

War, Politics and Morality.

The Spanish Catholic Church and World War II.

by

Gerald Varley, B.A (Hons.) B.Ed., B.Ed. (In-Service), Dip.L.

Thesis presented as requirement for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science,
University of Adelaide.

November 2008.

Contents.

Abstract.	III.
Declaration.	IV.
Acknowledgements.	V.
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations for Sources.	VI.
Introduction.	1
Part 1. Historiographical Review of Research.	
Chapter 1. ‘España es Diferente.’ Spain and its Catholic Church in the Early Franco Era. Perceptions of Twentieth Century Historians and a Wider Historical Reality.	12
Part II. The Church, War and the Modern World.	
Chapter 2. God and War. The Evolution of Catholic Teaching on the Morality of War.	33
Chapter 3. War, the Church and the Earlier Twentieth Century World.	45
Part III. Ideology, Morality and the Spanish Church in a World at War.	
Chapter 4. From ‘Our War’ to World War. The Spanish Catholic Church In its World, 1936-1945.	61
Chapter 5. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church And Fascist Philosophies.	95
Chapter 6. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church And Communism.	125
Chapter 7. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church And Liberal Democracy.	144
Part IV. The Church and ‘Total War.’	
Chapter 8. The Spanish Church, Neutrality, National Sovereignty and Total War.	164
Chapter 9. The Church and Total War. War on Civilians.	192
Chapter 10. The Church and Total War. The Treatment of Conquered Peoples.	218
Chapter 11. The Church and Total War. The Response of the Conquered. Resistance, Collaboration and War Criminals.	238
Chapter 12. The Church and Minorities. Spain, the Church and the Jews.	259
Conclusion.	290
Bibliography and Sources.	
1. Primary Sources.	297
2. Secondary Sources.	301

Abstract.

This thesis starts from the proposition that moral and ideological issues now drive the continuing intense interest in World War II. There has been an increasing challenge to the probity of the response of both opponents and bystanders to the threat raised by Nazism. The thesis views these issues from the viewpoint of the Spanish Catholic Church, an institution involved in yet detached from the war, having morality as its core concern yet itself struggling to reconcile moral principles with political imperatives. Such tensions might illuminate, in particular, the similar struggles of the Western Allies.

This study has been set against a background of historiographical development. It has considered the evolution of Catholic teaching on the morality of war and threats posed to the Church in the early twentieth Century political world of conflicting ideologies. In Spain, the Church, quintessentially Spanish yet inspiring extremes of devotion and hatred in Spain's total, ideological Civil War, had been devastated by that struggle. In defending its urgent spiritual priorities during a new European war, it faced many challenges that necessitated reactions involving complex interplay of morality and politics. Not only was its relationship with the victorious Franco regime uncertain but it feared the infiltration into Spain of any of the European war's contending ideologies- Fascism and Nazism, Communism and liberal democracy. The thesis describes the Church's response.

This work also takes the view that the intensity of the ideological struggle made World War II a war of unprecedented totality. This study examines the attitudes of the Spanish Church to aspects of total war. It concludes that, although the responses of the Spanish Church reveal interplay of the moral and the political, these reactions shed some light upon questions of war and morality still asked today.

Declaration.

This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other University or tertiary institution and to the best of my knowledge and belief it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

Should this thesis fulfil the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, I consent to it being made available for loan and copying.

School of History and Politics.
University of Adelaide.
November 2008.

Acknowledgements.

I wish first of all to acknowledge an immense debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Fredric Zuckerman, Associate Professor, School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide. Dr. Zuckerman was a constant source of help and encouragement throughout my undergraduate studies and as an honours student. As supervisor of this thesis, Dr. Zuckerman gave unstintingly of his time and professional expertise, even when twice recovering from illness. Whilst always subjecting my work at every stage to frank and rigorous professional criticism, Dr. Zuckerman also provided unfailing encouragement throughout the years of my candidature.

My thanks are also due to Dr. Vesna Drapac, Postgraduate Co-Coordinator, School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide, and Dr. Robert Dare, Head of School until July 2006, for their invaluable contributions to the postgraduate induction programmes of our Department and to the life of our postgraduate community. I wish to acknowledge the help and support of that community, the staff, both professional and administrative, and postgraduate students during the past three years. My friend and fellow postgraduate student, Daniel McCarthy has been a particular source of support.

Every staff member and history student owes a great debt of gratitude to Ms. Margaret Hosking, Subject Librarian (History), University of Adelaide. Ms. Hosking has been an unfailing source of help during my entire time as an Adelaide University student.

I also acknowledge the help of the staff of the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at the University of Adelaide, particularly Señor Javier Díaz, for allowing me to attend lectures in the first year of my thesis in order to refresh and improve my Spanish language proficiency.

In Spain, I am particularly grateful to Rev. Dr. Francisco Gil Delgado, Canon of the Cathedral of Seville and noted historian and author of books on the history of the Spanish Church in the early Franco era. Rev. Dr. Delgado showed a keen interest in my study gave careful, considered answers to my questions and treated me with truly Spanish hospitality on my visit to Seville in 2006. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the *Institución Colombina* and the *Hemeroteca Municipal* in Seville. In Valladolid, I received valuable assistance from Señor Javier Burrieza, Librarian of St. Alban's College. In Madrid, the archivists and librarians of many institutions deserve my gratitude. Particularly helpful and friendly were the members of the *Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco* who assist all visitors regardless of attitude towards Spain's former leader. In London, I received great assistance from the staff of the National Archives and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Those mentioned above have contributed to any merit that this thesis possesses. To myself alone should be ascribed its deficiencies and the opinions expressed.

Gerald Varley.

November 2008.

Glossary of Terms.

Acción Católica	Catholic Action.
Annales	originally French historical school aiming at „encompassing“ rather than „compartmentalized“ history.
Caudillo	Leader.
Carta Colectiva	Collective Episcopal pastoral letter.
Desmorizaciones	State sequestration of Church property.
División Azúl.	Blue Division.
Forastero	Strange and/or foreign.
Guerra Civil	Civil War.
Hispanidad	Linguistic and cultural affinity between Spanish speaking communities.
Maquisards	French resitants.
Movimiento	Political movement.
País vasco	Basque country.
Reconquista	Reconquest.
Regalism	State power in religious matters
Sefardíes	Jews of Spanish origin.

Abbreviations for Sources.

ADSS	Actes et Documents du San Siege.
AGA	Archivo General de Administración.
AMAE	Archivo, Ministerio del Asuntos Exteriores.
BHS	Bulletin of Hispanic Studies.
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional de España.
CDI	Colegio de Ingleses- Valladolid.
DIHGF	Documentos Inéditos Historia del Generalísimo Franco.
DGFP	Documents in German Foreign Policy.
FNFF	Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco.
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States.
ICS	Institución Columbina, Sevilla.
NAUK	National Archives of the United Kingdom.
RFP	Review of the Foreign Press.
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs.
WPIS	Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries.

War, Politics and Morality. The Spanish Catholic Church and World War II.

Introduction.

The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* Book 5: 38.

This study proposes to illuminate that interplay between politics and morality that informed the reactions of the Spanish Church to the moral and ideological issues of World War II and also to contribute to a clear understanding of that Church's fears and assumptions about the post-war world.

Sixty years after the end of World War II, to the vast majority of those now alive, as indeed to contemporaries, the war is history. Public interest in World War II, however, remains intense. This work will suggest that perennial moral issues arising from that war now prompt and maintain such interest. At the heart of this controversy is a challenge to the moral probity of both opponents and bystanders to the threat raised by Nazism. To what extent did the nature of their response to a number of specific issues raised by this threat damage their moral reputation?

There was, from the mid-1960s, increased scholarly and popular interest in the idea of the war as a moral and ideological struggle from which neither non-combatants nor neutrals were inviolable. Also, after years of comparative neglect, the Holocaust began to assume an increasing centrality in the concerns of scholars and public alike. The 1970's and 1980's saw the publication of an increasing number of works relating to World War II as a „total“ war as well as publications on the Holocaust as a concern central to that war.¹

¹ Books on the Holocaust in the 1960's included Alexander Donat, *Holocaust Kingdom: A Memoir* (London: Secker and Warberg, 1965); Leon Weliczter Wells, *The Janowska Road* (London: Cape, 1966); *Scroll of Agony: the Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan* (edited and translated by Abraham I. Katsch)

The 1990s were a period of intense moral questioning. In the wake of the „Swiss banks scandal,“ Adam Le Bor, Jean Ziegler and Isabel Vincent, amongst others, castigated the „unneutral“ conduct of the neutrals. Criticism spread to the conduct of the belligerents. Daniel Goldhagen alleged that the German people were „Hitler's willing executioners.“ Nor did the Allies escape. British and American restrictive immigration policies and failure to combat Nazi genocide had already come under vigorous attack. From Holocaust-related issues, moral criticism spread to other Allied policies. Area bombing of Germany was strongly assailed. In 1999, Rab Bennett challenged the morality, effectiveness and necessity of much resistance activity. By the end of the twentieth century, neither active opponents of Nazism nor bystanders during World War II were sacrosanct ²

This questioning has also been healthy in correcting myth and excessive triumphalism in the popular Western view of that war. However, general war histories

(London: H. Hamilton, 1966). See footnote 2 for later publications. Books emphasising the total nature of the war include Gordon Wright, *Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, *Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War* (London: Allen Lane, 1972); Volker R. Berghahn and Martin Kitchen (eds.), *Germany in an Age of Total War* (Totowa N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1981); Brian Johnson and H.J. Cozens, *Bombers, the Weapon of Total War* (London: Methuen, 1984); William Deist (ed.), *German Military in the Age of Total War* (Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985). ² Swiss banks had not only refused to release the assets of concentration camp survivors or their heirs but had bought gold looted by the Nazis and „jaundered“ much of it in other neutral countries. See Adam Le Bor, *Hitler's Secret Bankers: the Myth of Swiss Neutrality during the Holocaust* (Secaucus NJ: Carol, 1997); Jean Ziegler, *The Swiss, the Gold and the Dead* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997); Isabel Vincent, *Hitler's Silent Partners: Swiss Banks, Nazi Gold and the Pursuit of Justice* (New York: W. Morrow, 1997). Daniel J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Knopf, 1996), castigates the German people. Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy Towards Jewish Refugees: 1938-1945* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945* (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1979), Irving Abella and Harold Toper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982). Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies* (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), Walter Laquer, *The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the Suppression of Information about Hitler's 'Final Solution'* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980) are some of the Holocaust publications critical of the policies of the Western Allies. Michael R. Marrus and Robert Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), castigates Vichy France's record. Rab Bennett, *Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe* (Basingstoke UK: Macmillan, 1999), queries the moral legitimacy of much resistance activity. Controversy has continued into the present century. To note one example, A. C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in World War II a Necessity or a Crime?* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006.)

have been slow to modify the traditional focus on the war as a military, political, diplomatic and economic struggle and to reflect on the wide ranging moral and ideological issues which affected participants and bystanders alike. Monographs on individual topics since 1990 have therefore sometimes assumed a disproportionate influence on perceptions of moral issues arising out of the war. If undoubtedly sincere moral concerns from the 1990s are imported one dimensionally to the wartime period, there is a risk of „presentism,“- judging that period by present standards. There is a danger of failing to highlight those concerns and priorities applying in wartime society and ignoring the political context in which these policies were formulated. Is there an institution which was involved in the war yet detached from it, having morality as its core concern yet whose own attempts to reconcile moral principles with political imperatives might inform the similar attempts of the Western Allies? My thesis proposes the Catholic Church as such an institution. The Church was international, existing in all belligerent countries. It therefore possessed a universality not possessed by a national government or by a nationally based church like Britain's Anglican or Germany's Lutheran Churches. Catholicism had a definite, detailed teaching on war and moral issues based on centuries of Church tradition and experience. This work will consider the responses of the Spanish Catholic Church to wartime moral and ideological issues in the political context from which they cannot be divorced.³

³ A recent example of this relatively slow movement towards reflection on moral questioning in general war histories is seen in Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (2nd ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Weinberg has skillfully integrated discussion of the Holocaust into his narrative. However, his overall focus is overwhelmingly military and political. He devotes only seven of 1178 pages to strategic bombing, (574-581) and two (532-533) to issues of collaboration and resistance and his treatment of both issues is mainly descriptive. See Neville J. Wylie (ed.), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), frontispiece, for discussion of the importance of political context with regard to the wartime policies of European neutrals.

However, such a choice is far from uncontroversial. There is dispute over the nature of the Church as a morally authoritative institution. On the one hand, the institutional Church sees its moral authority as divinely ordained. Its view is that divine guidance and moral revelation has, over centuries, not only ensured the Church's survival in an increasingly hostile world, but its freedom as an institution from serious moral error, even if individual Churchmen may err. Other proponents of the Church's moral authority would point to that very survival as a source of immense prestige as Europe's oldest continually functioning institution, a reservoir of moral experience, a reference point for human conduct even amongst those who may not be practicing Catholics at such times of moral confusion as World War II. On the other hand, the Church has a dual identity, a spiritual institution in a political world. Its very survival may be seen as the result of successful compromise with that world. Some opponents of the Church see that accommodation and compromise as fatal to its moral pretensions, a mere cover for the protection of its wealth and political interests. Other observers, including some Catholics, would see the Church's revelation, if existent, as spiritual rather than political. Some have a „prophetic“ view of the Church as the voice of Christian conscience in the world. They would acknowledge occasions when the Church's accommodation to the political world has put its moral authority at risk. Many historians saw its responses to moral issues arising from World War II as providing such occasions. Accusations, particularly about Vatican indifference to the Jewish plight resurfaced and proliferated. To John Cornwell, Pius XII was „Hitler's Pope.“ The Vatican was forced to investigate its wartime conduct. By the turn of the century, there was a plethora of publications which called the very

moral authority of the Catholic Church into question.⁴

On the other hand, other institutions with any credible claim to detachment or moral authority are lacking. The League of Nations hardly survived the onset of war. Its post-war successor, the United Nations, was, during World War II, another name for the countries opposing the Axis. Some European neutrals, particularly Switzerland and Sweden came under intense critical scrutiny in the aftermath of the Swiss banks scandal of 1996, when allegations of profiteering and collaboration with Nazism surfaced. We have noted the general advantages of the Catholic Church. The choice of the Spanish Church further removes the constraints affecting the Vatican and the Church in belligerent countries.⁵

However, the choice of Spain and its Church does not and cannot remove controversy. Some historians have portrayed Spain and its Church as estranged from Western Europe and unconcerned in its affairs. There is lively debate over the role of Spain in World War II. Controversy abounds about the nature of the Spanish state in the early Franco era and the relationship of the Church to that state. This thesis will address these issues.

Crucial to a discussion of the attitudes of the Spanish Church to the moral and ideological issues of World War II is that previously noted dual identity from which no

⁴ The official Catholic view that the Church as an institution is preserved from serious moral error is implicit in its rejoinder to criticism of its role during the Holocaust, *We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoa*. For text, see Randolph A. Braham, *The Vatican and the Holocaust: The Catholic Church and the Jews in the Nazi Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 100 - 109. See particularly, a quoted speech by Pope John Paul II, 102. John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (London: Viking, 1999). See chapter 12 for a list of publications critical of the Church's wartime role.

⁵ Constraints on the Vatican included its international prominence and need to be seen to be scrupulously impartial, its position, enclosed by and dependent on Italy and its need to consider the position of Catholics in Germany and German-occupied countries. In belligerent countries, Catholics were influenced by their own patriotism, the experience of living in a wartime society and by government propaganda which could overwhelm influences from the Vatican and lead to identification with national policies.

part of the Catholic Church can escape. The Spanish Catholic Church was a spiritual institution, with spiritual goals. Its mission was human salvation through Spain's re-Christianization. Still, like the belligerents, it lived in a political world and, also like the belligerents; the Spanish Church pursued its goals through political means. Its view of the war was naturally refracted through its own perceptions and affected by these goals. However, the juxtaposition of politics and morality in the Spanish Church's attitudes to issues arising out of World War II is both intrinsically interesting and makes a sometimes enlightening comparison with similar juxtapositions in the attitudes, most particularly of the Western Allies, as they attempted to reconcile moral concepts of a „struggle for freedom“ with the practical political decisions necessary to ensure the success of that struggle. The Spanish Catholic Church existed contemporaneously with the war's events but removed from belligerent status if not necessarily neutral on all issues. The Church's views provide a useful perspective on the wartime conduct of the belligerents.

This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the ideological and moral issues of World War II. It places the Spanish Catholic Church, an institution involved with the war as well as a concerned onlooker, in the centre of that debate. Acknowledging the contested nature of the Catholic Church as a morally authoritative institution, this study nonetheless seeks to provide a contemporaneous, nonbelligerent view on how moral issues were perceived. Problems arising from a tension between the moral perspective of modern investigators and the imperatives of wartime belligerence that prompted pragmatic policies are thus avoided. At the same time, whilst questioning some perceptions of the nature of the Church as an appendage to the Francoist state, this thesis aims clearly to establish that during World War II, spiritual institutions had to

accommodate to a hostile ideological and political world.

Sources.

Most of the research in Spain is based on archival and other Catholic sources. The selection of Spanish Catholic resources needed to be made with regard to wartime realities and Church practices, both of which affected the public expression of the Spanish Church's opinion in the early Franco era. The Church realized that as a spiritual institution in a political world, it needed to pursue its spiritual goals through political activity but the expression of that activity in early Franco Spain was usually indirect. This thesis shows that public comment by the clergy on issues deemed political was highly uncharacteristic of the Spanish Church of that era unless there was, as in the *Guerra Civil*, a perceived dire threat to the Church's very survival. This study reveals that this silence was partly a product of external circumstances. There were no conferences of the Spanish Bishops after November 1939 during World War II and we shall see that Spain was for over two years without a Primate and for several years without a full complement of bishops. Moreover, from April 1940, a government decree restricted public comment by the clergy on non-religious matters. However, this thesis shows why ecclesiastical silence on political issues was more a matter of conviction. The narrowly religious therefore fills the *pastorales* (pastoral letters) and *boletines oficiales* (official publications) in ecclesiastical archives. Apart from occasional reprints of papal encyclicals such as the anti-Nazi *Mit brennender Sorge* or very unusually, a foreign Church document such as the German bishops' Fulda collective pastoral of August 1938, comment even on political principles was rare. These few exceptions are of primary importance as the voice of the Church, directly expressed through members of its

hierarchy, and are thoroughly examined. Although such comment on the day to day events of the war is absent, the Spanish Church hierarchy worked assiduously to mould „Catholic opinion“ through the various levels of the Catholic press, records of which are preserved in the archives of the *Biblioteca Nacional* and *Hemeroteca Municipal* in Madrid and in other locations. The opinions of the Church were communicated in a wide range of publications.⁶ Of greatest significance were the Catholic periodicals published *con licencia eclesiastica*, (with ecclesiastical approval). They were the official voice of the Church, aimed specifically at conveying its views and thereby influencing the opinions of the most devout, committed and leading members of different lay constituencies. *Razón y Fe* was the voice of the Jesuits, a religious order committed to obedience to the Pope and having strong Vatican connections. This most universalist of Spanish Catholic publications usually reflected Vatican views and was aimed strongly towards the Jesuit-trained elite which included foreign minister Serrano Suñer. *Ecclesia* and *Signo* were the periodicals of *Acción Católica*, the powerful and devout lay organization led and directed by the clergy, with branches in every Spanish town.⁷ *Signo* was directed towards *Acción Católica*'s youth section, regarded as of prime importance in leading Spain's re-Christianization among the young. Manuel Vigil y Vázquez records that in spring 1944, before D-Day, Primate Enrique Plá y Deniel gave explicit approval to *Signo*'s previous reporting on the war and laid down a policy „in view of the presumed Allied invasion and its presumed consequences“ of careful neutrality in all subsequent

⁶ For the importance of the Catholic press in disseminating the Church's views, see Richard J. Wolff and Jörg K. Hoensch (eds.), *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right: 1919- 1945* (Highland Lakes, NJ: Columbia University Press, 1987), 226.

⁷ For the ubiquity and influence of *Acción Católica*, see Angela Cenarro, „Elite, Party, Church. Pillars of the Francoist “New State” in Aragon, 1936-1945“ *European History Quarterly*, 28:4 (October 1998), 474.

editions.⁸ *Ecclesia* began publication in January, 1941, aimed at bringing the Church's views to *Acción Católica*'s adult branches. Father Jesús Iribarren, wartime editor of *Ecclesia*, reveals that its content, though determined by an editorial group, also received the assent of the Primate who preferred to work indirectly through its columns.⁹ The highly influential papal nuncio in Madrid, Gaetano Cicognani, also contributed to *Ecclesia* and gave it regular information.¹⁰ These periodicals thus provide a valuable insight into the interplay of the moral and the political which marked attitudes within the Church during World War II.

The Church hierarchy did not neglect the mass of Spain's Catholic laity. Although in World War II Spain, all the popular press reported on Catholic daily life, each major city had its newspaper through which the Church specifically reached out to ordinary Catholics. Foremost was Madrid's *Ya* which, notwithstanding the controlled nature of the Spanish wartime press, differed markedly in style and selection of reportage, from its *falangist* or monarchist equivalents, as occasional comparison will reveal. *Ya* was the only Spanish newspaper with a London correspondent. Reports from London were maintained even throughout *Ya*'s periods of pro-Axis reporting, which, as we will see, was regarded in part as the price of the Church's attempts to keep the Nazis at bay. *Ya*'s wartime reports therefore repay careful study. In the provinces, *Ya*'s local equivalents

⁸ Manuel Vigil y Vázquez, *El drama de la Acción Católica y el 'Nacional Catolicismo': Repaso del seminario 'Signo' en el 50 aniversario de su salida, 20 de enero, 1940, 20 de enero, 1990* (Barcelona: Santandreu Editor, 1990), 47- 48.

⁹ Jesús Iribarren, *Papeles y Memorias: Medio siglo de relaciones iglesia-estado en España(1936-1986)* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1992), 77, 78.

¹⁰ See William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875 – 1998*(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 394. See Ibid. 390, for Callahan's description of *Ecclesia* as „the official organ of *Acción Católica*, and indirectly, of the hierarchy.“ Wayne Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 217, describes *Ecclesia*'s process of consultation with the Primate and notes its sale to bishops, priests, *Acción Católica* lay leaders and religious institutions.

often had close links to the provincial hierarchy. In Seville, for example, *El Correo de Andalucía* featured a regular weekly column by the Archbishop, Cardinal Pedro Segura y Sáenz. We will see that, at key points of World War II, the popular Catholic daily press, more subject to direct government control than the periodicals, was less reflective than them of the Spanish hierarchy's views. Whilst we should bear this important proviso in mind, the popular daily press is a valuable mirror to Spanish Catholic perceptions of daily events as they happened.¹¹

Because this thesis aims to investigate the interplay of moral issues with politics on Church policies, there is a need to study a very wide variety of state records, both from within Spain and from foreign sources. A comprehensive search of the archives of the *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores* (Foreign Ministry) has uncovered much valuable information on the relationship of Church and state in World War II Spain. Equally valuable was a careful study of the confidential internal reports sent from all parts of Spain to keep the Franco regime well-informed regarding Spanish opinion. Collected in several volumes of *Documentos Inéditos para la historia del Generalísimo Franco*, these reports are highly-informative about the attitudes and influence of the Spanish Church. This thesis has also made extensive use of foreign archives and collections of primary documents. Careful study of the Vatican's documents, contained in twelve volumes of *Actes et Documents du Saint Siege Relatifs a la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, provides an essential guide to the important relationship with the Vatican of the Spanish Church and state. A wide-ranging search, in the British National Archives, of the correspondence

¹¹ *Ya*, though published by *Editorial Católica*, had a government-appointed editor. See pp.108-109 for pro-German statements in *Ya* on the Nazis and Poland, about which this proviso should particularly be borne in mind.

between British ambassadors and consular officials in Spain and the British Foreign Office, is highly-revealing of the attitudes of the Spanish Church and leading Churchmen at vital times in the war. Several series of published volumes of weekly British intelligence summaries as well as monthly British reviews of the international press between 1939 and 1945 provide additional valuable insights into the Spanish Church. The published volumes of German and American wartime foreign policy documents were also a very significant source in developing this thesis. The research for this study is set in the context of a wide range of secondary reading, both in Spanish and in English.

Chapter. 1. *España es Diferente*. Spain and its Catholic Church in the Early Franco Era. Perceptions of 20th-Century Historians and a Wider Historical Reality.

La historia hispanica, al menos en lo esencial, es la historia de una creencia y de una sensibilidad religiosa. – Hispanic history, in its essentials at least, is the history of a religious belief and sensibility. Americo Castro, *España en su historia* (original publication, 1948, published as *The Structure of Spanish History*, (trans. Edmund L. King) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), 121.

This chapter places the thesis within the context of existing knowledge about Spain and the Spanish Church. The Introduction noted the existence of several controversies, not least a perception that Spain and its Church were estranged from Europe and unconcerned in its affairs. The chapter therefore explains why the concept of Spanish *diferencia* occupied historians for much of the twentieth century and introduces the debate on Spain's role in World War II and the nature of the early Franco state.¹

By the end of the twentieth century, foreign writers and a later generation of Spanish historians had done much to break down the stereotypes which had earlier prevailed and had provided a more nuanced view of Spain and the Franco regime. This chapter will firstly examine the image of Spain prevalent earlier that century and will suggest that Spanish historians portrayed an image of a Spain divorced from the mainstream of modern European events. Such an image influenced perceptions of the early Franco regime at home and abroad. This image of *España es Diferente* was, at least, incomplete and was increasingly challenged by later Spanish and foreign historians. However, it retains some force in popular perceptions of the early Franco era.

The second part of this chapter examines *diferencia* and the Church, derived from a study of works pertaining specifically to the years 1939 –1945. Spanish and foreign, general publications as well as specialist works on the Spanish Catholic Church have

¹ See Introduction, 5.

been consulted. A review of this material suggests that later historians have departed from the concept of *España es Diferente* in regard to Spain. However they have continued to apply this concept to its Church, particularly the Church in the aftermath of the *Guerra Civil* (Civil War). In describing „National Catholicism,“ historians have emphasized the national at the expense of the Catholic. It is therefore unsurprising that the interplay of internal spiritual and external political concerns during World War II, much less the Spanish Church’s attitudes to the wider issues of that war, have remained largely unexplored.

This study does not aim to denigrate these historians, who have contributed to our knowledge of the distinctive nature of Spanish culture and history and to the strong national character of its Church. Rather it aims to use their insights, illustrated in this brief historiographical survey, as a point of departure. This work will add to their essential truth recognition that although „national“ in character, the Church could not be national in the sense of British Anglicanism or German Lutheranism. The Spanish Church remained part of a universalist institution, which had a clear spiritual goal and a strong, detailed, universally uniform body of moral teaching. In each individual country, however, Catholicism had to pursue its moral and spiritual goals through engagement with its host society, particularly with that country’s political structure. The following brief historiographical survey aims to illustrate historians’ perceptions of Spain and its Church.

The Disaster of 1898.

Following this disaster, *España es Diferente* was often used pejoratively, modern Spain's history being seen in terms of these differences, or better still, ignored. National catastrophes tend to produce a collective mood of introspection and self-doubt, frequently reflected in historiographical trends. This observation seems even more applicable to Spain after 1898 than to Britain after Suez or to the United States after Vietnam. The disastrous Spanish-American war of 1898 appears pivotal for twentieth century Spanish historiography. That catastrophe seemed to confirm Spain's descent into third-rate power status and its European marginalization. Many external European historians were confirmed in stereotypes about contemporary Spain's „Catholic fanaticism“, „backwardness“ and „decadence.“ Their interest in Spain became confined to its sixteenth century „Golden Age“, when Spain then possessed a centrality to European affairs that it had obviously lost. Within Spain, the „generation of 1898“, contemplating the disaster, saw their country as economically stagnant, militarily incompetent and politically unstable. This situation they saw as stemming from the nature of the country and its people, - a geographically isolated medieval enclave, the product of inward-looking institutions, differing fundamentally from „advanced“ Western Europe. Liberals among them saw the Spanish Church as such an institution; powerful, insular and impeding Spain's progress.

Rafael Altamira took an alternative approach to Spanish differences. His magisterial, four volume work, *Historia de España y la civilización española*, aimed to consider the past to regenerate „decadent“ contemporary Spain.² Altamira went beyond

² Rafael Altamira, original work, *Historia de España y de la civilización española (History of Spain and Spanish Civilization)* 4 vols. (Barcelona: Herederos de Juan Gill, 1899-1911). Abridged and translated in

the customary political narrative approach to Spanish history. By „integral and organic“ depiction of Spain's past, he hoped to encapsulate that Hispanic genius which had produced and given much of the world a vibrant, expansive, civilizing culture.³ This genius, rekindled, would lead to Spain's political and moral regeneration. Altamira, though a liberal, nonetheless appreciated the Church's contribution to that genius even whilst decrying its religious fanaticism and economic influence. A Civil War exile, Altamira remained active and his work influential in shaping popular conceptions of Spanish *diferencia* at home and abroad throughout the first half of the century.

Diferencia, the Guerra Civil, World War II and the Church. Contemporaneous Views.

Perceptions of *diferencia* in country and Church were reinforced by the many ideologically generated accounts of the Civil War, written during and shortly after that conflict. Few of these accounts described pre-Civil War Spain. Those which did were often characterized by political stereotyping, blaming the ills of Spanish society on the sins of their authors“ ideological opponents. The Church, predictably, was seen as a bulwark of Spanish values against atheistic, alien Communism, or a dispenser of „the opiate of the people“ according to ideological preference. Both sides, for different ideological reasons, had interest in emphasizing the insular nature of the Spanish Church. The result of the *Guerra Civil* exacerbated already extant trends. The early Franco regime was seen in terms of the ideological passion engendered by that conflict, producing among contemporaneous observers and since, diametrically opposed interpretations of the same events. Contemporaneous assessment of Spain“s role in World War II varied

one volume, as *A History of Spain: From the Beginnings to the Present Day* (Princeton N.J: Van Nostrand, 1949).

³ Altamira, *A History of Spain* (1949 edition) xi.

totally. Thomas J. Hamilton, for example saw Franco as a Fascist ally of Hitler, William J. Beaulac as a „silent“ Anglo-American ally. Likewise, the memoirs of Sir Samuel Hoare and Carlton Hayes, respectively the British and American Ambassadors in Spain for much of the war, differ markedly.⁴ A reasonably balanced exception was Gerald Brenan’s 1943 publication, *The Spanish Labyrinth*. Though clearly declaring his Republican sympathies, Brenan taxed others of like stance with taking „an exclusively moral and political attitude to the Church.“ Thus, Brenan sees them as failing to appreciate „its key position in the social pattern.“ They fail to grasp the Church’s „unsuspected power of rising and expanding because it provides something for which there is an increasing demand in times of stress.“ The Church had taken a prominent role in the Civil War and in the new regime. It was on this internal role of the Church, the regime’s so-called National Catholicism, and Spain’s re-Christianization, on which contemporary historians of the early Franco years concentrated virtually exclusively when discussing the Church.⁵

The result of the Civil War was pivotal for Spanish historiography. Winners and losers alike had a strong interest in maintaining the idea of Spanish *diferencia*. Many liberal and leftist historians, in exile, blamed Spanish *diferencias* as the underlying cause of the defeat of their ideals. Even as many engaged in ideological sniping at the Franco

⁴Examples of contemporaneous diametrically opposed views on the Church in the Civil War are Luís Carreras *The Glory of Martyred Spain* trans. from Spanish (London: Burns Oats, 1937) and Joseph McCabe, *The Papacy in Politics Today: Vatican Plots in Spain and Other Countries* (London: Gollancz, 1939). Pro-Church bibliographies of contemporaneous works include Ricardo de la Ceirva , *Cien libros básicos sobre la Guerra de España* (Madrid:Publicaciones Españolas,1966), anti-Church collections include Herbert Southworth, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (Paris:Ruedo Iberico, 1963). Thomas J. Hamilton, *Appeasement’s Child: The Franco Regime in Spain* (London: Gollancz, 1943) and William J. Beaulac, *Franco, Silent Ally in World War II* (Carbondale, U.S.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986) are diametrically opposed. Sir Samuel Hoare, *Ambassador on Special Mission* (London: Collins, 1946), is considerably less sympathetic to Spain and more negative about Franco than is Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1945). Both Hoare, a high Church Anglican and Hayes, a Catholic, agree on the Spanish Church’s opposition to Nazism and its attempts to keep Spain neutral.

⁵ Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth*, original edition 1943, first paperback edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), vii, viii.

regime, Salvador de Madariaga attempted a wider perspective of Spanish history. To Madariaga, Spain was certainly different. The land itself, inaccessible, „a great power and a great presence,“ made it so.⁶ The real difference, however, he perceives as the separatism and dictatorship present in Spanish national character. To Madariaga, „all Spanish individuals and groups tended to tear themselves away from the rest in order to assert themselves in separation and return no longer on the same level but on top, as dictators.“⁷ Madariaga is no friend of the Church. He sees it as „always on the side of the rich, the powerful, the oppressive authority.“⁸ For all that, he views Spain's unity not as political or linguistic but as religious. In its Church, „nationality and religion became one.“⁹ In Madariaga's leftist future therefore, „the Left must yield to the Right in religious matters.“¹⁰

As that leftist future receded and Franco's regime consolidated, exiled Spanish historians turned from re-fighting the Civil War to more fundamental questions of the nature of Spanish identity and *diferencia*. In 1948, Americo Castro published *España en su historia*.¹¹ Castro went „in search of the Hispanic peculiarity“, using literary texts as evidence.¹² Castro's answer was that Spain was a uniquely plural society, with Christian, Muslim and Jewish influences. Castro, contemplating the blend of the spiritual with the traditional and the popular in Spanish religion, suggested that „Catholic faith was *felt* by Spaniards rather than *understood*“, but that its „lost efficacy“ was a powerful factor in

⁶ Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1942), 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 451.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 377.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 455.

¹¹ Americo Castro, original publication, 1948, published as *The Structure of Spanish History* (trans. Edmund L. King (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1954).

¹² See, for example, Castro's section of that title (45-59), in which Castro cites Justinius, Aldana, Fitché, Kierkegaard and others.

Spanish decline.¹³ Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz's *España: un enigma histórico* was a massive rebuttal of Castro. Albornoz insists on the centrality of Castille in „setting the standard for Spanish life“, and of the *reconquista* with its conflict between Christian and Muslim as central to Spanish history. From it was forged a specifically national Spanish Catholicism and a *homo hispanus*, thus a *diferencia* that was Europe's historical enigma.¹⁴

This view of „National Catholicism“ was echoed on the other side, where Franco's Spain, like many authoritarian regimes, used history as a powerful prop. In the early Franco era, *España es Diferente* became a watchword, used to highlight superior and unique Spanish values epitomized by the regime. Linguistic unity was to be achieved by abolishing regional language and autonomy. Foreign ideologies; Communism, democracy and Nazism, were excoriated. Above all, the regime emphasized continuity with Spanish history's Golden Age, inspired by its national Catholicism.¹⁵ The Church had an honoured place in Francoist Spanish history and society provided that it played its part in the Francoist schema. This selective view of history, if presented by some historians from genuine conviction, also attracted the hagiographic hacks that are part of any authoritarian regime.¹⁶ Censorship and academic discrimination discouraged dissenting views.

¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴ Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, *España: Un enigma histórico*, original publication, 1956, published as *Spain: A Historical Enigma* (2 vols.) (trans. Colette Joly Dees and David Sven Reher) (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975), 18, 196, 1158-1167.

¹⁵ See Jesús M. Vásquez, Felix Medin and Luis Mendes, *La Iglesia Española contemporánea* (Madrid, Editoria Nacional, 1973), 78.

¹⁶ One example was Juan Tusquets, who wrote a series of diatribes against the regime's enemies, including *Masones y pacifistas* (Burgos: Ediciones Antisectarias, 1939).

The Decline of *Diferencia*.

1. Jaime Vicens Vives.

Jaime Vicens Vives can be credited with making the first breach in the walls of *diferencia*. An innovative historian, Vives had suffered from Francoist employment discrimination. However, by the early 1950's the Franco regime, keen to break out of its post- World War II international isolation, had modified such practices. Vives, prudently, still ended his *Aproximación a la historia de España* at the outbreak of the Civil War, despite the book's 1952 publication. Rather than assert Spain's *diferencia*, Vives adopted the socio-economic approach of the French *Annales* School and placed strong emphasis on archival research. For the first time in 15 years, there was a book on Spanish history that was impartial „rather than ideologically inspired.“¹⁷ Vives identified a „general European crisis“ of the early 20th-century in which Spain was different only in that „some facets [of this crisis] affected Spanish life exclusively.“¹⁸ One of these perceived facets was religion. Vives, typically, placed specifically Spanish religious „facets“ as history „entwined with politics and even with war“, in a wider European context of challenge and renewal for the Church in the 70 years preceding the *Guerra Civil*. If that was so, neither Spain nor its Church was as *diferente* as earlier historians had indicated.¹⁹

2. The Influence of Foreign Historians.

¹⁷ Jaime Vicens Vives, original publication, *Aproximación a la historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Vicens-Vives, 1952; quotations from Jaime Vicens Vives, *Approaches to the History of Spain* (trans. Joan Connelly Ullman,) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), x.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 144-145.

By the early 1960s, the Franco regime, secure as a valued Western ally, felt less need to emphasize its, and Spain's *diferencia*. Intellectual repression was further relaxed and the regime felt sufficiently confident to turn cautiously to Western Europe. This was the decade of Spanish *desarrollo* (development). *España es Diferente* became less a credo than a slogan to attract tourists and investors. Also attracted were Western historians, encouraged by the cooling of Civil War passions, to make an objective study of the victorious regime. Whilst many Hispanic historians were still embroiled in the Castro-Albornoiz debate, foreign writers demolished stereotypes of *diferencia* and made significant contributions to our understandings of Spain and its Church. From the 1960s onwards, British historian Raymond Carr and his American colleague Stanley Payne strongly attacked stereotypical views, the product of the late nineteenth century and reinforced by Civil War ideological prejudices. Carr castigates „large scale generalizations on the nature of Spain and Spanishness.“ He asserts „more would be achieved by patient investigation of those features of Spain's political and economic underdevelopment which she shares with other societies.“²⁰ Similarly, Stanley Payne decries excessive emphasis on Spanish „difference“ which led to „exaggeration and distortion“ on one hand and „defensive ethnocentric hyperbole“ on the other. To Payne, „Spain's experience, in many respects, was to be more typical than has been supposed.“²¹

Both historians valuably explode the myth of the regime as a monolithic, Fascist party-state. Carr refers to government by „a Byzantine structure of political clans.“²² Payne's *Franco Regime* and other works give an excellent picture of Franco's „balancing act

²⁰ Raymond Carr, original publication, *Spain: 1808-1939*, extensively revised and republished as *Spain: 1808-1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), preface, 1st edition, vii.

²¹ Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime: 1936-1975* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 3, and 4.

²² Carr, *Spain*, 697.

between the various “ideological families” of the regime.²³ Carr and Payne made important contributions to foreign understanding of the position of the Spanish Church. Carr makes the significant point that „Catholicism was, and is, not only a personal faith but a formal sign of belonging to Spanish society.“²⁴ Thus, his conclusion that „the Church, rather than the new-fangled and repulsive rhetoric of the *Falange*, legitimized the rule of Franco in the post [civil]–war years“ both is unsurprising and enlightens our understanding of Church, regime and their relationships.²⁵ Payne develops similar themes in a penetrating analysis in *Franco Regime* of Francoist „National Catholicism“²⁶

Herbert Feis, an economic historian writing in the 1960’s, stresses a point vital to understanding of Spanish World War II policy; Spain’s Civil War economic devastation and the primacy of its economic needs over any ideology of *diferencia*. In *The Spanish Story*, Feis emphasizes a convergence between the Church and „ruling groups“ against „the thought of associating again with the vulgar, sacrilegious Nazis“.²⁷

Later foreign historians have made valuable contributions to our understanding of Spain, the early Franco period and the Church. Paul Preston’s leftist liberal perspective is, unsurprisingly, unfavourable to the Church, which he perceives as prominent amongst „reactionary elements in Spanish politics.“²⁸ However, Preston’s focus upon Catholic

²³ Payne, *Franco Regime*, 236. See also many other works, including *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967); *Franco’s Spain* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968). Payne continues to write well-regarded works on Spain, see *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006) and his 2008 publication, *Franco and Hitler* (see note 35).

²⁴ Carr, *Spain*, 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 701.

²⁶ Payne, *Franco Regime*, 362-369.

²⁷ Herbert Feis, *The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War* (New York: Norton, 1966), introduction, v, emphasizes antipathy between Spanish Catholic values and Nazism.

²⁸ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War: 1936-1939* (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 10.

dissidents in the early Franco period is an important reminder that Spanish Catholicism was not necessarily *diferente* and indicates significant points of resistance to any convergence between the regime and Nazism.²⁹ David Ringrose, although describing neither the Church nor the Franco period helped to demolish many assumptions on which earlier perceptions of Spanish *diferencia* had been based. Provocatively referring to the „Spanish miracle“, Ringrose used statistics to prove the mythical nature of Spain’s nineteenth century „economic stagnation.“³⁰

3. Debate on Spain and World War II.

Perhaps one example of Spanish *diferencia* in the early post-World War II period was the lack of studies on Spain’s role in that war. Two early post-war memoirs were published by Spaniards prominent in the wartime Franco regime. Former foreign minister Ramón Serrano Suñer and General Director of Foreign Policy José Maria Doussinague both provided a justification for Spanish wartime policy. This, perhaps understandably, was the final word whilst the regime lasted. After Spain’s transition to democracy, the foreign ministry archives remained closed until 1984 and for many Spanish historians, „our war“ the *Guerra Civil*, was a prior interest. However, the translation into Spanish in 1986 of German historian Klaus-Jörg Ruhl’s work as *Franco, Falange y Tercer Reich* was perhaps a further sign of a post-Franco declining sense of *diferencia* and increasing Spanish concern for Spain’s wartime relations with the wider world. Ruhl had worked in German and British archives. He emphasized tensions within the rightist coalition supporting Franco and the importance of Spain’s wolfram exports. Ruhl concluded that the question of Spain’s entry into the war on the Axis side was closely linked to the

²⁹ Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 350-353.

³⁰ David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish Miracle': 1700-1900* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).

reconstruction of the Francoist system and „constituted the greatest test for the Franco regime.“³¹

The continued decline in *diferencia* and the new directions in World War II studies following the collapse of European Communism have led to new interest and lively debate on Spanish wartime foreign policy. In 1992, the first meeting of Spanish historians on Franco's regime took place. Two years later, Rafael García Pérez published *Franquismo y Tercer Reich*, a study of Spanish-German wartime relations. Like Ruhl, Pérez stressed the „heterogeneity of political forces“ supporting Franco's regime and concluded that the regime's involvement with Germany became a „chronicle of misunderstandings marked by mutual frustration.“³²

That same year, liberal historian Javier Tusell published *Franco, España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial*, a work which has become a touchstone for ideologically charged debate. Tusell attacked as mythical Franco's „prudent caution“ and asserted that if Spain did not take a pro-Axis part in the war, it was a „pure miracle.“ In 2002, Manuel Ros Agudo's *La guerra secreta de Franco* extended Tusell's thesis, underlining Spanish tolerance of German espionage until 1944 and co-operation with the Gestapo.³³

Conservative historians responded. In 1997, Luís Suárez published *España, Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Suárez challenged Tusell's thesis. To Suárez, Serrano Suñer, though pro-German, was primarily a Spanish nationalist who would not support Spain's

³¹ Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar* (Madrid: Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1947), José María Doussinague, *España Tenía Razón* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1949), were the early post-war memoirs. Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y Tercer Reich* (Madrid: Akal, 1986), had been published in German in 1975, hence its use of foreign rather than Spanish archives. See Ruhl, 257, for quotation.

³² Rafael García Pérez, *Franquismo y Tercer Reich* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994) 576.

³³ Javier Tusell, *Franco, España y la Guerra Segunda Mundial: Entre el Eje y la neutralidad* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1994), 646, Manuel Ros Agudo, *La guerra secreta de Franco* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002, XXVI).

entry into the war at the ultimate cost of German bases on Spanish territory. Suárez also stressed Spanish efforts to achieve a compromise peace in 1943. Likewise, in 2005, Pio Moa, in *Franco, un balance histórico*, attacked Agudo's conclusions. He highlighted Spain's economic dependence on the democracies and saw as prescient Franco's efforts to achieve a compromise peace, realizing that a protracted struggle would ultimately benefit the USSR.³⁴

The debate has recently attracted overseas historians. Wayne Bowen's, publication *Spain during World War II* discusses several aspects of Spanish wartime society. He notes Franco's pragmatism, and discusses the existence of „a coalition of mutually hostile elements“ in a government with policies reflecting widespread uncertainty rather than following a fixed path marked by ideological *diferencia*. Stanley Payne in *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II*, whilst broadly supporting the Tusell thesis, like Moa gives weight to the economic factor and stresses the importance of Francisco Jordana, foreign minister from 1942 to 1944 in „turning Spanish policy around.“ Payne emphasizes a crucial point, „the absence of key Spanish documents.“ As these are lacking, debate on Spain's wartime role might fail to reach a definitive conclusion.³⁵

4. Post-Franco Spanish Historians, *Diferencia* and the Church.

Late twentieth century Spanish historiography views Spain as an integral part of West European tradition. A generation of post-Franco Spanish historians influenced by the

³⁴ Luís Suárez, *España, Franco y la Guerra Segunda Mundial* (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 1997). Pio Moa, *Franco, un balance histórico* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 2005).

³⁵ Wayne Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 1, 2. Stanley Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 257, vii

Vicens Vives approach and the insights provided by foreign historians took Spanish historiography in new directions. Julian Marías, examining Spain's „supposed abnormality“ (*diferencia*), identified „elements“ peculiar to Spain, including its Church history, which should be kept in mind, but doing so „is approximately the opposite of making them act as the automatic explanation for everything“.³⁶ Marías insisted on key elements common to all Western societies, including Spain.

Romero Salvado, writing of the century following the Spanish-American war, drew conclusions opposite to the generation of 1898, stating that „the Spanish case will be analyzed very much as an integral part of the Western world“.³⁷ José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert strongly argued that Spain's successful modernization and democratization proved that Spaniards had no reason to feel „different“ from or „peripheral“ to Europe. In considering the early Franco period, there is a marked decline in ideological passion. Marías attempted to get rid of prejudices regarding what the regime „must have been like to see what it really was like.“ He concludes „its only policy [was] its own survival.“³⁸ Junco is tempted to say that, superficially, „nothing much happened.“³⁹ Their view of the Church is influenced by a modern Spanish society in which Catholicism is seen as „a personal belief rather than a politically-linked ideology.“⁴⁰ The Church's support for Francoist „National Catholicism“ and its „re-Christianizing efforts are seen by Marías as „restoring the outward form of a “Catholic

³⁶ Julian Marías, original publication, *España intelligible*, published as *Understanding Spain*, (trans. Frances M. López-Morillas) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 5.

³⁷ Romero Salvado, *Twentieth Century Politics and Society in Spain: 1898-1998* (New York: St. Martins, 1999), preface.

³⁸ Marías, *España intelligible*, 405.

³⁹ José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds.), *Spanish History since 1808* (London: Arnold, 2000), 257. This work is a compilation of essays, mainly by Spanish historians with contributions by their American and British counterparts.

⁴⁰ Sebastian Balfour, „The *Desarrollo* Years, 1955-1975“ in *Ibid*, 283-284.

country”⁴¹; even though „the Catholicism of many was empty and defective.“ Similarly, Antonio Cazarola saw an „insistence more on outward acceptance than on inward conviction.“⁴¹ Such „inward conviction“ is notoriously difficult to quantify, but one might observe that its growth and a campaign aimed at „outward acceptance“ are not necessarily antipathetic. In past Spanish society, that inward conviction had always been manifested in institutionalized form through political expression. In general, modern Spanish historians reject Spain’s *diferencia* and see the country as an integral part of Europe. However, they seem, by continuing to ignore the response of the Spanish Church to events outside its borders, to deny the application of these conclusions to the Church.

***Diferencia* and the Church. Foreign Historians and ‘National Catholicism.’**

Paradoxically, whilst the contemporary political expression of Catholicism has declined in post-Franco and post-Second Vatican Council Spain, interest in the political Catholicism of the early Franco years has recently grown. In 1983, Payne could correctly say that „foreign Hispanists“ had given the subject little attention.“ In *Spanish Catholicism*, Payne valuably points out that the „conventional criticism“ of Spanish religion as given to external form over internal spirituality, if true as a „general tendency, is also to an extent a caricature.“⁴² He sees modern Spanish „religiopolitical conflict“ as conforming to the general European pattern rather than *diferente* but deriving its intensity from the full complexity of Spanish history. Payne’s coverage of the early Franco Church is brief and covers the familiar ground of „National Catholicism“ and „resacralization.“ However, there are useful references to opposition to Nazism from „religious rigorists“

⁴¹ Mariás, *Understanding Spain*, 392; Antonio Cazarola, „Early Francoism: 1939-1957“ in Junco, *Spanish History since 1808*, 262.

⁴² Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison: Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), Introduction, xi,

and moderate Catholics.⁴³

Frances Lannon provides valuable insights into the history of the modern Spanish Church in a thematic review of the period 1875-1975. Lannon sees the Church in this period as alternating between privilege and persecution. She stresses the effect of Civil War persecution in making the Church pleased to establish „vitaly important common ground“ with the regime in „the dictatorship“s Catholicism.⁴⁴ However, Lannon emphasizes that Spanish Catholicism was not monolithic in the early Franco period, and she instructively describes the important regional variations which continued to exist within the Church notwithstanding Franco’s Civil War victory.

In 1996, Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway included Spain in a series of parallel studies in *Political Catholicism in Europe: 1918-1965*. The authors, whilst acknowledging distinct national Catholic mentalities, emphasize commonalities in the twentieth century European Catholic experience. Crucial was rejection of the secular liberal premise that religion was a matter of private conscience. To Catholics „faith determined...their public acts. Religion could not be divorced from politics.“⁴⁵ Mary Vincent took this politico-religious nexus further to argue that, to Spanish Catholics, „there was only one way to be Spanish and that was to be Catholic“, thus creating a Manichean division between „Spain“ and „anti-Spain“. She asserts that for many Catholics, the Civil War therefore became a crusade and convergence of values with the victorious regime was, for most Catholics, inevitable, after which they abandoned

⁴³ Ibid., 181.

⁴⁴ Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875-1975* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 222.

⁴⁵ Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, (eds.) *Political Catholicism in Europe: 1918-1965*. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), Introduction, 5.

politics, „often with relief.“⁴⁶ Vincent“s study covers the familiar field of „re-Christianization“, and does not discuss the war beyond Spain“s borders.

William Callahan provides a most comprehensive treatment of the period. Callahan examines the term „National Catholicism.“ He concludes that a perceived identity of Catholicism and „Spanishness“, a rejection of the secular liberalism of the Republic and a gratitude to Franco „as providential savior of faith and nation“ legitimized the regime. However, „National Catholicism“ was not an ideology, still less a programme.⁴⁷ Callahan sees amongst Catholics a shared crusading spirit for spiritual re-conquest sharpened by the *Guerra Civil*. Nonetheless, he insists that political involvement and compromises with the state, if a necessary prerequisite for the achievement of spiritual goals, exacerbated Catholic diversity. Moreover, Callahan sees this diversity evident in Catholic attitudes towards Nazi Germany, though Nazi racism and statism evoked widespread distrust. Although not touching on Spanish Catholic attitudes to the wider war, Callahan valuably summarizes opposition by several prelates to elements of Nazism and its radical *falangist* imitators.⁴⁸

Post-Franco Spanish Historians of the Church.

In Spain, there was little analytical work on this subject until the very end of the Franco era although the document compilations of Nicholas López Martínez in 1972 and Jesús Iribarren two years later provided useful resource material for later writers.⁴⁹ Jesús Vázquez *et al* published, in 1973, a review of the contemporary Church more structural

⁴⁶ Mary Vincent, „Spain“ in Buchanan and Conway, *Political Catholicism*, 98, 107.

⁴⁷ Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 382-384.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 391, 394-396.

⁴⁹ Mons. Nicholas López Martínez (ed. and introduction), *El Vaticano y España: Hitos documentos desde 1936* (Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1972); Jesús Iribarren, *Documentos colectivos del episcopado Español 1870 -1974* (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1974).

and sociological than historical. Historical treatment, whilst emphasizing the contribution of Catholicism to Spanish unity, devotes little space to the early Franco era, in which it sees the Church as exchanging protection and patronage for a role of pillar of the regime.⁵⁰ In 1975, Francisco Gil Delgado developed Iribarren's findings of a lack of early Franco era *episcopales colectivos* to characterize the „silent harmony“ of Church-state relationships, noting the Church's need to recover from the ravages of civil war.⁵¹ Others see the Church as more politically engaged. José Toribio suggests some Church permeation of the regime. He quotes contemporary diplomat, Agustín de Foxá's description of the Spanish system. „It is not national socialism or national syndicalism; it is national seminarism.“⁵² José Luíz Rico focuses, as his title suggests, on the Church's political role. He sees the regime comprising several *mentalidades* (tendencies of thought) rather than one *ideología*. The Church represented a traditional and conservative *mentalidad*. It aimed both to perpetuate a friendly regime and to maintain a favourable position in the balance of power between that regime's contending groups.⁵³ By the 1980s, there was some widening of discussion to include external influences. Luíz Suárez brings out the important role of the Vatican as a support for the Spanish Church.⁵⁴ Two multi-volume studies of the Church, the first edited by Agustín Afliche and Víctor Martín in 1983, the second by Quintín Aldea and Eduardo Cardenas in 1987, see the Church as alarmed by and strongly opposed to the spreading influence of Nazism in

⁵⁰ Vázquez *et. al.*, *La Iglesia Española contemporánea*, 77-79.

⁵¹ Francisco Gil Delgado, *Conflicto Iglesia – Estado* (Madrid: SEDMAY, 1975), 179-184.

⁵² José Manuel Cuenca Toribio, *Relaciones Iglesia – Estado en la España contemporánea (1833 -1985)* (Madrid: Alhambra, 1985), 102.

⁵³ José Luíz Rico, *El papel político de la Iglesia Católica en la España de Franco (1936-1971)* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1977), 80 – 83.

⁵⁴ Luíz Fernando Suárez, *Francisco Franco y su tiempo* (8 vols.) (Madrid: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 1984), vol. 3, 83-4.

Spain.⁵⁵ In the 1990s, the Church came under criticism for its perceived attitudes in the early Franco era. Vicente Carcel Ortí *et al* articulated commonly felt views that the epoch was marked by a tacit contract by which „the Church legitimized the Franco state in exchange for facilities and privileges in order to accomplish its mission.“⁵⁶ Elsewhere, there was lively debate between Alfonso Lazo and Francisco Verdera, over the alleged racism of the Church in the early Franco era. Lazo asserted that there was an „abundant echo“ of traditional anti-Semitism in Catholic publications whilst Verdera defended the Church, asserting that bishops and laity opposed both home grown and imported racist and totalitarian theories.⁵⁷

Thus we have seen that even most recent general historians and specialists, when considering the early Franco era Church, still perceive it as *diferente* in that it was concerned almost totally with political and spiritual priorities within its borders. They focus on the certainly important topics of the Church’s political relationships and its „re-Christianizing“ goals. This picture is incomplete. Certainly the trauma of the Civil War made, for the Church, internal regeneration a priority and a satisfactory accommodation with the regime vital for that regeneration. However, like Spain itself, the Church, even though exhibiting strong and important national characteristics, was part of the Western European Catholic world. The Church was concerned with morality, even when involved with politics, its political involvement perceived as a means to the

⁵⁵ Agustín Afliche and Víctor Martín, *Historia de la Iglesia* (Spanish edition under the direction of José María Javierre (33 vols.) (Barcelona: EDICEP, 1983, N27, 174; Quintín Aldea and Eduardo Cardenas, *Manual de historia de la Iglesia* (10 vols.) (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1987), vol.10, cap. vi, 343,345,346.

⁵⁶ Vincent Carcel Ortí (director), José Manuel Cuenca Toribio *et al* (colaboradores), *La Iglesia en España 1808 – 1975* (Madrid: Edit.Católica, 1979), 667.

⁵⁷ Alfonso Lazo, *La Iglesia, la Falange y el Fascismo: un estudio sobre la prensa española de postguerra* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1995), 53, 117 -121, 138, 155 – 164, 171, 175, 185 - 7; Francisco Verdera, *Conflictos entre la Iglesia y el Estado: la revista ‘Ecclesia’ entre 1941 y 1945* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1995), 47, 69-70, 89-92.

pursuit of its spiritual goals. The Church was highly aware of political threats, internal and external, to the achievement of these goals. This study will suggest that its re-Christianizing programmes were integral to its strategy to counter these threats. Moreover, „Catholic“ means „universal“. As part of the universal Church, Spanish Catholicism, whilst usually avoiding direct public political comment, was concerned with and did respond to the wider moral issues raised by the World War, as a careful reading of secondary works makes clear. Although historians directed their attention to the Church’s national priorities, the occasional reference to an outspoken cardinal, a pastoral letter or an article in official Church publications or the Catholic press about the wider war make this response evident.

This study proposes an investigation of a wide range of sources, Catholic and secular, from Spain and abroad.⁵⁸ This chapter’s review of secondary literature has revealed that, to its friends and enemies alike, the Church was a powerful body integral to Spanish life. Catholicism’s strong national character was important to Franco and to the consolidation of his regime. The thesis will extend this view, so that the Spanish Church is seen in a more universalist, outward-looking light. More importantly this work contends that the Spanish Church was in an advantageous position to contemplate the issues arising in an outside world at war. As well as having national character, it possessed standing in the Catholic world and was important to the papacy as well as to Franco. Its own Civil War experience had given it insights into the nature of modern war not available to other neutral countries. To re-emphasize, the Spanish Church was strongly placed, as a universalist institution in a nonbelligerent country, to consider the conduct of both sides in the light of its moral teaching, even though pursuit of its spiritual

⁵⁸ See Introduction, 7 -10.

goals necessitated interplay of the moral and the political in its responses and it was not neutral on all issues. Such moral teaching was the distillation of centuries of experience, as the next part of this work will reveal.

Part II. The Church, War and the Modern World.

Chapter 2. God and War. The Evolution of Catholic Teaching on Morality in War.

A good man would be under compulsion to wage no war at all, if there were not such things as just wars. *St Augustine, City of God Book XIX, chapter 7.*

The aim of this chapter is to place the interplay of morality and politics in the attitudes of the Spanish Catholic Church towards the moral issues of World War II in historical context. Historically, the Church's universalist aspirations, its claims to interpret divine will and its experience of human nature have produced political and moral tensions as the Church has struggled with the problem of war. These tensions have been influential in the development of its „just war“ teaching.

The first of these tensions is a consequence of the Church's claims to universality. „Catholic“ means „universal“ and historically, political involvement has been a consequence of universalist aspirations. An exclusivist sect can, to a degree, isolate itself from its host community, an aspiring universalist Church cannot. If such a Church aspires to the infusion of its religious values throughout its host society, it must engage with the totality of that society and therefore with its political structures. The more the early Christian Church grew, the more necessary became such engagement. When Christianity became the Roman Empire's official religion in the fourth century, political involvement with the state became imperative.

The second tension arises from the Church's claim to interpret that divine will which is at the heart of Christianity's view of morality. Given a universalist Church's need to be engaged with political structures, the Church faced the question of the extent and

practical application of divine will to moral conduct in politics. How did divine will apply, beyond the Church and its members, to the political entities with which the Church was engaged?¹ Was the Church's role a „prophetic“ one, a voice of conscience, confronting every moral delinquency of the state, at the possible cost of internal division and state retribution? Should it, rather, seek to permeate the state with Christian principles, working within the state's structure, and accepting attendant compromise between principle and political practicality? The conundrum of the relationship between Church and state has continued throughout Christian history, though, because of its universalist aspirations, the Church has often veered towards the second alternative. The „National Catholicism“ of Franco era Spain was, to a degree, an example of such a choice. Catholics, however, have never accepted the secular liberal view of religion as solely a matter of private conscience, divorced from affairs of state.

The third tension arises from the practical experience of the Church. The Church knows that acceptance of its message, still less immediate and total transformation of human life in response, will be far from universal. Within itself as well as externally, the Church faced those perennial human vices of selfishness, fear and greed, which at the individual level produced conflict and at the societal level produced war. So, engaged as it was in its society's politics, the Church had to confront and respond to the reality of recurring war. Increasingly urgent in the modern era was how the Church should respond to threats of violence against its own freedom of worship and teaching. In Spain, between 1936 and 1939, the Church faced a Civil War in which it perceived one party as bent on Catholicism's destruction. The Church's response to such specific modern threats may

¹ Scripture's famous answer in Luke 20:25 did not specify what areas of conduct should be rendered respectively to Caesar and to God.

be understood in relation to the historical development of its general attitudes to war.

These attitudes are complex, partly because historically Catholic Christianity is composed of a number of strands. Its basis is Judaism. The Catholic Church, therefore, has always opposed attempts, from the Gnostic Marcionites of the second century to crypto-Nazi „German Christians“ of the twentieth, to reject the Old Testament and Christianity's Jewish base. War, as a consequence of human sinfulness, permeates the Jewish scriptures. It would be ended by the action of God at „the end of days“ rather than being an achievable human reality.²

The second strand contributing to Catholic Christianity is the teaching of Jesus and that of the Apostles. New Testament teaching about war is not unequivocal. Whilst exclusivist sects have insisted upon a literal interpretation of isolated texts as imperatives to earthly conduct, the Catholic Church has placed them in the full context of the totality of Old and New Testament teaching.³

The third strand of Catholic Christianity is the influence of Greek and Roman philosophy and of Roman governance. Scattered Jewish communities across the Greek-speaking East Mediterranean had experienced some Greek acculturation and many converts were Greek. As Greco-Roman thought began to influence many aspects of Christianity, its specific approach to warfare is particularly pertinent to this study. The Greeks had, with some success, attempted to limit the frequency and severity of war.

² In Exodus 20:13, the Hebrew word often quoted as „kill“ is more accurately rendered „murder.“ See A.J. Hoover, *God, Britain and Hitler in World War II: The View of the British Clergy, 1939- 1945* (Westport Ct.: Praeger, 1999), 29. Jewish scripture condemns individual murder rather than participation in war. See for example Exodus 15:3, Deuteronomy 20:4. For the „end of days“, see Isaiah chap. 11.

³ Injunctions such as Matthew 5:38 and 5:44 to „resist not evil,“ and „turn the other cheek,“ from a chapter ending „be ye perfect“ may be seen as analogous to those of Isaiah envisaging a future state resulting from divine action rather than an imperative to present conduct. Elsewhere, Roman Centurions are commended and Jesus“ action against the moneychangers in Matthew 21:12 suggest circumstances in which force may be justified.

Plato laid down codes to restrict indiscriminate violence with a view to a restored and lasting peace. Roland Bainton credits Aristotle with the first use of the expression „just war.“ In attempting to define and exemplify 'just' conduct in war, Greek and Roman philosophers developed important concepts of a 'natural law', 'enjoying at least the weight of universal usage and...religious or cosmic sanction.'⁴

From the first, the Church had universalist aspirations.⁵ In reality, however, the scattered early Christian communities more closely resembled modern day sects and as such were prone to draw, from the strands composing Christian thought, a literalist, pacifist interpretation, attempting indeed to „be ye perfect.“ A number of reasons influenced this stance. Firstly, military requirements of Emperor worship precluded Christian enlistment and encouraged Christian alienation from military and government. Secondly, intermittent persecution by the state reinforced Christian perceptions of the Empire's evil nature rather than encouraged any identification with the state and obligation to defend it. Thirdly, common ceremonial, uniform scriptures and hierarchical rule, features of a universalist Church, were still developing. There was variety of belief and practice based on different emphasis on isolated scriptural texts, particularly texts advocating perfectionist pacifism. Fourthly and crucially, most early Christians saw themselves as an exclusivist body of believers in a hostile world, in expectation of imminent divine intervention on their behalf. For three centuries the Church grew relatively slowly.⁶

⁴ Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes towards War and Peace* (New York: Abingdon, 1960), 39. See Bainton, 33-43 for war in classical times.

⁵ Mark 16:15. Jesus' followers are told to „go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature.“

⁶ The reasons for a pacifist tilt in the early Church are described in Thomas J. Massaro and Thomas A. Shannon, *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War*, (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 8-9.

The conversion of Constantine from 312 is universally and rightly seen as pivotal for the Christian Church.⁷ The Church's position, its prospects and its attitude to war were transformed. New opportunities and new problems arose for Christianity. Only gradually did the Empire move from tolerating Christianity to accepting it as the Empire's official religion. However, even official toleration made Christianity's aspirations to universality more realistically attainable. The Empire's stability, usual order and good communications had helped the spread of Christianity, which was given further impetus by the Empire's increasingly benevolent acceptance. New converts poured into the Church. A universalist Church, however, needed a clearly defined universal organization. The Roman state's unity, language, law and hierarchical structure provided a logical organizational model to follow. The Church therefore grew more closely to resemble and identify with a state to which its previous attitudes had been at least ambivalent. As this relationship grew to the stage where the state sponsored and protected the Church, there arose a corresponding obligation on the Church to support the defence of the state, particularly as the threat from barbarians grew. As early as 314, A Church council condemned deserters and declared „military service free and open to Christians.“⁸ A universalist Church also needed uniform, intellectually consistent doctrines, carefully derived from the total corpus of its traditions.

Augustine's several works helped meet this need. Augustine gave the Church intellectually and theologically coherent arguments that summarized and justified a stance on warfare commensurate with its universalist aspirations and political

⁷ The dramatic story of the battle of the Milvian Bridge is well known. In fact, Constantine proceeded cautiously from toleration to preference for Christianity and received baptism only near death in 337.

⁸ Tom Frame, *Living by the Sword? The Ethics of Armed Intervention* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 66.

responsibilities. Augustine cited and synthesized scripture and the work of Greco-Roman philosophy. He also built on a century of Christian involvement with the state and the significant contribution of St. Ambrose, from whose works Augustine developed the concept of justice as the basis of dealing with the state's enemies and the prohibition of the clergy's participation in war. Considering the Church-state relationship, Augustine saw the Empire, however flawed, as a rightly constituted, therefore God-ordained authority.⁹ As such the state had a duty to defend those Christians for whom it had responsibility and Christians had a concomitant duty to fight on its behalf. Writing when the Empire was collapsing under barbarian attack, Augustine not only refuted pagan claims that Christianity had undermined Rome but also foresaw the conversion of the barbarians in a Church more universal than the Empire had been.¹⁰ However, even so universal a Church would not cure humanity's inherent sinfulness of which war, even amongst Christians would continue to be a manifestation. In *The City of God*, Augustine saw humanity as a mixture of good, aspiring to the spiritual, heavenly city, and evil, resulting in the material, debased earthly city. The Church, though directing humanity towards the first, lives in the second. In so imperfect a world, war, although a product of sin, can be a cure for sin and, therefore, just if fought for love and the protection of peace in both „cities.“¹¹

Augustine's teaching on war encompasses the right to engage in just war (*jus ad bellum*). War fought for a just cause is legitimate and Augustine envisages and sanctions,

⁹ Following Romans 13:1. „The powers that be are ordained of God.“

¹⁰ Frame, *Living by the Sword?*, 68.

¹¹ St. Augustine, *City of God*, Gerald G. Walsh et. al. trans., Vernon J. Bourke, ed., (New York: Doubleday, 1958), Book XIX, chap.7, Book XIX, chap.13.

from Old Testament precedents, „war on the authority of God.“¹² War is justly fought if just in disposition, that is, fought for Christian love. It must be just as to its auspices, in other words waged under a properly constituted authority. Augustine says little about *jus in bello*, just conduct in war, but if his suggestion of war at divine behest provided justification for crusades, his insistence on justice in disposition led logically to sanction for limitations on martial conduct.

Augustine’s works have continued to underpin Catholic doctrine on war, and are highly pertinent to modern Spain. On September 30, 1936, an early religious endorsement of Franco’s cause was contained in then Bishop of Salamanca Enrique Plá y Deniel’s pastoral letter, *The Two Cities*. Citing Augustine, the bishop, whilst allowing for imperfections on both sides, contrasted the Republican earthly city, characterized by „hatred, anarchy and Communism“, with the Nationalist heavenly city, characterized by a „just cause, heroism and martyrdom.“ Plá y Deniel was indeed, one of the first prelates to declare the nationalist cause a crusade.¹³

The crusading concept arose with the consolidation of European Christendom under an increasingly powerful universalist Church and papacy that frequently identified itself with the heavenly city of Augustine. It can be seen as response to, and imitative of, the Islamic tradition of „holy war“ that was threatening Christendom’s borders. A crusade could thus be justified as a war of defence and James Johnson’s placement of crusades within the just war tradition is therefore logical. Johnson defines a crusade as God’s war, willed by God against God’s enemies, proclaimed by the Church and conducted under its

¹² Augustine, *Contra Faustinum*, cited in Jenny Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 114.

¹³ *Boletín Episcopal de Salamanca*, LXXXIII (1936), 265 – 305.

auspices.¹⁴ Crusades thus demanded a total, uncompromising pursuit of victory, which, at times, suggested the modern concept of total war. Therefore we cannot be surprised that the crusading concept should have a twentieth century revival. Crusading references were used in the latter years of Second World War Allied propaganda, to the distress of the Church which saw such use as a usurpation of Church prerogatives. In Spain, long threatened by Islam, the Christian *reconquista* took on an uncompromising crusading complexion, with powerfully resonant memories awakened in the Spanish Civil War. Primate Isidro Gomá y Tomás's statement in 1938, „the war cannot be ended by compromise, by arrangement or by reconciliation.... Pacification is only possible by force of arms“ reflected that Spanish crusading tradition.¹⁵

In the medieval epoch, Augustine's teachings were extended and developed. Augustine's emphasis on right intention opened the door to *jus in bello* doctrines, and there is an interesting interplay of morality and politics in medieval attempts to limit war. Church initiatives such as the peace of God and truce of God and canon law provisions of immunity for some categories of noncombatants melded with the *jus gentium* body of social custom and the code of chivalry. We might note a principle which has had continued application. War could be limited when there was convergence between the interests of Church, rulers and nobles to reduce war's cost and destructiveness. However, unsupported Church initiatives, like the prohibition of the crossbow, were unsuccessful. Similarly, in the twentieth century, initiatives to limit war, whether religious or secular, the Hague Conventions for example, would be only as successful as the interests of powerful belligerents would allow them to be.

¹⁴ James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 9-10.

¹⁵ See Payne, *Spanish Catholicism*, 179.

The works of St. Thomas Aquinas produced a slight but ultimately significant shift in Catholic thinking on the justice of war. Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* restates the Augustinian criteria of competent authority and rightful intention. However, he amplifies just cause to suggest that those attacked should in justice be so „on account of some fault“ in contrast to Augustine's criterion of a specific injustice or recovery of a specific right or interest infringed. Moreover, whilst scripturally based, Aquinas' works „appeal[s] to universal principles of reason“ which Tom Frame suggests „began a secularization of the [just war] tradition.“¹⁶ Certainly, Aquinas' increasing emphasis on a classical natural law tradition, independent of, though not incompatible with, Christian tradition widened just war concepts. For example, Aquinas modified the position of Romans 13:1 to a consideration of possibilities of rebellion against tyranny.¹⁷ *Summa Theologica* states, „there is no sedition in disturbing an unjust regime, one that is conducive to the good of the monarch rather than the common good.“¹⁸ Even the „Christian“ rulers of Aquinas' epoch might not be perfectly just, and in a more secular environment, the Church might even see revolt against anti-Christian rulers as a duty. In Spain in 1936, the Spanish Church allied the tradition of „crusade“ to that of just rebellion against „anti-Christian tyranny.“ The Collective Pastoral of the Spanish bishops in July 1937 cited Aquinas' doctrine as legitimization for the Nationalist rising.¹⁹

The sixteenth century Spanish theologians, Francisco Vitoria (1480-1545) and Francisco Suárez, (1548-1617), built on and amplified the emerging body of Catholic just

¹⁶ Frame, *Living by the Sword?*, 81.

¹⁷ Romans 13:1 „Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.“

¹⁸ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Blackfriars ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), II-II Q.42, A.2.

¹⁹ *Carta Pastoral Colectiva del Episcopado español*, 1 July 1937, cited in Cardenal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, *Pastorales de la Guerra de España (estudio preliminar de Santiago Galindo Herrero)* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialph SA, 1955), 147 – 189.

war teaching. Vitoria emphasized the importance of proportionality of intention:

*No war is just the conduct of which is manifestly more harmful to the state than it is good and advantageous; and this is true regardless of other claims or reasons advanced to make the war a just one.*²⁰

Suárez writes in the context of a post-*reconquista* imperial Spanish nation state countering the Reformation. His works reveal an interesting interplay of the moral and the political underlying the Church's changed circumstances. Suárez supports Spain's struggle, declaring as heresy the proposition that war is intrinsically evil or forbidden to Christians.²¹ In asserting that the state may coerce those of its own citizens who are unbelievers in matters of the faith, Suárez likewise supports a Spanish identification of Catholicism and nationalism. However, though war is just in the defence of religion, it is not just if aimed to extend religion. The right of the state to coerce belief does not extend to its non-citizens.²²

Some historians see the considerable post-sixteenth century contributions of Hugo Grotius, John Locke and Immanuel Kant to just war theory as part of a separate secular tradition, based on a natural law not specifically Christian. Frame postulates parallel Christian and secular streams of thought „that have only rarely conversed with each other in the last 400 years.“²³ The Church, however, sees one consistent tradition. Catholic perspective is that God is the author of all law. Catholicism sees an „overarching sphere of divine law “within which the natural law is enclosed, a support for scripture and Church tradition.²⁴ Pius XII stated that „Natural Law has, for its foundation and support,

²⁰ Cited in A.J. Coates, *The Ethics of War*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 167.

²¹ Suárez, *A Work on the Theological Virtues*, cited in Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 115-116.

²² Suárez, *On Faith*, cited in Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War*, 163-165.

²³ Frame, *Living by the Sword?*, 86.

²⁴ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War*, 54.

God.”, and that the Natural Law and revelation „stream forth in a different manner... from the same divine source.”²⁵ Thus the Church, in supporting the slow evolution of international law on a natural law basis, did so from its own perspectives.

The Church’s „just war” teaching as developed by the nineteenth century under these various, but to the Church, symbiotic sources, may be summarized. There are two strands, *jus ad bellum* – the right to go to war, and *jus in bello*- right conduct in war. A war may be deemed justly entered into if the following conditions apply. Firstly, that there is just cause, to resist aggression, undo an injustice or restore a right. Secondly, that war is undertaken by a properly constituted authority. Thirdly, that there is right intention, the exclusion of hatred or motives of revenge. Fourthly, that war is undertaken as a last resort, all reasonable hopes of peaceful resolution being exhausted. Fifthly, even when these other conditions apply, war should not be begun unless there is reasonable hope of success. Loss of life and destruction is not justified if there is no prospect of the cause, however just, for which the war is waged, prevailing.

This point precedes a final criterion which leads into the second strand of right conduct in waging war. A war waged for just purposes must also be justly fought- just ends do not justify unjust means. In this regard, two general principles apply. The first is discrimination between belligerents and noncombatants. The latter must as far as possible be protected from the consequences of war. The second is proportionality, avoidance of unnecessary or excessive harm even to the enemy. The use of sufficient force to achieve just aims is justifiable. The use of excessive force or of methods resulting in loss or

²⁵ Respectively in Pius XII, encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus* 20 October, 1939, cited in Philip Hughes, *The Popes’ New Order: A Systematic Summary of the Social Encyclicals and Addresses, from Leo XII to Pius XII* (London: Burns Oates and Washburne, 1943), 25 and broadcast, *La Sollenta Della Pentecoste* 1 June 1941, cited in *Ibid.*, 177.

destruction not commensurate with the achievement of such aims is immoral.²⁶

Though simply expressed as basic principles, these conditions were accompanied by considerable commentary, the distillation of centuries of thought and experience. They provided a basis on which efforts to assess the morality of wars and to limit their destructiveness had been made in the past. They can provide a measurable standard by which the conduct of modern war may be assessed. However, succeeding chapters will show that during World War II, the specific and public application of these standards to the belligerents by the Church was subject to interplay of the moral and the political deemed necessary for a spiritual institution existing in a political world.

²⁶ Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), provides a useful commentary on Just War doctrine and its modern application. Commenting on *jus ad bellum* criteria, its authors make the pertinent point that all six need to be applicable, „four out of six... does not amount to an overall pass mark“, 12.

Chapter 3. War, the Church and the Earlier Twentieth Century World.

In the 20th-century, war will be dead, the scaffold will be dead, hatred will be dead, frontier boundaries will be dead, dogma will be dead; man will live. He will possess something higher than all these- a great country, the whole earth, and a great hope, the whole heaven. Victor Hugo, *The Future of Man*.

People never object to clergy intervening in politics, provided they do so on their side. Daniel Mannix, Archbishop of Melbourne, cited in Cardinal George Pell, (edited by M.A. Casey), *God and Caesar: Selected Essays on Religion, Politics and Society* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 31-32.

Victor Hugo's words epitomized the optimistic aura with which secular humanists invested the dawn of the twentieth century. Their idealistic view of humanity and inevitable human progress could see a place in the new era neither for war nor for that purveyor of 'dogma', the Church. That institution, for its part, seemed besieged by enemies, its view of the sinfulness of humanity a 'dark ages' view superseded by rationalist enlightenment. However, the actual experiences of the new century soon seemed to lend more credence to the Church's view of humanity. This chapter will contrast secular humanist and Catholic attitudes to the probability of future peace as the twentieth century dawned. It will suggest why the Church's pessimistic view proved justified. The chapter will then examine Catholic attitudes to moral controversies arising from the First World War and the conduct of the papacy in that struggle. Such attitudes and responses provided important precedents that were highly influential in the Church's actions in the Second World War. We will consider the position of the Church after World War I and its responses to events as another war threatened. This chapter will emphasize the Church's spiritual perceptions that governed its political actions in a hostile pre-war world of conflicting political ideologies and would continue to do so during World War II.

As the nineteenth century had advanced, to many the Catholic Church had appeared to be in inglorious retreat. Christian doctrines of human sinfulness redeemed through divine intervention seemed discredited by Enlightenment philosophies. Church claims of divine creation and Scriptural revelation appeared superseded by the Darwinist theory of evolution. Darwinist theories, applied to the social realm, seemed to suggest humanity's inevitable and natural progress towards perfection, without need for God or the Church. In the temporal realm, the papacy lost the last vestiges of its territory to the new Italian state. The Pope seemed an impotent prisoner in a miniscule Vatican. To rationalists, the papacy's assumption of *ex-cathedra* infallibility appeared the last gasp of a dying institution that would not survive the following century. The Church's universalist claims sounded absurd. Humanistic optimism seemed justified by the fact that the nineteenth century appeared to be marked by unprecedented peace and rising living standards. Moreover, an international law independent of Christian morality looked to be advancing apace. To many optimistic secular humanists, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 appeared natural steps in the realization of Hugo's prediction of the 'death of war.'

However, to the Church, such secular rationalists seemed over-optimistic. The Church remained unconvinced that apparent peace and prosperity in the 19th-century was lasting or even real. As that century progressed, rising nationalism was infused with social Darwinism to justify pseudo-scientific illusions of national racial superiority. Such a philosophy was not only at variance with and threatening to Catholic universality but had potential for increased rather than lessened international conflict. Furthermore, industrial capitalism increased European production and wealth but exacerbated social

division. Capitalists, unrestrained by conscience or government regulation, failed to use this wealth fairly to improve the wretched conditions of the new industrial proletariat. Socialism was a proletarian reaction. As Ultra-nationalism became increasingly based on race, so Marxist socialism was based on class and preached class war. Both dogmas, as secular religions promising earthly paradises for a section of humanity at the expense of others, were naturally antagonistic to the universalist Church. Both ideologies, by their exclusivity, contained the seeds conflict within and between nations. Additionally, as the American Civil War had already demonstrated, industrialism had created the technological basis for intensified future conflicts involving mass mobilization and mass destruction.

Moreover, the successes of the Hague Conventions were more apparent than real. From their inception, the Laws of War (Hague Conventions), accommodated rather than transcended nationalistic self-interest. The great powers ratified the Conventions subject to reservations regarding Articles in conflict with their own interests.¹ Britain never ratified them. The provisions applied only between 'consenting powers' and only if all involved powers were parties to the Conventions. Any contracting power had a right to denounce the Conventions.² Moreover the Laws of War were rapidly overtaken by an advancing technology. Aerial warfare was not envisaged. Fundamentally, the Conventions were based on a logical contradiction. If regulation of war was possible, why was not its abolition? If perceived nationalistic self-interest prevented war's

¹ See Robert Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1970), 40, for great power reservations and restrictions on the application of the Conventions.

² *Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of War on Land*, Section V

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague05.htm>,

last modified 2 March 2003, Article 20 for application, Article 24 for right of denunciation.

abolition, would not that same self-interest cause inconvenient regulations to be ignored in the absence of enforcement provisions? The medieval Church had faced the same problem. Catholicism's view that war was the perennial product of human sinfulness was not shared by those optimistic secular humanists who saw the Conventions as a precursor to the end of war. Moreover, the medieval Church had possessed an overarching moral authority not available to the framers of the Conventions and additionally it had not been faced by powerful, nationalistic nation states. Thus, even as secular humanists anticipated the arrival of a new century of universal peace and brotherhood, the danger of internal and external conflict continued to increase.

The Church appreciated these dangers and spoke out against them. In 1878, Leo XIII's assertion that the age was rushing on a path to destruction provided a stark contrast to Hugo's optimism. Leo warned of human society's „endless disagreements, whose issue must be war and revolution.“³ In 1889, Leo described war as „the first terror which is threatening“ and presciently warned that the increase in the size of armies and advances in weaponry would make a modern war disastrous. Two years later, Leo identified social division as one cause of political conflicts. Though rejecting socialism and defending private ownership, he proposed what were then radical definitions of workers rights and the state's social duties.⁴ In 1899, Leo's desire to express the Church's views to the conference preceding the Hague Conventions was frustrated by a virulently anticlerical Italian government. In 1902, Leo warned against rising nationalism, „a jealous self-

³ Leo XIII, encyclical *Inscrutable*, 21 April 1878, cited in Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 3, 4.

⁴ Leo XIII, encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, 15 May 1891. For rejection of socialism, legitimacy of private ownership, state responsibility, see Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 145-155. See also, Joseph Husslein, *The Christian Social Manifesto: An Interpretive Study of the Encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1931), 71-76, 102-108, 144-149.

sufficiency" producing international distrust and spurring the arms race.⁵ The Church was already anticipating the devastating war to come.

The outbreak of the First World War thus saw the Church better prepared than its liberal humanist opponents. Chapter 2 described the development over centuries of a coherent just war doctrine through which events potentially might be viewed with reasonable impartiality. Moreover, Benedict XV, (1914-1922), was a Pope whose approach to the war showed wisdom and foresight. Benedict was aware of those practical constraints on the Vatican noted in the introduction to this study and appreciated the need to avoid compromising the Church's spiritual authority and international character. From the first, Benedict XV, charged all belligerents with the lack of that Christian love deemed by Augustine an essential pre-requisite for a just war. He also decried their failure to make war a last resort, seen in a refusal to listen to Benedict's own appeal for a peaceful settlement.⁶ The war began and continued with an intensity that prompted violation of just war principles. Germany began the war by attacking neutral Belgium in violation of the *jus in bello* standard of non-combatant immunity, which was further infringed by unrestricted submarine warfare. For their part, Anglo-French forces violated neutral Greece and the British naval blockade starved non-combatant civilians. Both sides' rudimentary bombing of cities also violated non-combatant immunity. Benedict's stance was further justified as the war's continuing slaughter violated the *jus in bello* standard of proportionality.

In the short term, the Vatican was reviled on both sides. Nationalistic passions were inflamed by the intensity of the struggle and resultant mass slaughter to a point of near-

⁵ Leo XIII, encyclical, *Pervenuti*, 19 March 1902, Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 186.

⁶ Benedict XV, encyclical, *Ad Beatissimi*, 1 November 1914, *Ibid.*, 7, for Benedict's appeal.

hysterical hatred of the enemy. Catholics supported the state in every belligerent country, accepting that the state was fighting a just war, under legitimate authority, for a just cause and with peaceful intention. They were not exempt from the rising tide of European nationalism, infused with delusions of national superiority, which only total victory could vindicate. Even Catholic prelates were not unaffected by patriotic influences. However, the Church's international nature and the powerful restraint provided from Rome partly modified the hatred which invaded and almost pervaded churches in belligerent countries.⁷ Catholics were indeed at first regarded suspiciously as being relatively fainthearted and possessing „double allegiance.“⁸ When the bravery of Catholic soldiers, priests as chaplains and nuns as nurses quickly nullified such suspicions, wartime propaganda on both sides turned on Benedict who, like truth, was one of the war's first victims.

From the first, Benedict stated that:

*to involve the authority of the Pope in the actual contests of the belligerents would surely be neither appropriate nor useful...the Apostolic See...must remain perfectly impartial... Were he to do otherwise, not only would he not help at all the cause of peace, but worse, he would create aversions and enmities to religion and expose to grave disturbances the tranquility and internal concord of the Church.*⁹

This statement underscores the interplay of moral and political considerations for the Church. Benedict could see the danger of compromising Catholicism's claim to moral

⁷ See, for example, the Anglican Bishop of London's exhortations „kill Germans...to save the world, to kill the good as well as the bad, to kill the young men as well as the old.“ To Churchmen in the USA, „this was a holy war. Jesus was portrayed sighting down a gun barrel. The Germans were Huns. To kill them was to purge the earth of monsters.“ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes towards War and Peace*, 207, 209. In Germany, Richard Grunberger cites a „victory-or death counterblast by 160 pastors for a call by five of their colleagues in 1917 for a negotiated peace.“ Richard Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich* (London: Phoenix, 2005), 549.

⁸ See E.E.Y. Hales, *The Catholic Church in the Modern World* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958), 270.

⁹ Benedict XV cited in J. Derek Holmes, *The Papacy in the Modern World* (London: Burns and Oates, 1981), 8.

authority and also had to countenance such political realities as the presence of Catholics fighting on either side as well as the danger to Vatican charitable initiatives posed by any belligerent perception of papal partiality. Thus, though reserving the right to condemn „every injustice by whatever side committed“, and in fact condemning such acts as the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the use of poison gas, Benedict usually conveyed such protests through diplomatic channels. In public pronouncements Benedict was cautious, avoiding naming perpetrators of immoral policies. When, for example, Austria bombed Padua, Benedict’s telegram to the city condemned aerial bombardments of undefended cities „by whomsoever they are carried out.“¹⁰ In arguments to be repeated by Pius XII thirty years later, Benedict defended such public caution on two grounds. Firstly, in the fog of war created by accusations and counter-accusations of atrocities, truth was difficult to ascertain. Secondly, that to condemn publicly German occupation of Catholic Belgium without similar condemnation of Russia’s occupation of Catholic Poland would be to risk loss of impartiality and therefore moral authority. Benedict’s approach of guarded neutrality powerfully affected the Vatican’s approach under his successors, both in Spain in 1936, and throughout World War II.

In World War I, both sides, straining to enlist every resource to obtain total victory, wanted the moral prestige of the papacy to bless their cause and condemn the enemy’s. Benedict’s public caution regarding the enemy’s conduct and private condemnations of their own raised the ire of belligerent countries. Benedict was reviled in Italy as „*Maleditto XV*‘, in France as „the *Boche* Pope“, in Germany as „the *Francosenpapst*.“ Similarly reviled, in the war’s poisoned atmosphere, were his efforts for peace.

¹⁰ James Bentley, *God’s Representatives: The Eight Twentieth Century Popes* (London: Constable, 1997), 58-59.

Benedict's attempts to prevent the spread of the war by appealing for, first Italy's, then the United States' continued neutrality, were ascribed to pro-Central Powers sentiment. His letter of August 1917 to each belligerent appealing for peace and suggesting seven bases for negotiation was castigated on either side for allegedly favouring the enemy.¹¹ Even an office established by Benedict to reunite families split by war had to be closed amid belligerents' accusations that it fomented spying. On Italian insistence, the papacy was excluded from participation in the Versailles treaties, or the post-war League of Nations.

The war's end brought in train a natural revulsion to its horrors and a short-term revival of secular humanist optimism. United States President Woodrow Wilson was hailed almost as a secular messiah, the establishment of his proposed League of Nations as guaranteeing a permanent end to war.¹² Particularly in the English-speaking victor nations, Britain and the United States, those Protestant Churches, which had in wartime preached strident patriotism, felt themselves to be discredited. There was thus a tendency to veer in the opposite direction of internationalism and pacifism.¹³ The Catholic Church emerged in some popular perceptions as the real winner of the war.¹⁴ The cooling of wartime passions was accompanied by a strengthening of the Vatican's political prestige, as Benedict received tributes from both sides for his wartime conduct. That prestige was reflected in increased political representation at the Vatican. Whereas in 1913, only

¹¹ For Benedict's proposals, see Benedict XV, *Des le Debut*, 1 August 1917, Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 186-190.

¹² For the quasi-religious fervour provoked by Wilson's arrival in Europe, see Piers Brendon, *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s* (London: Jonathon Cape, 2000), 13.

¹³ See Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Towards War and Peace*, 211-212, Gerald L. Sittser, *A Cautious Patriotism: The American Churches and the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 18, 19.

¹⁴ Kenneth Scott Latourette, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (6 vols.) (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1962), vol. 4, 28, quotes this as a popular saying.

fourteen states considered it politically worthwhile to have representation, by 1939, 38 countries were represented at the Vatican, which itself maintained 38 nunciatures and 23 apostolic delegations abroad.¹⁵ Political prestige reflected moral prestige. The Vatican's practical wartime charity and disinterested efforts for peace began to receive due international recognition. Moreover, the war efforts of French Catholics had diminished anticlericalism in France, facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations. In Britain, the Church's relative restraint from wartime nationalistic excesses and its international nature reaped appreciation in the changed post-war political and moral climate. Catholicism's permanency, universality and not least its consistency of teaching attracted many seeking security in the postwar world.

In general, the Catholic Church avoided the attitudinal swings of some Protestant churches. Benedict had given approval and support to the League of Nations whilst warning that its establishment would not, of itself, guarantee peace. Before his death in early 1922, Benedict stated presciently regarding the Versailles treaties that a peace existing only in treaty declarations whilst „latent hostility and enmity continued among the nations“ would at best be fragile.¹⁶ His successor, Pius XI, likewise warned of the League's limitations, „there is no human institution which has power to impress on all peoples any code of common laws adapted to the present times.“¹⁷ Accordingly, whilst sending blessings on the League's formation and to the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference, the papacy avoided the flirtations with optimistic secular internationalism and pacifism that marked some Protestant clergy. By 1930, Pius was warning against

¹⁵ Holmes, *Papacy in the Modern World*, 15, for tributes from both sides, 10 for increased representation.

¹⁶ Benedict XV, encyclical *Pacem Dei Munus*, 23 May 1920, Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 194-195.

¹⁷ Pius XI, encyclical, *Ubi Arcano Dei*, 23 December 1922, *Ibid.*, 18.

„any sentimental pacifism, confused, imprudent, taking no account of dangers.“¹⁸

He did so advisedly for such dangers were already becoming apparent. Optimistic visions of a post-war era of European democracy, international understanding and perpetual peace guaranteed by the League were already evaporating. The war had bequeathed huge political and economic problems to virtually every country. In the „successor states“ to the old empires, created by the treaties often with little regard to ethnic cohesion or economic viability, these problems were dire. Democratic institutions, newly installed in the first flush of liberal enthusiasm, were unable to cope with this plethora of problems. Democracy soon became a scapegoat for all national ills and was seen as a focus for ethnic and social division. Popular nostalgia for wartime values of order, hierarchy, unity and strong leadership soon fomented and brought to power single party „movements“ which were strongly nationalistic, politically elitist and authoritarian. The Depression, spreading from the United States after 1929, further weakened faith in liberal solutions. Yet more ominous for prospects of continuing international peace was the nature of regimes in several major European countries. In Italy, Mussolini’s Fascist regime had already taken power. The spectre of Soviet Stalinism continued to haunt Europe, its power to foment social division enhanced by economic distress.

It was, however Hitler’s Germany that would soon provide the greatest threat to European peace. Hitler exploited that „latent hostility and enmity“ feared by Benedict XV within Germany in response to the Versailles treaty. Hitler traded on British popular guilt over the treaty’s treatment of Germany and consequent reluctance again to risk the horror of war in enforcing its terms. Contemptuously repudiating the disarmament clauses of Versailles and withdrawing from the League, Hitler then offered Britain an advantageous

¹⁸ Pius XI, address, *Benedetto Il Natale*, 24 December 1930, Ibid., 202- 203.

naval agreement. The British, putting national self-interest before League solidarity, accepted Hitler's offer, undermining the possibility of concerted League action against him. In 1935-1936, Britain and France prevaricated over League sanctions against Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, in the interests of good relations with Italy and their own economic recovery. The League, from the first identified with the victor powers and the treaties had been hampered by American non-participation, Italian alienation and universal distrust of the Soviets. Britain and France had been left as the league's only great power defenders. Moreover, from the League's inception, the disparate national interests of these two powers and their fundamentally differing conceptions of the League's peacekeeping function forestalled any consistency in that defence. Without consistent Anglo-French support, the League's peacekeeping function was unworkable. As Nazi Germany became increasingly well armed, racially radical, violent, expansionist and repressive towards Christian opponents, its enhanced power drew Fascist Italy and other authoritarian states into its orbit. Britain and France abandoned appeasement in face of Hitler's voraciousness and untrustworthiness, making war increasingly likely. It became virtually inevitable when by the Nazi-Soviet pact; Hitler neutralized his only other powerful potential European enemy¹⁹.

¹⁹ For British popular guilt, Italian alienation and fundamental Anglo-French differences as to the nature of the League's peacekeeping function, see J. Kenneth Brody, *The Avoidable War* (2 vols.), vol.1, *Lord Cecil and the Politics of Principle 1933 – 1935*, respectively 46, 28 and 28 – 29. Ian Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis and the Road to World War II* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 7, also makes the telling point that whilst Germany was weak, the fundamental differences between the British view of the League's role as one of conciliation and the French emphasis on the League providing for French security were not at first obvious, but they became so once Germany gathered strength. For the association of the League with the victor powers, see George Scott, *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations* (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 15. For US non-participation in the League as „a blow whose effects can hardly be over-estimated“ see F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (2 vols.), vol. 1, 72- 74. Vol.2, 669 – 684, of that work gives a good account of Anglo-French prevarication over sanctions in response to Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and its deleterious effect on the League.

The reaction of the Catholic Church to these events was cautious and complex. Vesna Drapac has pertinently criticized the purely political emphasis of some Church historians as „religious history with the religion left out.“ From a historian’s perspective, we need not accept all or necessarily any of Catholicism’s spiritual claims. However, we need to understand how the earlier twentieth century Church saw its own nature and purpose as these impacted on its political actions when war again threatened.²⁰

The Catholic Church was by the early twentieth century Europe’s longest surviving institution. If the Vatican’s propensity to „think in centuries“ has become a cliché, as perceptive an observer as future British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan captured its atmosphere of the eternal during a wartime visit. Macmillan described a „sense of timelessness,“ as „centuries come and go.“²¹ This atmosphere reflected the Church’s self-perception of being an eternal, divinely-appointed institution. The Church saw itself as the one source of salvation for every human soul. Its hierarchy was charged in every age with preserving the continued existence of the Church to make that salvation constantly available through preaching and education. The function of the Church, even the value of human life, lay in human salvation, in preparation for the next world, for which the social and political aspects of life in this world were but means to that end.²²

However, this political world was where the Church and humanity had to live. Political action was essential and the Church reacted to the threats resented by a hostile world and an approaching war by using the political experience of centuries. In its

²⁰ Vesna Drapac, *War and Religion: Catholics in the Churches of Occupied Paris* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 26.

²¹ Harold Macmillan, *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean , January 1943-May 1945* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 587.

²² Hence the genuine rejoicing in the Spanish *carta colectiva* of July 1937 of the reconciliation to the Church of the vast majority of condemned „Communists“ before death. See chapter 4.

specific teaching on war, the Church had remained reasonably consistent. It had been suitably encouraging to the League and to disarmament initiatives but had refrained from unconditional endorsement of either. As an international institution and a sovereign state, the Vatican had of necessity relations with various European governments. Its leadership considered that by remaining faithful to the preservation of the institutional Church through the guardianship of its right to preach and educate, the Church would outlive transient political regimes. The nature of political relationships with these regimes was determined by their willingness to give the Church as a minimum the political freedom to proclaim its message. Though its own hierarchical, authoritarian structure gave it some affinity with Christian regimes of similar authoritarian nature, the Church was prepared to accept any regime allowing it these freedoms. In 1888, Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical *Libertas Praestantissimum* had asserted that the Church was indifferent to the form of a government so long as its system was just and preserved religious freedom. Amplifying this teaching, Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Dilectissima Nobis*, in June 1933, had restated that doctrine. The Church would not prefer one form of government to another, provided always that essential Church freedom to worship and teach, „the rights of God and of Christian consciences“ were safeguarded.²³ The Vatican's Concordat with the Nazi regime shortly afterward demonstrated this policy whereas Communism's refusal of these freedoms explained the Church's implacable anti-Communism.

These sentiments provide a litmus test to the Church's attitude to political regimes prior to 1945. It appreciated that few if any secular governments would share its spiritual goals. Catholicism would however work with any regime which would not violate „the

²³ *Libertas Praestantissimum*, 20 June, 1888. Its teachings are summarized in Hughes, *Popes' New Order*, 76 -85. *Dilectissima Nobis* is cited in Wolff and Hoensch, *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right*, 204.

rights of God and of Christian consciences." The Vatican sought, by a series of Concordats with secular governments, to gain legal guarantees of these rights. In return, the Church offered political neutrality. It would refuse to support „Catholic“ political parties or authorize the involvement of the Church in politics except in the defence of such guarantees. Catholicism's view of any regime was determined primarily by the extent to which it upheld or infringed these basic rights of the Church, only secondarily by that regime's political nature or its treatment of its citizens. The Church thus hoped to co-exist even with regimes of which it did not approve. As it had survived barbarian invasions, wars and revolutions over centuries, the Church would survive any new war as it had the last one.

This it would do by following Benedict XV's precedents. Unless one side posed a clear threat to the Church's rights, in war the papacy would exercise guarded neutrality. A papal address in 1935, on the eve of Italy's Ethiopian campaign, provides a pre-war example of the complex interplay of moral and political considerations which could affect the specific application of Catholic just war principles and would do so in World War II. In Italy, a Concordat had established the rights of the Church after decades of mutual distrust between Church and state. Pius XI did not want to give anticlerical Italian Fascists an excuse put these rights at risk. Moreover, Pius was aware that considerable Italian patriotic enthusiasm for this venture did not exclude some bishops.²⁴ He duly condemned wars for conquest and insisted that even in defensive, inevitable wars, morality must be preserved. Pius emphasized a need to weigh the proportionality between the ends for which war is undertaken and the evil involved in its waging. In a carefully

²⁴ See Anthony Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators: 1922-1945*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 73-75 for statements of Italian bishops.

crafted statement, the Pope suggested, „it is being said that ... a war of defence, a war to safeguard the frontier... a war become necessary through the expansion of a daily increasing population... a war to defend or make certain the material security of a country would by that very fact be a just war,“ without endorsing any of these statements or applying them to Italy’s case. He reminded his audience that the just war criterion of last resort „ought to be studied.“²⁵

In the 1930s, Catholic political neutrality was increasingly strained by the plight of Catholics in countries with militantly anticlerical governments. In Mexico, the Church was challenged by harassment and anti-religious legislation. In theory, Catholic teaching was clear. Leo XIII, in 1878 had stated that the general position of Romans 13:1 regarding obedience to rulers applied. However, Leo, paraphrasing Acts 5:29, had stated that „if rulers command anything contrary to the divine or the natural law, it is God we must obey rather than men.“²⁶ Twelve years later, Leo had reiterated that when state laws „are manifestly at variance with the divine law“ as when „they exact something which is harmful to the Church – to resist becomes a positive duty, to obey, a crime.“²⁷ What then did „to resist“ signify? In a letter to the Mexican Church, Pius had specifically ruled out the formation of specifically Catholic political parties „so as not to give the enemy any excuse to treat religion as a political party faction.“²⁸ Was armed rebellion sanctioned? In principle, following the teaching of Aquinas, it was, but in rebellion as in war, the prudential *jus ad bellum* criterion of likelihood of success applied. In Stalin’s USSR, for

²⁵ Pius XI, address, *To the Congress of Catholic Nurses*, 27 August 1935, Hughes, *Popes’ New Order*, 205-206.

²⁶ Leo XIII, encyclical, *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, 28 December 1878, Ibid., 38.

²⁷ Leo XIII, encyclical, *Sapientiae Christianae*, 10 January 1890, Ibid., 88.

²⁸ Pius XI, letter, *Paterna Sane Sollicitudo*, 2 February 1926, Ibid., 98.

example, Roman Catholics were relatively few, if viciously persecuted, and a rebellion by Catholics alone had no chance of being successful. In Mexico, and in Spain, Catholics were numerous, and by 1936, in both countries, persecution was mounting. The next chapter will consider the Church's role in events in Spain between 1936 and 1945.

Part III. Ideology, Morality and the Spanish Church in a World at War.

Chapter 4. From ‘Our War’ to World War. The Spanish Catholic Church in its World.

The religion of the Spanish nation is, and will be perpetually, the apostolic Roman Catholic, the only true faith. The nation should protect it through wise and just laws and prohibit the exercise of any other. Spanish Constitution of 1812. Cadiz. Cited in Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 74.

Spain has saved itself because it never ceased to be Catholic. Archbishop and Primate Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás. – *Pastoral Catolicismo y Patria* 5 February 1939.

The Caudillo does not want war, the army does not want war, the people do not want war and you can rest assured that the Church certainly does not want war. The Archbishop of Valladolid quoted in Hoare to Halifax, 8 August 1940, FO 371/24516, NAUK.

The previous chapter described the Church's position as a spiritual organization in a hostile political world of ideologies antagonistic to the Church. It emphasized the Church's preferred attitude of neutrality in war and even in politics unless its spiritual mission, pursued through freedom to preach and educate, was threatened. This chapter will place the Spanish Church in the social and political context of the Spanish state and society. An examination of that position before and during the *Guerra Civil* will illuminate the often complex internal relations between the Church and the Franco regime during World War II.

Chapter 1 suggested that for all but three years of the twentieth century, Spain occupied at best a peripheral place in the consciousness of English-speaking societies and their historians. It noted that the three exceptional years, those of the Spanish Civil War, attracted a host of publications, many ideologically driven and lacking a deep

understanding of Spanish history and society.¹ In general the contemporaneous secular liberal view became and remained, in the English-speaking world, the received popular wisdom. In Spain the *Guerra Civil* was, from this viewpoint, a struggle between democracy and Fascism and the succeeding Franco regime was Fascist. It therefore supported the Axis during World War II. Franco in this view was aided by a rich and uniformly reactionary Church. That Church immediately and joyfully embraced the Fascist rising, triumphantly rejoiced in its victory and for years thereafter enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Fascist Franco regime. Some writers even speak of the „attraction of Fascism“ for the Church. Such a popular view persists, despite several more nuanced studies by historians since the 1960s.²

We will first examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Church“s position in Spanish society at the outbreak of the Civil War. As this thesis is about the Church in World War II, its study of the *Guerra Civil* does not purport to provide a full account of that struggle or even to provide a comprehensive review of the often controversial role played by the Church. Rather its discussion of the Civil War will highlight those important effects of that conflict which would influence the attitudes of the institutional Church and of the majority of Catholics as the events of the World War II unfolded.

¹ Valentine Cunningham, ed., *Spanish Front: Writers on the Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), introduction, xxx, states, „Most writers about the Civil War were essentially ignorant and short-term visitors, involved in an odd species of tourism.“ Peter Monteath, *Writing the Good Fight: Political Commitment in the International Literature of the Spanish Civil War* (Westport Ct: Greenwood Press, 1994), Introduction, xii –xiii, notes the „determined commitment to political ideologies“ and the „Manichaeian terms“ in which the war was seen by writers on both sides, before widespread disillusionment set in.

² See chap. 1, 15 -16. For the „attraction of Fascism,“ see chap.5.

The Pre-Civil War Church and Spanish Society.

Spain became a nation state on the basis of a fundamental identity between Church and nation. To be Spanish was to be Catholic.³ Near universal adherence did not, however, imply the fanaticism that has been ascribed to Catholicism in Spain. Actual observance in the 1930's, as measured by attendance at mass, varied regionally from very high to extremely low. Moreover, we shall see that by the 1930s, the Church had become alienated from and even hated by some important sections of Spanish society. However, the jest of Basque philosopher Miguel de Unamuno that „in Spain, even the atheists were Catholic“ is not without point. Even militant atheism defined itself in relation to, even if in violent opposition to Spanish Catholicism. Moreover, a Church of such national character could exploit the adherence, however nominal, of a large number of previously uncommitted Spaniards as a substantial reservoir of support when seemingly threatened by foreign, 'un-Christian' therefore 'un-Spanish' doctrines. The subsequent popular view of the Church may have underestimated its nationalist appeal as much as did the Republicans in 1936.⁴

Opinion as to the actual state of the pre-*Guerra Civil* Spanish Church varies. The Church's continuing strong physical presence, seen in the magnificent buildings, religious processions, pilgrimages and statues may have confirmed some Civil War writers in their stereotypical images of Spanish Catholicism- omnipresent, monolithic, fanatical, rich, politically reactionary, dominated by and serving the upper and middle

³ Several historians have emphasised this identity. See, for example, Mary Vincent, „Spain“ in Buchanan and Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe*, 97-98. Such identity is often not well-understood in English-speaking multi-faith countries but is unique neither to Spain nor to Catholicism. Historically it has held true in Orthodox countries such as Russia, Greece and Serbia as well as in Catholic Ireland and Poland, often as a response to foreign occupation or domination. This identification would constantly be emphasized by the Spanish Catholic press during World War II, for example *Ya*, 29 October 1942, 1, „in Spain, there is only one way to be Spanish –to be Catholic.“

⁴ Unamuno is cited in Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Orbis, 1982), 70.

classes. On the other hand, some Spanish Catholics were deeply pessimistic about the condition of the Church and about its future. A report for the Holy See, prepared in 1931, stated ' In Spain, religion is dying little by a little, under the protection of the state.'⁵ Father Ramon Sarabia, in 1936, wrote '*¿ España...es Católica? (Spain...Is it Catholic?)*', contrasting the 'rose legend' of 'most Catholic Spain' with a perceived reality of widespread indifference, even hatred towards the Church.⁶

The popular view also exaggerates the wealth of the Church. Much Church property had been confiscated during the nineteenth century. In 1931, the government valued total Church holdings at about \$13 million US, but much of this figure comprised buildings and other fixed, unsaleable assets.⁷ Nor were the clergy wealthy. Not only was the average parish priest poor, but, as Carr asserts,' there were no luxurious princes of the Church: a bishop was expected to give all his surplus income to charity once his simple household needs were satisfied.'⁸ The Church indeed was a major, often the sole provider of basic health care and education to many Spaniards. To afford its educative and charitable work, it had become dependent on wealthy benefactors. Thus, from the viewpoint of its opponents, the Church had become identified with the wealthy and politically reactionary. The Church also needed state subsidies for payment of clergy and maintenance of buildings and saw Republic's determination to end state financial support as a serious threat.

⁵ Cited in Vincent, „Spain“, in Buchanan and Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe*, 106.

⁶ Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 240.

⁷ See Stanley Payne, „The Church, the Second Republic and the Franco Regime“ in Wolff and Hoensch, *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right*, 193. See also Afliche and Martín, *Historia de la Iglesia*, vol. 27: 337 forward.

⁸ Carr, *Spain, 1808 -1975*, 46.

Socially and even politically, the Church and its clergy were more diverse than their detractors claimed. Carr's contention that 'the Spanish Church was democratic' may be somewhat overstated, but the Church had long provided an avenue whereby Spaniards of lowly origin could receive an education and those of particular talents could rise in the hierarchy.⁹ Cardinal Pedro Segura, Spain's Primate in 1931, provided a contemporary example. A table, cited by Callahan, showing the social origins of seminarians in 1934, reveals an overall majority coming from financially modest backgrounds and from those rural northern regions where a separatist tradition and fear of governments centralized in Madrid flourished. The British were to note that a strong Basque Catholic clergy had been „profoundly influenced by the separatist movement since the beginning of the century.“ It was their religion as such and their predominantly rural, and not their class backgrounds, which estranged many priests from an often antagonistic increasingly urban society. Hatred of the Church came not only from working-class revolutionaries but had long been endemic in Spanish bourgeois liberalism.¹⁰

The depth of this liberal antagonism in Spain is at times insufficiently appreciated in English-speaking societies. The fulminations of popes against liberalism and Franco's later denunciations of freemasonry aroused antipathy in the English-speaking world. However, Anglo-Saxon liberalism often differed sharply from liberalism in Catholic Europe. In English-speaking countries where a variety of faiths co-existed, liberalism supported freedom of religion whilst anticlerical opinion was content to advocate a neutral state free from Church interference. Likewise, Anglo-Saxon freemasonry was

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 210, Table 5. For British comment on Basque separatist clergy, see Bernard Malley, Councillor, British Embassy, Madrid, FO 371/ 102059, National Archives, United Kingdom (henceforth NAUK).

and is deist and organizationally usually apolitical. In Catholic Europe, the Church's universalist and exclusivist claims seemed to anticlerical liberals to pose a direct challenge to the secular state. Likewise, some European freemasonry had eliminated belief in God, was avowedly anti-Catholic and attracted the anti-religious. Many masons and liberals in Catholic Europe were thus antipathetic to Catholicism and, with varying degrees of radicalism, attacked the Church. The presence of virulently anti-religious liberals and masons in the Spanish Republican government of 1931 and the equally virulent hostility felt towards such *forastero* and 'anti-Spanish' doctrines by many devout Catholics created a pre-condition for polarization.¹¹

Thus, many liberals hated the Spanish Church for its intellectual and spiritual position. Moreover, significantly-supported anarchist and Marxist revolutionary movements hated the Church for its socio-economic position. Anarchism was based on a premise that the existence of government and its coercive power over the individual was the source of human misery. To Spanish anarchists, the Church was a deadly enemy for two reasons. Firstly, it provided another coercive force against individuals. Catholic doctrine of humanity as sinful and needing the Church's guidance was totally at variance with the anarchist belief that freedom from external restraints would allow the essential goodness of humanity to be revealed. Secondly, the Church was one of the social props of the coercive state; Church and state should both be destroyed by a violence manifested in the physical destruction of church buildings. By the twentieth century, many anarchists

¹¹ See Jasper Ridley, *The Freemasons* (London: Robinson, 2000), for a balanced account of Anglo-Saxon and European Freemasonry. Distrust of *forastero* (strange and/or foreign) influences was at the heart of *franquista* propaganda. This term, with „anti-Spain“ was used so frequently precisely because it appealed to a popular contemporaneous Spanish prejudice by no means confined to Franco’s supporters. Philip Morgan suggests that „propaganda usually works ... most effectively when it confirms or re-enforces existing attitudes, when there are already well-rooted sentiments on which to build.“ Philip Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, Italians and the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 43.

had incorporated belief in syndicalism, which advocated worker takeover of industries by 'direct action' - strikes and violence, into one destructive anarcho-syndicalist creed.

Revolutionary anarchism had gained substantial support in the south and in Barcelona, where economic deprivation and distrust of central government were strong and the practice of Catholicism was particularly weak. In these areas, the Church seemed to be fighting a losing battle against this deadly enemy which was not only a physical threat but a rival for the allegiance of the people.¹²

An even deadlier rival was Marxism. Karl Marx had, as early as 1854 seen Spain as an interesting case study in revolution.¹³ In contrast to the anarchists who wished to destroy the state, Marxists wished to seize it for themselves. Marxism was particularly popular in Madrid where belief in a centralized Spain was strong. Marxists, of course, hated the Church as 'opiate of the people', for its support for the capitalist system and as competitor for popular allegiance. In 1931, if anarchism presented the greater physical danger to the Church, Marxism presented the greater political danger. Marxist support in Spain was relatively small.¹⁴ Marxists were, however, skilled in propaganda and at fomenting and exploiting social unrest. Their commitment and discipline had enabled them to overcome minority status to achieve power in Russia, to which Spanish communists looked for support. During the Civil War, the Church was to describe all its enemies as 'communists'. This appellation, if politically inaccurate, represented a shrewd

¹² J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Movements of Social Dissent in Modern Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962), 42-56, describes Anarchist ideology and provides readings from influential anarchist Bakunin on *Religion as Enslavement and Revolutionary Violence as the Only Means of Progress*, (133, and 135). Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*(New York: Free Life Editions, 1977), defines Spanish anarcho-syndicalism (8-9) and describes its development (128-157).

¹³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Revolution in Spain* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939). Marx's articles of 1854, written for the *New York Daily Tribune* on the Spanish revolution of that year, were reprinted under the above title.

¹⁴ Carr, *Spain: 1808 -1975*, 661, puts its strength, even in July 1936, at only 40,000, though it was to grow to 250,000 by March 1937.

estimate by the Church of what constituted its most dangerous opponent.

We have seen that, to Catholics of monarchist, traditionalist views, the advent in April 1931 of a Republican government containing many of their sworn enemies, was in itself anathema. Such views seemed confirmed in May by a wave of incendiarism against churches and by the government's hesitant and tardy condemnation. Primate Segura attacked the government with such vehemence that he was forced into exile. However, Spanish Catholicism was far from monolithic. Toribio notes widespread disenchantment with the monarchy amongst the lower clergy and suggests that a policy of cautious accommodation was widely-supported. Enrique Plá y Deniel, then Bishop of Ávila, spoke in his Pastoral Exhortation *On the Advent of the Republic* of the „respect and obedience owed to the civil powers and the need for dignified fulfillment of their civic duties by Catholic citizens for the good of the country.“¹⁵ To Basque and Catalan Catholics, the Republic gave hopes of regional autonomy. Segura's fellow-Cardinal and acting successor, the Catalan Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, though a political conservative, favoured a pragmatic, conciliatory approach. On September 14, 1931, Vidal was able to reach an *acuerdo reservado* (secret agreement) with the government, recognizing the „juridical character“ of the Church.¹⁶

The problem with the *acuerdo* was precisely that it was *reservado*, for fear, as the text expresses, of the anti-religious „inveterate extremists“ among the Republican parliamentary majority who were soon heard. Manuel Azaña's declaration that „Spain has

¹⁵ Toribio, *Relaciones Iglesia-Estado*, 19 -23. *Boletín Eclesiástica de Ávila*, XLII, (1931) 173 – 182, for Plá y Deniel's pastoral exhortation.

¹⁶ The protracted negotiations preceding this agreement are described in *Archivo Vidal i Barraquer*. (henceforth AVB) vol.1, parts 1 -3. Vidal's views are perhaps seen as more „progressive“ than they actually were by Hilari Raguier, *Gunpowder and Incense: the Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War*-tr. Gerald Howson (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), xviii, but Raguier provides evidence of that Cardinal's pragmatic approach. Raguier also provides an English text of the *acuerdo* (331 – 332) from the *Archivo Vidal i Barraquer*.

ceased to be Catholic" was taken by the „extremists" as a signal for an attack on the position of the Church through the Republic"s new constitution. Article 3 of that document asserted „The Spanish state has no official religion." Article 26 was a fundamental attack on the Church's mission and on its financial survival. All state financial support to the Church was to end within two years. Religious orders were forbidden to teach and required to give up all property not used for specifically religious purposes. The secularization of schools was symbolized by the removal of crucifixes. The Jesuit Order, owing obedience to the Pope, and therefore to 'an authority other than the state' was to be dissolved and its property confiscated. Subsequent legislation legalized divorce, instituted civil marriage, foreshadowed the closing of all Church schools and even secularized the cemeteries. Even the pragmatic Vidal had earlier expressed fears that such an „atheistic and secular constitution" would be a sign of the „apostasy of the Spanish state." Philip Minehan pertinently sees this „venture onto intensely sacred ground" as „tactically risky politics, providing the Spanish right with a perfect and much-needed oppositional rallying cry." Catholics such as Navarre"s fiercely traditionalist Carlists were already responding by forming *Requetés*, paramilitary militias.¹⁷

There seemed some hope of reasonable co-existence, however, after a confederation of rightist parties united mainly by defence of the Church, became the largest parliamentary grouping in 1934, and most anti-clerical legislation was allowed to lapse.

¹⁷Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 290, sees Azaña, then Minister of War, later Republican Prime Minister and President, as a moderate and his statement as expressing a belief that Spain should no longer be a confessional state with a privileged Church rather than as signal that the Church should be attacked. Callahan details the constitutional changes in *Ibid*, 286- 294. For Vidal"s comment, see Vidal to Alcalá-Zamora, 3 August, 1931, AVB, vol.1, parts 1 -2, 178. See Philip Minehan, *Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece, 1936-1949* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 59 for „tactically risky politics". See Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and the Crisis in Spain, 1931 – 1939*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 20 – 27 for Carlist traditionalism, 219- 222 for *Requetés* militias.

Unfortunately, the mid-1930s were inauspicious times for moderation, in Spain as elsewhere. In Mexico, virulent anticlerical persecution seemed to some Spanish Catholics to presage the Spanish Church's fate should the left again take power.¹⁸ Stalinist persecution in the USSR caused alarm in the minds of those Catholics who perceived a growth of Spain's Communist Party and its influence. Despite Hitler's Concordat with the papacy, Nazism attracted few Spanish Catholic admirers as its anti-religious nature soon became apparent. In Spain, the new democracy was attempting to go against a Europe-wide trend to authoritarian government, driven by the Great Depression, a cataclysm bringing economic dislocation and social misery to virtually every country. Democracy was severely tested even in literate, economically advanced societies with strong democratic traditions. The Spanish Republicans were being pressed to meet the unrealistic expectations of volatile, often barely literate supporters, using an untried system in one of Europe's poorest countries. Payne astutely highlights the Spanish contrast between advanced political aspirations and social and economic backwardness, a „maximally explosive“ combination of „optimal freedom and opportunity for the development of socio-economic conflict with very limited means for its deflection or resolution.“¹⁹ Many Republicans lacked the governmental experience and political realism to see politics as the art of the possible rather than of the ideal. In Spain's parlous economic circumstances, programmes of reform needed careful prioritization and consideration. Moreover, in such circumstances, a perceived fundamental threat to

¹⁸ See chapter 3.

¹⁹ Payne, *Spanish Catholicism*, 151. See also the comments by Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War: 1931-1939* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965, 478- 479 „When the Republic arrived...Spaniards wanted to do everything at once“ and by Mary Vincent, *Spain 1833- 2002: People and State* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 121, „The Republic came into existence freighted with expectations, a universal panacea for an apparently endless list of competing claims.“

entrenched Spanish institutions would put the survival of Spain's new democracy at risk. The Republic's industrial and agricultural reforms were well-intentioned and ultimately probably desirable. In the prevalent circumstances, they may have been inapposite and inevitably increased political polarization. Whilst the industrial and agricultural working-classes became more susceptible to the appeal of the extreme left, large and small-scale business and landowners saw the Republic as a threat to their existence.²⁰

To leftists, 1934-1935 was the *bienio negro* (black two years), in which their legitimate aspirations were thwarted by reactionaries. In early 1936, for the Church, events took a decided turn for the worse as elections were called. The left, made desperate by Spain's parlous economic position and frustrated by the events of the *bienio negro*, declared an electoral alliance, the *Frente Popular* (Popular Front). Moreover, the anarchists who, for obvious reasons, had boycotted previous polls subordinated political principle to political realism and threw their considerable support behind the *Frente*. Whilst 'no two historians agree of the number of votes and seats won by each party,' the effect of the result was obvious enough; a polarized Spain deadlocked between left and right with the centre virtually eliminated. The electoral system, which had favoured the right in 1933, this time heavily favoured the left. Leftists were determined to achieve their various and conflicting millennialia with or without government sanction. In the five months between the election and the military rising, what Payne sees as a „pre-revolutionary situation inexorably developed.“ Spain descended into chaos as civil order broke down. The prisons were emptied, both of political prisoners and of common criminals, many determined to wreak vengeance on those responsible for their

²⁰ By 1932-1933, Spanish international trade had sunk to 30% of its 1928 level. See Richard Herr, *Spain* (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 168.

incarceration. In the countryside, labourers seized land and expelled landowners, industries were paralyzed by violent strikes, the cities by riots and shootings by rival political gangs. The socialists declined to participate in the government, fearful of mass defection of support to Communists and anarchists, and joined them in accentuated radicalism and attacks on the Church.²¹

Azaña's new government pressured by extremists from within and without, seemed both weak and partisan in controlling disorder.²² Land seizures were merely retrospectively legalized and the government seemed helpless or unwilling to act against violent strikes, Church burnings and assaults on clergy. The right saw a situation seemingly analogous to that of Russia in 1917, with Azaña cast as Kerensky and socialist leader Largo de Caballero, cast by his own followers as 'the Spanish Lenin', preaching a proletarian uprising.

The Church looked on with alarm. Amidst such chaos and extremism, conciliatory policies and diplomatic initiatives were useless. Its political ally, CEDA, was losing influence as faith in the diplomatic process waned, traditionalist militias drilled, and some Catholic youth flirted with Fascism. With its schools, closed by the government ostensibly for their own protection, but unlikely to reopen under a *Frente Popular* regime, the Church could only rely on its spiritual resources. It had, perhaps, the consolation that these resources were being increasingly demanded. The extremity of prevalent circumstances drew many Catholics closer to their Church, conceivably to pray

²¹Herr, *Spain*, 182, for disagreement on the election result, Payne, *Spanish Catholicism*, 166 for „pre-revolutionary situation“. Many Catholics, similarly, see 1931 -1933 as the *bienio rojo*; *rojo* (red) having of course a political connotation which was to be applied universally by Nationalists to their opponents in the *Guerra Civil*.

²² Technically, the government was not Azaña's after his election in May as president, in place of Zamora, removed by the Cortes. The physically ailing Quirogo took over as prime minister. However, it was Azaña who gave the government such direction as it still possessed, though handicapped by his removal from the direct political realm.

for a miracle. In July, for many Catholics, that miracle duly arrived.

The *Guerra Civil* and the Church.

However, it is untrue that a monolithic Church immediately and joyfully greeted the rising of 1936. We have already noted that Spanish Catholicism was not monolithic. Indeed, in Navarre and the *país vasco* (Basque region), those very areas where Catholic practice was strongest, a polarized reaction to the rising amongst Catholics resulted in a civil war within the Civil War. Fiercely traditionalist Carlists fought their fellow Catholic Basque nationalists who defended a Republic which had promised the *país vasco* a measure of autonomy. In Navarre, the Carlist paramilitary *Requetés* had immediately mustered to support the rising with the enthusiastic support of local priests. However, fourteen Basque priests were later to pay for with their lives for their role on the Republican side, others were imprisoned. Moreover, not even Spain's three cardinals could work in concert as the rising began. Segura was in exile in Rome from where he could only, as Gil Delgado comments, follow disconsolately media reports of the disintegration of Spain. Though Segura's successor as primate, Isidro Gomá, would take a leading role in support of the Nationalists, Spain's third cardinal, Vidal, in contrast to his two colleagues, was to oppose any identification between the Church and the Nationalist cause.²³

The genesis of the rising was military. Military discontent with the Republic was rife.

The Republicans had drastically culled the officer caste and democratized the army.

²³ The Republic established a Basque autonomous government on October 1. See José M. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy* (Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 85. For enthusiastic support of priests in Pamplona for the *Requetés*, Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, 251, cites the eyewitness account of J Pérez Madrigal, *Memorias de un converso* (Madrid: 1943 – 1952, vi, 128- 130. For comment on Segura, see Francisco Gil Delgado, *Pedro Segura: Un Cardenal de Fronteras* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2001), 299.

Officers still serving feared more cuts and even greater „Bolshevisation“ of the military. Several leading officers, including Franco, removed to distant and obscure commands, feared for their future career prospects. To the military, however, wider issues were at stake. The army, with the monarchy and the Church, were widely seen by most officers as repositories of essential values which epitomized „Spanishness“ guaranteed an ordered, united Spain and transcended political regimes and ideologies.²⁴ By mid-1936, the monarchy was exiled; the Church and the military itself seemed under attack. Regional separatism, promoted by the Republic, seemed to threaten Spain’s sacred unity. Moreover, to the army, the regime tolerated, when not actually fomenting, the revolutionary *forastero* ideas of „anti-Spain“, which were producing chaos, criminal mayhem and misery, and threatening the country’s very existence.

The *London Times* erred in describing the revolt as „monarchist.“²⁵ Still less was it Fascist. If most officers admired German military efficiency and many approved the social order of Germany and Italy, few approved the secular radicalism of such foreign regimes inimical to traditional Spanish values. Franco’s *Manifesto of Las Palmas*, on July 18 called for „war without quarter ... on the foreigners and foreign-oriented people who openly or deceitfully endeavor to destroy Spain.“²⁶

Nor was the rising in defence of the Church. Franco’s July 18 proclamation made no reference to religion and the following day, General Emilio Mola, the rising’s apparent leader declared „We believe that the Church should be separated from the state for the

²⁴ Marx, strangely enough, took this view. „It was only in the army that everything vital in the Spanish nationality was permitted to concentrate.“ Report to *New York Daily Tribune*, 4 August 1854, cited in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Revolution in Spain* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939), 96.

²⁵ *London Times*, 20 July 1936, 12a.

²⁶ See Brian Crozier, *Franco: A Biographical History* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967, app. 4, 519 - 522).

good of both institutions.²⁷ The military sought not the abolition of the Republic but a Republic purged of its revolutionary leftist elements and recast in a more authoritarian mould with a strong military presence. Franco ended his first address to the troops with „*Viva la Republica.*”²⁸ The Spanish hierarchy was also cautious. It had had no pre-involvement in the rising and the early statements of Franco and Mola gave it no particular encouragement. Gonzalo Redondo asserts „at first, hierarchy and generals ignored each other.”²⁹

By early September both Church and military faced added complications. The Republic had secured the Basque Provinces and Basque Catholic support by granting local autonomy. This move both made the early victory of the rising more problematical and divided Spanish Catholics. A further complexity was the internationalization of the war. Both sides requested and received foreign assistance; the Nationalists from Germany Italy and Portugal, the Republicans from the Soviet Union and from the leftists of the International Brigades. This development intensified ideological hatred and extremism on both sides. To many abroad, the Nationalist side, and Franco, acquired and retained „a tinge of Fascism as persistent as the stain of blood on Lady Macbeth”s hand.”³⁰

In these circumstances, Vidal argued for the Church to remain aloof. In a letter to Vatican Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli, Vidal castigated the extreme right, insisted that the Church should never be used for the purposes of politics and asserted that any

²⁷ Jose Angel Tello, *Ideología y política: La Iglesia católica Española: 1936- 1959* (Zaragoza: Libros Pórtico, 1984), 55.

²⁸ T. F. Burns, *Changing Opinion in Spain, 1939-1945*, 3, Archive, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (henceforth RIIA), 8/1216.

²⁹ Gonzalo Redondo, *Historia de la Iglesia en España, 1931-1939*, (2 vols.) Tomo (vol.) 2 *La Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialph SA, 1993), 13.

³⁰ The Basque autonomous government was officially inaugurated on October 1. See José M. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy* (Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 85. See Crozier, *Franco: A Biographical History*, 196, for „Fascist tinge.”

such identification by the Church „sows the seeds of future divisions.“ Vidal represented what Hilari Ragner describes as a „third Spain“ of liberal Catholics and moderate Republicans determined to work for peace and praises such Catholics. Why then was the „third Spain“ unsuccessful? Firstly, Vidal, its natural leader, was from the start of the *Guerra Civil*, in exile in Rome and was unable directly to influence events in Spain. Secondly, the „third Spain“’s natural constituency, the *país vasco*, was soon under Nationalist control. Thirdly, as Ragner himself acknowledges, „so vicious had grown the mutual hatred of the combatants that any initiative towards peace could only come from Spaniards abroad.“³¹

We have already noted that in Spain itself, political polarization was such that many Catholics welcomed the rising as deliverance from an anti- religious regime. This reaction was soon intensified by atrocities committed against the Church in parts of Spain controlled by Republican forces. Within days of the rising, the revolutionary left began a campaign of burning and looting of churches and massacres of priests, other religious and lay Catholics unparalleled in Western European history.³² The Church saw not only its essential rights but its very existence threatened. Politically, it could justify support for the rising on the grounds that even if the Republican government was not directly responsible for them, the massacres proved a breakdown in its authority and ability to maintain order. Emotionally, the massacres intensified Catholic hatred of „Reds.“ To many Catholics, the Soviet aid received by the Republicans guaranteed that a Communist

³¹ Vidal’s letter to Pacelli, 10 May 1937, is cited in Ragner, *Gunpowder and Incense*, 212 – 213, from ABV unpublished section. See Ragner, 336 – 337, for the Italian Consul’s report of *The Saving of the Cardinal of Tarragona* from arrest, 213 for Ragner’s comment on the „mutual hatred“ of the combatants, 249 for his praise of the „third Spain“.

³² The standard account is Antonio Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España 1936-1939* (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1961). Moreno lists 4181 priests, 2365 monks and 283 nuns killed, some in circumstances which defy description. Thousands of churches were wholly or partly destroyed.

Spain would be the outcome of a Republican victory and elevated the rising into a „crusade“ on behalf of religion, as the Bishop of Pamplona had declared as early as August 23.³³ Cautiously at first, Church and Nationalists turned to each other.

The papacy remained cautious. Politically, the Vatican wished to retain relations with the Republican regime whilst the war's outcome was in doubt, not only for the sake of the Basques but to maintain some influence, however residual, in the event of a Republican victory. In the war's early weeks, the Nationalists' lack of religious commitment and acceptance of help from Germany and an Italy with which the Vatican's relationship was complex raised doubts about the nature of a victorious Nationalist regime. Continuing Republican anti-religious atrocities, however, provided grounds for papal moral condemnation whilst signs of increasing emphasis on Nationalist religiosity provided political reassurance. The papal address of September 14, whilst avoiding endorsement of the Nationalist cause, in condemning the atrocities, tacitly encouraged the alliance of Spanish Catholic hierarchy and Nationalists. Classic Catholic „just war“ doctrines were restated. On September 30, Bishop Plá y Deniel published his definitive pastoral *The Two Cities*, defining the religious nature of the war in Augustinian terms.³⁴ In November, Primate Gomá in his pastoral *El Caso de España*, referred to „a truly crusading spirit, against the anti-Spain.“³⁵ By January 1937, Gomá, in an open letter to Catholic Basque president José Aguirre, re-emphasized that the religious nature of the war transcended economic and regional issues. Communism, „hydra with seven heads, and synthesis of all heresy“, was diametrically opposed to Christianity and Gomá restated

³³ See Toribio, *Relaciones Iglesia-Estado*, 72, for other early references to the war as „crusade“.

³⁴ Papal address, *La vostra presenza*, 14 September 1936, Claudia Carlen, *Papal Pronouncements: The Papal Encyclicals, 1939-1958* (Raleigh NC: McGrath, 1981), 13:171. See chap. 2, 36-37, of this study, for Augustinian doctrines.

³⁵ Gomá, *Pastorales de la Guerra de España*, 53, 55.

the Thomist doctrine of a Christian „moral rights of defence against an unjust aggressor.“³⁶ That month, Mola, modified his view of the essential separation of Church and state, suggesting that such separation „did not imply divorce.“³⁷

Well before this time, Nationalist leaders had bid for Catholic support. As early as August 15, Mola had broadcast, pledging „to raise the cross, symbol of our religion and our faith“ over the new state. On September 4, the Nationalists implemented educational concessions to Catholic doctrine in their zone. On the Nationalist side, Franco's emergence as leader and his confirmation as head of state on October 1 helped the process of alignment with the Church. One need not doubt the genuineness of his religious convictions to assert that Franco pursued this alignment with a mixture of the caution and political opportunism which marked his career. Cautiously, Franco had avoided political commitment during both monarchy and Republic and unlike many of the generals he never expected a quick victory.³⁸ Opportunistically, he had used German contacts to obtain crucial German aid, whilst simultaneously welcoming Jewish support in Morocco.³⁹ Whilst the Republicans suffered from chronic divisions and mutual suspicions, Franco, by uniting the right in one *movimiento* (movement), consolidated his own position and reassured the Spanish hierarchy by bringing the Fascist *Falange* under his control.⁴⁰ Crucially, some Spanish prelates began to see a future Franco regime as more than providing deliverance from „exotic diseases“ but creating an opportunity, „the

³⁶ Gomá, *Carta abierta al Sr. D. José Aguirre, 10 January 1937*, in *Ibid.*, 87. For Thomist doctrine, see chap. 2, p. 39.

³⁷ Mola, speech, 29 January, 1937, cited in Ramon Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 279.

³⁸ Franco to General Kindélan, 5 August 1936. „I haven't the faintest doubt that we will win, but it is going to be long and costly.“ Cited in Crozier, *Franco: A Biographical History*, 200.

³⁹ See *Ibid.* 196-200. For Jewish support, see chap. 12.

⁴⁰ The *Falange Española Tradicionalista y el JONS*, or *FET* (of which Crozier comments, „its creation condemned Spanish fascism to slow death by strangulation.“ *Ibid.*, 237.

legal framework necessary for priests and religious to re-Christianize the alienated masses.⁴¹

Franco, however, was initially unsuccessful in gaining that papal recognition which would guarantee the official, unequivocal backing of the Spanish Church. The Vatican cautiously appointed Gomá „confidential and semi-official representative“ in December 1936 but not until March 1937 did Pacelli tacitly authorize, by leaving to Gomá’s „prudent judgment“, the publication of a collective Episcopal pastoral, backing Franco.

On April 26, the issue of international support was both complicated and made more urgent when German bombers obliterated the Basque town of Guernica (Gernika). As with many Civil War atrocities, the number of innocent dead is disputed. What is indisputable is the wave of horror this act unleashed around the world. In Spain, the Church at first tried to deny the Guernica bombing but the atrocity bitterly divided Catholics everywhere and eroded international Catholic support for the Spanish Church’s claim that the Nationalists were fighting a Christian *cruzada*. In France, leading Catholic author Francois Mauriac and other Catholic intellectuals sent a letter of protest to the Pope. International Catholic opinion needed reassurance after the bombing of Guernica, and in July, when the Nationalist capture of the Basque regions ended visible Spanish Catholic divisions, Gomá’s „prudent judgment“ was exercised.⁴²

The *Carta Colectiva del episcopado Español* (Collective Pastoral Letter), aimed to clarify the nature of the struggle, particularly to the outside Catholic world. It denied

⁴¹ Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 351. Callahan cites (351, f/n 29), in contemporaneous clerical literature „an ill-disguised satisfaction that “regionalism, socialism, syndicalism and communism...exotic diseases carried by the new barbarians” were about to be swept away.”

⁴² For disputes as to the number of dead and both Catholic and general reaction in Britain and the USA, see Ian Patterson, *Guernica and Total War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), respectively 29 -30 and 38 - 42. For Mauriac’s protest to the Pope, see Richard A. Gordan, *France and the Spanish Civil War* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1974), 243. For initial Church denials, see Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Orbis, 1982), 167.

foreign press suggestions that the Church had wanted the war.⁴³ The *Carta Colectiva* rehearsed „continual and violent attacks“ on the Church under the Republic and alleged Communist preparation for revolution without which „the rising would not have happened.“⁴⁴ It detailed „anti-Spanish „and „anti-Christian“ Republican atrocities and denied that the struggle was „a war of classes' or „between democracy and statism.“⁴⁵ In supporting the „civic-military movement“, which has „strengthened the national spirit,“ the prelates trusted that the „men of government would not wish to accept foreign models but to establish a state in keeping with national traditions.“⁴⁶

The *Carta Colectiva* sealed the open backing of most of the hierarchy and of many of the laity for the Nationalist cause, though there were important exceptions to that commitment as well as variations in the intensity of Catholic support. This backing has been bitterly condemned. Raguer „from a point in time nearly seventy years after the end of the Civil War“ praises Catholics who worked for peace. The *Carta* almost certainly, however, reflected contemporaneous views broadly held within the Church under the pressures of a polarizing, total, civil war, seen by many Catholics as both being fought for the survival of religion and for the promise of a purified re-Christianized Spain.⁴⁷

These hopes and fears which had influenced the increasing alignment of the Church with the Nationalist cause certainly muted the response of episcopate and clergy to atrocities committed by the Nationalist side. In November 1936, Marcelino Oleachea, Bishop of Navarre, had strongly condemned executions by the Nationalists without due

⁴³ Gomá, *Carta colectiva del episcopado Español*, 1 July 1937, in *Pastorales de la Guerra de España*, 153.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 161.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 172,179,180.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 181.

⁴⁷ Raguer, *Gunpowder and Incense*, 110-114, notes these exceptions, which included Vidal, with approval. See *Ibid*, 115 – 117 for critics of the *Carta Colectiva*. Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 349, aptly sees the war's causes as complex and the *Carta's* arguments as simplistic. In the midst of total war, however, complex arguments seldom appeal.

process of law. Mateo Múgica, Bishop of Vitoria, had earlier been forced into exile after similar protests. By January 1937, however, Gomá, in his letter to Aguirre, defended the Church's public silence in face of the Nationalists' killing of the fourteen Basque priests. The July *Carta Colectiva* expressed the attitude of the broad majority of the Church for the rest of the war. It criticized „in the name of Christian justice and charity“ the excesses carried out in the Nationalist zone but placed these in the context of greater atrocities committed by the enemy in a total war. Its rejoicing that „at the moment of death, as sanctioned by the Law, the immense majority of our Communists have been reconciled to ... [the Church]“ was consistent with the Church's soul-saving priorities. However, it is unsurprising that the Spanish episcopate, in subordinating „prophetic“ advocacy of moral principle to the achievement of spiritual objectives through political means has attracted much subsequent criticism, particularly by those who have a „prophetic“ view of Catholicism. The Spanish Church's attitudes during the *Guerra Civil*, and their rationale, should be borne in mind when we consider its moral attitudes to issues arising from World War II.⁴⁸

The backing of the Church was of considerable help to the Nationalist cause. It gave the right a unity which the left never obtained and gave its cause respectability.

Catholicism, Lannon suggests, „was convenient shorthand for a whole series of conservative aims pursued with varying emphases and priorities around which these

⁴⁸ The full text of Oleachea's sermon is given in Raguer, *Gunpowder and Incense*, 338 – 340. For Múgica, see Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 354. Gomá had privately protested to Franco, after which Nationalist executions of priests stopped. See Sánchez, *Spanish Civil War*, 80. On the Basque priests, Vincent aptly comments, „in quantitative terms, fourteen priests are scarcely significant when compared to the 6,845 priests killed by the other side, but ... shooting ordained Catholic clergy is a curious activity for those fighting in the name of God.“ Vincent „Spain,“ Buchanan and Conway, *Political Catholicism*, 118.

⁴⁸ For Gomá's response to Aguirre, see Gomá, *Pastorales de la Guerra de España*, 77. For *Carta Colectiva* comments, see *Ibid*, 156. For the Church's soul-saving imperative, see chap.3, 56. For a „prophetic“ view of the Church, and thus a highly critical view of its role in the Civil War and afterwards, see Raguer, *Gunpowder and Incense*, 321 – 325.

groups could unite even when religion was not their primary motivation.⁴⁹ „Catholic“ tangibly expressed those traditional national values that conservative Spaniards saw as threatened by foreign political philosophies and systems. Material and especially spiritual Church support mobilised and motivated volunteers for the Nationalist cause and greatly assisted its victory. In the international sphere, the steadily increasing support of the papacy did much in Catholic and conservative circles, though not elsewhere, to counter the odium of Franco’s association with Germany and Italy. At the time of final Nationalist triumph, Pacelli, newly-elected as Pope Pius XII, told Franco. „We give sincere thanks, with your Excellency, for Spain’s desired Catholic victory.“⁵⁰

Certainly that ‚Catholic victory‘ was greeted by the Church with triumphalism. ‚Victory! Victory! Victory!‘ exulted the Jesuit journal *Razón y Fe*.⁵¹ *Ya*, Madrid’s Catholic newspaper, described the Madrid Corpus Christi procession, the packed crowd giving ‚constant *vivas* to Christ the King, the Spanish army and its unconquerable *Caudillo*.‘⁵² Even the papacy had praised Franco for fighting ‚in defence of the faith and Christian civilization.‘⁵³ Rico describes the period as one of ‚religious inflation,‘ which raised expectations of a return of Spain’s Golden Age, in which Church and regime would combine for the greater glory of God and Spain.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy*, 199.

