporary life. The survey results demonstrates that Lebanese view other Lebanese identifying themselves predominantly within the confines of religious-sectarian identification but when quizzed about their own dominant factor of political identification many nominated identifying along the lines of state nationalism. This is a significant finding which needs to be at the heart of government public policy and 'identity politics' development. Multiple identity does not need to be viewed as an obstacle to nation-building but rather as a contributor to the multi-faceted

reality of Lebanon. The government and civil society need to work together to find a consensus on what is acceptable within the public domain.

As for the reality of a 'Middle East entity' emerging in the short-to-medium term it seems highly unlikely due to the increased tension the Arab, particularly Palestinian, Israeli conflict has left within the immediate vicinity of events and on the region as a whole. The rise of the second *intifada* has only further contributed to the anger of the region's people. The intensified use of the suicide bomber acting out, the frustration, disillusionment and anger of Arab and Israeli policies have only fuelled tensions within the region. Although inroads have been made between Israel and numerous Arab states, particularly Gulf states, at the economic level it is highly unlikely that the blueprint envisaged by Peres will be applied at any point in the near future with the backing of the region's citizens.

The ongoing dispute about identity within Arab nations amongst the progressive and traditionalist elements of society is only going to intensify with regional and international developments. Arab regimes need to closely examine their own behaviour and past actions when considering the state of Arab affairs today. The impact of colonialism and ongoing external interest in the region needs to be reconciled with, and policies developed, to counter the impact it is having on individual nation-states and the region as a whole. Whilst the political, economic and cultural affairs of individual Arab nations remain underdeveloped and un-liberated, the likelihood of any regional entity emerging as a strong regional competitor remains an illusion.

The thesis demonstrated that although globalisation brings accessibility to Western food, clothing, pop-culture and the like, its impact on non-material values such as democracy are not necessarily acceptable. Instead it was found, particularly within the case of Lebanon, that local adaptations within value systems, political, economical and cultural institutions incorporate cultural traits exclusive to a given country or region. Thus, although there is a fear found amongst many Arab and/or Islamic individuals towards globalisation, it is also evident, that globalisation has, in turn, displayed numerous local adaptations of the changing world political system.

In conclusion, as the politics of identity through all of its diversity needs to be constructed, nurtured, developed, sustained and re-constructed in the Arab world, similarly political and cultural pluralism needs to be encouraged at a regional and global level. Just as cultural and political homogeneity is unsustainable, impractical and unachievable at a global level, it cannot be achieved in heterogeneous nations such as Lebanon. Instead political and cultural pluralism need to be incorporated into a shared and just polity. Coexistence, debate and shared value systems are the required focal points. In the meantime, a transcendent Lebanese Identity remains a mere mirage.....

AFTERWORD

The abhorrent events which unfolded on the morning of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America was a ramification of the decades-long US foreign policy interests in the 'Middle East'. The spectacular imagery of two planes demolishing the World Trade Centre building, transmitted internationally, demonstrated the organization, dedication, and precision required to have undertaken such acts of terror.

Soon after the 'war on terror' had begun, the world was once again divided into two opposing forces. US President George W. Bush defiantly stated: "you are either with us, or against us". Leaving no time to absorb, question or ponder the events of that tragic day and why they occurred. The battle soon became one of 'the forces of good versus the forces of evil'. Despite limited attempts at community harmony it became a matter of Islam versus Judeo-Christianity, East versus West, 'Us' and 'them'. Many governments throughout the world took the opportunity to clamp down on domestic and regional opposition groups labeling them 'terrorists', and thus justifying their own acts of terror and oppression. These acts will only fuel opponents of any given regime. The cycle of violence and oppression will only escalate.

Afghanistan and Iraq have experienced the wrath of US aggression. Under a dangerous doctrine of 'pre-emptive strike', departing from accepted norms of modern international law, foreign military forces removed another nation's government. This was allegedly because of stocked weapons of mass destruction and alleged links with Al Qaeda, the terrorist group allegedly behind the acts of September 11. Re-occupation of the Arab world has commenced. The question is whether the re-colonisation of the region will bring about more turmoil, destruction and instability than it did at the beginning of the 20th Century. To date, the situation in Iraq demonstrates this might be the case, leaving the US in its most vulnerable overseas military position since Vietnam.

This chain of events can all be linked to the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, which saw the establishment of a US naval base in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This was one of the major grievances of Ussama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind behind the attacks on New York and Washington. The 'Middle East' region is at boiling point. Saudi Arabia is on

the edge of major change, Iran and Syria may be the next target of the 'coalition of the willing', the Jordanian and Egyptian governments are dependent on US protection, the Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat remains impounded by the Israelis for the second year in his headquarters in Ramallah, Israeli targeted killings of Palestinian political and military leaders intensifies, suicide bombings in Israel return, and the innocent on all sides of the equation continue to be the pawns of their political elite.

