

**Chinese Urban Community Construction as a Grassroots
Governance Strategy: Social Capital with Chinese
Characteristics**

Min Zhao

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Studies

Centre for Asian Studies

School of Social Sciences

THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

January 2014

Table of Contents

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>	<u>I</u>
<u>LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES</u>	<u>III</u>
<u>ABSTRACT</u>	<u>V</u>
<u>DECLARATION</u>	<u>VII</u>
<u>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</u>	<u>VIII</u>
<u>LIST OF ACRONYMS</u>	<u>IX</u>
<u>1 INTRODUCTION</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>2 COMMUNITY IN THE INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS AND CHINESE COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>31</u>
<u>3 SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CHINESE URBAN COMMUNITIES</u>	<u>75</u>
<u>4 SOCIAL NETWORKS AND TRUST IN CHINESE URBAN COMMUNITIES 112</u>	
<u>5 COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTIONS AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION</u>	<u>156</u>
<u>6 THE PARTY BRANCH SYSTEM IN COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>196</u>
<u>7 CHINESE DEMOCRATIZATION AND URBAN COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION AS A STRATEGY OF GRASSROOTS GOVERNANCE</u>	<u>228</u>
<u>8 CONCLUSION</u>	<u>276</u>
<u>APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE OF COMMUNITY SOCIAL CAPITAL</u>	<u>281</u>
<u>APPENDIX 2 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH COMMUNITY LEADERS</u>	<u>298</u>
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	<u>301</u>

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1-1 SOCIAL INTERACTION AMONG RESIDENTS IN A RESIDENTIAL BUILDING IN BEIJING	11
TABLE 1-2 INTRODUCTION OF VISITED COMMUNITIES	23
TABLE 1-3 COMMUNITIES IN WHICH QUESTIONNAIRES WERE DISTRIBUTED	25
TABLE 1-4 AGE COHORT OF RESPONDENTS OF SELECTED COMMUNITIES	25
TABLE 3-1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 143 VICTIMS AND THEIR BEGUILERS IN PYRAMID SALES IN DATE REQUIRED (SHI AND TENG 2011)	96
TABLE 3-2 ATTITUDES OF DIFFERENT GENERATIONS TOWARDS LAWS AND KINSHIP	100
TABLE 4-1 SURVEY OF 'THE PERSONS OUTSIDE THE HOME THAT YOU FEEL CLOSEST TO' IN TORONTO (N = 845) (WELLMAN 1979)	126
TABLE 5-1 TYPES OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION (YANG 2007)	161
TABLE 7-1: QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON "INDIVIDUAL STRUGGLE"? (BURTON AND REITZ 1981, P. 61, QUOTED FROM CHAN 2000, P. 210)	246
TABLE 7-2: QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON "INDIVIDUALISM"? (MICHELSON 1976, P. 38, QUOTED FROM CHAN 2000, P. 211)	247
TABLE 7-3: INVESTIGATION ON THE CONDITION OF POLITICAL THINKING IN SHANGHAI UNIVERSITIES IN 1996 (WHYTE 1956, P. 17, QUOTED FROM CHAN 2000, P. 225)	247
TABLE 7-4 DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGSS OF DEMOCRACY (SHI & LU, 2010, P. 128)	249
TABLE 7-5: QUESTION: WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING VALUES IS MOST IMPORTANT? (DOWD, CARLSON <i>ET AL.</i> 2000, P. 194)	249
FIGURE 5-1 AGE LEVELS OF COMMUNITY WORKERS IN BEIJING 2008	177

FIGURE 5-2 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF COMMUNITY WORKERS IN BEIJING 2008	178
FIGURE 6-1 COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE OF SHENHE DISTRICT (CHEN 2004, PP. 193-194)	215
FIGURE 6-2 COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE OF RUIJIN ERLU, LUWAN DISTRICT (CHEN 2004, PP. 193-194).....	172

ABSTRACT

Since 1978, the implementation of reform agenda and opening up policy, China has undergone the most rapid economic change and along with a significant urbanization process, which has changed the social, political and cultural structures of Chinese society. However, social transition along with urbanization has caused widespread social problems and citizen dissatisfaction, to the point of threatening the Communist Party's (CCP) political legitimacy. To address this political decline the CCP organised a grassroots form of community-based response, titled the Community Construction Project in urban China. This was a top-down project designed to solve or at least ease many social problems caused by rapid urbanisation, the decline in the welfare policies associated with the *danwei* (work-unit, 单位) and to reaffirm support for the CCP within the community. It was also hoped that this would assist in, keep the society stable and peaceful in a period where material inequality was growing. This process can be read as top-down but reality has involved many social actors, such as governments at all levels, scholarly engagement in applied and theoretical research, social organizations and community residents. Therefore its actual practice and outcomes vary according to concrete social and material settings due to the interaction among these different actors.

To understand the community construction project and its potential impacts on the future of Chinese society, this research systematically analyses the measures employed in urban community construction. Since community construction is an organized project, covering many aspects of community life, research on it requires a perspective relevant to all those aspects and not one that seeks to impose a formalistic Western version of community on China. In this thesis, the theory of social capital has been selected to combine community social networks, social trust, community participation, community autonomy and Chinese democracy in a coherent framework for analysing the present political conditions. It examines the Western concept of social capital and reveals how it is reconceptualised in theory and practice in China to include the Party-state rather than the inappropriate concept of a civil society divorced from the State, as

theorised by Western social capital theorists. These aspects of community life, that are related to and influenced by each other, are used as an indicator of social capital but show that in China they have clear Chinese characteristics, which the participants are fully aware of. It is reflective social capital, one that build networks and trust but one where the role of the CCP is fully apparent.

The concrete measures of Chinese urban community construction, which are undertaken mainly by Community Residents' Committees and engaged with those aspects and employed during community construction, are here analysed separately according to data collected through field work conducted in seven communities of Nanjing, China. Questionnaires about residents' attitudes towards neighbourhood relationships, community participation, trust and other issues related to the project of community construction were distributed to community residents as an indicative form of evidence to support the broader theoretical findings. Interviews were conducted with heads of selected Community Residents' Committees about the current conditions of their communities and their understanding of community construction.

The conclusion of this research shows that the community construction project, whose aims were to reshape the State-society relation, strengthening social stability and government control, relieving the government burden and improving grassroots governance, however, provides only limited improvement in building community social networks, trust, community participation and community autonomy. The analysis suggests that this less than optimum outcome is due specifically to government policies and policy implementation that operates from a perspective that the Party-State and civil society are as one. Nevertheless, the process did open up a space for debates over community power, which was divorced from a Western version of democracy but was meaningful in the social, material and political context of China in this period of rapid modernization and urbanisation.

DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University of Adelaide Library, being made available for loan and photocopying, subject to the provision of the Copyright Act 1968.

The author acknowledges that copyright of published works contained within this thesis as listed above resides with the copyright holders of those works.

Signed: _____ Date: _____.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My deepest thanks go to my supervisors. I entered into the academic arena of social sciences almost as a stranger in 2009. Their help and support guided me through my Ph.D. journey. For Professor Gregory McCarthy, his academic thoughts encouraged me to think openly and deeply. His warm patience helped me stay on the course whenever I felt depressed and dis-animated. Dr. Gerry Groot, whose energetic academic spirit always inspired my interest in the topic of my thesis during the over four-year long journey. Associate Professor John Spoehr introduced me into the theory of social capital, which is a major element of my thesis and also the most interested field of my research. I also own my debt of gratitude to Dr. Kate Cadman, who helped me greatly with her editorial advice and support.

Thanks to Chinese Scholarship Council, whose financial support enabled me to study in Australia, and the Centre for Asian Studies of the University of Adelaide providing me with a friendly academic environment. My thanks are also given to the Graduate Centre of the University of Adelaide. I'm so impressed by the IBP project when I started my Ph.D. as it was really helpful for me to get around

I am grateful to my colleagues and friends, Professor Mobo Gao, Dr. Songping Jin, Dr. Baohui Xie, Dr. Robyn Groves, Shurong Han, Yang Li, Xiuming Chen, Xiaoxiao Xie, Dr. Hui Li, Dr. Bingyang Shi, Dr. Jiajia Fan, Dr. Xiaobo He, Professor Purnendra Jain, Dr. Ning Zhang, Dr. Xianlin Song, Ms Sarah Hoggard and other friends in the centre for Asian Studies. Thanks for their friendship, intellectual stimulation, knowledge sharing, encouragement and companionship.

My sincere gratitude is devoted to my families. Their support made me confident to face all difficulties in my life. Thanks to my husband, for his warm and patient company in Australia.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CRC: Community Residents' Committee

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

MoCA: The Ministry of Civil Affairs

NGO: Non-government organizations

SOE: State-owned enterprise

1 Introduction

The thesis analyses Chinese urban community construction program from the perspective of the theoretical concept of social capital but applies this Western concept in a manner that reveal how its applicability to China is always political rather than civil. Where social capital in liberal democracy is seen as a means of analysing and reviving civil society; in China social capital theory has an historic root in the policies adopted by the CCP following 1949 and then displaced post-1978. These policies tied social capital to work place units, naturally, the abolition of these units created a vacuum for social capital formation. The following economic and social problems had an effect on the government-led program to develop social capital at a community level.

This thesis looks into the actual interaction between Party-state government and community organizations and residents in developing social capital, as part of a community construction program. The thesis show that the application of community construction programs had ambivalent results; firstly, they did not alleviate the CCP's loss of legitimacy but did give a degree of power to the communities. It was social capital with 'Chinese characteristics', quite distinct from the Western model but nevertheless did give space to for political discourse at the grass roots level.

Historical background of Chinese urban community construction

Since the late 1970s China has been experiencing a massive urbanization process. The dramatic social transition caused economic and social dislocation, and this explains in part the community construction program to establish social and

political stability in grassroots society. As this modernization and urbanization process has continued apace, the number of people in the rural population, according to the data from National Bureau of Statistics of China, has decreased notably from 825,293,929 (79.4% of total population) in 1982 to around 76,851 million (59.47% of total population) in 2003 and about 64,222 million (47.43% of total population) in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The rapid pace of this urbanization in China has caused significant changes in Chinese social structure and social lives. For individuals, they have obtained more freedom of mobility and a different structure of social networks, but lost some stable supportive social relationships. For governments, they increasingly have to deal with many problems such as social disorder, a heavy welfare burden, and decreased government control.

The remarkable urbanization process was initiated after the implementation of the reform and opening up policy of 1978. The decline of the *danwei* (work-unit, 单位) system and the rapid development of urban China has released and attracted a great number of rural residents to move into cities for employment. The *danwei* system was established nationwide after 1949, so as to perform many important welfare and political functions on behalf of the state, such as social control, production arrangements and service provision. The decline of the *danwei* system has had several notably consequences for Chinese society as well as for individuals. First, the tight economic and political control of the *danwei* system on individuals has been loosened, that is, people have more freedom to choose where to work, where to live and what to do within their economic means. Therefore, the freedom of movement of individuals has been increasing continuously. According

to the 2010 census data of Mainland China, the number of individuals whose actual living addresses was different from their registered addresses for more than half a year was 116,995,327, an increase of 81.03% over those of 2000 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The looser political control on individual's lives along with the increased market control has occurred as a result of various causes, such as the reduction of regulatory control, shrinkage of the welfare functions of *danwei*, and the development of various economic organizations, which are discussed in following chapters.

Second, the decline of the brigade system, the rural form of *danwei*, released numerous rural residents from farmland to cities to work and live during the urbanization process. People now have more choices about how to make a living and where to live, depending on their material circumstances. Today many people who now live in urban areas work for non-agricultural corporations such as commercial enterprises, in which they earn money out of their own human capital but to have to pay for their accommodation rather than as part of a larger social system.

The decline of the *danwei* system and the growth of urbanization have had many positive impacts, such as more freedom and more opportunities for individuals and organizations, and the rapid development of urban China. However, there are also inevitably negative impacts as well. The highly stable social order and social control function formerly undertaken by social norms and the *danwei* system has decreased due to the ever-increasing independence of movement and heterogeneity of residents in certain areas. The government has lost its previous effective control over individuals and grassroots society due specifically to the

decline of the *danwei* system. Social order has been confronted by great challenges as well, for example by the rise in crime. According to the Ministry of Public Security, there have been three phases of criminal activity in China since 1949. The first phase was from the establishment of the PRC to the end of the 1970s, when the number of criminal cases rose from 160,000 to 500,000 per annum. In the second phase, from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, the number of criminal cases increased rapidly from about 500,000 to over three million. The third phase, after 2000, saw the annual number of criminal cases rising to four million (Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China 2008). Correspondingly, the rate of migrant worker criminals has also notably increased (Song 2004).

Furthermore, this social transition has also brought forward many other social problems such as the affordability of housing and health care, the shortage of social services, the lack of people's sense of social security, and a lapse of many social norms. Therefore, reconstructing social order and strengthening social control are seen to be two urgent tasks for Chinese society and for the government at the current stage. 'Community' (*shequ*, 社区) has been selected as a social unit for doing this in a 'community construction' (*shequ jianshe*, 社区建设) process.

That current community construction project is not the first such attempt to build community in China. Chinese governments have made great efforts to change formal and informal institutions in both countryside and cities. The first attempt of the government to organize local communities was undertaken after 1949 to implement the *danwei* system in both urban areas (Luo and Lü 2001) and rural areas (Zhang 2004), when it was a new administrative system based on socialist

ideology. This practice then fundamentally changed the structure of Chinese society.

Before industrialization, traditional Chinese society consisted of consanguineous communities in which “people’s rights and obligations are determined by kinship” (Fei 1949/2009, p. 69). Resources were distributed according to kinship, and individuals had to rely heavily on family for support. Family was the element unit in Chinese society. Families behaved as actors on behalf of their members, while members were firmly bound to them. This situation developed partly because of the low level of production and the shortage of production means. Because of low productivity, members of extended families had to work together to support each other in harsh environments merely to survive. Individuals had to be part of a family to share lands and other productive enterprises that they might not otherwise have access to. Since individuals were tightly bonded to family, the norms and sanctions originating from the family were very effectively exercised on its members.

The traditional society was quite stable for more than two thousand years in China until the modernisation process. The two main causes of social transformation in the West, as Coleman has pointed out, were the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, and these referred to revolutions in ideas and productivity respectively (Coleman 1993) but one could add here the links between these revolutions and colonial and imperial expansion. Since the productivity in China developed relatively slowly in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the first phase of social transformation and community reconstruction were also primarily driven by political and ideological factors, principally national but not unrelated to

geopolitical factors such as the Imperial engagement with China, the Sino-Japanese War, the World Wars and the emergence of the Cold War.

After 1949 the Chinese government established the nationwide Household Registration System (*hukou*, 户口) along with a strategically ‘planned economy’. Urban citizens were registered as urbanites and assigned to work units (*danwei*, 单位) of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while after the Three Great Remoulds (*sanda gaizao*, 三大改造) between 1953 and 1956, rural citizens all came to belong to production ‘brigades’ and production teams as parts of massive communes. Under this planned economy, these work units and production groups were responsible for providing services to their members and conducting social control functions. Social mobility was strictly controlled as urban citizens were unable to choose for themselves the work units they worked in, and it was practically impossible for rural citizens to move to cities. People’s relationships were highly politicised in the new ideology-based social structures (Bu 2005).

The work-unit-based communities under that system were relatively stable before the 1980s. However, due to the post-Mao reform and opening-up policy after 1978, the social control mechanisms in which social members were firmly bound to certain social organizations was broken up. The transformation from ‘work-unit people’ (*danwei ren*, 单位人) to ‘society people’ (*shehui ren*, 社会人), in an accelerated process of rural-urban migration, has brought severe challenges to the governance systems in urban China.

Along with the deterioration of the *danwei* system, new types of communities, other than those *danwei* communities, which are composed of members of the

same work units, have emerged in urban China. These have been categorised from various perspectives*. From the view of community social structure, communities have been divided into four, five or six categories by researchers (Zhang 1995, Wang 2002, Qi 2007). The most widely recognized communities are: traditional housing block communities, tribal *danwei* communities, hybrid comprehensive communities and transfiguring marginal communities. Other types of communities are also mentioned by researchers, such as a new commodity-housing community and local special communities (including community composed of migrants from certain areas, community around universities, and community based on development zones).

On the base of the above studies, it is clear that a wide variety of communities exist in contemporary urban China. A traditional housing block community is mainly composed of old urban housing blocks including residential and

* Urban communities have also been categorised according to the time of construction, developers, residents' professions (industrial community, commercial community, residential community and hybrid community) and the carrier of the community (urban community, rural community, transfigured community and virtual community) (Tao, Y. (1996). "上海城区的社区类型预测和社区的文化建设 *Shanghai chengqu de shequ leixing yuce he shequ de wenhua jianshe* Forecast of Community Types and Culture Construction of Shanghai Urban Communities [In Chinese]." *Shanghai Artist* **1996**(1): 2, Miao, Y. (2000). "关于社区及社区类型的研究述评 *Guanyu shequ ji shequ leixing de yanjiu shuping* A Review of Research on Community and Community Types [In Chinese]." *Journal of Hubei TV University* **17**(2): 3, Ying, L. (2004). "论建立以社区为基本单元的城市规划新体系 *Lun jianli yi shequ wei jiben danyuan de chengshi guihua xin tixi* On Building a New Urban Planning System with Community as Elementary Unit [In Chinese]." *Residential District Planning* **28**(12): 6.

commercial buildings. In these communities, residents are in different professions and have close neighbourhood relationships. Tribal *danwei* communities are established by one or more *danwei*. Most residents in *danwei* community are working in or related to the *danwei*. Community interactions are then closely related to the *danwei* system. By contrast, a hybrid comprehensive community, to some extent, is a kind of newly built residential community established since the 1970s on the edge or in an isolated area of a city. It usually has well-organized infrastructures and a commercial centre. Due to its short history, however, and the lack of public space, community social networks and neighbouring relationships are weak and unstable. Another example, transfiguring marginal communities, has been transformed from rural communities adjacent to cities. This kind of community is based on both residential and production characteristics. Most marginal communities lack basic infrastructure and are not well planned. In transfiguring marginal communities, traditional kinship, regional ties and neighbourhood bonds have declined. Furthermore, some of them are not covered by relevant branches of municipal government and have no formal community governmental organizations. Nevertheless, along with the urbanization process and the stretch of urban management, the transfiguring marginal communities have gradually become new comprehensive communities by improvements to basic infrastructure and service provision.

Despite the differences between these types of Chinese urban communities, no matter whether a traditional community or newly built commercial community, they are all confronted by similar problems (Wang 2002) and these are explored below in relation to their contexts.

Increasing social stratification and social segregation

In the planned economy, communities were built on the basis of *danwei*. This meant that, according to principles of equalitarianism most urbanites were living in similar housing. However, the recently emerged communities are not organized and distributed by *danwei* but according to residents' incomes and social status. Thus, 'upward' social stratification is occurring where people earning more money are moving into higher-grade communities. The 'downward' stratification refers to the phenomenon that, as a result of the renewal of old urban areas and real estate developments, low-income groups cannot afford to upgrade and remain trapped in poverty and low-quality housing (Hisao 1999, Mi 2008)

Increasing heterogeneity

The increase of the heterogeneity of Chinese urban community residents is an obvious consequence of the implementation of reform and opening up policy. This phenomenon has stemmed from the high mobility of Chinese citizens and housing privatization. Since the late 1970s, the previously strict economic and political control on Chinese citizens has been loosened, leading to the high mobility of citizens in job-seeking and housing choice. A great number of rural residents have moved to cities whilst many former worker of *danwei* left for new jobs, which has released them from their villages and *danwei* communities. Moreover, housing privatization has allowed Chinese people sell and purchase houses through market, which means they have more market autonomy to select their residential place. The increasing heterogeneity of residents has notable influence in urban China, especially in big cities, during the urbanization process. Though all urban

communities are experiencing the challenge of resident heterogeneity, it is apparent that two types of them have been significantly influenced: the commodity community and the former *danwei* community. Commodity communities are opened to the market and thus are available to those people who can afford them. The *danwei* communities have clearly suffered from similar problems since the privatization of housing; community bonds based on workmate relationships have inevitably been weakened as houses have become tradable in an open market.

Aging

Another problem is the aging of population in all Chinese communities. In addition to the issues raised by new levels of economic diversity among residents of communities, life opportunities for people of different age groups are also undergoing challenging changes. Chinese citizens are now becoming more willing to live apart from their parents and children, due to the differences in life style. But the possibility to live in different houses is based on the income of family members. If this is affordable, the young generation are more likely to move into new houses and communities, while the older generation stay in their current houses. If either group cannot afford new houses, they have no choice but stay in the old community together. In these situations, therefore, the aged people are usually related to low-income community and family. According to Wang (2002), the lower the average income of community residents, the higher the extent of aging extent will be. Generally speaking, in high/medium income communities, people are most likely to live apart from their parents and children, and to reside in heterogeneous communities. However, the problem of aging is serious in two

kinds of communities: the traditional housing-block communities in old urban areas, and the cheap commodity communities at the edge of cities.

Weakened neighborhood relationships

Further issues have been raised as a result of the fact that neighbourhood relationships have gradually given way to relationships based on professions and lifestyle habits. According to Zhang's (2006) research in a community in Beijing, the neighbouring interactions were at a very low level indeed:

Table 1-1 Social interaction among residents in a residential building in Beijing

Questions	Percentage of all respondents
Not know neighbours' names	72
Not know neighbours' work units	68
Never visit neighbours' home	95
Visiting neighbours' home very often	0
Know neighbours' interests	1
Help neighbours very often	1
Have no interaction with neighbours	93

The problem of weakening neighbourhood social relationships and networks has been worsened by the lack of public space and inappropriate construction, especially in newly built high-rise residential buildings. This has already become a focused issue in urban planning and community construction as more and more people pay attention to the welfare of the aged and the healthy growth of children.

Taking the above problems into consideration, close social networks and intimate neighbouring interactions have not only challenged but are also needed in all

kinds of communities. Actually, by contrast, there is a developing factor, which is positive to the cultivation of community social capital. Along with the reform of the housing distribution system, many urbanites have bought their own houses. Different from living in *danwei*-owned houses, these commodity house owners place considerable attention on the maintaining of their real estate and their community infrastructures, instead of leaving the maintenance to the *danwei* as formerly. Through this house privatization, urbanites actually own their houses, instead of just using them. These residents have shown solicitude for the community they are living in, including community maintenance, management and service provision (Read 2003, Li 2009). Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the challenges and necessity for a new community governance structure has come to the attention of both central and local governments of China (Yu 2009). To deal with those problems against the current social background, community construction has been seen as having increasing importance since the 1990s.

For Chinese government, one reason of the program of community construction is to establish stability by solving the social and economic dislocation caused by social transition and alleviating the social tension among interest groups. It is also a method by which the Party-state can generate legitimacy and trust by encouraging autonomy and providing better services to community residents.

Strategies and aims of Chinese urban community construction

Community construction is an important strategy that the Chinese government has implemented to deal with the social problems identified above caused by rapid urbanization and modernization. Specific policies and measures of community

construction have been changed during the last twenty years according to various social settings. The Chinese central government has attached increasing importance to a program of urban community construction, not only as a safety net for social stability (Xu and Chow 2006), and to be a carrier of social welfare, but also to act as a basic social unit for governance. For urban community residents, community construction provides more and better community services. They require more autonomy and power to manage community issues rather than simply following the demands of local governments. Chinese Governments in various levels intend to lighten their burden of social welfare and grassroots management by encouraging residents' community participation and the development of NGOs. Meanwhile, governments also want to obtain more control over individuals and grassroots society. Nevertheless, both community residents and governments hope to keep society stable and improve community development through targeted community construction.

In the document *Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC on Further Carrying forward Urban Community Construction* (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000), issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, PRC (MoCA), in 2000, "community construction" was defined as a process in which community members, under the leadership of CCP and the government, use community resources, strengthen community functions and solve community problems to improve the development of community politics, economy, culture and environment, as well as the living standards and quality of community's members (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000). Its main objectives were "strengthening community functions, consolidating the

working base of the Party in cities, enhancing primary-level government and autonomous citizen organizations, improving people's lives and cultural levels, enlarging primary-level democracy, bringing citizens and Party closer together and keeping the society stable" (ibid.).

The policies of Chinese community construction have developed through time. The approach of community construction has followed what Xia (2008) has called a 'direct and indirect' approach. The direct approach emphasizes visible concrete construction, such as the building of community centres, a top-down project led by the government, in which community construction is designed by appointed people instead of community residents. The indirect approach requires residents' abilities to think and act collectively during which cooperation is greatly valued. The key goals here are to build the solidarity and autonomy of community members and to develop networks within communities. The indirect way needs to be carried out in a dedicated and patient way, but it has many potentially positive outcomes.

During the first stage of this community construction plan, the direct way was employed to provide community service provision and physical infrastructure building was the major task. Significantly, from eleven principal documents issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs between 1993 and 2006 covering issues from community medical services, Party building, working buildings for community organizations, to services for the disabled and the aged, only one mentioned the residents' autonomy (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000), which indicates that the direct way does not aim to prioritise this.

However, in the second stage, since 2009 the Chinese government has transferred the community construction approach into the indirect way, devoting increasing attention to community governance structure and autonomy. For instance, the only two documents issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs attached great importance to the work of Residents' Committees. In the document *Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC on Further Carrying forward Urban Community Construction* (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2009), strengthening the primary autonomy-based community governance system ranked the number one task, even prior to community service provision. In 2010, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, together with the General Office of the State Council, issued the *Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the work of Urban Community Residents' Committees*. This policy is to improve the work of Residents' Committees in urban communities (General Office of the CCP Central Committee and General Office of the State Council 2010). According to the relative documents' sources, three approaches were developed to improve grassroots-level autonomy. First, the development of autonomous resident organisations was listed as a part of the primary task at the first stage of community construction. Also, some specific methods, including instituting primary-level democratic election procedures, were put forward to improve the local-level democracy and autonomy.

Secondly, the autonomous function of CRCs (*shequ jumin weiyuanhui*, 社区居民委员会, CRCs hereafter) was specifically emphasized. The local governments were not allowed to ask CRCs to do routine government work on the governments' behalf. This move was intended to set CRCs free from routine tasks so they could

act on behalf of residents. This was a significant step since, although CRCs had been defined as the main body of primary-level autonomy since 1989, they had previously operated as branches of local governments. Now, thanks to this initiative, being independent is the most important thing for CRCs. Furthermore, the importance of primary-level democracy and autonomy were also emphasized in the 2009 number ten document of the MoCA (2009).

A third aspect of the indirect approach was seen in a new emphasis on the role of voluntary work. The 2009 document about urban community construction also mentioned the cultivation of voluntary organizations through the establishment of a volunteer registration system and mechanisms to encourage voluntary participation in social development schemes (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2009).

By these means, community construction is expected to be an important solution to many social problems which cannot be solved solely either by the free-market or the government. Currently, it is proposed that there are more than 100 tasks that should be dealt with at the community level, including public security, social assistance, employment and family planning (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2005). In addition, due to the restructuring of the housing system, the healthcare system, and services for the aged and the unemployed, the importance of employer-employee relations and local government-resident relations are decreasing. The governmental *danwei* system is now unable to exercise their previous social control functions effectively. Consequently, from the policies issued by the central government, there are two aims of community construction: the first one is providing services previously

undertaken by government and *danwei*/work units, while the second one is strengthening social control.

In this context, the first aim is related to the insufficiency of infrastructure and public basic services such as schools, hospitals and waste treatment. Chinese urban construction is now mainly being led by real estate developers aiming to address the need for service buildings, based on narrow profit motives and not necessarily at arm's length from government. The market motives, the lack of planning and the rapid increase of population in cities and towns have caused a shortage of public services. Residents have to go downtown for entertainment, education and health care although they live in suburbs far away from the city centres (Lü, Rowe et al. 2001, Zhang 2006, Zheng, Liu et al. 2008, Zheng, Yang et al. 2010). Establishing community-based service-providing bodies and encouraging people to operate such businesses are important parts of community construction to cope with this problem.

The second aim, enforcing social control on the basis of the construction local communities, requires the efforts of both governments (policies of central government and implementation by local governments) and society due to the complicated causes of social disorder. Zhang (2006) has noted the decrease in direct social control resulting from institutional transformation as well as the lowered authority of social norms and the weakened grassroots-level autonomy of social organizations. Generally, the power of governments has been the formal aspect of social control, while social norms have acted as the informal aspects. Both of these two are expected to be reinforced during community construction. The power of government is to be increased through the adjustment of local

government and local organizations of the CCP Social norms are supposed to be stabilized and reconstructed through CRCs, community organizations, and close neighbourhood networks.

In summary, the special principle of community construction is intended to develop social organizations and public participation in local communities so as to deal with the social problems caused by social transformation, and to strengthen the power of the Party-state, which has decreased during the recent period of social transformation. These two aims are interwoven in the community construction process. On the one hand, they are mutually beneficial. The community construction project, which has been initiated by the Chinese government, is encouraging the development of community organizations and autonomy. This community development helps the government to solve social problems and complete much-needed tasks in local communities. On the other hand, the development of Party-state power in community settings can be considered a form of conflict. The Party-state requires power to control community issues and the individual's life, whilst community organizations and residents stake a claim for power and autonomy as well. Here is the rub, social capital in China involves the Party-state but the participants are well aware of this and work within these boundaries to seek a form of network and trust that goes beyond market individualism or politicised subjectivity to a form of collective action (resistance) with the perceived acceptable political boundaries.

NGOs and rural community construction in China, which are often mentioned together with urban community construction, are also two important parts of Chinese community construction. The development of NGOs is critical element of

urban community construction. Rural community construction and village elections go even further than urban community as a practice of grassroots autonomy. This thesis, however, concentrate only on Chinese urban community construction, as NGOs and rural village elections are widely studied by Chinese and foreign scholars (Li 2004, Zhu 2004, Landry, Davis et al. 2010, Tan 2010, Xiao and Zhu 2012).

Theoretical framework

This Chinese community construction, as a strategy of the Chinese government to reorganize grassroots neighbourhoods, is having a profound influence on Chinese society. Studies on the policies and implementation of community construction reveal some of the current conditions as well as future potentials for Chinese grassroots society. The project of community construction in China involves several parts. Designers, executants and participators in the project have different intentions from each other. Their interaction during the implementation of the project, especially which among governments, community residents and organizations, shapes the current conditions of communities and leads to the potential outcomes of the project.

Research into Chinese community construction can be conducted from many perspectives. It can be seen as an activity undertaking what Coleman has called the 'rational reconstruction' of social institutions (Coleman 1993). Studies can also take the perspective of social capital as the widely agreed elements of social capital, that is, social networks, norms and trust; constitute the key components of

community. It can also be studied from the view of building “good communities” (Etzioni 1993, Etzioni 2000).

In this thesis, community construction in urban areas is studied as an urban governance strategy of the Chinese government to reduce government expenses, recreate legitimacy and deal with social problems. As Bray maintains, community construction is a practice of the Chinese government to reorganize and reorder urban grassroots society (2006). From this point of view, this research intends to explore the impacts of Chinese urban community construction on society development and the power of the state, and to investigate the actual status of state-society interaction and show that it is not merely a form a regulating or disciplining the society.

The project of Chinese community construction covers various aspects of community life, such as political structures, economic development and culture. To systematically understand this complex process in a single study, a handle-able point related to various aspects of community life is needed. This thesis devotes its attention to social stabilization, social order and social participation as all these are covered by the concept of social capital. The theory of social capital provides a sound conceptual base for studying many functions of Chinese community construction such as community networks, trust, community participation and democracy. Social capital theory is ideal for this research because the concept of social capital not only connects individuals, neighbourhoods and society, but it also engages with fundamental impacts on governance and democracy. But social capital theory as developed for studying liberal-democracies requires reconceptualization to make any sense in China today; a simple formula of

sameness to the West will not do.

The first part of the thesis's main body analyses the impacts of community construction in urban China on public social capital in Chinese urban communities. This part is divided into three sections: the first section introduces the history of and research on social capital in Western countries, as well as the typical characteristics of Chinese traditional social capital and its possible impacts on social transition. The second section addresses the impacts of community construction on two core indices of social capital in Chinese urban community that is social networks and trust, to search for effective measures and ideal conditions for social capital cultivation. The third section is concerned with community participation, which connects community autonomy and governance. Community participation is an obvious demonstration of the outcome of community construction on community autonomy. It is also an important index of the interaction between the state and society.

The second part of the thesis delves into the reasons for the shortcomings and defects of community participation in the governance structure of Chinese urban communities. Although community autonomy is encouraged by government policies, local governments and Party organizations still have significant power over community issues. The power of the Party-state has been strengthened, whilst society and individuals try to have more power and freedom.

The third part analyses further the future of the interaction between the Party-state and society as the process of democratization unfolds. By taking more factors into consideration, it becomes apparent that the democratization process in China will

develop slowly and is unlikely to challenge the authority of the Party-state as it continues to adapt to the pressures to change in both top-down and bottom-up ways.

Methodology

The theoretical hypotheses that underpin this thesis will be examined by both literature review and case studies. Currently, there is little research addressing the interaction between the State and society in urban Chinese local communities. To deal with this issue, specific published research, surveys and archive related community social networks will be investigated using the theoretical principles of trust, participation and community governance. The hypotheses will be analysed and proved to be true or false according to the related research.

Furthermore, to describe and analyse this ongoing contemporary process, the use of a case study is considered as an ideal methodology for conducting this research. Consequently, fieldwork of this research was conducted in seven communities in Qinhuai District, Nanjing city, Jiangsu province, China, in October 2011. The survey conducted in Nanjing was limited by time and authorization. Nevertheless, it reveals a clear picture on community construction that shows it has specific Chinese characteristic and this will be outline in chapter four. The findings of this survey are supported by similar studies in other areas and are analyzed with relevant studies.

Qinhuai District of Nanjing City is one of the model districts of community construction project. It is located in the downtown area of Nanjing city. One of the most famous attraction site and commercial centre of Nanjing, Fuzimiao, is

sited in this area. It has 5 subdistricts, 48 communities and 6 villages. Until the end of 2009, the area of Qinhuai district is 23km² and the population is 253,300. In this study, 7 communities were visited and questionnaires were conducted in 5 of them.

Table 1-2 Introduction of visited communities

	Area	Population	Community types
Longyuan Xinyu (LY community)	600,000m ²	4436	Transferred from village
Xiaoxihu (XXH community)	53,900m ²	About 10000	Commercial and blend
Lianziying (LZY community)		About 7000	New and blend
Shuangqiao Xincun (SQ community)	150,000m ²	6854	Transferred from <i>danwei</i>
Shuguangli (SGL community)	250,000m ²	11032	Old and blend
Qiaohongyuan (QHY community)	320,000m ²	8300	Old and blend
Dongshuiguan (DSG community)	138,000m ²	More than 10000	Old and blend

In all these 7 communities, Longyuan Xinyu community (LY) is newly constructed from 4 villages, in which most residents are familiar with each other. Shuangqiao Xincun community (SQ) and Shuguangli community (SGL) were *danwei* communities formerly and a great part of current residents in SQ community are still working in a state-owned company while many houses in

SGL community are sold or rent to new residents (in-movers). Xiaoxihu community (XXH) and Lianziying community (LZY) are new commercial communities in which residents who are featured with high fluidity. XXH community is in an old downtown commercial area, next to the Fuzimiao centre, in which many buildings there are shops and restaurants. LZY community is a renewed community with newly constructed compounds. The community is not located in a whole united area but divided by a river and the ancient wall of Ming Dynasty and is scattered around a green park. It is hard for residents to run community activities and get familiar to each other.

Questionnaires were distributed in five communities: SQ community, LY community, LZY community, XXH community and SGL community. Taking the variables of social capital transition into consideration, the five communities can be divided into two groups from two perspectives respectively. First, in the population, a majority of the residents of SQ community, SGL community and LY community, belong to a relatively stable and affiliated work unit in that they come from villages from which the community became established. To the contrary, XXH community and LZY community are more commercially driven and hybrid with highly mobile populations.

From the community construction activities point of view, Residents' Committees of SQ community, LY community and LZY community are active in organizing community activities, while those from the other two simply answer the local governments' requests.

Table 1-3 Communities in which questionnaires were distributed

	Active in organizing community activities	Inactive in organizing community activities
Population with low mobility	Shuangqiao Xincun community; Longyuan Xinyu community	Shuguangli community
Population with high mobility	Lianziying community	Xiaoxihu community

From the policies issued by Chinese central or local governments, active practice of community construction is expected to lead to harmonious community life, high-grade social trust, active community participation and better governance. The actual outcomes of Chinese urban community construction are investigated on the basis of relevant studies and fieldwork conducted in this thesis.

In the 5 communities where questionnaires are distributed, 1% of residents were chosen as samples. 400 questionnaires were distributed randomly with the help of the CRCs, 384 valid questionnaires were collected. 7% of samples are under 18 years; 54.29% are between 18-55 years; 41.06% of samples are above 55 years old.

Table 1-4 Age cohort of respondents of selected communities

Age	SQ	LZY	XXH	LY	SGL
Under 18	0	13	2	8	5
18-55	11	39	91	22	46
Above 55	53	19	6	20	49

In the first part of questionnaire, some basic information of interviewees is

collected: age, years they live in the current communities, and work status. The second part is about attitude towards the communities, neighbours, RCs, and community activities. The third part, which is designed to explore the importance of major social relationships, includes two questions: ‘whom will you ask for help in need?’ and ‘what do you think about the importance of the following social relationships?’

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Community construction led by the Party-state of China has positive impacts on public social capital and the development of society. Personal connections among community residents and residents’ participation in community activities is considerably improved through community construction.

Hypothesis 2: The project of Chinese urban community construction, with an important purpose of increasing community autonomy, is supposed to reduce the power of the Party-state in urban neighbourhoods. Community residents are successfully encouraged to unite together to solve shared problems and protect their own interests.

Hypothesis 3: If the last two hypotheses are true, that is, community residents are reasonably connected to and trust each other, actively participate in community activities, and unite together to solve community problems, then the development of society and the shrinking of the power of the Party-state will lead to the fast development of Chinese democracy.

Organization

This thesis contains seven chapters, in which the main body can be divided into four parts and the last three parts are in line with the three hypotheses.

The first part includes Chapters One and Two, which mainly constitute an introduction of the research.

Chapter One presents the social background, hypotheses and methodology of the research.

Chapter Two covers the history of Chinese urban community after 1949 and the project of community construction. The first part explains the status and functions of *danwei* and *danwei* community, and describes its rise and decline. The second part is a description of Chinese urban community construction, including its aims and implementation measures. The third part is an introduction to the communities selected for fieldwork.

The second part includes Chapters Three, Four and Five. The first hypothesis is proved to be truth on the basis of analysis in this part.

Chapter Three introduces the definitions and significance of social capital, and also analyses the unique characteristics of Chinese social capital. Here the characteristics of Chinese social capital are analysed in the context of the current government efforts towards local community construction and the changes in local social capital are examined in relation to the process of reforming community governance structures. The official attitudes towards social capital in

social policy and political rhetoric will also be analysed to assess the importance attached to it and to determine which aspects, if any, are emphasized.

Chapter Four explores social networks and trust in Chinese urban community, which contributes further analysis of Chinese social capital.

Chapter Five is about an important index of social capital and community democracy, that is, public participation, in Chinese urban community. Public participation is not only important for the development of society but it also has profound impacts on the state and effective governance.

Chapter Six is the third part, portraying the interaction between the party-state and society in Chinese urban community. The second hypothesis is proved wrong according to the analysis conducted in this part. The power of the Party-state is found to be strengthened through the community construction process in Chinese urban community, although is weaker than that in *danwei* system.

The fourth part, Chapter Seven, is devoted to a general description of positive and negative factors of Chinese democratization. Against this grand background, research into the state-society interaction during Chinese urban community construction will be seen to have more implications. Since the second hypothesis is not true, the third hypothesis needs further investigation. According to this chapter, even though the grassroots society of China can be stabilized, interconnected and developed, the process of democratization will not be optimistically accelerated in the current stage.

Significances and shortcomings

This research analyses Chinese urban community construction from the perspective of the theoretical concept of social capital. The first contribution is about social capital cultivation in particular Chinese social settings. The possibility of state-driven social capital cultivation and favourable social conditions for the development of social capital under the frame of community construction are analysed and explored. The second contribution of this research is an in-depth understanding of the policies and implementation of Chinese community construction. This thesis looks into the actual interaction between Party-state government and community organizations and residents, in the practice of community construction. New knowledge is generated about the cooperation and conflict between Chinese state-government and society to understand the potentials for social development and democratization in the future.

This research is indicative rather than quantitative. Most data employed from other scholars are neither collected in same areas nor in same periods so cannot be compared directly. This study's own fieldwork is limited to one district in the city of Nanjing at certain point in time. Thus, the conclusion of this research are a combination of theoretical exploration and indicative empirical research bot point to the ambivalence of social construction in China, showing that participants are neither the placid subjects of an 'authoritarian regime' nor pure market subjects but are highly reflective and aware of political power, whilst seeking autonomy within the boundaries of that power.

2 Community in the Industrialization Process and Chinese Community Construction

The introduction set out how community construction creates forms of ambivalent subjectivity. This chapter takes the first part of this concept, that of community and shows how it differs from its Western academic construction to that of China.

The structure of the chapter is to outline the term community and how it came into vogue in liberal democracies to explain urbanization in the West, especially in the USA in the late 19th century and into the 20th century. Secondly, the chapter will outline how community is seen in terms of ‘community construction’ to address social problems. Caused by rapid urbanization as occurring in contemporary China, the term community construction is used here to show it has entered into the Chinese vocabulary to explain the means by which communities are constructed rather than emerging organically.

In China the development of the concept ‘community’ has attracted considerable attention from government and scholars, dealing with social problems attributed to the rapid social transformation. This chapter analyses the transition and the difficulties experienced by Chinese urban communities in the context of industrialization and urbanization. The major measures by which Chinese communities have been constructed as a response to the problems of change at economic, social and political levels are discussed in following chapters.

In this chapter, definitions of community will be discussed, initially from traditional to modern ones. Secondly, western research on urban communities against the background of 19th century industrialization is employed to summarize

the trends and problems confronted by urban communities in periods of transformation. Thirdly, the transition of Chinese urban community after 1949 is analysed and then compared with its western counterpart in order to draw lessons from western urban studies. The major measures of Chinese community construction are summarized in the final section.

Definition and functions: the traditional concept of community

The term of community has been defined by scholars from various perspectives according to the purposes and interest of their research. Such definitions cover villages, towns, and even global interest groups in different contexts. The change of community definitions implies noticeable shifts in scholars' interests and attention in relation to aspects of social life.

In the western intellectual discourse, the notion 'community' (*gemeinschaft*) was introduced into social theory by Tönnies to indicate an ideal way by which people organize themselves together, in contrast to broader 'society' or narrower 'association' (*gesellschaft*) (Tönnies 1955, p. 136). Tönnies perceived a dramatic transition in the way people lived and connected together in the early stage of industrialization and modernization. Community, as Tönnies argues, originally existed in various forms: inside groups founded upon natural bonds and commitments (such as family and clan); inside small organizations that emerged and developed historically (as in village and cities); and also inside ideological combinations (Tönnies 1955). Tönnies argues that the most important and primary community, which was founded on blood relationships, was based upon three key personal relations: relations between mothers and children, between husbands and

wives, between brothers and sisters. He saw these family relations, as strong and stable, being established naturally and overlaid with familial sentiments. According to Tönnies, any community based on blood-relationships gradually developed and split into what he called 'community of place' and 'community of mind' (Tönnies 1955). Community of place describes the situation that existed in certain areas where people lived together and interacted very often with one another. Community of mind emerged out of a community of place when the people who were living in a community of place developed friendship, common beliefs and shared history. Tönnies argues that community, on whatever basis, has historically been built upon sentiments, habits or common memories among people related in some way to each other. Significantly, although Tönnies attaches importance to a common will for the emergence and maintenance of community, blood ties and regional attachment are never ignored in his work. Even the community of mind, for example, could be well maintained through frequent communication within one city.

Community is described by Tönnies as quasi-organic, while society is seen as mechanic (1955). In terms of the organic, three characteristics can be drawn from Tönnies' argument: firstly, in a community, people are attached closely not only to land, but also to fellow members. Community members know and interact with one another frequently. Relationships between them are close, stable and reliable. Secondly, people obtain support and help from their family members and other community members. Thirdly, people's behaviours are regulated by consensus, including tacit understanding, agreement, contract, common belief and so forth. To the contrary, people in society are essentially regarded as separated instead of

being united, living together without consensus, and interacting with one another on the basis of equal exchange. The common will and shared relations bonding people together are weak and fragile. People are perceived as free to choose whether to connect or disconnect to others, to be friendly or hostile to them. Their behaviours are primarily regulated by conventions and laws.

Different from Tönnies, Durkheim suggests that society is organic and community is more mechanical in function (1984/1893). Taking the different perspectives of their research into consideration, this contradiction can be easily understood. Durkheim analysed community from the whole society level, that is, communities are seen as segmented entities in a large surrounding (1984/1893). Most people in a community are only connected to fellow community members with very limited relations and commitment to the outside world. In a society, however, people cannot live without products and services from all social groups. People are closely related to the whole social system instead of primarily to a local community. Meanwhile, local communities cannot develop if they have no commercial exchange with other communities. Despite these contradictory opinions, both Tönnies and Durkheim agree that community is homogenous and relationships inside community are cordial and stable.

However, despite the usefulness of these contending theoretical frameworks to historical understanding, it is clear that both these theorists were working from contexts and principles which were very different from those of today. Just as Day asserts, "...community seems inevitably to belong more with the social order of the past, while the features of association fit more closely the world of the present" (2006, p. 6). This narrow definition of local attachment and commitment are no

longer suitable as prevailing concepts for the industrialized and modernized world, where there is both physical and virtual community and familial links.

Theoretically, after its introduction into the sociological arena, the notion of community has had remarkable attention devoted to it by scholars from a variety of disciplines such as sociology, economics and politics. As Delanty (2010) maintains, community plays an important role in current society as features of traditional community such as roots, commitment, identity and sense of belonging are urgently sought and needed. Community has evolved from its sociology confines to broader social theory. It has attracted wider attention than before, as worldwide economic developments have challenged the traditional social structures in both rural and urban settings. Therefore, community the notion, inevitably, has come to have multiple definitions. Even early in its emergence as an academic category community was used widely; for instance, Hillery lists 94 definitions used in community studies by 1950s (1955). According to Hillery's analysis, there are no agreed features of community, except that of specifying the persons who are members of the community. Nonetheless, two main approaches to define community can be identified as particularly useful today: the one conceives community as a spatial aggregate, which includes "a set of social relations occurring within a distinctly spatialized and geographical setting" and "the outcome of a particular mode of social interaction among individuals or social groups" (Bay 2009a); the other views community as "a particular type of social relationship between the individual and society"(ibid.). Clearly in these approaches community is envisaged as primarily relational. Nevertheless, in spite of this relatively agreed set of definitions, community has been widely studied

from a variety of perspectives including education, social control, economic development, and political improvement.

This major change in community definitions, from being region/kinship-based to be conceptualized as a variety of social groups and social relationships, is responding to scholars' attention to the multiple ways in which community has changed and how such a society has developed. Moreover, multiple definitions of community have appeared along with the social transformation process, with three prominent approaches to community studies emerging. All studies about urban community, despite their differences, generate new knowledge of urban neighbourhood, social groups, and inter-personal relationships during social transformation. Here, three broad approaches will be studied as a means by which Chinese social construction can be located and explored.

Urban community in the industrialization and urbanization process

Among a wealth of urban community studies, three conceptualisations can be identified as relevant for this analysis. The first approach is concerned with the health and sanitation problems needed to be addressed as a result of suddenly increased populations. Scholars following the second approach are more interested in sociological change. They have observed how variables such as “employment, family, kinship, political structure, and patterns of religious belief” help to keep the social relations stable and to maintain a “functionally integrated society” (Bay 2009b). The third main approach, addresses an emerging sense of loss, and this has been held by scholars as well as by classical community theorists, focusing largely upon the threat and destructive influence of social

transition and modernization on traditional social relationships (Bay 2009b). These scholars have been devoted to exploring the decline of community life and the mechanisms for how to integrate into a 'society'. The third approach, which has been concerned with social networks, norms and social order, is, to a great extent, one that coincides with social capital study. Although all these approaches are concerned with the decline of traditional community due to social transformation, scholars studying urban community from the third perspective have different opinions about whether community still exists in any meaningful way in contemporary urban areas according to the way people relate to one another and the norms they bear in mind.

Early scholars who witnessed the first wave of the disintegrating effects of industrialization and urbanization on traditional life style were prone to lament that, during urbanization, traditional community had declined or had been transformed to be a mechanical and impersonal 'society' (Tönnies 1955) or 'city' (Park 1915, Wirth 1938). Their attention focuses on the growing irrelevance and inefficacy of traditional social and moral order, in other words, the decline of traditional social capital. Other scholars conducted research on subculture groups which existed in modern cities, such as ethnic groups and class-distinct groups (Lewis 1952, Fischer 1975, Gans 1982, Suttles 1984). The notion of community, for these scholars, is neither a life-style nor a way people organized together, but, as Day notes, it represents "...those things which people have in common, which bind them together, and give them a sense of belonging with one another" (Day 2006, p. 1). The supportive and controlling functions of social capital in these small communities were key objects of these studies.

A further development occurred with the third approach, which is advocating the emergence and development of virtual communities (Wellman and Leighton 1979, Calhoun 1998, Wellman and Hampton 1999, Hampton and Wellman 2001). The hypothesis is that rapid developments and vast utilization of communicative and virtual technology have changed the fundamental nature of community. Virtual and cyber-based community has now overcome kinship bonds and geographical limits. Community relations are established on the basis of individuals' free choice of interests, habits, and beliefs. The composition of people's personal social networks and norms regulating cyber-based relationships has been changed accordingly. Based on growing academic debates on community, some scholars have postulated that virtual communities are equivalent to the old 'real' communities (Wellman and Leighton 1979, Etzioni 2000, Hampton and Wellman 2001), a perspective that will be discussed later.

Decline of traditional community

Parallel with these debates on the nature of urban community, there have been targeted investigations into the accompanying repercussions on communities of origin. The mainstream research tracking the decline of traditional community was undertaken in the first half of the twentieth century by the Chicago School at the University of Chicago. Scholars from this School investigated the transition of urban communities from several different perspectives. By comparing industrialized urban communities with traditional communities, they concluded that the social structure and social functions, which had been maintained by traditional community, had declined (Park 1915, Wirth 1938). Social disorder had been brought about in social life and relations. The social problems revealed in the

studies of the Chicago School can be a good reference for research on Chinese urban community as this School was searching to find categories to analyse USA during a process of rapid urbanization and moral dislocation (Park 1936, Burgess and Locke 1953, Thomas and Znaniecki 1958, Thrasher 1963).

Like their European predecessors, agrarian families left their farmlands and hometowns due to the American industrial revolution to work in factories and companies in urban areas, including Chicago. Scholars observed that traditional close ties among people have been diluted in the continuously increased heterogeneity of urban populations. They calculated that labour division and industrial disciplinary processes, had bonded urbanites more tightly to the whole social production system rather than to their families and neighbours, as most individuals have concentrated on work to create the basic material conditions for life. The Chicago School studies noted that the close and stable attachment to families and neighbours decreased when people lived and worked in separated places and had high mobility in choosing places to work and live. Here, lack of interaction and high heterogeneity eroded the foundation on which communal life developed. These phenomena had been perceived by Tönnies and Durkheim at first, and then they were further observed and analysed by scholars from the Chicago School of Urban Sociology.

Taking Chicago City as a natural laboratory of sociology, Park paid great attention to the inefficacy of social control as a function of urban organizational and moral systems. First, he set his eyes on the decline of close and intimate bonds between community members as he viewed face-to-face contact within a proximate locality as “the basis for the simplest and most elementary form of association”

(Park 1915, p. 580). Due to the breaking down of traditional neighbourhood bonds and sentiments, some neighbourhoods were in the process of dissolution and new neighbourhoods emerged, which had no substantial characteristics but were merely a geographical expression. Without the stable and intimate relations from which traditional mores stemmed, the social order became unsettled. In Park's view, there were several reasons for the decline of traditional and intimate neighbourhoods: the heterogeneity of urban population; the mobility of people's focus of interest; and the place people lived and worked. Secondly, the "primary", face-to-face, direct relations between members of traditional community were substituted by "secondary", indirect relations (Park 1915, p. 593). In this context, the social control function of traditional mores, springing up from intimate personal relations, has been replaced by that of positive institutional law. Thirdly, Park noticed the difficulty in governance, in other words, political control. Not only was the former governmental structure no longer suitable for the expanded population, but also there was great difficulty for voters to know the officials they were voting for. To solve these problems, Park suggests developing two kinds of groups, one for political organizations, and the other for voters, that is, building primary relations to improve the performance of a secondary political mechanism. Park's fourth point is that communication agencies of public opinion had shifted from village gossip to newspapers, bureaux of research and educational campaigns (1915). Evidently, the social control function of public opinion in the modern cities was not the same as that of village dialogue in traditional communities where people knew and relied on each other intensively.

In a much later work, Park (1943) also perceived the problem of education in a

rapidly changed society, especially for people who have moved from one place to another. In the USA context, the so-called cultural crisis emerged when cultural transmission from one generation to the next was interrupted. Moreover, those values which were embodied in traditional culture such as literature and art, on which society was built, were likely to be neglected in the transition communities. Park suggests re-establishing close and intimate networks among individuals and building general understanding between the older generation and the younger generation, and between people from different regions, through education institutions.

Another sociologist of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, Louis Wirth, expressed his concern about changes to local community under a social transition process (1938). Similar to Park, Wirth also noticed the decline of kinship and neighbouring ties and local attachment due to increasing density and heterogeneity of population and the high mobility of individuals' interest, habits and places to live and work. Further than that, Wirth declared that individuals had taken part in "voluntary groups" as distinct from natural groups such as kinship groups and neighbourhoods, to "express and develop their personalities, acquire status" (1938, p. 23). Thus the regulation of people's behaviour, in other words, social control, was supposed to be undertaken by those formally organized groups. However, Wirth claims that these specifically purposed groups were not competent to integrate the individuals who composed them, so as to take up the social control function. For him, that is the reason why the so-called 'social diseases', such as crime, corruption, suicide and so on, were more severe in urban areas than that in traditional communities.

Meanwhile, different from Park and Wirth, their contemporary, Zimmerman, held a relatively optimistic attitude towards the future of American communities, in spite of modern factors promoting what he calls “community nominalism” (1941). He defines two different types of community: real community and nominal community. The definition of real community, echoing Tönnies’ expression of *Gemeinschaft*, indicates communities that are composed of stable populations having specific culture, history, religion and traditions of their own. In contrast, nominal community is built merely upon the basis of geographical proximity, and refers to a group of people who live in the same area but have very little in common. The age of the settlement, according to Zimmerman, is the factor transforming nominal communities into real ones. Although in his study a large proportion of American communities were more nominal than real, Zimmerman was confident that the evolution of American community was moving from nominal to real in the long run.

Urban sub-cultural community

From a different approach, some scholars, rather than examining the decline of traditional community, have instead focused their attention on some specific sub-cultural groups as evidence of new forms of community inter-relations, on say ethnic grounds (Lewis 1952, Fischer 1976, Blackman 2005, Colosi 2010). They have expressed the belief that close and intimate communities still exist in modern cities and devoted themselves to exploring the way those communities have organized, functioned and expressed themselves.

Based on his research on the life of Tepoztecan migrants who were living in

Mexico City in the 1950s, Oscar Lewis contends that the influence of industrialization and urbanization should be studied in the light of the particular history, culture and other factors (e.g. ethnicity, culture, religion) of the selected areas, without which sociological findings should not be generalized (1952). He argues that, in his context, the negative impacts of urbanization were not necessarily the case, as he found there was no apparent evidence of social disorganization and cultural crisis in the Tepoztecan communities in Mexico City. Conversely, it could be argued that the life of Tepoztecs there was still structured in a traditional way and their standard of living was generally rising in the city.

Also with some degree of optimism, whilst conducting research in one of the oldest Chicago slums, the Addams area, Suttles identified the development of local ethnicity and moral order, despite the social ills such as a high crime rate and adolescent 'gangs' (1968, 1969). These local norms, however, were not purely or completely but selectively imported from the wider society. People living there mainly followed local norms as the conventional mores imported from wider society were not competent to deal with issues in the Addams area. One signal of the inefficiency of conventional norms was that "deviant" people and behaviours were exceptionally tolerated and even encouraged in this area.

The existence of such sub-cultural community is also recognised by Fischer and explained as a result of urbanization due to the variety, density and diffusion effects of subcultures which are promoted by the density and heterogeneity of urban populations (1975). Further than that, he also explored the possibility of the growth of real communities by analysing the positive factors involved in

integrating suburban working class communities (Fischer 1976).

Consequently, researchers focusing their attention on urban sub-cultural communities argue that there exist elements of stable and close community in a society with high fluidity and heterogeneity. They try to find how urban sub-cultural communities maintain and cultivate community commitment and norms to help community members and improve community life. However, despite the advantages of urban sub-cultural community for community members, it also has shortcomings as a part of wider society. Sub-cultural communities which are based on race, kinship, region or religion are relatively exclusive. Community norms and networks can hardly be stretched and used in the outside society. Therefore, they cannot effectively fulfil the tasks of social control and social welfare at the society level.

Urban interest-oriented community and the development of virtual community

Quite different from region-based community and from sub-cultural community, interest-oriented communities in urbanized areas are vibrant and can be realized much more conveniently than ever before with the help of the fast developed computer technology. In urban areas where people's living space has stretched beyond their neighbourhoods, urbanites have tended to join voluntary groups based on similarity of interest, habits, and ideas. This kind of community has featured a high fluidity of membership. To a large extent, members feel free to join and leave at will and so have been connected by weak ties. The development of this kind of voluntary community has attracted attention from a large number of scholars since the computer technology has been developed and widely used

around the world. Computer technology, connecting people regardless of social and geographical distance, has dramatically changed people's social networks, as well as communities.

There is a wealth of debate on the impacts of Internet technology development on people's social networks and communities (Etzioni 2000, Castells 2001, Wellman, Haase et al. 2001, Kraut 2002). Some are strongly against Internet technology as it may be seen to separate people from real life and diminish face-to-face interaction between family members and neighbours, or to lead to declines both in individuals' communication with family members and in their social networks (Fox 1995, Kraut, Patterson et al. 1998). Others, in contrast, welcome the Internet as a useful and convenient tool to facilitate communication among people from every corner of the world, which can promote the betterment of human beings (Patton 1986, Song 2009). Nonetheless, the impact of the Internet on social networks is never a simple and straightforward issue and should be studied from many perspectives, as people may engage in both social and a-social activities online (Wellman and Gulia 1999, Ellis, Oldridge et al. 2004). Researchers have looked into particular relations between Internet technology and specific social issues, such as online communication about children's education between schools and parents, or Internet and social capital (Cisneros 1996, Calhoun 1998, Castells 2001, Wellman, Haase et al. 2001, Yang 2003).

In terms of the influence of the Internet on personal relationships and community, this can be analysed from varying perspectives. For one thing, the function of the Internet can be seen in some positive light to establish new relationships and new communities. However, the nature of cyber-communities as communities is still

open to criticism. This community has been supposed to depend increasingly on virtual technology instead of face-to-face interaction and this is seen as superficial rather than deep communities (Putnam 1993). Therefore, in this context geographical proximity is no longer the precondition for the establishment and maintenance of community. Although the relations and sentiments developed by virtual communities can be the basis for real community, virtual community cannot be viewed as equivalent to real physical community. It is evident that the separation of communal life from geographical attachment by cyber-based communities has diminished the responsibilities and obligations of personal relations. The anonymous identity of the Internet surfer, hand in hand with people's mobility from one virtual community to another, have hindered the establishment and reinforcement of strong ties (Donath 1999). Studies also show that Internet usage leads gradually to decreased commitment to any online community (Wellman, Haase *et al.* 2001) thereby further weakening network ties across contexts.

In contrast, it is argued that the Internet serves well to maintain and reinforce existing relationships. The Internet is a powerful tool for people to communicate with friends and acquaintances. It has been proved that the Internet is especially useful when friends are dispersed socially and geographically (Wellman, Haase *et al.* 2001). Furthermore, remarkable success has been shown in the Internet application of intentional integration activities in a physical community in Canada (Wellman and Hampton 1999). The widely discussed Internet group is in Netville, a new suburb near Toronto which was equipped with advanced Internet facilities, helped to enhance formal and informal discussion concerning community affairs

among community members and to build neighbourhood relationships so as to weave a closer community network (Wellman and Hampton 1999).

In fact, interest-oriented community and virtual community have brought forward remarkable changes in people's social activity. Accessing virtual communities can be convenient, fast, relatively inexpensive and with less restriction on membership. However, compared with communities in agricultural society, interest-oriented and virtual communities tend to only provide weak social relationships and thus less stable social order. Therefore, despite the positive impacts of interest-oriented community and virtual community on social life, they are not able to substitute for traditional community in terms of reciprocal support and social stability. Putnam's surveys indicate that virtual communities compliment but are no substitute for face-to-face social capital formation and community solidarity (Putnam 1993, Putnam 2000).

These debates sparked by the industrialization and urbanization sparked initially last century in the USA have distinct parallels with contemporary China. The Chicago School were concerned with the apparent process of alienation and social dislocation causing and accelerating antisocial behaviour. Scholarly debate then moved on to see in urban contexts some different forms of communities being created, including ethnic and virtual. The insights from these debates are important for the consideration of community construction in China to which the chapter now turns.

History of Chinese urban community after 1949

Traditionally, Chinese society consisted of such communities that people's social

networks are determined by kinship (Fei 1949/2009). Resources were distributed according to kinship, which means individuals had to rely severely on family to support their own lives.

As a result of these social settings, the structure of people's social networks in the traditional society in China were built on a hierarchical Emperor-based foundation, dominated by a peasant economic system for more than two thousand years, until the social transformation post-1949 widely affected Chinese society. The Communist government of China reorganized Chinese society in both urban and rural areas after the almost century-long social disorder in China. In rural areas, residents were regulated by communes, production brigades and production teams. At the same time, Chinese urbanites were assigned to state-owned work units (*danwei*) that had community based networks and functions.

In urban areas, in order to meet the needs of members' lives, socialist work units were built around a multi-functional living area inside or around the working place (Lu 1989, Liu 2000, Luo and Lü 2001, He 2003, He 2005). Therefore, *danwei* was not only a place for people to work or study, but also the place where people lived. The geographical overlap of *danwei* and living areas produced various *danwei* communities. As such, most communities built in the 1960s and 1970s were *danwei* communities in China. Although some purely residential communities were also constructed, they still operated under the administration of a nearby *danwei*. This legacy is notable, as *danwei* community is still one major community type in contemporary China.

The suppression of urban statutory community by the danwei system

After the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese government gradually developed socialist economic and social systems. In terms of the social administration, the government adopted two parallel social administration structures, socialist work units and street committees, to carry out the fundamental economic and social administrative functions. However, this dual structure was not effective because the development of the street committee system was suppressed by *danwei* for a long time, continuing until the early 1980s (He 2003, He 2005). Thus the *danwei* system itself was the main approach for the Chinese government to realize its authority and maintain social control.

The suppression of urban statutory community was effected through two main processes (Hua 2000): First, Hua argues that most Chinese urbanites were enrolled into the *danwei* system. In *danwei* society, all citizens had a *dangan* (personal document, 档案) of their own, on which their social identities were clearly marked out. A variety of identities such as official, worker, soldier and student belonged to the *danwei* system, while other people did not. The percentage of the population outside the *danwei* system, which in 1953 was about 60% of the total population, was almost negligible after the activities of the ‘three big transformations’ (*sanda gaiza*, 三大改造)*” and the ‘great leap forward’ (*dayuejin*, 大跃进).

Secondly, the government’s distribution of resources to citizens was mostly

* “Three big transformations” was a nationwide movement conducted by CCP from 1952 to 1956 to transform agricultural industry, capitalist industry and commerce and handicraft industry into socialist economies. <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/211753.htm>

through *danwei*. Resources were centralized under the control of the government, and the government invested most resources in productive *danwei*. There was barely any space and no actors to develop non-*danwei* community. According to research by Li (2009, p. 61), before the marketization of the housing system in the 1980s, above 90% of urban houses were investments by governments of different levels. Yet, among these houses, less than 25% were administered by governments, while more than 75% belonged to *danwei*.

The social support and social control functions of danwei

In this regime, the social support and social control functions are the two sides of the one coin of the *danwei* system. On one hand, the identity category of a *danwei* member meant social support in every aspect of life (Lu 1989). In the early stage of the PRC, when private enterprise and market economy were strictly limited, the employment of urbanites became a major responsibility of the government. Urban citizens were distributed to governmental organizations, state-owned enterprises and other state-run organizations. As owners of social property, people who were enrolled in the *danwei* system were granted a whole set of social welfare rights, which were provided by *danwei*, including housing, endowment insurance, medical insurance and services, child nursery, education and even bus services. A worker in a state-owned factory described his *danwei* life before the enterprise reform in China as follows:

It costed us almost no money to live. Daily expenditures, except buying fruit or snacks, were basically taken over by the factory. Medical service was free, children's education was free, usage of water, electricity and house was free,

even haircutting, taking baths and watching movie was free too (Wu 2010, p. 293).

The other side of the system was that, the *danwei* people were controlled by *danwei* through two strategies. The first one was through the authority endowed by the government. *The danwei* system has been described as an institution employed by the Chinese government to effectively conduct its authority and domination (Lu 1989, Li 2002). *Danwei* was the basic unit of the Chinese administrative system, through which citizens participated in political activities (Lu 1989). Leaders of socialist work units were assigned and their work was arranged by the high level authorities according to the total economic plan. The other strategy was the power brought by the resources possessed by *danwei*. *Danwei* acted as an intermediary between state and citizens in the control and distribution of resources (Liu 2000). Resources distributed through *danwei* led to the dependence of *danwei* members on the *danwei* they worked for. Therefore *danwei* maintained its dominant authority over its members.

The deterioration of the danwei system

The danwei system has been challenged and has gradually become ineffective since the 1980s. There are many causes for this decline: first, a large number of the labour force could not be accepted by *danwei* as the state enterprises were marketised, shedding their welfare functions; secondly, *danwei* functions were transferred to local governments; thirdly, the deficit of a majority of state-owned enterprises led them to concentrate on economic rather than support functions; fourthly, migration to the cities created a migrant labour force that was not tied to

a *danwei* (Hua 2000).

Firstly, in the early 1980s, tens of thousands of ‘educated youths’ went back from rural areas to cities, and babies born in the baby boom during the 1960s grew up to join the work force. They could not be fully employed by only state-owned organizations and enterprises and therefore they entered into the private labour markets (Zhang and Yin 2000, He 2003). The government had to permit them to operate individual businesses, privately owned businesses, and even Sino-foreign joint ventures outside the *danwei* system. Furthermore, due to the better welfare and income structures of non-*danwei* enterprises, some astute *danwei* members, most of whom were elites of their *danwei*, left the *danwei* they worked for to establish their own or join non-*danwei* enterprises (Womack 1991).

Secondly, after the social welfare system reform and state-owned enterprise changes from multi-functional organizations to production specific organizations, *danwei* transferred many of its functions to non-*danwei* organizations. At the community level, more than thirty functions were taken up by street committees and community service stations (Zhu 1997). Further than that, in the 1980s the Ministry of Civil Affairs advocated “society undertaking social welfare” (*shehui fuli shehui ban*, 社会福利社会办) instead of “*danwei* undertaking social welfare” (*shehui fuli danwei ban*, 社会福利单位办). The most important and influential measures were housing commercialization and the re-establishment of the social security system. For instance, the number of currently-employed workers who were covered by endowment insurance was increased from 95,018,110 in 1999 to about 215,650,000 in 2011; by 2004 the number of retired people covered by endowment insurance was about 41,026,000 rising to around 68,262,000 in 2012

(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012). Since the retirement pension has been distributed through community service centres, the relationship between retired employers and their former *danwei* was completely broken.

Thirdly, a majority of state-owned enterprises faced challenges and problems in the late 1990s. More than half of them were in deficit and still many suffered accounting insolvency (Wang 2001). *The danwei* system could no longer afford to support the tens of thousands of unemployed and laid-off workers. Thus, the government had to issue policies to encourage the bankruptcy, reform and selling off of some problematic state-owned enterprises.

This deterioration of Chinese SOEs was followed by the decline of *danwei* community. Urban neighbourhoods were released from the direct control and support of the *danwei* system, and they developed into various types of communities. Chinese urbanites still organize and participate in voluntary groups and virtual groups as well. This transformation of Chinese urban community during the post-1978 industrialization process shares some common points with that in Western countries but has differences as well. On one hand, Chinese urban communities have experienced the decline of traditional community networks and suffered from consequential social disorder and anti-social behaviour. Chinese urban community has also witnessed the rise of interest-oriented and virtual groups. On the other hand, sub-culture community in urban China is not as influential as its counterpart in Western countries, which can be indirectly assumed from the limited amount of research on the topic. The former village community and *danwei* community have received more scholarly attention instead. Furthermore, community development projects, which are mainly conducted by

community members and organizations, are proposed and driven by the government in China. The influence and power of the state in the community construction process will be explored with more emphasis later in the thesis.

Measures of Chinese urban community construction

The definition of “community” in China is different from the original definition of Tönnies. In China, definitions of community place stress on regional rather than ideological features. Along with the social transition after the reform and opening up policy of the late 1980s, the social problems in regional communities have attracted considerable attention from scholars and governments, and it is on the basis of academic research in the 1990s that the Chinese government has issued the slogan of “community construction”. A great number of scholars conduct their research on community and community construction from a variety of perspectives as well (Bu 2004, Li and Chen 2008, Liu and Liu 2008, Li 2009, Zheng, Yang et al. 2010). In this way, the definition of community, not only by government but also by scholars and citizens, has been influenced by community construction. Due to the needs of policy and decision-making, ‘community’ in China generally refers to ‘statutory community’, in other words, to governmentally defined community. In this definition, the regional boundary is the first feature of community, as the sense of belonging to community is supposed to be cultivated in relation to an individual’s geographical location.

Community construction is seen as a part of social development in China. Social development, in Zheng Hangsheng’s statement (2008), is the continuing process of studying the new manifestations, new characteristics and new trends of social

conflicts, social problems and social risks, and creating new mechanisms, new objects and new actors to solve them. Through these new mechanisms, objects and actors, it is argued that disagreements, conflicts and risks can be controlled, problems can be solved, social security can be ensured, solidarity can be improved and people's living standards can be enhanced (Zheng and Xie 2008, p. 2).

However, it is argued that Chinese community construction is an intentional institutional transition designed and carried out by Chinese governments (both central and local) (Xu 2001). The leading role of the Party-state and governments of China is reflected in many aspects of community construction such as cultivation of community awareness and community participation.

A further conceptual perspective is proposed by Benewick *et al.* who contend that there are three main purposes for Chinese community construction: "improving management effectiveness and efficiency; improving welfare service delivery; and promoting democratic or participatory procedures" (Benewick, Tong *et al.* 2004, p. 19). Through the top-down enforcement of community construction, according to this analysis, the power of the Party has been strengthened. By comparing self-governance in rural areas and the Shenyang model of community construction, Benewick *et al.* further claim that the self-governance experiment is only a strategy of the Party-state of China to keep the stability of society under its own authority. Yan and Gao characterized community construction in China as muddling through chaos, top-down control, regulated participation, and community as functional establishment (2007). The studies on the nature of Chinese community construction highlight the pervasive impacts of the Party-state of China during the process of community construction, which will be discussed from various aspects

in this thesis.

More generally, studies of Chinese community construction have occurred through a series of stages showing a developing trend towards dealing with urban governance. At the early stage, community studies were mainly focused on community service provision. As the development of community construction advanced, increasing importance has been attached to better governance, social networks, public participation, community democracy and so forth. Nevertheless, community service remains the key part of community construction as well as of community governance. It is conducted to provide welfare programs and daily life services for enterprises, institutions and residents, especially the disadvantaged minority in larger communities. Historically, community service emerged and developed in industrialized countries where the urbanization caused by Industrial Revolutions brought increasing unemployment and poverty to some sectors. Therefore, community service, as a part of social welfare, was advanced to solve the resulting social problems.

In China, urban community services are similarly not organic but have been put forward by civil affairs departments, and according to (Zhang 2004, p. 158), the development process of Chinese community services can be divided into three stages since their emergence.

Stage 1 1983-1987

The transformation of Chinese urban social structure after 1978 intensively challenged the social welfare system, which was regarded as related to the planned economy. The Ministry of Civil Affairs started to canvas reform of urban

social welfare around the opening of the 8th Nation-Wide Civil Affairs Conference in 1983. The idea was that social welfare should be provided in various forms by state and social organizations cooperatively. This idea was further developed in 1984 when it was decided that social welfare should be undertaken by state, enterprises, institutions and individuals together. The contents of community services and the responsibilities of civil affairs departments were clarified in the community service forum which was held in Wuhan in 1987.

Stage 2 1987-1993

After the Wuhan forum, civil affair departments in cities such as Wuhan, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Changzhou and Yiyang started the trialling of community service reform in selected streets (through basic-level governmental departments). The tasks for these trial reforms included establishing directory organizations of community services, drawing up plans of community service development and exploring different community service modes suitable for various communities. According to data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by 1993 more than 80% of urban streets carried out community service construction. Meanwhile, there were 112,000 community service facilities in Chinese cities, of which 24,000 were for the aged, 9,000 for the disabled, 16,000 for key entitled groups, and the remaining 63,000 were comprehensive service centres and other convenience facilities such as wet markets.

Stage 3 1993-present

After the popularization of community services, it became evident that there was a funding shortages soon emerged that hampered the extension of programs. For

the further development of social services, a policy statement entitled Opinions on Accelerating Community Service Development was issued by 14 central ministries and commissions* to clarify that community service is the objective and fundamental task of social security system development, and to draw up related protective regulations as well (The State Council of PRC 1993). The Ministry of Civil Affairs started to build model urban districts by issuing the National Criteria for Community-Service Model Cities in 1995 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC). Accordingly, in 1998, the Ministry of Civil Affairs named 46 'National Model Districts of Community Service'.

Contents of community service

There are various opinions on how to analyse and summarize the contents of Chinese community services. Tang (1992) divided community services into three categories: the first category is seen as the key part, which refers to welfare services. These gratuitous services are conducted for the disadvantaged minority and the entitled groups to provide them with basic needs. In the second category, the general part, certain non-profit public services are conducted for all community members to solve problems in members' daily lives with low cost to them. Mutual help and collective activities are encouraged; the third category, the

* The State Committee of Planning, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Commission for Restructuring the Economy, The State Board of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Health, the National Sports Commission, the National Family Planning Commission, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration of Taxation, and the National Committee on Ageing

auxiliary part, mainly referring to commercial services, is the extension of basic community services. These last, profit-oriented services, such as laundry shops, pharmacies and restaurants, can support communities financially and cultivate a self-motivation mechanism and a complete service network.

Taking the actors involved in community services into consideration, these services in urban China can be divided into 6 levels (Xia 1998). First, certain individuals provide services for the community as a whole. This kind of service includes community members casually taking part in public welfare activities (such as, protecting the community environment and so on) and community volunteers. Second, inter-personal, reciprocal services refer to those in which each member is both an actor and an object of the services, providing and receiving service at the same time. The development of this kind of reciprocal service was the original intention of community service construction. Third, communities and enterprises provide services to each other, and these kinds of services are practically represented by the project known as ‘co-construction of streets and enterprises’ and ‘reciprocal service’ of streets and enterprises.

At the fourth level, communities provide services for their members, which is the original meaning of community service. Fifth, services are provided by governmental organs to the disadvantaged and the entitled groups such as the families of soldiers, especially martyred ones. These services have been covered by community services since the integration of community services and civil affair targets, and this reinforces the welfare function. Sixth, governments provide services for communities, which is another original intention of community service construction. As a welfare system, community services at this level

include various provisions such as housing, drainage, waste disposal, public transportation, police force, parks, play grounds, health care and education.

These six levels of community services can be summarized into three categories, informal, quasi-formal and formal. The first two operate at informal levels in which community services are mainly maintained by reciprocal mechanism. The reciprocal services of communities and enterprises, and services provided by communities for community members, all belong to the quasi-formal level. In these cases it is the market mechanism that drives the development of community service. At the formal level, community services, which are maintained mainly by the welfare system, include the services provided by governments for the disadvantaged and other entitled groups and communities.

In all these ways, provision of community service is a fundamental and important part of community construction. It is closely related to each community member's daily life. The content of the service influences the relationships between residents and community, while the manner of service provision can affect the utilization of each community resource.

From the research on different urban communities of China, it can be said that the services of most communities are limited to certain categories: services focused on the disadvantaged, such as meals-on-wheels and the safety-and-health hotline for the aged; services based on government-invested organizations such as community hospitals; and the very limited categories of voluntary activities such as voluntary patrols. These services can cover only a section of the community members. To fully engage the initiative of community members to take part in

community life, services for the main body of these members should be discovered and fostered. In this regard, the Longfeng community of Daqing City is a particularly good example of community service innovation. Here, the service provided is designed not only for the disadvantaged but also for general community members (Longfeng District Daqing City Heilongjian Province 2009). Services provided for elderly persons with no family and for the disadvantaged include: escorting to hospital, doing shopping, delivering meals, paying water and electricity costs, door to door haircutting service, blood pressure measuring, and house-keeping service. Services provided for all community members include: intermediary service of house-keeping; newspaper and magazine delivery; milk and gas delivery; household appliance repairing; legal advice; railway tickets and bus tickets delivery; and a community restaurant. These detailed services meet many daily requirements of community members. When the members can solve problems easily within their community, then the possibility that they will seek help from their relatives, friends and colleagues reduces accordingly, and in this way to some extent the members increase their involvement in the community.

Compared with the Longfeng community, services provided in many urban communities of China are financially supported by the government, led by CRCs' members, or provided by volunteers. Only a small section of the community members are involved in the process of service provision and very limited community resources are utilized. In the Longfeng community, various community groups such as NGOs, enterprises, volunteers and residents are all activated to provide the community services. More opportunities are generated during this process for community members to become familiar with each other

and make new social networks. Both the service providers and the recipients benefit from this process as the services are not all free, but can be divided into three categories: free, low-paid and paid. These services are thus more stable than those provided by volunteers only.

Public participation

In debating the move towards community construction, the role of participation by the community becomes crucial to the overall achievements. In the literature, community participation refers to the situation in which community members or organizations take part directly or indirectly in community public management, public services and other daily activities. During this process, the community members and organizations affect community governance and the relevant operation system, and enjoy the outcomes of community development.

It has been widely agreed that community participation is important for community members and community development for a range of significant reasons (Rowe and Frewer 2000, Pattie, Seyd et al. 2003, Yang 2005, Liu and Liu 2008, Sandstrom 2009, French and Bayley 2010, Cheung and Ho 2012):

- a) It provides a platform for community members to express their thoughts and exercise their basic rights;
- b) It improves the understanding and communication between community members, enhancing the sense of belonging by the member;
- c) It promotes the formation and development of members' identification with the community;
- d) It helps to utilize community resources, reduce the costs of community

management and operation, and increase community cohesion.

Currently, in China community participation in the provision of community service can be described as still at a low level (Yang 2005, Yang 2007, Xu, Perkins et al. 2010, Zang 2010). Juveniles and the aged are relatively active in participating in public activities, whilst the young and the middle-aged members are indifferent. The absence of the young and the middle-aged, the main body of the society, produces the situation characterised by inactivity in community participation. Three reasons for this situation can be summarized. First, the democratic decision-making system is not efficient enough. Basic-level democratic elections, community meetings and supervision are not carried out in practice. The sub-district office and CRCs are unlikely to communicate with community members. Therefore, generally, community residents know little about the community and community work, let alone take part in the community construction. Second, community groups have few channels to become involved in community management and make efforts for community development. Third, community service cannot adequately meet the needs of community members.

One case, however, is particularly interesting in this regard. The renewal of old buildings project in Tongzhou district (Tongzhou District Beijing City 2009) provides us with useful ways to improve community participation. In Tongzhou district 72.1% of the buildings are old, which means the building renewal project was relevant to most of community members. It was a large-scale project which provided a great opportunity to organize most residents to take part in community public affairs. There are several key points in the successful implementation of this renovation project. The first point is detailed research and widely distributed

information about the project before it came into practice. The district government conducted very thorough research on the detailed conditions of the old buildings, such as their numbers, years of construction, property and real estate management practices, infrastructure, and resident structure. This research gave the government an understanding of the attitudes and requirements of the residents towards the renewal project through questionnaires, as well as hearing meetings and attending residents' conferences. Eventually, the meanings and practical procedures of the renewal project were propagated to residents through broadcasting, using TV channels and newspapers at the district level, and the community blackboard, newspaper, and letters for residents at the community level. Community residents understood the project and so were able to participate in the project actively.

The second point is providing proper guidance for autonomous management among the old buildings. The district government suggested that residents of old buildings establish a management structure comprised of building directors, a self-management system, and residents' meetings within buildings. Then the building residents were encouraged to clean the corridors of the old buildings, repaint building walls and repair the broken windows and the armrests along the stairs. The third point is promoting and supporting the autonomous management that developed among the old buildings. How to conduct the old building renewal project was subject to the discussion of residents living in each building, under the guidance of the sub-district office and CRCs. The practice was established whereby the project requested the signatures of all residents living in the building. Nevertheless, this project was funded and managed by residents. Residents undertook the daily affairs and provided their service voluntarily, following the

guidance of building managers who were elected by residents themselves.

This project has lasted since 2006 and reported that it has obtained great achievements. For example, residents are encouraged to cultivate their own ‘featured building units’. After frequent communication and collective activities, residents living in same building units have become very familiar with each other. They are more willing to help each other and much like a ‘family’ no matter they are retired teachers or migrant workers (Hua 2011, Wang 2013). Thus, although this project was government driven it did bring networks of social capital and community engagement that went beyond traditional community or minority and ethnic communities in the previous Western studies in this chapter.

Community autonomy—CRCs

Another impact of active public participation and service provision is the development of community governance. The construction of an urban community governance system is taken as an important part of strengthening basic governmental organs and socialist democratic politics (Fei 2002, Chen 2009). From the perspective of the aims of macroscopic policies in China, the post-1978 reform reshaped the basic-level social governance system, which was then directed into the co-development and cooperative governance of state and society.

With the support of central government, basic-level governments of many cities, especially key cities, have tried to reform the community governance system according to local circumstances (Division of Grassroots Regime and Community Building 2009). Thus the methods for community governance system reform have depended on the local government capability, local social resources and the

development of norms of market society and practices. Strengthening basic-level state government and cultivating basic-level democracy are two important aims of social governance reform for China's basic-level society. However, generally speaking, local governments are focused on expanding the basic-level governmental system into community life and bureaucratizing community organizations and residents' committees. In other words, community governance systems in most Chinese cities are complex, with both autonomous and governmental functions intertwined.

Actors in community governance include Party branches, residents' committees (community resident representative committees), community service stations and community service centres. The reform of a community governance system can be analysed through the relationship between residents' committees and community service centres. In some communities, residents' committees mean the same thing as community service centres. Financial resources and important personnel appointments and dismissals in residents' committees are controlled by local basic-level government. The CRCs work as sub branches of local governments in communities rather than as autonomous organizations of community residents. This relationship can be seen as representing the reform's aim of increasing state power (Wang 2003).

In this way, CRCs are transformed to be actual community governmental departments. Furthermore, CRCs bureaucratic functions are reinforced by local basic-level governments through their control of personnel appointments and dismissals, whilst emphasizing governmental responsibilities. Social resources can be used to implement the work of the bureaucratic system. Meanwhile, the

governance system, based on the isomorphism of state and society, restrains the autonomous activity of social organizations.

Different from the isomorphism of CRCs and community service centres, the discreteness of these bodies represents a legitimate attempt at co-development of state and society. In this process, community service centres are separated from CRCs and become actual community government organs. The personnel, finance, management and responsibilities of community service centres are regulated according to the governmental bureaucratic system. However, CRCs no longer take governmental functions while government officers are not responsible for CRCs' activities. Community organizations are gradually released from control and social power is supported by the state, which is favourable for the development of community democracy.

The basic level democracy and autonomy of community residents are important parts of community construction. However, as the main body of community autonomy, CRCs still have a long way to go to undertake all their responsibilities (Wang 2003). At policy level, according to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Organic Law of Urban Residents' Committee of the People's Republic of China, CRCs are clearly grassroots autonomous organizations. However, in practice, the autonomous function of CRCs has been weakened.

CRCs, as grassroots autonomous organizations, came into being after the establishment of the PRC. In the early years of the PRC, there were local social capital movements, citizens in some cities organized autonomous organizations

such as patrols, anti-theft teams and resident groups, which generally had positive effects on social stability. Soon afterwards, under the advocacy of central governments, CRCs were established in cities to manage citizens outside the *danwei* system, such as those seen as being in the disreputable ‘under-class’, recipients of home remedies, and some entitled groups. Earlier, The Organic Regulations of Urban Residents’ Committees of People’s Republic of China, which was issued in 1954, had not come into practice after its issue because of movements such as the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune. More recently, CRCs have recovered and redeveloped since the third plenary session of the eleventh central committee of the CCP in 1978. However, they still face very real difficulties in meeting the goals of their roles in the social development of Chinese urban communities.

Difficulties faced by CRCs

The autonomous function of Residents’ Committees (RCs) is severely restrained by the tendency to become bureaucratic. Slowly, along with the revolution and social transition, urban residents have been gradually released from *danwei*. Social functions once were undertaken by government organs and by enterprises have been transmitted to be solved within communities. CRCs have to assume the massive bureaucratic work transferred from basic level governments. From their inception, CRCs generally have undertaken dozens or in some cases even more than one hundred tasks, including social security, social assistance, employment and reemployment, and family planning .

One main reason for CRCs becoming bureaucratic is the sub-district offices’

inability to undertake all the tasks expected. One more level of government branch is needed to be established under the sub-district office; however, due to the laws of government structure, the sub-district offices regard CRCs as their alternative organizations in the community. Sub-district offices usually assign mandatory tasks and devolve work to CRCs so they have actually become the bearers and operators of various levels of government (Gu 2005). Moreover, the lack of supervision of grassroots autonomy makes CRCs pay more attention to the bureaucratic tasks from government than to their own local issues, and so they neglect their function of grassroots autonomy.

The Organic Law of Urban Residents' Committees of People's Republic of China stipulates that the directors, assistant directors and committee members of CRCs should be voted in from among the residents of a community by its residents. According to the nature of CRCs and the regulations governing voting for their members, we can see that being a CRC member is not an occupational job, but simply voluntary public-welfare work. A CRC's members are supposed to be civil society activists. Their work for CRCs should be part-time, as they have no salary but only a subsidy. However, in practice CRCs' members are commonly called "CRCs' cadres", and even the profession of 'CRCs' cadre' has been criticized sometimes. The name of 'CRCs' 'cadre' originally came from the practice of CRCs' undertaking many basic bureaucratic tasks for the Party-state and to report upwards. The problem is, once CRCs' members accept this title, they have to take the responsibility to fulfil the commands coming from governments, other than work as spokesmen for the community residents. Further, as the CRCs' members have to be voted in by residents, working as a CRC member is not a life-long

occupation. Neither are CRC members necessarily professional; being a CRC member only requires certain community management knowledge and skills.

For quite a long time, most of the work of CRCs has been bureaucratic from governments so the CRCs' function of independent grassroots activism is weak. For there to be strong community action separate from the Party-state, the CRCs' autonomy function would need to be created and developed but this would present a challenge to CCP control (Wang 2009). The system of democratic election, democratic decision-making and democratic management is compromised by the structure of the roles as voluntary and part-time therefore not challenging the CCP political system but complimenting it. The space for raising issues is limited and constrained by the cadre system. Nevertheless, it is a conduit for airing social problems and issues that have not been taken up by the usual appeal to the State-party.

This lack of autonomy is evident in that under the general policies issued by central government, communities in different provinces, cities, even districts, have their own specific strategies for community construction. They are focused on governance structures, services for the aged residents, community culture cultivation, and so forth. How their efforts impact on community social capital needs separate consideration an analysis to which the thesis will return to shortly.

Community and social capital

Researchers focused on community study have shared several points with social capital theorists. For instance, Selznick (1995) devotes himself to stressing the benefits to a community of the solidarity and commitment of traditional

community bonds, which are also important elements of social capital. Since Selznick advanced his definition of community to cope with social problems brought on by modernization, his concept of community covers all kinds of groups generating solidarity and commitment, such as local groups, kinship groups, and purpose-oriented groups. By implication, Selznick's theory links traditional communities with solidarity and with social capital.

An even clearer relationship between community and social capital is discussed by Etzioni (1995). Etzioni emphasizes the importance of community values to government and society, and illustrates the significances of community norms for social life. He maintains that in contemporary Western countries, community values, in other words, a "sense of personal and social responsibility" is necessarily and urgently needed (Etzioni 1995). He also suggests that, in a competitive democratic context, community censure can effectively release the pressure of government to keep social order (Etzioni 1996). Moreover, Etzioni defines shared core values and personal social networks based on affection and norms, as key elements of community, and even develops Putnam's concept of social capital and community (Putnam 1993, Etzioni 2001, Etzioni 2007).

The relationship between community and social capital is also mentioned in other research. For example, Huang and Wang *et al.* (2011) summarized three key elements of community, which all coincide with those of social capital. The first is identity, referring to a basic understanding and trust among community members. The second is the sense of security provided by the security systems within a community, such as reciprocal mechanism and kinship networks, which are quite different from those provided by government and police systems. The third is

solidarity, which means the mechanism by which community members help and cooperate with each other to deal with scourges, challenges and risks.