⁵⁰ *London Times*, 3 April 1939. 12d.

⁵¹ ‚La oración hispánica de la victoria‘, *Razón y Fe*, no.496, May 1939, 6.

⁵² *Ya*, 9 June 1939, 3.

⁵³ See Callahan, *Catholic Church in Spain*, 386.

⁵⁴ Rico, *El papel político de la Iglesia Católica*, 75.

The Spanish Church in a World at War.

However, within five months of the end of the *Guerra Civil*, a European war, a challenge and potential threat to the Church, in Rome and in Spain, and to the new Franco regime alike, was imminent. The Vatican did what it could to preserve peace. In the last week of August, Pius XII made a peace appeal described as „moving“ by the *London Times*. Once war began, the Vatican followed the precedential policies established by Benedict XV and remained strictly aloof from the struggle. In June, with war clouds already gathering, Pius had declared that it was not the function of the Church to take sides in purely earthly affairs – as a mother, the Church could not favour or oppose one or other of her children. In political terms, this policy had regard to the tactical reasons impelling Vatican neutrality and guarded the spiritual authority of the papacy. The Vatican would resist the constant and conflicting pressures from both sides to enlist this spiritual authority in condemnation of a particular enemy „outrage“. In light of the previous war’s experience, Pius knew that specific „atrocities“ claims might lack veracity. Moreover, even in 1939, the Vatican suspected that as the war intensified and became more „total“, no belligerent would remain untainted and that the belligerents would attempt to give even the most carefully crafted statements of papal neutrality a political connotation. The British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summary* in October, for example, declared that the Pope sought peace „at almost any price.“⁵⁵

In Spain, support for the papacy’s efforts to avoid war came from both Catholic and

⁵⁵ See *London Times*, 25 August 1939, 12e, for papal appeal; Pius XII, speech to the Sacred College, 2 June 1939, cited in Pierre Blet, Robert A. Graham, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider, *Actes et Documents du Saint Siege Relatifs A la Seconde Guerre Mondiale* (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 12 vols., 1967-1981 (henceforth *ADSS*.) ,vol. 1, no.54, 161 -165.; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries* (Millward, NY: Kraus, 1983) (henceforth *WPIS*) no. 2, 10 October 1939,11, for „peace at any price.“

falangist sources. *Ya* declared, „if peace is preserved, it will have descended from the summit of the Vatican“ whilst its *falangist* counterpart *Arriba* heard „the authentic voice of the representative of Christ.“ The Spanish Church and the Franco regime alike wanted continued peace and should this not be possible, Spanish non-involvement. Franco’s statement of Spanish neutrality and plea to avoid the spread of the war was approved by the Spanish Church and the Vatican alike. However, Franco’s regalist attitude to the Church and his exploitation of events surrounding the approach and outbreak of the war was arousing suspicion in both institutions.⁵⁶

The Spanish Church supported the Vatican’s spiritual stance in support of peace and Spanish neutrality but its view was characterized by its own experience and by its religio-political agenda. More perhaps than any other institution in Europe, the Spanish Church knew at first hand the devastation wrought by modern war. Throughout the Republican zone, churches had been destroyed. In Barcelona, every religious building except the cathedral had been burnt. Moreover, the leftist massacres had cost some dioceses over 60% of their priests as well as thousands of Catholic laity. For the Church, the legacy of the *Guerra Civil* had been a fear of renewed war and a hatred of Communism. The first Spanish Catholic priority was recovery from these devastating losses of property and manpower. The accomplishment of this priority would aid the second, vital, longer term task of securing Spain’s spiritual recovery, the eradication of „anti-Christian, anti-Spanish values“ to ensure that Spain’s Church and people would never be subjected to a similar threat. Spanish Catholicism needed a period of peace and a regime that would as a

⁵⁶See *Ya*, 26 August 1939, 1; *Arriba*, 26 August 1939, 1. *London Times* 4 September 1939, 10e, 6 September 1939, 5g, for Franco on localization of the war and Spanish neutrality respectively.

minimum guarantee Church independence, freedom of worship and Catholic education.⁵⁷

Like the Church, Franco was aware of Spain's devastation and need for reconstruction. He was convinced that this would best be served by the consolidation of his own regime. We have noted Franco's caution and opportunism. In the atmosphere engendered by impending European war, Franco was being plagued by calls from radical *falangists* for partnership „in a new order of nationalistic regimes... inspired by revolutionary ideologies.“ Though uninterested in such visions, Franco opportunistically used such enthusiasm to broaden the basis of support for his regime, appealing to his own radicals and to Germany and Italy. Having recast his cabinet in a *falangist* direction in August, the following month Franco created one single *Falange*-controlled student organization. The Church was appalled at the implied threat to one of the pillars of re-Christianization. Gomá wrote to Franco describing the „alienation and fear“ that this action had produced among Catholics but the Church's furious lobbying was to no avail. Moreover, Franco's regalist view of Church-state relationships soon became apparent. When Gomá's first post-*Guerra Civil* pastoral letter appeared, its call for improved personal morality could be interpreted as an attack on some government members. His plea for respect for Church autonomy and call for a „generous and splendid pardon“ for past enemies certainly drew Franco's ire and publication of the pastoral outside diocesan bulletins was banned. Gomá's furious protest drew Franco's strong accusation of Church ingratitude and political interference.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ For Barcelona devastation, see King (British Consul) to Eden (Foreign Secretary) 1 August 1936, FO 371/20525, NAUK; for losses in each diocese, see Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa*, 763-4

⁵⁸ For radical call see Wayne Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 2; see Gomá's letters to Franco of 4 October 1939 and 20 October 1939, on the *falangist* student organization and the ban on his encyclical respectively in Antonio Marquina Barrio, *La Diplomacia Vaticana y la España de Franco, 1936 -1945*,(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicos, 1983), 203 -204 and 205 -206.

In the early months of the European war, both within the Spanish Church and in the Vatican, suspicion of Franco was widespread. There were fears that such attitudes presaged Franco's intention to move towards the single party totalitarianism and anti-religious policies pursued by his former *Guerra Civil* German ally. There were also concerns that Franco would threaten the independence and spiritual integrity of the Spanish Church by using the anachronistic „right of presentation“ - state participation in the nomination of bishops, to infiltrate radical *falangists* or Francoist sycophants into the ranks of a Spanish episcopate depleted by the massacres of the *Guerra Civil*. In the *país vasco*, discontent simmered as Serrano Suñer, then Interior Minister, amplified Franco's slogan, „Spain: One, Great and Free“ to rule out any concession to the political or even the linguistic aspirations of Basque Catholics. Franco moreover refused to countenance the return from exile of Vidal and Múgica, both of whom had refused to sign the *Carta Colectiva* of July 1937, and who strongly opposed Franco's regalist view of the Church-state relationship. In October, the British ambassador reported the arrest and ill-treatment of several Franciscan priests in San Sebastian for saying a requiem mass for Basque soldiers killed in the *Guerra Civil*. In early 1940, 67 Basque priests remained imprisoned for alleged *Guerra Civil* crimes. The Church had doubts as to where Franco stood.⁵⁹

In this situation, the Vatican gave the Spanish Church strong support. It upheld Vidal against Francoist claims that Vidal was „behind a campaign of false information against us“ and not only refused to countenance Vidal's resignation from his diocese but continued, if unavailingly, to work for his return to Spain. These disputes and the

⁵⁹ Suñer's rigidly centralist policies are detailed in a speech on 14 June 1939, cited in *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* (henceforth *BHS*) (Vaduz: Kraus, 1964), vol. 16 no. 63, July 1939, 152. For the Franciscans, see Peterson (British Ambassador, Madrid) to Foreign Office (henceforth FO), 26 October 1939, FO 371/23169, NAUK. For the Basque priests, see Archivo General de Administracion (henceforth AGA), Legato 190, B 184, 6.863, 1940.

treatment of the imprisoned San Sebastian Franciscans caused the nuncio to threaten the breaking off of negotiations over the nomination of bishops. During these negotiations, the Vatican had continually refused Franco's claim to the right to nominate candidates for vacant sees. It maintained that refusal, even at the cost of considerable handicap to the administration of the Spanish Church as other bishops, including Primate Gomá, died. Under the Republic, the Vatican had forced Segura's resignation as Primate for his public opposition to the Church's political neutrality towards that regime. It now upheld that prelate when he raised the ire of Franco for his similarly public opposition to *falangist* infringement of Church rights in April 1940.⁶⁰

In fact, the Church initially failed to realize that Franco was motivated above all by the desire to consolidate his own regime. Opportunism would be balanced by a pragmatic and cautious approach. Politically he would not maintain power by a totalitarian party state but would defuse opposition by maintaining a shrewd balance between the disparate elements of the victorious coalition. *Falangists*, monarchists and traditionalists were called upon to contribute to and to receive from the new state as shifting circumstances made necessary, but none would be dominant and Franco would have final control, becoming ever more indispensable. Moreover, Franco saw the Church, with the army, as powerfully underpinning his regime. Thus soon after his gestures to the *Falange*, Franco made a popular balancing gesture to the Church. The restored state subsidy for clergy

⁶⁰ For Vidal, see Yanguas (Spanish Ambassador, Holy See) to Beigbeder (Spanish Foreign Secretary), 28 June 1940, in *Documentos Inéditos para la Historia del Generalísimo Franco*- 4 Tomos (vols.), (Madrid: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco/Azov, 1992-1994), henceforth *DIHGF*, Tomo II -1, 220 – 236. For threats to break off negotiations see Lord Lloyd interview with Gomá, 24 October 1939, FO 425/416, NAUK. For Segura's „unprecedented“ forced resignation, see Hoare (British Ambassador, Madrid) to FO, 30 January 1942, FO 371/31271, NAUK. For Segura's upholding of Church rights, see *Boletín Eclesiástico de Sevilla* (henceforth *BES*), 1 April 1940, 233 -243, *Instrucción pastoral sobre los derechos de la Iglesia*, in Institución Colombina, Sevilla (henceforth *ICS*). For Vatican upholding of Segura, see „desde Roma“ to Beigbeder, 25 and 27 May 1940, *DIHGF*, Tomo II -1, 200.

stipends was widely applauded in quarters as diverse as *Arriba*, Madrid's Monarchist *ABC* and the *London Times*. It was seen in the Madrid British Embassy as „a sop to the clergy whose opposition to the government is becoming endemic.“⁶¹

By the spring of 1940, the Church was coming to terms with the nature of the regime and becoming skilled in defending and extending its interests. A decree of April 1940 prohibiting the publication of comments by the clergy on other than religious matters may have seemed a blow to the Church and certainly the controlled popular Catholic press gave an impression of greater convergence between the Church and the regime than there actually was. However, Segura stated clearly in *boletines oficiales* at that time that whilst the Church would always act in defence of its rights, engagement by the Church in public politics risked giving its enemies an excuse for persecution. The episcopate adopted a policy of private representations over differences within a context of public gratitude for the regime's gestures in support of the Church as more likely to resolve the former whilst encouraging the latter. Franco began to initiate legislation in the Church's interest. Some legislation reflected convergent concerns, such as repression of Communism and freemasonry repugnant to Franco and Church alike. Other laws remedied serious Church concerns such as education. Franco's initial concession to the *Falange* was more than counterbalanced by legislation progressively giving the Church supervision over education at all levels. On the position of the priesthood, a compromise was arrived at by which many imprisoned Basque priests were released on condition of being prepared to work outside the *país vasco*. The regime later made a concession, noted in the *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico* of Seville, that any priest accused of „crimes against

⁶¹ See *Arriba*, 24 October, 1939, editorial, *ABC*, 24 October 1939, editorial, *London Times*, 18 November 1939, 5b for clergy stipends; see Peterson to FO, 26 October 1939, FO 371/23169, NAUK, for „endemic opposition.“

the state“ or indeed of common crimes, would be imprisoned separately in conditions where they could exercise „such priestly functions as the Church authorizes.“⁶²

The Church saw further progress in this direction as predicated on continued Spanish neutrality. If Spain continued to be neutral, the state“s attention would be focused on domestic issues and the importance of the Church as a unifying factor would increase. The British *Review of the Foreign Press* shrewdly observed that in Spain, „loyalty to the Church bound together political elements which in other respects held widely divergent views.“ Of course, the preservation of Spanish neutrality was important to the Church“s spiritual programme as well as for political reasons as this chapter has already noted. The Church viewed with alarm a European war involving belligerents espousing conflicting ideologies; Nazi, Communist and liberal democratic. All of these it viewed as inimical to Spanish Catholicism and national values and penetration into Spain by any of them as a threat to Spain“s spiritual regeneration. The three following chapters will describe in detail the Spanish Church“s reasons for holding such views and its attitude to each ideology. It is sufficient at present to say that continued neutrality would leave Spain relatively less open to penetration by any of them.⁶³

The period between June 1940 and June 1941 was one of great danger to the preservation of Spanish neutrality. As Nazi triumphs in the early summer of 1940 brought the Germans to Spain“s frontier, the Church feared, not without reason, that Franco“s opportunism might overcome his caution. He might be tempted to emulate Mussolini and

⁶² See Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, *Review of the Foreign Press, 1939 – 1945. Series B European Neutrals and the Near East* 6 vols. (Munich: Kraus, 1980), (henceforth *RFP*), vol. 3, no. 30, 26 April 1940, 8, for the government decree restricting clergy pronouncements. Segura“s statements, which reflected the teachings of Pius XI, (see p.57), are made in *BES*, 1 April 1940, 233-243 and 15 April 1940, 276-278, ICS. A full list of Franco“s pro –Church legislation is given in José Chao Rego, *La iglesia en el franquismo* (Madrid: Ediciones Felmar, 1976), 69 -71. See *BES*, 15 November 1941, 584, ICS, for concessions to accused clergy.

⁶³ *RFP* vol. 3 no. 61, 28 November 1940, 2.

enter the war on the Axis side in the hope of substantial gain at minimal risk. The Church worked intensely behind the scenes, using the personal relationships of higher prelates with Franco to dissuade him. In June, Franco swore to the terminally ill Gomá to do all he could to keep Spain out of the war. In August, the Archbishop of Valladolid, „personally much revered and esteemed by General Franco“ told the British that; *The Caudillo does not want war, the army does not want war, the people do not want war and ...the Church certainly does not want war.* The Vatican too added its voice in support of Spanish neutrality and the British Embassy reported that the papal nuncio in Madrid, Cigognani, had „great influence“ with Franco and was „faithfully seconding the Pope“s efforts for peace.⁶⁴

A further powerful voice behind the scenes in favour of neutrality was the army. From a practical viewpoint, it knew that Spain“s military forces were in no position to fight a new war after the devastation of the *Guerra Civil*. Army and Church, traditional repositories of traditional Spanish values, continued the „sword and altar“ alliance of the *Guerra Civil* into the new regime. Like the Church, the army saw neutrality as keeping foreign ideologies at bay and aiding the restoration of the traditional Spain for which Church and army alike had fought. The Church strongly and publicly emphasized this alliance. The Catholic press portrayed the Church-army alliance in almost mystical terms. *Ya*’s Seville equivalent, *El Correo de Andalucía* published an article on *The Mystery of the Conception of Mary in the Spanish Infantry* unimaginable elsewhere in Europe. Celebrations of the Day of the Army each December were copiously reported. Cardinal Segura described the enemies of the army as those of the Church. As army and Church

⁶⁴ For Franco’s pledge to Gomá, see Yencken (British Embassy, Madrid) to Eden, 15 November 1941, FO 371/26991, NAUK. For the Archbishop of Valladolid, see, Hoare to Halifax (Foreign Secretary), 8 August 1940, FO 371/24516, NAUK. For the nuncio’s role see Hoare to Halifax, 9 August 1940, Ibid.

together underpinned the regime, Franco was reluctant to risk alienating this powerful alliance for neutrality. He therefore kept the Nazis at bay before June 1941 as the next chapter will describe. Chapter 6 will further describe how, on Hitler's invasion of the USSR, Franco, with the support of Church and army, found a formula to express opposition to mutually detested Communism whilst preserving that Spanish neutrality which they mutually saw as necessary.⁶⁵

By mid 1941, the Vatican could see Franco's continued response to Vatican efforts to limit the spread of the war. Moreover, Franco declined to emulate Nazi anti-religious totalitarianism or, unlike an Italy descending into satellite status, Nazi radical racist policies. Franco's internal policies produced legislation in the Spanish Church's interests. These policies and his expressions of Monarchist sympathy at the death of ex-King Alfonso early that year not only resulted in some reconciliation with the previously intransigent Segura but were well received in the Vatican. The regime's relations with the Vatican began to improve. In June 1941, a compromise *Convenio* (agreement) preserved the independence of the Spanish episcopate and allowed the appointment of a new Primate.⁶⁶

Similarly, within Spain, Franco's preservation of neutrality and his pro-Church legislation attracted gratitude and support within the Spanish Church. The Church's policy of continuing private representations on points of difference whilst strongly supporting points of convergence in its press continued. For example, the press

⁶⁵ A report by General Kindélan, cited in Wylie, *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents*, 248, graphically describes the parlous state of Spain's military forces. See *El Correo de Andalucía*, 7 December 1941, 9, for „Conception of Mary”; article; *Ya*, 6 December 1942, 1-5, for copious reporting of Army Day. For Segura's comment, see Report, Governor of Seville, 19 April 1943, *DIHGF* Tomo IV, 218 -220.

⁶⁶ Sir Robert Hodgson, former British Agent in Nationalist Spain, noted in June 1941, that „the prospect of being reduced to the pitiful condition which has overtaken Mussolini is not one ...likely to commend itself to General Franco.” RIIA 8/728. See Hoare to Eden, 29 May 1941, FO 371/26991, NAUK, for Franco's „improved relationship” with Segura noted by the nuncio.

emphasized the Church's strong support, even the divine inspiration, of the policy of Spanish neutrality. In November 1942, *Razón y Fe* praised the efforts of Spain's government in keeping the country from falling into the vortex of war. In August 1943, the review *Ecclesia* quoted the Bishop of Ávila's pastoral prayer to God „who gave the victory in the past [*Guerra Civil*] war and has kept us safe in the present.“ That October, *Ecclesia* attributed „our peace“ not only to the Church's prayers but to God's grant of „special insights“ to Spain's leadership. *Ecclesia*, published „with ecclesiastical approval“, usually reflected the opinion of the hierarchy. *Ecclesia* also repeatedly applauded government legislation providing for Church control of education and giving funds for church reconstruction. State subsidies for church building steadily increased, reaching, as *Ya* noted, 40 million pesetas by 1943. By the end of that year, *Osservatore Romano* could even describe Spain as a papal comfort in the midst of war.⁶⁷

For all that, in Rome and in Spain, some private reservations remained. In the *pais vasco*, the regime continued surveillance on priests suspected of separatist sympathies as Basque Catholic discontent simmered. For all Franco's legislation favouring the Church, fears persisted that Franco's regalist view of Catholicism and the shifting nature of his policy in response to circumstances might in future put these gains at risk. The 1941 *Convenio* did not enshrine the rights of the Church and consequently was not privately regarded with satisfaction in the Vatican. When Franco published a regalist announcement, „His Excellency the head of State has deigned to appoint“ Plá y Deniel, *Signo* published the pointed rejoinder, „the Holy Spirit, who initiated the Episcopate to

⁶⁷. *Osservatore Romano* is cited in *DIHGF*, 10 December 1943 Tomo IV, 646. *Razón y Fe*, no. 538, November 1942, 361 for praise; *Ecclesia*, no 108, 7 August 1943, 23, for Bishop of Avila; no 116, 2 October 1943, 3, for „special insights;“ no. 40, 18 April 1942, 5 -6 and no. 81, 30 January 1943, 3 for church construction; no. 87, 13, March 1943, 13 – 14, for education; *Ya*, 30 January 1943, 2, for figures.

rule and govern the Church, has exalted" Plá to the Primacy. Continuing suspicions caused by Franco"s insistence on vetting other episcopal candidates for undesirable political views and on a regalist oath of loyalty had delayed episcopal appointments until early 1943. In Rome, the exiled Vidal had continued to be suspicious of the regime, suggesting to the Vatican Secretary of State on 28 June 1942 that it was better to prolong episcopal vacancies rather than fill them with those not meeting „required conditions.“ Franco therefore remained intransigent over the return of Vidal until the cardinal"s death in September 1943 removed a potential danger to the regime. Despite the government binding itself, at the time of the *Convenio* to a speedy conclusion of a new Concordat, mutual suspicions prevented its conclusion until well after the war ended. For all that, during that war, the regime had shown sufficient flexibility and had offered the Church enough to seem preferable to any feasible alternative. As the war ended, the Church continued to take this view. Following chapters will examine these alternatives and explain why the Church thought as it did.⁶⁸

This account has attempted to demolish the myth of a Spanish totalitarian party state.⁶⁹ It presents Franco as a devout but regalist Catholic in the tradition of Spanish rulers, his domestic policy marked by caution and opportunism. We have seen how Franco actually governed, his handling of different factions and shifting situations and the intelligence of the Church"s response to that style of government. The chapter has

⁶⁸ For Vatican dissatisfaction with the *Convenio* see Juan Texidor (Councilor, Spanish Embassy, Vatican) to *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores* (Foreign Ministry, henceforth MAE), 15 July 1941. "It is clear that the Vatican wishes to refer to the *Convenio* as little as possible." *Archivo General, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores* (Henceforth AMAE) Leg R 4006. Yencken to Eden, 15 November 1941, quoted Franco"s regalist decree, FO 371/26991, NAUK. See *Signo* no. 95, 8 November 1941, 1, for Church rejoinder. For Basque dissident priests see *DIHGF*, 10 February 1943 Tomo IV, 117 and 142 – 143. Vidal"s comment is noted in Ramón Muntayola, *Vidal y Barraquer. El Cardenal de la paz* (Barcelona: Laia, 1974), 425. For Vidal"s death given „barest possible mention" in Spain, see *DIHGF*, 25 September 1943, Tomo IV, 439. See *DIHGF*, doc.5, 1942 Tomo III, 61 – 154, for assessments of 164 „possible" bishops.

⁶⁹ This is not of course, to deny that the regime was authoritarian and oppressed former enemies.

argued that the received popular view of the Spanish Church in its world between 1936 and 1945 is open to some doubt as well as attempting to modify stereotypes about the monolithic nature of the Church and its place in Spanish society in 1936. We saw that the bulk of Spanish Church became supporters of the Nationalist side only when not just the Church's right to preach and educate but its very existence was widely perceived to be at risk. The section on domestic policy in World War II has presented the view that the Spanish Church defended its own independence and intelligently supported Spanish neutrality both from moral considerations and politically as part of that defence. The following chapters will consider the Spanish Church in a wider European world at war.

Chapter 5. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church and Fascist Ideologies.

German spirit and culture today are diametrically opposed to Spanish culture and spirit. Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, Primate of Spain, letter to Franco, 9 February 1939.

These parsons are too stupid for words. They are trying to give a reactionary impulse to Spanish politics. Adolf Hitler, 7 July 1942, H.R. Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Table Talk* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), no. 254, 568.

In the previous chapter, a popular perception that the Spanish Church enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with a „Fascist“ Franco regime was explored and challenged. A view of the „attraction of Fascism“ to the Spanish Church finds some resonance in the wider debate during the intense moral scrutiny that marked World War II studies in the 1990's. The Church did not escape, as criticisms expressed in the 1960's resurfaced. Critics have grounded their attacks on Catholic attitudes to the Holocaust in a more general questioning of the Church's relationship to Fascism and Nazism. The Church's attitudes, both at the Vatican and in occupied Europe are often depicted as at best ambivalent, at worst compliant. Philippe Burrin claims that the Church, otherwise supine, „knew when to act“ when interests like its control of Catholic youth groups were threatened.¹ Jone Gaillard goes further by suggesting a „close convergence of interest“ between the Church and Fascism. She constructs a typography of convergences such as; one infallible leader, one body of right belief, subordination of the individual, „the complete submission of any other authority to their own power“ as common to Catholicism and Fascism.² The Spanish Church, in turn, has been attacked for its

¹ Philippe Burrin, *La France a la heure allemande, 1940-1944* (Paris: Seuil, 1995), translated as *Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation, 1940-1944* (London: Arnold, 1996), 225.

² Jone Gaillard, „The Attraction of Fascism for the Church of Rome“, in *The Attractions of Fascism* edited by John Milfull, (New York: Berg, 1990), 207-214.

attachment to a „Fascist“ regime. Michael Richards, for example, argues that there exists a „certain totalitarian kinship between Fascism and religion and, particularly, here, Catholicism,“ citing convergences resembling Gaillard’s. He asserts „the similar totalitarian potential of Fascism and Catholicism as understood by the Spanish church hierarchy in the 1930’s and 1940’s are evident.“³ This chapter will examine the relationship between the Church and Fascist ideologies between 1936 and 1945 in the light of these and other analyses of the Church’s ideological stance.

Italian Fascism was an inspiration for the original Spanish *Falange*. However, under the Republic, neither the Italian original nor its Spanish variant had much popular appeal in a country or to a Church to which they seemed alien to Spanish tradition and religion. In 1933, future Republican President Manuel Azaña had noted in his diary the impossibility of a Fascist regime in Spain, correctly predicting that a successful revolt against the Republic would produce „a military and ecclesiastical regime of traditional type.“ In the election of February 1936, the *Falange* attracted 0.7% of the vote. At its height, Italian Fascism was by inspiration socially radical, anti-religious and racist-imperialist and aspired to totalitarianism. However, in Italy, countervailing influences; the monarchy, the business community and particularly the Church provided powerful constraints which blocked Fascist penetration. Church-state conflict continued through the 1930’s over Fascist breaches of the 1929 Concordat, a struggle which increased the suspicion with which Italian Fascism was regarded by the Spanish Church.⁴

³ Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 65, 172.

⁴ Lukacs cites Hitler’s remark to Goebbels in 1943, shortly before the collapse of the Italian Fascist regime that in Italy there were three powers; the *Duce* (Mussolini), the king and the Pope and that of the three the Pope was the strongest. John Lukacs, „The Diplomacy of the Holy See during World War II.“ *Catholic Historical Review* 60; 2 (July 1974), 277-278.

In the Civil War, the Nationalists had received considerable Italian help, opening up the possibility of a „special relationship“ between the two regimes as a result. The prospect that the victorious Franco regime would resemble those of his former *Guerra Civil* allies caused concern to the Spanish Church. Franco was indeed prepared to borrow Fascist trappings. The salute, the chant of „Franco, Franco, Franco“ at rallies, even the Spanish corporatist „parliament“ established in 1943, were analogous to Italian models. The resemblance, however, was more apparent than real. Even the 1938 *Fuero de Trabajo* (labour charter), widely seen as an imitation of the Italian *Carta del Lavoro*, owed in fact as much to the corporatist labour legislation of neighbouring Portugal, the inspiration for which was the social Catholicism of Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesima Anno*. Similarly, the Spanish *Instituto Nacional de Industria* is often seen as an imitation of the Italian *Istituto de Ricostruzione Industriale* but Payne reveals Spanish industrial mobilization commissions pre-dating Italian Fascism, reflecting a Spanish „military-technocratic concern for industrialization.“⁵

Whilst Italy stayed out of the war, it had some credibility as a great power, its neutrality being courted by the Pope.⁶ The Spanish Church retained some residual gratitude for Italian help during the *Guerra Civil* and some natural sympathy for fellow Catholics of similar cultural background. In late 1940, with Germany rampant, Italy was seen by some at the Vatican as a possible member of a Mediterranean-Catholic bloc, a

⁵ Azaña is cited in Redondo, *Historia de la iglesia en España* Tomo I, 517. For particular concern that Franco would emulate Nazi anti-religious practices, see chap.4, 83 – 84. See Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970), 56-59 for Portugal's 1933 Statute of National Labour. Kay makes the important point that corporatism is not an Italian Fascist invention, dating back at least to the 1870s. For *Quadragesima Anno*, 13 May, 1931, see Hughes, *Popes' New Order*. See Payne, *Francisco and Hitler*, 166-167, for the genesis of the *Instituto*.

⁶ Pius XII to Mussolini, 24 April 1940, *ADSS*, vol.1, no.284, 425-426.

counterweight to Nazism.⁷ Italy continued to gain sympathetic coverage in the Spanish Catholic press. Italy's few military victories were highlighted, Italy's many defeats muted. The „identity“ of Italian and Spanish interests was emphasised, Italian respect for the Church underlined. The „excellence“ of Italian morale and the „indissolubility“ of the Axis continued to be proclaimed in Spain even as both were visibly crumbling. However, both the Vatican and the Spanish Church became increasingly alarmed as Italian military and political weakness reduced the country to a Nazi satellite. Any Spanish –Italian „special relationship“ declined as a result of these developments and with the course of the war.⁸

Despite Hitler's Concordat with the Vatican, Nazism had even less appeal in Spain than Italian Fascism, as its *forastero* nature and anti-religious policies soon became apparent. However, the value of the German military as an ally in the *Guerra Civil* was soon seized upon by the opportunistic Franco. The Vatican-Nazi Concordat, however subsequently criticized, at least had value in that frequent Nazi infractions gave Pius XI a basis on which to make a definitive denunciation of Nazism. *Mit brennender Sorge* (variously translated as „with burning sorrow or „with burning concern“), in March, 1937, was a clear defence of those basic rights of the Church which the 1933 Concordat with the Nazis ostensibly guaranteed. Pius XI's encyclical detailed Nazi breaches of the Church's rights of worship and education which previous chapters have identified as being at the core of any relationship between the Church and a secular state. *Mit*

⁷ French Ambassador at Holy See to Secretariat of State, 1 October 1940, *ADSS* vol. 4, no.104, 168-169.

⁸ See *Ya*, 24 July 1942, 1; 25 July 1942, 3, for highlighting as „victories“ Italian recapture of two insignificant military objectives in North Africa. *Ya*, 13 February 1941, 1 for identity of interests; 22 September 1942, 3 for respect for the Church *Ya*, 26 September 1942, 3 for „excellent“ morale; 11 June 1943, 1 for Axis indissolubility.

brennender Sorge however went beyond such defence to make a detailed attack on Nazi ideology. The encyclical condemned Nazi paganism, - „those who understand by God a weird impersonal Fate supposedly according to pre-Christian German concepts.“ It excoriated Nazi idolatry, - „those who take the race, the people, the state, the form of government or the active rulers, and deify them with idolatrous worship.“ *Mit brennender Sorge* denounced Nazi racism, - „a refusal to accept the Old Testament denies belief in the real Christ.“ The Christian revelation is „obligatory forever,“ nothing can be added or subtracted by arbitrary „revelations“ deriving from the myth of blood and race. It assailed Nazi moral nihilism- stating that every attempt to dislodge moral teaching and conduct from Faith and build them on human regulation leads the individual and the community to moral destruction. The encyclical attacked Nazi totalitarianism, asserting that it results in a denial that God-given rights which each individual possesses are inalienable. *Mit brennender Sorge* was a seminal statement. In the political world of necessary compromise, the Vatican and the Nazi regime would continue to have diplomatic relations whilst that regime lasted, as both sides attempted to extract what political advantage they could from such continuance. In the realm of ideas, however, *Mit brennender Sorge* signaled clearly the anti-religious nature of Nazism and its incompatibility with Catholicism ⁹

Mit brennender Sorge had given a clear papal warning of Nazism’s anti-religious threat to Catholics everywhere including Spain. For the Spanish Church, the encyclical’s timing was politically highly inopportune as those same Nazis were fighting to rid Spain of „Communist“ terror. With the war still in the balance, the Church had to show caution in publicly expressing opposition to Nazism. Nonetheless, though the Spanish circulation

⁹ *Mit brennender Sorge*, Pius XI, 14 March 1937, Hughes, *Popes’ New Order* 110-113.

of *Mit brennender Sorge* was more restricted than the Pope preferred, even in the midst of the *Guerra Civil*, Segura published that encyclical in full over seven issues of his Ecclesiastical Bulletin from April, 1938.¹⁰

By early 1939, the Spanish Church's Spanish „Communist“ enemy was all but vanquished. However, the Church, in Spain and in Rome feared the penetration of Nazi ideology in Spain and possible Nazi influence on the new regime. In January, Segura had published in full in his Ecclesiastical Bulletin the German bishops' own collective pastoral of August 1938, detailing a Nazi persecution with the ultimate aim of „the destruction of German Catholicism.“¹¹ A Spanish-German Cultural Agreement that same month providing for extensive youth exchange visits raised alarm in Rome and Toledo alike. The Vatican protested that the agreement violated the 1851 Spanish-Vatican Concordat. This protest, inconsistent as it was with the Vatican's later attitude to that Concordat in the „presentation“ dispute, showed consistency of concern to block Nazi influence over the young. Gomá's Lenten pastoral in March 1939 warned Spaniards to be on guard „against foreign infiltration“¹² Gomá also protested vigorously to Franco. His letter shows a wide knowledge of sources that proved beyond doubt Nazism's anti-religious and persecuting nature and he declared roundly, „German spirit and culture is diametrically opposed to Spanish spirit and culture.“ Franco, typically, whilst not

¹⁰ *BES*, 1 April 1938 to 8 August 1938, Documentos de la Santa Sede: Carta Colectiva de Su Santidad Pío XII Sobre la Situación de la Iglesia Católica en el Reich Germanico. ICS.

¹¹ *BES*, 1 January 1939, Documentos Episcopales: Episcopado Aleman: Carta Colectiva sobre la Situación de la Iglesia Católica en Alemania, 26-30. ICS.

¹² See Yanguas (Spanish Ambassador to Holy See) to MAE, 29 January 1939, AMAE, Leg R, 3458 Exp.12, for protest; *London Times*, 13 March 1939, 13c, for pastoral.

revoking the agreement, let it lapse. His foreign ministry had ample proof of the truth of Gomá's contentions.¹³

Moreover Franco knew that the Germans were disliked in Spain. By their own ambassador's admission, they had „soon lost in popularity and favour“ during the *Guerra Civil*, perhaps because of their tactless arrogance noted by his predecessor. In June 1939, the German ambassador in Italy reported the remarks of the visiting Suñer; Suñer described Spain as „out and out Catholic,“ even more so since the *Guerra Civil*. He emphasized the effect of „propaganda“ depicting the Church in Germany as persecuted and pointing out the „impossibility of seeking Spain's salvation in the company of such „friends.‟“¹⁴ However, even within the Church, there was some residual gratitude for German help in vanquishing the „Communists.“ „The Church could not yet a while turn against its recent saviour,“ Gomá „sadly“ admitted to Lord Lloyd later in 1939. This gratitude was fanned by a huge propaganda effort by the German embassy, sufficient to cause fears in the Vatican over the spread of Nazi propaganda and influence in Spain.¹⁵

Partly as a result, the Nazi-Soviet pact was played down in the popular Catholic press.¹⁶ However it gave thinking Spaniards a „rude shock“ as the British embassy asserted and Edwin Henson, Rector of St. Alban's College, writing from Valladolid,

¹³ Maria Luisa Aisa, *El Cardenal Gomá y la Guerra de España: Aspectos de la gestión pública del Primado, 1936-1939* (Madrid: Instituto Enrique Floréz, 1981) doc. 71, 504-508. See Magaz (Spanish Ambassador-Berlin) to MAE, 11 February 1939, AMAE, Leg R 3461, Exp. 6 for foreign ministry proof.

¹⁴ Stohrer, (German Ambassador, Madrid) to German Foreign Ministry (henceforth FM), 19 February 1939, *Documents in German Foreign Policy* (hence *DGFP*) (London: HM Stationery Office, 1951), vol.3, no.740, 847; also Faupel, (German Ambassador, Madrid), to FM, 7 July 1937, *DGFP*, vol.3, no.386, 405, on German tactlessness. For Suñer's remarks see Mackenson to FM, 11 June 1939, *DGFP* vol.6, no.507, 697.

¹⁵ Gomá to Lord Lloyd, 24 October 1939, FO 425/416, Archives Western Europe Part 40, 1939, no.26,66. NAUK, for „sad“ admission. Yanguas to MAE, 25 April 1939, 30 June 1939, AMAE Leg. R, 3458, Exp.13, for Vatican concern

¹⁶ *Ya*, 23 August 1939, 1 and 3, even optimistically suggested that it would remove the threat of war.

confirmed.¹⁷ The Church's strong distrust of Hitler was heightened. A „Catholic“, he was persecuting the German Church. As an „anti- Communist,“ he had „trampled on Christian and Catholic principles even to the final extremity of making a pact with the Bolshevik Devil.“¹⁸ The *London Times* reported Spanish disillusionment. [Hitler] „The valiant paladin of the crusade against Communism is no paladin at all.“¹⁹ In view of the Church's fears regarding totalitarian tendencies in Spain, the bishops were further alarmed by „contacts between the political regime in Spain and Nazi organizations in Germany.“²⁰ The Spanish Church was „on its guard against anti-Christian doctrines.“²¹

The Vatican guarded its neutrality as the war began but relations with the Nazis could be expected to be difficult. The German ambassador, Diego von Bergen later described how Pius XII continued his earlier practice as Vatican Secretary of State of a „private exchange of views“ avoiding official authorities to facilitate candid discussions of „awkward questions.“ Bergen saw this procedure as having „greater lasting effect“ than official steps and protests. Pius XII, however, had no illusions about the anti-religious nature and growing radicalism of Nazism. As war began, Pius feared that victory for Nazism, as for Communism, would be disastrous for Europe and the Church. His first encyclical, *Summa Pontificatus* condemned two errors as „pernicious to the well-being of nations“: „forgetfulness“ of the duty of human charity imposed by humanity’s common origins and equality and the statist usurpation by civil authorities of the place of God –

¹⁷ Petersen to Halifax, 2 January 1940 FO 371/24507, NAUK; Henson to Pears (British Embassy, Madrid), 18 October 1939. Archivo, Colegio de Ingleses, Valladolid (henceforth CDI).

¹⁸ *WPIS*, no.7, 14 November 1939, 10 and 11.

¹⁹ *London Times*, 11 January 1940, 5a.

²⁰ Peterson to FO, 23 November 1939, FO 371/23169, NAUK.

²¹ *WPIS*, no. 6, 7 November 1939, 10-11.

the elevation of „the State or group“. For those familiar with the nuances of the Vatican“s use of religious language, the implied criticism of Nazism was plain.²²

These implications of the need to resist Nazi infiltration were not lost on the Spanish Church. In Seville, Segura fulminated against „the danger of profane novelties of political-character, exotic expressions which risked the loss of faith and piety.“²³ The Jesuit *Razón y Fe* printed the entire encyclical over two issues. That journal took up papal encyclical teaching against „elevating a race or class“ and warned that Spain should be „on guard against such possible foreign contagion.“ Two months later, *Razón y Fe*, in an article, *The Myth of Race* used quotations from *Mein Kampf* and Rosenberg“s *Myth of the Twentieth Century* to demonstrate Nazism“s incompatibility with Catholicism.²⁴

Concurrently with this article, Vatican Radio ran a strong campaign denouncing Nazi atrocities in occupied Poland and religious persecution in Germany. *Signo* highlighted the times and wavelengths of Vatican broadcasts to Spain.²⁵ If, as the British pointed out, few Spanish households possessed radios powerful enough to receive foreign broadcasts, among those which did were many influential Spaniards.²⁶

Mit brennender Sorge was potentially a powerful anti-Nazi influence in Spain. Contrary to wide belief it was not suppressed, featuring regularly in *Signo*‘s list of publications available for purchase throughout 1939. However, despite Segura“s earlier efforts, it was, as Henson pointed out, not well known. Henson had without success in September asked the British Catholic Truth Society for at least a million copies for

²² Bergen to Weizsacker (FM), 22 June 1941 *DGFP* vol. 12, no. 674, 1082, for „private exchanges“; See *Summa Pontificatus*, 20 October 1939, in Carlen, *Papal Encyclicals*, 10,11.

²³ *BES*, 2 April 1940, 294-295. ICS.

²⁴ *Razón y Fe*, no. 503, December 1939, 305,307; no. 505, February 1940, 123, 127.

²⁵ *Signo*, no. 5, 17 February 1940, 4.

²⁶ Bowen, *Spain during World War II*, 167, puts the rate of private radio ownership at 1.5%. However, meeting places for *Acción Católica* equipped with radios helped spread the content of Vatican broadcasts.

distribution in Spain.²⁷ In October, Gomá, though seeing the moment „not opportune“ for a wider distribution, had obtained 500 copies and „distributed one copy to every intellectual he could reach,“ as well as ensuring that copies reached all priests. Gomá told Lord Lloyd that „our [the Allied] cause was the cause of Christendom itself... On the issue of the war depended all the Church stood for – no more, no less.“²⁸

Germany’s spectacular victories in spring 1940 radically changed the situation. France was vanquished, Britain expelled from a continent over which Nazi Germany looked set for years of dominance. Against Nazism’s apparently invincible military might, Europe’s neutral countries were helpless. Even democratic Switzerland and Sweden muzzled its free press from fear of meeting the fate of other democratic neutrals, whilst rightist authoritarian regimes hastened to board the bandwagon of the „inevitable victors.“ The Spanish Church feared that Franco would do likewise. In June, France’s surrender tempted Franco’s nationalism and opportunism to overcome his habitual caution. He may also have been motivated by his Civil War experiences- residual gratitude for Axis help, an equation of liberal democracy with his Republican opponents, a professional military admiration for the German military. Franco offered Hitler Spain’s entry into the war, „after a short period of preparing the public.“²⁹ Franco's cynical opportunism in attempting to gain Gibraltar and North African possessions without a real war was no doubt seen for what it was by the equally cynical and opportunistic Hitler who, for several weeks, during which the powerful *Wehrmacht* reached the Spanish border, disdained to reply.

²⁷ Henson to Catholic Truth Society, 23 September 1939, CDI.

²⁸ Lord Lloyd, interview with Gomá, 24 November 1939, Archives Western Europe, Part 40, 1939, no.26, 66. FO 425/416, NAUK.

²⁹ German Secretary of State to FM, sent from Spanish Ambassador, 19 June 1940, *DGFP*, vol. 9, no.488, 620.

For the Church in Rome and in Spain, the situation was difficult. Italy was now a belligerent. The British forecast „an inevitable complete withdrawal of the Vatican from the temporal area with *Osservatore Romano* emasculated.“³⁰ Papal hopes of peace were dashed. Vatican soundings at the end of June were rejected. Despite the risk of association with Hitler, a month later the Pope tried again, asking the British to consider rather than spurn the dictator’s peace offer. This met further rejection, as was the fate of a German initiative in November relayed through the nuncio in Madrid.³¹ Meanwhile, according to José de Yanguas, Spanish ambassador at the Holy See, there were those at the Vatican who had persuaded themselves of some mellowing in Hitler, who, in response to victory, had „invoked providence with humility“ and „realised the spiritual force of the Church.“ In consequence, Yanguas suggested „possible changes in attitude following German victory“ as the Vatican’s response to „the reality of the new Europe.“³²

For the Spanish Church, the situation was even more complex. It shared Franco’s distrust of democracy and residual gratitude for Axis help in the Civil War.³³ Like the Vatican, it felt a necessity to respond to „new European realities.“ Crucially, however, its spiritual priorities would be threatened by increasing Nazi influence in Spain and Spanish abandonment of neutrality. Pro-Axis press articles were a lesser evil than Nazi occupation or war. For these varied reasons, the Church’s press participated in the violently pro-Axis tilt in the Spanish press which was part of Franco’s process of

³⁰ *WPIS*, no. 37, 18 June 1940, 9.

³¹ For original soundings, see Maglione to German Ambassador, 27 June 1940, *ADSS*, vol.1, no.360, 497-498. See Maglione to German Ambassador, British Apostolic Delegate, Nuncio- Italy, Italian Ambassador-Vatican, 26 July 1940 vol.1 no. 370, 505, for July approach. See Secret: Papal Nuncio’s Memorandum, 17 November 1940, FO 371/26991, NAUK, for November approach.

³² Yanguas to MAE, 26 July 1940, AMAE Leg.R 3461, Exp. 6. What now seems incredible naivety may have been influenced by the relatively mild French armistice which allowed the existence of a pro-Catholic Vichy regime and the initial Nazi tolerance of the Church in occupied countries.

³³ At this time, the prestige of democracy had reached its lowest ebb, see chap.7, particularly pp. 149-150.

„preparing the public.“ On July 16 an article in *Ya* declared „Marxist“ charges of German materialism „ridiculous“ and that „Hitler has a realistic sense of the sacred and eternal mission of the Church and the immense spiritual power of the papacy,“ a gross misrepresentation of Hitler's attitude to religion.³⁴ *Ya*, and even the review *Signo* felt compelled to offer sops to the bellicose nationalism whipped up by *falangist* radicals, who, in the wake of German victory, thought that their hour had come. Both included nationalistic articles on „Spanish“ Gibraltar.³⁵ *Signo*, in July, had quietly dropped *Mit brennender Sorge* from its list of available publications.

On the other hand, however, *Razón y Fe*'s article *The Aryan Question-Myth* was written at the height of Nazism's triumph. Its declaration „there are no essential difference between races...the unity of the human race is well-known to the Faith as well as to science“ was courageous in that context.³⁶ Moreover as the summer of 1940 neared its end, British diplomats in Spain knew that Franco's war fever had cooled. Additionally, though the Catholic press continued its anti-British tone, no Catholic publication advocated pro-Nazi belligerency or endorsed Nazism. The clergy, though bound by a decree of April 1940, restricting all clerical public utterances and writings unconnected with religion, were, in concert with the nuncio, working powerfully behind the scenes on behalf of Spain's continued neutrality and to keep Nazism both physically and ideologically at bay. In Navarre, some priests went further. The Germanophilia of the

³⁴ *Ya*, 16 July 1940, 1. Hitler had some respect for the Church's organisational success. See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 113-117. However, his words and actions as well as Nazi practice in the 1930's gave ample evidence of Nazism's implacable enmity to religion. See, for example Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: Nemesis 1936-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 39-42. Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 101-102, uses quotations from Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Table Talk* to illustrate his assertion of Hitler's „rabid anticlericalism“ and „snide and vulgar comments“ about religion. For the Spanish Church's equation of democracy with its Republican foes, see Chapter 7.

³⁵ *Ya*, 4 August 1940, 1; *Signo*, no. 37, 28 September 1940, 4.

³⁶ *Razón y Fe*, no. 510-511, July-August 1940, 320.

radical *falangists*, hated in this Carlist, traditionalist heartland, coupled with the Franco regime's centralism and failure to restore the monarchy, provoked a strong pro-Allied reaction in which the clergy were already playing a leading role. The collected documents of Carlist historian Manuel de Santa Cruz reveal a secret radio station run by priests in a church at Urzainqui. This was the focal point of a network of Carlist agents who stood ready to inform the British the moment any invading German troops crossed the frontier and to prepare resistance in that eventuality.³⁷

This period, from summer 1940 to June, 1941 was one in which Spain was in direct danger of falling into the Nazi orbit. Hitler's interest in Spain revived with plans to close the Mediterranean by the capture of Gibraltar. The previous chapter described the Church's strong and influential advocacy of neutrality but important military, political and economic developments in this period explain the success of its efforts to preserve Spain from becoming a Nazi satellite. Portugal's Premier António Salazar, at a crucial moment in July „acted as a magnet, drawing Franco away from the Axis.“ To the British, the Spanish-Portuguese agreement at the critical time of July 1940, guaranteeing the „territorial integrity, and the inviolability, security and independence“ of both nations had an importance that „could not be exaggerated.“³⁸ Moreover, the Battle of Britain and increasing indications of American mobilization on Britain's side were powerful signs, convincing Franco that the war was far from over. Crucial, however, as the country faced starvation that autumn, was Spain's dependence on Britain and the United States for vital

³⁷ See chapter 4 for Franco's short-lived war fever. Manuel de Santa Cruz, *Apuntes y documentos para la historia del tradicionalismo español: 1939 – 1966. Tomo 2, 1940* (Sevilla: ECESA, 1979), 58 -59. Santa Cruz noted few exceptions to this general pro-British groundswell. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain*, 300, concurs.

³⁸ Tom Gallagher, „Anglo-Portuguese Relations since 1901“, *History Today*, 36:6(June 1986), 39-45. For British comment on the Spanish-Portuguese agreement, see Hoare to FO, 15 January 1942, FO 371/31234, NAUK.

supplies. Meanwhile, the Nazis, whilst unwilling to supply Spain's vital economic needs, were demanding military bases on Spanish territory in the event of Spain entering the war and prevaricating on granting Spanish colonial claims. Franco therefore fought a long, complex battle, assuring Hitler and Mussolini of undying loyalty whilst avoiding specific commitments. His efforts were aided by Italian debacles in Greece and Africa which diverted the *Wehrmacht's* attention to those theatres and away from Spain. We have seen in Chapter 1 that interpretations of Franco's conduct are controversial and that crucially, Spanish documents on the subject are not available and we therefore have to rely on German and British sources. If the Germans misunderstood Spanish intentions, the British were sure that Spain would not enter the war. Given these events, the British view and our knowledge of Franco's nationalism, caution and opportunism, the above interpretation of his policies is not unreasonable, even if not uncontested.³⁹

For the Church, this time was difficult and anxious. At least publicly, it did not contradict Franco's expressions of Spanish eternal friendship with Nazism, a lesser evil than actual commitment and a much lesser evil than Nazi occupation. Departure from the formula of „strict neutrality“ observed earlier in the war had become politically expedient amongst the few remaining European neutrals in the face of overwhelming Nazi power.⁴⁰

Germany's donation to the Spanish Church of religious objects to help replace the

³⁹ This fascinating struggle can be followed in *DGFP*, vols. 11 and 12. The Nazis might have been forewarned had they heeded their Ambassador, Stohrer's dispatches of the previous year in which he had both warned that the Church was „assured of great power“ in the new regime, and against trusting Suñer, Foreign Minister in this vital period. The „Jesuit-trained Suñer“ was in Stohrer's words „no friend of ours.“ Stohrer to FM, 19 February 1939, *DGFP* vol.3, no. 740, 847-848. The British were aware that Franco was deliberately fobbing the Nazis off. See Hoare to FO 1 April 1941, FO 371/26945, NAUK.

⁴⁰ This was not only the case in Spain. The Swedish and Swiss governments both exercised censorship of their countries' traditionally free press. In Sweden, the courageously anti-Nazi newspaper *Goteborg Handels Tidningen* was at times suppressed. In Switzerland, *Le Sport Suisse* was suspended for „improper comments“ on a Swiss-German soccer game. See *RFP*, vol. 3, no.52, 25 September, 1940, 1 for Sweden, *Ibid.*, vol.3, no.89, 12 June, 1941, 230, for Switzerland.

depredations of the *Guerra Civil* drew from *Ya* genuine gratitude and a tribute to the German Church's „devotion to the Führer.“ The visiting Heinrich Himmler arrived in October to a fulsome welcome. That same month, *Ya* descended to outright mendacity. An editorial claimed „the rebirth of religious life in Poland“ and „maximum respect for religion“ shown by the occupying Germans. A later article praised „the flourishing state of the Catholic Church in Germany“ and its „absolute liberty.“⁴¹ Fulsome tributes to Germany may perhaps be thought expedient in Spain's parlous political situation. The printing of lies about the Nazi attitude to religion was not only morally reprehensible but in contradiction to Vatican policy. Such articles in the Spanish Catholic press angered the Pope sufficiently for him to allude specifically to them to two visiting Spanish clerics in September and later to German ambassador Bergen. To Yanguas, fear of Nazi influence in Spain and Italy was the Vatican's dominant concern at this time.⁴² Indeed, Nazi propaganda had reached new heights, the Madrid embassy alone employing 385 personnel mostly dedicated to convincing Spanish Catholic opinion that Nazism was militarily invincible and religiously acceptable. The bishops were „inundated with literature from Berlin to show that England had yielded to infidelity, could not be trusted and was working against Catholic Spain.“⁴³

⁴¹ See *Ya*, 29 August 1940, 1 for donation and tribute; 17 October 1940, 1 and 22 October 1940, 1 for Himmler, 3 October 1940, 1 and 22 October 1940, 1 for religion in Poland and Germany respectively. Dr. Kracvak, the author of these lies, was a renegade priest who had joined the crypto-Nazi „German National Church.“ See Barrio, *la diplomacia vaticana*, 264. See p.10 of this study for effect of government control on *Ya*'s reporting at crucial points in the war.

⁴² Bergen to Weizsacker, 22 June 1941, *DGFP* vol.12, no. 674, 1082. Pius „responding to a „private exchange“ stated that „it was not possible to leave unanswered German propaganda in Spain with its rose coloured statements about the position of the Catholic Church in Germany“ as Vatican silence would imply agreement, not only in Spain but „all over[Latin] America.“ Yanguas to MAE, 24 September 1940, cited in Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana*, doc. 86, 537-538.

⁴³ Father M.C. Darcy, SJ, *Church and State: The Roman Catholic Church and World Affairs*. 14 January 1941, RIIA, 8/688.

This barrage of Nazi propaganda had at most limited success. In November, the more subtle Italians noted that German propaganda was „too evident and oppressive“ its very ubiquity counterproductive in producing the impression that any news about Germany was produced by its propaganda makers. German influence was moreover „strongly opposed ... by the educated classes, above all the clergy.“⁴⁴ The British also noted that „influential Catholic circles“ were „little impressed by German attempts to portray Nazism as no longer in conflict with the Roman Catholic Church.“⁴⁵ If the Catholic press was at this time, circumscribed by prudence in reporting political events, the Church’s spiritual resources could be used as a powerful block to Nazi influence. Processions, festivals, pilgrimages, missions, rosaries, the religious activities of Catholic organizations, were copiously reported in every Catholic publication. The blend of the spiritual, the traditional and the popular emphasized in these reports heightened the identity of Catholicism and Spanish values to the exclusion of the foreign and the anti-religious. In that process, the totality of daily reporting in the Catholic press could be considered more influential than individual mendacious pro-Nazi articles. In relation to these articles, Jesús Iribarren, wartime editor of *Ecclesia* suggests a widespread ability of readers of a censored press to read between the lines.⁴⁶ Wartime British reports from Spain concur regarding political articles that „it is almost sufficient for a statement to be made in the press for it to be immediately disbelieved.“⁴⁷ For all its propaganda, Nazism made little progress in Spain. The *London Times* reported that in Spain, „the Nazi

⁴⁴ Report, Lequio, (Italian Ambassador Madrid), 28 November 1940, cited in Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana*, 265.

⁴⁵ *WPIS*, no. 51, 25 September 1940, 10.

⁴⁶ Jesús Iribarren, „La iglesia y el Franquismo en la postguerra: *Ecclesia* y el Cardenal Plá y Deniel“, *Razón y Fe*, April, 1977, 427.

⁴⁷ *WPIS*, no. 22, 27 February 1940, 10.

doctrine has few disciples." The British Institute of International Affairs was convinced in November 1940 that „Spaniards of all parties...are the last peoples in Europe to accept willingly foreign conceptions of politics and social life" and saw Nazi propaganda as „over-reaching itself." An internal report of the regime stated at the end of 1940 that „the greater part of the population shows support for British victory."⁴⁸

By late 1940, even among radical *falangists*, there was growing disillusionment with Nazism as Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslaff Molotov was feted in Berlin whilst Spanish requests for German food supplies were ignored. Italy's military debacles dented perceived Axis invincibility whilst Germany's likely rescue of its ally would lessen Spain's direct danger. The popular Catholic press continued to print pro-Axis reports. However, *Razón y Fe* quoted Roosevelt's speech warning of Nazi domination in conjunction with Augustine's teaching „war cannot have any other end but peace", an implied criticism of Nazism, in February, 1941. This, together with the renewed availability of *Mit brennender Sorge* in *Ecclesia*'s list of publications from April pointed to a recovery of nerve. A number of factors may have contributed to this recovery. Firstly, the *Wehrmacht* looked likely to be occupied in the Balkans, well away from Spain. Secondly, Britain continued to hold out and there was increasing evidence of American support for the British struggle. Thirdly, Nazi propaganda blandishments had not been accompanied by any practical aid, whilst Anglo-American loans, predicated of

⁴⁸ *London Times*, 15 August 1940, 5b. See *Bulletin of International News*, vol. 17 no.24, 30 November 1940, for comment on „Spaniards of all parties," 8/659, 19 September 1940, for „propaganda over-reaching itself," both RIIA. See Informe de Barcelona, 27 December 1940, *DIHGF*, Tomo II-1 427-428, for comment on most Spaniards desiring a British victory.

course on continued Spanish neutrality, had helped alleviate the threat of famine and starvation in Spain.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the Church carefully monitored Franco's balancing policies. Internally his Youth Front law had protected youth religious education from radical *falangist* influence. The episcopate, though „not altogether reassured,“ continued, with the army and the nuncio, to support Franco's resistance to German pressure for greater commitment to the Axis.⁵⁰ In early 1941, the nuncio and the Spanish foreign ministry noted an intense Nazi cultural campaign designed to „show deference to Catholicism,“ and the nuncio warned of the danger of „Hitlerite propaganda in Latin America via Spain.“⁵¹ Concessions such as Hitler Youth visits and the opening of a German Institute in May seemed to verify the nuncio's fears. Inevitably, however, the Nazis nullified their goodwill gestures by concurrent threats and demands. British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare wrote that, „instead of using discretion and subtlety, [the Germans] behaved as if Spain were an occupied country.“ Tiring of Franco's procrastination, they presented a bill of 372 million Marks for German *Guerra Civil* assistance. Spaniards had been grateful for this help, but „resented a professed friendly creditor who came with a gun in his hand.“⁵²

Hitler's invasion of the USSR again transformed the situation. Chapter 6 will highlight the enthusiasm for continuing the „Anti-Bolshevik crusade“ even among anti-Nazi Catholics. We will also see that the Spanish Church supported the „crusade“ but the

⁴⁹ *Razón y Fe*, no. 517, February 1941, 97-98; *Ecclesia*, no. 8, 15 April 1941, 29.

⁵⁰ *WPIS*, no. 65, 1 January 1941, 10, for bishops' reaction to Youth Law; Yencken to FO, 11 February 1941, for strong German pressure. Hoare to FO, 18 April 1941, 28 April 1941, for military and the nuncio's strong support of neutrality. FO 371/26945, NAUK.

⁵¹ See AMAE, Leg R 3563 Exp.97, for German cultural campaign. See Cicognani to Maglione, 15 January 1941, *ADSS*, vol.4, no. 416, 287 for fears for Latin America.

⁵² Hoare to FO, 9 January 1941, FO 371/26945, for German bill; Hoare to FO, 15 January 1942, FO 371/31234, for German indiscretion, both NAUK.

Vatican did not.⁵³ One reason for this reluctance was the Vatican's ever growing realization of Nazism's anti-religious character. A verbal reply to the German ambassador regarding papal „reserve“ over the „crusade“ emphasized the Vatican's continued adherence to the policies of „impartiality“ laid down by Benedict XV in the previous war. This reply indicated that if Pius XII had spoken in its support, he would have also needed to condemn publicly „anticlerical measures and tendencies hostile to Christianity in Germany.“ The Vatican's fear was that after the defeat of Bolshevism, Christianity would go „from the frying pan into the fire.“⁵⁴

The Spanish Catholic press was without such constraints regarding the „crusade“, which it saw as a continuation of the Spanish *Guerra Civil* struggle. Without endorsing Nazi ideology, the popular Spanish Catholic press extolled the power of the *Wehrmacht*, now safely occupied far from Spain, and reported positively on Nazi religious initiatives. In August, *Ya* reported that the state would repair German churches damaged by British bombing. In September, *Ya* carried the thanks of Ukrainian bishops to Hitler for „religious liberation.“ In November it published German rebuttals of Roosevelt's assertions that Nazism intended to abolish religion. However, such pro-Nazi reporting was partly balanced by continued emphasis on *hispanidad*, that world-wide community of Spanish language and culture and the identity of that community with Catholicism. The Catholic press whilst extolling the triumphs of the „Crusade,“ still attempted to keep Nazi ideology at arms length.⁵⁵

⁵³ See p. 131.

⁵⁴ Menhausen (German Consular at Holy See) to State Secretary, 12 September 1941, *DGFP*, vol.13, no. 307, 489.

⁵⁵ See *Ya*, 6 August 1941, 3, for repair of churches; 10 October 1941, 1, for thanks to Hitler; 2 November 1941, 3, for rebuttal of Roosevelt; 11 November 1941, 3, for identity between *hispanidad* and Catholicism.

December 1941, however, produced yet another changed situation for Spain and the Spanish Church. The German check and Soviet counter-attack before Moscow and, fundamentally, the widening of the war and US entry, produced the first doubts that Nazi victory was inevitable or even overwhelmingly likely. Moreover, awareness of Nazism's crimes was growing. Yanguas reported that „certain measures“ of the Nazis had caused the Pope profound pain and the foreign ministry had independent confirmation of what these „measures“ and Nazi attitudes to religion were.⁵⁶ At the turn of the year, the Vatican made strong representations to that ministry about Spanish press reports which „suggest that the Catholic Church and the Holy See have a relationship of cordial normality with the German regime.“ In fact, „it is notoriously known that [in Germany] Catholic practices, its churches and its priests are objects of systematic hostility.“⁵⁷ The Spanish Catholic press took note. In January 1942, *Ya* reprinted an *Osservatore Romano* report asserting „many newspapers have published positive reports about the situation of the Church in Germany. Regrettably this is not so.“ Four days later, *Ya* editorialised its „community of ideas“ with *Osservatore Romano*.⁵⁸

By early 1942, then, not only had the direct Nazi threat to Spain lessened but Nazi victory looked less inevitable. Moreover Nazi crimes were becoming apparent to the Vatican which was powerfully influencing the Spanish Church to denounce Nazism's anti-religious nature. Direct episcopal criticism of Nazism surfaced, unsurprisingly, in Navarre, which we have already seen was home to a strongly anti-Nazi and anti-*falangist* Carlist Catholic traditionalism. In January, 1942, the Bishop of Pamplona told Hoare not

⁵⁶ Yanguas to MAE, 6 November 1941, cited in Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana*, doc.97, 550-552; Informe secreto sobre el trato de los judíos, December 1941, *DIHGF*, Tomo II-2, 405-406.

⁵⁷ AMAE, Leg R 3463, Exp.19, 31 December 1941, 24 January 1942.

⁵⁸ *Ya*, 30 January 1942, 3, for *Osservatore Romano* report, 3 February 1942, 3, for editorial.

only that „Russian Communism is preferable to German Nazism“ but that he and his colleagues with Vatican approval, were working for reconciliation in Spain, in reducing the influence of the radical *Falange* and bringing the regime closer to traditional Catholic values. The following month, the neighboring Bishop of Calahorra published a pastoral that, despite being kept out of the censored press, „went round the north of Spain like wildfire.“⁵⁹ The pastoral was a root and branch condemnation of Nazism in the style of *Mit brennender Sorge* and was sent to churches in conjunction with that encyclical. The pastoral used German sources to reveal Nazi paganism, to detail persecution of the German Church and to denounce worse persecution in occupied Holland. The bishop thanked God that the Spanish people „have preserved sufficient mental equilibrium not to believe such aberrations and myths.“⁶⁰

In the spring, Hoare reported that the nuncio had instructed Spanish clerics to speak out against German racial doctrines and warn that, in Germany and its occupied countries, Christianity was in danger. In response, the Bishop of Zaragoza had ordered the circulation of the Calahorra pastoral. The Bishop of Pamplona had preached „a fearless sermon to a crowded congregation.“ In Vigo, during a mission, a Jesuit priest denounced Nazism“s „attempts to substitute the swastika for the cross.“ The Archbishop of Valladolid publicly attacked „false doctrines“ of Nazism and condemned a widely-circulated German propaganda magazine. In Toledo, primate Plá allowed two German

⁵⁹ Hoare to Eden, 16 July 1942, PREM 4/21/1, NAUK, for anti-Nazi feeling in Navarre, see also p 103; Hoare to FO, 31 January 1942, FO 371/31234, NAUK for Pamplona; Hoare to Eden, 30 April 1942, FO 371/31280, NAUK, for Calahorra

⁶⁰ Fidel G. Martínez, Bishop of Calahorra, *Instrucción Pastoral*, 28 February 1942 ,8-9 for Nazi paganism, 11 for persecution in Germany, 14 for persecution in Holland, 10 for Spanish „mental equilibrium“. Biblioteca Nacional de España, (henceforth BNE).

priests who had escaped the Gestapo to preach and speak in his diocese.⁶¹ Independent confirmation of Nazi brutality was furnished by returning Blue Division volunteers who criticized „bloody repression in the rear of the occupied zones.“⁶²

As yet, little criticism of Nazism appeared in the Catholic press although *Ecclesia* was allowed to print the Bishop of Gerona’s condemnation of Nazi „philosopher“ Rosenberg and to emphasize that Rosenberg’s *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* was on the index of forbidden books.⁶³ However, both to the British and to the regime, the Church campaign was seen as important. It was perceived as increasing the already strong popular will for neutrality and influencing the regime to harness that popular will to increase support for Franco. The Foreign Ministry archives contain petitions supporting neutrality from several small Spanish towns sent within a few days in April, 1942.⁶⁴ As even to its admirers, the Franco regime was not known for sedulously seeking public expression of contrary opinions, the collection, perhaps even the inspiration of these petitions, may have been in justification of official policy. The British noted „the Catholic hierarchy’s open hostility to Nazi influence“ adding to and encouraging that of the „masses.“ whose current idiom „to do a German“ – to leave a cafe without paying“ showed widespread detestation of arrogant Nazis in Spain. British sources also highlighted the campaign’s Vatican inspiration, noting the Pope’s recent personal congratulations of Segura as signaling approval of his anti-*falangist* stance. Perhaps optimistically, they saw the Spanish campaign as a „portent of a stirring of the Catholic

⁶¹ See Hoare to Eden, 30 April 1942 for Valladolid, Zaragoza and Vigo; Hoare to FO, 15 May 1942 for nuncio’s initiative, Hoare to Eden 27 October 1942 for German refugee priests. FO 371/31280, NAUK.

⁶² Informe de la DGS, San Sebastián, 28 April 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 345-347.

⁶³ *Ecclesia*, no. 39, 11 April 1942, 21.

⁶⁴ AMAE, Leg. R 5162, Exp.1. The regime’s internal reports at the same time noted that 80% of Spaniards wanted neither side to win, and both to keep out of Spain. See 23 April 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 314.

conscience throughout the whole world.”⁶⁵ Meanwhile the regime's internal reports noted that, in the wake of the Calahorra pastoral, Catholic Action had assumed a marked anti-Nazi character. Later in the year, these reports revealed that the British were distributing propaganda leaflets quoting pastorals and sermons „from various bishops“, describing the German state as „declared enemy of the Church and of Christianity.“ In December, the Vatican gave further encouragement to the Spanish Church campaign, the nuncio being instructed to use extreme Nazi anti-religious statements to fuel anti-Nazi feeling within the Spanish hierarchy.⁶⁶

The Church's 1942 campaign also put Nazism's „incompetent imitators,“ as the Archbishop of Valladolid termed them, clearly on the defensive as Radio *Falange* attempted to hit back at „psalm-singing grouse.“⁶⁷ The *Falange* had lost any Fascist ideological purity after Franco's 1937 amalgamation. By early 1939, even the Germans had seen its influence decreasing whilst „clerical circles continue to gain ground.“⁶⁸ *Falangist* ideology and efficiency had been so further diluted after the Nationalist victory by an influx of „undesirable people;“ -place seekers, time servers, the corrupt, even opportunistic former Republicans, that further membership had been severely restricted in November 1941. Particularly amongst such opportunists, Germanophilia waxed and

⁶⁵ *WPIS*, no.134, 29 April 1942, 11 and 12, for hierarchy's attitude and „stirring of Catholic conscience“; no. 138, 27 May 1942, 11, for Church and „masses“; no.139, 3 June 1942, 12, for idiom; no. 135, 6 May 1942, 10, for Segura.

⁶⁶ Información Interior, DGS, 22 May 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 503-505. DGS 30 September 1942, *Ibid*, 631. See Maglione to Cicognani, 19 December 1942, *ADSS* vol.7, no.61, 500-502, for Vatican encouragement.

⁶⁷ Hoare to Eden, 30 April 1942, FO 371/31280, NAUK, for Archbishop's comments, *WPIS* no.132, 15 April 1942, 11 for Radio *Falange* broadcast.

⁶⁸ See Stohrer to FM, 19 February 1939, no.740, 847 and Memo, Deputy Director of German Department of Culture, 20 January 1939, citing Embassy reports from Spain, no.713, 818. Both *DGFP*, vol.3.

waned with prospects of German victory.⁶⁹ Moreover, as Suñer asserted, Franco was „not a *falangist* at heart.“⁷⁰ The party was one of several interest groups which Franco kept in balance, rewarding or retarding one or other in response to events, internal or external, whilst gradually consolidating his own indispensability. United States Ambassador Carlton Hayes, a practicing Catholic, accurately described this balance of forces with added Fascist „trimmings“ for Axis consumption.⁷¹ The „Nazi imitators' were thus a radical minority in one interest group. They had been most conspicuous at the height of Nazi triumph in the summer of 1940 and in the van of the „crusade“ a year later. However, their influence on Franco's policy was scarcely more than to elicit a few bellicose speeches for radical *falangist* consumption. These, the British declined to take seriously. British reports emphasized that, virtually from the beginning of the regime, detestation of the *Falange* had been widespread in Spain. „The army made no secret of its hatred“ and the Church, Spain's other „great institution“ was „scarcely less hostile.“⁷² The Church had fought radical *falangist* influence particularly in education and strong anti-*falangist* prelates like Segura and the Archbishop of Valladolid had soon put their local *falangist* opponents to rout. Even bishop Leopoldo Eijo y Garay of Madrid „the only Spanish Bishop who has identified himself with the *Falange*“ expressed apprehension at

⁶⁹ *El Correo de Andalucía*, 28 November 1941, 2, for „purification.“ See also *Ya*, 27 November 1941, 3(ed.) on the *Falange*'s „tendency to lose focus.“

⁷⁰ FO 371/26890, February 1941, cited in Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana*, 285.

⁷¹ Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain*, 55.

⁷² Kelly (British Ambassador, Berne to FO, 25 July 1941, and Hoare to Eden, 23 July 1941, FO 371/26906, NAUK for British lack of concern at Franco's bellicose speeches. Hoare quotes the Brazilian Ambassador saying Franco „did not mind what lengths of deception he went to in order to keep Spain out of the war.“ The Royal Institute of International Affairs commented, „In Spain, the man in the street has always expected the politician to mean about 20% of what he says.“ These are just words, and if they keep the Germans quiet, why worry?“ 8/1216, RIIA. See Hoare to FO, 15 January 1942, FO 371/31234, NAUK for popular detestation of *Falange*.

the spread of Nazi paganism.⁷³ The regime's own internal reports described 95% of the clergy as at best „indifferent“ to *Falange* ideology.⁷⁴ In retrospect, we can see that the Church's fears of a radical *falangist* party state might have been unfounded even had the Nazis entered Spain. Evidence from France, Hungary, Slovakia and elsewhere suggests Hitler's preference for convergent right authoritarian regimes to local Nazi imitators.

