# The value of benevolence: Spinoza and perfectionism

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#### Abstract

This thesis examines Spinoza's claim that rational benevolence is crucial to human well-being ('the rational benevolence claim'). According to Spinoza, rational benevolence is rational in two senses. First, it involves using reason to guide benevolent actions. Second, it involves the promotion of the rationality of other people. In order to assess the rational benevolence claim, we need to know what human well-being is. Spinoza holds that well-being consists in the perfection of human nature. Aristotle and the Stoics are the most illustrious proponents of perfectionism. However, their respective accounts have been criticised so severely that many have concluded that perfectionism about well-being is implausible.

This thesis argues that Spinoza's perfectionism avoids the traditional objections to the accounts of Aristotle and the Stoics. Nevertheless, Spinoza's own account, particularly his doctrine of agreement in nature, which underpins his rational benevolence claim, has attracted criticism. The thesis defends the rational benevolence claim in the following ways. First, the thesis shows that Spinoza avoids the traditional objections to perfectionism. Second, the thesis argues that there are available replies to the objections to Spinoza's doctrine of agreement in nature.

#### Thesis declaration

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#### **Abbreviations**

# **Spinoza**

E Ethics

TEI Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect

GMW God, Man and his Well-being

MT Metaphysical Thoughts in Parts I and II of Descartes' 'Principles of philosophy'

PT Political Treatise

TPT Theological-Political Treatise

L Letters

## Abbreviations for sections from the Ethics of Spinoza

App appendix

Ax axiom

C corollary

Dem demonstration

D definition

Lem lemma

P proposition

Pref preface

S scholium

Post postulate

#### Aristotle

NE Nicomachean Ethics

### **The Stoics**

De Fin Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum

DL Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers

Ep Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales

LS A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers

# Other

ELP Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy