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20th August, 1956.

My dear Prasanta,

I am sending herewith an advance copy of my new book on scientific inference, as I thought you would like to see it yourself, and to have a copy available in the Institute. There are a fair number of trifles, which I hope you will find entertaining as a pure and applied mathematician, and, of course, a central pre-occupation with the problem of how inductive reasoning may properly be expressed. I have corrected in your copy a number of misprints, which, though they would scarcely mislead, might somewhat impede the understanding of what is said, such as that which I have marked on page 120, where I have put in a paragraph to remove what I think has been a real misapprehension among some American statisticians, to whom it was not clear that if the same probability statement could be ordinarily derived either from datum (a) or from datum (b), that it does not follow that given datum (a) datum (b) can be inferred, for in fact if both were known a very much stronger probability statement could be derived.

Probably you may be interested also in the contrast between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to the concepts of

applied mathematics, which is also involved in some of the explanatory paragraphs. I have been chiefly concerned, however, to build up a basis for the understanding of inductive reasoning from its simplest beginnings, and am content to leave to others, who may be attracted by it, the business of a systematic exposition of the point of view which I have tried to make assimilable. Obviously a good deal will not be understood all at once.

With respect to Behrens' problem, and the Table 11 of Pearson and Hartley's "Biometrika Tables", I have written a more specific criticism for the ~~Statistical~~ Journal of the R.S.S. (B Methodological)

With love to Rani, and regards to your colleagues at the Statistical Institute,

Sincerely yours,

Enc.