As 1942 ended, the Church could take encouragement in its anti-Nazi campaign from Franco's dismissal of Suñer, seen as a pro-Axis advocate. Moreover, while Nazi propaganda remained strong, its Allied counterpart had greatly improved using, as the regime's internal reports noted, the Spanish bishops' pronouncements to promote anti-Nazi feeling. By the end of the year, these reports emphasized the response of the Spanish clergy to Nazi persecution of the Church in Poland and the Low Countries. A sermon in Tarragona cathedral had declared „German racism“ comparable with „Communism and socialism.“⁷⁵ The outspokenness of Spanish bishops in denouncing the Nazi system as anti-Christian was noted even in the United States. *Current History's* articles of October, 1942 and February, 1943 helped dispel the myth of „the attraction of Fascism“ for the Spanish Church.⁷⁶ At this time too, Allied ambassadors described strong anti-Nazi feelings amongst the Spanish clergy. Hayes, commenting on US Cardinal Spellman's Spanish visit in February, 1943 noted that the nuncio, the Primate, the Archbishops of Madrid, Barcelona [sic] and Seville „are all naturally critical of Nazi

⁷³ For strong episcopal opposition to *falangist* educational influence, see *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico*, Zaragoza, 2 March 1942 and 16 March 1942, BNE. For Segura, see *BES* 1 April 1940 and 15 April 1940, ICS. For Archbishop of Valladolid and Garay, see Bowker (British Embassy, Madrid) to Churchill, 17 July 1945, FO 371/49658A, NAUK.

⁷⁴ Informe FET, undated, early 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 141.

⁷⁵ For response to Nazi persecution and sermon, see Información Nacional, 30 December 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 742-745.

⁷⁶ See *Current History*, vol. 3, no.14, October 1942, 118 and vol.3, no.18, February 1943, 509.

doctrines and are favorably disposed towards us."⁷⁷ The British too saw Spellman's visit as marking the „increasing influence of the Vatican in Spain and a further trend away from *falangism*." Hoare, touring Andalucia, found that not only Segura but the Archbishop of Valencia and the Director of the Jesuits in Malaga were strongly against Nazism. Moreover, the British noted a number of strong anti-Nazis amongst newly-appointed Spanish bishops.⁷⁸

However, the Nazi disaster at Stalingrad produced yet another new situation for the Church. Antipathy to Nazism remained but there was new fear within the Church of a Communist victory. This for a while muted public criticism of Nazism. *Ya* declared that „National Socialist Germany will save Europe from Bolshevism" and *Alcazar* was still prepared to print lies about the „flourishing state of German Catholicism."⁷⁹ Spain and the Church desired a compromise peace. Primate Plá had been advocating this since his inauguration but his efforts in support of Spanish peace initiatives were not supported by the Vatican, as will be seen.⁸⁰

If, during 1943, the Spanish Church could not influence international events, it could encourage the growth of Catholic spirit and the decline of radical Nazi influence within the *Falange*. For example, Bishop Garay praised the „Catholicism" of the *Falange* which responded by organizing a national pilgrimage to Santiago in August. The following month, *Falange* Secretary General, José Arrese declared that the *Falange* was not „part of a foreign regime."⁸¹ Meanwhile, as 1943 wore on, the war began to tilt decisively in

⁷⁷ Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain*, 97-98.

⁷⁸ Hoare to Eden, 15 March 1943 Archives Western Europe, 186, (Segura), 188, (Malaga); Part 48, no. 43, 126, (Valencia). FO 425/421, NAUK. For British comment on Spellman visit see *WPIS*, no. 177, 24 February 1943, 12. See Hoare to FO, 1 January 1943, FO 371/34817, NAUK, for episcopal appointments.

⁷⁹ *Ya*, 30 January 1943, 1: *Alcazar* cited in *RFP*, vol. 6, no.184, 7 May 1943, 250.

⁸⁰ See pp. 135-136.

⁸¹ *BHS* vol. 21, no.81, Jan 1944, 31, for pilgrimage, 35 for Arrese.

favour of the Allies. The cautiously opportunistic Franco reacted, declaring Spain's reversion from „non-belligerency“ to „neutrality“ in October. In the press, August saw censorship reimposed on the dispatches of Axis correspondents whilst internally there was some relaxation. *Ya* was allowed to hint at „restrictions on religious practices“ in Germany.⁸² In November *Ecclesia* printed in full the German bishops' Fulda Pastoral, condemning Nazi racism, religious persecution, attacks on religious education in Germany and suppression of religion in Poland.⁸³

In January, 1944, Segura vigorously denounced nine dangerous errors of German racism and declared that totalitarian doctrines „constitute paganism.“ Moreover *Ecclesia* published Segura's pastoral in full the following month.⁸⁴ By then, Nazism retained credit solely as a bulwark against Bolshevism, the dread prospect of which caused the Spanish Church again to hope for a compromise peace. In April 1944, the National Congress of Catholic Action called on „Catholics of all nations to exert influence to bring peace nearer“ and the British noted a „peace fever“ in the Spanish press. The Vatican, however, gave no encouragement.⁸⁵

The German retreat from Spain's border virtually signified the end of any remaining Nazi influence in Spain. Occasional references to courageous German soldiers facing „atheistic hordes“ as in the German bishops' pastoral, published by *Ya* in November, made no reference to Nazism. Indeed, at the end of the war, the Spanish Church saluted

⁸² *Ya*, 20 August 1943, 1.

⁸³ *Ecclesia* no. 121, 6 November 1943, 7-8.

⁸⁴ *BES*, 1 January 1944, „declaración sobre los principales errores modernos.“ ICS; *Ecclesia*, no. 136, 19 February 1944, 7 and 20.

⁸⁵ See *RFP*, vol. 6, no.230, 12 April 1944, 80, for Congress; *WIPS*, no.237, 19 April 1944 10, for peace fever. See chaps. 10, 11 for reasons for Vatican attitude.

as „German heroes“ those Catholics who had opposed Hitler and „confronted racist idolatry in Germany.“⁸⁶

The material presented in this chapter calls into doubt the allegations of a Church „attracted“ by Fascism or its Nazi variant. To substantiate such allegations, their advocates make a list of the „commonalities“ of Catholicism and Fascism. Though such commonalities may exist, this approach fails to consider the existence of these, and more, commonalities between Fascism and Communism. Totality of beliefs and goals is far more important than either surface resemblances or commonality of interests which may bring together antipathetic systems for mutual political advantage; the Hitler-Stalin pact or the West’s alliance with Stalin being examples. Catholic theology fundamentally opposed Fascist and Nazi views of „the role of the state, the Church, the individual and society and theories of racism.“⁸⁷ However, unlike Communism, Fascist and Nazi regimes saw tactical advantage in conceding to the Church its minimum requirements. It was this concession to the Church’s essential spiritual mission, not any intrinsic „attraction“ of their ideologies that motivated the Vatican, in a spirit of *realpolitik*, to conclude Concordats with Germany and Italy. In its Italian Concordat, despite Fascist violations, the Church may well have gained more than it lost. In World War II, that Concordat, whatever its restrictions, allowed the continued independence of the Vatican to exercise its spiritual and political roles. We saw that the German Concordat did at the very least provide the legal basis for the courageous encyclical, *Mit brennender Sorge*.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ See *Ya*, 2 November 1944, 3, for German bishops’ pastoral; *Ecclesia* no. 204, 9 June 1945, 3(ed.) for „salute to German heroes“; *Signo* no. 282, 9 June 1945, 1, for „confronting idolatry.“

⁸⁷ See Wolff and Hoensch, *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right*, xi.

⁸⁸ For *Mit brennenderSorge*, see pp. 96 – 97. For a reasoned defence of the tactical value of the Vatican-Nazi Concordat, see John Jay Hughes, „The Pope’s Pact with Hitler, Betrayal or Self-Defense,“ *Journal of Church and State* 17 (Winter 1975) 63-80.

In Spain, „evidence“ should similarly be based on the totality of policy and conduct of both regime and Church. Facts or even pictures in isolation can be misleading. Even during the *Guerra Civil*, Franco had dealt tactfully with Nazism“s military presence. In World War II, the Church supported Franco in using tact to prevent the return of that presence to Spain.⁸⁹ Neither is the oft-displayed picture of Spanish bishops executing a *falangist* salute proof positive of unconditional Church devotion to Franco, as chapter 4 has shown. Still less is it „proof“ of attraction to Fascist or Nazi ideologies, which in their radicalism, their racism and above all their secularism were alien to Catholicism and to Spain's national and religious traditions.⁹⁰ On the other hand, insufficient attention has been given to the Church“s use of spiritual resources at times when political comment was perforce constrained. Credit is correctly given to such manifestations as rallies and parades in strengthening popular identification with Nazi and Communist ideologies. These same manifestations when used by the Church were equally effective. Spanish Catholicism used such „outward forms,“ blending the spiritual with the traditional and the popular, to cement the identification of Church and people, to make Spaniards receptive to the Church“s message and conversely, to keep out ideologies inimical to that message. As Gomá had written in 1939, Nazism was such an ideology, fundamentally at variance with traditional Spanish Catholic values⁹¹

⁸⁹ E.g. *Noticiero de España*, ER 6023, 1938, 56/25, 26 February 1938, no.26, BNE, Madrid, from Franco“s wartime press office, gives a lyrical report on the „clarity and precision“ of the words of Hitler, because such „words“ accorded with Franco“s own objectives.

⁹⁰ This picture appears, among other places, in Raymond Carr, *The Spanish Civil War: A History in Pictures* (New York: Norton, 1986), 101; Julián Casanova, *La Iglesia de Franco* (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 2001), 44, 232.

⁹¹ See Chapter 1 for comments on Catholicism“s „outward forms“. In contrast see, for example, Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives* (London: HarperCollins, 1991), 249. Bullock notes that „Hitler“s most original achievement was to create a movement which was deliberately designed to highlight by every manipulative device- symbols,

language, ritual, hierarchy, parades, rallies...“Perhaps these achievements, also replicated by Stalin, are not really original. Hitler, Stalin and Nazi propaganda Minister Goebbels were all apostates from religions which used all of the above as aids to the identification of Church and people. See quotation, *German spirit and culture today are diametrically opposed to Spanish culture and spirit*, Gomá to Franco, 9 February, 1939, on page 95 of this chapter.

Chapter 6. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church and Communism.

One of the errors, or compilation of errors, openly contrary to the most fundamental principles of our Holy Faith, is known by the name of Communism. Its gravity leaps to the eye. Of its virulence and disastrous effects, we have seen, in our own country, a terrible and salutary demonstration. Don Fidel García Martínez, Bishop of Calahorra, pastoral Concerning Certain Modern Errors, 28 February 1942.

In this chapter, in contrast to both the last chapter and the next, historical controversy is relatively lacking. Though leftist and liberal historians might berate the wartime Church for its „attraction“ to Fascism or its lack of enthusiasm for liberal democracy, they are at one with more conservative historians in describing the Church’s attitude to Communism. In 1939, it was universally known that Communism was anathema to the Vatican and the hated enemy of Spanish Nationalists and the Spanish Church. These attitudes were maintained during and indeed after World War II. The research conducted for this study supports this consensus.

For all that, the political expression of those attitudes is not without interest. Communism was perceived by the Church as an anti-Christian competitor for human souls and wherever it gained power, as a persecutor of the institutional Church. However, we are by now well aware that the Church lived in a political world. In that world, though Soviet Communism was everywhere distrusted, the USSR’s potential usefulness as an ally remained attractive. In August 1939, both sides had courted the Soviets. In June 1941, Churchill subordinated personal antipathy to Communism to the pragmatic need to gain Soviet support. Though the Church’s spiritual mentality towards Communism remained unchanged, the political expression of that mentality did vary with the impact on the Church of the belligerents’ changing attitudes towards the USSR. The political

attitudes of the Church also changed with the course of the war, as confidence in Communism's defeat changed to fear of Communist victory. This chapter will detail the Church's spiritual opposition to Communism and also consider its political shifts.

Communism, from its emergence, was and remained both in principle and practice, the deadly enemy of the Church. As early as 1878, Leo XIII had condemned „a revolutionary social movement publicly organized with the avowed purpose of uprooting the foundations of society at large.“¹ In 1931, Pius XI excoriated a system that „as a theory advocates class war ... and in practice, once successful „it is monstrous beyond belief how cruel and inhuman [Communists] show themselves.“² Goaded by religious persecution in the USSR, Mexico and Spain, Pius XI returned to the attack in March, 1937 with an encyclical devoted to Communism. This ideology was described as „intrinsicly wrong and no-one who would serve Christian civilization may give it any assistance in any undertaking whatsoever.“ Referring to Spain's „Communist“ massacres, Pius XI declared such atrocities „the natural fruit of a system that lacks all inner restraint.“ Repeating his 1931 strictures on its atheism and inhumanity, Pius added a litany of Communism's vices –„the destruction of marriage, social order, and moral responsibility, of human liberty, rights of personality and natural hierarchy, rejection of natural law.“ Communism is „necessarily totalitarian and has a false theory of society, authority and ownership. It denies the existence of the human spirit; its economic system is its sole inspiration.“ Communism is, in short, „a system in opposition alike to reason and divine revelation.“³

¹ Leo XIII, 28 December 1878, *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, Hughes, *Pope's New Order*, 36-7

² Pius XI, 13 May 1931, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Ibid. 171.

³ Pius XI, 19 March 1937, *Divini Redemptoris*, Ibid, 41-51.

With so foul and literally diabolical a system, the Church should, in principle, have no relations. Communism was moral anathema. Politically it was a „secular religion,“ seducing human souls and denying them to the Church, refusing the Church those essential freedoms of worship and education that make a regime tolerable. With Communism therefore the normal interplay of the moral and the political did not, in principle, apply. Yet, in the political world, things were not always simple, a Communist threat not always clear. In the 1930's, the situation was complicated by the emergence of Nazism which the Vatican was ever more clearly identifying as a threat of similarly anti-religious nature. In Spain therefore, the Vatican had been very cautious, identifying which side was more likely to meet Catholicism's political prerequisites before committing itself to Franco.

In 1937, only the Soviet Union was Communist-ruled and its religious persecution endangered relatively few Catholic souls. Even these few, however, had prompted the Vatican in the 1920's to make efforts to establish minimal relations with the Soviets. These efforts had collapsed through Communist intransigence.⁴ Consequently, the Vatican feared that Communist control of any other country would put at risk the souls of existing Catholics and deny the chance of conversion to non-Catholics. The Church would therefore oppose and condemn any Soviet expansion, even when, as in Finland, few Catholics were directly threatened.

In Spain, hatred and fear of Communism was endemic, a natural legacy of the persecutions of the *Guerra Civil*. Gomá had described Communism in 1937 as „hydra with seven heads and synthesis of all heresy.“ Such Spanish hatred was not confined to

⁴ See Hubert Jedin and John Dolan, eds., *History of the Church* (10 vols.) (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), vol. 10, 60-63.

the Church or to Catholics. Wartime United States Ambassador Hayes, who was a practicing Catholic, observed a „universal fear of Communism, among “leftists” as well as the “right.”” Hayes quotes assertions by the former leftist Mayor of Toledo that Communists aggravated and exploited leftist divisions for political advantage during the *Guerra Civil*. Spanish Catholics saw ample reason, in principle and by experience, to detest the enemy against which they had fought a „crusade.” In May 1939, Padre Enrique Basabe compared Franco to biblical King David, killing the Communist Goliath.⁵

Comment by Church and press on the dismemberment of Catholic Poland was however surprisingly muted. The British *Review of the Foreign Press* observed, „no Church utterances, even on Poland in the Spanish press for weeks.” British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries* saw „both Army and Church shocked by German treason” in combination with the Soviets and their joint overrunning of Poland. However, the Church morally saw nothing to choose between the conduct of the Nazis and the Soviets. Politically, moreover, the tense situation between Church and regime in September 1939, noted in the previous chapter was one which, considering the government enforcement of Franco’s „strict neutrality” declaration of September 4 on the press, the Church did not wish to exacerbate. The press contented itself with publishing a

⁵ See Gomá, *Carta Abierta*, 10 January 1937, in *Pastorales*, 87. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain*, 50, for „universal fear” and Communist exploitation.” in the *Guerra Civil*. In support of these allegations, see Ronald Radosh, Mary L. Habek and Grigory Sevostianov (eds.) *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War* (New Haven, Ct. and London: Yale University Press, 2001),xxiii. The authors, investigating the Soviet archives in the 1990’s, assert „the documents prove that advisors from Moscow were attempting to Sovietize Spain... with a Stalinist style economy, army and political structure” See Sermon, Palencia Cathedral, 21 May 1939, archive *Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco* (henceforth FNFF), 22579, for Basabe.

papal eulogy about the Poles and reprinting *Osservatore Romano*'s report of Sovietization and religious persecution in Soviet occupied Poland.⁶

The USSR's attack on Finland in December saw no such restraint. Taking its cue from Suñer, who denounced Communist „Asiatic barbarism,“ the popular press abandoned strict neutrality and pelted the Soviets with abuse. *ABC* inveighed against Soviet „perfidy and barbarity.“ *Ya* emphasized the brutality of Communism and compared the USSR to a ravening wolf.⁷ The Church supported Franco's assertion that „Finland is our sister in glory and honour.“ The president of Catholic lay organisation *Pax Romano* declared „over the cold waters of Lake Ladoga today, as yesterday on the burning banks of the Ebro, are fought battles of life and death against the common enemy of Christianity.“⁸ *Ya* used quotations from *Osservatore Romano* and from the Pope to emphasize that the Vatican shared Spanish condemnation of Soviet aggression.⁹ *Signo* described how Pius XII's decision to send medical supplies to Finland inspired Spanish Catholics. A similar appeal to Spain by Finnish Catholics for communion wine and candles met a huge response, Gomá himself donating generously.¹⁰

„Christianity's common enemy“ continued its religious persecution in the ensuing months. Spanish Catholicism's attitude was reflected in its press. In February 1940, *Razón y Fe*, attacking „the myth of the proletariat“, asserted that Communism was not

⁶ See *RFP*, vol.6, no.2, 11 October 1939, 20, *WPIS*, no.1, 3 October 1939, 5 and no. 6, 7 November 1939, 10, for British reports. For concurrent Church–state disputes and Franco's neutrality declaration, see Chapter 5. See *ABC*, 1 October 1939, 11, for papal eulogy of Poles; 18 October 1939, 10, for reprint of *Osservatore Romano* report.

⁷ *ABC*, 5 December 1939, 7; *Ya*, 10 December 1939, 10, 1 December 1939, 1 (ed.) *The Wolf and the Lamb*.

⁸ *Signo*, no. 4, 10 February 1940, 1.

⁹ *Ya*, 3 December 1939, 7 quoting *Osservatore Romano*; 26 December 1939, 1 *Pope Condemns Aggression towards Finland*.

¹⁰ See *ABC*, 27 December 1939, 8, for Pius XII's aid. See *Signo*, no. 3, 3 February 1940, 1, for Finnish appeal and response.

exclusively an economic system. It invaded sociology, philosophy, even theology.¹¹ In March, *Signo*, reporting on the Soviet execution of the head of Poland's Catholic universities commented, „the Russians use any pretext to persecute Catholics.“¹² In June, *Ya* lamented that the newly Soviet-occupied areas of Romania would „pass from civilisation to barbarism.“¹³ The following month *Signo* chronicled the „sad pantomime“ of the parliaments of the Baltic States, including largely Catholic Lithuania, „approving“ incorporation into the „Red paradise.“¹⁴ By March 1941, *Signo* was declaring Communism „one of the greatest enemies of Christianity and humanity“ in eulogizing Franco’s defeat of Communism in Spain.¹⁵ In April, the Catholic review *El Escorial* excoriated Communism as „a cancer on the body of Europe.“¹⁶

Nor had this „cancer“ quite been exorcized from Spain itself. Communist activity was of course clandestine, party membership small, but Spanish Communists were disciplined and dedicated. An internal report of the regime in mid 1941 describes their „re-organization and preparation for a „post-war Communist Spain.“ Communists had carefully studied their Catholic enemy and hoped to exploit differences between Church and regime. A year later, an internal report was even claiming that in Jaen, „former Communists“ had infiltrated themselves into Catholic Action. This apparently strange phenomenon was not as incredible as it sounded, nor was it always attributable to subversive motives. As with its efforts to keep Nazism at bay the Church, as part of its

¹¹ *Razón Y Fe*, no. 505, February 1940, 121.

¹² *Signo*, no. 7, 2 March 1940, 1.

¹³ *Ya*, 29 June 1940, 1, (ed.)

¹⁴ *Signo*, no. 28, 27 July 1940, 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, no. 60, 3 March 1941, 1.

¹⁶ *El Escorial*, *Cuaderno* 8, 325

re-Christianizing efforts, used all its spiritual resources to the utmost, not only to prevent any Communist recrudescence but to convert its former enemies.¹⁷ Missions in former „Red“ strongholds were copiously reported in the Catholic press. Prison chaplains made a huge effort to convert Communists and successes were jubilantly reported. In truth, as with the former „Communists“ flocking into the *Falange*, many of the „converted“ may have been less sincere or sinister than simply opportunistic. Certainly, „conversion“ radically improved the release or employment prospects of former Republican supporters, under an otherwise hostile regime.¹⁸ Meanwhile, as Franco with the support of Church and army was struggling to keep the Nazis out of Spain, Communist Republican exiles were active on Nazism’s behalf. The regime’s internal report noted on June 9 1941, that Dolores Ibarruri, the prominent Republican politician known as *La pasionaria*, exiled in Moscow, was pontificating that „Hitler will be the saviour of the proletariat.“ She was soon to be disabused.¹⁹

We can thus see why in Spanish Catholic circles, the German invasion of the USSR was seen as a continuation of the „crusade“ of the *Guerra Civil*. As the *British Review of the Foreign Press* reported, „a crusade against Communism was the dominant note in the press“- particularly the Catholic press.²⁰ Whilst *Ecclesia* was content to emphasize the hierarchy’s view that Communism was a religious, social and political doctrine condemned by the Church, *Ya* shrieked the headline, *The European Crusade Against*

¹⁷ We have noted in Chap.4 the Church’s genuine enthusiasm for the „deathbed conversions“ of condemned „Communists.“ This enthusiasm, rather than protests at the executions has often been retrospectively condemned; see Raguier, *Gunpowder and Incense*, 135. Such revulsion, even if justified, is essentially a „presentist“ reaction. One may not agree, but needs to see how the 1930’s Church thought.

¹⁸ July 1941, Tomo II-2, 186- 294, and 28 May 1942, Tomo III 503-505, both *DIHGF*. See *Ecclesia*, no.7, 1 April 1941, 8, for reports of missions; no. 43, 4 May 1942, 7, for report of 331 former Communists converted in prisons. Casanova, *Iglesia de Franco* 253-254, notes how a favourable ecclesiastical testimony could help a former Republican.

¹⁹ 9 June 1941, *DIHGF*, Tomo II-2,160-161.

²⁰ *RFP*, vol. 4, no. 93, 10 July 1941, 265.

Communism Begins and spoke of „A Historical and Transcendental Moment“²¹ *Signo* was euphoric, describing the „explosion of joy“ that the news produced in Spain. „Europe had decided to go further along the road Spain opened.“ Appealing to the youth of *Acción Católica*, a likely source of *División Azul* volunteers, *Signo* declared, „Catholics of Spain and the World, the grain is ripe for harvest. Prepare your sickles.“²²

Some „Catholics of Spain“ wanted a role in the „crusade.“ However, the institutional Church, in Spain and in Rome, and the Spanish state, had to temper spiritual enthusiasm with political reality. In view of Spain’s economic dependency and military weakness, Church and army remained committed to general neutrality. To Franco, national self interest transcended ideology. Franco's solution was that there were „two wars.“ Spaniards could fight Bolshevism whilst remaining neutral in the western conflict. Nor was there a declaration of war. Spanish troops went to the front as volunteers, from whom Franco „carefully disassociated himself.“²³ He could thus retain economic links with the West and rid himself of his most zealous radical *falangist* opponents who went to fight.²⁴

Similarly though the „crusaders“ naturally looked for papal endorsement, Pius XII and the Vatican showed caution. The Vatican’s tactical neutrality would not lightly be jettisoned. Ideologically, much as he detested and feared Communism, Pius would not compromise the moral authority of the papacy by even indirectly supporting, in Nazism, another anti-religious ideology.²⁵ In the absence of Pius XII’s specific backing, Catholic

²¹ *Ecclesia*, no. 14, 15 July 1941, 2, (ed.); *Ya*, 24 June 1941, 1, (ed.)

²² *Signo*, no. 76, 28 June 1941, 1.

²³ Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany*, 109.

²⁴ As the British, by now rightly cynical about Franco’s opportunism, noted in *WPIS*, no. 91, 2 July 1941, 13. See also Hoare to FO, 15 January 1942, FO 371/31234, NAUK.

²⁵ See chapter 5.

enthusiasts quoted his predecessor's trenchant condemnations of Communism or argued that Pius's references to „the predominance of atheism and impiety“ were a coded papal sanction of the „anti-Bolshevik crusade.“ On August 14, Pius extolled „Christian heroism on behalf of duties dictated by the Christian conscience“ but never came nearer to backing the „crusade.“ On August 24, *Ya* finally had to concede that such papal support would not eventuate, arguing that the papacy „must maintain an attitude exclusively on a spiritual, religious plane, and cannot use or condone the term “anti-Bolshevik crusade” explicitly.”²⁶

Though supporting the limits established to Spanish participation, the Church provided religious inspiration and showed enthusiasm for the „crusade.“ The popular Catholic press strongly encouraged recruitment for the Blue Division. Reports and pictures of thousands of eager volunteers filled *Ya* at the end of June, supported by headlines like *Spain Longs for Vengeance for the Fallen.*²⁷ Masses and rosaries for the volunteers were held in Spanish cathedrals and military chaplains recruited to serve at the front. *Signo* even likened these to the missionaries in sixteenth century America.²⁸ The Catholic press emphasized the religious zeal and piety of the volunteers from their pre-departure pilgrimage to the Virgin of Pilar, to their departure with a pastoral benediction from the Archbishop of Valladolid and their zealous attendance at mass and confession at the front. *Ecclesia* saw young volunteers from Catholic Action preparing for „an apostolate of the trenches.”²⁹

²⁶ *Ya*, 10 August 1941, 1 for „atheism and impiety“; 14 August 1941, 1, for „Christian heroism“, 24 August 1941, 1, for *Ya*'s concession.

²⁷ For example, *Ya*, 27 June 1941, 1; 28 June 1941, 1.

²⁸ *Signo*, no. 78, 12 July 1941, 1.

²⁹ See *Ya*, 10 July 1941, 1 for pilgrimage, *Signo*, no. 79, 19 July 1941, 1, for departure, *El Correo de Andalucía*, 17 December 1941, 3, for religious zeal at front. See *Ecclesia*, no. 15, 1 August, 1941, 9, for „apostolate.“

In the absence of specific papal backing, the Spanish Church worked hard through its press to justify the „crusade.“ Between July, 1941 and the end of the year, *Ya* published prominently international support for the „crusade“, or at least hostility to the USSR, from Ireland, Finland, France, Romania, Slovakia and German bishops.³⁰ In December, *Ecclesia* published the Archbishop of Washington’s denunciation of United States aid to the Soviets.³¹ The vile nature of the Stalinist regime was strongly underlined. *Signo* highlighted Soviet tyranny and religious persecution in the newly „liberated“ Lithuania and Ukraine as early as July.³² *Ya* reported the perfect „human interest“ story of two Spanish boys taken to the USSR during the *Guerra Civil* and liberated by the Finns, along with the standard condemnation of Communist barbarity in Latvia.³³ *Ecclesia* emphasized the hierarchy’s view of „crusade“’s „soul-saving function,-,„to the volunteers, it is not enough to destroy the Red Army but to plant seeds of Christianity in lands and souls.“³⁴ In that connection, *Ya* was soon able to report „the revival of religious life in liberated Russia.“³⁵ Clerical support for the „crusade“ and prayers for the Blue Division throughout Spain were regularly reported.³⁶ Only Segura dared disturb the unanimity of Church enthusiasm. The British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summary* reported from Seville that Señor García Sánchez, speaking at Segura’s invitation, pointed out that in

³⁰ See *Ya*, 9 July 1941, 1 and 10 July 1941, 3(ed.) for Ireland, 9 August 1941, 3, for Finland; 3 and 5 December 1941, 3 for France; 21 September 1941, 1, for Rumania; 23 October 1941, 1 for Slovakia; 2 November 1941, 3, for Germany.

³¹ *Ecclesia*, no. 24, 15 December 1941, 2.

³² *Signo*, no. 77, 5 July 1941, 1, for Lithuania; no. 78, 12 July 1941, 4, for Ukraine.

³³ *Ya*, 21 September 1941, 1.

³⁴ *Ecclesia*, no. 14, 15 July 1941, 3.

³⁵ *Ya*, 3 December 1941, 1.

³⁶ Two examples among several in *Ya*, 15 August 1941, 1 in Ciudad Real, 7 December 1941, 5 in Toledo. *Ecclesia* no. 19, October 1941, 27, reported the Archbishop of Valladolid’s denunciation of Communism which was caused by human greed and avarice.

1939, no volunteers had been sent to defend Catholic Poland from two equally reprehensible totalitarian systems.³⁷

With winter came not the oft-predicted German victory but a widening of the war and United States belligerency. The first Spaniards killed were lauded as heroes, their blood spilt „in defence of Christian civilization.“ When the first priest attached to the Blue Division was killed, *Signo* saw this deed as that of an enemy „charged with an insatiable hatred for the Church.“³⁸ Even Bishop Fidel Martínez of Calahorra prefaced his celebrated excoriation of Nazism with a denunciation of Communism.³⁹ As the Soviet campaign dragged on, there was within the Church a growing realization that the struggle against Communism would be long and hard.⁴⁰ By April, 1942, whilst *Signo* was still depicting „life in the Blue Division“ with pictures of smiling volunteers, its tone had subtly changed to one of the defensive note of „saving the Cross from demonic Asiatic hordes.“ Bishop Garay’s April pastoral declared „there is no love without sacrifice.“⁴¹ Moreover, despite eulogistic reports in the Catholic press when the first volunteers, wounded or on leave, returned to Spain, official reports differ. They describe the troops’ reception in San Sebastian as „cold with little enthusiasm.“⁴²

The popular Catholic press worked hard to engender enthusiasm for the „crusade“ and particularly for the Blue Division. In contrast to daily reports of „Red barbarity“ *Ya* emphasized the „popularity,“ „piety“ and „humanity“ of the volunteers.⁴³ However, a note

³⁷ *WPIS*, no. 93, 16 July 1941, 11. For Segura’s opposition to totalitarianism „in all its forms“, see Hoare to Eden, 15 March 1943, FO 425/421, NAUK

³⁸ *Signo*, no. 100, 13 December 1941, 1.

³⁹ See quotation, head of this chapter.

⁴⁰ *Ecclesia*, no. 22, 15 November 1941, 4.

⁴¹ *Signo*, no. 118, 18 April 1942, 1, (pictures), 2 (comment), 3 (Garay pastoral).

⁴² *Signo*, no. 24, 30 May 1942, 1, may be compared with 28 April 1942, *DIHGS*, Tomo III, 345-7.

⁴³ See *Ya*, 14 December 1942, 3 for Blue Division’s popularity in Berlin; 28 March 1942, 4 and 6 December 1942, 2, for piety and work of chaplains, 6 March 1942, 4, for humanity. In view of Bowen’s,

of defensiveness crept in. In June, *Signo* emphasized Soviet perfidy after the Nazi – Soviet pact as justification for Hitler’s invasion. The previous year, *Signo* had needed no justification.⁴⁴ In August, *El Correo de Andalucía* reported Franco’s words that Spain „stands ready to defend its integrity.“ In September, quoting Australian Earl Page’s gloomy prediction of a ten year war, *El Correo* suggested that deadlock was being reached.⁴⁵ If this was so, Communism was clearly far from collapse. Though the Jesuits’ *Razón y Fe* could still speak optimistically, in November 1942, about Spain’s future role in re-Christianising Russia, comments in *Ecclesia* were reflecting a more pensive attitude amongst the hierarchy.⁴⁶ That same month, *Ecclesia* warned that Communism was more than an external political threat, „dialectical materialism, the basis of Communism, is incompatible with the Catholic conception of the world.“ In February, 1943, *Ecclesia* described Communism as an internal fifth column that had rotted France and was dangerous to Spain. The following month, after Stalingrad, it paid grudging tribute to the „courage and tenacity“ [of] the „Red“ soldiers. „Leadership has transformed Communism into an ideal, a religion with – apostles, agents and propagandists, excommunications, icons, martyrs.“⁴⁷

This being so, Europe, the Vatican and Spain were in danger from this rival religion in the event of Soviet victory. Fear was already evident in neighbouring Portugal. *Ya* quoted the Lisbon press in January 1943 on the Communist danger to Europe and England.⁴⁸

extensive research, (*Spaniards and Nazi Germany*, 114, 118,169) there is no reason to doubt this last on a front where it was otherwise conspicuously lacking.

⁴⁴ *Signo*, no. 127, 20 June 1942, 6.

⁴⁵ *El Correo de Andalucía*, 25 August 1942, 2, 11 September 1942, 8.

⁴⁶ *Razón y Fe*, no. 538, November 1942, 408.

⁴⁷ *Ecclesia*, no. 71, 21 November 1942, 15-16; no. 82, 6 February 1943, ed.; no. 87, 13 March 1943, 13-14.

⁴⁸ *Ya*, 23 January 1943, 1.

Spain's government shared with its Church an awareness of this danger. That month, Franco told the nuncio that „English ruling circles“ shared his „horror“ of a Communist victory. In February, Spain's foreign ministry sent a memorandum to British ambassador Hoare, warning of the dangers of „a Sovietized Europe and ... a Russian imperium from Atlantic to Pacific.“⁴⁹ Perhaps this dread eventuality could be prevented by a separate peace between Germany and the Western Allies. *Ecclesia* asked „is there a government sufficiently impartial to show the road to one or other belligerent?“⁵⁰ In the Spanish foreign ministry, José Doussinague prepared Plan D, based on the peace proposals of papal Christmas messages. Spain was to be the leading mediator, assisted by other Catholic neutrals. The Vatican, though well aware of the Communist menace, declined to associate itself with these initiatives. It knew that the United States would not countenance a compromise peace. Moreover, the Pope expressed strong fears about the „Nazi danger.“⁵¹ Despite claiming a papal inspiration which they did not have, public peace pronouncements by foreign minister Jordana, then by Franco, were well-received within the Spanish Church. *Razón y Fe* saw „routes to peace“ being opened. *Signo* headlined, „Spain raises its voice, united with the pontiff [sic] in favour of peace.“ *Ecclesia* could even „look forward to peace.“ *Alcazar* grimly warned of the alternative, Communism the only possible winner „on the ruins of Christian civilization“ and followed this up shortly afterwards with a report of the appalling treatment of priests in

⁴⁹ See Cicognani to Maglione, January 26, 1943, *ADSS* vol. 7, no. 95, 202-203 for Franco's claim, which, if true, did not influence the policies of English *governing* circles. See MAE to Hoare, February 1943, AMAE, Leg R 1370, Exp.7, for memorandum.

⁵⁰ *Ecclesia*, no. 83, 13 February 1943, 3.

⁵¹ Tittman, (US Charge d'Affaires, Vatican) to Maglione, 8 August 1942, *ADSS*, vol. 5, no.431, 638-639; See Maglione to Bernardini (nuncio-Berne), 3 March 1943 *ADSS*, vol.7, no. 133, 258, for Vatican's doubts for prospects of peace, AMAE, Leg R.1370, Exp.7, for papal fears of Nazi danger and Plan D.

Poland and the Baltic States under Soviet occupation to add point to its message.⁵² The peace initiative achieved nothing. The Nazis remained confident of total victory.⁵³ The West and the Communists needed one another until Hitler was defeated.

Having failed to influence events, Spain and its Church could only react to them. Growing Allied dominance and pressure led Franco to re-declare neutrality in October and quietly to withdraw the Blue Division shortly thereafter.⁵⁴ Catholic press coverage of the Division had long before been quietly scaled down. *Juventud's* „letter from Russia“ made its last unheralded appearance on June 10 1943. Such a change did not imply any Spanish Church compromise with Communism, even when Stalin made cosmetic policy changes for Western consumption. *Signo* denounced as „farce“ Stalin's „dissolution“ of the third international, a word *Juventud* replicated to describe Stalin's „restoration“ of religion.⁵⁵ Soviet religious persecution continued, and was denounced, *Ecclesia* quoting a *New York Times* article, *Neither Catholic nor Fascist* in an attack on Soviet hypocrisy in February 1944.⁵⁶ In December 1943, *Ya* headlined the Ministry of Justice report, *Red Terror in Spain* a timely reminder of „Red“ *Guerra Civil* atrocities and an implied warning for a feared „Red“ future.⁵⁷

Nor were such fears of Communism confined to Spain. The Vatican's lack of support for Spain's peace initiative had not signified complacency in the face of Communism. As early as September, 1941, Monsignor Domenico Tardini of the Vatican

⁵² *Razón y Fe*, no. 543, April 1943, 4; *Signo*, no. 174, 15 May 1943, 1; *Ecclesia*, no. 97, 22 May 1943, 20., *Alcazar*, 26 May 1943, 1; 30 June 1943, 3, for Spanish press reports on peace initiatives.

⁵³ See visit of German Ambassador to Franco, 12 June 1943, AMAE Leg R.1370, Exp. 7.

⁵⁴ The British described the withdrawal as being handled „with not untypical stupidity“ – a „not untypical“ contempt for things Spanish by some British reporters- *WPIS*, no. 223, 12 January 1944, 15. In fact, internally the withdrawal was handled with a remarkable delicacy, the Division simply fading away in the Spanish press.

⁵⁵ *Juventud*, 14 March 1944, 1.

⁵⁶ *Ecclesia*, no.135, 12 February 1944, 4.

⁵⁷ *Ya*, 7 December 1943, 1.

State Secretariat expressed fears in the events of Soviet victory. A year later, Tardini described Stalin as „the lion that will devour all Europe.“ By early 1943, nuncios“ reports from Switzerland, Lithuania, Hungary, Greece, far-away Brazil, as well as Spain all emphasized the Communist menace. In the Vatican as in Spain, no one was taken in by Stalin“s dissolution of the Comintern or pretence of religious moderation.⁵⁸ Such fears were duly transmitted to the British Foreign Office, but as the Soviet juggernaut rolled westward, the Vatican, and Spain, could only watch and warn. Macmillan, visiting the Vatican in late 1944, found the Pope „depressed about the world,“ speaking of „Communism, infidelity and misery.“⁵⁹

Spanish Catholics watched with dismay as Catholic Lithuania, Hungary, „the bridge of Western and Christian civilization“ and Poland, „Vanguard of Christianity,“ were „enslaved.“⁶⁰ Bulgaria, Romania and strongly Catholic Slovakia followed.⁶¹ A certain wishful thinking was evident. In August, 1944, although conceding that the war might end with the victory of those who are not Christians, Auxiliary Bishop of Madrid, Monsignor Casmiro Morello declared „only Spain and Portugal can re-Christianize Russia.“ Even in March 1945, Radio Valladolid was quoting the *Hoja Parroquial*, organ

⁵⁸See Notes of Tardini, 15 September 1941, *ADSS*, vol.5, no.78, 218, for Tardini“s initial fears; vol.7, no. 477, 22 September 1942, 695 fn.2, for comments on Stalin; vol.7, no.119, 18 February 1943, 234, for nuncios“ reports. See Portuguese Ambassador, Vatican to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, for Vatican“s realistic appreciations of Stalin“s deceptions, HW 12, 289, June 1943, NAUK.

⁵⁹ For example, through Osborne, (British Ambassador, Holy See), to FO, 5 February 1943, FO 371/37538, NAUK; Maglione through A. Cicognani, 16 August 1943 and 18 August 1943, *ADSS*, vol.7, nos.349, 351, 559, 562-563 to Washington. See Macmillan, *War Diaries*, 18 November 1944, 586, for Pius“ comments.

⁶⁰ *Signo* had many articles. See no. 252, 11 November 1944, 8, for Baltic States; no. 245, 23 September 1944, 1; no. 248, 14 October 1944, 1 for Poland as „vanguard of Christianity“, no. 261, 13 January 1945, 1, for Hungary as „bridge“, no. 267, 24 February 1945, 1, for „enslavement.“

⁶¹ *Ya*, 27 March 1945, 1, highlighted executions and the „enslavement“ of these countries inside the Soviet orbit.

of the parish priests of Madrid, relating the „Miracle of Pskov,“ an apparition of the Virgin to announce the collapse of the Soviet Empire.⁶²

Elsewhere, resistance to Nazi occupation had, as *Ecclesia* admitted, brought Communists and Catholics together. As areas were liberated, Communists were exploiting such cooperation to undermine Catholic anti-Communist solidarity. In Italy, *Ya* reported with approval that a Communist–initiated „pretended policy of collaboration“ had been rejected by Italy’s Catholic Action. *Ya* had previously made the point that such gestures were spurious, quoting an Italian Communist publication’s words – „to a true Communist, God, country and family are words without value.“⁶³ The Vatican feared post-liberation chaos in Italy that would be exploited by the Communists and Pius XII strongly repudiated „Catholic Communists“ and the „Catholic left“. These repudiations were prominently reproduced in Spain as chaos after liberation in neighbouring France encouraged Republicans to attempt Spain’s „liberation“. ⁶⁴ In France, the Bishop of Montauban, imprisoned for resistance by the Germans, faced Communist harassment once he made clear Catholicism’s incompatibility with Communism. *Ecclesia* reproduced his letter of repudiation. It underscored that incompatibility in its final issue of 1944.⁶⁵ Communist „co-operation“ was only tactical and vanished as soon as the Vatican made clear its condemnation of the „Catholic left.“ This reality was highlighted by February 1945 in *Ya*’s reports of renewed religious persecution in Soviet „liberated“ Poland and by

⁶² See 9 August 1944, no.166, 733 and 3 March 1945, no.194, both 848, Leg. 190, B202, AGA. No date was given for this „collapse“.

⁶³ *Ya*, 14 July 1944, 1, for rejection; 14 June 1944, 2, (ed.), for quotation.

⁶⁴ See *WPIS*, no. 252, 2 August 1944 14, and no. 275, 10 January 1945, 12, for Vatican condemnations, reproduced in *Ya*, 14 July 1944, 1, 3 January 1945, 1. For Republican „liberation“ attempts see Chapter 12.

⁶⁵ See *Ecclesia*, no.177, 2 December 1944, 3, (ed.), and 6 (letter); no.181, 30 December 1944, 3, for incompatibility.

Signo's vigorous defence of the Pope against „charges of Fascism by radio Moscow and the orchestrated Russian press.“⁶⁶

To the Church, victorious Communism was by then a world-wide imperialist menace. *Ecclesia* in February 1945 reported anti-religious Communist acts in Eastern Europe, presciently noting that absence of Baltic States representation in Stalin's Orthodox Church Council for the Soviet Union presaged those states' future. Where the Soviet armies could not reach, Communist propaganda did, in Europe and America maligning Spain and its Church for their „Fascist orientation,“ as *Ya* reported in April. That month, the foreign ministry was kept busy denying allegations in the Soviet media of military aid to Germany and Communist-spread rumours of impending revolution in Spain.⁶⁷ Even in distant Latin America, the Chilean hierarchy had become alarmed at the Communist threat to their region and *Ecclesia* printed in full their Bishops' collective pastoral, a reflection of the Spanish hierarchy's fears for Spain.⁶⁸

The war ended with Spain out of reach of the Red Army. However, Spanish Catholics had felt real fear that the Western Allies would sufficiently support Spanish Republican exiles to replace the Franco regime with an anti-religious leftist government. Chapter 4 noted the Church's dissatisfaction with aspects of the Franco regime. However, *Ya* encapsulated the Church's attitude with its motto „we prefer a Spain, Christian ... ruled by Franco to a Spain Sovietized, partitioned and enslaved“ and its four strongly pro-Franco articles in five days in autumn 1944, as pro-Republican guerrillas invaded from

⁶⁶ *Ya*, 9 February 1945, 3; *Signo*, no. 267, 24 February 1945, 8.

⁶⁷ See *Ya*, 6 April 1945, 1, for „smoke“ put up by the Communists; AMAE Leg. R 1467, Exp. 11, for Russian allegations and rumour spreading.

⁶⁸ See *Ecclesia*, no. 188, 17 February 1945, 20, for Eastern Europe; no. 190, 17 March 1945, 7 for Chile.

France.⁶⁹ The leftist threat brought Church and regime closer together. Similar articles within days in *Ya* and the *falangist Arriba*, emphasizing the „Red“ exiles“ chronic disunity and lack of Spanish support expressed one common hope of Church and regime.⁷⁰ In fact the guerillas, by an objective British assessment, „expected more active assistance than they received.“⁷¹

The Spanish Church“s other hope was a growing realization in the West of the nature of Stalinist Communism that would soon transform the USSR from ally into potential adversary. In the United States, the Catholic press had already condemned the Spanish guerrillas and emphasized the danger of Communism to peace.⁷² Near the end of the European war, anti-Communism increased amongst non-Catholics. A „sensational US report about Russian life“ was headlined in *El Español*. In Britain, even the liberal *Manchester Guardian* was becoming critical of the USSR, as *Ya* was happy to report.⁷³

The war ended but, as *Ecclesia* sadly editorialized in June, „peace has not arrived“ owing to the existence of a „tyranny no less despotic than that which has been vanquished.“⁷⁴ The Spanish Catholic Church had supported and contributed to the defeat of Spanish „Communism“ in the *Guerra Civil*. Throughout the European war, it had consistently opposed Soviet Communism, only, to its dismay, to see that system imposed throughout Eastern Europe and to loom as a possible threat to Spain itself. The Church“s hope reposed in the growing realization in the Western world of the Communist threat. Such realization might make possible the continuation of the Franco regime, which

⁶⁹ See *Ya*, 10 September 1944, 1 (motto), 7 November 1944, 1; 8 November 1944, 1; 9 November 1944, 1; 11 November 1944, 1 for pro-Franco articles.

⁷⁰ *Ya*, 9 January 1945, 1; *Arriba*, 18 January 1945, 1.

⁷¹ *WPIS* no. 265, 1 November 1944.10.

⁷² *Ibid*, no. 265, 1 November 1944, 12.

⁷³ *El Español*, 20 January 1945, 1; *Ya*, 11 March 1945, 1.

⁷⁴ *Ecclesia*, no. 204, 9 June 1945, 4.

whatever its faults was, by the Church, deemed infinitely preferable to the dreaded spectre of Communism.

Chapter 7. The Spanish Church and the Wider World at War. The Church and Liberal Democracy.

Democracy is an ideal system- but for a non-existent humanity, which is not inclined to evil, or for angels confirmed in faith. Dr. Agustin Panado y García, Archbishop of Granada, pastoral, *The Sacred Duty of Obedience*, 1 February 1940.

The Catholic Church was not and is not a democracy. Chapter 2 noted how and why the Church adopted a structure that was authoritarian and hierarchical. The following chapter traced the development of the Church's attitude of usual neutrality in politics and in war in the early twentieth century. The Church, a spiritual institution in a political world of conflicting ideologies, would work with any form of government which would respect the Church's spiritual authority and enable the Church to exercise its spiritual role. The three succeeding chapters noted how the Church guarded its spiritual authority, exercising political initiatives with caution when that role was clearly perceived to be under threat. This attitude, both during World War II and subsequently, drew criticism from many supporters of liberal democracy particularly in the English-speaking world. To them, the war, certainly in its latter stages, had become a „moral crusade“ in defence of human freedom and even of „Christian civilization“ against an enemy whose crimes increasingly made obvious the evil nature of its ideology. The moral superiority of democracy did not appear obvious to the wartime Church, neither in the Vatican nor particularly in Spain. Such attitudes became increasingly a source of grievance to the Western Allies as the war neared its end. This sense of grievance, both then and subsequently, may have caused the argument that Fascism was „attractive“ to the Church to fall on fertile ground. This chapter will investigate why many within the Church hierarchy and prominent lay leaders were suspicious of liberal democracy.

We may begin by making a point which some liberal democrats of English-speaking background may not always give full consideration: the often virulently anticlerical nature of the liberalism that had pervaded much of continental Europe since the late nineteenth century. Such anticlericalism the Church saw, on moral and political grounds, as a threat. Thus, Leo XIII, in 1888, whilst not condemning democracy itself, declared „the liberal and secular inspirations of some systems another matter.“ „Liberty of worship“ could conflict with Catholic truth whilst „liberty of speech and press“ could lead to vice and harmful opinion. „Liberty of teaching“ often in practice restricted the Church whilst fomenting anti-religious state education. Above all, the separation of Church and state was „an absurdity - the state should facilitate living according to divine law.“¹ To Leo and his successors, liberalism, when anti-clerical, threatened the basic „Catholic minimum“ of freedom to worship and teach, as events in Spain were to show. Even when liberalism was religiously neutral, many Catholics feared a resultant moral vacuum leading to licentious selfishness, the risk of corruption of the faithful and national degeneration. Also noteworthy is the political context of this moral condemnation. In Italy, a virulently anticlerical government had annexed the Papal States, made the Pope „a prisoner in the Vatican.“ and denied the papacy any role in the Versailles treaties. French anticlerical liberalism had „removed God from French classrooms“ whilst its Spanish equivalent was responsible for the *desmortizaciones*, the sequestration of Church property.

Moreover we have noted the retreat of democracy in Europe in the inter-war period. The failure of the League of Nations destroyed faith in the ability of a democratic organization to preserve peace whilst the Depression undermined the credibility of liberal

¹ Leo XII, *Libertas Praestantissimum* 20 June 1888, cited in Hughes, *Pope's New Order*, 81-85.

capitalism as guarantor of prosperity – or even employment. Before these events, Italy, centre of institutional Catholicism, had abandoned a chaotic, anticlerical, post-1918 democracy. Italian Fascism was acceptable to the Vatican because the regime was prepared to guarantee, through the 1929 Concordat, the „Catholic minimum“ of respect for the Church’s rights of worship and education.

Many Spanish Catholics saw their country as having experienced liberal anticlerical democracy at its worst. The assumptions of the Spanish secular liberal ideal were fundamentally at variance with the Church’s view of the identification of Spanish and Catholic values. From the *desmortizaciones* of the 19th century to the anti-clerical, secularizing Second Republic, liberal democracy seemed set on persecuting the Church. In early 1936, the Republican government had appeared weak and partisan in controlling escalating disorder. Government response to church burnings and assaults on priests had been to close Church schools. In the early *Guerra Civil*, the government had not controlled leftists bent, apparently, on the extirpation of religion and the physical destruction of Church and clergy. At the end of that war, Plá y Deniel, then Bishop of Salamanca, published a pastoral urging the abandonment of the liberalism „that has led to Spain’s ruin.“²

To many Spanish Catholics, the image of overseas democracy was also negative. The United States, the aggressor of 1898, had selfishly abandoned Europe in 1919 and was imperialistically subverting Hispanic, Catholic culture in Latin America. American democratic freedom encouraged family breakdown, materialism and immorality. Many Catholic Spaniards perceived Britain through a history of religious

² Plá y Deniel, *Boletín Episcopal de Salamanca*, „The Triumph of the City of God.“ (Bilbao, El Mensajero del Corazón de Jesús, 1939.)

hostility and British occupation of „Spanish“ Gibraltar. France was the home of European anticlericalism and had a Popular Front government superficially similar to that established by the hated enemy in Spain. Moreover, Anglo-French 1930's diplomacy has been widely viewed, not only by Spanish Catholics, as feeble and self-seeking. Chapter 3 described Anglo-French duplicity in sabotaging the League. In Spain, Anglo-French diplomacy had achieved the worst of all worlds. Britain and France had been principled enough neither to defend „liberal democracy“ nor to restrain its anti-religious excesses. Neither had they been pragmatic enough to back the Nationalist winners. Their governments gave late and grudging recognition to the Nationalists even as the leftist press in both countries castigated Franco's „Fascism.“ The Anglo-French allies had sacrificed democratic Czechoslovakia at Munich, yet had been seeking an alliance with Spanish Catholicism's hated Bolshevik enemies until forestalled by Hitler. *Signo*'s comment „we have doubts about the sincerity of the anti-Communist furore of the democracies that for months had bid for Communist friendship“ reflected a view widely held in the Spanish Church.³

With the coming of war, Spanish Catholic perceptions of Allied weakness and duplicity increased. Britain had hoped to use Nazism's „aggression which has no respect for religious liberty“ as powerful propaganda in Spain. Henson in Valladolid, when asked to help, was disconcertingly frank in summarizing Spanish Catholic feelings. Why, Catholic Spaniards asked, had Britain allowed Catholic Austria to disappear, turned a blind eye to the struggle for religion in Spain, had been prepared to ally with the USSR, encouraged, then abandoned, Catholic Poland, gone to war over Nazi aggression but

³ *Signo*, no. 50, 10 September 1939, 1.

ignored Communist aggression in that same country?⁴ Allied procrastination over the Soviet attack on Finland could soon be added to the list. A British report from Spain noted candidly, „in the eyes of Catholics especially, acquiescence in Russian acts of rapacity which, when performed by Germany, are a *cassus belli*, deprives the Allied cause of moral justification. Spaniards ask, for what moral principle is the war being conducted?“⁵ Such lack of „moral principle“ deepened an already strong skepticism within the Church about the very nature of democracy. In February 1940, The Archbishop of Granada described it as an ideal system „only for a non-existent humanity.“⁶ Vatican broadcasts that same month, criticizing all „anti-Christian forces“, accused British socialists of worshipping „the dark ideology of materialism,“ antipathetic of course to the Church’s soul-saving mission.⁷

Nazi successes in Norway and the West deepened the skepticism of Spanish Catholics about liberal democracy’s moral qualities. *Ya* saw Scandinavian socialism producing a „debilitating pacifism.“ *Signo* likewise saw democracy producing in Norway, „a country of skeptics, a high rate of divorce, superficial patriotism“ – this despite the demonstrated fighting qualities of Finns and Norwegians alike.⁸ Likewise, the French collapse was seen by *Ya* as the result of „evil politics“, as well as the machinations of Freemasonry which had undermined the French military.⁹

⁴ British Embassy, Madrid to Henson, 14 October 1939, requesting assistance, Henson to Pears (British Embassy, Madrid), 18 October 1939 and Henson to Malley, (British Embassy, Madrid) 17 December 1939, for replies. CDI.

⁵ *WPIS*, no.10, 5 December 1939, 12.

⁶ *Carta Pastoral*, 1 February, 1940, FNFF, 384.

⁷ *WPIS*, no. 20, 13 February 1940, 10.

⁸ *Ya*, 10 April 1940, 3; *Signo*, no. 15, 27 April 1940, 3.

⁹ *Ya*, 18 June 1940, 1.

In the last half of 1940, with Spain determined to placate the all-conquering Nazis, the pro-Axis, anti-democratic tilt in the Spanish press reached its height. In an almost rabidly anti-British tirade, *Signo*, in July, castigated „the head of government of a country of heretics“ for claiming that Britain's was the cause of „Christian civilization.“ Britain, through „three centuries without rest of national-Masonic parliamentarianism“ had been „dedicated to impeding Spain.“ British „Benthamite liberalism“ was the cause of Spain's loss of South America. *Signo*'s accusations of „panic in England“ and „an alarming percentage of cases of alcoholism“ there, a month later, were mild in comparison. *Ya*, in August, suggested that „liberalism that led to license“ caused the French disaster. Some examples of that „licence,“ religious indifference and low birthrates, were standard Catholic indicators of moral laxity, others, like „Parisian fashions“ and the Deauville Casino, simply seem ridiculous.¹⁰

What was not ridiculous was a prevalent European mood in summer, 1940. Liberal democracy had been in retreat for at least a decade in Europe. It was now confined to Britain, fighting, apparently hopelessly and alone, remote Ireland, surrounded Switzerland, together with Sweden and Finland threatened by Germany and the USSR respectively. At every stage of the war to date, Germany had shown initiative and daring whilst the democratic Allies procrastinated. Germany's victories created an aura of fear, a sense of awe of Nazi invincibility and even among anti-Nazis, a feeling of having to adjust to a long-lasting Nazi „New Order“ in Europe. Neither the Vatican nor even some in the United States were exempt.¹¹ In *Current History* of November 1940, Anne

¹⁰ *Signo*, no. 23, 22 June 1940, 1; no. 27, 20 July 1940, 3; *Ya* 3 August 1940, 1.

¹¹ For the Vatican, see p. 105.

Lindbergh's *The Wave of the Future* advocated the intrinsic superiority of „dynamic“ Fascism which was inevitably replacing „degenerate“ European democracy.¹²

In Spain, this mood slowly faded as autumn advanced and British prestige revived. However, deep skepticism about democracy amongst Spanish Catholics remained. *Ya* noted with approval that Vichy had abandoned „the false idea of human equality“ and instituted a hierarchical regime.¹³ Throughout the winter, that newspaper portrayed British democracy in the poorest light. In November, it denounced Churchill's religious insensibility for rejecting a Christmas truce. In December *Ya* highlighted liberal democracy's unpreparedness in reporting the Bishop of Birmingham's denunciation of air-raid shelter construction. In early February, it criticized Anglicanism's „antiericalism“ and later that month castigated Britain for refusing to state its aims in war and for peace.¹⁴ In February also, the British sadly reported that „in Spanish eyes, this country [Britain] succeeds in combining imperialist, plutocratic and „Red“ tendencies.“¹⁵ The British Consul in Palma de Mallorca in June amplified this theme, saying that „some of our [British] politicians still see Russia as a democracy“ without seeing the similarity in „the political doctrines of the two slave states.“¹⁶ In April, *El Escorial*, a new Catholic „professional magazine of literature and culture“ blamed liberal democracy and capitalism, „in monstrous alliance,“ for the demise of the Catholic „community of God and country“ in most of Europe.¹⁷ By early June, *Ecclesia*, was questioning British

¹² *Current History* vol. 52, no.3, Nov. 1940, 3-4.

¹³ *Ya*, 11 October 1940, 1.

¹⁴ *Ya*, 27 November 1940, 1, for Churchill; 20 December 1940, 1, for air-raid shelters; 8 February 1941, 1 „Duke of Bedford Abandons Anglicanism“; 27 February 1941, 3 for war aims.

¹⁵ *WPIS*, no. 71, 12 February 1941, 11.

¹⁶ British Consul, Palma de Mallorca to FO, 18 June 1941, FO 371/26891, NAUK. By the time the Foreign Office received this communication, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union would have caused it to be studied in a very different light!

¹⁷ *El Escorial* Issue 8, 1941, 325-31.

democracy's „morale and will“ to continue the war, despite U.S. aid, „without the stimulation of an actual [American war] declaration.“¹⁸

It was Hitler's attack on the USSR that gave Britain some „stimulation“ at this time. However, British support for the Soviets saw a renewed lowering of British prestige in Spain, „particularly amongst Catholics and the Spanish middle class.“¹⁹ The British Consul in Barcelona feared that ground had been lost amongst the military, the (traditionalist) *Requetés*, the Monarchists and the Church. The Consul in Seville, as early as July 30 communicated already strong Spanish fears that an Allied victory would establish a „Red“ Spain.²⁰

Consequently, the hypocrisy of democracy was a constant theme in the Catholic press. *Ya* immediately denounced Churchill's „hypocrisy,“ in supporting the USSR and looked for international vindication of its view. In July, it reported Catholic Ireland's disgust at Churchill's „monstrous contortion.“ When the United States announced aid to the Soviets, *Ya* quoted with approval American isolationist press magnate Randolph Hearst's assertion that „Britain and the US have abandoned democracy.“²¹ Even greater approval greeted a pronouncement in the American *Christian Science Monitor* that, „Bolshevik penetration of British society was making rapid progress.“²² The second anniversary of the Soviet attack on Finland gave *El Correo de Andalucia* the opportunity to assert „in that short space, the democracies have opted to embrace Stalin in place of aiding the Finns -so much for liberty.“²³ Britain's relatively free media did not always

¹⁸ *Ecclesia*, no.12, 15 June 1941, 28.

¹⁹ *WPIS*, no. 90, 25 June 1941, 11.

²⁰ British Consuls reports to Hoare, 30 June 1941, (Barcelona), 30 July 1941 (Seville), FO 371/26891, NAUK.

²¹ *Ya* 24 June 1941, 3 for „hypocrisy“; 10 July 1941, 3 for Ireland; 26 July 1941, 1, for Hearst.

²² *Ya*, 14 September 1941, 1.

²³ *El Correo de Andalucia*, 30 November 1941, 8.

contribute to Britain's image in Spain. A London *Daily Express* article, *London's Rich Don't Go to War*, reporting „thousands of rich young men frequenting nightclubs“ was reprinted in Spain as evidence of democracy's corruption.²⁴ Moreover, at this time, BBC broadcasts to Spain frequently contained material, contributed by Spanish Republican refugees, which was sufficiently offensive to the Church for even the pro-Allied Archbishop of Valladolid to complain.²⁵

The „hypocrisy“ of the Anglican Church became a favourite target. *Signo*, in August, attacked that Church for „blessing the Soviets,“ declaring „so-called national Churches are merely political instruments.“ *Ya*, when it reported Finland's Archbishop of Turku's denunciation of the Archbishop of Canterbury's reversal, made a telling argument. Having supported Finland against the USSR, that same prelate now supported the Soviets. *Ya* gave prominence to similar Anglican „prayers for Soviet victory,“ during the autumn. In contrast, American Catholic prelates were quoted with approval in their opposition to US intervention in aid of Communism. In particular, Boston's Archbishop, Cardinal O'Donnell's, declaration that „in many parts of the world, peoples don't desire a form of government similar to that of the U.S.“ had resonance in the Spanish Church.²⁶

However unforeseen the circumstances of America's actual entry into the war, perceptive Spanish Catholic observers had long noticed increasing U.S. involvement. In February, 1941 *Razón y Fe* had sympathetically quoted Roosevelt's speech, *If Britain goes down...*, justifying US aid to Britain, and implied some support for Anglo-American

²⁴ *Ya*, 8 July 1941, 1.

²⁵ Malley to Henson, 15 December 1941. CDI.

²⁶ See *Signo*, no. 82, 9 August 1941, 1, for Anglican Church „blessing the Soviets.“ See *Ya*, 1 August 1941, 1 for interplay of imperial politics with the Anglican Church; 3 August 1941, 1, for Archbishop of Turku; 9 September 1941, 3 and 4 November 1941, 3, for Anglican prayers „for Soviet victory“; 4 December 1941, 1 for Archbishop of Boston.

attempts to halt Axis world domination.²⁷ In August, *Ya* reacted more perceptively than many in Britain in seeing that in the Atlantic Charter, „English pride has ceded the pass to the young America.“ In November, *Signo* noted US pressure on Finland to make peace with the USSR.²⁸

Many Spanish Catholics were, however, unimpressed by the expressed high principles of the new Allies in the United Nations Declaration of January, 1942. *Ya* asserted. „it is a grave matter that countries forged in Christian principles should link their fate with Communism“ and quoted with approval a sermon by the Archbishop of Italy’s military chaplains, „plutocrats and Bolsheviks intend to oppress the European nations founded by Christianity.“²⁹ For most of that year, democracy continued to be portrayed negatively. The United States was seen as capitalistically profiting from the war, „rivers of gold flowing into Wall Street“, and undisciplined, „254,658 days lost to strikes.“ American moral influence was portrayed as decadent. The „swing generation“ was destroying family, patriotism, order and tradition. Crime and delinquency were rampant. Hollywood, that long standing Catholic bane, was „dedicated to war propaganda.“ In November, *Ya* produced the ultimate proof of American moral decadence; the US army had established beauty salons for its women soldiers!³⁰ The British fared little better. *Signo*, with some truth, accused them of religious persecution in Ulster. *Ya* denounced Britain’s press for using and abusing its „legal liberty.“ When such British „abuse“ included printing attacks by the English Catholic hierarchy on the „enormous

²⁷ *Razón y Fe*, no. 517, February 1941, 98.

²⁸ *Ya*, 16 August 1941, 3; *Signo*, no. 95, 8 November 1941, 8.

²⁹ *Ya*, 7 January 1942, 3; 11 January 1942, 8.

³⁰ See *Ya*, 11 July 1942, 3, for „river of gold; 24 July 1942, 3, for strikes; 1 July 1942, 3, for „swing generation;“ 25 November 1942, 3 and 13 December 1942, 3, for crime and delinquency; 18 November 1942, 3, for Hollywood; 21 November 1942, 3, for beauty salons.

misdistribution of wealth in England," *Signo* was of course pleased to reprint them.³¹
Anglo-U.S. differences and disagreements were emphasized.³²

Two articles published in mid-1942, with the war's outcome still in doubt, encapsulate the reasoning behind these continuously negative attitudes to liberal democracy. *El Correo de Andalucía* expressed a common Spanish Church belief in declaring, „in a liberal regime, many noble ideas become corrupted. In the [Spanish] new state, the individual, more than a voter, is a carrier of internal values.“ *Juventud*, at about the same time, castigated the alliance of a civilized country [Britain] with „a horde of godless barbarians.“³³ These two arguments continued to colour much Church thinking throughout the war as both Communism and liberalism were perceived as a threat to Catholicism's mission. Even as the course of the war turned towards the Allies and the already considerable revulsion for Nazism felt by many Spanish Catholics increased, liberal democracy was seen at best as the lesser of evils. The Church continued to distrust democracy in theory and in practice and did not want anything redolent of previous Spanish liberalism for Spain. *Ya*, in December, 1942, asserted „the failure of liberal economies.“³⁴ *Ecclesia*, in February 1943, saw liberalism as a „Fifth Column“ producing a „laicism which destroys matrimony, homes and schools.“³⁵ *Razón y Fe*, that April, saw democracy as giving „too much assistance to the rights of individuals.“³⁶ Moreover, there was widespread distrust of the practical motives of the democracies in fighting the war, particularly at Anglo-Saxon claims to be fighting a „struggle for freedom.“ When the

³¹ *Signo*, no. 133, 1 August 1942, 6, for Ulster; no. 142, 3 October 1942, 6, for English hierarchy, *Ya*, 14 August 1942, 3, for English press „abuses.“

³² *Ya*, 20 June 1942, 3; 17 July 1942, 3; 1 October 1942, 3.

³³ *El Correo de Andalucía*, 30 July 1942, 2; *Juventud*, 28 May 1942, 4.

³⁴ *Ya*, 16 December 1942, 3.

³⁵ *Ecclesia*, no. 82, 6 February 1943, (ed.)

³⁶ *Razón y Fe*, no. 543, April 1943, 4.

United States was still neutral, *Signo* had denounced its „capitalist motives dressed up in idealistic baggage.“³⁷ In November 1942, Hoare had reported a widespread fear not only of Communism but of „American domination“ in the event of an Allied win.³⁸ By the spring of 1943, old Spanish fears of *Yanqui* imperialism in Latin America were again being ventilated in the Catholic press along with equally long-held Spanish objections to British imperialism and oppression of Catholics in Ireland.³⁹ Worse still was the impression created by Anglo-Saxon claims of a „crusade“ for „Christian civilization.“ For two „heretic“ nations to usurp the Pope as arbiter of Christian values and the term „crusade“, made sacred by the Spanish Catholic *Guerra Civil* struggle appeared almost blasphemous. *Ecclesia* reflected a view widely held in the Spanish hierarchy in scathingly denouncing „crusaders of the microphone who try to hide self-interest behind a cloak of Christianity.“⁴⁰

Above all, Western democracy was, to Spanish Catholics, fatally compromised by its alliance with Communism. Some bitter Spanish allegations were not without truth. As early as mid-1942 *Ya* suggested that „London has conceded to Stalin a wide sphere of [post-war] influence.“⁴¹ When, in mid-1943, details of the Soviets“ Katyn massacre of Polish officers surfaced, the West was accused of playing down the atrocity to maintain both Soviet and Polish support.⁴² *Ya* in August correctly described the „mutual fears“ of

³⁷ *Signo*, no. 88, 20 September 1941, 4.

³⁸ Hoare to Churchill, 30 November 1942, PREM 4/21/1, NAUK.

³⁹ *El Español*, 13 March 1943, 1 for US imperialism; 3 April 1943, 1 for its British equivalent

⁴⁰ *Ecclesia*, no. 71, 21 November 1942, 3, (ed.) To give one example of the Anglo-Saxon „crusade“ claims, the staff at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters (Western) Allied Expeditionary Force) wore a badge featuring a „crusader“s sword of liberation.“ See David Stafford, *Endgame 1945: Victory, Retribution, Liberation* (London: Little, Brown, 2007), 79.

⁴¹ *Ya*, 25 June 1942, 1.

⁴² *El Español*, 8 May 1943, 3, (ed.)

the Soviets and Anglo-Saxons.⁴³ Allied delusions that Stalin had modified religious persecution in the USSR were derided by *Ecclesia* in November.⁴⁴

For all that, it was becoming obvious that the Allies were winning the war. Anti-Nazi revulsion had turned most bishops and clergy, whatever their reservations about democracy, in the direction of the Western Allies. The „notorious“ Canon Manes of Seville with his „outrageous language about Britain and the USA“ had become an almost unique exception – and he was soon suspended by Segura.⁴⁵ The publication by *Ya* in October 1943 of times and frequencies of *Voice of America* radio broadcasts were a telling sign of Catholic acceptance of that reality. Another such sign was a eulogy in *Signo* of the U.S. Catholic diocese of Chicago’s „strength of Catholic life,“ even though this was contrasted to an implied „power of the dollar“ reigning elsewhere in the United States.⁴⁶ In consequence, by December, 1943 *Ya*’s war reports had become much more balanced. Anglo-American advances, U.S. military strength and Allied buildup for the invasion of Europe were emphasized. Coverage of the Axis revealed a new note of desperation - Romania „will defend its existence“, Bulgaria’s „call for unity to face future problems“, and Goebbels’ telling comment „we will defend the Reich to the end“ were indicative.⁴⁷

The nature of that end raised hopes and fears in the Spanish Church. In October, 1942, *Ya* had reported British hopes of a post-war world re-organized „on Christian

⁴³ *Ya*, 14 August 1943, 3

⁴⁴ *Ecclesia*, no. 121, 6 November 1943, 15-16.

