

3rd May, 1955.

My dear Mac,

I am enclosing a word on your stay in this country for the "Libera Docenza".

I have been thinking of late about what I have called the 'fiducial argument' in calculating probability a posteriori valid in the light of experimental data, and I find that, probably as a result of the obscurity of my own writings, and partly as the result of rather jealously competitive claims by Neyman and his associates, there has been a great deal of confusion in what has been said about it.

First, it has been represented that fiducial probability is something different in mathematical logic from the classical probability of the eighteenth century mathematicians, whereas I have always thought it was exactly the same, and should not have otherwise called it probability, but ^{I do think} that the reasoning which I call the fiducial argument was of a form unknown to the early writers on probability.

Secondly, it has been alleged that statements of fiducial probability are not capable of verification by observations of

frequency. It is, to my way of thinking, easy to produce numerous examples to disprove this allegation, but I am mentioning these points in order to get your help, among others, in locating the sources of these discrepancies and of other misapprehensions on the subject. I believe I can best clear things up by working out explicitly what I should regard as the proper treatment ~~for~~ particular problems which have been discussed by others, so as to distinguish cases in which, as I see things, genuine statements of probability can be made from those from which nothing of the kind can rationally be ~~tempted~~ ^{chaunted}.

If you know of any controversial discussion of these matters, therefore, you might be able to give me a helpful indication.

Sincerely yours,