Conclusion

Comparing the transformation of Western and Chinese urban community during their industrialization processes, it can be identified that both Western and Chinese urban communities have suffered from social problems such as heterogeneity, lack of sense of security, and social disorder, which have been brought about by the decline of traditional social structures. Although the development of interest-oriented community and virtual community meet some of the needs of society and individuals, the social control and social support functions previously undertaken by traditional community cannot be fully fulfilled by these newly emerged communities.

Traditional community is a complex network founded on the base of region and kinship, which is rooted in pre-industrial society. Today, traditional community inevitably gives space to new style community and social life in line with the decline of agricultural society and the rise of urbanization.

In this time of transition and disruption, the project of community construction in China carried out by the government is expected to overcome the alienated identified in Chinese society and to increase the stability, reciprocity, solidarity as well. A larger role is also envisaged that community construction will enhance economic development and personal welfare, assist in providing education and medical services, but also to cultivate commitment, solidarity and sense of security for community members by improving community norms and institutions.

Community construction to be effective as a tool of government, however, requires cooperation among community members, social organizations and governments. Due to the leading role of government in the process of community construction in China, the intentions and activities of Chinese governments and CCP exerts an inordinate influence on the cultivation of social capital, authority structure and the future development of urban communities in China. Equally, how the space is created for active participation by the citizens in developing social capital with Chinese Party-state inflected characteristics is essential to its success.

The next chapter will address social capital theory as it applies to Chinese community construction, by introducing the theory of social capital as it emerged in liberal democratic theory in general and the significance of social capital for the wellbeing of society and community life. After that, the unique characteristics of traditional social capital in China will be discussed in order to clarify the transformation of Chinese social capital after 1949 as a basis for further analysis in the case study which follows.

3 Social capital in Chinese urban communities

As discussed in the last chapter the core elements of social capital theory coincide with the construction of community development. Furthermore, social capital, as Putnam (1993) has argued, has had significant influence on governance and democracy in communities across the world. In order to deeply understand the effects of Chinese community construction on community and social development, chapter Three, Four and Five will investigate the manner by which social capital has been adapted in Chinese urban communities during the process of community construction. Chapter Three introduces the concept of social capital and the unique characteristics of Chinese social capital both in traditional Chinese society and under the Maoist era, before 1978. Chapter Four investigates two basic elements of social capital, social networks and trust, in current Chinese urban communities. Chapter Five then addresses public participation in Chinese urban community, which is an important index not only of social capital but also of community governance and grass roots democratic activism as it operates in China.

Social capital research in the Western academic arena

Social capital has become a significant social theory issue in recent decades, which seeks to explain democratic engagement in civil society and by implications its effects on liberal democratic governance. As an interdisciplinary notion, social capital has been studied from various perspectives and used widely in research on social and governance issues from different levels of political commitment (Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993, Ostrom 1999, Maloney, Smith et al.

2000, Portes and Landolt 2000, Schuller, Baron et al. 2000, Fukuyama 2001, Lin 2001, Newton 2001). Social capital is an important form of capital to complement other forms of capital, such as physical capital, human capital, symbolic and financial capital (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1988, Ostrom 1999). The reason for the vast attention attracted to social capital in the last three decades may be attributed to the comprehensiveness of the concept. In other words, social capital “may capture the essence of many sociological concepts (e.g., social support, social integration, social cohesion, and even norms and values) and serve as an umbrella term that can easily be understood and transported across many disciplines” (Lin, Cook *et al.* 2001, Preface). Among all the social capital theorists, Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam make the most critical and fundamental contribution to its theory and application.

The concept of social capital was developed by several scholars separately long before its general use. However, it was Bourdieu’s (1977, 1986) research on the relationship between human capital and social capital which attracted the attention of other researchers to the usefulness of the concept social capital. Social capital in Bourdieu’s conceptualising, together with other kinds of capital, decided an subject’s (class) position in certain social space and societal structure, which in turn gives form to the opportunities they have (or have not) and the benefits they obtain (1985). In *The Forms of Capital*, Bourdieu defines social capital as having two parts: the first is social networks, which enable individuals to access resources; the second is how the agent/person is embedded in these social networks (1986). Bourdieu’s study of social capital develops from an individual’s ‘disposition’, and draws from empirical surveys the manner by which social

capital has multifarious effects on other forms of capital, notably financial capital (1986).

Another founder of social capital theory, James Coleman, who also conducted research from an individual perspective, focused his empirical study on the relationship between social capital and educational achievements (1988). Coleman defines social capital in a quite ambiguous way by its functions: "... it's not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure" (Coleman 1990, p. 302). Similar to other forms of capital, social capital is productive. The difference of social capital from other forms of capital is that it is embedded in social relations (Coleman 1988, Coleman 1990). Coleman summarizes forms of social capital as obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective sanctions, authority relations, and appropriable social organization. He also analyses the social conditions for social capital to generate, maintain and decline, and relates these to the closeness of social networks, stability of social structure, ideology and other factors (Coleman 1990).

Considerable contributions were made by Coleman to the development of social capital theory. He tried to combine the social context analysis of a sociological approach and the rational choice theory of economics, that is, not only to analyse the influence of the socialization process on individuals, but also to incorporate the internal motivation of their activities. He commenced by claiming social capital is an individual resource, but concluded that most forms of social capital have aspects of the public good (Coleman 1990).

The public aspect of social capital briefly mentioned by James Coleman (1990) was then expanded and popularized by Robert Putnam. Putnam's multi-dimensional studies in Italy and America on public engagement within the community captured both academic and public attention and in so doing popularized the concept of social capital and brought it into the mainstream discourse of politics. He found positive correlations between a high stock of social capital and better government performance (1993).

Different from Bourdieu's class perspective and Coleman's individualistic perspective, Putnam usually sees social capital as public goods. He defines social capital as "features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (1993, p. 250). The indicators Putnam employed in his research on Italian governance include civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance, and associations (1993). He developed these indicators further to become a seven-category measurement tool which has more than forty indicators (1995).

Although Putnam's approach to social capital has been acknowledged and commended by many scholars, it also has shortcomings (Edwards and Foley 1998). Portes, for example, criticized Putnam's research on social capital as characterised by 'logic circularity' (Portes 1998), which means Putnam confuses causes and effects. The definition of social capital employed by Putnam, Portes argues, confuses networks with components that stem from them. Thus, the lack of preciseness of this definition leads to a casual selection of indicators in social capital measurement. To avoid this problem, researchers following Putnam's approach tend to select other indicators, as Portes expresses it, that they has

“transformed the original truism into propositions that are noncircular” (2000, p. 5).

The confusion and disunity in Putnam’s approach reflects the influence of James Coleman, as Coleman uses this term ‘social capital’ in a very ambiguous way. For example, he defines the concept in different ways in one single article. Firstly he defines it by example, “implicitly as the relations” between parents and their children in school, and “explicitly...by its effects” (Coleman 1988, p. 382). And then he views social capital as a ‘resource’ that helps students to improve their school achievements. He also says social capital is intangible things which exist in inter-person relationships, such as trust. In this respect he does not only mean the resources possessed by parents and community members that children can access from around them, but also the norms and sanctions that parents develop together to govern their children.

Furthermore, as a newly emerged and interdisciplinary concept, social capital has inevitably been defined in different ways according to the interests of researchers, sociologically, economically and politically. Definitions of social capital have covered networks, resources obtained from networks, trust, norms and reciprocity (Bourdieu 1977, Coleman 1988, Cox 2000, Putnam 2000, Lin 2001, Woolcock 2004). The definitional disunity in social capital theory has attracted many criticisms (Fine 2001). However, despite their differences in perspectives and interests, most social capital theorists agree that network and trust are the central components of social capital as a public good (Schuller, Baron *et al.* 2000).

Finally, in addition to the three most acknowledged social capital theorists, there

are still other scholars who have made meaningful contributions in this field, such as Mark Granovetter, Ronald Burt, Alejandro Portes, and Nan Lin (Granovetter 1983, Burt 1992, Portes and Landolt 2000, Lin 2001). They have put forward notions about social capital, which relate predominantly to individual agency to wider social structures, including the important notions of ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973), ‘structural hole’ (Burt 1992), and ‘embeddedness’ (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). The research on social capital by these scholars is fundamentally based on social relationships. In other words, it is agreed that social capital has social features and resources that adhere to social networks that effects individual agency in community governance.

Social capital research can thus be viewed from various perspectives (Lin, Cook et al. 2001, Bourke 2010). Lin and Cook *et al.* divide this research into two groups based on the self-interested individual level “at which return or profit is conceived” (2001, p. 7). While the first group focuses on the individual’s ability and access to resources through networks, the second group-level perspective is concerned about mutual well-being in individual action (Lin, Cook *et al.* 2001). As an aside, the social in social capital has become individualised away from public good concerns or class privilege.

From this point of view, social capital has different meanings for social units at various social levels. For individuals, they can obtain more wealth, better social status and reputation through engagement in social networks. For groups, close relationships among group members generate solidarity, trust and cooperation among members, the identity of group members aligned to the group, and faster and more effective flow of resources within the groups. For countries, well-

structured social networks can conduct effective social control, generate social trust, promote social development, improve governance, and so on.

The positive impacts of social capital are widely acknowledged. Although some researchers have studied the negative effects of social capital (Portes and Landolt 2000), most research on social capital is optimistic. Social capital is regarded as providing “the basis on which we build a truly civil society” (Cox 1995, p. 17). It is also believed to be closely correlated to ‘associational life’ (Maloney, Smith *et al.* 2000) and even children’s performance in school (Bourdieu 1977). Further investigation has found more evidence of positive effects of social capital on people’s lives, such as Peter Nannestad’s research which has shown that both ‘bridging’ social capital and ‘bonding’ social capital are positive to immigrants’ integration into a new society (Nannestad, Svendsen *et al.* 2008). Moreover there is an assumption in Putnam’s work and those who have followed him that social capital has a positive effect on the quality of government as community engagement has the potential to feed upward to national governance (Knack 2002).

In China, social capital has attracted growing academic attention as social problems have been increasing due to the rapid social change caused by industrialisation and urbanisation. Since social capital is influenced by and related to social structure and social networks, social transition in contemporary China has brought fundamental changes to Chinese social capital. However, as will be explained, this community-based social capital tends in China to be strongly influenced by the Party-State and the upward loop is brought about through the CCP not challenging its methods of governance. It therefore fundamentally differs from an individualised notion of social capital as a rational

choice decision or as a civil society indicator of the health of democracy.

Characteristics of Chinese social capital

Before the concept “social capital” came into general use, Chinese scholars had already noticed some core elements of the relationships among individuals, culture, symbols and social networks. Several articles titled ‘cultural power’ were published, in which authors paid close attention to the importance of culture, trust, norms, institutions and their influence on social and economic development (Li 1994, Wang 1994, Shen 1999). A useful example is Sun’s research on the development of Hengdian, a Chinese town in Zhejiang province (Sun 1995).

It has been since the late 1990s that social capital theory has attracted much attention in the Chinese academic arena. Some researchers have devoted themselves to social capital as a theoretical concept rather than to its application. Li and Yang, for example, have collected the most important articles about social capital in an anthology (Li and Yang 2000). In her work, Bu systematically introduces social capital theory and points out briefly the characteristics of Chinese social capital in the different phases of the modernization process in China (2005). Ma analyses East-Asian social capital from a cultural perspective (2009). However, although this research has flourished in China, the majority of it has been about analysing the economic benefits of social capital such as employment, entrepreneurship and rural land trading, rather than focussing on governance and public good (Chen and Zhang 2002, Shi 2008, Bu 2009, Kang 2009). Little research has analysed social capital from the perspective of its civil effects and how it relates to the structure and history of China (Zhang 2006, Gao

2008, Li 2008).

Social capital in traditional China

China was and in many ways still is a traditional agrarian society with over fifty percent living in the countryside and many more with rural links working in the city as migrant workers (Hagen 1962, Jin 1989). The link between the past and the present is ever evident in contemporary China. The basic features of traditional Chinese society can be summarized as: (a) agriculture was the fundamental industry; (b) family and kinship was the major social organizational forms; (c) society was based on self-sufficiency and a semi-self-contained economy with high de-centrality and closure; (d) the society was managed and governed on the basis of traditional, basically Confucian, authority; (e) within a particular class structure, society had less social divisions and differentiation and high homogeneity than contemporary China (Liu 2000). Nevertheless, along with the 1911 and 1949 revolutions, the traditional structures and culture in China were remarkably changed, as they were again post-1978 through the industrialization and modernization process.

These enormous social upheavals have seen equivalent transformations in respect to the nature of Chinese social capital. In order to bring a theoretical understanding to the implications of these developments, social capital can be usefully divided into two categories, traditional and modern, based on the different social structures and networks from which the social capital stems. Miao (2008) argues that traditional social capital was based on blood relations and geographic relationships, which were extended outwards from families and clans.

On this foundation the prevailing form of social capital basically embodied close personal ties. However, this relatively close social capital can hardly surpass the limit of blood and geographic relationship to form general trust. In contrast, he argues that modern social capital is based on an individual's rights and obligations in a modern civil society, reflecting general trust and cooperation at the society level (Miao 2008). Moreover, Li found that in rural China there were two distinctive norms of relationship: villagers were supposed to live in harmony with others in the same villages, while remaining alert to, and keeping at a distance from, people from out of their villages (2004).

In the past, the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' were usually used to indicate the difference between backward and advanced societies. This usage was common in Western thought for nearly one hundred years. However, traditional and modern do not necessarily represent the backward and the advanced. In fact, traditional and modern elements co-exist in any society (Rozman 1981) so modern social capital in China is remarkably influenced by traditional social capital as modern Chinese society is gradually transformed from the traditional one.

Therefore, social capital in China is quite different from its western counterparts due to marked differences in China's cultures and history. In Jacob's (1979) opinion, *guanxi* (关系), the Chinese form of informal personal relations, had the specific characteristic of particularism, and although particularistic ties were not unique to China, those in China were very different from their counterparts in "the type of ties, the dynamics of the ties, the relative importance of the ties in politics" (1979, p. 271).

Unlike western liberal theory in which people are seen as equal individuals pursuing their individual interests, in Chinese traditional society people are perceived as being born into often strictly predefined networks to fulfil social expectations. In these networks, people are required to deal with different relationships according to differing principles, which are called *lunli guanxi* (伦理关系, ethical relations). The base of this network is kinship, which profoundly influences all relationships among Chinese citizens. People connected by closer kinship relations have stronger sentiments and obligations to each other, and vice versa (Fei 1949/2009). Fei termed this phenomenon the differential mode of association (*chaxu geju*, 差序格局) (1949/2009).

In traditional Chinese society, people were not considered or treated as individuals but as parts of networks or members of groups. The identities of individuals were embodied by the role they played in social relationships. The responsibilities and rights people had in most important relationships were clearly regulated. People had a strong sense of belonging to various groups, such as family, village, students of the same teacher, and finally nation. To keep the society stable, it was crucial to coordinate the relationships between people of the same and different groups.

There are five most important relationships, based on Confucius principles, evident in Chinese history sources, which are called ‘*wulun* (五伦, the five cardinal relationships), being: between father and sons; between Emperor and the people; between husband and wife; between elder brothers and younger brothers, and between friends (Mencius 2006, p. 111). The norms of these relationships are: sons must obey their father; the people must follow the emperors’ commands; younger brothers must respect elder brothers; wives must obey their husbands;

people must treat his friends with sincerity and integrity. People's behaviours to deal with these relationships are strictly regulated by the norms and ethics of the place and the period. It is argued that these five cardinal relationships have not only shaped the political and cultural structures of traditional China, but also influenced various aspects of social life in modern China (Zhang 1990, Li 2007, Zhang and Huang 2009).

The five cardinal relationships, that are central to the Confucius model, endowers the relationship between father and sons as the basic and core one for ordinary people (Hou 1947, Wang 1986, Tian 2012). This relationship is also the model for the other relationships. For instance, emperors of Chinese dynasties were also called "emperor-father", and teachers in the traditional Chinese education system were called "teacher-father". The norms of those relationships together kept the traditional Chinese society stable. Therefore, the norm of the father-son relationship, known as 'filial piety' (*xiao* 孝), was regarded as the most superior virtue by many Chinese emperors. Blood relationship, which is directly related to father-son relationship, is the base of the extended family. The extended family in China has consistently been regulated by the norms of the father-son relationship and as well as the elder brother-younger brother relationship.

The geographical relationships stemmed partly from blood relationship. Most people in traditional Chinese society were born, grew and lived in a certain area for all their lives with their family members from generation to generation. It was quite common that people living in same area had some kind of blood relationship, however close or distant the relationships were. For example, there are many villages in China that are named after a family name, and most villagers have that

family name. To some extent, the village can be seen as an extended family. In this way, the geographical relationship networks can be strengthened and expanded by marriage, and then the blood relationships expand as well.

The importance and superiority of the father-son relationship and its accompanying norms explains the dominant ‘the differential mode of association’ (Fei 1949/2009). Fei gave the metaphor that a person was a stone thrown into water and the waves that spread from the centre were his or her social networks. The closest network directly related to the person was their family, which was connected by bloodline relationships. The importance of other networks depended on the distance between those networks and family. The closer the networks to family, the more priority their norms have. The priority means, when the norms of different relationships conflict, the superior norms win and the interest of the relationship is protected.

This inwardness of social networks and norms becomes clearer when one group has conflicts with others. Group members must defend their own groups and fellow members irrespective of the reason, no matter whether the thing is right or wrong. A vivid phrase indicating such behaviours is “*huduan*” (护短, to side with a disputant who is in the wrong), which means shielding a shortcoming or a fault, or being partial towards a disputant with whom you disagree because the shortcoming or disputant belongs to an inner circle. “*Huduan*” is not a disparaging expression, as the behaviour of defending inner group and fellow members is accepted by all people and the behaviour not to do this would be seriously criticized.

There are clearly positive and negative effects as a result of the inwardness of these social networks and norms. The most obvious positive effect is strong group cohesion at different levels such as family, village, and country. In its thousands-of-years long history, China has suffered several invasions by other countries and yet there has remained a continuous cohesion based on kinship and loyalty. The negative effects include social inequality, regional protectionism and corruption, which are very serious social problems in traditional and now contemporary China.

Other than the norms conveyed by the five most important relationships which shape the social imaginary, there are further traditional Chinese moralities regulating behaviours between people who belong to different groups and have few intimate relationships. In traditional China, the five most highly praised virtues, which are named as ‘*wuchang*’ (五常, five virtues) were the following: *ren*, *yi*, *li*, *zhi* and *xin* (仁, benevolence; 义, righteousness; 礼, manners; 智, wisdom; 信, credit) (Dong 1975). Simply speaking, *ren* means being kind to others; *yi* means sacrificing one’s own interest to do the perceived ‘right’ thing; *li* means treating others properly according to one’s own social status; *zhi* means doing things wisely; *xin* means telling the truth and fulfilling one’s promises. These norms are vague and less tangible than those based on blood relationships in practice. The inferiority of the *wuchang* morality structure can be well demonstrated by a story from the Confucian Analects (*Lunyu*, 论语) (Confucius 2006). Yegong (叶公) told Confucius that there was an upright person in his home town who reported his father’s pilferage of another’s sheep. Confucius said, “Upright persons from my hometown are different from upright persons from

yours. Fathers concealing the shortcomings of their sons, sons concealing the shortcomings of their fathers, these are upright behaviours” (Confucius 2006, p. 147). Thus, according to Confucius’ discourse, people protecting others with close relationships are more important than obeying laws.

Traditional norms in Chinese society have lasted for thousands of years and they have experienced significant changes along with the social transformations in China. The informal relationships from which traditional norms were generated and functioned have been eroded in favour of bureaucratic institutions and this has been explained by Ji as the contradiction between particularism and universalism (2012).

However, historically these traditional norms and networks gave Chinese society certain constancy for thousands of years prior to the 1911 Revolution. The stable social structure and low mobilization of people in pre-industrialized China enabled the norms to hold society together. Nonetheless, when China modernized to become an industrial society from an agrarian society, impersonal relations, which are defined by capital, are still required to keep industrial organizations stable and smooth (Park 1915). Doubtlessly, during the continuous social change in China, the old traditional relations and norms have been eroded by the newly emerging industrial ones, and vice versa (Vogel 1965, Gold 1985), with great impact on Chinese social mores and behaviours.

Changes in Chinese social capital after 1949

Chinese social capital has changed constantly as a result of the various processes of modernization. The first obvious change was caused by the establishment of the

danwei system as previously discussed, which thoroughly changed the social structures in China and correspondingly then the nature of social capital.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government gradually adopted a new administrative system based on a strict socialist ideology in both urban areas (Luo and Lü 2001) and rural areas (Zhang 2004). In this system, society was divided into numerous closed organizations known as 'work units' in urban areas and 'production brigades' in rural areas, into which almost all citizens were bound tightly. The government controlled and distributed the rare resources through these work units and production brigades. In this process, people's personal relationships were reconstructed into this new resource distribution mechanism.

The influence of the establishment of the new government was far more intense in rural areas than urban ones. In rural areas, the production brigades (*shengchan dadui*, 生产大队) into which people were organized were established through land reform and the demarcation of class. These movements thoroughly rearranged the authority and social structures in villages (Zhang 2004). People's relationships became highly political since different political backgrounds led to different personal networks (Bu 2005). Furthermore, responding to the revolutionary process, Chinese peasants rose up to get rid of what they saw as the 'feudalism dross'. For example, they destroyed shrines and ancestral temples they had built themselves, and although some of those actions were merely symbolic, "revolutionary performance" (Zhang 2004), some of them actually changed the way people thought and behaved.

In this new resource distribution mechanism, personal relationships among Chinese citizens were largely determined by the new structures, and the importance of kinship and geographical relationships weakened to the point that the new interactions took precedence. According to Bu Changli, two main kinds of social capital became dominant in those social contexts: general trust social capital (comradeship) and special trust social capital (friendship) (2005). The comradeship-social capital is the result of the special political and economic systems operating at that time. Bu summarized the major features of this general trust social capital as highly political, based on equality, citizenship and universality, reciprocity and dependence on each other (2005 pp. 400-404).

In many respects, social capital in the *danwei* system was quite similar to that in the traditional one. In the work units and production brigades, people had opportunities to know each other and establish firm relationships during their daily interactions. The difference between *danwei* social capital and traditional social capital is that, in the former, organizations were no longer based on kinship but on comradeship instead. Collective norms, which meant work for the benefit of work units, for the party, and for the nation, were highly praised and deliberately put into effect. To some extent, the priority level of blood relationships became lower than that of the new collective norms. Thus it can be seen that, although Chinese people have always been prone to follow norms involving intimate relationships, the choice of the norms obeyed in practice can be influenced by emphasis and reinforcement of modern priorities and imposed social structures.

Changes in Chinese social capital after 1978

The second and most dramatic change in the nature of social capital in China has occurred since 1978. The modernization process has continued after the implementation of reform and the so-called ‘opening-up’ policy. People have been released gradually from the constraints of *danwei* and the production brigades. Millions of peasants have moved from rural areas to cities, while former *danwei* members and new-grown citizens have had increased freedom to choose and change their jobs on a national scale. People have been less bonded to and supported by *danwei*, leading to the decreased importance of relationships between *danwei* members and *danwei* networks, and corresponding decrease in the importance of the collective norms as well. The priority of intimate groups has risen again but, as a result of the high fluidity of family members, the intimate groups, which were formerly connected by kinship, have expanded to cover a range of quasi-kinship relationships to fill the space left by blood relationships. Jacobs has declared even more bases for *guanxi*, including locality, kinship, co-worker status, class-mateship, sworn brotherhood, surname, teacher-student relation, economic goal, public factors and so forth (Jacobs 1979).

The network structure of Chinese citizens and the norms they bear in mind during their interactions with each other have gradually been transformed into an increasingly heterogeneous society. Unlike the traditional Chinese society based on kinship, and the revolutionary society of Mao’s era that was based on ideology, the post-reform Chinese society has featured market principles and, as a result, Chinese society has witnessed the decline both of traditional kinship and of the socialist ideology.

On one hand, Chinese “extended families” have waned, not only in size but also

in functions. This has been due to the one-child policy and also to the increased opportunity of family members to live and work in different cities. “Extended families” in China have gradually shrunk to be “nuclear families” (Chen 2003). The importance of inner-family relationships has decreased in rural China, an even more so in industrialized cities. The support functions of family have diminished accordingly, which means people have to utilize other resources to support them. On the other hand, as a result of the development of the market economy, many people can now buy many services once provided through their family networks, and they have more financial resources to do so as so many are only-children families. However, those without the material means are highly disadvantaged with the loss of traditional and governmental forms of social capital.

As Chinese governments has begun to contract its social role from being the ‘society’s administrator’ to becoming a ‘society service provider’, it has gradually shifted its burden of providing its citizens with public services, such as accommodation, medical services, education and insurance, for the lower levels of society, particularly in the roles of city and local area governments. At the same time, the former *danwei*, which previously acted as the government agent and welfare provider to its members, though not to profit-pursuing identities have faced fierce competition from private and overseas enterprises in the now much more open market. In this competitive context, the state-owned *danwei* performed poorly due to the heavy burden of welfare costs and the inefficiency caused by egalitarianism that acted as a restraint on the use of financial capital that could have been used to increase productivity (Yuan 2000, Ji, Ran et al. 2004, Yuan

2004). In order to survive and develop in the market economy, many work units, especially state-owned industrial enterprises, stopped providing overall welfare to their members, releasing both employees' close ties to their employers and hence also the political power of the employers over them.

In this changing context that both kinship-based relationships and work units have faded, there is no doubt that these developments have had a profound influence on social networks, behavioural norms and people's attitudes to public issues, which are the core features of social capital. If the new high mobility of job choice is taken into consideration, region-based communities are ideal objects for analysing the change of social capital in this process. In addition, such communities have become important places for people to deal with their common issues collectively so, consequently, the Chinese government has placed great emphasis on community construction in these contexts (*shequ jianshe*, 社区建设) (Zhu 1997, Chen 2009).

The rapid social transition, especially in big cities, has challenged people's social networks and the corresponding social capital from two important aspects. On one hand, as demonstrated earlier, the blood-ties-region-bound social network has been diminishing and broken-down due to both the high living-place mobility and professional fluidity. Residents in small towns and rural areas travel to big cities for education and jobs where they have few or even no relatives around. They cannot easily obtain support through their blood relationship networks. To cope with the shortage of social supports, people have expanded the blood-relationship network to include some quasi-blood relationships. Traditionally, they usually call a closely related person "brother", "sister", "uncle" or "aunt" with intimacy in

daily life. To some extent, these addresses mean “I’m with you” or “we are close”. Today, some people are establishing nominal-kinship relationships formally, to fulfil similar roles. Although these relationships are not as stable and intimate as real blood relationships, they are very useful for the newly related people and the norms of these relationships are powerful. On the other hand, traditional norms, taking ‘*wulun*’ as examples, have been neglected, not only in daily life but also in the education system. Therefore, people’s behaviours outside their intimate networks are noticeably less restrained than before.

Chinese social problems relevant to social capital

Social problems stemming from societal changes and related to social capital are not exclusive to China. It has already been observed that the mobility of population weakened intimate relationships and moral order in the nineteenth century in the United States (Park 1915). The Chicago School’s analysis of social dislocation caused by rapid change in the USA has parallels with that of contemporary China. That is, like in the USA in the 1900-1950s, social problems in China after 1989 are rooted in the economic, social and political transition. The problems can be analysed from the perspective of social capital. Appropriate cultivation of social capital is supposed to make some contribution to cope with them.

Social problems related to social capital cannot be simply attributed to the insufficiency of social resources. In modern China three main problems of social capital can be identified. The first is the lack of constraints from traditional norms. The effects of traditional norms on people’s activities outside their intimate groups

have declined. The second is the deficiency of modern public social capital, such as an evident waning of public spirit. This deficiency is seen not only in that people are not active in public activities, but also that many people are not used to behaving and treating others equally according to relevant laws and regulations. The last problem is the conflict between traditional norms and modern norms. In modern cities, where people interact frequently with strangers or people with weak relationship to their lives and work, traditionally bonded social capital is more likely to have conflict with modern norms and regulations.

The first social capital deficiency, laxity of traditional norms, is typically embodied in a social phenomenon called ‘*shashu*’ (杀熟, cheating acquaintance/acquaintances for benefit) (Yang 2004). The notion of ‘*shashu*’ appeared in the 1990s, and became a formal word in the fifth edition of the Contemporary Chinese Dictionary in 2005, meaning “when doing business, making use of the trust of acquaintances, and making money from the acquaintances by unfair means (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2005, p. 1180). According to Shi and Teng’s research, most victims of pyramid sales were cheated in this way by their acquaintances (Shi and Teng 2011). Through ‘*shashu*’, the relationships which were formerly well maintained and protected by traditional norms are not as reliable as before.

Table 3-1 Relationships between 143 victims and their beguilers in pyramid sales in date required (Shi and Teng 2011)

Relationships	Families	Relatives (blood kinship	Distant relatives in (more than	Friends	Classmates or schoolmates	Fellow countrymen	Others
---------------	----------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------------	---------	---------------------------------	----------------------	--------

		three generations)	three generation blood kinship)					
Number of victims	2	6	18	24	14	76	3	

The second and third social capital-related problems are interpreted as the two main reasons for many serious social problems, such as corruption, improper privilege, unfair positive discrimination and so forth. In popular rhetoric, it is said that there are two sets of rules in Chinese society. The one is official principles, policies and regulations. The other is the so-called ‘hidden rule’ that operates as favours and benefits conferred by personal relationships. The latter is usually more powerful than the former (Tong 2004). Family norms and the old structure of clan and country have not only shaped social ethics, moral rules, social values, and the political system in traditional China but have been reconceptualised so as to still have influential impacts on current Chinese society (Zhang 1990, Tong 2004). In the contemporary, multi-levelled society of China, officials and patriarchs are granted superior authority to their son-people (*zimin*, 子民). However, quite different from patriarchs in clans who consider the interests of their families, officials have no blood kinship with their people, therefore, they concern less the interest of the people when they seek private gain through their power (Tong 2004).