⁴⁵ Malley to Henson, 25 September 1943. CDI.

⁴⁶ *Signo*, no. 219, 25 March 1944, 8.

⁴⁷ See *Ya*, 21 December 1943, 5, for Anglo-US advances; 26 December 1943, 1, „US forces total 10 million“; 19 December 1943, 3, 31 December 1943, 3 for invasion preparations. In contrast, 13 December 1943, 3 for Romania, Bulgaria; 22 December 1943, 4 for Goebbels.

principles“ but noted from London „chronic divisions“ about a future peace.⁴⁸ A year later, a perceptive article in *El Español* forecast the end of European domination of a world the future of which would be influenced by extra-European powers. In February, 1944 that newspaper correctly forecast that the end of the war would also end Western-Soviet cooperation.⁴⁹ The previous chapter emphasized the chronic fear of the Spanish Church, the Spanish and other neutral governments and the Vatican alike about the „Bolshevization“ of Europe. To them, apparent Allied complacency in the face of this threat was a constant irritant. The Vatican took perhaps too literally US representative Myron Taylor’s declaration „we Americans are new at world politics“ as indicating US naiveté in ignoring the Communist threat.⁵⁰ Scarcely less naïve as a political response to that threat was its own proposal for a revival of the Austro-Hungarian Empire!⁵¹ Both in the Vatican and in Spain it was realized how optimistic were British self-assessments of Britain’s post-war power and on the day of Britain’s return to France, *Juventud* lamented the British absolute lack of knowledge of the „problems and psychology of the continent.“⁵²

Certainly, the Western Allies failed to appreciate the depth of fear of a „Bolshevized Europe“ in the Church and amongst neutrals but perhaps the Church's view of Anglo-U.S. naivety is exaggerated. The Vatican and the Spanish hierarchy would alike have preferred an outcome of the war similar to that of World War I with neither Germany nor the

⁴⁸ *Ya*, 29 September 1942, 3, 6 October 1942, 3 for re-organisation, 14 October 1942, 3 for divisions.

⁴⁹ *El Español* 25 September 1943, 1, for extra-European powers, 5 February 1944, 1, for end of co-operation.

⁵⁰ Taylor (U.S. representative–Vatican) to Pius XII, 19 September 1942, *ADSS*, vol.5, no. 473, 688.

⁵¹ See AMAE, Leg.R 1467, Exp.11 and *Ya*, 23 November 1944, 3.

⁵² See British Legation to Vatican Secretariat of State, *ADSS*, vol.7, no.173, 306-309, 20 April 1943 and *WPIS*, no. 272, 20 December 1944, 9, Templewood (formerly Hoare) interview for over-optimistic British assessments of Britain’s post-war power; *Juventud*, 6 June 1944, 1, for British lack of continental knowledge.

USSR victorious. At the same time they feared, as had happened after the first war, a post-war withdrawal from European affairs by the United States and Britain. In that case, Europe would be „without defence,“ Communism its fate.⁵³ The Church correctly anticipated British decline but did not anticipate the rise of the United States power and the future strength of its presence in the world. Nor did Churchmen appreciate the pragmatism of America’s later wartime view which, put simply, saw half Europe Communist-ruled as better than a fully Nazi-ruled Europe.

To the Vatican, that Communist half included millions of Catholic souls now at risk and its hostility to Communism continued unabated. However it realized that the Anglo-Saxon view of democracy was likely to prevail over declining European anticlerical liberal traditions in parts of Europe liberated by the West. Crucially, the Vatican appreciated that new European democracies forged in the Anglo-Saxon tradition would uphold the Church’s spiritual authority and guarantee the Church’s rights of worship and education. Democrats saw Pius XII’s Christmas broadcast of 1944 as giving a cautious welcome to a democratic future. Although firmly rejecting „Christian leftists“, the Vatican prepared to sponsor „Christian democratic“ movements in Western Europe.⁵⁴

Spain, of course, had not required Allied liberation. Moreover, an attempt by leftist guerrillas to implement „liberation“ of their own in autumn, 1944, exacerbated Spanish Catholic fear of renewed civil war and skepticism about liberal democracy. To the Spanish Church, the Franco regime, however imperfect, guaranteed Catholic rights of worship and education that a leftist „liberation“ would not. As early as June, 1943,

⁵³ See *El Español*, 12 May 1945, 1, for Europe „without defence.“ As early as September 1941, Tardini had articulated Vatican hopes; „I hope that ...communism issues defeated and annihilated and Nazism issues weakened and ...conquerable“ Notes of Tardini, 15 September 1941, *ADSS* vol. 5, no. 78, 218.

⁵⁴ *WPIS*, no. 274, 3 January 1945, 11.

Juventud asserted, „to us, it is not important what others plan at the end of the war. We have our own solution – Spanish, Christian and Catholic.“⁵⁵ A year later, *Ya* declared Spain „a true democracy“ in its popular inspiration, respect for the person, and hierarchical, ordered structure for the common good.⁵⁶ *Razón y Fe* in September saw the Pope’s „social Catholicism“ rather than „unlimited liberal and pagan presumptions“ as the basis for national life.⁵⁷ In October, *Ecclesia* identified the „basic liberal error – denying humanity’s dependence upon God.“ Real „Catholic“ liberty was „doctrine and faith“ – political and social policy being a consequence of these principles.⁵⁸ In December, *Ya* declared democracy and parliamentarianism „not synonymous.“ The following month, that newspaper suggested that Anglo-Saxon parliamentary systems function „only under a peculiar ethnic psychology of opposition and cooperation“ where, unlike in Europe, there are no „ideological differences of life and death.“ *Ya* declared that „democracy imposed by force is tyranny.“⁵⁹ In February 1945, *Ecclesia* outlined the difficulties of being a political party and the danger of compromise with Communist infiltration as problems suffered by nascent European Christian democratic movements.⁶⁰ Such movements were not wanted in Catholic Spain. *Ecclesia* declared that „no one form of government had any magical virtue. What is important is to work for the common good through the application of Christian moral principle.“ *Razón y Fe* asserted that democracy was „not mandatory.“ It was a human formulation, not a divine revelation. Moreover, „some

⁵⁵ *Juventud*, 17 June 1943, 1 and 3.

⁵⁶ *Ya*, 25 July 1944, 1.

⁵⁷ *Razón y Fe*, nos. 560-561, September-October 1944, 182.

⁵⁸ *Ecclesia*, no. 172, 28 October 1944, 3 and no. 173, 4 November 1944, 3.

⁵⁹ *Ya*, 20 December 1944, 3 and 11 January 1945, 1.

⁶⁰ *Ecclesia*, no. 186, 3 February 1945, 16-17.

peoples were not mature enough for it." Spain should be „left in peace to seek its own destiny.“⁶¹

That destiny was a continued Franco regime. With both Republican exiles and Spanish Monarchists hopelessly divided, the opportunistic Franco replaced the regime's fascist trappings with democratic ones and declared Spain a „Catholic democracy.“⁶² Previous chapters have shown that Franco was skilled in acting in accordance with the Spanish proverb, „The wise man keeps in tune with whatever band is playing.“ In truth, Spain was no more a „Catholic democracy“ than it had previously been a „Fascist dictatorship.“ More authentic „Catholic democracies“ were to develop, ironically, in the defeated Axis countries with the rise of Church-backed Christian Democratic parties. Franco's remained a right authoritarian regime backed by the military and, crucially, by the Church. That institution saw the regime, whatever its faults, as guaranteeing the rights of the Church and identified strongly with the Spanish traditions with which Catholicism in Spain was interwoven. Franco's regime, like the Spanish Church, stood for the rejection of foreign ideologies that regime and Church alike had fought throughout the European war to exclude. Liberal democrats had emphasized the cautious papal endorsement of Christian democracy at Christmas 1944. The Spanish Catholic press, however, had stressed the Pope's fear that „fever for reform“ would produce civil war after world war. This fear for their own country was endemic amongst many Spanish Catholics. In the uncertain post-war world, the Church saw in the regime's continuance, the best guarantee of the continuance of its mission in Spain. Spanish Catholicism would

⁶¹ *Razón y Fe*, no.565, February 1945, 307.

⁶² For Republican and Monarchist disunity, see *WPIS*, no. 280 14 February 1945, 10-11 and 286, 28, March 1945, 10, respectively.

continue to use its spiritual resources to keep at bay democratic values it saw as inimical to Spanish and Catholic traditions.⁶³

As the war neared its end and the extent of Nazi criminality was fully revealed, Anglo-American propaganda that the Western Allies were fighting for „democracy“ or even for „Christian civilization“ struck a powerful chord among many liberal democrats. To some, victory was even a manifestation of democracy’s superiority. Particularly to non-Catholics among them, Spanish attitudes to liberal democracy sparked resentment. In March 1945, the British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summary* spoke of a Spanish „blindness to world opinion,“ (meaning, one suspects, primarily Anglo-US opinion) „which if it were not Spain, would be disconcerting.“ This statement reveals the negative liberal attitudes to Spain and its Church arising from the *Guerra Civil* and exacerbated by different perceptions of World War II.⁶⁴

This chapter has shown the considerable differences between Anglo-Saxon liberal democrats and many Spanish Catholics in perceptions of the nature of World War II. Such differences arose from the Spanish Church’s fundamental distrust of liberal democracy. Pre-war suspicion of democracy was grounded in papal teaching, democracy’s perceived international record of weakness and self-seeking policies, and above all in Spanish experience of a „liberalism“ that differed markedly from Anglo-American traditions. The British *News Chronicle* in December 1944 perceptively acknowledged the effect of the bitterness of the *Guerra Civil* on Spanish attitudes.

⁶³ The Pope’s 1944 Christmas message was widely and fully reported in the Spanish Catholic press, see for example *Ecclesia*, 6 January 1945, 5-8, for full text, but there were differences in emphasis in different publications. *Ecclesia* chose to highlight the Christian characteristics of rulers and ruled in a democratic regime, *Signo* emphasized papal warnings against „imprudent optimism,“ (no. 259, 30 December, 1944, 1) *Ya*’s commentary on 28 December 1944, 1 was a headline, *On Guard against Communism*. For endemic Spanish fear of renewed civil disorder, see Hoare to Eden, (undated, 1944) Archives: Western Europe, 1944, part 54, 111-112, FO 425/422, NAUK.

⁶⁴ *WPIS*, no. 285, 21 March 1945, 9

Spanish Catholics saw, „our war“ not as World War II, a fight for „liberal democracy“, albeit on the same side as Communism, but as the „crusade“ of the *Guerra Civil* against that same Communism, aided and abetted by a highly illiberal democracy. Primate Plá’s end of war pastoral declared „the European/World War had nothing in common with the Spanish *Guerra Civil*“ and suggested that „lovers of liberty should see our crusade as legitimate.“ Many „lovers of liberty“ in Anglo-Saxon countries of course disagreed.⁶⁵

Moreover, as World War II had continued, fundamental differences about the very nature of that struggle emerged between the views of Anglo-Saxon democrats and many Spanish Catholics. Spanish Catholics saw the Western Allies claim to be fighting „for democracy“ to be negated by the Western-Communist alliance. They saw victory as the result of military power of that alliance, rather than any inherent merit of liberal democracy. Moreover, to Spanish Catholics, no war which ignored the Pope and left Catholics in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere under alien, anti-religious rule could be fought for „Christian civilization“. By May 1945, the fading Western liberal enthusiasm for the USSR did not signify any increase in enthusiasm for Catholic Spain. Neither was enthusiasm for liberal democracy felt amongst many Spanish Catholics.

The previous four chapters have portrayed the Spanish Church as an important part of a universalist spiritual institution pursuing its spiritual priorities in a political world in conflict. They have described how these priorities and the unique nature and experiences of the Spanish Church, notably in the *Guerra Civil*, moulded its perspective on World War II and its attitudes to the competing ideologies represented in that struggle. The next section will attempt to show how the ideological nature of World War II contributed to

⁶⁵ For *News Chronicle* article, see Archives Western Europe Part 54, no.116, 221, FO 425/422, NAUK. Plá’s pastoral was widely reported, *Ecclesia*, no. 200, 13 May 1945, 5-6 has a full text.

the increasing „totality“ of that war and how the Spanish Church reacted to aspects of the war’s totality.

Part IV. The Church and ‘Total War.’

Introduction.

Silent enim leges inter arma. - In time of war, the laws are silent. Cicero.

Total war – from blockade to psychological warfare, from incendiary bombs to the waves of the radio [propaganda], is aimed to destroy the rights of the innocent. Razón y Fe, no.548-549, Sept-Oct, 1943, 185.

The next four chapters will examine the Spanish Church’s reaction to the impact of total war on respect for neutrality, attitudes to noncombatants and the treatment and response of conquered peoples. To give a sense of the immediacy of events and their day to day effect on the public attitudes of the Church, these chapters will use the Church’s press.

To show the response of the Church at the diplomatic level, reference will be made to the diplomatic records of Spain, the Vatican and the belligerents. The practices of both sides as the Church saw them will be considered.

Chapter 8: The Spanish Church, Neutrality, National Sovereignty and Total War.

By the will of powerful nations, the call of war has been extended to countries that until now were living peacefully. International law transcends economic or political considerations. The world is sick. Signo, no.13, 13 April 1940, 1.

The practicalities of modern warfare ...the experiment in liberal democracy, the emergence of aggressive authoritarian ideologies...had resulted in the erosion of beliefs which had underpinned the classical neutrality of the nineteenth century. Neville Wylie (ed.) European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.

This chapter builds on themes developed in chapter 4. That chapter highlighted domestic policy. It showed the Church as a spiritual institution in a political world, using political means in the domestic sphere to influence Spain’s continued neutrality as the best guarantee of its own independence to pursue its spiritual mission. This domestic focus will now be broadened to reveal the attitudes of the Spanish Church towards breaches of neutrality and national sovereignty in the international arena during a total war. Such

violations were inimical to Catholic just war doctrines as well as to what the Church saw as the concomitant tradition of international law. However, by September 1939, the Spanish Church knew from its own *Guerra Civil* experience how the concepts of neutrality and national sovereignty had already been fatally eroded. The Church could and would, exert all its influence on the new Franco regime in support of policies promoting Spanish neutrality. However, even if successful in the domestic sphere, the Church could not be sure, in a total war, that Spain would thereby be free from external belligerent violations or pressures severe enough to be fatal to Spain's stability. Above all, the Church feared a return to the conditions of the *Guerra Civil* damaging to its mission in Spain. Nor would the Church ever be neutral against Communism.

This chapter will describe how the concepts of neutrality and national sovereignty had been eroded in the 1930's, not least in Spain itself. It will show how in World War II, the exigencies of total war led both sides to accentuate that erosion. It will demonstrate the priorities that determined the Spanish Church's attitudes as this process became evident in Europe and the world. The chapter will focus particularly on the external threats and pressures on the neutrality and sovereignty of Spain, first from the Nazis, then from the Western Allies. It will describe how the Church perceived and reacted to these attempted coercions. The chapter will end with an assessment of the Church's fears for the likely position of Spain and other neutrals in a post-war world that would be dominated by conflicting major powers with little sympathy for Spain. The Spanish Church had, in turn, little sympathy with their ideologies.

Whereas national sovereignty exists independent of war, neutrality in war is defined by war, operating when war begins. A country may be „traditionally“ neutral, have been

„neutralized“ by international treaty, or may be neutral at the start of a war. It may, like Italy in World War II, become a participant by choice, or as occurred more often in that war, inadvertently, a result of the actions of a belligerent. In theory, respect for neutrality and national sovereignty was guaranteed by an international law that gave neutrals rights beyond immunity from invasion.¹ During the 1930’s, however, the position of potential neutrals in a future total war had become fatally undermined. Strong states like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union could ignore world opinion. They lacked internal opposition and could enlist or create strong internal support for the achievement of „national goals.“ Nor would democracies at war necessarily be more scrupulous. The efforts of the League of Nations to establish „collective security“ had collapsed in face of great power self interest and the League’s introduction of the idea of „aggressor“ had undermined the absolute inviolability of classical neutrality. Churchill would argue in December, 1939, in face of Soviet aggression in Finland condemned by the League, „the right to abrogate some of the very laws ... we seek to consolidate and re-affirm“ in justifying Allied proposals to aid Finland which would violate Norwegian and Swedish neutrality.² From here, it was a short step to justify any subsequent violations during the war. Moreover, technological advance had increased the capacity and importance of air power. Neutral „airspace,“ lacking physical definition, was soon infringed. The *London Times* reported British bombs being erroneously dropped on Denmark on the second day of the war. Soon afterwards, the Swiss complained that „violation of its territory by

¹ See chap. 3, f/n. 2

² Churchill, „War Cabinet Papers: Personal Files, 490-492,“ 20 December 1939, J.R.M. Butler, *History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Grand Strategy Volume 2: September 1939-June 1941*. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1957), 97.

belligerents“ aircraft had become a practice.”³ Popular perceptions of World War II include strong and correct ideas that the Nazis showed disregard for the neutrality and national sovereignty of other countries. A study of that era of total war shows that they were not alone.

Neutrality violations were condemned in principle by Catholicism“s *jus ad bellum* teaching of just cause and its *jus in bello* principle of discrimination; the immunity of non-combatants. The Church was, however, a spiritual institution in a political world and needed to use political means to guard its spiritual mission. Therefore, the Vatican at the start of the war chose to remain strictly aloof from the struggle. The Vatican could see how limited was its influence and that of world opinion, faced with belligerent intransigence, and was determined to follow the policies established by Benedict XV in World War I. Only after the hated Communists invaded Poland did the Pope eulogize the „heroism of the Poles.“⁴ At that time, Yanguas reported cautious papal policies that were to apply in most circumstances in which neutrality or national sovereignty was violated during the war. The Pope felt a natural sadness at the disappearance of a Catholic state and the fate of millions of Catholics fallen under the power of the Soviets and the Nazis „for whose respect for religion“ he had no confidence. However, „unlike his predecessor,“ Pius XII intended to use all his power „not to aggravate the situation.“ Instead, the Vatican used its influence where it might be effective, attempting to limit the war, at first

³ *London Times*, 5 September 1939, 8c and 16 October 1939, 7g.

⁴ *ABC*, 1 October 1939, 13. Franco, keen to improve currently strained relations with the Church (see chap. 5), opportunistically joined in with an expression of „sympathy for our Polish brothers.“ See *RFP*, vol.1, no. 3, 18 October, 1939, 22.

by encouraging continued Italian neutrality and consistently in backing the Spanish Church in its attempt to influence Franco to keep Spain neutral.⁵

The Spanish Church at the start of World War II had ample reason to understand and second the Vatican's lead. Internally, in a period of tense relations with the Franco regime, it needed the Vatican's support to consolidate its position in Spain in face of doubts about the regime's future directions. Whatever those doubts, the Church could support Franco's injunction to strict neutrality. Continued neutrality would enable the Church to concentrate on its spiritual mission and would strengthen its political position against any radical *falangist* challenge. However, even as it strove in the domestic sphere to guard Spain's neutrality, the Church feared that any spread of the war might present an external threat which would put Spain's neutrality or sovereignty at risk. The Spanish Church had witnessed the effect of the erosion of the major powers' international respect for neutrality and national sovereignty for itself. In Spain's *Guerra Civil*, the farce of „non-intervention“ had provided a hypocritical cover for its opposite by Germany, Italy and the USSR as well as encouragement from the European left for intervention by the „international brigades.“ Nor, as we have seen, had the hierarchy itself been neutral. Though retaining a residual gratitude for German and Italian aid for the Nationalist cause, the Church entertained no naïve ideas that either country had provided it out of a desire to help the Church's „crusade.“ Strongly distrusting the Nationalists' erstwhile allies and fearing the impact of their foreign ideologies in impeding the Spanish Church's spiritual mission, the Church had been glad to see foreign troops leave Spain. Above all, Spanish

⁵ Yanguas to MAE, 5 October, 1939, AMAE Leg R 1192, Exp.9. Pius' predecessor was of course Pius XI. For Vatican efforts to keep Italy neutral, see chap.5, 97.

Catholicism feared their return and a subsequent return to the endemic instability of the *Guerra Civil* that had been catastrophic for the Church.⁶

From an international viewpoint also, the Spanish Church was as content as the Vatican to remain aloof. It viewed Poland's dismemberment with a certain grim realism contingent on its own recent experience. The Church was well aware of Communist rapacity. Hitler's cynical subordination of ideology in agreeing with the hated Stalin to divide Poland confirmed Church views of Nazi amorality. Seeing nothing to choose between Nazi and Communist rapacity in Poland, the Church largely avoided comment that would make such a choice. Moreover, the Church saw Anglo-French reactions to Poland's plight, in making only futile gestures whilst a Catholic nation was dismembered, as showing a weakness and hypocrisy redolent of their attitudes during Spain's *Guerra Civil*. *Signo* expressed a common Church view, placing the blame for Poland's fate on its „powerful Allies who could not support it.“ In October, the British Ministry of Information contacted Edwin Henson in Valladolid to enlist the Spanish Church as a „channel to Anglo-Spanish understanding.“ The Rector of St. Albans College returned a devastatingly cynical reply as to how all the belligerents were widely perceived within the Spanish Church in the light of its *Guerra Civil* experience and subsequent events.⁷

The Church's priority was the defence of its own independence to pursue its spiritual goals in Spain. It was the degree of impact on that independence that would largely determine the Spanish Church's attitudes to neutrality and sovereignty violations

⁶ In Washington, the Spanish ambassador told US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles that „any sympathy that had previously existed in Spain for Germany had immediately vanished upon the announcement of the German –Russian alliance.“ Welles, memorandum of conversation, 29 November 1939, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (henceforth *FRUS*), Europe vol. 2, 1939, 819. This applied particularly to the Church. For the Spanish Church's immediate post-*Guerra Civil* attitudes to their „recent saviour“, see chap. 5, 101.

⁷ See *Signo*, no. 51, 24 September 1939, 3, for comment on Poland. For Henson, see chap. 7, 147-148.

elsewhere. Fear of a recrudescence of „Communism“ in Spain was so great that unilateral Communist violations anywhere were perceived as a direct threat to the Spanish Church and would be condemned. The attack on Finland by the hated Soviet Communists had therefore sufficient resonance with the Spanish Church to draw it out of its attitude of reserved suspicion. The Soviet attack was condemned by the Spanish Church and by the Vatican alike. Recent Spanish memories of „our war“ were invoked and revived as the Spanish Church spoke through its press of this latest example of Communist infamy, Allied inaction and United States „hypocrisy.“ All diocesan centres were asked to pray for the „latest victims of Russian aggression.“⁸

In early 1940, the British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries* from Spain noted that the influence of the Church was „in the ascendant.“ Its strong anti-Communism matched that of the radical *falangists*. Moreover, the Church’s attitude of suspicion towards all the belligerents and its strong advocacy of Spanish neutrality both appealed to and fostered the national mood of a war weary people described by the British as „largely indifferent“ to the European war. The Church’s „ascendant“ influence, linked with that popular war weariness, would influence Franco’s policies towards continued Spanish neutrality- so long as Spain itself was not threatened by any spread of the war.⁹

In February 1940, British ships intercepted, in Norwegian territorial waters, a German vessel loaded with British prisoners who had been concealed from Norwegian inspection. The „*Altmark* incident“ confirmed for the Church, even in the war’s early stages, its suspicion that both sides would be prepared to flout international law. Spanish Catholic press comment reflected Church concern over a threatened extension of the war.

⁸ See chap. 6, 126 for attitudes to the USSR, chap.7, 145-146 for those towards the Allies, *Signo*, no. 5, 17 February 1940, 1, for US „hypocrisy“; *Signo* no. 3, 3 February 1940, 1, for prayers.

⁹ *WPIS*, no. 19, 6 February, 1940, 12-13.

It also revealed fears that such an extension would provide new threats and challenges to the Church's efforts to keep Spain at peace. *Signo* perceptively commented that „once you begin an action, you cannot control its consequences.“¹⁰

With the coming of spring, such apprehension proved justified by Hitler's invasion of Scandinavia. The Vatican and the Spanish Church alike were dismayed by the latest extension of the war. Yanguas reported to the Spanish foreign ministry that the Vatican's *Osservatore Romano* was following a relatively pro-Allied line.¹¹ In Spain, although British intelligence reported a general Spanish reaction of „shock“ mingled with „some admiration for German efficiency,“ neither such reaction was evident in the Spanish Church's response. Perhaps influenced by the Vatican's approach and by its own experience, the Church's public reaction revealed neither great surprise over what its press had after all anticipated, nor any pro-German admiration. There was a natural humanitarian concern shared with the Vatican over the spread of the war. There was also a current of particular unease over a potential threat to Spain and the position of its Church if the war continued to spread. *Ya* deplored the extension of the war „from our Christian and humanitarian point of view.“ That newspaper also realistically highlighted the folly of relying solely on neutral status without armed force, arguing, probably with Spain in mind, that „countries with a strong army have a capacity to resist.“¹² *Signo*, though charging Britain, possibly correctly, with provoking the invasion, saw a wider moral problem in the belligerents' disregard for an international law „which transcends economic or political considerations.“ However, particularly vital to the Spanish

¹⁰ *Signo*, no. 6, 24 February, 1940, 1.

¹¹ Yanguas to MAE, 20 April 1940, AMAE Leg. R, 4006.

¹² See *WPIS*, no.30, 30 April 1940, 9 for shock and admiration; *Ya*, 10 April 1940, 3 (ed.), for Christian viewpoint and need for strong army.

hierarchy, as *Signo* implied, was the protection of the Church's spiritual mission through the political priority of continued neutrality. Spain's „great mission“ was to create a „Christian example“ in a sick world.¹³

A month later, Germany violated the neutrality of the Low Countries. The startling military success resulting from this violation caused real consternation in the Vatican and to the Spanish Church. Firstly, the invasions re-enforced the Scandinavian lessons that Nazis and Communists alike would subordinate respect for neutrality and sovereignty to military „necessity“ whenever they chose. Such new blatant amorality and the Vatican's fears at the continued spread of the war probably caused the Pope to be more responsive than might have been expected to intense Allied pressure to condemn „in the name of the Church and of civilization“ Germany's latest violation. Papal telegrams to the governments of Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg did not, in accordance with the precedents established by Benedict XV, condemn nor even refer specifically to Germany. However, sharp condemnation for responsibility in spreading the war was „implied“ as the *New York Times* noted.¹⁴ In contrast, the Spanish Church was at one with Franco- whose further admonition to strict Spanish neutrality was supported by a rigid caution in the Spanish Catholic press. *Ya* editorialized „Spain seconds his words.“ *Razón y Fe* however, as the Spanish „voice of the Vatican“ provided one exception, publishing the telegrams in full. Such Spanish publication indicated to Spanish Catholics that the Church in Spain shared the Vatican's fears of the results of escalating war.¹⁵

¹³ *Signo*, no.13, 13 April 1940, 1.

¹⁴ See Osborne to Vatican Secretariat of State, 10 May 1940, for Allied appeal, *ADSS*, vol.1, no. 300, 443-444, and nos.301-303, 444-445, for respective papal telegrams to Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. See *New York Times*, 12 May 1940, 1:2 and 36:4 for comments.

¹⁵ *Razón y Fe*, no. 508, May 1940, 224. *Ya*, 11 May 1940, 3 (ed.)

Secondly, Germany's rapid success brought the war dangerously close for the Vatican and for the Spanish Church. As Italy declared war on a near-moribund France, the Vatican, despite its earlier efforts to keep Italy neutral, was constrained to silence by its precarious relationship to the Italian state. In Spain, the relative popularity of Italy as against France, a legacy of the *Guerra Civil*, saw some Church sympathy for Italy reflected in the press. *Ya* saw Mussolini's action as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, „creator of an unsustainable European order.“ *Signo*, however, emphasizing Italy's removal of military centres and its declaration of Rome as an open city, even at this early stage, echoed fears within the Spanish Church for a potential threat to Rome, centre of world Catholicism.¹⁶

Publicly, that summer, the Spanish Church, true to its endemic detestation of Communism, denounced in its press a danger to European civilization as the hated Communists took advantage of German military distractions to violate national sovereignty in Eastern Europe. The same treaty of Versailles which *Ya* saw as the source of Italy's grievances had of course created grievances for the USSR. Finland and the Baltic States had gained independence, whilst Romania gained territory at the USSR's expense. Unsurprisingly, the virulently anti-Communist Spanish Catholic press expressed the Church's hatred of Communism; condemning the Soviets for what it had excused Italy. *Ya* described the Soviet „assault on Romania,“ declaring that „the German and Latin pillars have a given European civilization its principal base.“ After Stalin's takeover of

¹⁶ See *WPIS*, no. 37, 18 June 1940, 9 for Vatican silence; *Ya*, 11 June 1940, 1, for Versailles Treaty; *Signo*, no. 22, 15 June 1940, 1 for Rome.

the Baltic States, *Signo* lamented „Russia“s advance over Europe,“ and of course the consequent threat to Lithuanian Catholics.¹⁷

Privately, the Spanish Church knew that it faced a much more immediate danger. German troops were on Spain“s borders and Franco had declared for Spain an equivocal „non-belligerent“ status. The Church“s carefully constructed political platform for its spiritual mission, peace through support of Spanish neutrality, could collapse overnight through Franco“s indiscretion or Nazi pressure. Before June 1940, the attitudes of the Spanish Church to questions of neutrality and national sovereignty, though an important support to the Vatican, were of marginal interest to the major national powers. Germany“s victories and Italy“s entry into the war had transformed the situation, giving the Mediterranean and Spain“s key strategic position a new importance. Between June 1940 and June 1941, there was an intense struggle for influence in Spain. The documents of the major protagonists attest to a common realization of the importance of the Church and its attitudes as important to Spain“s attitudes. The relationships between the key protagonists and the Spanish Church at this time therefore repay study.

On Spain“s horizon, but of daily increasing importance as American policies tilted towards Britain, was the United States. A powerful and mutual legacy of suspicion existed between the Spanish Church and that country. However, the United States contained twenty-million Catholics. Archbishop (later Cardinal) Francis Spellman, was highly influential within the Roosevelt administration as well as at the Vatican, was respected by the Spanish Church and was supportive of its desire to retain Spain“s independence. Crucially, the United States controlled Spain“s vital oil supplies and could provide the financial help by which Spain“s independence could be preserved in return

¹⁷ See *Ya*, 29 June 1940, 1(ed.); *Signo*, no. 28, 27 July 1940, 3.

for continued Spanish neutrality. For the Church in Spain, the United States was potentially a strong if distant ally, encouraging that continued Spanish neutrality which the Church saw as vital to the attainment of its spiritual goals.¹⁸

In June 1940, Britain's position had seemed weak. However, Churchill's defiance encouraged Spanish Church belief in Britain's will to continue the war. Churchill appointed as ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, a devout Anglo-Catholic, who took care to cultivate the Spanish Church. He visited the sick Gomá, bringing letters of commendation from English Cardinal Arthur Hinsley and from William Godfrey, Apostolic Delegate in London. These connections, his visit and his gesture in kneeling to receive Gomá's benediction were well-received by the Spanish hierarchy. Hoare lost no time in establishing links to such influential Churchmen as the Archbishop of Valladolid who were strong advocates of Church independence and Spanish neutrality. When sure that, partly through the influence of these Churchmen with Franco, Spain's precipitate entry into the war was less likely, Hoare, like the Americans, was in a position to offer Spain vital supplies and loans. These would be predicated upon and help provide that continued Spanish independence and neutrality desired by the Church.¹⁹

¹⁸ For mutual legacy of suspicion, see chap. 7, 147. See John Cooney, *The American Pope: The Life and Times of Francis Cardinal Spellman* (New York: Times Books, 1984.) Spellman was probably the most powerful ecclesiastic outside the Vatican in World War II. Cooney notes Spellman's close personal links with Pius XII, (40-42 and in quoting Spellman's diary, 28 September 1944). He emphasizes Spellman's realization of the importance of Spain to the Vatican (122). Cooney cites, (112) an interview with Roosevelt presidential aide James Rowe, „When the archbishop spoke, whether about Vatican-US relations, the Franco regime or Hitler's Germany, everyone listened very carefully.“ See also Weddell (US Ambassador in Spain) to Secretary of State, 10 June 1940, in *FRUS*, General and Europe, vol.2, 1940, Spain, 796, and other documents in that series for US linkage of aid with neutrality.

¹⁹ For Hoare's visit to Gomá, See Barrio, *Diplomacia Vaticana*, 263. The British records, FO 371/24516, (particularly Hoare to Halifax, 8 August 1940) and FO 371/31234, (particularly Hoare to Foreign Office – report on his 19 months in Spain, 15 January 1942), NAUK, provide a good indication of the behind the scenes activities of the British and of leading Spanish churchmen.

The Nazis could of course, have ended Spain's independence and neutrality, and threatened the independence of its Church, by invasion. German foreign policy documents show how Franco, by continual evasion and avowal of eternal friendship for the Nazis whilst avoiding commitment to their cause, avoided this eventuality. Events in the Balkans also distracted the Nazis. The Spanish Church backed this deception, keeping behind the scenes its efforts to preserve Spanish neutrality whilst, for a number of reasons, showing a pro-Axis tilt in its publications.²⁰

Thus, in public at least, the British could do little right and the Axis little wrong as the Spanish Catholic press reported their respective violations of neutrality and national sovereignty during this period. ²¹*Ya* excoriated the British attack on the neutralized French fleet at Oran as „perfidy against honour“, contrasting this dastardly deed to „the noble attitude of Germany and Italy in victory.“ The British were similarly condemned for attacking the Vichy colony of Dakar, *Ya* musing that „one must find a new Spanish version of the words “fair play”.“ The Spanish government had been left in no doubt by its ambassador's reports of the facts and nature of Nazi aggression in Belgium, „condemned by all the diplomatic corps.“ The press, however, chose to focus solely on British „hypocrisy“ when the British presented the Belgian government's „fleeing to London as heroism“ whilst castigating Belgian King Leopold's decision „to stay and share the fortune of your soldiers“ as „desertion.“ British perfidy and contempt for neutrality, from its designs on Ireland to its infringements of Swiss air space in bombing

²⁰ See *DGFP*, vols. 10 (23 June 1940- 31 August 1940), 11, (1 September 1940 – 31 January 1941), 12 (1 February 1941 – 22 June 1941) for correspondence between Ambassador Stohrer and his Foreign Ministry). Hitler even wrote directly to Franco on February 6, 1941, (*DGPF*, vol. 12, no. 22, 37) in an unavailing effort to gain Franco's commitment. See chapter 5 for reasons for pro-Axis press reporting.

²¹ See chap.6.

Italy and actual bombing of Switzerland, were constantly emphasized.²² Only occasionally was some doubt about the purity of German intentions allowed to creep in. *Ya* suggested in September „within the inevitable friendship for Germany“, that the German occupation of Norway, Belgium and Holland were, despite explanations of „forestalling Britain, not in reality more than a strategic necessity.“²³ Unsurprisingly, a deafening silence greeted the Italian attack, and reverses, in Greece. This attitude by the Catholic press might well have led the Nazis to believe that Church antipathy towards them was less deep seated than it actually was.²⁴

The Spanish power struggle was followed with intense interest by a further interested party, the Vatican. The papal nuncio, Gaetano Cicognani, was so well informed and influential with Franco that later in the war, the US State Department would instruct its ambassador in Spain to sound out the nuncio regarding any likely changes to Spanish policy.²⁵ In August 1940, Cicognani so ably supported Vatican and Spanish bishops“ efforts to influence Franco to preserve Spanish neutrality that notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary and the pro-Axis tone of even the Catholic Spanish press, Hoare was optimistic that Spain would stay out of the war.²⁶

²² AMAE, Leg. R, 1189, Exps. 37-38, for reports from Belgium; *Ya*, 5 July 1940, 1, for Oran, *Ibid.*, 25 September 1940, 3, for Dakar, *Ibid.*, 24 December 1940, 1, for bombing of Switzerland, *Signo*, No. 26, 13 July 1940, 1, for Ireland, *Ibid.*, no. 31, 17 August 1940, 4, for airspace infringement and bombing in Switzerland.

²³ *Ya*, 25 September 1940, 3.

²⁴ In July, Ambassador Stohrer had warned his foreign ministry to beware of „strict and intolerant Catholicism“ that gave even apparent sympathizers such as Suñer „certain reservations with regard to the Third Reich.“ (Stohrer to FM, 2 July 1940), *DGPF*, vol.10, no. 87, 98). However, the subsequent tone of the Spanish Catholic press may well have convinced the Nazis that the Church could be wooed. For examples of deep seated Church hostility to Nazism, see chap.5, 98,100,101,102,105,108,113,114,115,117, 118,119.

²⁵ Cicognani’s brother, Amleto, was Vatican Apostolic Delegate in Washington. The brothers are clearly distinguished in the Vatican documents by references to A and G. Cicognani. See Secretary of State to Hayes, 1 December 1942, *FRUS*, Europe, vol.3, 1942, 313, for US estimates of G. Cicognani’s influence in Spain.

²⁶ See Hoare to Halifax, 8, August 1940, FO 371/24516, NAUK.

However, throughout the following autumn and winter, Nazi pressure on Spain to enter the war was intense, as the German, British and Vatican documents attest. The Nazis, understanding the Church's key role, attempted an intense campaign, of which the British, the Spanish foreign ministry and the Vatican were well aware, to woo the Church. We have noted the German donation of religious objects to replace the depredations of the *Guerra Civil*. In February 1941, the Spanish foreign ministry recorded an exhibition of these objects, combined with a concert in Madrid of German religious music, the proceeds to be given for the repair of devastated churches. In April 1941, the British reported a proposed visit of Spanish bishops to Germany. Throughout this period, the bishops were deluged with Nazi propaganda. At the Vatican, Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione was sufficiently concerned to sound out Cicognani about the effect of this campaign.²⁷

Cicognani, in a series of replies, acknowledged the intensity of Nazi pressure on the regime and Nazi attempts to show „deference to Catholicism.“ He suggested that this surface deference had been sufficient for some of the more nominally Catholic radical *falangists* to declare an attitude of „Catholics- yes, Vaticanists-no.“ However, Cicognani remained convinced of strong Spanish adherence to the Vatican, the continued loyalty of the episcopate to Rome and its consistent attempts to influence the regime to maintain the Church's independence and Spain's sovereignty. Moreover, the countervailing propaganda of the Vatican and the British and the Spanish Church's behind the scenes activity was achieving results. Nazism's anti-religious character was becoming known in Spain and consequently, most Spanish Catholics and their clergy retained pro-British

²⁷ See AMAE, Leg R 3563, Exp 97 and p. 105 for donation and concert. See April 1941, FO 371/26983, for proposed visit of bishops. See chap. 6 notes 45 and 53 for the intensity of Nazi propaganda towards the Church. See Maglione to Cicognani, 16 January 1941, *ADSS*, vol.4, no. 233, 338 for Vatican concern.

sympathies. The Spanish Church, despite Nazi blandishments, continued to see the best political support for its spiritual mission as defence of its independence through Spanish neutrality.²⁸

That defence, in part, explains the continued public pro-Axis interpretation put on the many international violations of neutrality and national sovereignty during 1941. In March, *Ya* printed puppet President Emil Hacha's declaration that the German-occupied Czech Protectorate was „liberated from the consequences of war.“ In April it highlighted Danish protests over the American occupation of Greenland. The Spanish Church's natural sympathy for fellow neutral and Catholic Ireland placed in a position not dissimilar to Spain's made *Ya*'s attack that same month on Anglo-U.S. pressure on Ireland to cede military bases understandable. Anglo-American „machinations“ in the Balkans were a favorite theme in the Spanish Catholic press that month as the Nazis added Yugoslavia to the list of vanishing neutrals. These machinations were real enough and Yugoslavia was too disparate to allow its Regent, Prince Paul, to succeed in an attempted balancing act similar to that performed by Franco. *Signo* expressed a widely felt Catholic joy in greeting Croatia, and the extension of the Church's mission in a new Catholic state, arising out of the „regretted bloodshed“ in Yugoslavia. *Signo*, perhaps prudently at a time when the Nazi threat to Spain was intense, neglected to mention by whom the blood had been shed. *Ecclesia*, more evenhandedly, whilst not criticizing the Nazis, noted that, in entering Yugoslavia, Catholic Hungary had used the same excuse – the breakdown of civil government – as that concocted by the Soviets to enter Poland in

²⁸ See Cicognani to Maglione, 16 January 1941, 31 January 1941, 15 March 1941, 8 April 1941, all *ADSS*, vol. 4, respectively nos. 233, 339-344; 250, 369-373; 287, 416 and 314, 448.

1939. By implication, *Ecclesia* emphasized the Spanish hierarchy's view of a need for stable, Church-supported government in Spain.²⁹

After the Yugoslav campaign, *Ya* published a German press „invitation“ to Switzerland to consider what could happen „when there is a contradiction between government policy and the expressions of the press.“ This, in fact, was the situation in Spain but the Spanish Church could not prudently say so and its press continued a pro-Axis interpretation of Allied neutrality violations. Iraq was technically independent, in fact under a resented British tutelage which was challenged by a pro-Axis coup. When this was crushed, *Ya* responded with a eulogy over „the valiant struggle of the Iraqis which has raised universal sympathies.“ Iran was more genuinely a neutral country but its Shah's suspected German sympathies led to an Anglo-Soviet invasion in August, 1941. With the hated Soviets involved, Spanish Church response was predictable, particularly as the invasion came days after the expressed high moral principles of the Atlantic Charter. The British were castigated for hypocrisy, declaring the liberty of peoples whilst occupying neutral countries. The United States had earlier come under similar attack when occupying Iceland.³⁰

Previous chapters have shown that Hitler's invasion of the USSR, combined with both genuine Spanish Church enthusiasm for the „anti-Bolshevik crusade“ and Spain's token participation, had lessened Nazi pressure on Spain. The Spanish Catholic press could uphold the integrity of the few remaining neutrals, from genuine conviction as well

²⁹ See the following references in *Ya*; 15 March 1941, 3, for Hacha, 15 April 1941, 3, for Greenland, 16 April 1941, 1, for Ireland; *Ya*, 20 April 1941, 3(ed.) and *Signo*, no. 65, 12 April 1941, 2, for British „machinations“; *Signo*, no. 70, 17 May 1941, 2 and 4, for Croatia, *Ecclesia*, no. 9, 1 May 1941, 28, for Hungary.

³⁰ *Ya*, 30 April 1941, 1 for warning to Switzerland, *Ibid.*, 8 May 1941, 3 (ed.) for Iraq; *Signo*, no.85, 30 August 1941, 4 and *Ya*, 26 August 1941, 3 (ed.), for Iran; *Signo*, no. 78, 12 July 1941, 2, and *Ya*, 9 July 1941, 1 for Iceland.

as an affirmation of Spain's own neutrality, except in the struggle against Communism. In October 1941, *Ya* declared that „Ireland does not want to enter the war“ and a few days later, quoted with approval Sweden's re-affirmation of neutrality. The Pope's Christmas 1941 tribute to „those governments that have retained their honour,“ was seen as particularly applicable to Spain.³¹

In the first part of the war, Spain had successfully defended its own neutrality at a time of acute Nazi threat. We have seen the part which the Church took in that defence and how the Church's priorities influenced its attitudes to Nazi violations of neutrality and national sovereignty elsewhere. Less dramatic, though increasingly important as the war progressed, were Allied pressures on Spain's rights as a neutral. In international law, neutrals had rights beyond territorial inviolability. The Hague Convention specifically stated that a neutral state, for example, „is not called on to prevent the import or export ... of arms, munitions of war, ... or anything that can be of use to an army or fleet.“³² This theoretical right had already been eroded by a countervailing acceptance of the rights of belligerents to blockade enemy ports and seize „contraband“ bound for the enemy. From September 1939, it was obvious that the British would repeat the blockade which they had operated with success in the previous war. By 1918, an ever-widening definition of „contraband“ and extension of rights of search to anywhere at sea had been blatantly aimed at starving Germany out. The rigour of this policy had caused concomitant suffering to neutrals including Spain.

³¹ See the following references in *Ya*; 25 October 1941, 1, for Ireland, 30 October 1941, 5, for Sweden, 26 December, 1941, 1 for Pope's Christmas message.

³² *Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of War on Land Section V, Article 7.*
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague05.htm>

The blockade's re-imposition in 1939 had been bitterly resented in the Spanish *falangist* press. *Arriba* in November protested vigorously neutrals rights „to import and export in order to live.“ The Catholic response was more muted. The Church realized that Spain's economic dependence on Britain was a powerful argument for that continued Spanish neutrality which facilitated the Church's independence. Moreover, the British, particularly in response to the sensibilities of the still neutral USA, soon modified their system. In early 1941, with Nazi pressure on Spain still intense, *Ya* reported with approval the United States Catholic hierarchy's condemnation of „hunger as a weapon of war“, which argued from Augustinian principles that „noble aims don't justify ignoble means.“ However, the United States was moving towards an involvement in the European war. This was reflected in increased American commitment to Britain and soon in help to the invaded Soviet Union. America's government was thus increasingly likely to support a hardened British attitude to acts of neutrals which aided the Axis. In August 1941, to aid the USSR, Britain blockaded Finland, though not then at war with that country, a „co-belligerent“ with Germany. *Ya* reflected a widely-held Church view of British „hypocrisy“ in condemning Britain's attack on a country it had supported in 1939-40, as *Ya* saw Finland's situation as unchanged in its struggle against Communist aggression. In September, the British embargoed goods bound for neutral Switzerland following a German-Swiss trade agreement. The Spanish Catholic press defended Swiss trading rights, seeing a potential threat to the independence of all neutrals, including Spain and thus to the Spanish Church. At the end of 1941, the British government announced a tightening of its blockade of the entire continent. By early 1943, *Ya* was

contemplating a „rationed Europe“, bitterly denouncing the effect of the war on neutrals, particularly on Spain.³³

During the war, Spain suffered at times from severe food shortages, for which the Allied blockade could always be cited as the primary reason. There was sometimes justification. In early 1942, for example, *Ya* blamed problems caused by the blockade; loss of markets and the inability to import chemicals such as nitrogen, for specific agricultural problems.³⁴ From the Church’s viewpoint, economic deprivation, apart from humanitarian considerations, could lead to political instability and thus be a threat to the Church’s mission. On the other hand, Spain's strategic position and Allied interest in its continued neutrality led at first to relative Anglo-American restraint as Spain reaped a financial bonanza in its wolfram trade with Germany.

Wolfram was vital in weapons production. After June 1941, when Germany could no longer import wolfram from Asia via the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Iberian Peninsula was Germany’s virtual sole supplier. Portugal was the main producer but Spain was an important subsidiary source. The Allies at first attempted to interdict German supplies by pre-emptive buying, resulting in an escalating „wolfram war.“³⁵ However, the growth of Anglo-American power was matched by a determination to use it, regardless of neutral sensibilities, even neutral trading rights in international law. When in early 1944, Spain and Portugal attempted to assert these rights in response to Allied demands that

³³ *Arriba*, 7 November 1939, 1 for *falangist* view; AMAE, Leg R 1449, Exp. 4, for modifications under US pressure, *Ya*, 29 March 1941, 1 for American hierarchy’s condemnation, *Ibid.*, 3 August 1941, 1 for Finland. That country maintained the legal status of „co-belligerency“ with sufficient success to keep itself at arms length from the Nazis but the Western Allies did eventually declare war. See *Ya*, 25 September 1941, 1, for Switzerland, *Ibid.*, 12 January 1943, 3(ed.) for „rationed Europe.“

³⁴ *Ya*, 14 April 1942, 3, (ed.), for blame for shortages, *Ibid.*, 10 May 1942, 3, (ed.), for specific problems.

³⁵ The price increased from \$ 1144 per ton in 1940 to almost \$20000 per ton at the end of 1941, whereupon the prescient Salazar, fearing the social and economic dislocation produced by this price spiral, restricted both price and production.

these countries stop exporting wolfram to Germany; the Allies tightened the economic noose around Iberia and embargoed oil supplies. The Allies attempted a moral and political justification for their policy. Churchill emotionally chastised Salazar that Portuguese wolfram sales allowed Germany „to manufacture the arms by which British soldiers were sent to their deaths.“ U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, asserted that neutrals were not considering their long-term self-interests in refusing to align themselves with the Allies, „whose sacrifices contribute to their salvation as well as ours.“³⁶

The Vatican, which had of course its own view of the source of salvation, did not agree. From a moral viewpoint, it sympathized with two Catholic countries. Anglo-American methods were „wounding to a proud people.“ Politically, the Vatican feared Iberian destabilization, as Cicognani reported to Rome renewed anti-Allied radical *falangist* demonstrations. Vatican diplomats deplored „interference in the internal life of a country ... with advantage only to Soviet Russia.“ Spain was outraged and united as even the *London Times* acknowledged. The *falangist Arriba* echoed the Vatican argument that Communism would be the ultimate victor. The monarchist *ABC* claimed that the British had „no conception of the problems affecting neutrals in war“ and that Britain had lost its many Spanish sympathizers. The Spanish Church, like the Vatican, feared a loss of Spanish independence and a renewed internal political instability that would threaten its mission in Spain. Cicognani reported to the Vatican the Spanish Church’s appreciation for Vatican support and that Spanish neutrality was following the papal example. Publicly, the Church’s popular press strongly emphasized that international law supported the Spanish position. *Ya* reported that Spain’s „strict neutrality conferred rights

³⁶ Churchill to Salazar, April 1944, Hull, statement, April 1944, both cited in Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe*, 176, 177.

under international law" and *Juventud* saw „full recognition of our international rights" as „what we want for Spain." *El Español* emphasized Spain's „courtesy and correctness" towards the belligerents and its „profound Christian sense." So great was this „patriotic reaction", that foreign minister Francisco Jordana claimed that it hampered the government in making concessions.³⁷ Unsurprisingly, the cautious and opportunistic Franco first fomented this reaction then used it to delay bowing to the inevitable for as long as possible.³⁸

By April, it was obvious that the Allies in a total war intended bending every neutral to their will, regardless of the letter of international law. The US Secretary of State instructed Hayes in Madrid that „the military situation is so changed that we can be much stiffer in our trading position." Moreover if, as the next chapter will show, the Allies could ignore Church censure of their bombing of Rome, they were unlikely to heed Catholic criticism of their attitude to neutral trading rights. *Ya* reported the conflicting attitudes of Turkey which had agreed to stop chrome exports to Germany and Sweden which rejected Allied demands and cited with approval the Swedish attitude to the „sanctity of agreements." Switzerland, still surrounded by German occupied territory, was in consequence treated by the Allies somewhat more carefully but its „conversations" with the Americans were designed „to reduce Swiss exports to Germany." These last

³⁷ Portuguese Ambassador (Vatican) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lisbon, file 128119, 11 February 1944, HW 12/297, NAUK, for Vatican reaction. *London Times*, 3 February 1944, 3c, for „united" Spanish reaction. *Arriba*, 7 February 1944, 1(ed.), *ABC*, 2 February 1944, 3 (ed.), *Ya*, 2 February 1944, 2 (ed.), *Juventud*, 15 February 1944, 1, *El Español*, 5 February 1944, 2, for Spanish press; Jordana to Spanish Ambassador, Washington, 10 February 1944, file 128087 HW 12/297, NAUK. See Cicognani to Maglione, 14 February 1944, *ADSS*, vol.11, no. 39, 134 -139, for description of Spain's internal situation and the Church's fears.

³⁸ British Intelligence used cricket terms to describe these delays. Franco „sits tight in his crease, refuses to play any ball not on the wicket and hopes that before long the frustrated bowlers will take themselves off. The present tactics certainly fall into the category of appeals against the light, having the bowling screen shifted and adjusting the buckles of the pads." *WPIS*, no. 233, 22 March 1944, 10.

„conversations“ were reported with studied objectivity because by this stage, Franco had capitulated from economic necessity and with lingering hopes, which he shared with the Spanish Church, of being instrumental in arranging a separate peace.³⁹

Though the popular Catholic press had strongly supported the Spanish „patriotic line,“ Catholic reviews, significantly, were more restrained. *Signo*, for example, had reported the imposition of the Allied embargo without comment. In May, it reported the Allied-Spanish agreements which phased out Spanish wolfram sales to Germany and ended various minor concessions made to placate the Nazis in 1940, as „in line with political realities.“ Such relative objectivity had been based on a strong Spanish Church hope that Spain could „serve as a bridge between belligerents to avoid a peace on unsure foundations.“ These „unsure foundations“ might lead to the Franco regime“s being unseated and lead in Spain to the Church“s ultimate fears; a renewal of civil strife, Communism and a consequent dire threat to the Church“s mission. In mid-April, there was a renewed peace campaign in the Spanish Catholic press. However, Hayes, supporting the „stiffer“ American attitude, described this campaign as „inept.“ The Church“s hopes, shared with Franco, of Spain“s acting as a bridge to peace, were illusory, the Allies were determined on victory and on neutrals“ compliance with Allied interests. *Ya* reported further Allied „negotiations“ with Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal. The total determination of the Allies to enforce their will over enemies and neutrals alike is seen in their blockade of Switzerland as late as January 1945.⁴⁰

³⁹ See Secretary of State to Hayes, 24 March 1944, *FRUS*, Europe, vol. 4, 1944, 370-371 for „stiffer“ US position. See *Ya*, 21 April 1944, 1, for Turkey, *Ibid.*, 14 April 1944, 3 and 23 April 1944, 1 for Sweden, *Ibid.*, 7 May 1944, 3 for Switzerland.

⁴⁰ *Signo*, no. 212, 5 February 1944, 5, for initial report, *Ibid.*, no. 213, 12 February 1944, 1, for Spain as bridge; See *Ya* 12 April 1944, 1 and 13 April 1944, 1 for renewed peace campaign. See Hayes to Secretary of State, 18 April 1944, *FRUS*, Europe vol.4, 1944, 390, for „inept“ Spanish campaign. See *Ya*, 9 May

A similar determination, fuelled by a sense of moral rectitude, and by the devastation wrought by total war, was reflected in the Allies determination to shape the post-war world. Even before D-Day, the leading Allied powers, feeling certain of victory, were giving consideration to a new international organization to replace the defunct League of Nations. It seemed increasingly likely that this organization would enshrine the dominance of the leading Allied powers and exclude the papacy and the neutrals, still less the defeated, from any say in the post-war settlement. Unsurprisingly, the concern this prospect aroused in the Spanish Church was reflected in its press. In its September-October edition, *Razón y Fe* emphasized the Vatican's viewpoint, declaring the Pope's „social Catholicism“ as the only basis for a just and lasting peace. In October, *Ya* made the not illogical point that „it is paradoxical that an organization constituted by democracies whose mission is democracy should be dictated by the great powers.“ In support, the following month, *Ya* quoted a statement by the United States Catholic bishops that all countries should participate in building a new international order.⁴¹

Fears expressed in the Pope's 1944 Christmas message about the impermanence of peace and the misuse of words like „freedom“ and „democracy“ gave rise to corresponding fears in the Catholic world, including Catholics in the Allied nations. Fears for Spain's future had powerful resonance with the Spanish Church. In February 1945, *Ecclesia* reflected the hierarchy's views in editorializing agreement with a document published by their North American colleagues. This document expressed fears that mistakes made after the previous war, inherent in the Versailles treaties and the League

1944, 3, for Ireland, *Ibid.*, 10 May 1944, 3 for Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, *Ibid.*, 5 January 1945, 4, for blockade of Switzerland.

⁴¹ *Ya*, 19 May 1944, 4 for report of original Allied discussions, *Ibid.*, 21 November 1944, 1, for dictation of the great powers and US Bishops' statement; *Razón y Fe*, no. 560-561, September-October 1944, 182, for need for „social Catholicism.“

would be repeated. The bishops declared that „no international organization can sustain an unjust peace.“ They called for recognition of the equality of all nations „regardless of size and power“ and for clearly expressed rights and limitations on national sovereignty. The bishops, having experienced the „war to end war“ euphoria of 1918, warned that they could envisage further wars „which will only be just if in defence of these principles.“⁴²

The great powers“ views differed, not about the need for a just and lasting peace but about how this elusive concept could be obtained without damage to their national interests. Accordingly, they ignored occasional voices, even from within the Allied Catholic world, suggesting that the papacy should have representation and thus be in a position directly to question these interests. The major powers were agreed that only members of the „United Nations“, those countries belligerent on the Allied side, were to be invited to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945, at which the foundations of the post-war international order were to be laid. A number of countries, including Turkey, made purely formal declarations of war in order to gain representation. The remaining European neutrals –Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden – and Spain, did not. *Signo* commented sardonically on the rush of nations declaring war in order to get into the United Nations, leaving only twelve neutral nations in the world. To *Signo* it was „ironic“ that a world peace organization excluded those who have kept the peace. *Signo* published a picture of Irish leader Eamon De Valera as a „true symbol of independence.“ Like

⁴² The Pope’s 1944 Christmas message was, as was customary, recorded in full in the Spanish Catholic press. See for example, *Razón y Fe*, no. 565, February 1945, 383- 392. See *Ecclesia*, no. 186, 3 February 1945, 3-4 (ed.), for North American Episcopal statement.

Spain, Ireland paid the price for several years after the war of exclusion from the United Nations, the structure of which reflected the dominance of the major victor powers.⁴³

The inviolability of neutrality had been fatally eroded before the war started. W. M. Carlgren, writing on Swedish wartime foreign policy, stated „in the great powers“ scheme of things ...respect for neutrality carried far less weight than regard for their interests. Neutrals were therefore „obliged to adopt... a corresponding scale of values“- as Sweden certainly did.⁴⁴ This comment might well be applicable to the Spanish Church, in its political defence of its spiritual priorities. Chapter 4 noted its domestic success in contributing to the maintenance of Spain’s own neutrality. This chapter has considered its attitudes in the field of international relations in view of the precarious state of neutrality and national sovereignty in a total war. With regard to violations of the neutrality of others, public attitudes were influenced by those political priorities seen as necessary for the advancement of the Church’s spiritual goals, for which Spanish neutrality and the keeping at bay of foreign ideologies, were deemed particularly important. Utterly opposed to Communism, the Church unhesitatingly condemned every Soviet infraction of neutrality. Suspicious of democracy, the Church, through its publications, frequently highlighted the moral gap between professed Allied ideals and practices in violating neutral rights during a total war. Any abstract moral force in these arguments, however, must be set against its more pragmatic attitudes to Nazi neutrality violations. Realizing that the achievement of its spiritual goals was best served by preserving Spain's neutrality and keeping Nazi influence at bay, the Church supported Franco’s policy of accommodation to German power without commitment to Nazism. Nazi neutrality

⁴³ See *Ya*, 11 February 1945, 6, for Catholic Bishop of Liverpool’s call for papal representation; *Signo*, no. 268, 3 March 1945, 8, for comments on exclusion of neutrals.

⁴⁴ W. M. Carlgren, *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War* (London: E. Benn, 1977), 229.

violations were therefore publicly rationalized on the grounds of „Allied provocation“ or „strategic necessity,“ grounds not extended to the Allies in similar circumstances. It is interesting that international law was invoked as an important argument only early in the war with the near-simultaneous invasion of Norway by both sides and in 1944 as a buttress to Spain's own neutral rights. Nor was Spanish or indeed international Catholic opinion effective in challenging the moral right of the victor powers to ignore the neutrals in shaping the immediate post-war settlement.

Able as the Spanish Church advocated Spain's neutrality, then, it did so through flexibility in the political realm rather than through abstract defence of the concept of inviolable neutral rights. In the context of the war's totality, that concept was virtually incapable of defence. In Thucydides' words, the strong did what they had the power to do, and the weak accepted what they had to accept.⁴⁵ The Spanish Church could rightly highlight inconsistencies between pretension and policy on the part of the Western Allies. However, whilst one should be realistic about Allied policy, it is too easy to be provoked retrospectively into a cynical moral relativism by tendentiousness in the moral pretensions of the Western Allies. To the Western Allies, violations of neutrality and national sovereignty were means to the greater end of winning the war. With the war won, the Western Allies, whatever their opinions of the Franco regime, did not violate Spanish national sovereignty to unseat Franco and the countries they had occupied regained national sovereignty. To the Nazis, such violations were ends in themselves, the violated countries being ruthlessly exploited on behalf of the Nazi war effort as Chapter 10 will show. The post-war national sovereignty of the wartime neutrals was a

⁴⁵ See Introduction, 1.

by-product rather than the object of the struggle of the Western Allies. It was nonetheless a fact. This would not have been so had the Nazis won.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ See Gerhard Weinberg, „German Plans and Policies regarding Neutral Nations in World War II with Special Reference to Switzerland“, *German Studies Review* 22 (1999), 99-103.

Chapter 9. The Church and ‘Total War.’ War on Civilians.

Humanity owes this vow [to return to divine law], to the thousands upon thousands of non-combatants: women, children, the sick, the aged; those who the air war – and We have from the outset, often denounced its horrors- has deprived, without distinction, of life, possessions, health, homes, refuges and places of worship. Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message, 24 December 1942.

*Wars are not won with the methods of the Salvation Army. Adolf Hitler cited in Gordon Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 125.*

...A whirlwind of evils, against entire peoples; against the old, women, children – the most innocent. Razón Y Fe, nos.522-523, July-August 1941, 338.

This chapter discusses the increasingly „total“ military methods by which the war was waged, with particular reference to aerial warfare, from the viewpoint of the Church, both in the Vatican and more particularly, in Spain. The use of terror by the Nazis and by the Soviets from the start of the war occasioned little surprise. However, this chapter will demonstrate that the British soon abandoned the moral restraint which they had preached to both sides during the Spanish *Guerra Civil*, and themselves practiced early in the European war. By 1942, they had instituted „area bombing“ of German cities. Likewise, Roosevelt had condemned the bombing of cities in September 1939 and the Americans, once in the war, did attempt „precision bombing“ of specific targets. In practice, however, there was little difference in the torrent of death and destruction rained on German civilians.

The narrowing of the moral gap between the approaches to the aerial war of the two sides has attracted strong retrospective condemnation, particularly of the RAF. Episodes like the bombing of Dresden have even contributed to a moral relativist view of the war. On the other hand, defenders of the Allies have made important distinctions between Nazi conduct and that of the Allies. They see the Allies, for much of the war, as having

little alternative in bringing home to Germany the consequences of the Nazis deliberate use of terror as an instrument of policy. They see the Allies as using „terror bombing“ in response to Nazi terror, a means to an essential „total war“ end of total victory over a terrorist regime. In the words of „Bomber“ Harris, Chief of the RAF’s Bomber Command, the Nazis having sown the wind „will reap the whirlwind.“ Harris’ attitudes found much agreement at the time.¹

The Church saw humanistic „natural law“ attempts to limit war, culminating in the Hague Conventions as enclosed in its own just war teaching. However, as early as 1914, belligerents had ignored these precepts. To the papacy, the increasingly indiscriminate nature of bombing in that war was already violating its teaching on the principle of non-combatant immunity. Benedict XV therefore clearly condemned the bombing of Padua.²

Before World War II had even begun, the Spanish Church had been given first hand experience of the deadly dual effect of improved technology and ideological hatred in sponsoring a „total war“ which ignored Church teachings in visiting aerial terror on civilians. Spain had been a laboratory for such terror. The political and moral effects of the Guernica bombing have previously been noted, as has the equivocal attitude of the Spanish Church to bombing by the Nationalist side. In fact, the Civil War had been marked by indiscriminate bombing of cities by both sides, firmly establishing a military precedent for future wars. The Nationalist *Noticiero de España*, defending aerial attacks

¹ Harris is quoted in Stephen A. Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: the British Bombing of German Cities* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 192. Though Garrett arrives at negative conclusions regarding the British bombing offensive, (134-141), he provides a fair account of how it was perceived in Britain at the time, including the acceptance by „moderate opinion“ of Harris’ premise (94).

² For Pius XII’s clear statement of natural law enclosed in divine law as revealed in Church teaching, see p. 43. See John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven Ct: Yale University Press, 2001), for documented assertions that not all such atrocities were Allied propaganda, as was later widely believed. For Benedict XV’s condemnation, see p. 50.

against claimed „military objectives“ in Barcelona, listed „indiscriminate attacks“ by the Republicans on Palma de Mallorca, Ibiza, Granada, Zaragoza, Valladolid and Pamplona. Henson, in a private letter written shortly after the Guernica bombing, describes the Republican ploy of waiting until Valladolid’s anti-aircraft defences had been moved elsewhere before bombing that undefended city. That the defenders of „democracy“ and those of „Christian civilization“ had both been prepared to adopt this tactic in Spain to the limits of their capacity augured ill for future war directly involving the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. In 1938, Louis le Fur, writing in *Temps Present* suggested that such bombing had become inevitable in modern total war.³

Genuine democracies had, however, at least affected genuine shock. The British had declared to the Spanish Nationalists that „the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards methods of warfare by which undefended towns containing no military objectives are bombarded to the danger of the civil population is well known.“ Indeed, the British opened the air war with extreme scrupulousness. Whilst the RAF scattered leaflets over Germany, Kingsley Wood, British Secretary for Air, met a suggestion that Germany’s Black Forest should be set on fire with the reply, „Are you aware it is private property? Why, you will be asking me to bomb Essen next.“ In an indirect reply to a Vatican initiative in October that belligerents suspend air attacks on Sundays, Britain claimed the moral high ground. Attacks should be carried out in such a way that

³ For previous discussion of the Guernica bombing, see chap.4. See *Noticiero de España*, no.28, 26 March 1938, ER 6023, 56/25, BNE, for Republican bombing. Henson to Association of the Venerable College of St. Alban, 22 June 1937. CDI, for Valladolid. Le Fur’s *Temps Present* article of 24 June 1938 is cited in Gordan, *France and the Spanish Civil War*, 244. The Nationalist bombing of Barcelona had of course, been as „indiscriminate“ as that of the Republicans, as had been the limited bombing of cities employed in World War I by both sides. The then primitive state and consequent inaccuracy of aerial technology made such bombing in effect indiscriminate, whatever claimed intentions of attacking military targets existed.

neighbouring civilian populations „should not be bombed by negligence.“⁴ Hitler, unsurprisingly, had no such scruples, disdainingly replying to the Vatican. World War II had begun with an act of terror. The Nazis, in bombing undefended Warsaw, clearly announced their intention to use the terrorization of civilians as a weapon of war. They were later to repeat this tactic against Rotterdam, Belgrade and elsewhere.⁵ It was obvious from the first that one side at least intended to wage a war limited only by the enemy's capacity to retaliate.

However, in Spain, the Church refrained from any public commendation of the British or condemnation of the Nazis. When Roosevelt reacted to the attack on Warsaw by denouncing the bombing of civil populations, *Ya* was content to report that denunciation and the positive response of both sides. Hitler responded positively, more from an exaggerated fear of the British reprisal bombing capacity than from any moral considerations as the *Luftwaffe's* continued bombing of Polish cities shows.⁶

Even more than the Vatican, Spain and its Church were, in the light of its experience in the *Guerra Civil*, in a good position to appreciate the effect of war on civilians. To the Spanish people, the effect of the often random death and destruction wrought on the innocent had been profound. So great had been the resultant expenditure of emotional capital that none was left to spare for the victims of a new, remote war. British press

⁴ See British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs to Franco's agent in London, 28 December 1938, Leg.109, Sig. A-O-I, 54/6798. AGA, for British attitude during the *Guerra Civil*. Kingsley Wood is quoted in Angus Calder, *The People's War* (London: Literary Guild, 1969), 61. See Maglione to Orsenigo (Berlin nuncio), 4-October 1939, *ADSS* vol. 6, no.83, 158, for Vatican initiative.

⁵ If the bombing of Rotterdam is today generally regarded as a communications failure rather than a deliberate act against an already surrendered foe, there remains the initial threat of terror bombing, its execution and the lack of any private, still less public expression of regret for the „mistake“ at the time.

⁶ See *Ya*, 2 September 1939, 4, for Roosevelt's denunciation. Both sides exaggerated the offensive capacity of the other. The British had, in addition to moral scruple, certainly exaggerated the number of available German bombers and misinterpreted the Spanish experience to a gross over-estimation of likely casualties from a German attack. See *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series*, Richard M Titmuss, *Problems of Social Policy* (London: HM Stationery Office, 1950) 8, 11.

attaché T. F. Burns commented on the Nazi assault on Poland, „it was no surprise to those who knew the spirit of the people at that time to see how little it affected them. „Our War“ was over.“ The Church had been devastated, by „Communist“ atrocities on the ground and the random air attacks of both sides which had killed priests and destroyed its buildings. With a natural hatred of the „Communists“ went a resultant cynicism from Church and people alike regarding any distinction between the methods and motivation of belligerent countries in the new war. *Signo* expressed this common Church attitude in commenting on September 10, „the present war, a struggle of several European nations, does not have the justified nature of our war.“ Church and people alike feared above all the return of war to Spain and the Church feared to take any action that might produce this eventuality deemed inimical to its spiritual mission. In the political realm, the Church was prepared to follow rigidly Franco’s injunction to „strict neutrality.“ It wished to improve its currently strained relations with the Franco regime to increase its influence for the maintenance of neutrality throughout whatever developments the war brought. Moreover, seeking Vatican support in face of radical *falangist* threats to its mission in Spain, the Spanish Church preferred to follow the Vatican’s cautious approach at the start of the war. Not even the then ultimate enormity of the threat of poison gas being used in the new war could therefore attract comment from Catholic publications. It was the *falangist Arriba* that announced the Nazi declaration that they would not use it „except in retaliation.“⁷

Political hatred of „our war“’s late enemy however aroused the Spanish Church’s indignation. Consequently, its press bitterly attacked Soviet bombing of open cities in

⁷. See T. F. Burns, „Changing Opinion in Spain 1939-1945“ 8/1216, RIIA, for comments on Spanish passivity. See *Signo*, 10 September 1939, 1, for Spanish Church’s skeptical attitude to European war, *Arriba*, 15 September 1939, 6, for poison gas.

Finland and particularly castigated the deliberate targeting of hospitals. *Ya*'s denunciation of Soviet bombing of a monastery recalled „Red“ *Guerra Civil* atrocities. Though in his 1939 Christmas message, Pius XII attacked the use of „destructive weapons against non-combatants, the Spanish Church“s publications emphasized his denunciations of the USSR and interpreted the Pope“s comments solely in the light of Communist atrocities.⁸ Pius had followed the practice of Benedict XV in generalizing his comments, but did not go as far as Benedict had done in denouncing attacks on particular cities. There were of course differences. Pius had no illusions about the effect of a papal condemnation of their policies on Hitler or Stalin. Austria in the previous war had been a Catholic power. Moreover Padua of course was in Italy, where a condemnation, even if ineffective, had increased popular papal prestige.