In Lebanon the climate is one of alarm and anxiety. International pressure on Lebanon has intensified in the past several months to ban the legitimate political party, Hezbollah, because it is viewed by the West and its allies as a terrorist group. This is despite the fact that it emerged as a liberating force seeking to expel Israel from its occupied lands, and has since developed into a strong political force in Lebanese politics with several MPs elected by the people to represent the party in Parliament. Australia is one of the countries to have banned any branches or association with Hezbollah in Australia or abroad.

Developments in the region will intensify before there is a lull in the conflict. Whether the Bush Administration seeks to eradicate Iran as one of the three 'axis of evil' states remains to be seen. In recent months the Bush Administration has accused Syria of harboring some of Iraq's former political elite and its weapons of mass destruction. Threats have ensued for some period against these two countries, if and how the US may act out its foreign policy threats will be closely monitored by many throughout the region and internationally.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Taef Agreement
Appendix 2 – Sample Survey

APPENDIX 1

THE TAEF AGREEMENT

Members of Parliament met in Taef, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and reached agreement on political reform, the ending of the war in Lebanon, the establishment of special relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a framework for the beginning of Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. General Aoun, head of the government at the time, rejected the Agreement. His main objection to it was that Syria had not committed itself either to rapid or complete withdrawal from Lebanon. To the contrary, Syrian forces were to stay in place for a full two years, ostensibly "assisting the Lebanese government extend its authority." After that, Syrian forces were to be redeployed only as far as the Beqaa valley. The Agreement gave no timetable for any further Syrian withdrawal, merely stipulating that "such withdrawals would be negotiated at the appropriate time by the governments of Lebanon and Syria." Furthermore, Aoun charged that the political reforms were unacceptable because they simply shifted power from the office of the President to that of the Prime Minister without solving any fundamental political problems. General Aoun issued a Decree dissolving Parliament before the Parliament could meet, elect a new President, and enact the Agreement into law.

The Parliament, however, ignored him, passed the agreement on November 4, and went ahead to elect Deputy Rene Muawwad to the Presidency on November 5.

THE TAEF AGREEMENT

First, General Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles:

A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.

B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.

C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.

D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.

E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.

F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability.

G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.

H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].

I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.

2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber may vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.

3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.

4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.

5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:

a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.

b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.

c. Proportionately between the districts.

6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.

7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.

2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.

[No item 1. as published]

2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be

considered major issues: The state of emergency and its abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him individually.

F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases: a. If its chairman resigns.

b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.

c. If its chairman dies.

d. At the beginning of a president's term.

e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.

f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.

2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected on the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:

a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.

b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms:

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units | district and smaller units | through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:
 - a. The president of the republic.
 - b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
 - c. The prime minister.
 - d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.

3. Freedom of religious education.

C. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.

2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.

3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.

4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.

5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.

G. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories: Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:

1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.

2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.

2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.

3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.

4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.

5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammama-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation: Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations: Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.

APPENDIX 2

**The Effects of Cultural Globalisation on Middle Eastern Identity
- A Lebanese Case Study -**

Questionnaire

1. From the list below, rank YOUR personal forms of identification from 1 to 5. 1 being the most dominant, 5 being the least dominant					
Identificat- ion	1	2	3	4	5
Middle Eastern					
Arab Lebanese					
Lebanese Arab					
Lebanese					
Phoenician					
Maronite					
Orthodox					
Catholic					
Sunna					
Shiite					
Druze					
Phalangist					
Lebanese Forces					
Aounist					
Socialist					
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)					
Amal					
Hezbollah					
Ba'athi					
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP)					

* List cont.' over the page *

Communist					X
Marxist					X
Clan/Tribe/ Family	X				
Syrian					X
Palestinian		X			
Armenian					X
Kurdish					X
Other:					

2. From the list above how do you think the majority of Lebanese society identify themselves? ie. regional, pan-national, state nationalism, racial, ethnic, religious, political affiliations/orientations, or traditional identification such as via clan/tribe/family?

- 28
1. religious
 2. regional
 3. political
 4. ethnic
 5. traditional identification

3. Do you think that the concept of multiple identity is an obstacle to national unity?

- a) Yes
- b) No

4. Do you think a common National Lebanese Identity exists? Please explain.

I think people step down have this common National Lebanese identity. Probably they keep on fighting and not showing it but in time of difficulties and wars we see them all together helping each other out.