In China, due to the inwardness and superior priority given to norms within intimate relationships, people are usually partial to persons from their own groups in resource and interest distribution, which has been proposed as a main reason for social inequality and corruption. In the 1980s Gold (1985) noticed a re-emergence

of certain traditional personal relation-based social relations in China. He argues that traditional personal relations were being reshaped to be instrumental in obtaining resources by the eroding of the bureaucratic institutions of the Cultural Revolution and the restructuring of state-society relations. It is a common phenomenon that people utilize their authority to help their relatives or friends at the cost of others' interests. To some extent, this is acceptable and people know they would do the same thing if they were in the same position. This kind of behaviour is generally regarded as 'not to forget one's roots'. However, conflicts do happen frequently in some areas such as in medical service provision and school enrolment in people's daily lives.

Many hospitals in China are places where the above three problems are all obvious (Fu and Li 2005, Xiang, Zhao et al. 2007, Wang 2009). Corruption is severe and *Guanxi*, people's relationships with superior norms, is very important in relation to medical practice. Some hospital managers falsify medicine prices, while some doctors ask patients to buy lots of medicines useless for their illness, betraying both traditional moralities (such as honesty) as well as modern norms such as laws, hospital regulations and professional ethics (Fu and Li 2005). Conflict between traditional and modern norms also arises in hospitals. Relatives or friends of hospital workers receive more efficient medical services, waiting a shorter time and having better doctors at lower or even no expense (Xiang, Zhao et al. 2007, Wang 2009).

Although the negative impacts of traditional Chinese norms cannot be easily


changed (Schramm and Taube 2003)*, they have gone through changes for the better during the social transition process. Ai (2006) contends that under the new market system there has been a declining trend of *guanxi*, in terms of informal personal relations.

Since the social capital transition under the *danwei* system, however, it has been witnessed that the priority level of norms can be influenced by reducing the importance of intimate relationships and reinforcing traditional ethics together with modern moralities. The feasibility of influencing the priority level of norms is here drawn from data collected from Nanjing communities in field work carried out for the purposes of this study (see Table 3-2). When asked *whether they thought laws were important or not*, 59.86% of the over 55-year old interviewees said that they considered that laws are important, while 92.34% and 100% of interviewees aged between 18 and 55 years old, and less than 18 years old, attached importance to laws respectively. Laws were thus more important for the younger generation citizens. In contrast, when asked *whether they thought kinship was important* only 60.7% of the young citizens (under 18 years old) thought highly of kinship, while the percentage of the other two age groups expressing importance were much higher (Table 3-2). This change clearly shows the impacts

* "...a substantial displacement of the *guanxi* networks, even with a further strengthening of the Chinese legal system, is hardly to be expected in the short run." Cited from Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003). On The Co-Existence of Guanxi and a Formal Legal System in the Pr China-An Institutional Approach. Documento presentado en el encuentro de ISNIE. p. 21.

of social transition on people's attitudes toward traditional norms and modern laws.

Table 3-2 Attitudes of different generations towards laws and kinship



Research on social capital cultivation

There are two groups of opinions about government performance in relation to social capital cultivation. Ostrom (1999), for example, points out the negative one, which is that social capital cannot be directly developed through external intervention (Ostrom 1999, Knack 2002). But Ostrom agrees that governmental institutions at national and regional level have strong influence on social capital for community development. Fukuyama is another scholar who is not optimistic over the role that governments can play in social capital cultivation. He contends that social capital is a by-product of cultural factors such as “religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and other factors that lie outside the control of any

government” (Fukuyama 2001, p. 17). He argues that states committed to public good principles could directly generate social capital in the area of education and indirectly in other areas by “providing necessary public goods, particularly property rights and public safety” (Fukuyama 2001, p. 18). However, Fukuyama also warns that improper or ill-advised government activities might have negative impacts on the development of social capital (Fukuyama 2001). Further, a seven-year study was conducted in Indian villages by Krishna, who maintains that social capital was “generated through the internal efforts of community groups” and not necessarily related to government institutions, or externally-promoted by organizations (Krishna 2007, p. 941).

However, another group of scholars is optimistic about the ability and possibility that government can strategically help to improve social capital. North (1990) in a study from an economics perspective found that formal institutions had significant impacts on the collective activities of social groups by facilitating economic and political exchange and reducing risks in the exchange process. Skocpol (1992) argues that the development of social capital is not necessarily in contradiction to the performance of government and it is elsewhere held that social capital can be improved by good governance (Tendler 1997). Some social capital researchers have focused attention on the significances of the cooperation between state and society in social capital cultivation and social development. Evans (1996) puts forward the notion of positive “state-society synergy”:

“State-society synergy” can be a catalyst for development. Norms of cooperation and networks of civic engagement among ordinary citizens can be promoted by public agencies and used for

developmental ends (p. 1119)... The value of synergistic strategies is evident. Creative action by government organizations can foster social capital; linking mobilized citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of government. The combination of strong public institutions and organized communities is a powerful tool for development. Better understanding of the nature of synergistic relations between state and society and the conditions under which such relations can most easily be constructed should become a component of future theories of development (p. 1130).

Evans thus argues strongly for governments to implement creative “synergistic strategies” for community organization. Similarly, in a study in Birmingham in the late 1990s Maloney, Smith *et al.* also witnessed positive outcomes of high level contact between public authority and social organizations such as voluntary associations (Maloney, Smith *et al.* 2000).

Since the close relationship between social capital and politics has been established by scholars (Harriss 2001), a great number of studies on methods for improving social capital stock have been conducted. While the bulk of studies of social capital have focused on the effects of social capital on various aspects of social life, factors affecting the quality and quantity of social capital itself have not been widely investigated. The only studies on this issue have focused on the impacts of specific government policies such as those relating to family structures (OECD 2001, Babajanian 2008), education (Schneider, Teske et al. 1997, Hughes, Bellamy et al. 2000, Billante and Saunders 2002), urban design (Jacobs 1961) and others.

Studies of social capital cultivation have made great contributions. However, social capital is primarily thought of as a positive attribute without due consideration of its downsides. A typical example is the ‘communitarian view’ of social capital research that regards social capital in a one-dimensional manner; it “is inherently good, the more is better” and always with positive outcomes (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p. 229). As mentioned earlier, Robert Putnam defines social capital as characterized by positive social phenomena such as high-level public participation and trust. Such a form of social capital is affirmative, however, social capital has not only positive effects but also negative ones, which have been called the ‘downside of social capital’ or ‘perverse social capital’ (Portes and Landolt 1996, Rubio 1997). According to the research conducted by Browning, Feinberg *et al.* (Browning, Feinberg *et al.* 2004), close social networks do not only improve collective efficacy in neighbourhoods, but they also provide social capital for offenders and other destructive community groups.

Furthermore, it is not only the positive and negative effects of social capital that should be taken into consideration, but also the social capital that sustains public good but hinders development for a given community deserves more attention during the process of its cultivation. For example, Fukuyama (2002) contends that a high level of certain forms of social capital (as in isolated, small radius social networks) in some traditional communities actually acts as an obstacle to development. What those communities need is the destruction of traditional social capital and creation of new forms of social capital (that is, broad radius trust) based on modern organizational structures.

For social capital cultivation in Chinese urban communities, both the downsides

and the 'proper-type'/positive social capital should be carefully examined. Taking the negative effects of traditional norms into consideration, two risks of social capital development strategy must be taken into account. First, shortage of social capital, in terms of both social networks and appropriate norms, can lead to severe social disorder and social unrest. For one thing, increasing feelings of insecurity and uncertainty are caused by a lack of reliable supports and stable relationships. The erosion of steady jobs, work-based communities and stable family life has given birth to "a lack of stability, security and concomitant feeling of anxiety and uncertainty", and widespread concern about many social issues such as job security, rising crime, loss of community, and so on (Hopper 2003). For another thing, the lack of social mores and norms results in low efficiency, social inequality and corruption, as discussed above.

Secondly, simply increasing the amount of social capital can be a high-risk strategy as well. The more important the strong ties are (whether blood relationships, quasi-kinship relationships or other intimate relationships), the more privileged and superior the norms of those relationships. If the norms of strong ties have overwhelmingly higher priority than those of traditional ethics, or modern moralities and laws, the social order is in danger, under threat from regional protectionism, corruption and underworld gangs (Zhou 2000, Yang 2002, Yu 2002, Hu 2006, Bao 2007). Taking the relationship between social capital and the legal system, for example, can explain the two risks. For one thing, traditional norms are sources and complementary to modern legal systems (Ma 2004). For another, as has been shown, an over-close relationship between informal personal relationships and authority threatens both the spirit and the practice of 'rule by

law' in Chinese society (Zhang 2007).

According to the discussion above, problems of social capital are embodied as various social issues in different social units. For a nation-state, good social capital appears as high level democracy and good governance. At the community level, proper social capital serves as reciprocity and trust among community members, safety, a sense of belonging, and efficient governance of community affairs. It is reasonable to conclude that social capital cultivation in Chinese urban communities has specific emphases in different circumstances. The emphases of social capital cultivation needs to be different between rural communities and urban communities, as well as between urban *danwei* communities in which a majority of the members work together and newly formed commercial communities with high fluidity.

Social capital in Chinese communities

Community, especially regional community, is an ideal place to study the impacts and practices of social capital. The widely-agreed elements of social capital, social networks, norms and trust, are also the key components of community. Robert E. Park (Park 1915, p. 581) has asserted that there have been “nascent neighbourhoods and neighbourhoods in process of dissolution” (Park 1915, p. 581) when the size and distribution of population has changed significantly in local communities. Furthermore, the existing bonds, attachments, interests and sentiments between community members have been broken by the mobility of the population and distraction of people's attentions to disparate areas. Nevertheless, it is possible for a nominal community, “a mere geographical expression” (Park

1915,p. 579), to become a real neighbourhood in the course of time. Social capital is important for urban geographical communities to be real, united ones, and also important for the development of groups into communities. In the practice of community development, governments and NGOs in western countries have noticed the importance of social capital in better community life, especially in relation to public participation. We can also identify the leadership of NGOs in a variety of types of community development (Korten 1987, Uphoff 1993, Mathie and Cunningham 2003).

In China today, appeals for social capital come from both the top and the bottom of the society. On one hand, the Party-state of China needs to develop relatively more stability, legitimacy and close social networks to maintain both social order and control. On the other hand, citizens of China ask for close social networks to obtain social support and the sense of belonging. It has been argued that the revival of community studies originally stemmed from the insecure conditions of modern society and was a response to a general social crisis in solidarity and belonging (Delanty 2010). Primary neighbouring contacts are not only the basis of associational life in cities, but also a base for political participation, since neighbourhood is the basic unit of political control. Thus, in order to establish social support and a social control system in a regional-based community, it is crucial to accelerate the revolution of community from nominal communities to real ones.

To this end it is possible to draw lessons from the history of western urban community since the beginning of industrialization as many problems that occurred in western urban community are exactly the ones currently threatening

and confronting Chinese community today.

Three main phenomena can be identified from the above analysis as problematic issues. The first refers to the decline of traditional community. Traditional and intimate community in which people previously lived with strong sentiment and commitment, have been transformed to be merely linked by a geographical expression, which has given birth to a series of social disorganizations and disorder. Park and Wirth have given particular attention to the inefficacy of the social control function of such transformed communities, such as the incompetence of secondary organizations and newspapers (Park 1915, Wirth 1938). However, they do not lose hope for the future of urban community and try to give suggestions for keeping community life healthy and converting them again to be real communities. Furthermore, Zimmerman (1941) believes that nominal community will develop to be real community given appropriate terms of time. In America, playgrounds have been built and sports activities organized in low socio-economic communities so as to promote local order, raise moral and accelerate social integration.

The second issue is the activities of subcultural communities which have held specific norms and followed local social order against the conventions of the wider society. Different from America, which is composed of a variety of ethnic groups from all over the world and suffers from racial tension and segregation, China is rather experiencing its conflict in relation to the norms of traditional culture and modern institutions, within a multi-ethnic society but one dominated by one major ethnic group.

The third problem is the emergence of virtual community, which affects people's social networks in a complicated way. For instance, surfing online can both increase people's public participation through online social and political groups and news websites on the one hand, yet decrease neighbouring face-to-face interaction on the other. Since it is not practicable to suppress the wide usage of Internet, utilizing the Internet strategically as a tool to help community integration has potential for community construction.

Chinese community construction is quite different from the community development programmes in western developed countries. In western contexts, a high level of public participation and the relative freedom of community residents to take charge of community affairs is the base of community autonomy, which is not the case in Chinese communities. Government is still the most important factor in Chinese community construction and development. Community source organizations and residents are mostly passively following governments' demands. The current work of Chinese community construction is to establish new community management systems to help residents express their opinions on community affairs and actively cultivate a sense of public participation. Herein lies the paradox of social capital in China, to grow social capital the Party-state has to promote it from above but its success requires more autonomy from below; not necessarily through a western form of civil society but at least within the space of the Party-state that does not directly threaten the CCP.

The importance of the role of governments in social capital cultivation in urban China is interestingly discussed by Liu (2007). In his opinion, there are two types of government performance: vertical political mobilization and networked

grassroots governmental organizations. It is under the vertical structure that interactions among residents are usually taken into the political system, as when community residents take part in community activities instructed by local governments. Under the networked grassroots governmental organizations, social capital in the form of voluntary groups is encouraged and granted developing space and platforms.

Consequently, there is a complicated process of interaction between the state and society during the construction of Chinese urban communities. Governments and urban residents have the same need to improve modern social capital while both of them ask for more power in the same one space. The Party-state still works to revive its nerve-tips in grassroots society, which is in direct contradiction with grassroots democracy. Urban residents are eager to have more power in dealing with their own issues but their expectations need institutional and resource supports from the state. Whether their work is successful or not, what the outcomes of their interaction will be, and what the effects are on social development and democracy in China, are interesting and pressing questions.

In the next section, Chapter Four and Five, three key indices of social capital are explored, that is, social networks, trust and public participation, which will be analysed based on field work data and other scholars' applied research. Chapter Four is concerned with social networks and trust in Chinese urban communities. The typical characteristics of the social networks of Chinese urban residents are analysed and the main measures employed by urban communities to improve social capital are examined. The current condition of trust is additionally discussed. The aim is to understand the process with consideration of the

appropriate and proper social capital that would create a public good and the interaction between the state and society to facilitate such an outcome.

In summary, this chapter has outlined the theoretical roots of social capital. It has highlighted how social capital is but one form of capital, and these various forms interact with each other shaping the disposition of an individual and their opportunities in life. Secondly, the chapter has noted how social capital, as a concept, has developed to explain how individual and group network relationships can affect governance at both a community and a societal level. This theory was then related to the change in the values and norms of Chinese society, from primarily an agrarian nation with strong familial and village ties, to one where modernization has undermined the old forms of social capital. Meanwhile, social capital, as it has evolved during rapid industrialisation in China, is not so much organic as tied to the developments fostered by the Party-state as it seeks legitimacy and social control. Nevertheless, as the following chapters will reveal, this is by no means a construction imposed on a passive society; rather, individuals in China today develop social capital within and through the existing social networks and relationships.

4 Social Networks and Trust in Chinese Urban Communities

After the general discussion of social capital theory and social capital in Chinese society, this chapter moves to explore two basic notions of social capital: social networks and trust to explore the paradox of social capital from above versus social capital from below. According to several social capital theorists such as Burt, Granovetter and Nan Lin, social capital is generated from and existing within social networks within civil society-from below go the State (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992, Lin 2001). Meanwhile, Putnam, Fukuyama, and others pay more attention to trust as a major indicator outside the State but affecting attitudes to governance (Putnam 2000, Fukuyama 2001). Clearly, the concept of social capital includes social networks and the resources brought from those networks, engaging the interests of both individuals and society. Social networks are fundamental elements of social capital, from which resources can be accessed and through which trust can be generated. In return, trust and other social norms have certain impacts on the development of social networks and this does not mean it is not possible for the State to generate the space for social capital.

Social networks and trust are also primary elements and functions of community, which coincides with the notion of social capital. From this point of view, a good community is the positive outcome of social capital, and the social capital of a community influences the wellbeing of individuals, society and also the state. In this chapter, these two notions, social networks and trust, are analysed in the context of Chinese urban community construction. Due to the causal relationship between them, the main body of this chapter is concerned with the changes in social networks occurring during Chinese social transition and the impacts of

Chinese urban community construction on community social networks. The concept of 'social network' will be analysed as a carrier of social capital and a key element of community. Data collected from five Chinese urban communities of Nanjing city will be used as an indicative means to analyse the impact of different factors on the social networks of community residents. Trust is analysed from the perspective of the generating mechanism and current condition in urban China, since it is argued that it cannot be changed by a government project in a short period.

Theories of social networks

Social network is a fundamental notion in both social capital and community research. Since the social capital here is defined as the resources individuals and groups can draw from their networks, social network is a basic subject for social capital research, which includes focuses on the structure and features of social network. In addition, social network, as one of the two key elements of community, is also essential for community research (Hillery 1955). Wasserman and Faust (Wasseman and Faust 1994) have summarized two common elements of social networks from various definitions as nodes and relationships. Other researchers have defined the two central characteristics as the area and the sociality (Qi 2007), and 'sociality' here represents the idea that a community is a functional, organizational and emotional network which has been developed to exist in people's common lives.

Significances of inter-relational networks

Social networks are comprised of social connections or relationships. Social

relationships, the basis of networks, refer to “regular social encounters with certain people over a period of time” (Argyle and Henderson 1985, p. 4). From Argyle and Henderson’s point of view, social relationships are not characterised by attachment and “positive emotion”, but by the “expectation that this the relationship will continue for at least some time in the future” (1985, p. 4). People who are connected by “relationship” are not only those meeting accidentally but also those who have relevant regular interactions.

Social networks are essential for all human beings and have therefore been studied by scholars from a variety of perspectives (Wellman and Leighton 1979, White 1981, Granovetter 1983, Israel 1985, Bruhn 1991, Scott 1991, Lin 1999, Roch, Scholz et al. 2000). As outlined earlier, sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel have noted the centrality of personal interactions and social networks in their writings (Tönnies 1963, Simmel and Wolff 1964, Durkheim 1984/1893). Other researchers have focused on the necessity of social relationships/networks to the wellbeing of people, such as to their health, happiness and development (Pilisuk and Froland 1978, Berkman and Syme 1979, Bruhn 1991, Baumeister and Leary 1995, Feeney 1999). Still others have paid attention to the nature and the structure of social networks, as well as to social relationships in people’s various life periods and to social networks in large scale social life (Craven and Wellman 1973, Wellman and Leighton 1979, Van der Poel 1993, Antonucci, Akiyama et al. 2004).

From the research of scholars in these different arenas, there are several benefits of social networks that can be identified. For individuals, social networks are important in many aspects of people’s lives. First, at a basic anthropomorphic

level, human beings, as a species of animal, need fellow support and companionship from the very beginning for their survival, getting food, and protecting themselves (Lorenz 1965, Bruhn 2011). Secondly, relationships give meaning and significance to human life (Bruhn 1991). Having a new or enjoyable relationship is one of the most happy things for human beings (Argyle and Henderson 1985, Bruhn 1991). Thirdly, social relationships are closely related to people's health, both mental and physical. Deficiencies in social relationships can lead to mental and physical health problems, such as sickness, eating disorders and suicide (Berkman and Syme 1979, Reynolds and Kaplan 1990, Baumeister and Leary 1995, Stewart 2009). Fourthly, a close social relationship is essential to personal development. People draw social support through social relationships when they experience need (Baumeister and Leary 1995, p. 509). Furthermore, for healthy social development, people also learn how to connect with others and adjust their behaviour during their interaction with others (Glantz and Johnson 1999).

For neighbourhoods, relationships involved in neighbouring can enhance the life experience of residents, especially the safety of older people, by improving their access to critical goods and services and promoting their independence and their positive feelings about themselves, as well as boosting their general psychological wellbeing and social involvement. Relationships within neighbourhoods are especially important to the old and to minority groups. A local network of neighbours, friends, and acquaintances is an important source of personal wellbeing, and of help. Residents who have similar problems may get together to help and support each other.

More broadly, social networks are important for a 'good' society (Kearns and Forrest 2000). It has been pointed out that the structure of social networks has determinant impacts on the functioning and instilling of social regulations and norms (Wellman 1988). Furthermore, social networks are crucial for social integration as this depends on wide inter-group communication and face to face interaction among members from diverse social groups and levels (Blau 1977).

Research on social networks

It has taken nearly one century for social network analysis to develop from a hypothesis to become a theory and an important branch of western social science. The history of social network research can be divided into 4 stages, namely: the early stage, the establishment stage during the 1930s-1950s, the critical development stage between the 1960s-1970sn as in involved empirical studies of behaviour, and the further stage after the 1980s was to link behaviourism to larger social groupings, such as community.

In the early stage, the social network was systematically illustrated firstly by German sociologist Simmel in 1908 (Simmel and Wolff 1964). Simmel describes society as social relationships that are connected one to another. In Simmel's opinion, when an actor joins into a group, he/she is restrained by the group. The structure of that group is the social network. Therefore, the actor cannot be analysed as an individual separately, but must always be seen as a part of a social network of normalisation. Furthermore, an actor joins a network not as an isolated individual but also brings his/her social relationships into that network (Simmel and Wolff 1964).

Although Simmel mentions social network in his works, he does not describe the concept explicitly. The development of social network analysis occurred during the 1930s-1950s. At this time there were three main approaches to social network analysis: social measurement, looking into small groups; research on interpersonal relationships and the formation of informal small groups; and the study of community structure in tribes and rural areas. These three approaches developed and blended well together and formed the basis for modern social network analysis.

During the 1960s period, social network research experienced an expanding process from its start to a flourishing stage as positivism began to expand and gain a hold of academy, especially in America. Harrison C. White is the key researcher in this not only because of his research, but also because of the students he cultivated. Additionally, Coleman conducted research on the impact of social networks on the dissemination of information and the promotion of inventions (Coleman 1966). Then Granovetter put forward the notion of “weak ties” in 1973, which greatly influenced the theoretical work of social network analysts. He classifies social relationship into “strong ties” and “weak ties” and argues that “weak ties” are more powerful in information obtaining since “strong ties” are generally among homogeneous actors, which means that the information the actors own is similar. Meanwhile, “weak ties” exist mainly among heterogeneous actors, which is advantageous to information dissemination and exchange.

Along with this rapid development, there were problems for social network analysis. Analysis methods were becoming increasingly technical, limiting the

research to within a narrow scale. Consequently, after the 1970s, the approach of social network analysis was left outside mainstream sociology and began to gain a place in economics.

In the 1980s a large number of sociologists adopted social network analysis as a tool to study and analyse economic phenomena. Mark Granovetter put forward the notion of "embeddedness" in 1985, bringing social network analysis back into mainstream sociology. He argues that economic behaviour is embedded in social structures, and the core social structure is the social network of a person's life. White put forward the theory of market network in 1981, asking 'Where do markets come from?' In that article, he views manufacturers as members of a group, in which the network structure is maintained and reproduced continuously (White 1981).

Social network analysis was gradually combined with research on social capital after the 1990s, and thus attracted further attention of researchers. Ronald S. Burt points out in his book *Structural Holes*, which was published in 1992, that quantity of social capital is not necessarily related to the strength of social relationships, but to the existence of structural holes, which are weak connections between groups and individuals. Then Lin (2001) was another important sociologist that studied social networks from the perspective of social capital. He argues that resources are embedded into individual's social networks and can be drawn out from them. The quantity and quality of resources an individual can draw from the network is subject to its homogeneity, the social status of network members and the relationship strength (Lin 2001).

Thus, after nearly 70 years of academic progression that included critiques of behaviourism and structuralism, research on social networks has been more reflective, expanded and increased its focus from small group study to the study of large social units such as communities and their organization in cross-country comparisons (Putnam 1993). The outcomes of social network research have been applied not only within the sociology arena, but also other in social science fields such as economics, politics, psychology and education.

Network elements

From the various perspectives from which social networks have been studied (Blau 1977, Van der Poel 1993, Field, Schuller et al. 2000, Scott 2000), it is evident that three main elements are most frequently used to analyse this conceptual notion: size, density and structure.

a) Size

The size of a social network is obviously an important indicator to evaluate its nature and role. The larger a social network is, the more resources actors can get through the network. The size here refers to the number of actors who are connected by relationships within a certain group.

b) Structure

The structure of a social network is the proportions of certain types of relationship in the whole network. The relationship among actors is influenced by many social factors, an important one being the political and economic institution through

which the network operates. The importance of a certain relationship in the network can be measured by comparing its proportions to the network as a whole, and to the resources and support drawn from a range of relationships.

c) Relationship intensity

The relationship intensity is the strength of connection between an actor and members of his or her social network. The stronger the relationship is, the more central it is to an individual's well-being, and the more resources and support that can be drawn through it.

Factors influencing social networks

From a social biology perspective, people form interpersonal attachments consciously or unconsciously as a fundamental characteristic of human biology (Bowlby 1969). In terms of the development of social networks, this theory assumes that they are constructed inevitably in this attachment process, and their construction is influenced by many factors. From a social cultural perspective, the broader social structure is emphasized as providing opportunities or restricting individual social network building due to power relations, since an individual's social status and financial capital within the macro social trends of which they are part significantly influence the construction and maintaining of their individual network (Fischer 1982, Feld and Carter 1998). Social networks are also affected by other ethnographic factors such as gender distinction, economic status and demographic situation that include race, ethnicity and diasporic factors (Blau 1977).

An important theory employed to analyse social network building in America is rational choice theory. According to this conceptual logic, people do not spend the same time and energy on all relationships but to some extent follow the so-called 'exchange theory', which means people will stay in relationships only when "the rewards minus the costs give them more than they could receive in any alternatives available – taking into consideration the costs of making the transfer" (Argyle and Henderson 1985, p. 41). The income from the relationship is related to network size and to the relevant 'self-disclosure tendency'. It is here proposed that individuals rely finally on small networks where they tend to disclose themselves to enhance their private interest. Individuals can then gain high income from this type of social network (Scott 1995).

Van der Poel (1993) uses rational choice theory combined with behaviourism to explain people's social behaviour, including how people construct and maintain networks of personal contacts and how they can draw on their networks for social support. He seeks to reveal motivations of social network construction from the rational-choice perspective (Van der Poel 1993). He believed that social network construction to maximize self-interest is mainly restricted by three intersecting factors, namely the opportunity to make contact with others, the transportation distance from others, and the length of time an individual has known others. The less the individual has contact with others, the further the transportation distance is, and the shorter time individual has known others, the higher is the cost of network construction for economic gain.

The dilemma with social network theory based on a rational choice perspective is that it reduces all networking actions to self-interest and therein asserts, space,

structure and inter-personal relation from first principles. The basic problem with rational choice theory of social capital is that it has no general theory of values or social power structures and fails to explain why there are different social capital outcomes across say gender or race lines or as Putnam notes why rational choice inadequately explains the opposite effects networks have on women and men (Putnam, 1993). For Putnam networks are the critical factor rather than the individual economic actor. That is, rational choice theory has the social as a black box, simply where actors seek self-interest. A view clearly at odds with Bourdieu's notion that the social involves conflict based on power relations and that people's access to economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources are constrained by social systems. Moreover, rational choice theory neglects the manner by which social capital operates within families for non-economic means for example to sustain meaningful family and kinship ties.

For our purposes, the building of individual social networks is restricted by social structure, power relation, the broader environment, which explains why people tend to build networks of relationships with people similar to themselves and why there can be winners and losers in social capital formations (Fischer 1982, Feld and Carter 1998). From this point of view, today the information technology and mobility of modern society enable people to choose their favourite social networks but these are constrained by social structures, whether they be in the West or in China (Hampton and Wellman 2001, Li and Chen 2008). The platform of social interaction has been transferred from a residential location to voluntary communities. Therefore, people are able to be connected to numerous networks, which include both virtual and real ones, with more freedom but these are by no

means outside a larger political and social formation.

Moreover, not all the consequences of people's freedom to select their social networks are positive. In the information age, communication among community members is no longer constrained within physical spaces nor by the notion that the virtual is free from structural power. People often communicate with each other through the Internet and mobile phones, rather than having a meeting at home, or in community squares and meeting rooms. This has opened up the potential for social capital but the information rich and information poor will have differing opportunities and benefits. The influence of close physical distance for social network building has decreased accordingly in importance but power relations remain in play within social systems at local, national and global levels.

Impacts of social networks on local communities

The early academic studies on community began with the premise of social good which delved below the State to the social system at a familial and community level. That is, what makes a community important and meaningful is an individual's feeling that he or she is valued, that his or her safety and protection are provided for in a social system, and that they have access to resources outside the community (Sarason 1974). Studies showed that the kind of community which individuals believe can foster healthy connections for them is called a "competent community" (Iscoe 1974). Prezza and his colleagues (2001) found that the strongest predictor of a sense of community was the degree of neighbouring or of closeness and familiarity with the community. Neighbouring can be an important complement to a family support systems, especially for adults with no, or limited,

family support. The most useful indicator of residents' willingness to take part in community activities and their sense of community is the length of time they have lived in a certain community (Jeffres, Atkin *et al.* 2002).

Additionally, people's social networks are built around a series of activities, such as work, entertainment and family gatherings. Field and Schuller *et al.* (2000) found that neighborhood, family, friends and other social interaction circumstances are critical for social network building. In this study, the social networks of those who were unable to join these activities were greatly restricted.

In a residential community, the relationship among community neighbors is different from other types of relationship (Argyle and Henderson 1985). Residential communities are locality-based neighbourhoods. Even today, the most advantaged characteristic of residential communities for social network building is spatial proximity, despite the fact that this has decreased along with the development of information technology. Generally, social networks in neighbourhoods vary according to the frequency of neighbours' interaction with each other. In the agricultural communities, people live and work in the same area. They have opportunities to meet and interact with their neighbours frequently and often develop close relationships. Another example is the *danwei* community in China. The interaction and cooperation of community residents in their work units enabled them to establish close and neighbourly relationships and were also connected to a large sense of a social system (Hua 2000, Zhang 2006). However, in urbanized cities where people live, work and seek entertainment in different places, community residents have few chances to communicate with their neighbours to develop a relatively stable relationship or to feel connected to a

social structure.