In May, 1940, press attaché Burns in Spain found „difficulties in finding or fostering much moral reaction to Germany“s treacherous swoop on the Low Countries or bombing of defenceless Rotterdam. People would listen, shake their heads, and meet this tale of woe with one of their own, bitten into their own flesh and memory.“ Such popular Spanish reserve mirrored a similar reserve on the part of the Vatican and of the Spanish Church. The Vatican had been content with an „implied“ condemnation. The Spanish Church saw the achievement of its spiritual priorities as predicated on Spanish independence and neutrality and it looked for Vatican support. The Church was therefore content to note and adopt the Vatican“s approach. Catholic publications reported the

⁸ *Ya*, 1 December 1939, 1; *ABC*, 10 December 1939, 11, 12; *Ibid*, 20 December 1939, 8. See *Ya*, 10 December 1939, 1 for monastery attack. Though the papal address was of course, printed in all Catholic publications, its anti-Communist interpretation is recorded in chapter 6.

German advance without comment as to its methods. Spanish readers, as Burns noted, could from personal experience imagine the plight of civilians in a total war.⁹

Previous chapters have described, in the wake of German victory in the West and the consequent threat to Spain, the reasons for a pro-Axis tilt even in the Catholic press. *Ya* described German bombing of British cities as „reprisals.“ This was perhaps initially literally true although Geoffrey Best prudently advises readers to be „on guard“ in whatever circumstances the word „reprisal“ appears.¹⁰ An impression was given that the Nazis were attacking legitimate targets-,the industrial and spiritual heart of Great Britain.“Coventry, truly enough, was described as „a centre of the aeronautical industry,“ its destroyed Cathedral was not mentioned. Reports of „British bombs on working class districts“ gave an opposite impression of „terror bombing.“ Pictures of a bombed German hospital and a report of bomb damage to a Berlin cathedral in an area „containing nothing of military interest“ confirmed this impression. Many anti-British attitudes had their roots in the Spanish *Guerra Civil* experience, a *Signo* correspondent commenting „we do not forget that British governments did nothing to help avoid our cities receiving that which London is now receiving.“ The gap between British precepts in the *Guerra Civil* and British practice when Britain's own survival was threatened did not pass unnoticed.

However, such criticism of Britain was weakened by some obvious one-sidedness. The

⁹ Burns, „Changing Opinion in Spain,“ 8/1216, RIIA. For „implied“ Vatican condemnation, see p. 171. That page also describes the strong injunctions by Franco to „strict neutrality.“

¹⁰ See *Ya*, 8 September 1940, 1, 25 September 1940, 1 for „reprisals“; See Geoffrey Best, *War and Law Since 1945*(Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 203, for comment. Standard histories see an erroneous German attack on London leading to a British „reprisal“ against Berlin and Hitler“s subsequent sanction of terror raids on London. See for example, Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*,(London:Collins, 1952), 48, Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint (and John Prichard), *Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War*(2nd.ed.) (New York: Viking: 1989), 156; H.P. Willmott, *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War* (London: Joseph, 1989), 110. Neutral contacts still existed by which either side could have proposed a moratorium on further such attacks after the British „reprisal.“ It seems therefore that the mutual bombing of cities continued by the will of both sides.

same *Signo* correspondent in October sarcastically referred to British bombs hitting such „military targets“ as workers homes in German, Dutch and Belgian cities, apparently overlooking his previous week’s article describing, without comment, how British workers were forced out of their homes.¹¹

Editorially, *Signo* was more balanced, deploring the „terrible duel between London and Berlin“ and the ensuing carnage. Somewhat optimistically, it declared „the voice of the Church has been heard, its words of mercy like dew.“ More prosaically, Chadwick notes that „someone was presenting a note to the Vatican every week, persuading it to say something or protesting that it should not have said something.“ „Solemn complaints“ could come not only from governments. *Ya* reported a German Catholic protest against British aerial warfare which destroyed „churches, institutions and Catholic foundations.“ Cardinal Maglione, responding to a counter protest from British ambassador D’Arcy Osborne, replied presciently that Britain’s „devoting attacks to military targets [sic] deserved fullest credit but he „would not be surprised if public opinion forced us [Britain] to imitate Germany’s example.“ In consequence of this deluge of complaints, the Pope in a homily during a mass for the victims of war restricted himself to a general cautious comment on „whirlwinds that, in the light of day or the dark of night scatter terror, destruction and the slaughter on helpless folk.“ In Spain at this time of intense Nazi pressure to enter the war, Catholic publications reflected the Church’s priority of avoiding such entry. Though all, as was customary, printed the entire homily, comment unsurprisingly strongly centred on the Pope’s request for prayers around the world and

¹¹ *Signo*, no. 35, 14 September 1940, 2, for attacks on „industrial heart“; *Ya*, 16 November 1940, 1 for Coventry. *Signo*, no.35, 14 September 1940, 2 for British bombing working class districts, *Ya*, 23 October 1940, 1 for hospital, *Ibid.*, 22 December 1940, 1, for Berlin Cathedral. Compare *Signo* no. 39, 12 October 1940, 4 and no. 38, 5 October 1940, 4 for inconsistency of criticism. See *Ibid.*, no. 38, 5 October 1940, 4 for Civil War reference.

particularly in Spain for peace rather than touching on bombing, though Churchill was shortly afterwards castigated for denying a Christmas bombing truce. The previous chapter described Nazi attempts to woo the Church in early 1941. Not surprisingly, at a time of intense pressure, the Church chose not to make rejection of its „suitor“ obvious by comment on the Nazi terror bombing of defenceless Belgrade in April.¹²

To the Spanish Church, Hitler’s invasion of the USSR caused conflicting emotions. Spain's decreased danger of occupation produced relief and lessened the need to placate the Nazis but the Soviet campaign heightened the Church’s endemic hostility to Communism. This hostility could modify disapproval at deliberate attacks on non-military targets. Thus *Signo* in August, 1941, asserted „in Russia there are plenty of military targets, the Kremlin is not one of them. But without doubt if there exists in the whole world a target which we would call moral, such a target deserves to be visited by the bombs.“ *Razón y Fe* however as the Spanish voice of a Vatican which had declined identification with Spain’s „crusade,“ published an impartial protest at the war’s escalating brutality. Emphasizing the relevance of a recent papal allocution, *Intervention of Divine Providence in Human Affairs*, to the war, *Razón y Fe* denounced the decline of „the spirit of justice and Christian charity,“ specifying a „whirlwind“ of evils – bombing, deportations, blockades, suffered above all by the innocent and deplored the evil of religious persecution.¹³

¹² See *Signo*, no. 35, 14 September 1940, 1, for „terrible duel.“ Owen Chadwick, „The Papacy and World War II: Further Documents,“ *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* vol. 19, no.2 (1968), 231, commenting on *ADSS*, vol.4, for deluge of complaints. See *Ya*, 3 October 1940, 1, for German Catholic protest. See Osborne, to FO, 26 November 1940, FO 380/61, for Maglione’s response; Osborne to Halifax, 30 November 1940, FO 380/48, for papal homily, both NAUK. See *Ya*, 24 November 1940, 1, and 27 November 1940, 1, for Spanish response.

¹³ See *Signo*, no. 84, 23 August 1941, 1, for Kremlin, *Razón y Fe*, nos. 522-523, Jul-Aug. 1941, 338, for papal allocution.

Earlier in the war, bombing on both sides was inaccurate. In August, 1941 the Butt Report had exploded the myth that the RAF attacked military targets with precision. At best, one aircraft in four, at worst one in ten actually got within 8 km. of targets still less hit them. So ineffective was RAF bombing that its 1941 raids killed fewer German civilians than RAF personnel. On the other side, *Ya* recorded an Irish protest at the German bombing of Dublin in place of Belfast.¹⁴ The seeming capriciousness and indifference to civilian casualties of RAF attacks in France which caused much Spanish Catholic press criticism was a result of such inaccuracy but nonetheless provided powerful Nazi propaganda. *Ya* in November denounced an attack on the French coast in which children were wounded by machine guns and declared that „the main victims of gangster bombings in France have been country dwellers of all ages.“ In March, 1942 pictures of the RAF’s „cruel bombardment“ of Paris appeared, and *Signo*, in somewhat backhanded commiseration, declared, „Paris, once the Mecca of pleasure and vice deserves in its pain our loving compassion.“ That „cruel bombardment“ was Nazi propaganda, at most a few bombs hitting the wrong target. That spring, the spectre of gas was again raised. Churchill had alleged Nazi plans for huge gas attacks on the Eastern Front and threatened retaliation. *Ya* headlined emphatic Nazi denials but gas was of course being used on Jews in the camps, a fact yet known to few in Spain. In June, *Ya* suggested that the Soviets, of whom all perfidy was believable, were preparing chemical weapons for use in the East.¹⁵

In early 1942, RAF strategy was recast. British bombing would be progressively

¹⁴ See *Ya*, 3 June 1941, 3, for Irish protest. See John Keegan, *The Second World War* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 420, for Butt Report.

¹⁵ See *Ya*; 12 November 1941, 4 and 14 November 1941, 4, for denunciations of the RAF; 18 March 1942, 1 for Paris; *Signo*, no. 113, 7 March 1942, 8 for „loving compassion.“ *Ya*, 11 May 1942, 1 for gas, *Ibid.*, 11 June 1942, 3 for chemical weapons.

intensified as more and improved bombers with greater bomb loads became available and technological advances improved accuracy. Whilst the hitting of military targets of course remained desirable, there was a changed, if not publicly admitted, emphasis on „area“ bombing which would affect German production indirectly by „de-housing“ German workers and destroying their morale. Later in 1942, the Americans joined in, and although they remained committed to „precision“ bombing, their raids by day complimented British night attacks to submit Germany to constant bombardment.

Developments as the war tilted towards the Allies from the autumn of 1942 were to require a complex interplay of moral and political responses both from the Vatican and from the Spanish Church in the ensuing months. Highly significant in its political effect was the US invasion of North Africa which militarily put the Axis on the defensive. The arrival of US ground forces signified an American contribution to the war which in the West would become preponderant and give the United States such political predominance that its commitment to unconditional surrender would prevail. Though this formula was not publicly announced until the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, the Pope the previous autumn had already been told of America’s determination for total victory with no question of a compromise peace. In early 1943, the Soviet triumph at Stalingrad not only confirmed likely Allied victory but gave intense alarm and fears both to the Pope and to the Spanish Church of a Communist Europe. The Pope knew what the Spanish Church did not, that any attempt to forestall this dread possibility through working for a compromise peace was doomed to fail.¹⁶

¹⁶ See Taylor to Pius XII, 19 September, 1942, *ADSS* vol.5 no. 473, 684-690 and p. 132 for papal knowledge of US aim of total victory. In response to criticism of the unconditional surrender policy, one might suggest that the Americans drew on the previous war’s experience of the stimulation given to Nazism by popular German perceptions that Germany had been „stabbed in the back“ by „leftists and Jews“

These political developments intensified the totality of the war. To the Allies, the total fanaticism and brutality of Nazi conduct of the war justified the totality of the bombing offensive. By the end of 1942, the Vatican was well aware of the nature and scope of Nazi atrocities. However, morally it saw these atrocities and Allied bombing of civilians as equally violations of divine law. Politically, despite pressures by each side to condemn the other, the Vatican would not prejudice its authority and impartiality in pursuing its mission by condemning the violations of one belligerent without denouncing all such transgressions. Accordingly, Pius XII in his Christmas message attacked evils on both sides. Pius' statement on racial persecution will be considered in chapter 12.

On the Allied bombing, Pius said,

humanity owes this vow [to return to divine law] to the thousands upon thousands of non-combatants – women, children, the sick, the aged; those who the air war – and We have from the outset often denounced its horrors- has deprived, without distinction, of life, possessions, health, homes, refuges and places of worship.

Pius knew not only that the war was reaching a turning point but that bombing was escalating in intensity. He was naturally concerned for humanity in general. He also had fears for the Church's mission. He was already worried that its nerve centre, the Vatican, faced obliteration from the air as Allied North African victories pointed to an Italian campaign. Accordingly, on December 29, Maglione wrote to Cicognani to enlist Spanish Church and state support.¹⁷

The Spanish Church that autumn had not been privy to Allied policy decisions, but could see their effects. As the combined Allied offensive intensified, the Western air

rather than defeated. Unconditional surrender would make German defeat manifest. The Vatican still spoke against unconditional surrender. See, for example, Notes of Tardini, 31 March 1943, *ADSS*, vol.7 no.153, 281-283, for an unavailing approach through the British ambassador.

¹⁷See *Signo*, no. 157, 16 January 1943, 2, for text of papal message. See Maglione to Cicognani, December 29 1942, *ADSS*, vol.7, no. 78, 172-174., for Maglione's initiative.

forces dropped a greater and progressively escalating volume of bombs far outstripping the Germans 1940 blitz. To the Church, indiscriminate bombing violated the *jus in bello* principles of discrimination and proportionality. Even when a threat to the Vatican was still unlikely, the Church had been appalled by the wholesale slaughter of German civilians, many of whom, in the western industrial areas of Germany, were Catholics. Though the Spanish Church was constrained from direct political comment by government and Church policy, and by the fluid situation of a war which could still come to Spain, it had expressed its views through its publications. *Ya*'s denunciation of the first thousand bomber raid on Cologne as a „terror attack“ reflected a widely held Church opinion. British bombing of occupied countries caused denunciations that at times reflected the bitterness of *Guerra Civil* attitudes that remained in some quarters within *Acción Católica*. Its publication *Signo* sarcastically combined such a denunciation with an attack on the hated Soviets. Noting the Soviet donation of its London embassy's railings to Britain's „munitions drive“, *Signo* observed, „perhaps someday these same railings will fall from some Spitfire on a peaceful French town.“ In December *Ya* expressed more moderate Church concern in condemning the bombing of Britain's erstwhile Dutch Allies, causing 105 deaths in Eindhoven. Though concern within the Church was widespread, blame was not always one sided. *Razón y Fe* in November reflected a more balanced, internationalist view, expounding Vatican opinion in denouncing the mutual destruction escalating until „the annihilation of one of the sides or of both.“¹⁸

¹⁸ See *Ya*, 2 June 1942, 3 for Cologne, *Ibid.*, 12 December 1942, 3 for Eindhoven; *Signo* no. 148, 14 November 1942, 3 for Russian railings; *Razón y Fe*, no. 538, November 1942, 361 for mutual annihilation.

The papal Christmas message and Maglione's subsequent initiative came at a propitious time for a combined response by the Spanish Church and state. The Church had been invigorated by the appointment of six new bishops and this successful process of induction had increased a feeling of accord with the state. This accord had already been developing as the moderate Jordana had replaced Suñer, identified with the *Falange* and Axis-leaning policies. Moreover, Franco's strong assertion of a policy of Spanish independence during the Allied North African landings was in harmony with Church priorities and those landings' success had at last reduced the Nazi threat to Spain. The Spanish Church strongly supported the Vatican request. Every Catholic publication had printed the full text of the Pope's Christmas message and *Signo*'s following issue emphasized the papal statement about bombing. Spanish Church and regime alike, equally fearing a Communist Europe, particularly after Stalingrad, wanted as first priority a separate peace. *Ecclesia* accordingly endorsed foreign minister Jordana's statement, „the Iberian countries are at the service of peace, observing the will of the Church.“ The Spanish Church and state did not know what the Pope knew about American resolve. As both sides were unresponsive to Spanish peace feelers, the next alternative was a Church-led campaign against indiscriminate bombing. This might be a first step to an Allied change of heart, at least in gaining some response to the Pope's attempts to protect the Vatican. Public Allied commitment to unrestricted bombing was growing. *Ya*, on December 31, had published Churchill's „apocalyptic words“ - „cities, ports, centres of production will receive attacks in size, continuity and severity never before experienced.“ So uncompromising a policy would from the Spanish Church's moral viewpoint increase destruction and death. Politically, it would damage the Church's mission as possible

social disintegration under the bombing increased the likelihood of a Communist Europe. A successful Spanish campaign against „area bombing“ in which the Church’s publications would take a leading role, morally would humanize the war whilst protecting the Vatican and politically might still be a first step to a peace which would prevent these dire consequences.¹⁹

On May 9, 1943 *Ya* used the classic *jus in bello* argument in denouncing the „aerial second front“ that „the results are not in proportion to the effort and losses.“ After a week of headlines and articles from May 15 onward, *Ya* commented on May 22 „our Catholic Spanish tradition“ – „compels us to raise our voice on behalf of international law.“ On May 25, *Ya* denounced „a method of war which accentuates its horrors whilst indecisive for its conclusion.“ That same day, *Alcazar* declared, „if it were possible to organize a plebiscite of all races and cultures, all would respond unanimously that aerial warfare against defenceless populations is inhuman; even more grotesque is the contrast between the ends of „peace“, „civilization“ and the means used.“ On May 26, *Alcazar* saw Communism as the only winner on the ruins of Christian civilization if the bombing continued and the following day suggested that the aerial war showed disequilibrium between moral progress and that of science.²⁰

However, Spanish ambassador the Duke of Alba informed Madrid of „a most unfavourable reaction“ in Britain and of allegations that the campaign was Axis-inspired. The Spanish foreign ministry noted that even the British Catholic publication *Tablet* condemned the Spanish Church’s press campaign. From Madrid, Hoare told his foreign

¹⁹ See *Ecclesia*, no. 79, 16 January 1943, 21 for Jordana comment. See chap.6, pp. 137-138, for peace initiatives. See *Ya*, 31 December 1942, 7, for Churchill.

²⁰ See *Ya*, 9 May 1943, 4 for proportionality, *Ibid.*, 23 May 1943, 1 for international law, *Ibid.*, 25 May 1943, 1, for horrors. *Alcazar*’s comments are on 25 May 1943, 1, 26 May 1943, 1, 27 May 1943, 6.

minister, Eden, that „the Christian conscience only wakes up when Axis cities are now in peril.“ *Ya*’s claim that „at all times we raise our voice for Christianity without distinction of nationality“ was palpably untrue. The political exigencies that had dictated the public policies of the Spanish Church during the German blitz in 1940-1941 came back to haunt the credibility of its campaign in May 1943. Jordana’s telegram to Spanish embassies abroad correctly refuted Axis instigation and equally correctly claimed Church support. However his assertion that Spain had during the whole war maintained a clear, constant position for the humanization of the struggle, following the direction of the Pope, without regard to nationalities at best represented an aspiration rather than a reality. As the campaign was achieving only unfavorable Anglo-American reaction and in view of Hoare’s veiled threat that the campaign „embroiled“ relations between the Allies and Spain, it was ended. The British noted the „last minute withdrawal“ of a Spanish public proposal on the limitation of bombing. *Ya* sadly observed, „as Catholics and Spaniards we direct a call to the belligerents without much hope of being heard with attention“ and a little later seeing this apocalyptic horror as „an inevitable reality of modern war.“²¹

The Spanish Church soon, however, returned to the charge when a direct threat to the Vatican emerged. By mid-1943 an invasion of Italy was clearly likely. This, in a total war, raised the spectre of the destruction of that country’s rich cultural and religious patrimony. Above all, there was the prospect of what, to many Catholics, would be total war’s ultimate obscenity, the destruction of Rome and the Vatican by bombing or in

²¹ See Alba to MAE, 31 May 1943, *DIHGF*, Tomo IV, 268, for British reaction. See AMAE, Leg R 1467, Exp. 11 for London *Tablet* article, Leg. R, 1467, Exp. 13 for Jordana’s refutations. See Hoare to Eden, 28 May 1943, for „Christian conscience“; Hoare to Foreign Office 31 May 1943, for „embroilment“; Hoare to FO, 7 June 1943, for dropping of Spanish proposal, all FO 371/34846, NAUK.; *Ya* 28 May 1943, 1, for impartiality claim, *Ibid.*, 1 June 1943, 3 for call to belligerents, *Ibid.*, 7 August 1943, 2 (ed.) for „inevitable reality.“

consequence of fighting for the city with dire consequences for the Church's mission in every country. We noted the Spanish Church's concern for Rome's safety as early as June, 1940. In April, 1941, *Ya* had published a British threat to bomb Rome if the Axis bombed Athens or Cairo. In that eventuality, the British declared their intention to avoid hitting the Vatican but raised the possibility of a perfidious Italian attack on the city state, using British bombs. *Ya* had described this as an insidious double play - to preserve cities in British hands and to blame the Italians if the RAF, in fulfillment of the British threat, hit the Vatican, an eventuality all too likely given existing RAF inaccuracy. *Ya* expressed Spanish Church horror at „perfidious propositions“ to bomb „the capital of Christianity“ but at this stage as Yanguas shrewdly observed in reporting to Madrid, the likelihood of Rome being bombed was small. British loss of prestige in the Catholic world was one of a number of constraints.²²

By 1943, the Allies were in an immeasurably stronger military and political position and total war had hardened their attitudes. In January, Osborne reported that the Pope was „obsessed“ by the possible bombing of Rome. Pius XII had justifiable fears in view of the probability of an Italian campaign after pending Allied victory in North Africa. In the context of total war, the Allies considered themselves to have a reasonable case. The Vatican was an anomalous, neutral enclave in an enemy capital. In Spain, the regime's internal report in June 1943 asserted that the failure of the Spanish anti-bombing campaign to move Allied opinion „stirred up great emotion amongst the Spanish Episcopate“ not least a fear that Rome would be bombed. Government sources noted similar fears amongst Catholic bishops in the United States, who asked Churchill in early

²² See p.171 for 1940 concern; *Ya*, 19 April 1941, 1 for British threat; Yanguas to MAE 26 April 1941, AMAE Leg R 1192, Exp. 10, for report.

July to avoid bombing Rome. In reply to Churchill's response that no guarantee could be given whilst the Italian government was in residence there, the Archbishop of Detroit suggested that Italy should declare Rome an open city.²³

The first bombing of Rome in July evoked an appalled Spanish Church reaction. Because the destruction of the Vatican would constitute a direct threat to the Church and its mission, the Spanish episcopate felt constrained to depart from its public reserve on „political“ issues. Public telegrams of commiseration and support were sent to the Vatican by the Primate, the Bishop of Pamplona and by Catholic Action. Primate Plá even took the unprecedented step of a direct protest to Churchill and Roosevelt via the Madrid ambassadors. *Ecclesia*, often reflective of the Primate's views, reinforced his atypical direct Church action by publishing an extraordinary issue, declaring „Rome is the world. It belongs indivisibly to all civilized Christians and should not be defended or attacked.“ *Ya* highlighted international condemnation of the bombing, including censure by two United States archbishops. However, the Allies judged world reaction to be „milder than might have been anticipated.“ Plá, protesting to Hoare, was informed that the bombing had been handled „with discretion and sobriety.“ US Secretary of State Cordell Hull replied uncompromisingly, „it is not recalled ... that the Spanish Episcopate ever protested against the unchristian acts that have characterized Axis warfare.“²⁴

The Spanish Church was aware of such criticism. Wishing to divorce its campaign to save Rome from the imputations of „Axis instigation“ that had dogged its May press

²³ See Osborne to Foreign Office, 5 January 1943, for Pope's „obsession,“ FO 371/37538, NAUK. For Vatican fears see also *WPIS*, no.168, 22 December 1942, 12. See *DIHGF*, Tomo IV, 19 June 1943, 343 and 20 June 1943, 347 for Spanish episcopate's fears. See FNFF, 5655, 2 July 1943 and 5618, 21 July 1943, for US Catholic fears.

²⁴ See *Ecclesia*, extraordinary issue, 24 July 1943, 2, (ed.) for 'Rome is the world'; *Ya*, 25 July 1943, 4, for telegrams, *WPIS* no. 199, 28 July 1943, 13, for „milder“ international reaction, *Ibid.*, 10 for Hoare's responses to Plá. For Plá's telegram to Roosevelt via Hayes and Hull's reply, see Hayes to Secretary of State, 21 July 1943, *FRUS* 1943, Europe, vol.2, Vatican 933, 934.

campaign, it carefully avoided outright condemnation of the Allies in press reports of the bombing of Hamburg, although referring to a „martyred city.“ Moreover its press comments on Rome avoided one sided comment. *Ya* reported Rome’s second bombing on August 14, after which the Italians declared Rome an open city, a „unilateral“ declaration which „London“ refused to accept. *Signo*, discussing open cities, pointed out that under international law, bombing or military attack is illicit when its only aim is to terrorize the civilian population and when under „total war pretext“ it is used against undefended cities. *Signo* pertinently asked „is modern total war, compatible with old international law?“ Later in August, *Ya* reported Italian de-militarizations in Rome and a plan for Switzerland to monitor these but subsequent German occupation of Rome after Italy’s surrender gave the Pope grounds for skepticism about the protection given by open city status. Such skepticism was justified when bombs from an aircraft of unknown nationality slightly damaged the Vatican in November 1943, producing „shock“ all over the world and condemnation by both English and German bishops. *Razón y Fe*, whilst emphasizing Rome's predicament, placed it in the context of the papal messages which had constantly stressed the greater enormity of war on the innocent. An article declared that „total war, from blockade to psychological warfare, from incendiary bombs to [propaganda], is aimed to destroy the rights of the innocent. The moral law is universal, there are no exceptions.“²⁵

25. See *Ya*, 29 July 1943- 1 August 1943, for references to Hamburg. For comments on Rome, see *Ya*, 14 August 1943, 1 for bombing, *Ibid.*, 15 August 1943, 1, for Italian declaration, *Ibid.*, 17 August 1943, 3, for „London’s“ rejection, *Ibid.*, 25 August 1943, 1, for Italian demilitarizations, *Ibid.*, 26 August 1943, 1, for Swiss monitoring.; *DIHGF*, Tomo IV 26 October 1943, 551, for papal skepticism; *Signo*, no.188, 21 August 1943, „What is an open city?“, *Signo*, no. 200, 13 November 1943, 4 and *Ya*, 9 November 1943, 1,2, 3, for attack on the Vatican; *Razón y Fe*, nos. 548-549, Sept-Oct, 1943, 177, 185, for total war and the innocent.

By the end of the year, in Italy the innocent were increasingly threatened on land as from the air. *Juventud* presciently warned of the threat to the ancient abbey of Monte Cassino caused by the Allied advance and the Pope made a plea to all belligerents to respect Vatican neutrality as fighting approached Rome itself. In February, 1944, Monte Cassino was totally destroyed, the outlying papal estate of Castelgandolfo, packed with refugees, was bombed with loss of life, and Rome was again attacked. United States Archbishop Spellman's condemnation and declaration „the peace of the Vatican is necessary for civilization,“ was, as a reflection of Spanish Church views, prominently reported in the Spanish Catholic press.²⁶

Faced with a possible catastrophe in Rome as the land war approached, the Vatican made strenuous international efforts to influence opinion to support the city's inviolability. In this campaign, the Spanish Church, asked to play a prominent role, responded with a will. In the largest, most comprehensive campaign of the war, the episcopate and every Catholic publication and organization was involved. There were prayers in every church and even street demonstrations to „save Rome.“ In early March, *Signo* hinted at Spanish intervention. The Spanish episcopate saw a direct threat to the Church equivalent to that from the „Reds“ in 1937 and accordingly published its only *Cartas Colectivas* of the European war, addressed to the Pope on March 19 and to the Spanish government on March 24. The government in response offered mediation with both sides and proposed the setting up of a commission of neutrals under Spanish

²⁶ See *Juventud*, 14 December 1943, 1, for Monte Cassino, *Ya*, 30 November 1943, 1, for papal plea, *Ibid*, 6 February 1944, 1, for Castelgandolfo, *Ibid*, 17 February 1944, 1, for destruction of Monte Cassino, *Ibid*, 23 February 1944, 1, for Spellman protest.

leadership „to ensure reasonable conditions for the respect of the city of the martyrs, capital of Christianity.“²⁷

This huge Spanish response reflected genuine moral concern. A threat to the Vatican was a potential threat to the mission of the Spanish Church. A political element was also present. Spain was under an Anglo-American oil embargo as the Western Allies attempted to pressure the regime into ending wolfram sales to Germany, using moral arguments in justification. Spanish Church action on the Vatican's behalf would not only cement relations with the Holy See but would counter Allied moral pretensions. Indeed, this action did cause the Allies some embarrassment as their diplomatic responses show. The United States resorted to blaming Germany's use of Rome for military purposes and Eden for Britain was obliged to repeat the lie that it was British policy to bomb military targets only. Nor to the Spanish hierarchy were the public responses by the United States and Germany to questions put by Irish leader De Valera on their respective attitudes to the inviolability of Rome convincing. *Ecclesia* accordingly referred to the „embarrassment and shamed phrases with which mutually both tried to shift the blame.“ Crucially, however, *Ecclesia* noted that „neither side has agreed to put the subject to an international authority“, as the Spanish government and Church hierarchy alike were probably aware would be the case.²⁸

²⁷ See Maglione to Nuncios and Apostolic Delegates, 29 February 1944, no. 64, 174, for world appeal, Maglione to Cicognani, 29 February 1944, no.65, 175, for appeal to Spain, both *ADSS*, vol.11; *Signo*, no. 216, 4 March 1944, 1, for intervention hint.; The *Cartas Colectivas* are reproduced in Jesús Iribarren, *Documentos colectivos del Episcopado Español, 1870-1974*, (Madrid: La Editoriál Católica, 1974). See Cicognani to Maglione, 21 March 1944, no. 117, 229-230, Spanish Ambassador to Vatican Secretary of State, 23 March 1944, no. 125, 238-239, for Spanish responses, both *ADSS* vol. 11.

²⁸ See Tittman to Tardini, 19 March 1944, no. 108, 221-222; Osborne to Maglione, 27 March 1944, no.133, 244-245, *ADSS* vol.11, for US and British diplomatic responses; *Ecclesia*, no.146, 29 April 1944, 4(ed.) for public responses.

In April, *Signo* published an impeccably argued collective judgment by the Chapter of International Law of the Spanish universities on the obligations of belligerents in the case of Rome and the Vatican. Whilst this supported the Vatican's case, it had of course no more effect on the conduct of the belligerents than the moral support of that case from neutrals and even from Catholics in Allied countries. More significantly for democracies, a current poll showed only 19% of Americans „disapprove of bombing European religious places when military leaders consider it necessary“ whilst 75% of the British still believed that their air force bombed „strictly military targets.“ Naturally, among belligerents, the argument that such action saved soldiers lives, whether or not true, was always powerful. Moreover, in the midst of the wolfram dispute, Spanish initiatives on behalf of Rome were received by Allied governments „with some suspicion.“²⁹

In the end, Rome was abandoned by the Nazis without a fight. *Ya* published a thanksgiving telegram from Primate Plá to the Pope who *Signo* somewhat idealistically declared „saviour of Rome.“ Interesting indicators of the shift in Spanish alignment are seen in *Ya*'s prominent reporting of Spellman's visit to thank Roosevelt for Rome's preservation and in that not even the *falangist* press attempted to give the Nazis any credit. Nazi military power was obviously waning and, thanks partly to the Church's efforts, in Spain, except as a counterweight to the dread Bolsheviks, Nazism had exhausted its credit even amongst those with whom it had ever possessed any. There is no indication that the Allies were influenced by the „Save Rome“ campaign. Castelgandolfo and its refugees were bombed again as late as May 12 even if the centre of Rome was

²⁹ *Ecclesia*, no.145, 22 April 1944, 3,(ed.) cites support from Canada, Australia, the University of Washington and even „the English Episcopate“; poll, *Washington News*, cited in Cardenas to MAE, 20 April 1944, „suspicion“ cited in MAE to Ambassador „Holy See, 24 April 1944, both AMAE Leg. R 2221, Exp.10. See Garrett, *Ethics and Air Power*, 88, for British figures.

not. To the Spanish Church, the destruction of Rome and the Vatican would have been, in *Razón y Fe*'s words, reflecting the Pope's „an abomination in the eyes of God“, and would also have been a crippling blow to the international Church. However, *Signo*'s pictures of ruined Monte Cassino graphically illustrated the sovereignty of „military necessity“ in total war. That doctrine probably saved Rome and in different circumstances would have destroyed it.³⁰

Razón y Fe commented in April 1944 that „nobody foresaw the full horrors of this war in September 1939.“ Before D-Day, there was extensive Allied bombing of their former French ally. Genuine military objectives were targeted but the need to blanket a wide area to avoid revealing the invasion's destination caused destruction and a considerable number of civilian casualties. Spanish Catholic comment was, however, balanced and restrained. This restraint reflected both increasing Allied dominance in the war and the Church's attempt to gain credibility for its concurrent attempts to save Rome. *Ya* reported sympathetically how the struggle between military necessity and the moral and political effects of wounding a past and future ally could divide the Church. In May, 1944, it published both an appeal by the French prelates against this bombing and their British equivalents' response of military necessity for France's future liberation. Perhaps an even greater unforeseen horror was the Nazi launching of V1 and V2 rockets against London. *Ya* strongly deplored this „attack on a defenceless civil population“ and, recalling its 1943 campaign rather than its 1940 stance, claimed „the position of the Catholic press

³⁰ See *Ya*, 7 June 1944, 3, for Plá's telegram, *Ibid.*, 16 June 1944, 3, for Spellman, *Ibid.*, 13 May 1944, 1 for Castelgandolfo; *Signo*, no.230, 10 June 1944, 1, for Pope as „saviour“; *Ibid.*, no. 227, 20 May 1944, 1, for Monte Cassino; *Razón y Fe*, no. 555, April 1944, 321, for „abomination.“

is consistent." In September, *Ecclesia* strongly seconded Pius XII's sympathetic message to Britain urging the people to „bear their trials with Christian forgiveness."³¹

However, the Spanish Church in the light of its own war experience realistically appreciated that Christian forgiveness was unlikely in the atmosphere of total war. In November, *Ya* published British reports admitting that the bombing of cities would not decide the war but the destruction of Dresden was reported with little comment. In March, 1945, similarly, *Signo* published without comment the Archbishop of Munich's pastoral detailing the extent of the destruction in his city. With the war nearing its end and V-weapons still falling on England, moral condemnation would achieve little. Moreover, with Spain's future perhaps in the balance, to offend the Allies was as politically unwise as to offend the Nazis would have been in autumn 1940.³²

During the war, the Nazis consistently used aerial terror as an instrument of policy, somewhat restrained early in the war only when the possibility of retaliation existed. The British began the war with extreme scrupulousness, for reasons compounded of a similar fear of retaliation and concern for world, particularly American opinion, as well as moral reserve. This chapter has described the reasons for the abandonment of that reserve. Though the effectiveness of area bombing has been hotly debated, its protagonists make valid points, even if agreeing that German morale was not shattered nor was vital German production curtailed until later in the war. Supporters see the offensive as forcing a German change to home defence and to fighter as against bomber production and a near disappearance of the *Luftwaffe* from the Eastern front and in the vital period of the

³¹See *Razón y Fe*, no. 555, April 1944, 321, for „horrors" *Ya*, 16 May 1944, 3 for French prelates, *Ibid.*, 30 May 1944, 9, for British response, *Ibid.*, 20 June 1944, 1, for V1 condemnation; *Ecclesia*, no. 164, 2 September 1944, 19, for papal message.

³² See *Ya*, 5 November 1944, 4, for British report, *Ibid.*, 16 February 1945, 1 and 17 February 1945, 1, for Dresden; *Signo*, no. 272, 31 March 1945, 8, for Archbishop of Munich.

Normandy landings. These are of course retrospective arguments. Their validity was unclear at the time. What was clear during the war was that, for a time, bombing was the only way in which the Western Allies could hit back directly at Germany. Its effects in curtailing German production then seemed credible and indeed did achieve this objective as accuracy improved late in the war. Moreover, in the inevitable hardening of attitudes produced by a total war, arguments that the Nazis were „reaping the whirlwind“ were seen as widely relevant. Only with the war virtually won was there some Allied revulsion. Garrett records Churchill distancing himself somewhat from the offensive after Dresden and cites post-war comments by war historians Fuller and Liddell Hart.³³

In 1939, Spain and its Church possessed a first hand experience of terror bombing unique in Europe. However, that experience inhibited rather than encouraged Spaniards to speak out unless the hated Soviets were the perpetrators, just as the Church had been equally reluctant to speak out about Nationalist bombing during the Civil War. Above all, the Church was primarily motivated by a threat to its mission posed by any return to Spain of that war’s destruction and later by a similar threat posed by a feared destruction of Rome. In autumn 1940, Spanish Church reticence was possibly compelled by the country’s political situation, but when reticence became one-sidedness, the probity of Spanish Catholic opinion was fatally compromised in the view of the Allies. In its campaigns in May 1943 against area bombing and its efforts to save Rome, the Spanish Church did stand out in defence of important *jus in bello* principles of proportionality and discrimination, safeguards against the risk of war descending into barbarism even when its cause is just. It likewise attempted to defend a priceless centre of European religion and civilization against destruction. Both campaigns caused the Allies some

³³ See Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, 29 for Churchill, 105 for Liddell Hart, 109 for Fuller.

embarrassment. However, the Allies could claim inconsistency of attitude and political rather than purely moral motivation on the part of the Spanish Church, charges, as we have seen, true enough to be credible. Neither Spanish campaign therefore seriously challenged Allied policy or opinion. Not until area bombing was no longer seen as needed for victory did that opinion begin to turn against it.

Chapter 10. The Church and Total War. The Treatment of Conquered Peoples.

To the powers of occupying territories during the war, We say with all due consideration: let your conscience guide you in dealing justly, humanely and providentially with the people of occupied territories. Do not impose on them burdens which you are in similar circumstances have felt or would feel unjust. Pius XII, Easter Message, 13 April 1941. Available at *Internet Modern History Sourcebook*, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410413b.htm>

Whenever you come across anything that might be needed by the German people you must be after it like a bloodhound. It must be taken out ... and brought to Germany. Hermann Goering, Instruction. Cited in, *Trial of the Major War Criminals: Nuremberg Documents and Testimony*, IX, 634.

[In France today], *it is prohibited to belong to a secret or Communist society, possess arms, criticize a state institution or personalities, listen to anti-national radio stations, buy or sell land without permission, acquire or use materials to print or copy, open or take over a new business, divorce if married less than three years, ...drink coffee after 3 pm..., drive a car faster than 80 kph., use hot water in the bath except on Saturday or Sunday ... [etc.].* Ya, 21 May 1942, 3.

Even as World War II was still being fought, the Western Allies made clear to the world that the Nazis, under the guise of bringing a „new order“ to Europe, were ruthlessly exploiting the economic and human resources of occupied countries and oppressing their peoples. This chapter will go beyond these well-known facts. It will examine how the Spanish Church revealed to Spanish Catholics through the Church’s press its perceptions of Nazi occupation policies and consider the interplay of the moral and the political that governed that perception. The chapter will also call attention to the effects of Communist occupation in Eastern Europe early and late in the war. These effects were often downplayed by the Western Allies because of their Soviet alliance but were highlighted by the Spanish Church in consequence of its detestation of Communism. Total war policies resulted in myriad human needs. We will consider the efforts of the Vatican and the Spanish Church to alleviate such needs, including their endeavours on behalf of prisoners of war. This chapter will also highlight the frequent frustration of these efforts

by the Nazis, the Communists, and occasionally even by the Western Allies. We will also examine German recruitment of Spanish volunteer workers, the strenuous efforts of the Spanish Church to guard against their ideological contamination and the impact of these efforts on the Church's response to the Nazi conscription of other foreign workers.

The liberal optimist framers of the Hague Conventions had envisaged the occupation of foreign territory as a temporary consequence of war, during which there would be mutual respect for the rights of occupier and occupied. When peace ensued, occupied territory would be evacuated or would no longer be foreign in consequence of transfer by treaty from the loser to the winner of the war. Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 had provided a recent model and memory. Though First World War experience might have given some indication of what might be expected in a new war, what was not generally anticipated as World War II began was a semblance of „peace“ within war for whole nations occupied for years whilst their occupier attempted to subdue remaining enemies. Equally unanticipated were occupiers devoid of conscience, contemptuous of custom and determined, under the propaganda guise of a „new European order“ on exploiting every economic and human resource of the conquered.¹

In Catholic teaching, the objective of a just war was of course a just peace. Just war doctrine envisaged that attitudes to the peoples of any temporarily occupied territory should follow the *jus in bello* principles of discrimination and proportionality. The papacy had, however, no illusions about Communism and Nazism both of which it had denounced. Perceptive Churchmen anticipated that during any prolonged Nazi or

¹ www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hagueo4.htm

Such are the assumptions underlying for example, Articles 1 and 3 and in particular the Annex: Section III: Military Authority over the territory of a Hostile State, - notably Articles 43, 46,47,50,52.

Communist occupation, the occupied would face religious persecution. They knew that a view of individual insignificance, particularity of individuals of other races or classes, underlay these ideologies. Nazi and Communist occupiers were therefore likely to plunder foreign economic resources and exploit occupied peoples.

The Spanish Church was particularly aware of this reality. Many Spanish Catholics could draw on their own *Guerra Civil* experience of „Communist“ occupation in anticipating the spiritual and material deprivation that occupied Poland“s Catholic population would face. As early as September, 1939, *Ya* signalled its support of the Vatican's commitment to aid war victims. In October, *Osservatore Romano*'s report of „Sovietization“ and ill treatment in Poland“s Russian zone was widely reprinted and British intelligence was already reporting widespread Spanish fears at Bolshevism“s westward spread. Franco, personally sharing these fears and politically using them to improve relations with the Spanish Church and the Vatican, expressed „strong support for Roman and Christian values.“ *Razón y Fe* reproduced and endorsed the Pope“s October encyclical condemning the practical implications of „statism.“ At Christmas 1939, Pius XII made a strong if general denunciation of widespread disregard for „human life and liberty.“ This condemnation was widely reported and supported in the Spanish Catholic press, though naturally in the context of the Finnish war given a strongly anti-Communist implication. However, some Spanish Catholics in early 1940 knew of Nazi persecution in Poland through Vatican broadcasts, constantly advertised by *Signo*. Others close to the hierarchy and the regime learned of such persecution through a petition sent through the Spanish ambassador to the Holy See from Polish members of Rome“s Gregorian College,

to aid Polish priests and seminarians in German concentration camps. Franco's „generous intervention“ on their behalf was requested.²

In June 1940, Osborne's report of a recent papal address to the College of Cardinals showed that the Pope was well aware of the abuses arising from foreign occupation. Pius XII declared that for those nations occupying foreign territories, there was a duty to establish a rule of law with respect for the lives, honour and property of the conquered, their religious rights and the rights of families. Criticism of the policies of Nazi and Communist occupiers was already implicit, although the Church could not yet anticipate the degree or details of the abuse and exploitation of the conquered which would follow. In Spain, the „Vatican's voice,“ *Razón y Fe* strongly re-emphasized the Pope's Christmas words on the rights of the innocent as the spring and summer of 1940 saw a vastly increased number of Europeans come under Nazi and Communist occupation.³

Knowing the Church's endemic hatred of Communism, we are unsurprised to read *Ya*'s accusation that areas occupied by Russia would pass from civilization to barbarism. In the Baltic States, mass deportations, economic exploitation and of course religious persecution were to be uncovered a year later and widely reported in Spain as these areas were „liberated“ by the Nazis.⁴

In the West, Nazi occupation seemed initially milder. There was much talk of a „new order“ in Europe which even influenced Catholic circles. *Ya* in September, without endorsing Nazism, expressed hope for a „new order“ in Europe of regeneration and

² See *Ya*, 24 September 1939,1, for Vatican aid, *ABC*,18 October 1939,10, for Sovietization, *WPIS*, no.3, 17 October 1939, 8, and no.4, 24 October 1939,8-9 for Spanish fears and Franco's declaration, *Razón y Fe*, no. 503, December 1939, 308 for statism, 388-392 for encyclical (first part). See chap. 6, 129, for strongly anti-communist interpretation of Pius XII's Christmas message. See *DIHGF*, Tomo II-I, 9 February 1940, 85, for Gregorians' request.

³ See Osborne to Halifax, 4 June 1940, FO 380/48, NAUK, for report. See *Razón y Fe*, no. 508, May 1940, 81, for re-emphasis of papal message.

⁴ See *Ya*, 29 June 1940, 1(ed.).

prosperity. Even the Pope's 1940 Christmas message, headlined by *Ya*, enunciated principles of a „new order“ in Europe. The Pope's „new order“ had of course nothing in common with Nazism's. Though, as Shirer reports, „no comprehensive blueprint for the New Order was ever drawn up.“ Alan Millward admirably catches its essence - „the German occupations came to resemble gigantic looting operations. There was little that was new and less that was orderly in the “New Order,”” as rivalry reigned within Nazi administrations. These progressively escalating depredations would reduce the occupied nations, particularly France, to penury. However, this was not immediately obvious. Though Nazi persecution of Jews soon became apparent, there was initially no anti-Catholic persecution, indeed in France the new Vichy regime seemed likely to improve the position of the Church. Even Nazi conscription of human resources was at first voluntary. In Spain, the Church feared that its country faced Nazi occupation or satellite status and worked to prevent such an eventuality, which it perceived as disastrous for its spiritual mission. Consequently, the Spanish Church was far less critical of Nazi than of Communist occupation. In August, 1940, *Ya* printed a picture of smiling Belgian volunteers going to work in Germany „in the best social conditions.“⁵

The Vatican also avoided direct criticism of Nazi occupation. In April 1941, however, with most of Europe under foreign occupation, Pius XII publicly enunciated the Church's view on the duty of occupiers, in essence a variant of the Golden Rule. In Spain, *Ecclesia* reprinted the Pope's message and supported it with a strong editorial. Moreover, the astute Spanish Catholic reader could follow in *Ya*'s regular reports from Paris how far

⁵ See *Ya*, 1 September 1940, 1(ed.) for „new order“, 25 December 1940, 1, for papal Christmas message, 20 August 1940, 1, for picture. See Shirer, *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 937 for „no blueprint“ comment. Shirer, *Ibid*, 943 lists some of the depredations; 9000000 tons of cereals, 75% of total French oats production, 80% of French oil, 74% of French steel, to name a few commodities, as well as huge financial exactions. See Alan Millward, *The German Economy at War* (London: Athlone, 1965), 52, for looting.

the occupation of France negated the Pope's precepts as France was progressively impoverished. By March, 1941, these reports spoke of the „martyrdom of the middle class,“ with huge inflation in food prices. „Dr. Ersatz“ ruled with the appearance of the first shoes of paper and wood and the black market reached into every aspect of life. By June, the Paris meat ration, when available, was 250g per week and *Ya*'s reporter asserted, „the stomach exerts a grim tyranny.“ By early 1942, there were severe food shortages in Vichy, shortages which by May had extended to medical products. In June 1942, to the French, the most important battle being fought was „the battle of the potato.“ By July, the French food situation everywhere was „grave.“⁶

At first, criticism of the German occupation was muted, readers left to draw the logical conclusion for the source of French misery. The Spanish Church would do nothing to provoke a Nazi invasion of Spain. Moreover, the collaborationist Vichy regime was desecularizing schools, an imperative for the Church's mission everywhere. *Ya* therefore expressed the Spanish Church's concurrence with French Cardinal Henri Baudrillart's assertion that collaboration was better than civil war and Communism. By July 1941, with the *Wehrmacht* occupied in Russia, Spain and the Church had a little more freedom. Moreover, Nazi religious persecution in occupied Europe was worsening. The British realized that this fact would powerfully influence Spanish Catholics. Their propaganda to Spain by leaflet and radio improved. The British avoided the counterproductive Republican exiles previously favoured by the BBC, and used British Catholic sources trusted within the Spanish Church, like Cardinal Hinsley and the

⁶ The Golden Rule: Matthew 7: 12, Therefore all things whatsoever you would that men should do to you do ye even so to them for this is the law and the prophets. See *Ecclesia*, no. 9, 1 May 1941, 24 -25 for the Pope's Easter message in full, 2 for editorial. *Ya*, reports, 13 March 1941, 1; 18 March 1941, 8; 8 June 1941, 1; 24 January 1942, 3; 20 May 1942, 3; 3 June 1942, 3; 11 July 1942, 1.

Catholic journal *Tablet*. British broadcasts detailing instances of religious persecution in occupied countries as well as in Germany began to make an impact in Spain. Vatican initiatives in early 1942 urging leading Spanish Catholics to denounce such persecution received a strong response. Nazi religious persecution in Holland featured prominently in a pastoral by the Bishop of Calahorra in February. Guarded criticism of other aspects of occupation also began to emerge in the Catholic press. *Ya*, in February, 1942 commented cautiously that the French were not anti-German, rather anti-occupier. In May, *Ya* published a long, satirical list, noted above, of things currently prohibited in France. By September, *El Correo de Andalucia*, was referring outright, if delicately, to the „transfer“ of metals and electric power from France to Germany.⁷

In February, 1941, Franco as part of his placatory tactics forestalling Nazi pressure to enter the war had conceded to Germany a right to recruit Spanish volunteers to work in the *Reich*. Typically 'Francoist' delaying tactics were employed and only in November did the first recruits depart. Publicly, the Church linked this recruitment with the „anti-Bolshevik crusade.“ *Ya* described the workers as „a brotherhood similar to that of our soldiers in Russia.“ *El Correo de Andalucia* noted the perfect German organization, the very advantageous contracts, and in Seville, the great interest shown about „work in a friendly country.“ Privately, the Spanish hierarchy and the Vatican were gravely concerned. They shared spiritual fears for the welfare of those going to work under an anti-religious regime and political worries that the workers would become indoctrinated with anti-Catholic Nazism and return to spread it in Spain. The nuncio was involved in

⁷ See p.110, for Vatican initiative and Calahorra pastoral. See *Ya*, 10 May 1941, 3 for Cardinal Baudrillart, 1 February 1942, 3 for France as anti-occupier, 21 May 1942, 3, for prohibitions, an incomplete list of which is printed at the head of this chapter. See correspondence, McCann to Ministry of Information and Roberts to Foreign Office, 30 July 1941, 1 August 1941 and replies for British propaganda, FO 371/26951, NAUK. See *El Correo de Andalucia*, 6 September 1942, 8, for „transfers.“

the final agreement in August. Shortly after the workers' departure, Toledo's Apostolic Administrator wrote to Suñer of the „urgent“ need for Spanish priests to be sent to attend their spiritual needs. The Nazis for months practiced the „Francoist“ tactics of procrastination and delay. In September, 1942, the Industrial Commission supervising the agreement suggested that the workers were mainly uneducated had „extremist tendencies and a low morality.“ The Church nonetheless persisted and in November, the Nazis permitted the entry of three priests so long as these were „pro-German in their political orientation.“ Even at that, the first priest was in March, 1943, „deliberately isolated without facilities to exercise his mission“ and the Bishop of Barcelona therefore hesitated to send others.⁸

In contrast to the volunteers of the Blue Division, we hear very little of the Spanish volunteer workers, prompting belief in the accuracy of the Industrial Commission's assessment. However, their presence in Germany increased Spanish Catholic interest in the fate of other foreign workers there. In May 1942, German recruitment of French workers was announced as an „interchange“, though what if anything the Germans were giving in exchange *Ya*'s readers were not told. Initial reports of an „influx“, in existing French economic conditions, are not unbelievable. In August, *Ya* announced, as more

⁸ See *Ya*, 28 February 1941, 1, for original concession; 23 November 1941, for „brotherhood“, *El Correo de Andalucía*, 25 November 1941, 1 and 8, for „perfect organization.“ The Church's struggle to prevent Spanish workers in Germany being contaminated by Nazi doctrines may be followed in AMAE Leg R 2225, Exp.6. See Apostolic Administrator, Toledo to Suñer, 11 December 1941 and 23 December 1941, for initial request and response to Suñer's assertion of Nazi reluctance; Letter, President of Commission, 11 September 1942, for comments on workers; *note verbal*, 6 November 1942, for reluctant permission to send „German oriented“ priests; complaint of Bishop of Barcelona about isolation of priest, 18 March 1943- all in that file.

French workers departed, that priests would be available in all areas where workers were sent, a reassurance to the relatives of Spanish workers already in Germany.⁹

With increased Allied bombing of Germany, initial enthusiasm to volunteer to work there soon faded. Though in late September, 1942, Reich labor commissioner Fritz Sauckel claimed „Germany has solved its problem of lack of workers,“ this boast was rapidly given the lie by Vichy leader Pierre Laval’s threat of compulsion. The Nazi announcement on November 1 that recruitment would not be forced in unoccupied France was made worthless by France’s total occupation a few days later. *Ya*’s report of the German bribe of the release of one French prisoner of war for every volunteer worker was a subtle reminder to Spanish Catholics of the vast number of these unfortunates detained since the 1940 armistice.¹⁰

The Spanish Church at first noted with approval that the French Church’s concern for the spiritual welfare of French workers in Germany complemented its own efforts on behalf of Spanish workers. In February, 1943 *Ya* reported that priests would accompany French workers to Germany and praised the previous sending of over 4000 parcels of religious material. However, the Spanish hierarchy’s experience of Nazi obstruction soon increased doubts, expressed in June when *Ecclesia* published and supported a strong collective pastoral by several French bishops. This pastoral emphasized the spiritual effects on homes and families as well as on the workers themselves. It stated that the Church’s efforts to send French priests „have not received satisfaction.“ The pastoral

⁹ See *Ya*, 27 June 1942, 3 for „interchange“, 30 June 1942, 1, for „influx“ 2 August 1942, 4, for religious facilities.

¹⁰ See *Ya*, 26 September 1942, 3 for Sauckel statement, 9 October 1942, 1 and 10 October 1942, 4, for Laval’s statements, 1 November 1942, 3, for Nazi pledge regarding unoccupied zone and prisoner release.

strongly stated „we cannot let pass abuses against the most basic humanity.“¹¹ Compared to these unfortunate French conscripts, the Spanish workers in Germany, as volunteers from an unoccupied country, retained not only the concern of their Church but representation from their government. As bombing of Germany became increasingly severe at the end of 1943, the Spanish ambassador in Berlin reported to Madrid on the need to repatriate Spanish workers, beginning a process by which most progressively returned home. Conscripts from other countries often had to await Allied liberation.¹²

By mid-1943, with the war tilting towards the Allies, the Spanish Church could afford to express through its press more criticism of Nazi occupation. In June, *Ya* published a strong article outlining the economic problems caused by armies of occupation- inflation, black markets and a shortage of supplies. By August, conscription of French workers was increasing and economic conditions and repression worsening. By September, France was „descending into chaos.“ Elsewhere, the Catholic traditionalist *Alcazar* published the results of the only free election held in Nazi-occupied Europe. In Denmark, the winning social democrats gained 186,000 votes, the Danish Nazi party 552. *Alcazar* made no comment, none was needed. The result was a crushing repudiation of Nazism by a conquered people even under by far Europe“s most lenient occupation.¹³

The Spanish Church gladly reported and supported any attempts to alleviate human suffering in an increasingly total and inhumane war. Where it had any influence, particularly with the relatively humane Italians and British, the Vatican used that

¹¹ See *Ya*, 9 February 1943, 3, for priests and parcels; *Ecclesia*, no.102, 26 June 1943, 6, for pastoral.

¹² From Vidal (Berlin) 24 November 1943, quoted in Tomo IV, 632, *DIHGF*. The number of Spanish workers in Germany was at peak about 8,000.

¹³See *Ya*, 12 June 1943, 3 for economic problems, 12 August 1943, 3 for increased conscription, 20 August 1943, 3 for worsening repression, 7 September 1943, 1 for descent into chaos; *Alcazar*, 6 May 1943, 3, for Denmark.

influence to provide spiritual and material aid to prisoners of war. Such initiatives were strongly approved by the Spanish hierarchy. *Ecclesia* prominently reported papal charity and praised initiatives by Vatican officials to provide, with British cooperation, pilgrimages for Italian prisoners of war in the middle-east to Palestine's holy places in December 1941. *Signo* reported Church outreach to Italian prisoners as far away as Australia. *Ya* quoted a neutral report describing Italian treatment of British prisoners as „good“, a fact which Vatican documents confirm from British testimony. The Church commended an Anglo-Italian exchange agreement for gravely sick prisoners of war and for repatriation of non-combatants from former Italian East Africa under Vatican auspices. Hopes expressed of an extension to match the scale of such exchanges arranged by Benedict XV in World War I remained unrealized. The Spanish Church itself participated in several exchanges of sick and wounded prisoners via Barcelona. *Signo* commented that diplomats from both sides, including Hoare, praised the Church and authorities which, „with Spanish generosity,“ aided the exchanges.¹⁴ In general, in the West, even the Nazis treated prisoners of war with sufficient decency for the furore erupting in the wake of the 1942 Dieppe raid to be treated as exceptional. When, during military operations, Germans taken prisoner were chained, *El Correo de Andalucia* reported, in September 1942, German chaining of British prisoners captured at Dieppe as a „reprisal.“ Claim and counterclaim continued for months, reported, at this pivotal stage of the war, objectively by Spain’s Catholic press, until both sides had exhausted the

¹⁴See *Ecclesia*, no. 38, 4 April 1942, 7, for papal charity; no. 24, 15 December 1941, 26, and no. 27, 17 January 1942, 21, for pilgrimages, *Signo*, no.122, 16 May 1942, 6, for Australia, no. 198, 30 October 1943, 1; no.228, 27 May 1944, 6; no.232, 24 June 1944, 6, for Spanish exchanges; *Ya*, 6 June 1943, 3 for neutral report; Duca (papal nuncio, Italy) to Maglione, 31 December 1940, doc. 217, 320 *ADSS* vol. 4, for confirmation; AMAE, Leg R 2195, Exp. 58, for Anglo-Italian agreement.

issue's propaganda value and mutual self interest suggested a reversion to relatively humane practice.¹⁵

Throughout the war, the Vatican attempted to extend its charity to those conquered peoples it could reach. Even in the West however, the British, correctly seeing Nazi looting as the root cause of civilian distress, were, in the context of total war, less cooperative with the Church's efforts to aid civilians than with its attempts to help prisoners of war. Britain was not prepared to allow Papal charity through the blockade to reach Belgium and particularly Greece where it was urgently needed. In Spain, the Vatican's voice, *Razón y Fe* alluded to „blockades and counter-blockades“ in hampering the supply of the necessities of life.¹⁶

In the East, both Nazis and Communists totally excluded any Catholic attempt at charitable outreach. From 1939 onwards, information from Russian-controlled areas remained scanty. *Signo* emphasized that Stalin from the start of the Nazi invasion had refused all co-operation with the papal information office for prisoners of war. Nor could the Church obtain much information from Nazi-occupied Poland. In the Nazi-occupied Polish *Warthegau*, where religious persecution was particularly virulent, the nuncio's protests were persistently rejected and the nuncio denied permission to visit. When the nuncio relayed a Vatican plea to send incarcerated Polish priests to a neutral country, the Nazis replied with the „concession“ of incarcerating them together in Dachau. The Nazis vetoed Vatican attempts to send charitable aid to Poland. When a letter from Krakow's archbishop Adam Sapieha, was smuggled out to the Vatican, its contents were deemed so

¹⁵ *El Correo de Andalucía*, 3 September 1942, 8 for „reprisal“; *Ya*, 3 September 1942, 1, 8 October 1942, 1, 11 October 1942, 3, 14 October 1942, 1, 17 October 1942, 4, 18 December 1942, 1 for conflicting claims.

¹⁶ See Introduction, 58 and 64, *ADSS*, vol.8, for British refusal to allow papal relief through the blockade. See *Razón y Fe*, nos. 522 – 523, July-August 1941, 338 and nos. 548 – 549, September-October 1943, 183, for effects on innocents.

horrifying that the Vatican, fearing Nazi reprisals, would not publish it. For similar reasons, and a lack of information, the Vatican's radio campaign about conditions in Poland had been suspended in February 1940. For much of the war, most Spanish Catholics had to rely on unreported Allied propaganda and word of mouth reports from Blue Division veterans for knowledge of Nazi occupation policies in the East. However, in November 1943, such sources received confirmation when *Ecclesia* was able to reprint the German bishops' Fulda pastoral of the previous August which not only alluded to the suppression of religious education in Germany but referred to the suppression of religion in the *Warthegau* and „de-Christianization“ elsewhere.¹⁷

In contrast, whilst the Nazis were advancing on the Eastern Front, Spanish Catholics had ample opportunity to learn of Communist treatment of the conquered in Nazi „liberated“ areas. Accounts of religious persecution were common. From the first, *Ya* carried reports of Russian shooting and torture of German prisoners, even reporting in November 1941, that Stalin had given orders to shoot all captured Germans. Though this was untrue, *Ya* in early 1943 reported an act of Soviet „bestiality“ alleging that Russia's prisoners had all their clothes removed to prevent escapes. One Communist atrocity reported around the Catholic world was the Katyn massacre of 15000 Polish officers. This had happened in the spring of 1940, was uncovered by the Nazi advance, and was revealed by the Nazis in the spring of 1943, probably as a diversion from their own crimes, currently the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. The Catholic world was shocked.

¹⁷ See *Signo*, no.136, 22 August 1942, 6 for Stalin; See Memoranda of State Secretary, no. 183, 319, 19 March 1941 and no. 474, 739, 8 May 1941, vol. 12, *GDFP* for Nazi obstruction of the nuncio's protests and efforts to visit the Polish *Warthegau*. See Orsenigo to Maglione, 13 November 1940, *ADSS* vol.3/1, no. 223, 328-329, for Nazi „concession.“ 2647 Polish priests were killed by the Nazis. See Oscar Halecki, „The Holy See and the Religious Situation in Central Europe, 1939-1945,“ *Catholic Historical Review* 53:3 (October 1967), 393-410. See Sapieha to Pius XII, 28 February 1942, doc.357, 539-41, vol.3/2 *ADSS* for letter. See introduction, 28 ff., vol. 6, *ADSS*, on lack of information on Russian occupied areas. See *Ecclesia*, no. 121, 6 November 1943, 7-8, for Fulda Pastoral.

A mass was held in Rome for Katyn's victims. In Spain, the Church's revulsion was reflected in the press. *Juventud* denounced Communism's „criminality.“ *Ya* castigated Communist „barbarism,“ described Katyn as „authentic genocide“ and related the massacre to Spain's own *Guerra Civil* experience. *El Español* denounced „a methodical crime“ and exposed Western attempts to downplay it. Although in the West, Catholic publications such as the American *Tablet* saw Katyn as demonstrating „the abyss between Russia and the West,“ the British and American governments had a common political interest in minimizing the massacre to reduce friction between their Polish and Russian allies. The vehemence of the Anglo-American reaction to the Spanish anti-bombing campaign that same month and imputations of its Axis inspiration were perhaps in part a reaction to embarrassment over Allied handling of Katyn.¹⁸

The following year, however, Spanish charitable initiatives were better received by the Allies. By 1944, because of Nazi looting and British refusal to relax the blockade, there was desperate need amongst conquered peoples. However, Vatican financial resources were severely strained. In supporting the Pope's appeal in May for „the victims of war,“ the Spanish Catholic Church emphasized the Vatican's mounting expenditure and reduced income in consequence of being cut off from the traditional contributions made by Catholics in currently occupied countries. Spanish Catholics responded strongly. The episcopate, in keeping with tradition, made substantial personal contributions. The 24 million pesetas (about \$2,500,000 US) raised, was a fine response from an impoverished country. With the reopening of western European frontiers in late 1944,

¹⁸ See *Ya* 19 August 1941, 3, for shooting, 21 August 1941, 3 for torture, 22 November 1941, 4 for alleged Stalin order, 12 March 1943, 1 for „bestiality“; 30 April 1943, 4, for „authentic genocide;“ *Alcazar*, 25 May 1943, 1, for mass, *Juventud*, 6 June 1943, 1 for „criminality,“; *El Español*, 8 May 1943, 3(ed.) for „methodical crime.“ US *Tablet* is cited in *Ya*, 22 May 1943, 3.

Spanish Catholics also contributed substantially to direct humanitarian aid for Belgium. Franco donated a month's salary. The *New York Times* noted Pius XII's special reference to the „charity of the head of state, government and people of Spain“¹⁹

By late 1944, this renewed contact with Western Europe and some relaxation of press censorship enabled Spanish Catholics to gain a fuller awareness of the worst features of Nazi occupation, if sometimes only obliquely. The Nazi massacre at Oradour sur Glâne, shortly after D- Day had not been reported in the Spanish press, but in November *Ecclesia* was able to report the joy of the French Church at the return of the Bishop of Limoges imprisoned for his protest at that massacre. Later that month, *Ecclesia* published an article on the trials of the Belgian Church under a Nazi occupation and religious persecution that Spain had thankfully avoided. The Belgian hierarchy had accepted the fact but not the legality of Nazi occupation. It had therefore declined collaboration and done what it could to protect victims of persecution. The price had been heavy. Many priests had been sent to concentration camps, others had gone to camps voluntarily in disguise to minister to deportees. Church property had been confiscated. *Ecclesia* was however pleased to report that the Church's principled stand had stimulated the faith of many Belgians previously indifferent to religion.²⁰

It was plain to the Church that such a principled stand and a responsive faith would soon be needed by Catholics in Eastern Europe. Europe's new occupiers in east and west would differ radically in their treatment of the Church. Whatever doubts the Spanish

¹⁹See *Ecclesia*, no.150, 27 May 1944, 3; *Signo*, no. 229, 3 June 1944, 1; *Ya*, 27 May 1944, 1 for prominence given to papal appeal. See *Signo*, no. 248, 14 October 1944, 1, for total. See *BHS*, vol. 22, no. 85, January 1945, 43, for Franco donation. See *New York Times*, 25 December, 1944, 10:2, for papal tribute.

²⁰ See *Ecclesia*, no. 173, 4 November 1944, 20, for Bishop of Limoges, no. 175, 18 November 1944, 19, for the Belgian Church.

Church possessed about Western claims to be fighting specifically for „Christian Civilization,“ religious freedom accompanied the West’s armies. Eisenhower’s promise to respect the German Church, reported in *Ya* in December 1944 was kept. In the East, the story was different. Poland was of course where the war had begun and its freedom Britain’s ostensible reason for entering the war. As the war approached its end, Poland and other Eastern European countries looked likely to pay the price of the war’s real objective, the removal of the Nazi threat, being achieved with considerable Russian help. In October 1944, *Ecclesia* reported the Russians setting up a „Committee for Religious Affairs“ to deal with relations with „minority religions.“ *Ecclesia* drew the Spanish episcopate’s prescient conclusion that, as Russia’s 1939 borders contained few adherents to such religions, the Russians were preparing for an expansion of their borders and a long occupation of Eastern Europe.²¹

With Nazism palpably on the verge of defeat, in contrast to the relative reticence of 1939, both the Vatican and the Spanish Church were outspoken about this new threat to the Church. In September 1944, Pius XII spoke of „Poland, Always faithful.“ In November, the Pope spoke of the necessity for all Catholics to defend their Polish brothers in faith in a just cause. The Pope’s speeches with full texts were prominently reported and supported in the Spanish Catholic press, which also highlighted the concerns of Catholics around the world. In January 1945, *Ya* carried appeals from the Archbishop of Westminster and from the Canadian hierarchy on behalf of Polish freedom. In February, the Catholic press published the Spanish Church’s concern over religious persecution already evident in Soviet occupied Catholic Poland and Lithuania. In March,

²¹ See *Ya*, 8 December 1944, 1, for Eisenhower promise. See *Ecclesia*, no. 169, 7 October 1944, 20, for „Committee of Religious Affairs.“

Ya featured prominently the protest of the Polish Orthodox bishops in the name of international law over the Soviet treatment of conquered Poland. In April, the call even of the bishops of far off Colombia for an independent Poland as part of a just, lasting peace was highlighted. The Soviets were of course determined that Eastern Europe would remain in their orbit. As the Hungarian Primate had perhaps foreseen in ordering priests not to flee before the advancing Soviet armies, the Catholic Church would have to deal with the new problem of substantial Catholic populations under Soviet occupation at the end of the war. In May, *Signo* reported Polish Cardinal August Hlond's „tragic report“ to the Holy See, a report making plain the difficulty and magnitude of this problem.²²

For a moment, however, even the dread prospect of a Communist Eastern Europe paled as the Church contemplated revelations of Nazi atrocities in the concentration camps. On 21 April 1945, *Ya* headlined Churchill's denunciation of Nazi atrocities and quoted an eyewitness report on Buchenwald's „Dantesque spectacle.“ *Ya* provided further reports from Buchenwald as well as giving a figure of 30,000 deaths at Dachau. The correspondent of Madrid Monarchist newspaper *ABC*, visiting Dachau, was so overcome as to report that no words would come as he tried to describe the scene. *ABC* printed a synopsis of the British parliamentary report on Buchenwald but pictures were deemed too horrifying for the Spanish press to print. With the world looking at Germany with revulsion, the Pope's allocation to the cardinals in June 1945 was perhaps timely. Those German Catholics who had confronted racist idolatry and remained faithful during

²² See *Ecclesia*, no. 166, 16 September 1944, 5 and 6, and no. 176, 25 November, 1944, 11, for full texts of September and November papal speeches. See *Ya*, 14 January 1945, 1 and 27 January, 1945, 3, for declarations of Archbishop of Westminster and Canadian hierarchy. See *Ecclesia*, no. 188, 17 February 1945, 19, and *Ya*, 9 February 1945, 3, for religious persecution. See *Ya*, 4 March 1945, 1, for Polish Orthodox Bishops and 20 April 1945, 5, for Colombian protest. See *Ecclesia*, no.188, 17 February 1945, 19, for Hungarian primate's instruction. See *Signo*, no. 277, 5 May 1945, 1, for „tragic“ Hlond report.

persecution were commended by the Pope whose words were praised in both *Ecclesia* and *Signo*.²³

In Spain, as the war ended, *Ecclesia* cited Cardinal Segura's survey of a Europe ruined in a moral and religious as well as in a material sense. Madrid newspapers *ABC* and *El Español* linked Buchenwald and Katyn as evidence of a European reversion to barbarism. The latter quoted the Spanish Primate's condemnation of the „fratricide of European nations.“ There was thankfulness that Spaniards had been spared the wartime horrors suffered by the conquered, mixed with fear that such terror might yet descend upon Spain in a renewed *Guerra Civil* if the victorious Allies supported a leftist „liberation.“ *Ecclesia's* editorial in May, 1945 reflected the Spanish hierarchy's general moral concerns and political fears for Spain. *Ecclesia* described the full litany of the sufferings of the conquered during the war. These sufferings, *Ecclesia* saw as being caused by the negation of Christianity, that liberal optimism which disbelieves in original sin or the human tendency to depravity. *Ecclesia's* comment that „the war's human suffering proved the bankruptcy of liberalism, Marxism and racism“ highlighted the Spanish episcopate's continued profound distrust of all three ideologies represented by the war's belligerents. The stated, general and moral message was that only a return to God was the remedy for that human sinfulness from which these horrors had sprung. The implied, Spanish and political one was that a continued Franco regime, modified with a

²³ See *Ya*, 21 April 1945, 1; 28 April 1945, 3; 4 May 1945, 4 for Buchenwald and Dachau; *ABC*, 4 May 1945, 9, for British report; 15 May 1945, 15, for eyewitness report; *Ecclesia*, no. 204, 9 June 1945, 3 (ed.) and *Signo*, no. 282, 9 June 1945, 1, for papal defence of German Catholics.

further infusion of Catholic values, was Spain's best hope that such horrors would not in turn be visited upon Spaniards.²⁴

The Spanish Church consistently publicized and supported the Vatican's response to the practical human need of civilians in conquered countries and prisoners of war. In that regard, the Vatican lived up to the example set by Benedict XV in the previous conflict. That its efforts were less effective in some areas than Benedict's had been was less the fault of the Vatican than of Nazi and Communist intransigence and the increasing totality of war. In Spain likewise, the efforts of the Church to safeguard the spiritual welfare of Spanish workers in Germany, its role in prisoner of war exchanges and its strong support for the Pope's 1944 appeal were in the best traditions of Spanish Catholicism.

Inevitably, in the political realm, political considerations coloured the response of the Church to the mistreatment of conquered peoples. Unsurprisingly, Communist abuses were invariably condemned. The Church played a valuable role in publicizing the Katyn massacre which the Western Allies would infinitely prefer to have ignored. On the other hand, the condemnations of the Vatican, Spain, indeed much of the Catholic world near the end of the war could do nothing to prevent the Catholics of Eastern Europe coming under Communist rule. With regard to Nazi abuses, the Vatican, hampered in the East by lack of information, constrained by fear of reprisals as well as by the need to preserve impartiality, largely confined comment to general statements of humanitarian principle after early 1940. Its instigated campaign against Nazism in Spain in 1942 did however include Nazi religious persecution in occupied countries.

²⁴ Segura is cited in *Ecclesia* no. 199, 5 May 1945, 18; *ABC*, 4 May 1945, 9, for commentary; *El Español*, 12 May 1945, 1 for Buchenwald-Katyn links; *Ecclesia*, no. 200, 13 May 1945, ed., for „bankruptcy.“

The Spanish Church followed the by now familiar pattern of extreme reticence in criticizing Nazism between mid-1940 and the end of 1941 in regard to Nazi occupation policies. However, the attentive reader of the Spanish Catholic press could follow the progressive impoverishment of France and draw logical conclusions as to its cause. From 1942 onwards, the Church was prepared at first guardedly to attack Nazi religious persecution, and then progressively publicize the conscription of workers and Nazi economic depredations. By late 1944, Spanish Catholics would have had few illusions about the Nazi treatment of the conquered. The revelation of the Nazi concentration camps provided, for Spain and the rest of the world, ultimate proof of the horror and inhumanity of that treatment.

Chapter 11. The Church and Total War. The Response of the Conquered. Resistance, Collaboration and War Criminals.

Armed resistance must be understood realistically, not romantically. R.L. Rubenstein and J.K. Roth, *Approaches to Auschwitz* (London: SCM, 1987), 174.

England has invented a new method of combat;-terrorism. George Suárez, editor of *Aujourd'hui*, quoted in *El Correo de Andalucía*, 22 September 1942, 3.

Criminal means, once tolerated, are soon preferred. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Harmondsworth UK: Penguin, 1968) 176.

In the previous chapter, we saw that a reading of the Hague Conventions reveals an assumption that occupation would be a short, temporary state. Occupation was assumed to occur during war and to be characterized by the mutual observance of the respective rights of occupier and occupied. That chapter demonstrated that in World War II, the reality of occupation differed radically from this envisaged world in circumstance, duration and severity.¹

How did conquered peoples respond? For many years after the war, legend sponsored a simple dichotomy; a „nation of resisters“ opposed a tiny minority of pro-Nazi collaborators. To an extent, this view still persists. This chapter will provide a fresh perspective. We will examine resistance, collaboration and war criminals as the contemporary reactions of the Spanish Catholic Church saw them, particularly in its press responses, as the war progressed. This chapter will suggest that the Church appreciated the need for restraint and even some accommodation in face of occupation’s realities. Such an appreciation was seen more by some governments of occupied countries exiled in London than by the Western Allies. On the other hand, this chapter will show that the

¹ See chap.10, footnote 1 for detailed references to the appropriate Articles of the Hague Conventions.

Church's attitudes were influenced by interplay of the moral and the political and especially by the Church's endemic hatred of Communism.²

In early 1940, like the Vatican, the Spanish Church had no illusions about the nature of Communism and Nazism, the deleterious influence of which it was making every effort to keep out of Spain. The Church feared the effects of any prolonged Nazi or Communist occupation on the religious life of Catholics in occupied countries. Though constrained by Franco's „strict neutrality“ policy in reporting Vatican radio's revelations of religious persecution in Poland, *Signo* had consistently advertised the times of these Vatican broadcasts. The Spanish Church in the *Guerra Civil* had used Aquinas's teaching of the justification of rebellion against „anti-Christian tyranny.“ Moreover, Spanish Catholicism possessed a powerful folk memory of support for the Spanish *guerilleros* in the struggle against Napoleon.³

However, by the summer of 1940, the situation was very different from that of 1808 or 1936. In Western Europe at least, Nazi policy in occupied countries was to allow the Church to retain its minimum rights of preaching and education through which the Church could work, as in Spain, to accomplish its mission and prevent ideological penetration. Additionally, in France, the collaborationist Vichy regime gave promise of reversing generations of French government anticlericalism and actively promoting

² The „nation of resisters“ response was promulgated and popularized by the wartime propaganda of the Western Allies. It was seized upon and even embellished by post-war politicians of former occupied countries as a national myth to aid the recovery of national self-respect after the ignominy of occupation. In France, for example, the legend of a „nation of resisters“ had become so ingrained in Gaullist post-war mythology that when American Robert O. Paxton published *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order* (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972), which questioned this legend, Paxton was greeted with a storm of abuse. See Keegan, *Second World War*, 490, for its persistence as „romantic myth.“ George Kren and Leon Rappoport, in 1980, saw it as „one of the few simplistic certainties of earlier generations so far safe from critical analysis by revisionist historians.“ *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behaviour* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), 122. Even in 1999, Rab Bennett still saw treatment of wartime resistance as „verging on the hagiographical,“ *Under the Shadow of the Swastika*, 34.

³See *WPIS* no.18, 30 January 1940, 9 and no. 21 20 February 1940, 11, for Vatican broadcasts.

Catholicism. In Spain, the Church was still recovering from the depredations of the *Guerra Civil*. It wanted peace for its physical recovery and the accomplishment of its spiritual mission and feared above all a return to political instability. Sporadic leftist guerrilla activity was still continuing, exacerbating the Church's fears of Communism. The Church saw all resistance activity in Spain and elsewhere as Communist inspired and wished to avoid even implied sanction of any such activity. *Ya*, in June, therefore, immediately denounced Britain's recognition of De Gaulle as legitimising a rebellion against the „prestigious patriotic Pétain.“ With German troops on Spain's border and the Church fighting strongly in favour of Spanish neutrality, the situation dictated prudence. Before June, 1941, the Spanish Catholic press scarcely reported, much less supported, resistance activity in the occupied countries of Western Europe and we saw in the last chapter that information about the occupied East was virtually impossible to obtain.⁴

In fact, there was little resistance activity to support and report. The mood of 1940 was one of awe of Nazi invincibility. Far from spontaneous revulsion, a numbed acceptance of Nazi domination prevailed in occupied Europe. Nor was collaboration, or at least accommodation to the reality of occupation, restricted to the pro-Nazi and the opportunistic. In the still neutral United States, the anti-Nazi *New York Times*, reported that the French press was urging the public to maintain „a loyal attitude“ to the Germans. As we follow that newspaper's reports from occupied Europe through the autumn of 1940, we see that resistance activity was limited, sporadic and at a low level. Only near the end of the year do we read even occasional reports of anti-Nazi demonstrations in Holland, Denmark and Norway. In France, one such public protest, on the anniversary of

⁴ For post-*Guerra Civil* guerrilla activity, see Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2006), 421. See *Ya*, 30, June, 1940, 1(ed.), for De Gaulle.

the Armistice on November 11, was serious enough to catch the attention of *Arriba* in Madrid, though not that of a Catholic press determined to support the Church's advocacy of Spanish neutrality by avoiding criticism of Nazism. Nor was Nazi reaction particularly brutal. Nantes escaped with a fine when German telephone wires were cut. Royan was even similarly treated when a German sailor was killed. Reported instances of violence towards Germans were extremely rare and may even have been motivated by ordinary criminality.⁵

By early 1941, Nazi occupation was becoming more onerous. In March, *Ya* still reported French collaboration as „without apparent fissure“ but in April, French collaborationist Marcel Deat felt obliged to defend collaboration against increasing acts of resistance. These were still relatively minor- slogans on walls, listening to the BBC, repeating „English propaganda,“ industrialists rejecting German contracts, workers“ strikes „fomented by the English.“ Deat's pointed reference to Nazi-held French prisoners of war was an unsubtle deterrent to resistance.⁶

In France or elsewhere that spring, as more countries fell into the Nazi orbit, few people needed much deterrence. Though active, willing collaboration was restricted to the pro-Nazi or venal few, resisters were a small if brave minority. With Britain isolated from Europe and fighting alone, years of Nazi domination seemed assured. In such circumstances, the attitude of the Spanish Church reflected political reality. Public pronouncements manifested the prudent just war criterion of hope of success. *Ya* castigated English attempts to foment support in France for De Gaulle's „puerile political

⁵ See *New York Times*, 25 June 1940, 6:2:3 for French press; 21 December 1940, 21, 6:6, 12 December 1940, 10:2, 14 December 1940, 5:1, for demonstrations in Holland, Denmark and Norway, 22 November 1940, 9:1 for *Arriba* report from France, 14 September 1940, 5:3 and 9 September 1940, 4:4 for reports from Nantes and Royan.

⁶ See *Ya*, 11 March 1941, 1 for collaboration; 8 April 1941, 3, for Deat.

campaigns." *Signo* quoted with approval advice given by the government of newly-conquered Greece to resume a normal life. The Spanish Church could draw on its wide experience of humanity and of „Communist“ occupied areas during the *Guerra Civil*. The Church saw a spectrum rather than a dichotomy in attitudes to occupation. Though almost all people in occupied Europe resented the occupier and willed the occupation's end, few would resign from their jobs even if their work served the occupier's purposes. Motives might vary from a „collaborationist“ careerism and opportunism through a more „neutral“ apathy or simple desire to provide for their families to a „resistant“ desire to frustrate Nazi designs and to keep out more active collaborators who would pursue these designs with greater enthusiasm. At times, several such attitudes might even co-exist. The Church appreciated these complexities perhaps more than did the British or later the Americans who were without experience of alien occupation.⁷

After Hitler's invasion of the USSR however, European resistance escalated and its increasing violence alarmed the Church. Greater resistance may in part have been caused by a steadily worsening economic deprivation and Nazi oppression. Additionally, the fact that Germany now had a continental enemy may have diminished feelings of hopelessness and increased the propensity to resist. However, the escalating intensity and violence of resistance was due less to spontaneous revulsion than to successful fomentation by the British and their new Communist allies.

Communist party membership in most occupied countries was small but Communist groups were cohesive, disciplined and ruthless. Their relationship with the Nazi occupiers had been uneasy, their militancy largely held in check by the dictates of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The situation was radically changed by Hitler's invasion. Communism's Russian

⁷See *Ya*, 11 May, 1941, 1; *Signo*, no. 66, 19 April 1941, 2.

heartland was threatened and Stalin was calling for partisan warfare against the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazi occupier intensified its already existent persecution of Communists. Communist cells redoubled their activities, targeting individual German soldiers and indigenous collaborators. Their aim was to provoke the Nazis into harsh reprisals against civilians. These reprisals would in turn increase anti-Nazi revulsion and increase support for resistance amongst the general population.⁸

The Spanish Catholic press soon reported the results of this policy with a shocked disapproval consistent with the Church's endemic hostility to Communism. On August 28, *Ya* condemned an attempt on the lives of French collaborators Laval and Deat. On September 20, *Signo* denounced French „crimes“ against Germans and castigated the culpable „Communist elements“ which were disturbing the peace of occupied France. Nor was Nazi reaction long delayed. Nazi reprisals were already in full swing in Poland and *Ya* on September 5 reported 18 Poles condemned to death for the alleged shooting of a German. Two days later that paper printed without comment the Nazi announcement that three French „Communists“ were to be shot for each German soldier killed.⁹

The Spanish Catholic Church saw the complexities of the issues involved. German soldiers could not be described as „non-combatants“ but were their assassins abusing their civilian status by their clandestine „military“ operations? Moreover, did not both assassination of individual German soldiers and the resultant massive and unwarranted reprisals that would ensue, breach the just war criterion of proportionality? Reprisals as

⁸ Between June, 1940 and June, 1941, Communists in general had avoided direct confrontation with the Nazi occupiers, largely restricting their activities to general propaganda against the „capitalistic“ war and against collaborationist governments such as Pétain's and the policies of indigenous collaborators. The *New York Times* reported several anti-Communist police campaigns and arrests, e.g., 10 December 1940, 3:5. See also Bob Moore, ed., *Resistance in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 132.

⁹ See *Ya*, 28 August 1941, 3, for attack on collaborators; *Signo*, No.88, 20 September 1941, 4, for denunciation of „crimes“; *Ya*, 5 September 1941, 3, for reprisals in Poland, 7 September 1941, 3 for announcement of reprisals in France.

such had never been illegal but their implied sanction carried a tacit understanding that such reprisals were not to be indiscriminate, sanctions being visited solely on those having responsibility for the corresponding crime. Being a „Communist“ was not of course proof of guilt of the specific assassination for which a reprisal execution might be justified. Indeed a Communist already held in custody could not logically be guilty of that specific crime. However, as Communist „terrorism“ and „sabotage in occupied Europe spread and escalated, the Spanish Church, with its endemic hatred of Communism exacerbated by memories of „Red“ terror in the *Guerra Civil*, chose not to inquire into this vital point nor to protest at the scope of reprisals. The Church preferred pragmatically to support those Europeans, still a majority, who supported „public order“ against Communist „terrorism.“ In September 1941, *Ya*, reporting on the reprisal shootings of ten „Communists“, endorsed an editorial in *Petit Parisien*, defending the „correct behaviour“ of the German troops and calling for collaboration with the police against terrorism.¹⁰

„Terrorism“ and „reprisal“ continued. In November, *Ecclesia* reported without comment the shooting of 50 „Communists“ in reprisal for the assassination of the German commandant of Nantes. In Britain, governments in exile began to replicate the Spanish Church’s view of the disproportionate harm the killing of individual German soldiers was bringing on the citizens of occupied Europe. On October 23 1941, De Gaulle issued specific orders against the practice. The Dutch were later to follow suit. The British, whose own citizens were not involved, had abandoned such qualms. As early as July,

¹⁰ See *Ya*, 19 September 1941, 1, for terrorism in France; 21 September 1941, 1, for „Communist“ sabotage in Bulgaria; 18 September 1941, 1, for *Petit Parisien* editorial. No Spanish publication had any way of verifying the political affiliation of the alleged „Communists“ shot. As Best comments, (see p. 198), on the word „reprisal,“ readers should be on guard whenever the word „Communist“ emanates from Nazi sources.

1940, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) had been set up with Churchill's instruction to „set Europe ablaze.“ SOE's envisaged methods had included „industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.“ In the prevalent European mood, British efforts had largely fallen on stony ground and Britain had at that time refrained from „terrorist acts.“ Soviet participation in the war increased political pressure on Britain to intensify its support for radicalized European resistance and increased the likelihood that this support would be fruitful. As Britain was militarily unable to establish the second front demanded by the Soviets and by leftists at home, support for sabotage in Europe was some substitute. Though the British did not yet countenance assassination, they chose, in that political climate, not to call Communist methods of resistance into question. This policy the Spanish Church denounced. The Church had greeted the new Croatian Catholic state with enthusiasm. In September 1941, therefore, *Ya* headlined „terrorism in Croatia“ and blamed British agents as well as „Communists“ for an attack on a headquarters of the collaborationist *Ustacha*. In November, *El Correo de Andalucia* excoriated English tactics of promoting insurrection in other occupied countries.¹¹

For the rest of that year and into 1942, the Spanish Church's view of resistance continued to be coloured by perceptions of the terrorism of „Communists“ and „anarchists“ who would shoot a lone German sentry. The Church's press therefore emphasized the unpopularity of terrorism in occupied Europe and highlighted popular worker protest against it. In February, 1942 *Ya* supported its Vichy correspondent's

¹¹ See *Ecclesia*, No. 21, 1 November 1941, 2, for Nantes reprisal; Dalton, (head of SOE) to Halifax, 2 July 1940, cited in M.R.D. Foot, *SOE: 1940-1946* (London: BBC, 1984), 19, for envisaged SOE methods; See chap. 8, 178, for Catholic enthusiasm for Croatia; *Ya* 17 September 1941, 1 for Croatia terrorism; *El Correo de Andalucia*, 21 November 1941, 8 for denunciation of Britain.

contention that „collaboration was the only possible road.“ The Church was reluctant to change this fundamental view. Even whilst signaling through reports in its press that Nazi retribution was becoming increasingly draconian and arbitrary, the Church did not protest. On December 16, *Ya* had reported Nazi threats to deport „Judeo-Communist“ elements to work camps in the East if the perpetrators of crimes against German soldiers were not discovered. By the following May, reports of a crime in Paris made obvious the fact that the five „east European Jews“ shot in reprisal had no more to do with the crime than a further such group threatened with shooting if the crime’s perpetrators were not discovered. By June, the Nazis were not even making a pretense of shooting „Communists“ or „anarchists“ in response to assassination, announcing an intention to shoot ten persons from the area where the crime took place and to condemn large numbers of others to forced labour.¹²

Perhaps the certainty that the innocent were suffering reinforced the Spanish Church in the belief that support for the maintenance of order was the best way to minimize such suffering. Furthermore, criticism of the Nazis was muted by increasing British sponsorship of the sabotage and even assassination that promoted the suffering of the innocent. The effects of the Heydrich assassination in June, 1942 reinforced such attitudes. Reinhard Heydrich, Nazi „protector“ of Czech Bohemia, had intelligently combined severity against dissent with benefits and incentives for Czech workers. Czech output had increased as resistance had declined. To reverse this trend, the British arranged Heydrich’s assassination with a deliberate aim of promoting massive Nazi

¹² See *Ecclesia*, No. 40, 18 April 1942, 2, for shooting of single soldiers; *Ya*, 16 December 1941, 1, for shooting of „Communists“ and „anarchists“; 14 February 1942, 1, for defence of collaboration; 16 December 1941, 1 for threats against „Judeo-Communists“; 20 May 1942, 1, for „east European Jews“; 2 June 1942, 1, for area reprisals.

reprisals against the Czechs. The horrendous scope of these of reprisals, including the notorious destruction of Lidice, was not reported in the Spanish press. However, within the Church this incident unleashed anti-British rather than anti-Nazi feeling despite the Church's concurrent Vatican-inspired anti-Nazi campaign. The old continental accusation that the British saw their continental Allies as pawns expendable in British interests resurfaced. The Spanish Church saw Britain's actions as cynical and in breach of *jus in bello* criteria of discrimination and proportionality and promulgated that view in its press.

In August, *El Correo de Andalucia*, publishing commentary on papers pertaining to Belgium's 1940 surrender, commented pointedly „nobody has the right uselessly to sacrifice human lives.“ That newspaper saw such sacrifice taking place in France and elsewhere as a result of „foreign agents actively fomenting disorder.“ On September 21, *El Correo* asserted that French Communists were receiving arms and supplies from London and Moscow. In direct contradiction to Allied propaganda alleging overwhelming European support, that newspaper emphasized that the Paris press was unanimous in condemning terrorism. The following day, *El Correo* supported this contention, quoting George Suárez, editor of Paris newspaper *Aujourd'hui*. Suárez stated baldly that England had invented a new method of combat – terrorism, its aim to erect a barrier between occupiers and occupied. On reprisals, Suárez stated „every schoolboy knows“ that an occupying army would not bear crimes committed against its soldiers. In early 1943, the Spanish Church's view was corroborated by Belgium's Primate. Cardinal Ernest Van Roey, a well-known opponent of Nazism, strongly condemned increasing and

unjustifiable acts of terrorism „whatever their motivation.“ Van Roey saw such acts as attracting inevitable repressive measures.¹³

Inevitably, there was, certainly with France, interplay of the moral and the political in the Church’s attitude. Even after France was completely occupied in November, 1942, the Spanish Church regarded the Vichy regime as a powerful religious ally. In January, 1943, therefore *Ecclesia* reported France under Pétain moving decisively towards re-Christianization, in parallel of course with the Spanish hierarchy’s priorities. Crucially and predictably, Vichy’s „recognition of the Church’s rights“ and subsidy for Church teaching orders, the familiar „Catholic minimum“, made it seem as deserving of Spanish Church support as were similarly pro-Catholic regimes in Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary.¹⁴

Thus, to the Spanish Church, the methods of European resistance were immoral in bringing down reprisals upon the innocent. Politically they were a subversive Communist threat to social order everywhere, particularly to regimes that were supportive of the Church’s values and perhaps eventually even to Spain. Therefore, even as the tide of war turned from late 1942 through 1943 and the Spanish Catholic press was becoming more sympathetic to the Western Allies in its coverage of military campaigns, Church publications continued to emphasize the Church’s view of the negative effects of resistance activity. In September 1942, *Ya* reported escalating French resistance; the shooting of 116 „Communists and terrorists“ and the closing of all French places of entertainment in reprisal for crimes against German soldiers. On November 4, *Ya*

¹³ For Church anti-Nazi campaign, see chap.5, 115-117. See *El Correo de Andalucía*, 6 August 1942, 3, for Belgian surrender; 11 August 1942, 3, for foreign agents; 21 September 1942, 8, for Paris press condemnation; 22 September 1942, 3, for Suárez article; *Ya*, 19 January 1943, 3, for Van Roey.

¹⁴ *Ecclesia*, no. 81, 30 January 1943, 11.

regarded as a „terrorist crime“ the explosion of a bomb in a French office of recruitment of workers for Germany and the following June described as a „terrorist attack“ a resistance action which freed conscripts assembled to work in Germany. Neither report questioned the validity of Nazi worker conscription.¹⁵

In mid-1943, the Church had increasing fears about the nature and direction of the war. The Katyn Massacres and the cynicism of Communist-led attacks on German soldiers calculated to produce reprisals on innocent civilians reinforced its revulsion for Communism. It rightly feared that the USSR was about to pass to an offensive which would lead to a Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the Western Allies, for all their pretensions of a „moral crusade“, seemed to be acting immorally by downplaying the Katyn massacre for political reasons and by practicing indiscriminate bombing. Moreover, by this time, they openly admitted financing French „combatants“ thus in the Spanish Church’s view both aiding Communism and contributing to the deaths of innocent civilians. Consequently, on June 1, *Ya* expressed alarm about the increasing hold of Soviet propaganda in France, „taking advantage of current difficulties and fomenting discontent amongst the masses.“ The same day, an article by law professor López Ortiz, *Reprisals against Non Combatants*, re-enforced the Church’s view, recalling Saint Augustine’s just war teachings applicable both to indiscriminate bombing and to the cycle of terrorism and reprisal. *Razón y Fe* shortly afterwards quoted the Pope's

¹⁵ See *Ya*, 20 September 1942, 1, for escalating resistance, 4 November 1942, 1, for bombing; 16 June, 1943, 1, for „terrorist attack.“

condemnation of means of struggle that failed to distinguish between the military and non combatants.¹⁶

In the autumn of 1943, the Soviets took the offensive. This advance was aided by widespread partisan warfare which put Germany and its allies on the defensive in occupied Eastern Europe. *Ya* reported German „resistance“ to attacks of „rebel Yugoslav bands“ and in Hungary the trial of 664 „Communists.“ Meanwhile in France, the „Communists“ had unleashed an „avalanche of terror.“ Terrorism there had become a „national obsession“ to the extent that *Ya*’s Vichy correspondent in October made an anguished call to „save France and its civilization.“ *Razón y Fe* reflected Vatican concern that the war’s escalating totality in every aspect was destroying the rights of the innocent. The Pope’s 1943 Christmas message accordingly made specific reference to resistance methods – „We recommend all to refrain from every hasty act that could only provoke still greater misfortunes.“¹⁷

By the end of 1943, the Nazis“ increasingly oppressive policies and more significantly the fact they were clearly losing the war, was leading to increasing popular dissent in Nazi occupied territories. To the Spanish Church, with its endemic fear of a Communist Europe, all manifestations of dissent were Communist inspired. In late November, *Ya* viewed a demonstration in France against worker conscription as „showing the power of the agents of Moscow.“ On December 14, that newspaper published a statement by French Catholic bishops upholding the legitimacy of the Vichy government

¹⁶See *Ya*, 9 May, 1943, 3, for British Commons statement admitting support for „combatants“; 1 June 1943, 3, for expressed alarm and Ortiz article, *Razón y Fe*, nos. 546-547, July – August 1943, 7-9 for papal speech.

¹⁷See *Ya*, 22 September 1943, 3, Yugoslav attacks, 21 October 1943, 3, for Hungarian trials, 5 October 1943, 3, for call to save civilization, 19 October 1943, 3, for „national obsession; *Razón y Fe*, nos. 548 - 549, September – October 1943, 183, *The Innocent and the War*. *WPIS*, no. 222, 5 January 1944, 14, for papal message.

and calling for obedience to its laws. That month, and in early 1944, „energetic“ measures to control „terrorism,“ by then widespread in France, Belgium and Norway were applauded. In March 1944, the Vatican reiterated warnings by French and Italian bishops about some methods used by resistance movements. By this time, although the Church’s condemnation of counterproductive terrorism continued to be valid, it erred in seeing all dissent as being fomented by rather than exploited by Communists. Also, though the Vichy government had supported the Church, by then Vichy’s days were numbered. Vichy’s legitimacy had long been undermined by its powerlessness to resist Nazi depredations and its continued collaboration with an occupier whose days of occupation were also numbered. By May, the *London Times* was reporting a Vichy attack on French clergy who were „encouraging rebellion“ but in Spain there was no mention of the fact that increasing numbers of French Catholics questioned Vichy’s legitimacy and favoured resistance.¹⁸

As events in neighboring France were important for Spain’s own future, Spain and its Church greeted the Allied invasion and its early progress with suitably neutral caution. Controversial comment was avoided even as the invasion was aided by resistance sabotage that led inevitably to reprisals against the innocent. Though the Oradour massacre, reported in the *New York Times* in early July, seemed to bear out the fears expressed by the Vatican at Christmas and in March, the Spanish Catholic press did not

¹⁸ See *Ya*, 26 November 1943, 3, for demonstrations, 14 December 1943, 3, for „legitimacy“ of Pétain, 3 December 1943, 4 and 12 February 1944, 4, for support for „energetic“ counterterrorist measures; *WPIS*, no. 230, 1 March 1944, 12-13, for Vatican warnings; *London Times*, 10 May 1944, 3d, for Vichy attack on French clergy.

report it. *Ya* was content to report without comment a German warning shortly after the invasion that all French resistors falling into German hands would be shot.¹⁹

In the late summer of 1944, it was obvious that liberation, far from bringing tranquility to France, had resulted in the „Franco-French War“ as resistors, including Catholics, turned on Pétainists and „collaborators.“ The Spanish Church was vitally concerned, morally because of fears for the innocent, politically because in the south, leftist *maquisards* collaborated with Spanish Republicans to attempt Spain’s „liberation.“ On August 30, *Juventud* denounced Communist *maquisard* crimes that recalled Spain’s *Guerra Civil* – assassination, expropriations, the shooting of a priest, „cruelty vented on the weak, on helpless women“ in comparison to which the discipline of the retreating Germans was „truly admirable.“ The same day, *Ya* saw „two struggles“ in France for liberation both from occupation and from an internal Communist terrorism. A week later, that newspaper, contrasted order in Italy under Allied supervision with French anarchy and again condemned England’s role in fomenting what had become „useless, counterproductive internal violence.“ With *maquisard* activity in the Pyrenees supporting Spanish „liberation“, *Ya* saw De Gaulle, who it had condemned as a „rebel“ in 1940, as „supported by all Frenchmen of goodwill“ and welcomed his willingness to take control to „eliminate foreigners and rebel groups.“²⁰

Chapter 8 described how, by early 1944, the Western Allies had been prepared to use their by then overwhelming military and economic power to override trading rights, conferred on neutrals by international law. Even before then, the Allies, in the *Moscow*

¹⁹ See *New York Times*, 8 July 1944, 6: 2 for Oradour, *Ya*, 13 June 1944, 4, for German warning.

²⁰ See *Juventud*, 30 August 1944, 4, for crimes, *Ya*, 30 August 1944, 2, for „two struggles“; 7 September 1944, 1, for England’s role and French-Italian contrast, 30 August 1944, 2 and 19 September 1944, 3 for support for De Gaulle.

Declaration on German Atrocities of November 1943 announced that war criminals would be „pursued to the uttermost ends of the earth, brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples they have outraged“ regardless of neutral rights of asylum. In September 1944, US ambassador Hayes recorded a „conversation“ with Spanish foreign minister José de Lequerica that insisted on Spanish non-asylum for Axis leaders. On October 3, all neutrals were pressured to „declare their attitude“ to giving war criminals sanctuary. By October 12, all except Ireland agreed to waive the traditional neutral right of asylum. Spain that day gave a „categorical guarantee“ that no war criminal would be given sanctuary. Robert Vansittart of the British Foreign Office stated baldly that „the security of civilization overrides the rights of neutrals.“ Roosevelt in justifying such Allied measures had declared Germany „an enemy that had been outlawed.“ However much Nazi conduct retrospectively justified that view, neutrals at that stage could still fairly dispute that one belligerent had the right to „outlaw“ another.²¹

The Spanish Church expressed its grave reservations through its press. In late October, *Ya* featured a strong protest by the French Bishop of Montauban at political persecution of „collaborators.“ As that bishop, as *Ecclesia* had noted, had been imprisoned by the Nazis for his protests against Nazi anti-Semitism, his objections carried moral force. In November, *Ecclesia* noted with disapproval the arrest of the French Bishop of Arras as a „collaborator“ for his writings against the resistance. The following month, *Ecclesia* published an article by Luis Sanchez Agesta of that Madrid Chapter of International Law which earlier that year had published its judgment on the

²¹ The Moscow declaration is available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm. See Hayes to Secretary of State, 8 September 1944, *FRUS*, Europe, vol. 4, 1944, 444, for „conversation.“ See *Ya*, 3 October 1944, 1, for Allied demand, 12 October 1944, 4, for Spain’s „categorical guarantee,“ 16 November 1944, for Vansittart. For Roosevelt’s comment, see Heinz Magenheimer, *Hitler’s War: Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions, 1940- 1945* (London: Cassell, 2002), 186.

status of Rome. Agesta castigated as „pharisaic“ Allied accusations of war crimes „that it is not sure that the[Communist] accuser has not also committed“ in an atmosphere of rancour whilst the war was still going on. With Katyn and „Red“ *Guerra Civil* atrocities still fresh in Spanish Church memory, Agesta’s comments reflected once again the Church’s detestation of Communism. The Allies of course, were no more inclined to heed a neutral Chapter of International Law on the issue of war criminals than on the inviolability of Rome in doing what they believed they had the right to do.²² The Spanish Church resented the Western Allies arrogation of the term „moral crusade,“ and questioned their unilateral right to define, try and judge war criminality. The Church realized, as the Western Allies perhaps did not, the complexity of the issues of „collaboration“ and opposed trials in the heated aftermath of war. On the other hand, the Spanish Church as yet had less appreciation than the Western Allies had of the full enormity of Nazi crimes.

The Allies were vindicated in principle in the last months of the war. The German retreat was accompanied by the continuing revelation of crimes committed by the Nazis and their minions in occupied countries. As these criminal acts became obvious, *Ecclesia* made clear that the Spanish Church and the Vatican accepted the principle of war crimes. However both continued to fear the risk of injustice in an atmosphere of total war which had exacerbated rancor and hatred. In March, 1945 the draconian sentence of life imprisonment and degradation given to Vichy Admiral Jean Esteva seemed to justify these fears. Esteva, who, even the indictment admitted had „a magnificent naval record, proved patriotism and friendship for Britain,“ was accused of „intelligence with the

²²See *Ya*, 22 October 1944, 9 and *Ecclesia*, no.173, 4 November 1944, 20, for Bishop of Montauban, *Ecclesia*, no. 175, 18 November 1944, 19, for Bishop of Arras, no. 177, 2 December 1944, 17-18, for Agesta article.

enemy“ in consequence of his failure to „join the French forces which resisted the Axis“ at the time of the American North African landings, but „acted as if he accepted Vichy“s instructions.“ *Ya* commented „there was no lack of critics on the sentence pronounced.“ Even the *London Times* found it „more severe than expected.“ In April, *Signo* published with approval a pastoral of the English episcopate warning against a peace of revenge and emphasizing the need to punish war criminals without confusing them with their respective nations. Five days later, revelations from Buchenwald perhaps brought home to Spain how difficult such distinction might be in practice.²³

However, the Spanish press reflected Church concerns, being unanimous in its condemnation of the method of Mussolini“s execution. The *falangist Arriba* quoted the Vatican“s *Osservatore Romano*“s condemnation of the „revival of hatred in northern Italy.“ The Monarchist *ABC*, with some lack of proportion, equated Mussolini“s killing with Katyn and Buchenwald. *Signo* castigated the „savage and hateful treatment“ of Mussolini's mortal remains at the hands of „bandits.“ *Ecclesia* condemned the „excesses of rancour“ surrounding Mussolini“s death and declared that Spanish Catholics „wish to see the re-establishment of justice but do not condone the brutality of hatred.“ The British political intelligence summaries noted that in accordance with its commitment to the Allies, Spain had refused asylum to Laval and Belgian collaborationist Leon Degrelle, but also noted that the Vatican continued to emphasize the distinction between justice and revenge. This distinction was strongly supported by the Spanish Church. On June 30, 1945, *Ecclesia* agreed that the Pope in his 1944 Christmas message and in a recent

²³ See *Ecclesia*, no. 198, 28 April 1945, 5, and no. 199, 5 May 1945, 4 (ed.) for text of Pius XII“s message and *Ecclesia*“s comment on „Justice without Hatred.“ See *Ya*, 23 March 1945, 3; *London Times*, 13 March 1945, 4e, 16 March 1945, 4c for Esteva trial and verdict. See *Signo*, no. 274, 14 April 1945, 8, for English pastoral.

allocation to cardinals had accepted the necessity that „perpetrators should expiate crimes.“ However, to the Spanish Church, as *Ecclesia* asserted, that „a criminal nation [the USSR] was acting as a judge“ showed the limitations of the judicial process. This feeling remained strong in the Spanish Church. In one of the few episcopal pastorals of the early Franco era Church to venture into „political“ issues, the Bishop of Orense castigated the moral efficacy of the Nuremberg trials. In such circumstances, to many Spanish Catholics, the moral effect of the trials would be at best equivocal.²⁴

For this reason, and in a perhaps misplaced concept of Christian charity, some Catholics in Spain, the Vatican and elsewhere, took this view to the extreme of helping fugitives wanted for alleged war crimes to escape possible retribution. In Spain, though Laval was extradited, Degrelle was enabled with the help of „influential Spanish friends“ to remain in Spain, where he continued for many years to expound his pro-Nazi views.²⁵

The response of the conquered to occupation during World War II is too important an issue to be treated simplistically. Where legend is questioned, the intention is not to suggest any moral equivalence among the belligerents. This chapter and the last has shown that the Nazis as occupiers claimed the protection of law and custom without the obligation to abide by either and such Nazi abuse itself legitimized resistance. Moreover, the exaggerations of legend should not result in reactive debunking. Such aspects of

²⁴See *Arriba*, 1 May 1945, 3, *ABC*, 4 May 1945, 9, *Signo*, no. 277, 5 May 1945, 1, *Ecclesia*, no. 199, 5 May 1945, 4, for Mussolini; *WPIS*, no. 292, 9 May 1945, 11, for Laval and Vatican distinction; no.293, 16 May 1945,12, for Degrelle; *Ecclesia*, no. 207, 30 June 1945, 19 -20, for Spanish reservations. This feeling remained strong in the Spanish Church. For Bishop of Orense, see BEO, December 1945, 3, BNE.

²⁵ For Degrelle, see Martin Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium: Leon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940-1944* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1993, 280-281, from which the reference to „influential Spanish friends“ is taken. Though the topic of Catholic post-war aid to escaped war criminals lies-beyond the time frame of this study, it provides another source of polemical controversy involving the Church. See Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust*, 162 -175, for his section, *Pius XII and Convicted War Criminals*, and 175 for a summary of the main allegations.

resistance as intelligence gathering and the rescue of Allied service personnel rendered great service to the Allied cause.

The attitudes of the Spanish Church raise some legitimate issues. The Church accurately portrayed the relative lack of resistance activity before June 1941 and early appreciated that responses to occupation were not simply dichotomous. Church publications exposed the immorality and contempt for the individual underlying Communist resistance strategy. The Spanish Church highlighted British complicity and even participation in that Communist strategy. Its press in the summer of 1944 brought out the obverse effects of French liberation. However, the Church might be fairly criticized for its support of regimes such as Vichy long after they had lost such legitimacy as they ever had. The Spanish Catholic press failed to report Nazi atrocities like Lidice and Oradour for political reasons similar to those it correctly accused the Western Allies of putting first in underplaying Katyn. The Spanish Church's endemic hatred of Communism caused it later in the war to underestimate the popular nature of dissent among the occupied, as the Allies had earlier overestimated it, and to regard all dissent as Communist inspired. This fear of Communism perhaps made it tardy in recognizing the full extent of Nazi war criminality. The Church's disapproval of the Allied overriding of neutral rights, fears of „victors“ justice,“ even the participation of the Stalinist regime, if valid in principle, might be seen to lack proportionality when measured against the enormity of Nazi atrocities that were the negation of Christian ethics. However imperfect, the Nuremberg process clearly enshrined the principle that perpetrators of war crimes risked retribution, a principle which the Spanish Church had accepted, with whatever comparable imperfections, for the punishment of „Red“ atrocities after the *Guerra Civil*.

The Church suggested no alternative process. Whatever alternatives to „victors“ justice“ would exist in the future, none existed in Spain in 1939 nor in Europe after World War II. Perhaps, during that war, like those of the Western Allies, the Spanish Church’s attitudes to the responses of the conquered displayed interplay of the moral and the political. For the Church, this was the consequence of being a spiritual institution in a political world but it meant that many would see the moral validity of its attitudes as mixed.

Chapter 12. The Church and Minorities. Spain, the Church and the Jews.

We serve neither sound scholarship nor the cause of Christian-Jewish reconciliation with exaggerated charges or attempts to suppress parts of the actual record. John T. Pawlikowski, OSM, „The Catholic Response to the Holocaust: Institutional Perspectives“, in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck (eds.) *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1998), 564.

Hispanic Judaism generally moved in a spiritual environment. We see it as the successors of those Hebrews with whom St. Paul generously debated. In Spain, Judaism did not acquire the materialistic character that it shows in some other places.
Sefarad – Magazine of the School of Hebrew Studies, Madrid. Año 1, vol. 1, 1941, 3.

The final chapter of this study will examine the Church’s response to the Holocaust. It will do so not because other minorities are considered unimportant but because the reaction of Pius XII, the Vatican and the Church to the Holocaust is mired in controversy. This study does not propose to enter this polarized, polemical debate. Rather, this work intends to develop two themes it has previously emphasized and apply them to the question of Spain’s wartime Jewish policy. In doing so, it may contribute to a greater understanding of the nature of the wartime Church and the diversity of its response to the Holocaust.¹

¹ The importance of the Holocaust in the development of World War II studies was an important theme in the introduction. See p.1 for its emergence in the 1960’s, p.4 for the continued embroilment of the Church in the 1990’s after initial questioning thirty years earlier. The Vatican’s rejoinder, *We Remember: A reflection on the Shoah*, in 1998, did not satisfy all Catholics and was regarded critically by many Jews. For text, see Randolph A. Braham, *The Vatican and the Holocaust: The Catholic Church and the Jews during the Nazi Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 100 -108. For a moderately critical Catholic comment, see John F. Morley, „Reaction of a Catholic Theologian,“ *Ibid.*, 47 – 67. For a moderately critical Jewish comment, see A. James Rudin, „Reaction of a Jewish Theologian,“ *Ibid.*, 89-98. Justus George Lawler, *Popes and Politics* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 37, lists 10 major publications between 1999 and 2001 alone. They are, Susan Zuccotti, *Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy*; Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust*; K. Voigt and J. Burgwyn (eds.), *The Italian Refuge: Rescue of Jews during the Holocaust*; Gavin Langmuir *History, Religion, Antisemitism*; John F. Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust*; Pinchas Lapide, *Three Popes and the Jews*; John Cornwell, *Hitler’s Pope*; Pierre Blet, *Pius XII and the Second World War*; Frank J. Coppa (ed.), *Controversial Concordats*; Gary Wills, *Papal Sin*; James Carroll, *Constantine’s Sword*; Margherita Marchione, *Pope Pius XII : Architect for Peace*; Ronald J. Rychlak, *Hitler, the War and the Pope*; Ralph McInerny, *The Defamation of Pius XII*; José Sanchez, *Pius XII and the Holocaust*. There were also many

Both themes are by now familiar. The first is that the Church was a spiritual institution in a hostile political world. In such a world, the Church's first priority was to safeguard its spiritual mission through the preservation of the institutional Church for the spiritual health of the faithful. Consequently, any humanitarian action to alleviate the plight of non-Catholics would be a secondary priority, undertaken where possible, if not endangering the Church's reason for existence. To this imperative, the Spanish Church was no exception.

The second theme, on the other hand, is the unique nature of the Spanish Church. Catholicism, though universalist in its spiritual goals, was not monolithic. This study has built on the identification by historians of Spanish „National Catholicism“ to emphasize the close identity of the Spanish Church with the national traditions and values that underlie this concept. We have seen how the Church saw the promotion of the „Spanish“ and the traditional, to the exclusion of foreign influences as integral to its re-Christianizing mission. We have examined the extent to which Franco both shared these values and exploited them to consolidate his regime. We have noted how *hispanidad*, that perceived sharing of language and culture with Spanish speakers abroad was seen by the Spanish Church and state alike as important to the internal Spanish self-concept and to Spain's international outreach. This chapter will show how these shared attitudes of Spanish Church and state produced a uniquely Spanish dichotomous approach by both institutions to the wartime „Jewish question.“

journal articles. For the bitter debate engendered, see Ronald J. Rychlak, „Goldhagen v Pius XII,“ *First Things*, 124, (June/July 2002), 37-54.

The contention that humanitarian concern for Jews was of secondary priority to the wartime Church requires explanation in view of a strong emphasis in Christian teaching advocating action to help all in need regardless of race or creed.² The essence of this explanation is the position of the Church as a spiritual institution in a hostile political world. Three factors may be identified as influencing the Church's specific attitude towards Jews in that world. The first is Catholicism's religious traditions. The Church existed to bring every human soul to salvation. Such human salvation the Church saw as conditional on acceptance of Catholic teachings. Without this acceptance, human beings were eternally lost. Among the „lost,“ therefore, were the Jews. Their non-acceptance of the Church's claims had made Jews historically the target of Christian persecution. Even in the twentieth century, before the Second Vatican Council, Catholicism continued, not only „erroneous and unjust interpretations of the New Testament,“ but to teach a negative „gospels“ view of Judaism. Traditional hostility encouraged stereotypes and outweighed the charitable teachings of these same gospels. Religious anti-Semitism had by no means disappeared, remaining potent in strongly Catholic countries.³

Secondly, we have seen that by the early twentieth century, the Church was under increasing attack from growing anti-clerical liberalism and Marxist socialism. In searching for the source of these „scourges,“ many within the Church, rather than

² Action to help the needy, reaching beyond race or creed is strongly reflected in the Gospels, see particularly the Parable of the Good Samaritan, Luke 10: 25-37

³ *We Remember* frankly admits the existence of historic Catholic „anti-Judaism“ but is disingenuous in implying that this „generalized discrimination“ faded away at the end of the 18th century. For quotations from *We Remember*, Section III, see text in Braham, *Vatican and the Holocaust*, 102-103. Whilst acknowledging, with *We Remember*, essential differences between Catholic and Nazi anti-Semitism, this study sees use of „anti-Judaism“ as euphemistic and prefers to confront the reality of Catholic anti-Semitism. David Kertzer, *The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism* (New York: Knopf, 2001), reveals anti-Jewish measures in the Papal States until 1870, (11) and that the notorious Jewish „blood libel,“ a calumny that Jews habitually murdered Christian children to obtain blood for ritual purposes, was still being promulgated in 1914 ,(236).

contemplating the complex social and economic changes brought by nineteenth century industrialization and urbanization, looked for a simple answer. Thanks to recently emergent racial anti-Semitism, one was available. Traditional religious anti-Semitism was transmuted into the social, economic and political realms. Conspiracy theories and calumnies that Jews fomented liberalism and Communism, dominated world capitalism and controlled anti-religious freemasonry found receptive Catholic audiences. These calumnies alleged that the exceptional in wealth, political, anti-Christian radicalism and criminality amongst Jews was typical. A strong ethic for education existing in many Jewish communities was misrepresented as a sinister plot to „dominate“ professions to the detriment of Catholics. Myths about the power and degree of international organization of Jews were promulgated. Many Catholics perceived an economic and political Jewish threat to the Church’s mission as well as an „unreasonable“ Jewish religious resistance to conversion.

Thirdly, the Church’s defence against these perceived threats to its mission changed its priorities. Historically, Catholic universality had encompassed not only salvation through the institutional Church but the infusion of society with Christian principles. In the early twentieth century, however, the Church increasingly reacted to threats to its mission by seeing the permeation of a wider society as secondary to guardianship of the souls of its membership. The Church used both spiritual and political means in that guardianship. Its spiritual defence was to build strong Catholic community organizations. Its political defence was to guard its independence, safeguarding Catholicism’s freedom to preach and educate. Both means of defence impacted on the Church’s position in the wider world. In the spiritual realm, the Church’s universality now lay in its eagerness to

bring into its framework all who would heed its message. Converts, including Jews, would be sought, welcomed and helped. The obverse of this activity was an increasing insulation of the Catholic community from influences that would endanger that community's continuity and priority given to providing for its members rather than reaching out into the world. Ironically, such Catholic communities were becoming more like the Jewish communities that many resented and misrepresented; some commentators even refer to „ghettoization.“ In the political realm, Concordats exchanged recognition of its essential rights for a commitment by the Church to keep out of politics. The Church retained a right to speak on „moral issues“ but the boundary between the moral and the political was ill-defined. The Church therefore regarded any „political“ activity which might bring retaliation against Catholics and increase controversy and disunity among them with caution. To put it simply, the Church would usually put the spiritual interests of Catholics first, against other interests even potentially inimical to its spiritual mission ⁴

The above factors describe tendencies generally applicable to twentieth century Catholicism before 1945. All have some application to Spain but were modified by circumstances peculiar to that country. Firstly there were few Jews in Iberian Spain. In 1492, a desire for political and religious unity had led the „Catholic Kings“, Ferdinand and Isabella, to give Spain's Jews the stark choice of conversion or expulsion. Those choosing to preserve their faith and culture resettled under Muslim rule mainly in Africa and the Balkans, as well as in Catholic but relatively tolerant Poland. These *sefardies* continued over centuries to form close-knit Spanish-speaking Jewish communities over

⁴See Drapac, *War and Religion*, 282, for descriptions of this close-knit world and „ghetto“ description by detractors. See also Martin Conway, „Catholic Politics or Christian Democracy? - The Evolution of Inter-war Political Catholicism“ in Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1945* (London: Routledge, 2004), 236–241, for Catholic pre- World War II „fortress mentality.“

which Spain had obtained a usual general right of protection. In the mid nineteenth century, a few Moroccan *sefardies* moved into Spain's North African enclaves, a handful returned discreetly to Spain whilst other *sefardies* settled in France. The early twentieth century saw two contradictory developments in Spain which later helped to produce a dichotomous attitude to Jewry. On the one hand anti-Semitism percolated into Spain from France. It was not restricted to the political right but where practiced by Catholics retained the basically religious character previously described. On the other hand, the national soul-searching following the disaster of 1898 produced new Spanish sympathy for overseas communities which had preserved a Spanish identity, even non-Christian ones. Though this *filosefardismo* (sympathy for the *sefardies*), greatly exaggerated the feeling of *hispanidad* present in those communities, its force was sufficient to influence a decree in 1924 giving Spanish nationality to their members. This was to be vital in World War II.⁵

Secondly, during Spain's traumas of the earlier 1930's Spanish Catholics suffered from Republican anticlerical threats that encouraged both a „ghetto“ mentality and a belief in conspiracy theories in which the „machinations of international Jewry“ figured prominently. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a crass fabrication of this type, went through five different translations into Spanish between 1932 and 1934. Inevitably in the *Guerra Civil*, truth became the first casualty. The Republicans castigated their enemies as „Fascist“, despite the near-invisibility of Spanish Fascism. On the Nationalist side, as

⁵ For spreading anti-Semitism from France, see José Antonio Lisbona, *Retorno A Sefarad: La Política de España hacia los judíos en el sigloXX* (Barcelona: Riopiedras Ediciones, 1993) 91. For leftist anti-Semitism, see Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío(1812-2000)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones de Historia, 2002), 207-213. For *filosefardismo*, see *Ibid.*, 261-273.

„Catholic“ was to become shorthand for all Spanish Nationalist values, „anti-Semites of the pen“ used „Judeo-Masonic“ to symbolize all *forastero*, „anti-Spain“ influences that were attempting to subvert these values. Even Gomá claimed that „Jews and masons poisoned the national soul with absurd doctrines“ and in a broadcast to the defenders of the Toledo Alcazar on August 28, 1936, linked Communists, Jews and masons as Spain’s enemies. However, those „good Jews“, the remote *sefardies*, were not quite forgotten as the pragmatic Franco quietly enlisted Moroccan Jews on his side even whilst simultaneously soliciting Nazi aid! *El Heralde de Marrueas* listed 29 major contributors to his appeal for the Nationalist forces in September 1936; 24 of them Jews.⁶

Whilst in Spain the *Guerra Civil* was continuing, Nazism’s growing persecution of the Church concentrated the collective mind of the Vatican as to how the racism at the heart of Nazi ideology might best be countered. Realization soon dawned that this threat was far more fundamental to a universalist Church than any putative Jewish „threat.“ The final years of Pius XI’s pontificate were marked by constant Nazi Concordat violations. Pius XI realized that Nazism not only threatened Jews but particularly the fundamental rights of the Church to preach and educate. Chapter 5 of this study agrees with *We Remember* in its assessment of the seminal importance of *Mit brennender Sorge* as an expression of this realization even though Jews are not specifically mentioned. We saw in that chapter that the encyclical’s publication caused some initial embarrassment for the Spanish Church as it moved cautiously towards full support of the Nationalists. However, the encyclical highlighted for Church and Nationalists alike the alien nature of Nazism

⁶ For translations of *Protocols*, see Chillida, 497. For conspiracy „strategy“ and anti-Semitism of the pen, see, Isidro González, *Los judíos y la segunda republica: 1931-1939* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial SA, 2004), 267-268. For Franco and Morocco, see *Ibid*, 294. For Gomá, see Lisbona, *Retorno A Sefarad*, 100. See Norman B. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1975), 8, for Alcazar broadcast.

and its incompatibility with traditional Spanish Catholic values which were integral to the Nationalist „crusade.“⁷

When Pius XI died in February 1939, Cardinal Pacelli succeeded him as Pius XII. Pacelli was a diplomat who, by nature and experience, favoured conciliation rather than confrontation. However, too stark a comparison should not be drawn between the two Popes. Both men, as Popes, were constrained by political considerations. Under Pius XI, for example, Catholic disapproval of the Nazi *kristallnacht* of November, 1938 had been expressed through several European prelates, citing the Pope's anti-racist denunciations, rather than by public Vatican protest. Thus, the increasingly tenuous relations between the Vatican and the Nazis could be maintained even though, as the Spanish consul in Munich reported, the Nazis clearly identified Catholics with their state's enemies. Additionally, by the time Pacelli became Pope, in March 1939, European war looked almost inevitable. That circumstance impelled the Vatican to prepare for the cautious neutrality that followed the precedents set by Benedict XV. In the circumstances in which Pacelli as Pope found himself, a very cautious attitude to the worsening plight of the Jews could be expected.⁸

However, as Nationalist victory loomed in the *Guerra Civil*, the Spanish foreign ministry files reveal that Pacelli whilst still Vatican Secretary of State showed concern at least for baptized Jews threatened by persecution. Correspondence in early 1939 reveals project *Sarogeco*, under the auspices of Pacelli, that aimed to resettle up to 50,000

⁷ See *We Remember*, cited in Braham, *Vatican and the Holocaust*, 104, for its comment on *Mit brennender Sorge*. See Frank J. Coppa, „The Papal Response to Nazi and Fascist Anti-Semitism from Pius XI to Pius XII“ in Joshua D Zimmerman(ed.), *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule, 1922-1945* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 270-275, for papal attempts to combat Nazi racism.

⁸ For Catholic reaction to the *Kristallnacht*, see Coppa, *Ibid*, 275. See also Castel (Spanish Consul, Munich) to MAE, 20 November 1938. AMAE Leg R 3461, Exp. 6. For cautious papal reaction to Italian anti-Semitic laws, see Kertzer, *Popes against the Jews*, 287-288. See Notes of Pacelli, *ADSS* vol.6, App.6, 539, authorizing English Cardinal Hinsley to speak in protest against the *Kristallnacht*.

Romanian baptized Catholics of Jewish origin in Spain! The Spanish ambassador in Bucharest passed on this „fantastic“ appearing proposition, with some suitably anti-Semitic comments- „the waters of baptism don’t change racial mentality,“ Jewish entry into Spain would „resemble that of the plague of parasites“ and in a follow-up letter, „most if not all are enemies of our Nationalist, Christian, anti-Marxist cause.“ That this project was not just a Romanian rumour was confirmed when the undersecretary to the Spanish ambassador at the Vatican wrote to the foreign ministry „I beg you, authorize me as soon as possible to put an end to this project - to declare to the Vatican the impossibility of receiving these *neófitos*.“ (new members). Doubtless such authorization was promptly given. In the throes of civil war in a devastated country, the winning Nationalists, regaled by stories of „international Jewish conspiracies,“ were as ill-disposed as they were ill-equipped to receive „international Jews,“ even those baptized as Catholics. However, even as obvious an anti-Semite as the Spanish ambassador in Romania had a totally different attitude to those „good Jews,“ the Spanish-speaking *sefardies*. Writing to his foreign ministry for forwarding to the Vatican, the same ambassador characterized them as „Spanish citizens who have always been distinguished by their patriotism.“ He referred to the „genuine case“ of the conversion of a *sefarad* family in respectful tones and urged the ecclesiastical authorities to give publicity to this „exemplary case.“⁹

⁹ See De Prat y Santo (Spanish ambassador, Bucharest) to MAE, 21 January, 1939 and 3 February 1939; Undersecretary to Spanish ambassador at the Vatican to MAE, 16 February 1939; De Prat y Santo to MAE, 15 March 1939, all AMAE Leg R 3462, Exp. 2. *Neófitos* literally means „new members“ but it had in certain racist minds vaguely derogatory connotations.

As the euphoria of victory in the *Guerra Civil* was succeeded by the new problems associated with the European war, many Spanish Nationalists revealed similarly dichotomous attitude to Jews. Belief in the symbolic „Judeo-Masonic conspiracy,“ shorthand for all foreign elements distrusted by Catholic Nationalist Spaniards, remained strong. However, the Nationalists had not been without their Jewish supporters. These Franco was prepared to welcome. In March, 1939, *Current History (US)* had noted that Spain’s richest man, a Jew, Juan March, was on Franco’s side. In July, Spanish ambassador Yanguas reported from the Vatican the critical sarcasm with which an Italian Fascist newspaper had derided Spanish reports of celebrations of Franco's victory by the Jews of Tetuan, Spanish Morocco. The confidence of this community of Spanish Jews that a victorious Franco regime would not replicate Nazi anti-Semitic policies already being enforced in Italy or allow Spain to be reduced to Nazi satellite status was to prove correct, despite occasional surface appearances to the contrary. As a Catholic nationalist, Franco believed in preserving the „pure“ Catholic unity of Spain. As a political opportunist he wished to reinforce the Catholic legitimacy of his regime by emphasizing its continuity with the policies of the Catholic Kings, including Jewish expulsion. In December, 1939, therefore, Franco spoke, in indirect reference to the Jews, of „measures taken in certain foreign countries to combat and banish those whose cupidity and self-interest is the stigma of their character“, a „burden“ of which Spain was freed centuries ago „by the grace of God and the clear vision of Ferdinand and Isabella.“¹⁰

¹⁰ See *Current History (US)* vol. 45, no.1, March 1939, 34, for Juan March. See Yanguas to MAE, 15 July 1939, AMAE Leg R 3462, Exp.2, for Italian Fascist newspaper. See Peterson to Halifax, 3 January 1940, FO 371/24507, NAUK, for December Franco speech.

Franco occasionally returned to this theme during the European war, exploiting the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy myth for internal and for Axis political consumption. However, Gonzalo Chillida cites evidence from Franco's own publications that the Spanish *Caudillo* was less anti-Semitic or generally racist than many contemporary European political leaders. Robert Hodgson, British Agent in Nationalist Spain from 1937 to 1939, also spoke in 1941 of the „reciprocated respect“ of Franco and Moroccan Jews and we have seen that Franco had exploited his support among Jews to gain financial aid in 1936. Therefore, when in March, 1940, the Jews“ alleged Marxist and Masonic „partners“ were proscribed, no anti-Jewish legislation was passed then or subsequently. Moreover, the previous November, the regime had founded a new school dedicated to „Hebrew Studies“ in Madrid.¹¹

Church publications of this period revealed a similar dichotomy of attitude to the Jews. Gomá's post-*Guerra Civil* pastoral cited a foreign bishop's assertion that „the Jews never forgave Spain for their expulsion“ and that „the masons work at the dictation of the Jews.“ However, Spain's „voice of the Vatican,“ *Razón y Fe*, reviewing American Henry Ford's anti-Semitic diatribe *The International Jew*, in May, 1939 was balanced. That review recognized Jewish problems „in some countries.“ Jewish „solidarity of conscience, religious practice, pride in race and resistance to assimilation“ made the Jews „a state within a state.“ However it would be unjust to condemn all Jews, measuring them all by the same standard. The article ended cuttingly, „Mr. Ford, famed for making excellent cars, makes in this case poor arguments.“ Sometimes, contradictory attitudes to Jews could surface within succeeding issues of the same Church publication. On 6 April 1940,

¹¹ Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España*, 396, 398-9, cites passages from Franco's publications that showed respect towards Jews and Muslims. See Hodgson *The Policy and Position of the Spanish Government*, 10 June 1941, 2, RIIA 8/728, for comment on „reciprocated respect.“

Signo reported on the *sefardies* in Tetuan, Amsterdam and Rhodes, all good Spaniards, particularly when content to remain where they were. The article commented with an implied criticism of Nazism, „compared with others, the solution of Ferdinand and Isabella was child“s-play.“ The following week, *Signo* castigated shadowy international Jewish conspirators, claiming that Britain“s charges over Germany“s invasion of Norway were an attempt to excite American opinion, which was confused by „subtle Jewish propaganda.“¹²

In the wake of Germany“s 1940 victories, Nazi anti-Semitism spread its influence over most of Europe and Jews bore the brunt of Nazi oppression. In the Vatican, this caused, as Yanguas understatedly reported, a „divergence“ between the Vatican and the Nazis. The Vatican realized the futility of representations to the Axis powers which, in the arrogance of victory, as British ambassador Osborne commented, „practically ignored the Pope.“ Moreover, the Vatican had not yet given up hope of sponsoring peace negotiations. In Italy the Vatican was politically circumscribed, once Mussolini had declared war. The slightest perceived infraction of impartiality raised Fascist execration. After Vatican Radio strongly condemned Nazi racism as incompatible with Christianity, Yanguas reported on August 9 that the Italian Fascist press was attacking the Vatican for „desiring the victory of international Jewry.“ Where the Vatican felt it had any influence, this was discreetly used. To Spain, for example, the Vatican, through Yanguas, clearly stated that „an anti-Catholic [racist] policy cannot be agreed to in a Catholic country.“¹³

¹² Gomá“s pastoral is cited in Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España*, 363. See *Razón y Fe*, no. 496, May 1939, 94-97, for review of Ford“s publication. See *Signo*, no.12, 6 April 1940, 1 and no.13, 13 April 1940, 1, for contrast of attitudes.

¹³ For Vatican Radio broadcast of 30 July 1940, see Walter Rosenberger and Herbert C. Tobin, eds., *Keesing“s Contemporary Archives*, vol. 4 (1940-1943), 4181. See Yanguas to MAE, 26 July 1940, AMAE Leg R 3461 Exp. 6, for „divergence“ and „anti-Catholic policies. See Yanguas to MAE, 9 August 1940,

In late 1940 and early 1941, the Nazi threat on Spain's borders was at its height. However, the Vatican's discreet support encouraged those Spanish churchmen who were working to keep Spain from descending into that satellite status of which intensifying persecution of Jews was elsewhere a characteristic sign. Consequently, Spain preserved its essential integrity. Firstly, it prepared to defend *sefardies* from Nazi oppression. In November, 1940, Spain's consul general in Paris, asked his foreign ministry for instructions in the event of Nazi attempts to confiscate the goods of Spanish Jews. The foreign ministry, at the height of Nazi pressure on Spain, hesitated. However, in February, 1941, it returned an unequivocal reply. No racial laws existed in Spain. Spanish subjects abroad were to be defended regardless of race or religion. Secondly, the Jews in Spanish territory remained undisturbed. In consequence, in January, 1941, the regime's internal report noted that in Morocco, most Jews were pro-regime. Thirdly, the Nazis had not yet precluded Jewish emigration. Economically, Spain, on the verge of starvation, was in no position to receive refugees regardless of nationality. Ideologically, Church and regime wished to preserve the country's Spanish-Catholic unity. However, Spain was prepared to issue transit visas in many circumstances for individual Jews proceeding to other countries. Other refugees including Jews entered Spain illegally. Spanish policy was not generous but Spain did provide a limited conduit by which some Jews could escape the Nazis. Finally, the regime continued to encourage *sefarad* culture. In early 1941, Madrid's School of Hebrew Studies published *Sefarad*, a magazine which continued throughout the war. *Sefarad's* first issue once again reveals a sharp

demarcation between „Hispanic Judaism“ which moved in a „spiritual environment“ and the „materialistic character“ that Judaism in other places showed.¹⁴

During this period, the Spanish regime and Church were at one in not wishing to provoke the Nazis. Any Spanish public condemnation of Nazi or Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism or references to any Spanish actions which helped Jews were therefore absent. Nazi policies still usually embraced persecution rather than extermination. When several Nazi satellites introduced legislation at reducing Jewish wealth or „domination“ of professions with minimal Nazi prompting, public Spanish Catholic reaction was guarded. *Ya* reported without comment on December 5, 1940 actions taken by the Romanian government to confiscate Jewish goods. The same day, *Ya* reported a speech by Hungary's prime minister that „the Jewish problem will be resolved in a united Europe.“ Neither the Hungarians nor the Spanish Church knew what this „resolution“ would come to entail. Ten days later, *Ya* reviewed a raft of Vichy legislation, including subsidies for Catholic schools as well as discriminatory „Jewish statutes.“ *Ya* saw the overall spirit of this legislation as „very good,“ although there was an implied criticism of Jewish legislation that „a law unsupported by custom is no law.“ Jews were portrayed as a disruptive force in occupied Europe in such reports as that in *Ya* on February 8 1941, describing a „group of Jewish contrabandists' discovered in Paris. The Pope's message of Easter 1941 referred to the moral duties imposed by occupation but in occupied Europe anti-Jewish measures continued apace. *Ya* reported on May 10 that in occupied France Jews were to be debarred from owning businesses. In Spain such measures could meet the approval of those Catholics who supported traditional religious anti-Semitism. An

¹⁴ See Rolland to MAE, 16 November 1940 and reply 26 February 1941, AMAE, Leg R 1716 Exp.2. For regime's internal report, see *Informe desde Oran*, 2 January 1941, *DIHGF* Tomo II-1, 459-460. See *Sefarad*, Año 1, vol.1, 3 for „contrast“ within Judaism.

article in *Ya* on May 27 described Jews „with the blood of God on their caftans“ condemned to wander eternally. The same article catered to believers in the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy- the Jews were going to the USA, „a country that knows little of their arts and ability to deceive the politically inexpert.“ However, we saw in chapter 5 how the totality of Spanish Catholic press reporting emphasized traditional Spanish values which excluded alien Nazism and embraced a *hispanidad* which tacitly included Spanish Jews.¹⁵

With Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, Nazi Jewish policy moved in the East from persecution to extermination with mass executions on the Eastern Front. Behind the fighting, Jews were transported to ghettos as prelude to execution. This fact was not immediately known in Spain, where, in the wake of the „anti-Bolshevik crusade,“ much reporting on Jews continued to link them with Communism. *Ya*, in its euphoria over the „crusade“ on 5 July 1941, editorialized that Stalin was acting with „Judaic impassivity“ in decreeing hunger and misery for „the most enslaved people on earth.“ *Signo* detailed religious persecution in Lithuania but claimed that „no synagogue or rabbi was persecuted,“ rather they were protected „for all are supporters of Stalin.“ *Ya* continued to publish anti-Jewish reports from elsewhere. In August, *Ya* reported that the Jews possessed „more than half of Slovakia’s [monetary] capital.“ In September, *Ya* saw „the elimination of the Semitic element in French life“ proceeding. It also reported on a Nazi-sponsored „exposition“ describing the past Jewish road „from the ghetto to domination of French political, economic and cultural life“ and Judaism’s links with Communism and

¹⁵ See the following references in *Ya*, - 5 December 1940, 1, for Hungary, 3 for Romania; 15 December 1940, 1, for Vichy anti-Jewish statutes, 8 February 1941, 1, for „Jewish contrabandists,“ 10 May 1941, 3, for occupied France, 27 May 1941, 3, for anti-Semitic article. See pp.110- 111 for totality of press reporting.

masonería. In October, *Ya* quoted an American poll citing the Jews as one cause of „increasing US bellicosity.“¹⁶

Although the Nazis attempted to keep their Eastern policies secret, word leaked. In December, 1941, a Spanish medical delegation which had visited Poland sent Spain's government a secret report detailing the appalling Nazi treatment of Jews and Soviet prisoners. Reports of Nazi brutality were also spread by Spanish volunteers on leave from the Eastern Front. Wayne Bowen's research shows that the Blue Division was not complicit in such brutality. Whatever religious anti-Semitism or belief in international Jewish conspiracies may have existed among the volunteers, when actually faced with Jews, they reacted humanely. Rules of non-fraternization with Jews were ignored, Spanish treatment of Jews was „in strict obedience to international law“ and there is „no evidence“ of Spanish war-crimes. Moreover, the Spanish protected Jewish medical staff in the hospitals. Bowen sees Nazi policies as „offensive to the Spanish Catholics of the Blue Division who believed with their Church, that conversion was the solution to the “Jewish question”.“¹⁷

However, with the Nazi threat to Spain still acute and the Nazis apparently winning the war, the Spanish government kept secret its knowledge of Nazi atrocities in the East. Nor did the Vatican pass on to the Spanish Church what it knew. On receiving the first reports of Nazi atrocities from the Polish government in exile and Jewish organizations, the Vatican followed the policies of Benedict XV in the previous war in refusing to

¹⁶ See the following references in *Ya*, - 5 July 1941, 3 (ed.), for Stalin; 2 August 1941, 1, for Slovakia; 5 September 1941, 1 and 6 September 1941, 3 for France; 26 October 1941, 4, for US poll. See *Signo*, no.77, 5 July 1941, 1, for alleged Jewish support of Stalin.

¹⁷ See *Informe secreto sobre el trato de los judíos*, December 1941, *DIHGF* Tomo II-2, 405-406, for medical delegation's report. See Wayne Bowen, „A Great Moral Victory“ in Ruby Rohlich (ed.), *Resisting the Holocaust* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998), 195 -212 for Blue Division and the Jews. See *Ibid*, 205 for Bowen's comment that Nazi policies were „offensive“ to Spanish Catholics.

countenance unconfirmed allegations from one side about the other. In this war, however, reliable confirmation soon arrived. In October, 1941 Guiseppi Burzio, Vatican *Charge d'affaires* in Slovakia, sent incontrovertible reports from Slovak military chaplains of systematic Nazi shooting of Jews on the Eastern Front. By early 1942 conditions were such as to make deportation, as the Vatican Secretariat declared, with masterly understatement, „rather dangerous for life.“¹⁸ However, in Spain, the Vatican did not re-enforce its own promptings to the Spanish Church at that time to speak out against Nazi paganism and racism by passing on its knowledge of the consequences of these Nazi beliefs. Spanish Catholics in late 1941 and throughout much of 1942 could therefore continue to believe that Nazi Jewish policies remained just within the bounds of acceptability.