5. What do you feel are the national characteristics of the Lebanese people?

- helpful
- sociable
- materialistic

6. Do you feel that national culture consists of:

- a) Rigid institutions properly fitted together into a stable and immobile structure.
- b) Malleable and mobile, where it is the outcome of a constant process of cultural production.
- c) Other:

.....

7. Do the existing characteristics, which make any given national culture distinct, make them immunised against change?

- a) Yes
- b) No

8. How would you rate the following as Obstacles to achieving National Unity?
 Highly Contentious (HC); Contentious (C); Little Contention (LC); Not an Obstacle (N)

	HC	C	LC	N
Concentration of non-Lebanese in specific labor sectors				X
Lebanese fears of increasing number of non-Lebanese			X	
Concentration of job appointments in the public sector to people other than through individual merit	X			
Confessionalism		X		
Mentality and way of thinking	X			
Customs and traditions		X		
Degree of communal bigotry			X	
Sought after sectors of employment	X			
High degree of affiliation to religious sectors	X			
Degree of sedentary lifestyle			X	
Level of education		X		
Inability to cope with problems and crisis and handle them positively.				X
Lack of democracy	X			
External Intervention	X			

9. Do you feel that the tragic Qana massacre in April 1996 marked the formation of a new Lebanese national identity? ~~Or was national feeling short lived?~~

- a) Yes
- b) No

10. If you answered yes to question 9 do you feel that the national feeling was short lived?

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) Continues to exist today

11. Which of the following characteristics do you think the Lebanese state should possess?

- a) Democratic and secular
- b) Have a religious-Muslim character
- c) Socialist and secular
- d) Capitalist
- e) Have a religious Christian character
- f) Stay the same
- g) Other:

.....
.....

12. Some political theorists argue that the multiple ethnic and clan identities found in Lebanon have prevented the ability of a national culture from developing by circumstances and intentions. Whilst others would argue that colonial history and postcolonial institutions within Lebanon itself were to blame for maintaining ethnic and tribal distinctions. Briefly explain why you do or do not agree with either statement.

13. Do you think that Lebanese confessionalism is a form of political plurality?

- a) Yes
- b) No

14. Do you think that Lebanese confessionalism is a fair system?

- a) Fair
- b) Unfair
- c) Has both its positive and negative aspects

15. Do you think that Lebanese confessionalism is enhancing or regressing the progress and development of the Lebanese state?

- a) Enhancing
- b) Regressing

16. Do you think that Lebanon ought to be divided along confessional lines?

- a) Yes
- b) No

17. Do you agree with the recent cabinet decision to introduce Civil Marriage services in Lebanon, and why?

I am not knowledgeable in this subject.

18. In most countries around the world there continues to be some form of underlying link between religion and state. In your opinion why hasn't the explicit separation of religion and state been successfully undertaken in the Arab world? Do you think it is necessary?

I don't think it will ever be established.

19. Do you think that religious identity is increasing:

- a) In Lebanon? Yes/No
b) In the Arab world? Yes/No
c) In the Middle East? Yes/No

20. Poverty and inequality exist in the Lebanese class, health, education and economic sectors. In your opinion is enough being done to eradicate inequalities and inconsistencies?

- a) Yes
 b) No

21. Can national unity exist alongside such gaps of inequality?

- a) Yes
b) No

22. Do you think that technological change is affecting the ability of national communities and national states to assert their sovereignty in the international arena and over their national destiny?

- a) Yes
 b) No

23. Do you feel that globalisation is a negative or positive factor?

- a) Positive
b) Negative
 c) Has both positive and negative factors

24. In your opinion does cultural globalisation threaten Lebanese national culture?

- a) Yes
 b) No

25. Would you consider identifying yourself as a Middle Easterner?

- a) Yes
b) No

26. In what circumstances would you consider yourself as a Middle Easterner?

- a) Politically
b) Culturally
c) Economically
 d) Psychologically
e) All of the above
f) Other:

27. If a common political Middle East is to emerge in the future, would you expect it to be:

- a) Democratic
- b) Socialist
- c) Autocratic
- d) Other:

28. If such a political structure were to arise in the future would you want it to be in the form of:

- a) Complete unity
- b) Federation
- c) Confederation
- d) Common borders with state sovereignty
- e) Leave it to the future
- f) Other:

29. Are you optimistic or pessimistic when it comes to the future of Lebanon and the region? Please explain.

p
I'm very pessimistic when it comes to the future of Lebanon & the region. Simply because people are not changing, they're still the same and the problems are not solved. Some of the still in the same situation and the same people are still in control.

Other comments:

Thank you for taking the time and effort to do this survey. Your contributions will assist in the formation of enhancing a greater understanding and cultural awareness of Lebanese society.

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