Nevertheless, spatial proximity is still an advantage for community residents to establish neighbouring relationships and look outward with a sense of security. Residents often have common locality-based issues such as noise, problems caused pets and local security, and it is convenient for them to receive and provide their neighbours with minor help. Neighbouring activities, as Argyle and Henderson (1985) have stated, include talking, keeping order and taking action towards shared problems, offering mutual help, forming mutual help groups and locality-based voluntary associations, such as churches, classes and clubs.

Mutual minor help, which is said to be the most important of neighbouring activities, includes “looking after house keys for tradesmen to enter in emergency”, “looking after pets or plants”, “helping out with items of food”, “shopping”, “giving help or advice with houses repairs or maintenance”, “helping out during illness”, “looking after children”, and “helping out when a family member or close friend has died” (Argyle and Henderson 1985, pp. 280-284). Such mutual help is unlikely to be offered in a community of strangers, however closely they are living together.

Social networks in industrialized western society

In traditional community, most people live all their lives in a given location with neighbours and fellow community members. They grow up and live in the same cultural and historical environment, and all their needs are fulfilled in the community as well. The relationships they experience, both ideal and physical, are quite stable and strong. In modern urban residential community, however, because

many people only live there for a small part of their lives, while they work and gain leisure somewhere else. The heterogeneity of population and separation of living and work places decreases residents' willingness and chance to establish relationships with their neighbours. Moreover, groups of neighbours may be somewhat homogeneous only in terms of education, wealth and occupational level, which are very little compared with kin, and lifelong friends. Besides, when a community cannot meet an individuals' needs or individuals demand more from their community than they are themselves willing to invest, people may be less likely to invest time and effort to get to know their neighbours and take part in community affairs (Janowitz 1967). Most of people's needs are supported by family members, relatives, friends and social organizations, while their entertainment needs are fulfilled through computer networks and voluntary communities. People are not likely to interact with their community neighbours unless there it is a necessity. The close social networks of regional community have inevitably declined.

In western contexts, surveys have been carried out in which people have been asked to list "the persons outside the home that you feel closest to" (see Wellman 1979), in which it is assumed that the spouse or equivalent is the closest attachment. The following table (Table 4-1) represents the result of a study in Toronto:

Table 4-1 Survey of 'the persons outside the home that you feel closest to' in Toronto (n = 845)
(Wellman 1979)

First five named

First person named

All kin	50%	65%
Child	6%	13%
Parent	9%	19%
Sibling	15%	21%
Other	20%	12%
Friends	38%	28%
Neighbours	6%	4%
Co-workers	6%	3%

From Wellman's (1979) data we can see that the closest ties are with friends, and then relationships with kin, that is, siblings, parents and children. The relationships with co-workers and neighbours have less importance, though some workmates are also friends, and neighbours may be friends, kin or workmates.

The decline of community, or community networks and activities, has been discussed by several community or social capital scholars (Simmel and Wolff 1964, Etzioni 1993, Putnam 1993, Myers 2000). Some sociologists have forecast that the growth of city life would lead to increasing social isolation, and the decline of family, kin, neighbourhood, and other face-to-face group relationships. This may not necessarily be the case in terms of family. Wellman (1979) conducted key research on the social networks of the residents of East York, a high density, mostly migrant worker suburb of Toronto, in the 1960s and 1970s. Here, 98% of these East Yorkers had at least one intimate relationship, and 61% of the respondents had more than five intimate relationships, which means stable and intimate social networks still existed. However, only 13% of the interviewed East Yorkers had intimate social relationships in their own neighbourhoods.

The decline of neighbourhood networks is also demonstrated by other relevant

research. From the data collected by the United States GSS (General Social Survey), the involvement of local community residents in community life is very low. In the 2010 published data, 89.5% (1022) respondents had less than six close friends living in their neighbourhoods or districts, among which 31.5% (356) respondents even had no close friends living nearby at all (Berkeley). 79.8% (911) respondents had not belonged to any neighbour association during the previous year. 4.0% and 9.9% respondents had belonged to such groups but said they never participated or participated only once or twice (Berkeley). Such responses clearly demonstrate the increasing lethargy of urban residents in relation to community participation.

The problem is particularly serious in large cities. It has been found that in general the larger the community, the less people know their neighbours. According to Argyle and Henderson, in an American survey in the early 1980s respondents in large cities and centres outside large cities were asked, “About how many people in this neighbourhood do you know by name?” The answers are demonstrated in the following table (Table 4-2: see (Argyle and Henderson 1985).

Table 4-2 About how many people in this neighbourhood do you know by name?

	Under 3	Over 20
In large cities	22%	27%
Outside cities	3%	70%

The remarkable difference here in the familiarity with neighbours between large cities and other places shows explicitly the impacts of industrialization on neighbouring networks in this context. Argyle and Henderson (1985, pp. 280-284)

draw the conclusion that neighbourly relations are shaped on the basis of “domestic proximity”, “voluntary associations” and “public places”. According to the settings in which people meet, it can be assumed that the construction of public places may be a useful way to increase the possibility for community members to interact with each other. Furthermore, the establishment of voluntary associations in a community may allow residents to spend more time taking part in community public affairs.

Another important cause asserted is the decline of neighbourhoods as seen in the rise of individualism. As Singer (1995) argues, the personal search for self-interest in a world of choice has been one of the major reasons for a loss of community. In Singer’s words, “...the collective impact that each of us has in pursuing our individual self-interest will ensure the failure of all our attempts to advance those interests” (1995, p. 22) . This point is supported by Mayers (2007), who states, “Another potential price we pay for radical individualism is its corrosion of communal well-being. Several of the problems that threaten our human future... arise as various parties pursue their self-interest but do so, ironically, to their collective detriment” (2007, p. 185).

From the above discussion, it may be concluded that, Western theory seeks to explain the decline in social networks as individual pathology or choice, divorced from the social and economic system. This ‘possessive individualism’ has led to calls for an increase in local and social networks and neighbourliness in local communities in industrialized societies, with the physical proximity of residents as a space that should be fully utilized to overcome individualism. Increasing face-to-face interaction and cooperation among residents might be an effective

way to promote their interrelationship. However, the interaction and cooperation must be based on the actual needs of residents, such as mutual minor help in daily issues.

The changes observed in western local communities to some extent parallel their Chinese counterparts. Lessons drawn from the above discussion are probably useful in Chinese settings, which still need further analysis. Nevertheless, individualism is always with a social setting and shaped by social structures of power.

Research on Chinese social networks

Social network analysis has been also employed by Chinese scholars investigating various aspects of social life but often with a larger social system in mind. That is, generally, social networks are regarded as positive for the construction of a harmonious society because they alleviate social contradictions (Xu 2007). They are also found having positive impacts on people's mental health (Ding and Xiao 2010). It has been shown that high-density community networks are positive to the cultivation of community attachments and commitment to the social system (Zeng 2008), and from their study, Yao and Zhang (2006) state that social networks improved the performance of social morals.

Other than these explorations of the significances of social networks, there is a large number of studies focussing on features of Chinese social networks and recent developments in specific contexts such among the aged, among urbanites of different social classes, and in rural areas (Dai 1999, Zhang, Ruan et al. 1999, Bian, Breiger et al. 2005, Zhang 2005, Liu and Lin 2012). For some, it is the

problems of social networks in China that are the focus of scholars' discussions (Lü 2006, Gou 2008).

The characteristics of Chinese social capital, relationship-orientation and the differential mode of association of people's activities have been discussed above in Chapter Two (Fei 1949/2009, Liang 1996/1936). According to Fei, individuals are centres of their social network circles. Those relationships which are closer to individuals are more strictly regulated by social norms and have more responsibilities and also more benefits attached (Fei 1949/2009). The differential mode of association, in other words, norms and obligations attached to different relationships according to the closeness, was supported by Li's (1993) research in Hong Kong, and by a study conducted by Bian *et al.* in mainland China (Bian, Davis *et al.* 2007). Other scholars have conducted research centring on the primary features of Chinese social networks (Zhai 1993). Li and Luo (2012) discovering another important feature of Chinese social relationships, that is, that the boundaries of social circles or groups of Chinese people change according to social settings, but the norms of the regulated relationships inside or outside those boundaries are different. Norms of relationships inside given circles are clearly defined, such as individuals are required to obey their parents, be ready to help their relatives and friends even at their own costs, whilst the norms of outside-circle relationships are vague and general but have a broader link to the norms of the Party-state.

However, the familial and kinship networks are also critical. The consequences of the pattern of difference sequence were explicitly explained by Zhai (2008). Zhai

argues that Chinese people are born into a given social network based on kinship, through which they are able to access resources and undertake responsibilities conveniently according to the specific norms privileged by their small and intimate social network rather than in line with broadly shared social norms. Chinese people tending to rely on intimate social relationships is the reason for the pervasive role of unspoken rules in Chinese society (Zhai 2008). Zhai (2008) also suggests that if individuals were to leave their kinship-based social networks, they would realize the importance of social groups, voluntary associations and public benefit activities.

Changes in Chinese social networks after 1949

Features and structures of social networks in China have not remained constant over time but conform to Bourdieu's emphasis on seeing the larger social system as opposed to individual (economic) choice and Putnam's notion of networks but in China these tend to criss-cross with the Party-state. They have been profoundly influenced by significant social or political movements such as the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Cultural Revolution, and the Reform and Opening up Policy.

The first remarkable change was caused by the Communist political activities after 1949 and the establishment of the PRC. The Party-state of China tried to transform the particularistic tie, 'friendship', into a universalistic morality, 'comradeship' (Vogel 1965). As Vogel (1965) negatively asserts, the decline of friendship and the transformation of values and behaviours to comradeship was primarily caused by real fear of political threats.

The second significant change in Chinese social networks was brought about by the Cultural Revolution, which started from 1966. Gold (1985) argues that the serious lack of resources in China during the Cultural Revolution period led to high dependence on the Party cadres. People relied predominantly on informal relationships with cadres to access resources and services. Moreover, the Cultural Revolution paralysed social order based on informal norms and formal laws and education systems, which caused a “re-emergence of certain traditional patterns” where individual, the community and the State were in active relationships (Gold 1985, p. 657). Gold (1985) also analyses the change of Chinese social networks after the post-1978 reform. He presents two important features provoked by the marketization of Chinese society, that is, instrumentalism and commoditization (together with other two features he identifies the political realm of ‘us and them’ and ‘friendship’), which he argues gave rise to several social problems such as social disorder.

Strong social relationships in local communities under the *danwei* system were attributed to the spatial proximity of residential and work places and to its State relationship. Whyte and Parish (1984), for example, regard the co-worker relationship among local community residents as very important for the development of strong neighbourhood attachments. Then Hazelzet and Wissink (2012) also ascribe the decline of social networks in local communities to the decay of the *danwei* system. In their opinions, under the *danwei* system, the close relationships among residents of a local community were not based primarily on spatial proximity, but rather on frequent interaction and cooperation during their work in the same work units. The spatial proximity of residential places however,

taken on its own is not seen as sufficient for the cultivation of social networks within local communities, nor for that of trust (Hazelzet and Wissink 2012).

Social networks in urban local communities of contemporary China

The current situation of social networks in Chinese urban communities has been shaped and is still influenced by features of traditional social relationships and social or political movements. Chinese scholars have conducted several studies on social networks in China (Zhang 2006, Zhang 2006). The research entitled “Tianjin urban residents’ professions, life style and social networks” and that on “the social life network of Tianjin urban residents” were conducted by Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, in cooperation with Columbia University and California University in 1986 and 1993 respectively. The first study analysed the social network structure and relationship structure of Tianjin urban residents, while the second discussed the transition in urban residents’ social network seven years after the first one. These two research programs laid the foundation for Chinese social network study and collected a wealth of basic material about Chinese social networks.

In the earlier Tianjin studies, Zhang *et al.* (Zhang, Ruan et al. 1999) analysed the size, structure, density, convergence and heterogeneity of Tianjin peasants’ social networks and showed that high convergence, low heterogeneity and high density were the three main characteristics of the social network of Tianjin peasants. However, according to these studies, current features of social networks in Chinese communities have changed along with the urbanization process in China. From the data collected in November 1986 (Ruan and Zhou 1990), the different

relationships that the Tianjin urbanites ranked as high (n=1011) were relationships with workmates (37.7%), spouse (15.0%), parents (7.4%), and then friends, siblings and 'old boys' (all around 7.0%). Also, the homogeneity of the social networks of these Tianjin urbanites was relatively high. According to Ruan and Zhou (1990), 54.9% of the interviewed network members of Tianjin urbanites (n=1011) were of a similar age, 40.3% of networks members had the same educational backgrounds, and 39.9% of them worked in the same profession.

A survey conducted in Beijing in the year 2000 also presents changes in the structure of Chinese urbanites' social networks (Zhang 2006). Data collected in the survey (n=1004) indicate a remarkable increase in the importance of friend-relationships and a sharp decline in workmate-relationships. The importance of the friend-relationship here was more than relationships with spouse and parents, and also more than the relationship among workmates.* The friend-relationship occupied 41.9% of the non-kinship relationships (workmate-relationship 27.6%, neighbour-relationship 12.1%, the 'old-boy' relationship 7.1% and other non-kinship relationships). The survey also implied that relationships, which were based on kinship and marriage, were still very important to these Chinese urbanites, even more important than they had been in Tianjin in 1986. According

* The ranked importance of different relationships for these Beijing urbanites in 2000, from high to low was: intimate friends, spouse, workmates, offspring, neighbours, parents, the old boys, siblings, other relatives, friends and others. Zhang, W. (2006). "宏观社会结构变迁背景下城市居民社会网络构成的变化 *Hongguan shehui jiegou bianqian beijing xia chengshi jumin shehui wangluo goucheng de bianhua* Changes of the Constitution of Urban Residents' Social Networks against the Background of Macro Social Structure Transition [In Chinese]." *Tianjin Social Sciences* 2006(02): pp.5.

to this survey, relationships based on kinship and marriage took over 42% of Beijing urbanites' social networks, 3.1% more than those of Tianjin in 1986 (Ruan and Zhou 1990, Zhang 2006).

The above findings were supported by another study conducted in 2004 on the social interaction of urban and rural residents during the transition period in China (Wang 2006). Data from this study were collected from 16 provinces (cities or autonomous regions) and there were 972 participants in all. There was a question framed as, "In your daily life, the people you usually communicate with are...?" 'Friends' was selected by 55% of the respondents, 'workmates' 48.1%, 'old boys' 45.2%, 'relatives' 42.8%, 'countrymen' 21.5%, 'business partners' 8.1% and 'leaders' 4.5%. Kinship-based relationships and friend-relationships (including 'work-mates' and 'old-boys') were by far the most important relationships for these Chinese people.

Although the relationships between families and relatives are seen in these studies to be still among the most important relationships, they are not as important as in traditional society. Lü (2006) researched community social interaction during the 2006 Spring Festival but came to a different conclusion on the basis of his survey that the non-kinship interactions were far greater than those between families and relatives. Moreover, as the Spring Festival is a traditional family festival, it can be inferred that the number of kinship interactions would normally be lower at other times.

Thus it has been strongly suggested that significant changes in major relationships among Chinese people have been brought about by the social transition, which is

apparent from the differences in the structures of Chinese urban social networks in diverse community settings. This has been clearly demonstrated in a 1999 study on the importance of different relationships for occupational support in cities, townships and villages (Dai 1999). Data collected in Dai's research in Guangxi Province are clearly presented in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3 Importance of different relationships for occupational support (Dai 1999)

	In cities (n=488)	In townships (n=483)	In villages (n=501)
Superiors	36.21%	29.1%	N/A
Workmates	34.53%	23.59%	N/A
Inferiors	2.4%	2.4%	N/A
Peers	6.0%	7.34%	N/A
Occupational relationships in total	79.14%	62.43%	8.81%
Relatives	7.43%	11.7%	57.32%
Neighbours	0	3.25%	21.26%

Table 4-3 shows explicitly a significant weakness of neighbourhoods in urbanized regions, especially cities, in relation to participants' seeking occupational support from their neighbourhood communities. This is also supported by the data on intimate networks collected in the same survey. Different from kinship/marriage-based relationships, which were seen as the most intimate ones in all the selected areas, relationships among neighbours occupied 3.67%, 4.6% and 16.95% of intimate social networks in cities, townships and rural villages respectively (Dai 1999).

The differences among structures of social networks in given areas were further

analysed in relation to whether they were related to the size of regions, or to the degree of the community's urbanization (Zhang 2009). Zhang (2009) compared the social networks of residents in Lianhua Township (Tongan District, Xiamen City), Fengcheng Township (Anxi County, Quanzhou City), Siming District and Huli District (Xiamen City), Fuzhou City, and Shanghai City, and found that in highly urbanized areas, residents had smaller social networks and fewer relationships with relatives, neighbours, countrymen and friends.

The changes of social network structures have given rise to new features of social networks, as well as to social problems. Beyond the instrumentalism and commoditization put forwarded by Gold (1985), some Chinese scholars have also defined current urban social interaction as “superficial”, “strange-interaction” and pragmatic (Lü 2006, Wang 2006, Zhang 2006). One of the serious social problems brought about by social change is the weakened social networks in urban local communities, as well as the decreased acceptance of shared social norms, and social control. From the above analysis, it is evident that the decreased strength of social networks in Chinese urban local communities has been caused by the urbanization process and the decline of *danwei* system, which are irreversible. Strengthening social networks in urban local communities now needs to be based on the nature of contemporary community interaction and the needs of residents. Clearly, this decline in social networking has larger implications for the link between the individual, the familial and the social system as a whole.

Community construction and social networks in urban local communities

Improving social networks in urban local communities should be examined in the

context of a grand scale social background. Zhang (2006) analysed research on urban local communities conducted by both western and Chinese scholars and states that, first, urbanization, the urban background and the urban environment have changed the structures and features of urban social relationships; secondly, the nature of community is now characterised by interpersonal relationships, instead of by region, social unity and social integration; and thirdly, the condition of the interpersonal relationships of a community decides its functions and forms. Based on these arguments, he declares that the integration function of urban local communities and urbanites' identification with their residential communities have been weakened as people have turned to relation-based communities (Zhang 2006).

This opinion was consolidated by Qi (2007), who conducted fieldwork in H residential compound, Qiaodong District, Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province. As Qi asserts, although local community and community networks were still important for residents of this former *danwei* compound, the community had gradually been transformed to a 'limited' community, with limited responsibilities and functions due to the social transition experienced throughout China.

This trend of declining neighbourhood networks and local communities makes it particularly difficult to develop social networks in Chinese urban local communities. Building on the above analysis of western and Chinese neighbourhoods and local communities, in order to strengthen the relationships between residents and communities and the relationships among neighbours, the most important thing is to increase the importance of community in people's lives by providing the services residents need as well as appropriate platforms through

which residents can interact with each other and perceive a larger social whole. Through such platforms residents can discuss the community affairs related to them and keep regular interaction to form understanding and trust, as well as develop close relationships. Moreover, just as public spaces such as churches and local clubs are important for neighbourhood networking in western societies, proper public spaces are here assumed to be positive for relationship establishment in Chinese urban communities.

Analysis of data collected through fieldwork in China

a) Importance of major social relationships

Mostly, the results of the field data analysis conducted for this study were in accord with the arguments mentioned above, but with some differences.

In these data, collected in 5 of urban communities in 2011 in Nanjing, the friend-relationship was the most frequently mentioned relationship, but its importance is only slightly lower than the kinship-relationship. In all 384 questionnaires, 82.50% of interviewees indicated the friend-relationship as ‘important’ and ‘very important’, slightly more than the kinship-relationship (80.52%; see Appendix 1). However, only 26.23% of interviewees thought the friend-relationship was ‘very important’, many less than that of kinship-relationship, which was 49.09%. Furthermore, for the question “Who will you ask for help in need”, 92.47% interviewees indicated they would turn to family members and relatives, while 90.62% of them would ask friends for help. Therefore, the friend-relationship is here the most frequently accessed interactive relationship, while the kinship-relationship is the most stable and reliable relationship.

In this context, neighbour-relationship has become more important than workmate-relationship. Different from the findings of Ruan and Zhang (Ruan and Zhou 1990, Zhang 2006), the workmate-relationship is no longer the third most important relationship; here that is neighbour-relationship instead. 75.06% of the interviewees thought neighbours were 'important and 'very important', while 71.69% held those attitudes towards workmate-relationship. Neighbour-relationship was also more important than workmate-relationship in the 'very important' option: 91% interviewees thought neighbours were very important while 84% of them thought workmates were very important.

b) Comparison of social relationship in different communities types

In the blended and commercial communities, (XXH community, LZ Y community and SGL community), the kinship-relationship was the most important relationship, while in the communities which had transferred from *danwei* community and villages, the friend-relationship was the most important one.

In SQ community, which was formerly a *danwei* community, the neighbour-relationship ranks in second place, indicating that it can be considered as to be more important than the kinship-relationship. In this familiar and stable community, the kinship-relationship is the third most important relationship, also below the friend-relationship.

Data collected from LY community, the former village community, coincides with the overall data in that the importance of relationships can be shown in the same way as: friend-relationship > kinship-relationship > neighbour-relationship > workmate-relationship.

c) Comparison of social relationship in similar communities

In the two relatively stable communities, SQ community and LY community, the importance of neighbour-relationship and kin-based relationship is different, as follows:

SQ community: Friends > neighbours > family members and relatives > workmates

LY community: Friends > family members and relatives > neighbours > workmates

Since these two communities were both composed of long-time residents and were already active in community activity organizing, the reason for this difference can be attributed to the living distance of family members and relatives. Most residents in LY community were formerly villagers. As we know, in traditional villages, relatives from expanded family always live together to share their common land. They have more opportunities to contact and interact with each other, and to keep their relationships close and stable. However, in a *danwei* community, such as SQ community, most neighbours who live together are also workmates. Residents come from different areas to live and work together for most of their lives. Therefore, in these contexts the neighbour-relationship is more close and stable than relative-based ones, when the relatives may not even live in the same city.

In the blended commercial communities, XXH, SGL and LZY, there is seen to be a difference attributed to the importance of neighbour-relationship and workmate-relationship:

XXH: Family members and relatives > friends > workmates > neighbours

SGL: Family members and relatives > friends > workmates > neighbours

LZY: Family members and relatives > friends > neighbours > workmates

In the high fluidity of the commercial community, the neighbour-relationship is not as reliable and close as in either the *danwei* or the village community. There are fewer opportunities and limited time for residents to get to know one another and become familiar with the people living next door. However, it is possible to help residents to establish new and relatively stable neighbour-relationships. The CRC of LZY community has had more difficulties than the other two communities to unite residents as they lived in different areas separated by quite a distance. The CRC members attached great importance to establishing community identity by publicizing community development, policies and activities using posters and films, and providing a platform for residents to get to know each other by organizing community activities (once or twice a month). These measures were judged to be effective, as the neighbours have subsequently become an important part of daily life.

Government implementation of community construction

The second part of the data analysis focuses on documents from governments and CRCs. By analysing these documents the focus of the implementation of community construction can be clearly distinguished.

As discussed in previous chapters, it is known that the major aims of Chinese

urban community construction is lightening governments' welfare burdens and alleviating social tension. Therefore, policies of community construction are mainly focused on the provision of community services and organizations for the disadvantaged in local communities. Although Chinese governments (both central and local) have realized the importance of community participation and autonomy, the actual practice of community construction is still following the old routine. The implementation of community participation and autonomy is, to some extent, ritual rather than practical.

In order to explicitly demonstrate the shortcomings of the implementation of community construction, LZY community, Qinhuai District will be taken as an example. In 2011, there were 20 community-based NGOs in LZY community:

- 1) Women's federation of LZY community
- 2) Labour union of LZY community
- 3) Community of LZY
- 4) Family planning association of LZY community
- 5) Benevolence supermarket of LZY community
- 6) Volunteer team for troubled teenagers
- 7) Committee of caring for the next generation
- 8) Service team for military families
- 9) Association of the disabled of LZY community
- 10) Association of senior citizens
- 11) Table-tennis team for senior citizens
- 12) Environment protection team
- 13) Female volunteer team

- 14) Propaganda team for the popularization of science
- 15) Propaganda team of laws
- 16) Association of calligraphy
- 17) Association of photography
- 18) Chorus of LYZ community
- 19) “Fire Team”—another chorus
- 20) Waist drum team

Among these 20 community organizations, the first five are branches of upper-level government departments or semi-governmental organizations. Organizations 6 to 11 are established for the disadvantaged. Organizations 12 to 15 are about voluntary activities, while the last five, from 16 to 20, are recreational organizations. More than half, if not all, of them are advocated and supported by local government and the CRCs. Therefore, the purposes of these organizations are helping local government to implement its policies and fulfil specified tasks and keeping a surveillance role within the community, alerting the government of possible issues which might provoke public discontent.

Looking after the disadvantaged, which is also lightening the government burden, is another important part of community construction which is shown here not only in the list of community organizations, and also by work reports of the CRC of LZY community. In this community’s work report of 2010, there were four tasks listed under the heading “Serving People”. These were: helping households receiving subsistence allowances, helping students in poor families with their schooling, helping the disabled, and helping the unemployed. It is easy to see how these tasks were being fulfilled by community organizations.

The implementation of community construction in the other six interviewed communities was very similar to that in LZY community, according to the descriptions of their community leaders. Consequently it may be argued that the slant of the practice of community construction has little influence on ordinary residents in communities, which means that a majority of community residents are not directly involved in these activities.

Trust in Chinese urban communities

As previously mentioned, a key element of social capital that is vital for the success of community construction is believed to be trust. In recent decades, the concept of trust has attracted vast attention in sociological arenas. Scholars are interested in what trust is and where trust comes from (Barber 1983, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Zucker 1986, Gambetta 1988, Wrightsman 1992). Since the 1990s, research on trust from the perspective of cultural studies has been given particular importance in the development of social theory (Alston 1989, Karp, Jin et al. 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Yamagishi, Cook et al. 1998).

The significance of trust is widely analysed by scholars in various academic spheres (Fukuyama 1995, Warren 1999, Misztal 2001, Newton 2001), and it has been claimed that “Trust is the glue that holds communities together” (Bruhn 2011, p. 22). Trust has positive impacts on friendships, community and associations, and social networks (Misztal 2001). Notably, the research of Seligman shows that, in modern society, trust is generated from social relationships and it can play a significant role in enhancing social integration and stability (Seligman 1997, Seligman 1998).

Trust, according to scholars, is shaped by both social factors and ethnographic factors (Barber 1983, Zucker 1986, Karp, Jin et al. 1993, Singer 1995, Seligman 1997, Hayashi, Ostrom et al. 1999). Some scholars have held that trust is an outcome of social structure, while clearly the two are influenced by each other (Luhmann 1979, Zucker 1986). Trust is also regarded as determined by cultural settings in different societies, as it is generated from different types of relationship such as kinship and associational relations (Alston 1989, Fukuyama 1995, Yamagishi, Cook et al. 1998). Sources of trust in personal relationships were further analysed in the 1980s and 1990s (Lewis and Weigert 1985, McAllister 1995), and there are also studies which highlight the impacts of personal characteristics on trust (Gambetta 1988, Good 1988, Wrightsman 1991, Wrightsman 1992).

Trust in Chinese society has attracted a great deal of attention from both western and Chinese scholars, especially focussing on features such as the generating mechanism, changes in criteria, and the current conditions of trust in China (Li 2004, Lu 2006, Yao and Zhang 2006, Ye 2006, Xu 2007, Zhang 2009, Zhu 2011).

A widely acknowledged argument is that trust in Chinese society is generated from close human relationships. Max Weber (1951) writing from a Eurocentric perspective distinguishes two types of trust: particularistic trust based on personal relationships and the norms of a kinship-based community; and universalistic trust, which is based on the shared beliefs of a religious community. He defines trust in Chinese society as particularistic (Confucius based) trust, in that here people are inclined to trust the people they have personal relationships with and that is why the “Protestant ethic” never took hold in China and therein blocking the

emergence of capitalist modernisation in China. Again there is notion that China is inferior from a culturalist reason, where Chinese trust is pre-modern. A similar conclusion is drawn by Whitley who studied trust in Chinese businesses as compared to the US ideal-type and found it wanting, where trust in the US business was general in China it was particular of narrow according to Zucker's theory of trust (Zucker 1986, Whitley 1991). Likewise, Whitley argues that trust in Chinese society was developed by "reputational and ascriptive means" (personal relationships) rather than by institutions as in other contexts (1991, p. 14). Due to the different features of trust in Chinese society, Fukuyama also regarded Chinese society as displaying low-level trust as compared to the ideal Western model.

There are supposedly similar features of trust in Chinese society which have been highlighted by western scholars. Fei (1949/2009) sees traditional Chinese society as a 'familiar' society, in which people trust people primarily because of familiarity. This argument is supported by Yang's (1999) empirical study on the development of trust among strangers in China. He found that trust was developed during the process of 'strangers' (*wairen*, 外人) becoming 'one of us' (*zijiren*, 自己人), so the trust in Yang's research is also one based on relationships.

In another empirical study on the generating mechanism of trust in China, Peng (1999) found that relationship development is an important trust generating mechanism through which Chinese people can increase their trust toward 'strangers'. According to Peng, there are two strategies to develop relationships and trust: emotional and instrumental. From this research, Peng argues that the

interpersonal trust in Chinese society is not simply determined by ascriptive factors only, but also depends on the actual closeness of relationships among people (1999).

From the above discussion, it is apparent that trust in Chinese society is defined through the prism of Western models that assume that it is both different but must adopt the Western universal model to become a truly trusting society. However, research on trust in China from a problem approach rather than a stage-theory regards the trustworthiness of specific relationships as changing according to the conditions created during the process of social transition. For example, according to Zhang (2009), apart from relatives, Chinese urbanites tend to trust their workmates and friends, whilst rural residents trust their neighbours. The change of trust has coincided with the structure of the social networks of Chinese people. Many former close relationships are not as trustworthy as before due to the loosening of relevant norms and the high mobility of people (Zhu 2011), which has been well demonstrated by cases of '*shashu*' (the cheating of acquaintances for benefits) (Wu 2010).

It has been found that several factors such as personality, capability and communication, which have been effective in western trust development, are similar and not different in the process of trust generation in China (Zhu 2011). Nevertheless, the closeness of relationships is still the most important factor of interpersonal trust in China. Applying this conclusion to community construction in China, it is clear that improving regular interaction and cooperation among neighbours is crucial for the generation and growth of trust in Chinese urban local

communities.