Chapter 10 noted executions of Jews reported as „reprisals“ and Spanish press reports continued to give persecution a quasi-legal coating of justification. „Illegal residents,“ defined as all Jews arriving in France since 1936, were interned in December 1941. A report that same month noted that the Nazis had fined the Jews of the occupied zone and threatened to deport Jews if perpetrators of „crimes“ against German soldiers were not discovered. *Ya*, editorializing on the above report, coined the portmanteau word „judeomasonicsocialistcapitalism“ incomprehensible in theory but in practice „destroying

¹⁸See Burzio to Maglione, 27 October 1941, *ADSS* vol.8, no. 184, 327-328, for initial report; Burzio to Maglione, 9 March 1942, *Ibid.*, vol.8, no. 298, 453, for further report. Notes of Secretariat of State, 25 January 1942, *Ibid.*, vol.8, no. 263, 418, for understated comment. Though the process by which the „Final Solution“ evolved, and Hitler’s role has continued to be contested, German historian Christian Gerlach, by „a combination of known and newly discovered documents“ has dated 12 December 1941, as Hitler’s announcement „to fifty leading Nazis“ of a „decision in principle“ to sanction „murderous initiatives“ taken in the occupied east and to make extermination systematic and extended to all European Jews. Gerlach’s arguments are now widely accepted by many historians. See Peter Monteath, „The Fuhrer’s Decision, (new evidence points to December 12, 1941 as the date of the decision to complete the Holocaust)“ *History Today* 48 (September 1998), 4 – 6.

those states which take it into their bosom." In July 1942, an assertion that Jews comprised 85% of black marketeers accompanied the reported exclusion of Parisian Jews from all entertainments. In August, Jews were accused of invading French villages and reselling the food obtained there at exorbitant prices. That same month, the incarceration of a prominent Romanian Jewish industrialist was represented as a warning to other Jewish bosses who failed to improve their employees' working conditions. On September 3, reports that the Jews of Romanian Bucovina were compelled to wear the yellow star were softened by the observation that Jews baptized before September 1941 were exempt. Ten days later the Jews who had arrived in France since 1936 and were to be deported to their country of origin were described as „undesirables." Moreover, the above cited reports are the only ones mentioning Jews appearing in *Ya* during this entire period when Nazi extermination of Jews was reaching its height. Neither *Razón y Fe*, the „Vatican's voice", *Ecclesia*, *Signo* nor any of the other Catholic reviews highly influential with Spain's Catholic elite had any references at all. In the absence of any specific Vatican promptings about the desperate plight of the Jews, the Spanish Church remained preoccupied with reconstruction and its mission. Ordinary Spanish Catholics could therefore see rumours spread by the returning volunteers as referring to isolated incidents.¹⁹

Franco was better informed. In August, 1942, he learned of the impending transportation of French Jews. On September 4 he restructured his government, replacing foreign minister Suñer with the more pro-Allied Jordana. Franco used reshuffles in government to change the internal factional balance, to increase his own power or to

¹⁹ See the following references in *Ya*, 16 December 1941, 3(ed.) for „judeomasonicsocialistcapitalism"; 16 July 1942, 3, for „black marketeers"; 29 August 1942, 3 for „invasion of villages, 27 August 1942, 3, for Romanian industrialist; 3 September 1942, 3, for Bucovina; 13 September 1942, 3, for „undesirables."

signal changes in external policies, sometimes all three simultaneously, mixing caution and opportunism. Franco's knowledge of the increasing radicalism of Nazi Jewish policy perhaps slightly exacerbated a cautious tendency to distance himself somewhat from the Axis as Allied strength increased. In any event, government changes resulted in a discreet increase of slight, if enigmatic, criticism of Nazi Jewish policy in the Catholic press. On September 17 *Ya* reported censure of Vichy by the United States both for its conscription of workers for Germany and for its anti-Jewish measures. Six days later *Ya* reported on Switzerland being „invaded“ by refugees. No reference was made to why this was so or to their usual racial origin but the article referred to the reluctance of other countries to take them. In case any reader had missed the point, the following day *Ya* carried an article that Bolivia was prohibiting Jewish entry. In December *Ya* reported Vichy's Minister for Jewish Affairs describing measures taken thus far as no more than the commencement of a wider programme to „eliminate“ the Jews from French life, an ominous hint in view of rumours which by then were gaining currency in Spain.²⁰

Such slightly critical tendencies should not be exaggerated. There were no Spanish press reports of the denunciation in September of the Jewish deportations by some French bishops. Anti-Semites remained powerful in the army and in some Spanish diplomatic positions. These included José Lequerica, then ambassador to Vichy, who commented on the French bishops' protest, „not all the French clergy feel the pro-Jewish ardour of the Archbishop of Toulouse.“ Nor was the British House of Commons declaration condemning the massacres of Jews in December reported in Spain. In the absence of any Vatican confirmation, this last may have been seen as Allied propaganda. Michael Phayer

²⁰ See the following references in *Ya*, - 17 September 1942, 3, for US censure of Vichy; 23 September 1942, 3, for refugee „invasion“; 24 September 1942, 3, for Bolivia; 12 December 1942, 3, *Towards the Elimination of the Jews*.

may have grounds in asserting that, in the absence of public protest, the Vatican was over-cautious in not communicating through sympathetic channels what it knew. Even in October, 1942, Maglione replied to American enquiries by admitting that „news of some measures taken against non-Aryans“ had arrived „from other sources“ but that the Vatican had been unable to check the „exactness“ of such news. Certainly, knowledge of the full extent and methods of Nazi policies was not „exact“ but the Vatican’s mention of „other sources,“ implying nebulous rumour, made no reference to the detailed reports from its own nuncios asserting that mass deportations and executions, not necessarily excluding converts, were occurring. Whilst the war remained in the balance and in the absence of any Vatican prompting, neither Franco nor the Spanish Church would publicly move too far or too quickly on behalf of foreign Jews.²¹

However, as elsewhere, the Nazi „final solution“ reached its peak; Spain remained an island of tolerance. In 1942, *Sefarad* described how Jews in Spanish Morocco lived with Christians and Moslems in an atmosphere of „mutual respect.“ The Church in Spanish Morocco was playing its part in maintaining and advocating a tolerant peace. In Iberian Spain, many clergy were similarly active. The Bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo was an enthusiastic supporter of *Sefarad* magazine. Whereas elsewhere in Europe, the Jewish basis of Christianity was minimized or denied, Spanish Bible weeks, instigated and attended by the episcopate and clergy prominently featured studies of Spain’s Jewish heritage. Whilst in other countries, priceless Jewish manuscripts were desecrated and

²¹Lequerica to MAE 15 September 1942, AMAE Leg R 1716, Exp.2. For military anti-Semites, see Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España*, 387. See Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 217, for Vatican over-caution. See Kevin Madigan, „What the Vatican Knew about the Holocaust, and When“, *Commentary*, 112(October 2001), 43-52, for documented chronology. See Secretariat of State to Tittmann, 10 October 1942, *ADSS*, vol.8, no. 507, 679, for Vatican response to US enquiry.

destroyed, in Spain such documents were exhibited and studied as part of Spain's spiritual patrimony. In emphasizing the „Spanish,“ the „traditional,“ and the „spiritual“ to the exclusion of *forastero*, anti-religious Nazism as well as Communism, these clerics were sufficiently „catholic“ in a wider sense to embrace even non-Christian contributions to Spanish traditions.²²

The regime was similarly motivated in discreetly fostering such traditions. *Sefarad's* first issue had carried a picture of Franco under whose patronage scientific studies, including Hebrew studies, had experienced a „renaissance“. The Spanish Ministry of Education had initiated increased emphasis on Jewish studies as part of a support for Spanish spiritual traditions that had been greatly curtailed under the anticlerical Republic. In 1944, the Francisco Franco Prize for Literature would be won by a work aspects of which related to Spanish Hebrew studies. The University of Madrid had developed and expanded courses on Jewish history and culture whilst Radio Madrid in a series of religious broadcasts spoke of the Jewish influence on Christian scripture. Meanwhile, limited Jewish transit through Spain had continued and the regime's internal reports mentioned the arrival and „royal“ reception of members of the Rothschild family in Las Palmas.²³

This relative Spanish tolerance, discreet and pragmatic though it was, particularly earlier in the war, encouraged first Jewish organizations and later the Western Allies to make Spain a platform from which some Jews might be saved. The initial Allied reaction

²² See *Sefarad*, Año.2, vol.1, 1942, 221, for Spanish Morocco. For role of the Church there, see José Maria Betanzos, Vicar Apostolic of Morocco, *Carta pastoral* for lent, 1942 (Tangier: Tip Hispano-Arabiga, 1942), BNE. See *Sefarad*, Año 1, vol. 1941, 249-250 for the episcopacy, Bible weeks and manuscript expositions. See *Ibid.*, Año 2, vol.1, 221, for Bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo.

²³ See *Sefarad*, Año 1, vol.1, 1941, 3, for Franco picture and „renaissance“; See *Ibid.*, 25, for Ministry and university courses; See *Ibid.*, Año 3, vol.2, 1943, 499, for broadcasts, *Ibid.*, Año 4, vol.1, 1944, 216, for prize. See Las Palmas, 14 April 1942, *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 374, for Rothschilds.

to news of the Holocaust amounted to little more than platitudinous hand-wringing. Though Anthony Eden, wartime British Foreign Secretary, interviewed for the 1970's television series *The World at War*, describes the British House of Commons standing in tribute to the Jews in December 1942 as „the most moving thing I have experienced in my years in parliament“ the Allies were slow to back gestures with action. Jewish organizations, particularly in the United States, soon realized that they needed to combine political pressure with practical help if even a remnant of European Jewry was to be saved. By September 1942, the U.S. Jewish American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) was established in Barcelona with tacit Spanish approval as the regime's internal report noted. By early 1943, the JDC was spending \$150,000 per month to help Jewish refugees. By June of that year, it was fully organized, aiding Jews in transit and providing Hebrew courses for Jews waiting to embark for the USA. A Jewish refugee in Spain engaged by the JDC to gather material for such courses commented from Jerusalem two years later on Spain in mid 1943. „One cannot speak of an anti-Semitic movement in Spain nor did any anti-Jewish laws exist, contrary to the general idea that Spain's government is not favourable to Jews.“ He spoke of his „surprise to find an institution where Christians, including some priests, were dedicated to Hebrew studies... even a Jewish library fully stocked.“²⁴

²⁴ For Eden, see, *The World at War*, London, Thames Television, 1972, Programme 13. The JDC had been formed in the previous war to co-ordinate the private humanitarian aid efforts of disparate Jewish organizations to Jews in the Ottoman Empire. For its activities in World War II, see Herbert Agar, *The Saving Remnant: An Account of Jewish Survival Since 1914* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1960), including its unofficial but tolerated office in a Barcelona hotel room, (140, confirmed by *DIHGF*, Tomo III, 30 September 1942, 633). For its expenditure in Spain, see Chaim U. Lipschitz, *Franco, Spain, the Jews and the Holocaust* (New York: Ktav, 1984), 138; for its cultural activities and refugee's comments, see *Sefarad*, Año 5, vol.1, 17 March, 1945, 258-260.

Meanwhile, after very strong Allied representations, reported by Osborne, that papal silence „risks renunciation of moral leadership“, Pius XII was constrained to speak on the plight of the Jews. His 1942 Christmas message was long and involved. Its theme was the necessity of a return by humanity to divine law. In the peroration, the Pope linked Nazi atrocities and Allied bombing of noncombatants, both seen as departures from that law.

Pius XII said:

Humanity owes this vow to hundreds of thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, and solely because of their nation or their race, have been condemned to death or progressive extinction.

This reference and a patronal address made in similar terms, on June 2 1943, are the closest to an outright public condemnation of the Nazi Holocaust that Pius XII came.²⁵

Vesna Drapac in *War and Religion* validly sees Church language as constituting a code the meaning of which is clear to those familiar with it and seeking its meaning. Perhaps Pius XII relied on this. The obverse, however, is that the wider world fails to see the totality of papal meanings and extracts what it wishes in accordance with its own political priorities. Thus the *New York Times* praised the Pope's words to point up Allied denunciations of racial persecution but ignored his reference to Allied bombing with which they were linked. In Spain, the Pope's entire message was printed in full in all Catholic publications but only *Signo* specifically linked bombing and persecution as the Pope did. Elsewhere the interplay of morality with politics and Church priorities was shown when the Spanish Church's public response was to use the Pope's message to warn against democracy and to support the campaigns for a separate peace and later that year against bombing whilst publicly ignoring his words on racial persecution. Privately

²⁵ Osborne to FO, 14 September 1942, FO 380/86, NAUK.

the papal message, however nebulous, gave encouragement to the Spanish attitude of discreet tolerance.²⁶

This tolerance was tested in early 1943 when the Nazis gave the Spanish foreign ministry the choice of removing its hitherto protected *sefardíes* or accepting their transportation to Nazi concentration camps. Franco wished neither to abandon „Spaniards“ (unless they had been Republican supporters) nor to introduce an „alien“ presence into Spain. His preference was that these Jews proceeded through Spain „like light through a crystal,“ one group arriving as the last departed. In March 1943, Jordana told U.S. ambassador Carlton Hayes that Spain was prepared „to rescue as many as possible,“ even to the extent of claiming for many Jews a spurious Spanish citizenship. The problem was where they were to go. The British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summary* reported that the United States did not want them to go to North Africa for fear of antagonising the Arabs, an attitude that the British themselves had consistently adopted in blocking Jewish emigration to Palestine. Still less did many Americans want them in the United States. Michael Marrus publishes a poll showing that, even by June 1944, 44% of Americans still saw the Jews as the main threat to US society, as opposed to 6% for the Nazis and 9% for the Japanese. As Jewish emigration through Spain proceeded slowly, therefore, Franco adopted the procrastinatory tactics at which he had become adept. He even briefly closed the border in March and threw in a reference to „propaganda services at the service of capital, Jewry and Marxism“ for Nazi consumption in May whilst simultaneously resisting Nazi demands over the *sefardíes*. Though the

²⁶ See Drapac, *War and Religion*, 23-24, for religious language. *Signo*, no.157, 16 January 1943, 1, linked bombings and persecution. Compare *New York Times*, 25 December, 1942, 10:1, with *Razón y Fe* no. 543, April 1943, (failings of democracy) and *Ecclesia* 16 January 1943, 21, (separate peace), for selective interpretation of the papal message.

Nazis eventually lost patience and deported some *sefardíes*, they were kept in relatively good conditions under Spanish diplomatic protection.²⁷

Slowly, the tide of war turned and the fact if not the details or extent of Nazi mass extermination policies reached Spain. The Spanish state and Church and the Vatican moved towards attitudes of mutual support for policies more favourable to Jews. This support was always cautious and was never in conflict with what were deemed to be essential priorities. In the spring of 1943, though the Catholic press raged over Katyn, it printed nothing about the concurrent razing of the Warsaw ghetto. However, positive references to Jews were replacing negative ones in Spanish Catholic publications. In July, *Ecclesia* reprinted and supported a strong article in *Osservatore Romano* endorsing the collective pastoral of the Slovak bishops. This went beyond asserting that baptized Jews were truly Catholics, to the statement, „We demand that civil rights and protection be extended to all citizens without distinction of origin and nationality.“ In October, the regime’s internal report noted that Domingo de las Barcenás, by then Spanish ambassador at the Vatican, had joined Vatican authorities in protesting „in severe terms“ to the German ambassador there against Nazi persecution of the Jews. That same month, Barcenás was asked by Pius XII to give an opinion in the light of criticism of the Pope’s lack of public defence of the Jews. Barcenás defended the Vatican and Spanish policy of „discreet action;“ a „spectacle“ would be counterproductive to Jews and would „put the Church at risk.“ Part of this „discreet action“ by the Spanish Church was to give asylum to

²⁷ Nazi demands and Spanish procrastination can be followed in AMAE, Leg R 1716, Exp. 2. See Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España*, 410 for Franco’s comment. See Hayes, *Mission in Spain*, 123, for Jordana’s comment. See *WPIS* no.187, 5 May 1943, 10, and Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State, 26 April 1943 *FRUS*, General, vol.1, 1943, 296 – 297, for US attitude. For US poll, see Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (London: Penguin, 1987), 162. For border closure (which also tested the Allies will to find places of refuge), see *WPIS* no. 182, 31 March 1943, 9. For Franco’s anti-Semitic reference, see *RFP*, vol. 6, no. 187, 28 May 1943, 289. For diplomatic protection see Martin Gilbert, *The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy* (London: Collins, 1986), 595 and AMAE Leg. R 1716, Exp. 5.

Jews in properties it owned in Rome. In December, Barcenas reported that the Vatican press was speaking out about Nazi persecution of the Jews. *Ya* co-operated with *Osservatore Romano*, reprinting that newspaper's discreet criticism of the rump Fascist regime's decision to confiscate the goods of Italian Jews. Many of these were Catholics by birth or sincere conversion, most of them, as *Ya* emphasized, were „totally innocent.“ In February 1944, *Ecclesia* supported the full publication of Segura's pastoral denouncing racism amongst other „modern errors,“ with a strong article, *Person and Race*, quoting St. Paul, „there is neither Jew nor Greek nor gentile...for all are one.“²⁸

In spring 1944, Hungary had the largest concentration of Jews surviving within Nazi reach. When in March, Germany directly occupied its satellite, anti-Jewish persecution immediately intensified. *Ya* presciently expressed „grave fears“ for Hungarian Jews and within two months, 400,000 were deported. There was intense Allied pressure on the Pope to speak. Finally on June 25, Pius XII asked Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy to avoid any intensification of the sufferings endured by people „owing to their nationality or race.“ In accordance with cautious papal practice, Jews, Nazis and deportations were not mentioned. However, the papal gesture, with Roosevelt's threat of retribution the following day, encouraged a deluge of neutral protests. By this stage, the Nazis were losing the war and the Allies, as neutrals had recently experienced through economic embargoes, were in a position to make Roosevelt's threats credible. Neutrals including Spain could express genuine moral concern with lessened fear of Nazi reprisals and in

²⁸ See *Ecclesia*, no. 104, 10 July 1943, 12, for Slovak pastoral. See Barcenas, „Condemnation by Church of Persecution of the Jews“, 19 October 1943, 519, Barcenas, „Audience with Pius XII“, 26 October, 1943, 551, „Request to Barcenas by General Gambara“, 19 December 1943, 650, for „discreet action“ of Barcenas. See Barcenas, „report,“ 7 December 1943, 643, for Vatican press; all *DIHGF*, Tomo IV. See *Ya*, 9 December 1943, 3, for *Osservatore Romano* article. See *Ecclesia* no.137, 26 February, 1944, 15, for *Person and Race*.

hope of gaining Allied goodwill. The Nazis needed Hungarian manpower to fight Soviet invasion. In July, they reluctantly acquiesced when Horthy stopped the deportations.²⁹

As Papal nuncio Angelo Rotta, by orchestrating a combined neutral protest, had influenced Horthy to prevent resumption in August, the Western Allies rightly suspected that this would be a temporary pause. The Spanish foreign ministry files record how the British and Americans worked with uncharacteristic speed, informality and co-operation with Spain to use that country as a conduit to save at least a fraction of Hungarian Jewry. Spanish Church publications worked to prepare opinion to expect a Jewish influx. *Ecclesia* on July 15 carried an article on the protection of Jews in Hungary, though its emphasis was still on the rights of converts. On July 23, *Ya* revealed that since the start of the war, 40,000 refugees, „most of them Jews,“ had crossed Spain „with the aid of the Spanish government.“ On August 18, *Ya* announced that the Hungarian government had agreed under Allied pressure, to let Jews go via neutral countries. In October, however, the installation of a pro-Nazi puppet government led to an immediate resumption of deportations. Accordingly on October 26, Pius XII contacted Hungarian primate Justinien Serédi exhorting the Hungarian Church to show the deep concern felt by the Holy See „for all those suffering persecution because of their religion or race.“ On November 1, the British *Weekly Political Intelligence Summary* noted the World Jewish Council’s request to the Pope to make a public appeal on behalf of Hungarian Jews but the Vatican knew from Rotta’s reports that constant diplomatic interventions extracted at most worthless promises from a regime as ineffectual as it was fanatical. Swedish diplomat Raul

²⁹ See *Ya*, 30 March 1944, 4, 1 April 1944, 10, for renewed persecution, 19 April 1944, 4, for „grave fears.“ *ADSS* vol. 10, 24 June 1944, Tittmann to Maglione, no. 241, 326-327, provides one example of Allied pressure. *Ibid*, 25 June 1944, Pius XII to Horthy, no. 243, 328, details the papal message. Horthy’s „bombardment“ by protests and the nuncio calling „several times a day“ are recounted in Hilberg, *Destruction of the European Jews* (1961 edition), 548-549.

Wallenberg, Rotta and Spanish diplomat Angel Sanz Briz worked tirelessly, distributing hundreds of safe conduct papers, hiding Jews in legations and galvanizing local clerics to provide shelter. It was thanks to these efforts that some Jews remained alive when the Nazis surrendered Budapest in February 1945.³⁰

In November 1944, the World Jewish Congress sent the Spanish foreign ministry a letter of thanks for Spain's efforts on behalf of Jews. In the war's last phase, Spanish Catholic publications reflected positively on how Catholicism and Spain had reacted to what *Signo* described in December, 1944 as the „intensity of the Third Reich's persecution of Jews.“ *Signo* suggested that „the Church had not reacted without protest.“ In January, 1945 *Ya* refuted British press attacks on Spanish „religious intolerance,“ pointing to the lack of anti-Jewish laws in Spain and the co-existence of all faiths in Spanish North Africa. The following month, *Ecclesia* reported the conversion of Rabbi Israel Polli of Rome, one of that city's Jewish community saved by Church action and noted Einstein's observation that when the universities, newspapers and writers were silent, only the Church stood out in defence of intellectual truth and moral liberty. *Ecclesia* pointed to the conduct of the nuncio in Hungary as an example of Church efforts

³⁰ *ADSS* vol. 10 recounts Rotta's frenetic activity from April 1944 onward; note for example, Rotta to Maglione, 23 May 1944, and Rotta to Maglione 10 June 1944, no. 207, 283-4 and no.227, 308-313, respectively. In AMAE Leg R 1716, Exp. 5, letters from the US and British Embassies in Madrid, offering to arrange transportation, cut corners regarding visa requirements, contribute to the maintenance of refugees in transit, and acknowledging Spanish help already received, attest to a considerable and urgent Allied-Spanish effort from July 1944. See *Ecclesia*, no. 157, 15 July 1944, 20, for protection of Jews in Hungary. See *Ya*, 23 July 1944, 1, for 40,000 refugees, *Ibid.*, 18 August 1944, 3, for Hungarian announcement. See Pius XII to Serédi, 26 October 1944, *ADSS* vol.10 no. 376, 460, for papal message. That volume also recounts Rotta's constant activity between October 18 and December 23, including orchestrating a combined protest of neutrals (17 November 1944, 498-500). See *WPIS* no. 265, 1 November 1944, 12 for Jewish Council request.

in defence of the Jews. As the war ended, the Vatican likewise received many tributes from Jewish organizations.³¹

Conclusion: Spain and the Jews.

Spain's policy and that of its Church towards Jews remained cautious throughout the war.

To the vast majority of Spanish Catholics, Jews were an abstraction. A *Sefarad* correspondent noted that in June 1943 scarcely any place in Iberian Spain had sufficient Jews to enable the muster of the traditional ten men required for public worship. Spanish Catholic anti-Semitism was largely symbolic and ideological, „Judeo-Masonic“ a continuing shorthand for alien values threatening the traditional „Catholic“ values for which Spanish Nationalists had fought the *Guerra Civil*. Attitudes to „our“ „good“ „Spanish“ Jews were much more positive; they were protected abroad and Sephardic culture fostered at home. Moreover, in rare contacts with Jews, Catholic Spaniards were humane. The examples of the Blue Division and of North Africa have been mentioned. The tiny Jewish communities in peninsular Spain were unmolested. A Jewish immigrant recorded in *Sefarad*, „For the first time in my life I was welcomed as a Jew.“ Chillida cites Trudy Alexy on a Barcelona Jew's experience. „Nobody asked or thought it important if I were a Jew or not.“ However, Catholic tolerance was not allowed to interfere with the Church's priorities; a „pure,“ „Catholic,“ „re-Christianized“ Spain. Indeed, at the end of the war, a *forestero* presence, even of „our“ Jews was not wanted, even if Spain had been in any economic condition to receive large numbers of refugees.

Chillida notes correctly that in reports in the Catholic press concerning the concentration

³¹ See Spanish ambassador, London 29 November 1944, Leg R 1715 Exp.5 AMAE for World Jewish Congress letter. See *Signo* no. 257 16 December 1944, 8, for intense persecution. See *Ya*, 5 January 1945, 1, for refutation of British attacks. See *Ecclesia*, no. 189, 24 February 1945, 4 (ed.) for positive response of the Church. *ADSS* vol.9 introduction, 59-61 lists expressions of gratitude received by the Vatican from Jewish leaders.

camps in April and early May, 1945, the word „Jew“ was scarcely mentioned. Nor for perhaps similar reasons connected with Britain’s Palestine mandate, was it mentioned in the *London Times* though its New York equivalent emphasized Jews as particular victims. Compassion had its political limits.³²

Earlier in the war, many Spanish Catholics were probably unperturbed by occasional reports in the Catholic press of anti-Jewish discriminatory measures when promulgated by Catholic Nazi satellite regimes and aimed to reduce Jewish „domination,“ particularly when converts were exempted. Franco's policies did not extend such measures to Spain, protected the *sefardíes*, and allowed a discreet Jewish transit whilst avoiding a *forastero* presence in Spain and maintaining the country’s „Catholic purity.“ These policies enabled Spanish Catholics to forget the Jews whilst the Church continued its mission. The occasional anti-Jewish utterance by Franco satisfied the Axis and local prejudices. When Nazi policy embraced extermination and whilst the war remained in the balance and Spain under Nazi threat, only the most veiled allusions to these policies were occasionally allowed to appear in the Catholic press. Early 1943 was a watershed in Spain’s Jewish policy with Spain’s „own“ *sefardíes* under threat. Moreover the war was turning towards the Allies, the direct Nazi threat lessening and the realization of Nazi extermination policies percolating through to the Spanish public. Spain’s policy of protecting its „own“ with discreet and gradually increasing support for Vatican initiatives in 1943 slowly shaded the following year into a stronger support for the Vatican and

³² See *Sefarad*, Año V no.1, 17 March 1945, 258-260 for references to scarcity of Jews and Jewish immigrant’s experience. Trudy Alexi, *La menuzá en los pies de la Virgen: Los marranos y otros judíos secretos. Una mujer descubre su herencia espiritual* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2000) 100-102, is cited in Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España*, 412. See Ibid, 414, 415, for lack of press references to Jews in concentration camp reports. Contrast similar lack of references to Jews in *London Times* reports 19 April 1945 to 14 May 1945, compared with *New York Times* references, e.g. 18 April 1945, 1:6, 20 April 1945, 3:2 etc.

cooperation with the Western Allies over the Hungarian Jews.³³ On balance, if Spanish policy was not generous, it was not shameful.

³³ See Jordana to Plá, 9 June 1944, AMAE Leg. R 1370, Exp. 7, for Spanish Church-state- Vatican co-operation.

Conclusion.

No nation defends 'civilization,' 'truth' or 'justice' unless there is some coincidence between these values and its own national self interest. Reinhold Niebuhr, Europe's Catastrophe and the Christian Faith (London: Nisbet, 1940), 25.

There it is an obligation to establish a separation between the civil and military realms and to restrict to the minimum necessary the limits of the second. Razón y Fe, nos.548-549, September-October 1943, 185.

World War II ended over 60 years ago. However, the universal use of the adjective „post-war“ without further qualification and the publication of a vast and growing number of secondary works pertaining to World War II attest to that war’s continued significance to the early twenty-first century world. This study has argued that one of the reasons for this continuing influence lies in moral issues raised by World War II that remain pertinent today. Though the direct political threat of Nazism and Communism has receded, liberal democracy continues to face challenges. Francis Fukuyama’s claims, in 1989, of the end of ideology, still less the end of history, seem premature. Conflict continues. Questions regarding the position of neutrality and national sovereignty, the limitations that should be placed on military operations and the appropriate treatment of civilians and minorities remain important.¹

In 1940, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote, „no nation defends “civilization,” “truth” or “justice” unless there is some coincidence between these values and its own national self interest.“ This study has shown that in World War II, „nation“ could be interpreted as

¹ See Francis Fukuyama, „The End of History?“ in *National Interest* 16 (1989), 3 -18. Fukuyama’s deterministic declaration of Western liberal triumphalism did not perhaps take into account „history’s predisposition to quirks.“ such as when the convulsions of 1968 challenged the „self-satisfied materialism“ of the 1950s and 1960s in the West. See Peter Monteath, „Jena and the End of History,“ Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath (eds.), *Rewriting the German Past* (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 271, 286. Fukuyama has since disavowed this claim in the light of subsequent events.

„human institution,“ even a spiritual institution such as the Spanish Catholic Church. That institution’s self interests were not, in its own perception, selfish interests, though we have seen that this view is contested. The Church saw itself as part of a universal institution existing for humanity – in its case to save the souls of Spaniards. This saving function the Church saw as best facilitated by the preservation of the institutional Church through the defence of that institution’s rights to preach and educate.²

Over centuries, Catholicism had developed a corpus of moral teaching as to how war should be justly conducted and regarded „humanistic“ natural law as concomitant to that teaching. However, the Church in the twentieth century lived in a political world threatened by hostile political ideologies none of which reflected its world view. In Spain in particular, many Churchmen saw the Church as threatened by a particularly virulent „Red terror,“ aimed at the extirpation of Spanish religion and of those traditional Spanish values with which it saw religion as inextricably linked. The Spanish Church saw political involvement as necessary to defend its spiritual interests, perhaps its very existence. As the European war began, the Church continued such involvement in defence of those interests.

In 1939, the Spanish Church, surveying a devastated country, urgently required peace for its physical reconstruction and pursuit of its spiritual mission. However, threats, both internal and external remained. Internally, though it had seen a Nationalist victory as infinitely preferable to the dread „Communist“ alternative, the Spanish Church feared that the new Franco regime might favour policies of the radical *falangists* that would challenge the Church’s position and priorities in Spain. However, the cautious and opportunistic Franco worked not through a party state but by means of a rightist coalition.

² Reinhold Niebuhr, *Europe’s Catastrophe and the Christian Faith* (London: Nisbet, 1940), 25.

Franco could dominate the disparate elements of this coalition, aided by an important military presence and a strong Catholicism which would provide a unifying element. Though some friction continued, the Spanish Church judiciously mixed public praise of and private representations to the regime. The Church's reward was not only the maintenance of its independence but substantial state aid in working towards its spiritual goals.

Such desirable outcomes could, however, still be subverted by external threats. In Europe, an increasingly „total“ war was raging involving conflicting ideologies – Fascism and Nazism, Communism and liberal democracy. Above all, the Spanish Church did not want Spain again to become a battleground for what it regarded as foreign influences hostile to the Church and inimical to its spiritual mission. It wished to keep such „anti-Spain“ presence or even influence, out of the country, a goal it usually shared with the regime. These priorities greatly influenced the Spanish Church's attitudes to the issues raised by World War II.

Strongly as it worked for Spain's own neutrality, for example, the Spanish Church's attitudes to the violations of the neutrality and sovereignty of others were often conditioned by the degree of threat it perceived by such actions as posing to Spain's and the Church's own position. The Church unhesitatingly condemned violations by the hated „Communists“ as threats to „civilization“ as well as to Spain. The Spanish Church, influenced by its *Guerra Civil* experience was much more enthusiastic towards Hitler's „anti-Bolshevik crusade“ than the more cautious Vatican. The „hypocritical“ contrast between the precepts and practices of the democracies was often condemned. This was particularly so when their violations of Spain's neutral trading rights seemed to threaten

the country's internal stability in 1944 although, by then, the military dominance of the Allies created some ambivalence, motivated by the Church's hope of Spain's being the „bridge“ to a separate peace. The Church's attitude to Nazi neutrality violations was largely conditioned by the direct Nazi threat to Spain itself, particularly acute from mid-1940 to mid-1941, which influenced a pro-Axis tilt in Church publications even as the Church privately worked to keep Spain neutral and the Nazis out of Spain.

A similar pattern is revealed in the attitudes of the Spanish Church to the effects of war on civilians. Communist infractions were unhesitatingly condemned but the Church, in a period of acute Nazi threat to Spain and thus to the Church's mission, was far more reticent in condemning Nazi breaches. Unsurprisingly, this one-sidedness came back to haunt the Church in Western Allied responses to its campaigns in 1943 against area bombing and in 1943-4 to preserve the inviolability of Rome. Similarly, Communist occupations immediately entailing the repression of religion were seen as assaults on European civilization. However, the Church's response to Nazi occupation was conditioned not only by the Nazi threat to Spain but by the fact that such occupation was seen at first as relatively mild. There was no immediate Nazi threat to the Church, the position of which actually promised improvement under collaborationist regimes such as Vichy. Only as the direct Nazi threat to Spain receded and Nazi economic depredation and religious persecution became more obvious did Spanish Church condemnation grow. The vexed question of Jewish policy reveals a dichotomy. Spanish Catholic anti-Semitic religious traditions were coupled with an irrational belief in „Judeo-Masonic“ international conspiracies as part of the *forastero*, „anti-Spain“ influences seen as threatening to the Church. Such anti-Semitism contrasted with the uniquely Spanish way

in which „our,“ „Spanish“ *sefardies* were tolerated and even valued. However, the Spanish Church did not wish to compromise Spain’s „Catholic purity“ by receiving large numbers even of *sefardies* in a peninsular Spain devastated by the *Guerra Civil*. When Nazi and satellite policies remained „merely“ discriminatory, the Church preferred to ignore the Jews, a distraction rather than a threat to the Church’s spiritual mission.

On the other hand, the converse of Niebuhr’s statement also contains truth. The Western Allies, in defending their own national self-interests against the threat posed to these interests by Nazism, did contribute to the defence of „civilization,“ „truth“ and „justice.“ They did not fight specifically for „Christian civilization,“ for the freedom of neutrals or for human rights. They certainly did not fight to save the Jews. However, freedom of religion, including Judaism, political and intellectual freedom and the freedom of the small nations that they liberated were the results of their victory. This is because these concepts were integral to values regarded as part of the Western way of life and thus of the totality of their national self-interests which should be interpreted in more than economic terms. Victorious Nazism, which shared none of these values, was rightly seen as a threat to all of them. If, by its „total“ nature, involving inescapable injustice, World War II may not appropriately be seen to meet all the classical criteria of a „just“ war, we may see it as a war of necessary evil in which the consequences of appeasement and inaction would have been infinitely greater human suffering.

Similarly, the Spanish Church, in defending its self-interest, also defended what it saw as essential religious and national Spanish values. At times, that defence served a wider truth. The Spanish Church condemned Communism’s anti-religious nature and persecutory methods at a time when the Western Allies pragmatically preferred that these

truths remained unexpressed. However one-sided its press reporting of Nazi bombing in 1940 had been, in 1943-44, the Church raised pertinent concerns about the bombing of civilians that remained apposite to future wars and are so today. The Spanish Church was motivated in its „Save Rome“ campaign by preservation of the institutional Church at the Vatican and hence in Spain. However, this campaign broached issues of similarly lasting importance - what limits should be placed on military necessity when its price is the destruction of religious and cultural heritage? The Church accepted the principle of just retribution for war crimes but also emphasized fundamental concerns as to when, how and by whom such crimes should be judged. Whilst resistance in concept was justified, a study of the contemporary attitudes of the Spanish Church provides a balance to received popular legend. Responses to occupation were not a simple dichotomy of resistance or collaboration. Moreover, the Spanish Church, though obsessed with the „Communist“ nature of resistance, raised important concerns contingent upon the flouting of just war criteria of proportionality, non-combatant immunity and even the likelihood of success that marked much resistance activity. However ambivalent its attitudes to Jews had been, the Spanish Church opposed Nazi policies when these became exterminationist and aided the Vatican and the Spanish state in providing what aid could be provided within the parameters of what all three institutions saw as their essential interests and priorities.

War continues to remain a part of the human condition, a consequence, as the Church sees it, of human sinfulness. If humanity is incapable of perfection in this world, as the Church believes and human history scarcely contradicts, those imperfections will continue to produce circumstances that will make pacifism impracticable. However, the other extremity of unrestrained total war today threatens not only the innocent but the

future of all humanity. Between these two extremes is the concept of just, limited war, outlined in Church teaching and by an international law which the Church sees as a concomitant revelation of divine will, even though, as we have seen, the interpretation of that will was not immune from political considerations. In the twenty-first century, for states of Western tradition, in defending essential interests and values, is there a more satisfactory alternative than to follow just war precepts? ³

³ Guthrie and Quinlan, *Just War*, 46, pertinently ask what other „ethical road-map“ those who would reject this tradition would put in its place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

PRIMARY SOURCES.

1. Unpublished Sources.

Official Archives.

Archivo Historico Nacional	Madrid.
Archivo, Colegio de Inglesias, St. Alban's College	Valladolid .
Archivo, Centro de Estudios Judíos-Cristianos	Madrid.
Archivo General de Administración	Alcalá de Henares
Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores	Madrid.
Biblioteca Nacional de España	Madrid.
Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco	Madrid.
Institución Columbina	Sevilla.
Hemeroteca Municipal	Madrid.
Royal Institute of International Affairs	London.
The National Archives, United Kingdom.	London.

2. Published Sources.

Documentary Collections and Correspondence.

Actas de las conferencias de metropolitanos españoles (1921 – 1965). Vicente Carcel Ortí, ed. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1994.

Actes et Documents du Saint Seige Relatifs a la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Pierre Blet, Robert A. Graham, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider, eds. 12 vols. Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1967 – 1981.

Aquinas, St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* Blackfriars ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.

Apuntes y documentos para la historia del tradicionalismo español: 1939- 1966. (Sevilla: ECESA, 1979).

Churchill „War Cabinet Papers: Personal Files 490 -492, 20 December 1939.“

J.R.M. Butler. *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom, Military Series, Grand Strategy, Volume 2: September 1939 – June 1941*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1957.

Documentos colectivos del episcopado español, 1870 – 1974. Jesús Iribarren, ed. Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1974.

Documentos inéditos para la historia de Generalísimo Franco. Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, ed. 4 vols. Madrid: FNFF, 1992 -1994.

Documents in German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. Series D. H.M. Stationery Office. London: HMSO, 1951- 1962.

Documents on the Laws of War. Roberts Adam and Guelff Richard, eds., Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.

El Cardenal Gomá y la Guerra de España: Aspectos de la gestión pública del Primado 1936 – 1939). Maria Lisa Rodriguez Aisa, ed. Madrid: Instituto Enrique Flores, 1981.

El Vaticano y España: Hitos documentos desde 1936. Mons. Nicholas López Martínez, ed. Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1972.

Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1939 – 1945. United States Department of State. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977

Gomá y Tomás Cardenal Isidro, *Pastorales de la Guerra de España.* Galindo de Herrero Santiago, ed. y estudio preliminar. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp S.A., 1955.

History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series. Richard M. Titmuss, *Internet Modern History Sourcebook.* Available at <http://www.ibiblio.org>

La diplomacia Vaticana y la España de Franco 1936 – 1945. Antonio Marquina Barrio, ed. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983.

La espiritualidad del sacerdote en los documentos pastorales del Cardenal Plá y Deniel. Martín Pedro Hormigón, ed. Madrid: Gráficos Analst, 1971.

Moscow Declaration on German Atrocities. November 1943. Available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm

Papal Pronouncements: A Guide, 1740 – 1978. Claudia Carlen, ed. Ann Arbor, Mich: Pierian Press, 1990).

Pío XII y la paz. (microform). Madrid: Dirección Central de Acción Católica, 1941.

Review of the Foreign Press 1939 – 1945. Series B. European Neutrals and the Near East. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 6 vols. Munchen: Kraus International, 1980.
Laws and Customs of War on Land. Section IV. Available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm>

Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of War on Land. Section V
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague05.htm>

St. Augustine, *City of God*. Gerald K. Walsh *et. al.* trans., Vernon J. Bourke, ed. New York: Doubleday, 1958.

The Papal Encyclicals, 1939-1958. Claudia Carlen, ed. Wilmington, NC: McGrath Publishing Company, 1981.

The Popes' New Order. Philip Hughes, ed. London: Burns Oats, 1943.

Wartime Correspondence between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII. Myron C. Taylor, ed. New York: Macmillan, 1947.

Vidal i Barraquer, Francesc, Església i estat durant la Segona República Espanyola, 1931 – 1936. Cura de M. Batollori i V.M. Arbeloa eds. Barcelona: Monistir de Montserrat, 1971 – 1991.

Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries 1939 – 1945. Great Britain, Foreign Office. Millwood NY: International Publications, 1983.

Newspapers and Periodicals.

ABC (1939 – 1945).

Arriba España (1939 – 1945).

Alcazar (1943).

Bulletin of Hispanic Studies (1939 -1945).

Current History (US) 1931 – 1945.

Ecclesia (1941 – 1945).

El Correo de Andalucia (1941 – 1945).

El Español (1942 – 1945).

Escorial (1940 – 1941).

Juventud (1942 – 1944).

Noticiero de España (1938 – 1941).

The New York Times (1931 -1945).

Razón y Fe (1939 – 1945).

Sefarad (1941 – 1945).

Signo (1938 – 1945).

The Times, London (1931 – 1945).

Ya (1939 – 1945).

Other Contemporary Sources.

Bell G.K.A., *The Church and Humanity*. London: Green and Co., 1946.

Betzanos Jose Maria, Vicar Apostolic of Morocco, *Carta Pastoral- con motivo de la Cuaresma del año 1942*. Tangier: Tip Hispano – Arabiga, 1942.

Bevan Edwyn, *Christians in a World at War*. London: SCM Press, 1940.

Brennan Gerald, *The Spanish Labyrinth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943.
Carreras Luís, *The Glory of Martyred Spain*. London: Burns Oats, 1937.

Cole W.W. and Potter M.F., eds., *Thus Spake Germany*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1941.

Doussinague José Maria *España Tenía Razón* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1949).

Epstein M., ed., *The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad*. 6 vols, 1939-1945. London: Longmans Green and Co., publication dates 1940-1946.

Hamilton Thomas J., *Appeasement's Child: The Franco Regime in Spain*. London: Gollancz, 1943.

Hayes Carlton J.H., *Wartime Mission in Spain 1942-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1945.

Hitler Adolf, *Mein Kampf*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943.

Hoare Sir Samuel, *Ambassador on Special Mission*. London: Collins, 1946.

Macmillan Harold, *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean January 1943 – May 1945*. London: Macmillan, 1984.

Madariaga Salvador de, *Spain*. London: Jonathon Cape, 1942.

Marx Karl and Engels Frederick, *Revolution in Spain*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939.

Martínez Fidel G., Obispo de Calahorra, *Instrucción Pastoral- sobre algunos errors modernos*. Calahorra: Logroño, s.n. 1942.

McCabe Joseph, *the Papacy in Politics Today: Vatican Plots in Spain and Other Countries*. London: Gollancz, 1939.

Neibuhr Reinhold, *Europe's Catastrophe and the Christian Faith*. London: Nisbet, 1940.

Oudendijk Piet J., *Pope Pius XII and the Nazi War against the Catholic Church*. Brisbane: *Worker Newspaper*, 1944.

Peers E. Allison, *The Spanish Dilemma*. London: Methuen, 1940.

Rosenberger Walter and Tobin Herbert C., *Keesing's Contemporary Archives: A weekly Diary of Important World Events*, vols. 3 (1937-1940), 4 (1940-1943), 5 (1943-1946). Bristol: Keesings' Publications, 1940, 1943, 1946.

Serrano Suñer, Ramón, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar* (Madrid: Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1947).

Suñer Serrano Ramón, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: Memorias*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977.

Skeen Fulton J., *War and Guilt*. Washington DC, National Council of Catholic Men. Producers of the Catholic Hour, 1953.

Tittmann Harold, ed., *Inside the Vatican of Pius XII, the Memoirs of an American Diplomat during World War II*. New York: Doubleday, 2004.

Trevor-Roper, H.R., *Hitler's Table Talk 1941 – 1944*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Tusquets Juan, *Masones y pacifistas*. Burgos: Ediciones Antisectarias, 1939.

Waldemar Gurian, „Hitler's Undeclared War on the Catholic Church.“ *Foreign Affairs* 16, 1 /4 (January 1938): 260-271.

SECONDARY SOURCES.

Abella Irving and Topper Harold, *None is too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948*. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982.

Afliche Agustin and Martin Victor (Eds.), *Historia de la iglesia* 33 vols. Barcelona: EDICEP, 1983.

Agar Herbert, *The Saving Remnant: An Account of Jewish Survival since 1914*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1960.

Agudo Manuel Ros, *La guerra secreta de Franco*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2002

Albornoz Claudio Sánchez, *España: un enigma histórico*. Original publication, 1956, published as *Spain: A Historical Enigma* (2 vols.)(trans. Colette Joly Dees and David Sven Reher). Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975.

Aldea Quintin y Cardenas Eduardo, *Manual de historia de la Iglesia* (10 vols.). Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1987.

Altamira Rafael, *A History of Spain: from the Beginnings to the Present Day* (abridgment of original 4 vol. work, *Historia de España y de la civilización española*, (1900 – 1911). Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1949.

Alter Reinhard and Monteath Peter (eds.), *Rewriting the German Past*. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press International, 1997.

Arnold-Foster Mark, *The World at War*. London: Collins, 1973.

Atkin Nicholas and Tallett Frank, *Priests, Prelates and People: A History of European Catholicism since 1750*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003.

Avni Haim, *Spain, the Jews and Franco*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982.

Bainton Roland H., *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*. New York: Abingdon, 1960.

Balfour Sebastian and Preston Paul, *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Barnett Victoria J, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust*. Westport Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Beaulac William J., *Franco: Silent Ally in World War II*. Carbondale, US: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.

Beevor Antony, *The Spanish Civil War*. London: Orbis, 1982.

Beevor Antony, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2006.

Bennett Rob, *Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe*. Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1999.

Bentley James, *God's Representatives: The Eight Twentieth Century Popes*. London: Constable, 1997.

Berembaum Michael and Peck Abraham J. eds. *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Berghahn Volker R. and Kitchen Martin eds. *Germany in the Age of Total War*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1981.

Bernstein Michael Andre, *Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994.

Best Geoffrey, *War and Law since 1945*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.

Best Geoffrey, *Churchill and War*. Hambledon and London: Hambledon, 2001.

Blet, Pierre, SJ, *Pius XII and the Second World War: According to the Archives of the Vatican*. Herefordshire, UK: Paulist Press, 1999.

Blinkhorn Martin, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931 – 1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Blinkhorn Martin, (ed.), *Spain in Conflict 1931 – 1939*. London: Sage, 1985.

Bolin Luis, *Spain, the Vital Years*. London: Cassell, 1968.

Bolloten Burnett, *The Spanish Civil War*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

Bookchin Murray, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*. New York: Free Life Editions, 1977.

Bosworth R.J.B., *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.

Bowen Wayne H., „A Great Moral Victory: Spanish Protection of the Jews on the Eastern Front“, Rohrllich Ruby, (ed.), *Resisting the Holocaust*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998.

Bowen Wayne H., *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order*. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2000.

Bowen Wayne H., *Spain during World War II*. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006.

Bowen Wayne H. and Alvarez José E, (eds.), *A Military History of Modern Spain- from the Napoleonic Era to the International War on Terror*. Westport Ct.: Praeger Security International, 2007.

Braham Randolph (ed.), *The Vatican and the Holocaust: The Catholic Church and the Jews during the Nazi Era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Brendon Piers, *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s*. London: Jonathon Cape, 2000.

Brody J. Kenneth, *The Avoidable War* (2 vols). Vol. 1, *Lord Cecil and the Politics of Principle, 1933 – 1935*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction, 1999.

Brody J. Kenneth, *The Avoidable War* (2 vols). Vol. 2, *Pierre Laval and the Politics of Reality, 1935 – 1936*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction, 2000.

Brown–Fleming Suzanne, *The Holocaust and Catholic Conscience: Cardinal Alosius Muench and the Guilt Question in Germany*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.

Bruce Steve, *Politics and Religion*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003.

Buchanan Tom, „Anti-Fascism and Democracy in the 1930s“ *European History Quarterly*, 32, 1 (January 2002): 39 -57.

Buchanan Tom and Conway Martin eds., *Political Catholicism in Europe: 1918-1945*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996.

Bullock Alan, *Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives*. London: HarperCollins, 1991.

Burleigh Michael, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror*. London/New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Burrin Phillipe, *La France a la heure Allemand: 1940 – 1944*. Paris: Seuil, 1995, (trans. as *Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation: 1940 – 1944*) London: Arnold, 1996.

Calder Angus, *The People's War*. London: Literary Guild, 1969.

Callahan William J, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875 -1998* .Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2000.

Calvocoressi Peter and Wint Guy (and Prichard John), *Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War*. (1st. ed. Harmondsworth, U.K: Penguin, 1972, 2nd. ed. New York: Viking, 1989).

Carr Raymond, *Spain 1808 – 1975* (2nd.ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

Carr Raymond, *The Spanish Civil War: A History in Pictures*. New York: Norton, 1986.

Casanova Julián, *La Iglesia de Franco*. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 2001.

Castelló José Emilio, *España: siglo XX, 1939-1978*. Madrid: Anaya, 1988.

Castro Americo, *España en su historia*. Original publication 1948, published as *The Structure of Spanish History* (trans. Edmund L. King). Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954.

Cenarro Angela, „Elite, Party, Church. Pillars of the Francoist “New State” in Aragon, 1936 – 1945.“ *European History Quarterly* 28 (October 1998), 461 -486.

Chadwick Owen, „The Papacy and World War II: Further Documents.“ *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 19, no.2 (1968): 227 – 231.

Chao Rego José, *La iglesia en el franquismo*. Madrid: Ediciones Felmar, 1976.

Chickering Roger, Forster Seig, Greiner Bernd eds., *A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937 -1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Chesnoff Richard Z., *Pack of Thieves: How Hitler and Europe Plundered the Jews and Committed the Greatest Theft in History*. New York: Doubleday, 1999.

Chillida Gonzalo Álvarez, *El Antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812 – 2002)*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones de Historia, 2002.

Churchill Sir Winston, *The Second World War* (6 vols.). London: Cassell, 1948-1954.

Cierva Ricardo de la, *Cien libros básicos sobre la Guerra de España*. Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1966.

Cierva Ricardo de la, *Historia del Franquismo: Orígenes y configuración (1939-1975)*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1975.

Coates A.J., *The Ethics of War* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997).

Cole Robert, *Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1939 – 1945*. Basingstoke, UK and London: Macmillan, 1990.

Coles S.F.A., *Franco of Spain*. London: Spearman, 1955.

Cooney John, *The American Pope: The Life and Times of Francis Cardinal Spellman*. New York: Times Books, 1984.

Cooper Norman B., *Catholicism and the Franco Regime*. Beverley Hills and London: Sage, 1975.

Conway Martin, *Collaboration in Belgium: Leon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940 – 1944*. New Haven Ct.: Yale University Press, 1993.

Conway Martin, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918 – 1945*. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.

Coppa Frank J., *The Papacy, the Jews and the Holocaust*. Washington DC: Catholic University Press, 2006.

Cornwell John, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*. London: Viking, 1999.

Crozier Brian, *Franco: A Biographical History*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967.
Cunningham Valentine ed., *Spanish Front: Writers in the Civil War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Davies Norman, *Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory*. London: Macmillan, 2006.

Dear I.B.C., *The Oxford Companion to World War II*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Deist Wilhelm, ed., *German Military in the Age of Total War*. Dover, N.H: Berg, 1985.

Delgado Francisco Gil, *Conflicto Iglesia-Estado*. Madrid: Sedmay, 1975.

Delgado Francisco Gil, *Pedro Segura: Un Cardenal de fronteras*. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2001.

Delgado José Luis Gureia, ed., *El Primer Franquismo: España durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 1989.

Delzell, Charles F., ed., *The Papacy and Totalitarianism between the Two World Wars*. New York: Wiley, 1974.

Detwiler Donald S., „Spain and the Axis during World War II.“ *Review of Politics* 33:1 (January 1977), 36-54.

Donat Alexander, *Holocaust Kingdom: A Memoir*. London: Secker and Warberg, 1965.

Drapac Vesna, *War and Religion: Catholics in the Churches of Occupied Paris*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998.

Editorial Staff, Catholic University of America, *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (15 vols.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Ellis John, *Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1990.

Elshtain Jean Bethke, *Just War Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

Falconi Carlo, *The Silence of the Papacy*. London: Faber, 1970.

Falls Cyril, *The Second World War*. London: Methuen, 1948.

Feis Herbert, *The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at War*. New York: Norton, 1966.

Ferguson John, *War, Peace and Religion*. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1973.

Finkelstein Norman G. and Birn Ruth Bettina, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998.

Fischel Jack R., *Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust*. Lanham Md. and London: Scarecrow Press, 1999.

Flower Desmond and Reeves James, *The War 1939-1945: A Documentary History*. New York: Da Capo, 1997.

Foot Michael Richard Daniel, *SOE 1940- 1946*. London: BBC, 1994.

Frame Tom, *Living by the Sword? The Ethics of Armed Intervention*. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004.

Friedman Saul S., *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy towards Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973.

Fukuyama Francis, „The End of History?’ *National Interest* 16 (1989), 3-18.

Fuller John Frederick Charles, *The Second World War 1939-45: A Strategical and Tactical History*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948.

Gaillard Jone, „The Attractions of Fascism for the Church of Rome“ *The Attractions of Fascism*, John Milfull ed. New York: Berg, 1990): 207- 214.

Gallagher Tom, „Anglo-Portuguese Relations since 1901“, *History Today* 36:6 (June 1986), 39-45.

Gallego J. Andrés, *Fascismo o estado católico?: ideología, religion y censura con la España de Franco, 1937-1941*. Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro, 1997.

Gallego J. Andrés *et.al. Estudios históricos sobre la iglesia Española contemporanea*. Madrid: Real Monasterio de Escorial, 1979.

Gallo Patrick J., ed., *Pius XII, the Holocaust and the Revisionists*. Jefferson, NC and London, McFarland, 2006.

Garrett Stephen A., *Ethics and Air Power in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities*. New York: St. Martins, 1993.

Garriga Ramón, *El Cardenal Segura y el Nacional Catolicismo*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977.

Gilbert Martin, *Auschwitz and the Allies*. London: Michael Joseph, 1981.

Gilbert Martin, *The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy*. London: Collins, 1986.

Giovanetti Alberto, *El Vaticano y la Guerra, 1939 -1940*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe SA, 1961.

Godman Peter, *Hitler and the Vatican: Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story of the Nazis and the Church*. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Goldhagen Daniel J. *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York: Knopf, 1996.

González Isidro, *Los judíos y la segunda republica: 1931 -1939*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial SA, 2004.

Green Vivian, *A New History of Christianity*. New York: Continuum, 1996.

Gordon Richard A., *France and the Spanish Civil War*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1974.

Guthrie Charles and Quinlan Michael, *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare*. London: Bloomsbury, 2007.

Gutman Israel, ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (4 vols.). New York: Macmillan, 1990.

Guttenplan D.D., *The Holocaust on Trial: History, Justice and the David Irving Libel Case*. London: Granta, 2001.

Grunberger Richard, *A Social History of the Third Reich*. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Halecki Oscar, „The Holy See and the Religious Situation in Central Europe 1939-1945.“ *Catholic Historical Review* 53:3 (October 1967), 393-410.

Harrigan William M., „Pius XII's Efforts to Effect a “Détente” in German-Vatican Relations 1939-1940.“ *Catholic Historical Review* 49:2 (July 1963), 173-191.

Hawes Stephen and White Ralph, eds., *Resistance in Europe, 1939 – 1945*. London: Allen Lane, 1975.

Hayles E.E.Y., *The Catholic Church in the Modern World*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958.

Haynes Stephen R., „Who Needs Enemies? Jews and Judaism in Anti-Nazi Religious Discourse.“ *Church History* 71:2 (June 2002), 341-367.

Herr Richard, Spain. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice – Hall, 1971.

Herr Richard, *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.

Hertzberger David K., *Narrating the Past: Fiction and Historiography in Postwar Spain*. Durham and London: Dukes University Press, 1995.

Hilberg Raul, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. New York: Holmes and Meir, 1985.

Holmes J. Derek, *The Papacy in the Modern World*. London: Burns and Oats, 1981.

Hoover A.J., *God, Britain and Hitler in World War II: The View of the British Clergy, 1939 – 1945*. Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 1999.

Horne John and Kramer Alan, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial*. New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 2001.

Hughes John Jay, „The Pope’s Pact with Hitler, Betrayal or Self-Defense?“ *Journal of Church and State* 17(Winter 1975), 63-80.

Husslein Joseph, *The Christian Social Manifesto: An Interpretive Study of the Encyclicals ‘Rerum Novarum and ‘Quadragesimo Anno’ of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI*. New York: Bruce, 1931.

Iribarren Jesús, „La iglesia y el franquismo en la postguerra: „Ecclesia“ y el Cardenal Plá y Deniel“, *Razón y Fe* April 1977, 427.

Iribarren Jesús, *Papeles y memorias: medio siglo de relaciones Iglesia-Estado en España 1936 – 1986*. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1992.

Jackson Gabriel, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War: 1931 – 1939*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Johnson Brian and H.J. Cozens, eds., *Bombers, the Weapon of Total War*. London: Methuen, 1984.

Johnson James Turner, *Ideology, Religion and the limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200 – 1740*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Junco José Alvarez and Shubert Adrian, eds., *Spanish History since 1808*. London: Arnold, 2000.

Jedin Hubert, Reppen Konrad and Dolan John, eds., *History of the Church* (10 vols.). New York: Seabury Press, 1980.

Kaiser Wolfram and Wohnout Helmut, eds., *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918- 45*. London: Routledge, 2004.

Kamen Henry, *A Concise History of Spain*. London: Thomas and Hudson, 1973.

Kaplan Chaim Aron (translated and edited by Abraham I. Katch), *Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan*. London: H. Hamilton, 1966.

Kasch Richard, *Franco*. Hove, UK: Wayland, 1976.

Katz Robert, *The Battle for Rome: The Germans, the Allies, the Partisans and the Pope*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 2003.

Kay Hugh, *Salazar and Modern Portugal*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970.

Keegan John, *The Second World War*. London: Hutchinson, 1989.

Keegan John, *The Battle for History: Re-Fighting World War II*. London: Hutchinson, 1995.

Kent Peter, „The Vatican and the Spanish Civil War“ *European History Quarterly (GB)* 28, 4 (1998), 441 – 463.

Kent Peter and Pollard John F., eds., *Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age*. Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 1994.

Kenwood Alun ed., *The Spanish Civil War: A Cultural and Historical Reader*. Providence, RI and Oxford: Berg, 1993.

Kershaw Ian, *Hitler: Nemesis 1936- 1945*. London: Allen Lane, 2000.

Kershaw Ian, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis and the Road to World War II*. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Kertzer David I., *The Popes against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*. New York: Knopf, 2001.

-
- Kren George M. and Rappaport Leon, *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behaviour*. New York: Holmes and Meir, 1980.
- Krieg Robert A, „The Vatican Concordat with Hitler“s Reich.“ *America* 189(9 January 2003), 14-17.
- Landau Ronnie J., *The Nazi Holocaust: Its History and Meaning*. London and New York: I B Tauris, 2006.
- Langer Lawrence L., *Using and Abusing the Holocaust*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Lannon Frances, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875 – 1975*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Lannon Frances and Preston Paul, *Élites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1990.
- Lannon Frances, „The Church“s Crusade against the Republic“ in Paul Preston, *Revolution and War in Spain: 1931 -1939*. London : Methuen, 1984, 35–55.
- Lapide, Pinchas E., *The Last Three Popes and the Jews* (London: Souvenir Press, 1967).
- Laquer Walter, *The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the Suppression of Information about Hitler’s ‘Final Solution.’* London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980.
- Latourette Kenneth Scott, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1962.
- Lawler Justus George, *Popes and Politics*. New York: Continuum, 2002.
- Le Bor Adam, *Hitler’s Secret Bankers: The Myth of Swiss Neutrality during the Holocaust*. Secaucus, N.J: Carol, 1997.
- Lazo Alfonso, *La iglesia, la falange y el fascismo: un estudio sobre la prensa española de postguerra*. Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1995.
- Lee Lloyd E., *The War Years: A Global History of the Second World War*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- Lee Lloyd E. ed., *World War II in Europe, Africa and the Americas with General Sources: A handbook of Literature and Research*. Westport Ct: Greenwood Press, 1997.
- Lewy Guenter, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
- Liddell Hart Sir Basil, *History of the Second World War*. London: Cassell, 1970.

-
- Lipschitz Chaim U, *Franco, Spain the Jews and the Holocaust*. New York: Ktav, 1984.
- Lloyd Christopher, *Collaboration and Resistance in Occupied France: Representing Treason and Sacrifice*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Longman Tremper III and Reid Daniel G., *God is a Warrior*. Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1995.
- Lukacs John, „The Diplomacy of the Holy See during World War II.“ *Catholic Historical Review* 60 (July 1974): 271-278.
- Lucaks John, *The Last European War: September 1939- December 1941*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1977.
- Madigan Kevin, „What the Vatican Knew about the Holocaust, and When.“ *Commentary* 112(October 2001) 43-52.
- Magenheimer Heinz, *Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions, 1940 – 1945*. London: Cassell, 1998.
- Mariás Julian, *Understanding Spain*. Ann Arbor, Mi: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- Marrus Michael R., *The Holocaust in History*. London: Penguin, 1987.
- Marrus Michael R. and Paxton Robert, *Vichy France and the Jews*. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
- Marwick Arthur, Emsley Clive, Simpson Wendy eds., *Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914 – 1955*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001.
- Marquina Antonio and Ospina Gloria Inés, *España y los judíos en el siglo XX: La acción exterior*. Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1987.
- Massaro Thomas J. and Shannon Thomas A., *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
- Matheson Peter, ed., *The Third Reich and the Christian Churches*. Grand Rapids, Mi: William B. Eerdmans, 1981.
- McInerny Ralph, *The Defamation of Pius XII*. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001.
- Michman Dan, *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective*. London and Portland Ore.: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003.

-
- Miller Richard B., *Interpretation of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism and the Just War Tradition*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Millward Alan, *The German Economy at War*. London: Athlone, 1995.
- Minehan Philip B., *Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece, 1936-1949*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Moa Pío, *Franco, un balance histórico*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 2005.
- Monteath Peter, *Writing the Good Fight: Political Commitment in the International Literature of the Spanish Civil War*. Westwood CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Monteath Peter, „The Fuhrer’s Decision. (new evidence pinpoints Dec 12, 1941 as the date of the decision to complete the Holocaust)” *History Today* 48 (September 1998) 4–6.
- Montero Mercedes, *Historiade la asociación católica nacional de propagandistas; la construcción del estado confessional, 1936 – 1945*. Pamplona: EUNSA, 1993.
- Moore Bob ed., *Resistance in Western Europe*. Oxford: Berg, 2000.
- Morán y Sanchez-Cabezudo Benjamín, *El cardinal primado de España y el origen del poder*. Madrid: Stadium, 1965.
- Moreno Antonio Montero, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España: 1936-1939*. Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1961.
- Morgan Philip, *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, The Italians and the Second World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Muntayola Ramon, *Vidal y Barraquer, El cardenal de la paz*. Barcelona: Laia, 1974.
- Nichols Peter, *The Politics of the Vatican*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968.
- Novick Peter, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*. London: Bloomsbury, 1999.
- Ogley Robert, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1970.
- Orti Vincent Carcel (director), José Manuel Cuenca Toribio *et.al* colaboradores, *La Iglesia en la España contemporánea, 1808 -1975*). Madrid: Edit. Católica, 1979.
- Paldiel Mordecai, *Churches and the Holocaust: Unholy Teaching, Good Samaritans and Reconciliation*. Jersey City, NJ: KTAV, 2006.
- Partner Peter, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Patterson Ian, *Guernica and Total War*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Payne Stanley G., *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*. Stanford, Ca. Stanford University Press, 1967.

Payne Stanley G., *Franco's Spain*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968

Payne Stanley G., *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

Payne Stanley G., *The Franco Regime, 1936 -1975*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.

Payne Stanley G., *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933 – 1936: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006.

Payne Stanley G., *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008.

Paxton Robert O., *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940- 1944*. London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972.

Pell Cardinal George edited by M.A. Casey, *God and Caesar: Selected Essays on Religion, Politics and Society*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007.

Perez Rafael García, *Franquismo y Tercer Reich* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994.

Pérez Rafael Gomez, *Política y religión en el regimen de Franco*. Barcelona: Dopesa, 1976.

Phayer Michael, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930 – 1965*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 2000.

Pierson Peter, *The History of Spain*. Westport, Ct: Greenwood, 1999.

Poliakov Léon, *Harvest of Hate*. London: Elek, 1956.

Preston Paul, *The Spanish Civil War, 1936 – 1939*. New York: Grove Press 1986.

Preston Paul, *Franco: A Biography*. London: HarperCollins, 1993.

Puzzo Dante A., *Spain and the Great Powers, 1936 – 1941*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

Radosh Robert, Habek Mary L., Sevostianov Grigory, eds., *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001.

Raguer Hilari, *Gunpowder and Incense: The Spanish Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War*. Tr. Gerald Howson. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

Ranzato Gabriele, *The Spanish Civil War*. Moreton in Marsh, UK: Windrush, 1995.

Redles David, *Hitler's Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2005.

Redondo Gonzalo, *História de la iglesia en España, 1931 -1939*. (2 vols.). Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1993.

Reitlinger Gerald, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1953.

Richards Michael, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Rico Ruiz Juan José, *El papel político de la Iglesia Católica en la España de Franco (1936-1971)*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1977.

Ridley Jasper, *The Freemasons*. London: Robinson, 2000.

Rhodes Anthony, *The Vatican in the Age of Dictators: 1922-1945*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973.

Ringrose David, *Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish Miracle' 1700 – 1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Ritter Carol, Smith Stephen D., Steinfeld Irena eds., *The Holocaust and the Christian World*. New York: Continuum, 2000.

Rhonheimer Martin, „The Holocaust: What Was Not Said.“ *First Things* 137 (November 2003): 18-27.

Rosenfeld Gavril D., *The World Hitler Never Made: Alternate History and the Meaning of Nazism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Roth Cecil, ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia Judaica* (16 vols.). Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1971.

Ruhl Klaus Jörg, (trans. Altimiras Nieves Serrano), *Franco, Falange y 'Tercer Reich': España en la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Madrid: AKAL, 1986.

Rychlak Ronald J., „Goldhagen v Pius XII.“ *First Things* 124(June/July 2002), 37 -54.

Schapiro J. Salwyn, *Movements of Social Dissent in Modern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962.

Salvado Francisco J. Romero, *Twentieth Century Spain: Politics and Society in Spain, 1898 – 1998*. New York: St. Martin's 1999.

Sánchez Antonio Cazorla, „Surviving Franco's Peace: Spanish Popular Opinion during the Second World War“ *European History Quarterly*, 32, 3 (July 2002), 391 – 411.

Sánchez José M, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*. Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

Sánchez, José M., *Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002.

Sandford George, *Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory*. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Scott George, *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations*. London: Hutchinson, 1973.

Seifert Anuschka, „Other “Schindlers” Revealed.“ *World Press Review* 41 (November 1994): 44-46.

Shermer Michael and Grobman Alex, *Denying History*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).

Shirer William J. *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1963.

Sittser Gerald L., *A Cautious Patriotism: The American Churches and the Second World War*. Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Smock David R., *Religious Perspectives on War: Christian, Muslim and Jewish Attitudes towards Force*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2003.

Smyth Denis, *Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940 – 1941*. Cambridge UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Southworth Herbert, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*. Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1963.

Stafford David, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940 – 1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive*. London: Macmillan, 1980.

Stafford David, *Endgame 1945: Victory, Retribution, Liberation*. London: Little, Brown, 2007.

Stearns Peter N. ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia of European Social History from 1350 to 2000*. Detroit: Charles Scribener's Sons, 2000.

Suárez Fernandez Luís, *Francisco Franco y su tiempo* 8 vols. Madrid: FNFF, 1994.
Suárez Fernandez Luís, *España, Franco y la Guerra Segunda Mundial*. Madrid: Actas Editorial, 1997.

Teichman Jenny, *Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

Tello José Angel, *Ideología y política: la iglesia católica española: 1936 – 1959*. Zaragoza: Libros Pórtico, 1984.

Temes Peter S., *The Just War*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003.

Toribio José Manuel Cuenca, *Relaciones Iglesia- Estado en la España contemporánea (1833 – 1985)*. Madrid: Alhambra, 1985.

Tusell Javier, García Genoneva and de Llano Queipo, *Franco y Mussolini: La política española durante la segunda guerra mundial*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1985.

Tusell Javier, *Franco, España y la Guerra Segunda Mundial: Entre el Eje y la neutralidad*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1994.

Vasquez Jesús M., Medin Felix and Mendez Luís, *La iglesia española contemporánea*. Madrid: Editoria Nacional, 1973.

Verdera Albinada Francisco, *Conflictos entre la Iglesia y el Estado: la revista Ecclesia entre 1941 y 1945*. Pamplona: EUNSA, 1995.

Vicens Vives Jaime, *Approaches to the History of Spain* (trans. Joan Connelly Ullman). Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.

Vigil y Vázquez Manuel, *El drama de la Acción Católica y el 'Nacional Catolicismo': repaso del semanario 'Signo' en el 50 aniversario de su salida, 20 de enero de 1940, 20 de enero, 1990*. Barcelona: Santandreu Editor, 1990.

Vincent Isabel, *Hitler's Silent Partners: Swiss Banks, Nazi Gold and the Pursuit of Justice*. New York: W. Morrow, 1997.

Vincent Mary, *Spain 1833 – 2002: People and State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Walters F.J., *A History of the League of Nations*. (2 vols.). London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Wasserstein Bernard, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*. London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1979.

Wells Leon Weliczer, *The Janowska Road*. London: Cape, 1966.

Weinberg Gerhard, „German Plans and Policies regarding Neutral Nations in World War II with Special Reference to Switzerland. “*German Studies Review* 22(February 1999) 99 – 103.

Weinberg Gerhard, *A World at Arms: A Global History of the Second World War* (2nd.ed.).New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wheal Elizabeth-Ann, Pope Stephen and Taylor James, *A Dictionary of the Second World War*. London: Grafton, 1989.

Williams Michael E., *St. Alban's College, Valladolid*. London: Hurst, 1986.

Willmott H.P., *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War*. London: Joseph, 1989.

Wilmot Chester, *The Struggle for Europe*. London: Collins, 1952.

Wolff Richard J. and Hoensch Jorg K, eds. *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right 1919 – 1945*. Highland Lakes, NJ: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Wright Gordon, *The Ordeal of Total War: 1939-1945*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Wylie Neville J. ed., *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Ysart Federico, *España y los judíos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Barcelona, Dopesa, 1973.

Zabecki David T., *World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia* (2vols.). New York and London: Garland, 1999.

Ziegler Jean, *The Swiss, the Gold and the Dead*. New York: Harcourt Bruce, 1997.

Zuccotti Susan, *Under his Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000.

Zuccotti Susan, „Pius XII and the Rescue of Jews in Italy: Evidence of a Papal Directive“
Zimmerman Joshua D., *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule, 1922 – 1945*.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 287 - 300.