In order to investigate the levels of trust in the urban communities which were the objects of this study, residents were asked three questions about trust and their answers are listed below in Table 4-4:

Table 4-4 Questions and answers about trust

		SQ	SGL	LY	LZY	XXH
Most community residents are trustworthy	Agree	83	43	63	63	87
	Disagree	1	2	0	0	0
	Not sure or no answer	16	5	3	8	12
People living in this community should be very alert otherwise they will be cheated	Agree	27	19	17	22	21
	Disagree	30	5	21	19	29
	Not sure or no answer	43	26	28	40	49
The level of trust has increased in recent years	Agree	60	38	53	41	0
	Disagree	7	1	1	1	79
	Not sure or no answer	33	11	12	29	20

To demonstrate the differences clearly, the data are shown in the following bar charts.

Figure 4-1 Do you agree that most residents in your community are trustworthy?




Figure 4-2 People living in this community must be very alert otherwise they will be cheated





Figure 4-3: The level of trust has increased in recent years



It is surprising to find such a relatively low level of trust in the SQ community while neighbouring relationships rank in second place of important relationships for SQ residents, as the analysis of relationships made in the previous section shows. A possible explanation for this phenomenon comes from the answers to the third question. As the Figure 4-3 shows, 7% of SQ residents, which is the highest proportion among the five communities, think the level of trust has declined. SQ community is a former *danwei* community so residents of SQ may have the most immediate and obvious impression of social transition, which makes them the most pessimistic and sceptical of the people who have lately moved in. The positive aspect of SQ is that 30% of the residents (ranking below only LY community) disagree with the statement that in this community people will be cheated if they are not alert enough, which actually refers to a relatively high trust level in the community members.

The condition of LY community, which is the former village community, is more optimistic. From Figure 4-1, while most residents in all the selected communities regard their fellow residents as trustworthy, residents in LY community hold the most positive attitudes toward the trustworthiness of their neighbours. This is reasonable because residents of LY community have more friends and relatives living in their neighbourhood. Then 31.82% of LY residents disagree with the statement “people living in this community must be very alert otherwise they will be cheated” (Figure 4-2), which is a highest proportion than all the other four communities. Besides, more than 80% of LY residents are happy with the current condition of trust as they think that trust has been increased in recent years.

SGL community, one which combines a former *danwei* residential area with commercial residential compounds and private houses, is characterized by the highest level of distrust among these residents. There are no adequate documents to explain this low level of trust and the differences between the two blended and commercial communities, LZY community and XXH community.

Conclusion

Chinese urban community construction has had some impacts on the development of community networks and trust through service provision and community activities. However, the impacts are limited for two reasons. The one is the negative influences of the social system and the general scale of the social settings on regional communities. The other is the purposes of the community construction project and the processes of its implementation.

Chinese scholars and governments (both central and local) usually have great

expectations of urban local communities. They regard the lagging behind of community development, the weakness of community functions and low-level community awareness as temporary problems which can be overcome through community construction. Some scholars have recently realized that contemporary urban local communities have been limited by the impacts of their larger scale social settings (Sun 2002, Gu 2005, Qi 2007). Sun (2002) has indicated that not all functions of grassroots society can be undertaken by local communities, and some functions must remain the responsibilities of governments and the market. Qi (2007) further argues from his fieldwork that the decline of urban local communities and community networks was inevitable. Therefore, during the process of community construction in urban China, the trend of decreasing community attachments must be taken into consideration.

In terms of the community construction project, several suppressive factors can be analysed through purposes of the project and the emphases evident in its implementation. The major aims of community construction are to lighten the governments' burden of social welfare and keep society stable. Policies of this project place most of their importance on community service provision. Moreover, during the implementation, CRCs pay much more attention to organizing and providing service for the disadvantaged such as the aged, the disabled and the unemployed. As a result, the majority of community residents are unlikely to be connected through these activities.

It is known from this chapter that regular interactions based on minor mutual help and shared problems are now needed to increase community networks. Community activities designed for certain groups of residents have limited effects,

while community organizations established according to government instruction have even less significance.

The impacts of community construction on trust, which is to a large extent shaped and influenced by social relationships, have previously been assumed to coincide with those of social networks. This assumption is not fully supported by the data analysis carried out in this study. There is no simple linear relation among community types, residents' mobility and community activities. Nonetheless, a strong positive relation between residents' familiarity and trust is supported by the data from a former village community and a former *danwei* community.

Overall, however, the outcome of Chinese urban community construction in relation to social networks and trust is far from satisfactory. Governmental factors are pervasive during this process, and they are not yet achieving positive results. To activate community interactions so as to develop the positive social capital inherent in social networks and trust, the majority of residents need to be mobilized based on their actual needs in daily life but this may challenge the Party-state.

5 Community Constructions and Community Participation

In last Chapter the changes to community social networks and trust brought on by social transformation were analysed beginning with the Western focus on individualist rather than social system analysis. This western approach when applied to China tended to assume that China was lacking as it was not the same as the West model of social capital and trust. The chapter then showed through fieldwork that there was a decline social capital and trust but that there was the potential for growing trust as Chinese society was being transformed. The chapter noted that one important reason, for needing to deeply understand these important indices and core elements of social capital, is that they have considerable influence on residents' community participation.

This chapter moves now to a consideration of the collective level of social capital evident in this kind of community action. Community participation has always been regarded as the basic embodiment of the Western democratic spirit (Putnam 1993), and another concrete representative form of social capital. It is usually taken to shoulder the idealistic task of implementing community autonomy and promoting the development of democratic politics. High-level community participation is thus often related to better democracy and more effective governance (Putnam 1993). Chinese scholars also associate active community participation with residents' awareness of responsibility and with a certain form of democratic governance in urban communities (Shen and Chen 2010).

Policies of Chinese community construction in China advocate and promote residents' community participation, which has produced some achievements, including enhancing residents' and community workers' awareness of community

participation and organizing some community groups. Nevertheless, there are several factors hindering the development of members' participation in community construction. First, as a result of the decline in community life and weakening of community social networks and trust, community participation can hardly be developed through intimate relations and interactivities among community residents. Second, Chinese community involvement currently depends mostly on economic interests and government advocacy. It has been said that "community awareness and support" might be the crucial factors in collective political participation, instead of individual commitment (Xu, Perkins *et al.* 2010, p. 270). However, to a large extent, urban community participation in China is a top-down activity initiated to meet the needs of governance, which means the implementation of community participation policies is subject to the attitudes of central and local governments of China. Participation that may be in conflict with governmental interests is not encouraged or is even prohibited. This is supported by the argument of Huang and Gui (2011) that vertical social capital hinders the development of "protest activity participation". Third, the practice in the revolutionary period, community participation in China had great colour through processes that the government advocated and in which the masses participated (Wang 1999, Guo and Zuo 2011). The Cultural Revolution is now negatively depicted as an excess of democratic participation or paradoxically as orchestrated by the Mao-led faction within the Party-state.

Today, impediments continue to exist. Most participation activities are designed for the disadvantaged residents, such as the unemployed, the disabled, and the aged. Therefore, they are less attractive to the majority of community residents.

Moreover, there are further historical, technical and emotional disadvantages, which bring significant limitations and shortcomings to effective participation. In this chapter, influential factors hindering the development of Chinese urban community participation will be analysed on the basis of current conditions.

Significance of community participation

In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville proposed that participation was a key element of American social and political life (1902). In the view of Tocqueville, it is pointed out that citizens exercising their political rights and participating in social governance is an important characteristic of a democratic society. Although he clearly had in mind white men as he excluded native Indians and African American slaves in his concept of citizens ready for participatory democracy. Since the 1960s, citizens' participation for all-peoples has been fought and won as a right in Western societies and has attracted wide attention and controversy as an important issue during the transitions in American society and politics. The background for the current debate is that democratic participation decreased in the 1980s from the social movements of the previous civil rights phase (Putnam 1995). Scholars have analysed this phenomenon from different perspectives, and while all agree with the assessment that participation decreased, they differ in their views of its causes (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999, Putnam 2000).

In 1993, Robert Putnam published his famous work *Making Democracy Work* to study public participation from the perspective of social capital . His research in Italy shows that different performances of voluntary social organizations lead to different efficiency in regional governments. In the areas where citizens follow

reciprocal norms and establish active social networks, positive trust and cooperation is related to good government performance (Putnam 1993).

Several years later, Putnam published another book, *Bowling Alone*, in which he points out that, although the United States has had a strong tradition of citizen participation, this participation had declined since the 1960s in America. By 1993, the participation of American people in social organizations such as bowling clubs, churches, labour unions and other voluntary organizations had decreased significantly (Putnam 2000). Putnam deduced that this decline was due to familial factors such as television watching but tended to neglect factors such as changing work pattern, with the intensification of the working day effecting leisure time.

Social capital theory regards the attention to public affairs and mutual social networks as premise conditions and fundamental characteristics of public participation. Because it is believed that active public participation promotes democracy and effective government performance, the revival of flourishing local voluntary organizations is regarded as a solution of the civil society decline in America (Putnam 2000).

Social capital theory within debates in China, especially the positive effects of public participation on democracy, tends to emphasize the pressing necessity for community participation (Jiang 2008, Li 2008, Yuan 2009). However, due to the a lack of institutional, organizational and cultural environments appropriate for public participation, social capital theory is unable to fully explain the current conditions of community participation in China (Yang 2005). Due to the leading role of government in Chinese community construction, especially in respect to

institution and authority distribution, participation is shaped within the framework of the state-society and this will be taken into consideration in following analysis.

Current situation of community participation in China

In the early stages, community construction in China focused only on objective conditions and community services. However, as the community construction project continues, community autonomy has become a central issue as it is now frequently mentioned by government officials and scholars. The role of community participation is seen as integral to autonomy, and, participation although has made developments, its defects and shortcomings have become obvious and these are demonstrated in following sections.

Participation models

Primarily, this study shows that in China residents participate in community activities in different ways. Scholars have classified community participation into several types: notably entertainment activity, community service, environment activity, community security and community autonomy among others (Shang 2011) ; or, alternatively, economic participation, cultural participation and political participation (Wang and Wang 1998). Yang has summed up residents' participation into four models according to two principles, whether or not related to public issues, and whether or not participating in the decision-making process (Yang 2007). Yang's four principles are coerced participation, induced

participation, spontaneous participation and planned participation.*

Table 5-1 Types of community participation (Yang 2007)

		Participating in the decision making process	
		No	Yes
Related to public issues	No	coerced participation(welfare-oriented participation)	spontaneous participation (Recreational participation)
	Yes	Induced participation (commitment-oriented participation)	Planned participation (rights-and interests-oriented participation)

Coerced participation is not the participation that is related to public issues nor do residents engage in the decision-making process. Advocators, usually government departments and CRC workers, lead and control the running of activities, while residents respond passively. According to Yang's survey in Lianhu Community, welfare-oriented participation is a typical kind of coerced participation (2007): residents who receive low-income benefits are usually asked to take part in voluntary community service such as community cleaning, security patrols and so on. However, the participation of those residents is not on the basis of care about the public issue but in exchange for their low-income benefits. The time and place of those activities are all decided by CRCs, as the participants only follow their instructions.

* Yang previously divided community participation as: dependent participation, physical participation and right-stands-oriented participation Yang, M. (2005). "公民参与、群众参与与社区参与 *Gongmin canyu, qunzhong canyu yu shequ canyu* Civil Participation, Mass Participation and Community Participation [In Chinese]." *Soceity* 5.

Induced participation is related to the related public issue, but the participants are not involved in the decision-making process. Both advocates and participants regard the activities as public affairs, but the subjects of the activities are still decided by advocates. A typical activity in this model is the voluntary participation of retired residents and building representatives (a form of commitment-oriented participation). Those actors take part positively in various activities such as community environment and security maintenance. Although the residents are closely related to CRCs, they have no rights to question the CRCs' decisions on any of their own community issues.

By contrast, spontaneous participation is self-mobilized. In the process of participation participants enjoy great autonomy and impose influence on the implementation and the decision-making. This type of participation is based on small-group interest instead of public issues, and typical activities of this model are recreational participation, which is mainly engaged in by retired residents.

Planned participation represents the activities related directly to public issues, in which the participants take part in the decision-making. It is the most organized and autonomous participation of the four models. To some extent, participants can impose their influence in relation to the objects and the process of those activities, and they share in the responsibilities and achievements. The typical activities of this type are seen in rights-and interests-oriented participation. In these, residents unite together to protect their interest in housing quality and property rights, or to protect the public environment around a residential area. The participants themselves organize those activities in a planned way. However, rights- and interests-oriented participation is not incorporated into the assessment of

community construction, as those activities are often regarded as interference in the basic-level government work of community control.

The above summary of Yang's (2007) four community participation models shows how different needs — that is, obtaining low-income benefits, seeking a sense of belonging, health and happiness, and protecting housing interests — drive residents of various ages, educational levels, and professions to take part in different community activities. Local government is itself seen as an actor with specific interests; it is a managing department, seeking the balance between interest-obtaining and political stability, and this could be a significant reason why public participation in community affairs remains at such a low level in China.

Insufficiencies of community participation in urban community

The insufficient community participation in Chinese urban planning and implementation can be seen in various kinds of performance: residents' motivation for community participation is weak; the member structure of community participation is unbalanced; residents' community interaction is at a very low level; most activities of community participation are apolitical (Chen and Yang 2004, Yu and Li 2006, Chen 2009, Xu 2009, Zang 2010, Shang 2011). In 2009 Shen and Chen (2010) found that in the urban communities of Beijing, public interest activities and volunteering activities ranked in first and second place in community participation. Community management activities were only in third place while the recreational activities were at last. Furthermore, according to this research of Shen and Chen (2010), most residents who were interested in and actually engaged in community participation activities were female, middle-aged

or senior residents, residents with low educational backgrounds and the retired.

a) Lack of action in residents' community participation

Interestingly, studies by Chinese researchers show that the willingness of community residents to participate in community activities is quite high. In a survey conducted in the Yuyuan community in Jinan city (Shang 2011), 42% of interviewed residents said they were "very much" willing to take part in community organized activities, 44% of the residents asked were happy to do that, 12% of the asked residents were "not sure" about the question, and only 2% of the interviewed residents said "no" to being willing to join community activities. However, in reality the actual action of residents' community participation is low. Significantly, according to Chen and Yang's research on community participation in Chengdu, a great number of residents even thought that community construction was a government project (2004). A further example is that, in Nanjing city (224 valid questionnaires were collected in this research), 92% of surveyed residents had owners' committees in their communities, but only 8.5% of them took part in the committees regularly (Zang 2010).

b) Population distribution of community participants in imbalance

Most participation members in community activities are retired residents, children and the disadvantaged. Therefore, most activities are organized for those residents (Shang 2011). Of those residents who engage often in these community activities, the female residents number more than the males, the aged more than the young, the unemployed and the retired are more than the employed. Yu and Li (2006) conducted a survey in Wuhan city and from the 750 interviewees who often took

part in community activities, 61% were female and 39% male; 62% were aged and 38% were younger residents; 30% were unemployed and 26% were retired. This ethnographic distribution of participants can be attributed to two major reasons. On the one hand, a majority of the contents and service of Chinese urban community construction is targeted to the disadvantaged residents, such as providing day-care for the aged and arranging jobs for the unemployed (although the jobs may be temporary and with low payment). Female residents, who are the ones that usually look after their families in China, have much more to do with local communities than their male counterparts. On the other hand, female residents, the aged and the unemployed are generally less active in social life so they have more social relations within their own local communities than with broader public issues.

c) Residents passive engagement in community activities

Most residents' engagement in community activities is a result of induced participation and coerced participation, which means that residents only follow the instructions of community workers to take part in those activities decided by community governmental departments such as a sub-district office or CRCs (Xu 2009). A typical example is in CRC member elections when sub-district offices instead of community residents decide all the process and the candidates. Shang's (2011) research shows that 98% of the interviewed residents were not engaging in community activities or were engaging only as followers, only 2% of interviewees were organizers or taking part in the decision-making process. Residents and organizations in the community were taking little responsibility for community construction and regarded community construction as a government project (Chen

2009).

d) Community participation as mainly non-political activity

Community participation covers a great range of community activities: community political construction, community cultural development, community development planning, community service, community security, and community environment protection, among others. These activities can be fundamentally divided into political and non-political activities. In Chinese urban communities, most community activities are non-political, and involve events such as entertaining, community service, and environment protection. Generally, residents pay little attention to political issues in the community (Chen and Yang 2004, Shang 2011). Two reasons can be summarized to explain this problem:

On the one hand, because community construction is advocated and dominated by government, residents choose to avoid the confrontation that might result from their engaging in political aspects of community initiatives. Since the primary purpose of this project is taking community into established government-controlled systems and keeping the community stable while lightening the burden of government, activities focused on community service, charity and community entertainment are encouraged with emphasis (Nanjing Municipal Party Committee and Nanjing Municipal People's Government 2007), but residents are very wary of entering political forums.

On the other hand, residents' expectations of community participation can hardly ever be fulfilled (Xiang 2006). Because residents have little rights within the activities that they themselves are eager to organize and participate in, they have

no chance to develop skills such as in decision-making and management of important community issues, or in the supervision of community authorities. The difference between expectations and outcomes reduces the residents' motivation for participation and prevents them developing the desire to engage in public affairs at a political level.

The dominant role of government in community construction

It is clearly evident, then, that the leading role of the Party-state in community construction remains pervasive. It comes from the foremost purposes, sponsors and main actors of this project, and, as outlined, it is motivated by goals which are specifically constructed to achieve social control. First, the foremost and final purpose of community construction is keeping grassroots-level social units stable (Liu and Liu 2008, Cong and Zhou 2009). By mobilizing residents' engagement in community issues, the administration resources of the governmental system and local private social networks are combined. Community residents are supposed to be an integral part of state power through this process.

Secondly, community construction in China is a top-down project (Cong and Zhou 2009). Government makes policies and allocates resources to promote community development towards its own ends, instead of residents' acting spontaneously based on their assessment of their needs. The driving force comes from government. Therefore, although community is theoretically defined as a unit of grassroots-level autonomy, in practice it still is a part of governmental system.

Thirdly, at the community level, community construction is executed by sub-

district offices and CRCs. From this study's survey in Nanjing city, it was revealed that CRC members, which are overlapped with community workers, are appointed and paid by local government, such as by the sub-district office and related government departments (family planning mission, labour bureau and so on). Local government controls CRCs from its financial resources, personnel matters and the organizing of activities. Therefore, the predominant work of CRCs is to fulfil the demands of local government, rather than taking part in decision-making on public issues as representative of community residents. In other words, residents can hardly influence the local affairs.

The insufficient development of community NGOs

Outside CRCs, NGOs, such as entertaining groups, service organizations, intermediary organizations and volunteer organizations, are also important actors in community. Positively, they are organized on the basis of residents' needs. Furthermore, through the activities of NGOs, residents become familiar with each other and develop community identity, which results in a strengthening of community networks. At present, however, NGOs in Chinese urban community are far from ideal and are largely unable to perform as expected and usually intertwined with the CCP.

First, government policy defines the tasks of community NGOs as maintaining social stability and providing social services in the absence of government (Bi 2003). A 2007 document issued by the Nanjing Municipal Government puts forward an NGO development principle that requires "placing priority on service-oriented NGOs, supporting charitable NGOs, and regulating entertainment-

oriented NGOs” (Nanjing Municipal Party Committee and Nanjing Municipal People's Government 2007). According to Xu’s research (2009), up to April 2009 in Shenzhen city, there were 87 community NGOs registered and operating in 235 communities, 29 of them were associations for the elderly, there were 25 cultural and sporting organizations, 12 community charities, 9 family planning associations, 2 organizations of home-based care for the aged, 9 rights-maintaining organizations and 1 “other”. From figures like this we can see that community residents have few rights and benefits by engaging in community NGOs, which leads to their low motivation for community participation.

Secondly, a large proportion of community NGOs is not organized primarily for resident’s needs but rather to meet government quotas. The number of community NGOs has become a demand from sub-district offices imposed on CRCs. According to the data collected for this study, the CRC Heads interviewed in Nanjing said they were asked to organize 2-3 community NGOs every year. The CRC Head of Dongshuiguan community said they established the community NGOs by “scraping together” and the outcomes showed evidence of “performance” with little real significance. Further, according to Zang’s study, 56% of interviewed residents claimed to just “know something” about community NGOs, and 57% of interviewees had little relation with community NGOs (2010).

Thirdly, a marked shortage of funds and resources hinders the development of community NGOs. It is hard for community NGOs to obtain financial support other than by government appropriation. They can obtain limited amount of subsidy if they organize activities according to requirements. The shortage of funds makes it so that they can only afford activities that require time and labour

instead of money. Most community NGOs in the communities surveyed in Nanjing organize regular activities in public spaces such as the community square or in a place provided by CRCs, but they have no specific activity space of their own.

Factors that have impact on community participation

From the analysis above on Chinese community participation, several factors can be extracted to explain the currently insufficient community participation: the lack of action is due to the imbalance of the proposed activity models and the low outcome of participation; the imbalance of population distribution is due to the imbalance of activity models too, as well as difference between the costs and the outcomes residents are able to obtain from community and outside-community society; the passiveness of participation and the shortage of political participation are caused by the dominant role of government and community management systems. A further influential factor only mentioned briefly above is the weakness of community networks, which leads to a lack of community commitment and shared common interests. These factors will be categorized here into four groups: institutional factors, technical factors, emotional factors and interest factors.*

* There are other factors which impact community participation such as the traditional consciousness of family and the sense of belonging to *danwei* instead of community. They can be defined as cultural factors. Since these factors are historical at the society level, there are no practical measures available for changing them so they will not be discussed in this thesis. Dai, F. (2008). "家文化视角下的公共参与 *Jiawenhua shijiao xia de gonggong canyu* Public Participation from the Perspective of Family-Culture [In Chinese]." *Guangxi Social Sciences*(4): 4. Chen, S. (2009). "城市居民社区参与的现状与思考 *Chengshi jumin shequ canyu de xianzhuang yu sikao* Current

Institutional factors

In this context, the community management system imposes significant influence on community participation and the development of community NGOs. This factor can be analysed from the leading subject/s of community construction at the community level. Those highly governmental-oriented characteristics of community construction are related to institutional factors coming from the contradiction between the procedures involved in administrative management and the expected autonomy of community organizations. This contradiction is concentrated in the awkward situation of CRCs.

CRCs are the generally accepted administrative organization of the community management system in practice. Community, as the grassroots-level social organization and management unit, has more than ten parties in community activity: community resident assembly, community party branch, community workstation, owners' assembly, owners' committee, community construction association, community affairs consultation panel, community organizations and community service companies. The characteristics of other organizations, such as overlapping personnel structures, non-permanence, insufficient performance, or lack of resources make them unable to shoulder the task of community administration by themselves. Thus, compared with other community organizations, CRCs, as urban grassroots-level autonomous organizations, have

considerable advantages in community administration: they were the earliest established and officially admitted organizations in the Chinese community; they are legitimate and authoritative; they are the most fully protected community organizations by law; they are the most acknowledged and accepted by residents; they have access to more resources than other community organizations and they are more closely related to local government.

For example, the owners committee, which is a purely residents' autonomous organization, has little impact on community administration. One survey conducted in Beijing shows that by the end of 2008, there were 707 owners' committees in Beijing, of which 669 were established in residential compounds, but only occupying 20% of those managed by property management companies (Wu and Sun 2011, p. 73). Furthermore, the most important work of the owners' committee is choosing a property Management Company for the compound to which it belongs and supervising its work. Residents invest time and interest in owners' committees for the sole purpose of looking after their assets.

Another important community organization, the community service centre, is established by local government to deal with community administrative works in some communities. Although to some extent this is "governmental", it is not as important as CRC in the process of community construction. This conclusion can be deduced from two perspectives. Firstly, the position of the community service centre as defined by government documentation. The community service centre is a complementary governmental branch to help CRCs to handle the daily management work. It is defined as a professional service organization under the control of a CRC, as stated by government documentation:

In order to better administer community affairs and provide service to community residents, CRCs with a large population in their communities and heavy administrative work can set up professional service organizations such as a community service station (or community workstation, or social workstation) if needed. ... Community professional service organizations are led and supervised by community party branches and CRCs.... In the communities where CRCs are competent for the community administrative work, it is not necessary to set up professional service organizations (General Office of the CPC Central Committee and Council 2010).

From this document, community service centres are established as assistants of CRCs and in practice, community service centres usually occupy the same place as CRCs. They are managed by CRCs and cannot be the leader of a community.

Secondly, the personnel overlap of community service centres with CRCs. A great number of community service centre workers are members of CRCs, especially the Directors. In Zang's (2010) survey of Beijing urban communities in 2008, 56.2% of community service centre Directors' positions were held by CRC heads or associate heads as concurrent posts. According to this study's survey in Nanjing, all the 9 interviewed CRC leaders regarded community service centres as subsidiary to CRCs or pointed out "they are the same thing." On this issue, there are different voices raised about the overlapping of functions and personnel affairs between community service centres and CRCs: the one view is that community service centres should be separated from CRCs as independent organizations without possible conflicts of interest; the other that is the two should keep

together as one administrative organization in order to capitalise on economies of scale and achieve administrative efficiency.

Since CRCs are the leading subjects of Chinese urban communities and the most important executants of community construction, the position and work of CRCs can be seen as an indicator of success in the community construction project. For both government officials and scholars, CRCs are grassroots-level autonomous organizations. They are expected to lead and promote the development of community autonomy. However, as a matter of fact, CRCs have more of the colour of governmental branches rather than of organizations representing community residents, which is an inevitable result of the political manner by which the personnel are appointed and the daily work of CRCs.

First, members of CRCs are employed and paid by sub-district offices and local government organizations. The identities of the leaders of grassroots-level social organizations and the way they are appointed is a major indicator of the nature of the grassroots-level social management system (and by implications the role of the CCP), especially in relation to whether it is administratively controlled or autonomous (Wu and Sun 2011). Members of the CRCs interviewed in Nanjing comprise three groups: social workers (including CRC Directors, Assistant Directors and secretaries and so on), labour security wardens, and floating-population administrators (*liudong renkou guanliyuan*, 流动人口管理员). Social workers are paid by sub-district offices, while labour security wardens are paid by the local labour bureau. The management of floating population administrators is more complicated as they are responsible for local police substations, CRCs, and sub-district offices at the same time. They are responsible for government

organizations instead of community residents, which again represent the prominent role of the Party-state in long-term residents' and floating population regulation and surveillance.

Secondly, most of the work of CRCs is assigned by government organizations. According to the 2011 survey in Beijing (Wu and Sun 2011), CRCs' work includes undertaking more than 160 tasks, keeping log books for more than 150 issues, being supervised by more than 20 government organizations, issuing more than 20 kinds of documents for residents, among other tasks. Of that work, more than 60% is assigned by government organizations. The interviews conducted in this study in Nanjing reveal a similar situation for the daily work of CRCs. In this context it is very hard for community social workers to set aside time and resources for the development of community autonomy.*

Thirdly, CRCs are financially supported by local government (Wang 2003, Xiang 2006, Wang 2009). The daily expenses of CRCs are paid by the sub-district office. Furthermore, when community NGOs need money to organize activities, CRCs have to apply for funds from the sub-district office. Therefore, those organizations

* A document issued by the Nanjing Municipal Government in 2012 tried to lighten the burden of CRCs: it is decreed that tasks which government departments and related organizations intend to assign to CRCs should be strictly examined; 60 log books which were being recorded by CRCs are abolished; assessments other than "harmonious community" and "safe community" held by central government, provincial government and party committees are abrogated, etc. General Office of Nanjing Municipal Government (2012). 南京市政府办公厅关于进一步强化社区工作准入的通知 *Nanjing Shizhengfu Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Qianghua Shequ Gongzuo Zhunru de Tongzhi* General Office of Nanjing Municipal Government Notification of Strengthening the Control of Community Tasks [In Chinese]. G. O. o. N. M. Government.

and activities encouraged by government have more possibility of being sponsored, which makes community activities dependent on government.

In the Nanjing fieldwork interviews, some community workers held the position that separating CRCs from community workstations could solve this problem. However, most community workers disagreed with this idea for two reasons: the first is that, CRCs and community service centres are the same thing and cannot be separated; second, CRCs and community service centres were separated, contradictions would arise between them. The fundamental reason for the problem is that most of the resources of the CRCs come from government organizations. If CRCs stop dealing with the administrative work of the community, the resources they have access to will reduce significantly. Furthermore, even though CRCs are separated from community workstations, they are responsible and dependent on local governmental organizations if they are appointed and paid by and apply for funds from local government. CRCs can be a real representative of community residents only when they are well informed about community resources and are able to solve community public issues with community resources.

Technical factors

In addition to these institutional impediments, there is a range of technical factors that interfere with the development of community participation in CRCs' daily work. These are predominantly the qualifications of CRC members, the competency of CRCs to mobilise residents, and the working focus of CRCs.

In many respects, the qualifications of CRCs to cultivate community participation have become an obstacle to fulfilling a CRCs' functions (Wu and Sun 2011). First,

the average age of community workers is not representative because it is relatively high. According to Wu and Sun's (2011) survey in Beijing, the average age of Beijing community workers was 45, and only 7.6% were aged less than 30 (see Figure 5-1).

Secondly, the general educational background of community workers is low. In the Beijing study, in 2008 20237 community workers, which comprised 62.4% of all Beijing community workers, were only educated to high school level or below; 27.8% (n=9058) received education to junior college level, and 9.7% (n=3157) to university level. Only 0.1% (n=44) had a Master's degree or above.




Figure 5-1 Age levels of community workers in Beijing 2008*

* Data in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 are cited from Wu and Sun Wu, Q. and Z. Sun (2011). 中国式社区治理：基层社会服务管理创新的探索与实践 *Zhongguoshi shequ zhili: Jiceng shehui fuwu guanli chuangxin de tansuo yu shijian* Chinese-style Community Governance: Exploration and Practice of Management Innovation of Grassroots Social Service [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.




Figure 5-2 Educational backgrounds of community workers in Beijing 2008

Wu and Sun (2011) show that the general working capacity of community workers is not sufficient. In 2008, only 20.5% community workers in Beijing (n=6670) were certificated as professional community workers. A related problem is the lack of professional social workers in the community. Workers of CRCs comprise community workers and community wardens. According to this research in Nanjing, only 2 or less community workers in each of the 7 interviewed communities were professional social workers. Some communities even had no professional social workers. The interviewees said that due to this lack of professional staff and limited participants, community workers have to spend most of their time on the daily routines, which are issued by central or local governments, rather than on issues related to the development of their communities. Furthermore, the shortage of professional community workers implies that a majority of them are unable to consider community issues in a scientific way. For example, many community workers are former layout workers of State-owned enterprises. Consequently they are professionally untrained for social work, and are more willing to follow government structures rather than thinking of community as a social unit.

A further point made by Wu and Sun (2011) is that CRCs need new effective ways to mobilise residents to participate in community activities as the traditional way has gradually lost its effectiveness (Yang 2005, Cong and Zhou 2009, Xu 2009). The traditional way of mass participation created by the CCP after 1940 has been mobilised and organized by the CCP and government (Yang 2005). The masses have been enrolled into the process of state establishment as human resources supporting wars and production, as the objects of management. The primary function of mass participation is social control, not encouraging people to engage in the decision-making process related to their interests, whether directly or indirectly, nor to question or provide checks and balances on the bureaucracy. Through grassroots-level political participation, members obtain the knowledge of political process. However, here the final purpose of participation is not learning to express and protect legitimate rights, and supervising the decision-making and performance of government, but rather receiving an education in party ethics and communist ideology to accept and support the current authority system (Yang 2005).

The fundamental prerequisite for the realization of mass recruitment is the absolute monopoly of resources by the state (Sun, Jin *et al.* 1999). In the grassroots-level society, activities mobilised by actors were named the “elite-recruitment model” (Yang 2005). In the current Chinese community, CRCs and other administrative departments have little power and resources to attract the response of residents. In order to mobilise residents to participate in community activities, community administrators have developed a new way of recruitment, which is called ‘local authoritative recruitment’ (Yang 2005). This community

level mass recruitment is conducted by CRCs, and, in the process, CRCs mobilise residents to participate by virtue not only of their administrative power but also through local social networks built by themselves.

CRCs have no or little right to engage in local governments' decision-making process in relation to the issues relevant to residents' interests, but only to report residents' opinions and requirements to local government. CRCs are supposed to have the dual responsibilities of social control and interest expression. Nevertheless, in practice the major function of CRCs is social control and most of their routine work concerns related issues such as conducting propaganda for policies and laws, maintaining public sanitation, providing family planning and so on (He 2010). This point is also supported by the interviews with CRC workers in Nanjing that, CRCs attribute most attention to community service instead of to residents' political requests because of their dependence on local government. Besides, the establishment of the market-society gave birth to a variety of distribution channels of resources while resources in the charge of CRCs remain very limited, which weakens the foundation of community recruitment.

It is due to the administrative authority endowed by government that CRCs can successfully mobilize residents to participate in community administrative affairs and conduct reciprocal exchange with social subjects (corporations, social organizations and so on) in the area under their jurisdiction (Liu 2010). Also, it is because of the authority of the administrative system that local governments are able to carry out the policies of the community construction project. However, the limitations of administrative authority and resources make it impossible for community workers to implement community recruitment effectively only on the

basis of administrative power (Qi 2007). CRCs have established a local social network based on emotions, favour, reciprocity and trust, and they also have an informal network of actors providing their support. This network mainly comprises retired CCP members and residents receiving basic living allowances. CRCs cultivate and develop relationships with those residents who are willing to cooperate in various ways, for example (Li 2002), to discover and foster appropriate supporters, help them solve problems, show respect and gratitude, show concern for their lives, organize recreational activities for them in return for service, and provide them with self-realization opportunities.

This local authority recruitment is a new strategy to recruit residents into the community construction process by combining the power of administrative networks with informal resources. Their interweaving functions of community autonomy and administration enable CRCs to access power and resources from both government and residents. However, the two main resources adopted by CRCs in community recruitment, that is, administrative authority and local social networks, are generated from traditional political and social institutions. The recruitment is conducted under the control of the local power and interest structure. Only the residents who are in need of governmental welfare resources and those who support the authority of the government are active in those ritual activities. This disadvantage is manifested in practice as a lack of regular and deep political participation and a marked indifference to political affairs among community residents.

Another important technical obstacle is that the importance attached to community participation is varied among different communities. It has been

shown above that, due to the shortage of human resources, the daily work of CRCs is concentrated on following the demands of sub-district offices and related government departments. Along with the development of community construction, CRCs have paid attention to community participation and community autonomy and they have made some achievements, though these achievements are varied, according to the objective conditions and activity of CRC members. As it's shown in the fieldwork in Nanjing, in the communities where CRCs have a heavy burden of social control and community service, the activities of community participation are generally less than in those which have fewer social problems and can more easily meet the quota of sub-district offices. From the survey in Nanjing it was seen that two major tasks of the CRCs in this context, other than responding to government instructions, were community security and floating-population management, and service to senior residents.

The variety of CRCs' challenges is clearly in this 2011 study data. XXH community was located in an old commercial area, and the floating-population management and community security were the work attracting most attention from the CRC. This CRC established a "caring base" to provide juvenile delinquents with legal education, psychological consultation and regular meetings. The most problematic issue in DSG community was house maintaining. In this old community, buildings were formerly belonging to and maintained by state-owned *danwei*. After the housing system reform, neither the former *danwei* nor the housing bureau was willing to take responsibility for housing. The CRC head of DSG community was very frustrated by the frequent disputes about decorations, garbage, pet dogs, car parking, and aging sewers. Meanwhile, members of QHY

community CRC were devoting their attention to the care of the aged. In the survey data, more than 20% of the residents in QHY community were aged above 60 and around 23% of them were living alone without their offspring (the 'empty nest' elderly). The head of the CRC visited the 'empty nest' elderly regularly and recorded their needs. He also got in touch with voluntary organizations outside the community and asked them to help the aged with their life issues. Finally, the SGL community had even more difficulties to solve, involving floating population management, landless peasants, low-income residents, the disabled, drug addicts, and even imprisoned people.

In all these four communities, most community activities organized by CRCs were recreational activities and service providing activities (legal consultations, voluntary patrols, etc.). No specific effort was being made to cultivate community identification and community autonomy according to the particular circumstances prevailing in each community. However, in other communities, since the social burdens were not as heavy as in the ones mentioned above, the situation of community participation in those communities was different because of their CRCs' awareness of community autonomy.

For example, the SQ community was transformed from a *danwei* community in which the CRC's work was still influenced by the authority structure of the state-owned ordnance factory. Not only the CRC head, but also the secretary and assistant head were cadres of the factory. The office buildings, water and electric supply were all in the charge of the factory. Since most residents in this community were familiar and well organized based on their association with the factory, it was relatively easy for the CRC to organize residents together to deal

autonomously with public issues. A good example is that the maintenance of environmental sanitation and community security were not serviced by property management companies but were managed by residents. The CRC had set up a Community University, asking community residents who had specialist expertise to be lecturers, and this was very popular among community residents. Furthermore, in addition to the residents' representative assembly (居民代表大会), the CRC reported its work and asked for advice from residents through residents' autonomous meetings which have been organized and held by the CRC every month.

LY community is a good example of a strong neighbourhood network and active community participation. As a former village community, 80% of the community residents were former villagers, who had a strong identity with the community and were quite familiar with each other. This community featured high autonomy in community affairs management. Residents in LY community often arranged meetings for themselves about shared problems. An example is that, once some land plots between village 2 and village 3 sunk, and the residents living around them met together to come up with a solution to the problem through their collective action. The solution was reported to and approved by the CRC, and the problem was solved accordingly. Besides, residents actively organized NGOs (such as the Peking Opera Troupe and so on) based on the real interests of the residents instead of just on the government quota.

By contrast, LZY community was characterised by its large and scattered administrative area. Here the CRC devoted itself to cultivating and developing community cohesion by publicizing community issues and organizing community

activities. In order to promote community identity among residents, the CRC of this community established the “Red Flag Roving Film Projection Team” to publicize community events, issues of interest, the CRC’s work around the community. Besides, the CRC had organized more than 70 activities every year to provide residents with platforms through which they could establish and strengthen social relationships. Unlike SQ community above, in which the CRC was closely related to the primary property owner in the district and had relatively strong power over community resources, LZY community had little authority to mobilise community actors (such as companies etc.) to deal with community affairs.

From the above analysis it is obvious that in the communities where residents have strong identity links and close neighbourhood networks, the NGOs are about real interests, and political participation is more active than in the others. Residents in the communities where the CRCs have more power over community resources are more willing to take part in political activities. These two aspects refer to the two fundamental factors of community participation: emotional factor and interest factor.

Emotional factors

The emotional identity of residents in relation to the community they are living in is an important factor influencing their community participation. According to Tao (2002), actors with low identity attach more importance to personal interest in their activities, while actors with strong identity pay more attention to loyalty and solidarity:

Sometimes we participate in affairs and activities not only in the consideration of interest, but also our responsibilities and obligations, or even for entertainment. Undoubtedly, residents' emotional identity to community strengthens their consciousness of responsibility and obligation. Furthermore, even in the pure recreational participation, when the participants are emotionally connected to others, they have more happiness (2002, p. 26).

On the one hand, neighbourhood networks significantly influence the strength of community identity. In some contexts, weakened neighbouring relationships have decreased residents' sense of belonging to community and then their activity in community participation (Xu 2009). This argument is clearly supported by related research. According to the research conducted in Wuhan by Yu and Li (2006) it was found that the willingness of permanent residents to participate in community activities and community affairs is considerably stronger than that of temporary residents. 96.9% of permanent residents interviewed in their research were "happy" and "very happy" to participate in community activities and community affairs;; 67.6% of temporary residents were "happy" to participate, while 32.3% of temporary residents said, "No" or "I don't care" to community participation. Chen's (2004) research also shows that in communities where residents are familiar with other residents, community participation is more active than that in the stranger-communities.

It is worth noticing that in Chinese urban contexts neighbourhood interactivity has declined significantly. From the discussion in Chapter Three we can see that the importance of neighbours ranks below relatives, friends and workmates. The

concrete data of Zang's (2010) shows that 51.8% of interviewed residents seldom interacted with neighbours and 63% of these residents would not visit their neighbours. In Zang's research, more than half of the interviewed residents said that they pay more attention to national economic development and political issues instead of to community affairs (2010). This opinion was also held by some residents interviewed in Nanjing, as they thought that attention to community affairs was "useless".

On the other hand, Zang's (2010) study also shows that the relativity of community identity strength is a significant factor which should be taken into consideration. A resident's community identity is directly related to their relationship to outer-community society (Xiang 2006). It is here argued that, the closer a resident is connected to the outer-community society and the stronger their sense of belonging to outer-community groups, the weaker is their identification with community. Contrarily, the harder residents find it to be accepted in the outer-community society and the weaker their sense of belonging to the wider society, the more importance they attach to community life, and so to their community identity. This argument can be used to explain an important and obvious problem of community participation, in that most community actors and activity participants are the aged and the retired whose attachment to the broader society has become diluted. The attachment of other residents to local community has been weakened as they are conveniently connected to outer-community society through modern communication technology, mass media and fast transportation (Wang and Feng 2004). Furthermore, the standard modern education system has the intention of giving people from different parts of the

country a similar educational background, based on which they can easily understand each other and develop the sense of belonging that extends a long way beyond their regional community.

Interest factors

Shared interest is also fundamental factor decisively influencing community participation. Interest is the most crucial motivation of residents' to participate in community affairs (Chen 2004, Wang and Feng 2004) and shared interest is also the material base of community autonomy.

Sharing interests with community fellows is the basis for the cultivation of a strong community participation consciousness. The solidarity of community is related to the dependence of residents on each other and on their networks (Shang 2011). If public resources can only be obtained with difficulty from the outer-community society, or the cost of moving to another community is very high, or personal relationships to community members are close, residents will be highly dependent on community and the solidarity among community members will be strong. In other words, the more shared interests are concerned with community affairs, the higher will be the dependence of residents on their community and then the more active will be their community participation. For example, in a local community, residents who own their own houses are more willing to take part in community affairs than the ones who are living in tenements (Wang and Feng 2004).

As with the emotional factors, the interest factors in community participation can also be analysed from two perspectives. The one is the earnings/return residents

able to obtain through community participation and the other is the relative advantage of that earnings. The more return residents can get from community participation, the more actively they engage community activities. Further, the consciousness of shared interest among community residents is positively related to residents' community identity. To be clearer, residents' living in a community for a long time are more resistant to the changes in the community and it is easier for them to organize activities about shared interests. In recent times, since the general community identity of residents has gradually declined in various types of communities, it is harder for them to develop shared interests and thus to create activities based on them.

Community participation is also affected by the return that residents are able to obtain through the activities that are generated. According to Chen (2004), in the community activities open to all residents or to most residents, benefits are shared by too many people. Therefore, residents' positivity to participate in those activities is not as high as that in small-group and high-return activities. Besides, the low participation in community activities can also be attributed to the difference between the expectations and the real benefits for residents' in community participation (Xiang 2006). In many contexts, residents are encouraged to organize and participate in activities that devote their effort to community service and social control, and which give them very little benefits, instead of focusing on important community issues. In short, the contradiction between the expected and real benefits of community participation is due to the prevailing power and interest structures at the community level. This will be elaborated in the next chapter.

The other crucial aspect of the interest factor is the relativity of residents' interest in community. This relativity means the relative importance of residents' interest in community compared with their interest in the outer-community society. As previously identified in relation to identity construction, the residents who are more closely connected to and rely on outer-community society for their interest are likely to be less willing to participate in community activities. For the same reason, the aged and the retired who are to a large extent confined within the community have a high consciousness of community participation. In Xu's study (2006), a large number of residents who indicated that they "will not" participate in community affairs were not unhappy to, but "have no time", because they had more important and meaningful things to do outside their local communities.

It has been demonstrated that the interest of Chinese urban communities has changed considerably in recent years (Shen and Chen 2010). Residents may be willing to participate in public benefit activities, volunteering activities and community management activities. However, their interest in community recreational activities has decreased to the last kind of community activities. Consequently, more work needs to be done to transfer resident's willingness to actual participation actions.

Conclusion and Suggestions to resolve community participation problems

This chapter has canvassed the reasons for participation in Chinese community activities; highlighting the character of those activities and the dominant role the Party-state, at its multiple levels, play in community organisations. The chapter

noted that residents were aware of the political role played by the government in their community and how this made them wary of acting in a way that was seen as political. Nevertheless, the evidence presented did reveal a level of community activity that was often high, if at times formalistic and ritualistic. Additionally, it showed that a degree of social capital was being developed but this was constrained by the larger social system in which it operated. Certainly there were evidence of rational choice self interest in play but this was by no means the dominant motivation or sources of this social capital or community networking in the Chinese case studies examined.

In sum, activities of Chinese urban community construction, although currently having limited positive impacts on the situation of community participation, do influence residents' attitudes and their general engagement in community activities. Therefore, to enhance the current situation of community participation in urban China, Chinese governments, both central and local, have to deal with a paradox that they want communities to do more but are reluctant to give them more autonomy, especially political autonomy, to deal with these problems.

Rather what are assigned to communities are the more practical issues. Through the analysis of the current situation and the influential factors on community participation, some summary suggestions can be put forward to deal with the political difficulties at the community level, notably: improving the competence of community workers; fostering community consciousness and community identity; and, organizing NGOs and activities on the basis of shared interest. Another suggestion is using network technology to facilitate and reduce the costs of residents' community participation. This method is put forward for the residents

who are 'willing to ' participate but 'have no time' (Xiang 2006).

First, it is important to give some political status to community work so that it can foster social capital that could filter upward. It is necessary to turn communities from residual organizations to semi- professional bodies, which would increase their relevance apropos the Party-state. This improvement in the competence of community workers includes three aspects: distributing enough professional social workers to community locations; enhancing the quality of community workers in respect to both their educational background and work experience; providing further education for community workers about community construction and community participation.

Secondly, it is important to foster community consciousness and community identity through public relations work. According to Zang's (2010) research, 70% of the interviewees held the opinion that government should intensify the knowledge of community construction and enhance the community consciousness of residents. There are two parts to this information process: publicizing community affairs and 'CRCs' work, such as construction projects in communities and other community activities, and publicizing the significance of community participation and encouraging residents to improve community management and protect their own interests. Governments are reluctant to do this at it could open up a competing political source of power and could also expose the close relationships between developers and government officials.

Thirdly, NGOs and activities need to be organized based on shared interests that address larger social system issues, such as an aging population. As discussed

above, neighbouring networks are important for community identity and for the willingness of community residents to participate. In the last chapter we found that community activities have a positive impact on community neighbouring networks. Community NGOs, both formal and informal, are supposed to be subjects in a community management system through which residents take part in community political and economic issues. NGOs are also channels for residents to express their desires to groups and communities. Taking the passive and insufficient participation into consideration, it is now crucial for bodies organizing community participation to discover shared interests and organize NGOs and activities based on them. However, each attempt to address a larger social issue and find linked networked answers has the potential to challenge the Party-state processes of a planned economy.

Again the conundrum is evident, there is a reservoir of untapped social capital but the history of grass roots participation (e.g. the Cultural Revolution), which is used as evidence the social stability is more critical than participation that might threaten the CCP system of political authority. This chapter supports the notion that social capital in China is as much social as it is individual, as such, there is the potential to unleash a more active citizenry, if the boundaries of governance could be eased.

To recap, it is evident that community construction in China is a bifacial process. On the one side, it is driven and enforced by the state. On the other side, it is supposed to be a bottom-up activity. The latter process, the gradual growth of community participation and then community autonomy, is also regarded as the sprout of Chinese civil society. All the suggestions above are practical at the

community level and have nothing to do with the prevailing community power and interest system.* The two fundamental and serious problems, that is, that CRCs are practically branches of local government instead of representatives of residents and residents have little power over community issues, cannot be solved without a radical adjustment of the community management system and the political space to operate in. Community management institutions will be analysed in the next chapter, with consideration of the unique tradition of Chinese democracy to forecast the prospect of community autonomy.

* Nearly 90% of interviewees argued that the government should withdraw its power from communities. Zang, L. (2010). "社区治理与公共参与--基于南京现状的调查 *Shequ zhili yu gonggong canyu--Jiyu Nanjing xianzhuang de diaocha* Community Governance and Public Participation--A Survey Based on Current Situation in Nanjing City [In Chinese]." Research of Administration of NPOs 7.

6 The Party Branch System in Community Construction

As noted in the previous chapter, there is a strong base for community activities and meaningful social networks but this is constrained by the larger social system rather than individual motivation. Politically this raises serious issues for the legitimacy of the CCP. In this case of the decline in Chinese political structure at the grassroots level of society, is a critical issue for the Party-state of China to revitalise its standing. Since the Reform and Opening-up of China post-1978, and the consequential rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, leading to social and welfare inequality, the issue has been how to maintain and strengthen the control over society. The events of 4 June heightened that concern. The Party-state's strategy to re-construct social order include that of community construction, the leadership of the CCP in community life has been emphasized from the very beginning of the community construction programme, and this is quite different from the stated primary government structure. In the policies at the primary level, community self-governance has been increasingly stressed and encouraged. Representatives of various interest groups are enrolled or invited into the community governance system to participate in community affairs, while the relationship between CRCs as the leading autonomous organization, and the sub-district office is that of "assistance-instruction". To the contrary, in reality the rebuilding of the Party branch system at the community level has been almost synchronous with the process of community construction. During the process of revitalizing the Party branch system, strengthening the leadership and expanding the organizational control of community organizations and residents by the CCP are the most emphasized tasks of local Party organizations.

The mode of the penetration of Party influence into community life is quite resilient and adaptable through the operations of daily practice. It is different from the way that the sub-district office influences or controls CRCs, which is achieved through personnel appointment and resource distribution. The efforts of the CCP to strengthen its power in the urban community are a response to the recent social trends of de-collectivization and de-centralization, which have weakened the CCP, and to some extent have been dissipated into everyday practice. In this chapter, the rebuilding of the Party branch system in Chinese urban local communities is analysed as a crucial component of China's strategy for governing grassroots society and the dissipation of Party power by the informal and private daily operations of community members is examined.

Backgrounds of community rebuilding of the Party branch system

Rebuilding the Party branch system in Chinese urban communities has been launched in the circumstance of the decline of the *danwei* system. *Danwei*, which, as previously described, acted as the basic social unit in cities of China before the Reform and Opening-up, was also the governance foundation of the Party-state. *The danwei* system was not only the principal way of social integration (He 2005, Zhu, Chen et al. 2011), but also provided the 'nodes' of the power networks of the Party-state (Xu 2001).

The great transformation of Chinese society since the 1978 Reform and Opening-up has given birth to dramatic changes in the social structure and the way of life in China, especially the decline of the *danwei* system, the rise of diverse economic forms (such as foreign invested enterprises, joint stock companies, joint stock

cooperative enterprises, individual businesses and private enterprises), new interest groups and the spread of various ideologies. These changes have shaken the governance foundation as they have challenged the control of the *danwei* system over resources and individuals. And also they have increased the difficulties of the Party-state to manage the changed society characterized by diverse economic forms, new social organizations, multi-faceted social activities, and individuals with considerable mobility. The Party has an urgent need to reconstruct its governance foundation and discover new methods to influence and control grassroots residents in the new social structure.

“Party branches are built in danwei” – the way of Party-state combination

The CCP has summarized an important principle from its experience, that, in order to guarantee the influence and ability of mobilizing people in grassroots society, grassroots Party organizations must be a conjunct to and embedded in social structure (Zheng, Yang et al. 2010, Hu 2013). Although this principle had not been put forward during the pervasive period of the *danwei* system, it had already been carried out thoroughly via *danwei*.

In the period in which the Party-state integrated society through the *danwei* system, the grassroots organization of the CCP was quite complete. On the base of the thoroughly stretched *danwei* network, the power of the CCP touched almost all aspects and levels of social life. The extent of the Party’s reaches included central, local and grassroots organizations, and it has been shown that grassroots Party influence extended into “the Party organization established in factories, stores, schools, government departments, sub-district offices, cooperation

organizations, farms, towns, villages, companies in the People's Liberation Army, and other organizations established by grassroots *danwei*. There are three levels of grassroots Party organizations: primary Party committees, Party branch committees and committees of general Party branches (Pu 1990, pp. 472-473)."

One important feature of the *danwei* system was that the primary Party committees were built according to the specific setting of *danwei* at every level. The structures of the Party committees were in high concordance with *danwei* organizations and led their activities. Party committees at every level were responsible for the upper level Party organizations. From top to bottom, the Party organization at each level formed a close chain through which the Party-state controlled the activities of *danwei* and passed the policies, requirements and demands of the Party to grassroots individuals (Bu 2004, p. 10). Since the structure of Party system was built according to governmental system, the power of the CCP was delivered together with governmental authority.

Changes caused by social transformation

The economic reform since 1978 has weakened the political control of the CCP over Chinese grassroots society. The Party-state of China has gradually withdrawn its control of social and economic life (Han 2007). As a result of the Reform and Opening-up, publicly owned enterprises in Chinese cities have been endowed with relatively increased autonomy in management. At the same time, diverse economic forms including individual businesses, private businesses, and foreign-invested enterprises have been encouraged. That has created a free space outside the existing institutional structures. The strict control of individuals through the

danwei system has been reduced and various interest groups have come into being as well. Initially, these newborn groups, such as private entrepreneurs, commercial households and migrant workers, were not been covered by the Party system, and the Party power was weakened significantly. Consequently, especially since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, strengthening Party power in the transforming society has become an important issue for the CCP. In the early stage of the 1990s, CCP intentionally built Party organizations in various forms of economic enterprise such as joint ventures with foreign investors and others that were wholly foreign owned (Cheng 2011, p. 3).

Along with the deepening reform and widening opening of China to the world, the modernization and urbanization process has been accelerated. The power of the CCP over grassroots society has decreased further by a variety of means. First, the thoughts of Western ideas have entered into China and challenged Marxism with it the ideological legitimacy of CCP over Chinese individuals; secondly, the decline and reform of the *danwei* system released a great number of *danwei* employees into the labour market; thirdly, since *danwei* has gradually shifted its burden of welfare to other social organizations, *danwei* employees have become less dependent on their *danwei*; finally, during the urbanization process a large work force entered into cities and these people were not included in the Party system of the day, which further weakened Party control.

The CCP was shocked by the weakness of its control on grassroots society when undetected by the CCP, the ‘Falun Gong’ (法轮功) emerged and developed at surprising speed. The Party analysed the factors that had weakened Party power at the primary level of urban society, and attributed the weakness to the instability of

the governance foundation of the CCP. From then on the rebuilding of the Party branch system in grassroots urban contexts has become a priority. For stability at least, perhaps even for the survival of the CCP, the importance attached to the rebuilding of the Party branch system was expressed in the speech of the former CCP general secretary, Jiang Zemin, presented at a conference of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CCP:

We can draw incisive lessons from the emergence of the ‘Falun Gong’ issue. One thought-provoking problem is that many Party members and cadres were involved in it. Quite a number of district and county level leading cadres at their posts took part in ‘Falun Gong’ activities. Some cadres, retired or at their posts, even several cadres who had joined the Party for several decades, have performed as key members of ‘Falun Gong’.

According to the deepening of reform and the development of a socialist market economy, economic sectors, interest groups, social organizations and social life styles have become more and more diverse, while these will inevitably bring such-and-such influences to people’s thoughts and opinions, and to their interpersonal relationships.

If the Party is not run strictly, if Party discipline is slack and Party organization is loose, we will risk ruining our state and Party (Jiang 2000)!

Countermeasures towards the rebuilding of the Party branch system

Because the Party’s governance foundation established in the *danwei* system has

so declined during the modernization process and it has become so vital for the CCP to reconstruct its governance foundation, a key approach has been via the primary level rebuilding of the Party branch system.in line with social transformation. This has involved combining grassroots Party organization with social structure (Zheng, Yang et al. 2010).

In order to strengthen this process of rebuilding, several crucial problems have had to be solved: a great number of newly formed economic organizations, autonomous organizations, and various activity groups have emerged, which demonstrate significant lack of Party power; as many state-owned and collective-owned enterprises went bankrupt, the Party organizations built within them lost their bases; because of the increased diversity of social life and the mobility of individuals, former Party organizations are no longer able to effectively touch and influence people's thoughts and activities. These problems have developed inevitably and in complex ways.

Firstly, in the process of socialist market economy construction, some state-owned and collective-owned enterprises have been merged, reorganized or even allowed to fail. The mobility of Party members has increased. More and more Party members are not firmly bonded to certain *danwei*. Furthermore, due to the aging tendency of the population, the number of Party members who retire and live in communities is increasing. In Shanghai, for example, the number of retired Party members had reached 370,000 by 2000, occupying more than a quarter of the overall number of Party members in Shanghai (Research Group of Chinese Urban Community Construction 2001).

Secondly, the emergence and development of social organizations brings another social space not effectively covered by the Party system. According to An's (2004) research, before the Reform and Opening-up of 1978, in Zhejiang province the total number of social organizations was less than 300, and government bodies basically operated those social organizations. By the end of 2002, the number of social organizations in this province, registered as provincial, district, or county organizations, had reached 10,038, an unprecedented increase. Further, during the decade after the early 1990s, in several cities of Zhejiang province, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Taizhou and Shaoxing, the number of social organizations increased at a rate between 8% and 10%, and during 2001 and 2002 the average rate of increase of professional organization was 42.86%. Significantly, in these newly established organizations, the coverage of Party organization was very limited. For example, very few of these social organizations had established Party branches: among the 1932 registered in the civil administration department of Hangzhou city, only 6.5%, that is 127 organizations, had Party branches; in Ningbo city, it was 93 organizations, 7.26% of the 1281 organizations registered; in Taizhou, it was only 6.6% of the 854 organizations registered; in Shaoxing, the percentage of the 800 organizations registered which had Party branches was only 4% (32 organizations); and in Wenzhou the percentage was 3.1% (34 out of 1095 organizations).

Furthermore, An's research (2004) shows that even where branches were established, the majority of those new grassroots Party organizational units were temporary branches comprised of organization members. Those temporary branches were largely informal and, unlike formal ones, were very inactive. For

instance, in Shaoxing, besides the 32 organization Party branches, there were still 161 other temporary branches, which occupied 83.4% of all the Party organizations. In Wenzhou, the number of temporary branches was 715. Basically, the Party activities of members in these temporary branches also belonged to and were arranged by their former or current *danwei* Party organizations. Most temporary Party branches performed basically no functions. In addition, some of the formal Party organizations were jointly established by more than one organization. For example, in Wenzhou 12 of the 34 formal-organization Party branches were joint branches. These joint Party organizations arranged very few activities and had limited effects due to their loose organization, the difficulty of organizing activities among members from different organizations, and their shortage of resources.

Third, the emergence of diverse forms of economic enterprise is another development that the Party system had not fully covered. According to the data collected in 2000 (Research Group of Chinese Urban Community Construction 2001), there were more than 130,000 foreign invested enterprises, joint stock companies not controlled by state or collectives, joint stock cooperative enterprises, individual businesses and private enterprises in Shanghai. About 1,400,000 workers were employed by these enterprises. The Party power was very weak in these new form economies because only a very small proportion of employees were members of the CCP. According to the sample survey (Research Group of Chinese Urban Community Construction 2001), the percentage of Party members in all employees of private science-and-technology enterprises in Shanghai was less than 5%. Thus, the coverage of the Party system in these

contexts was very limited. There were many blank areas of Party power. By 2000, among more than 8,000 foreign invested enterprises that were already in operation, only 30% of them had Party branches. Moreover, the work of Party organizations in those new form enterprises was inefficient in that some of the Party branches did not even organize any activity for several months. Some Party members' memberships belonged to *danwei* Party branches while they worked at other places so they could not be effectively controlled or influenced by Party branches.

As a direct response to this erosion of Party power, the Party-state has devoted great effort to building up the Party system in these new form economies and social organizations. The most emphasized issue is the coverage achieved by the Party system. Take the Shangcheng community* of Hangzhou city for instance, where according to data collected by the end of 2008, in all the 1872 enterprises not owned by state or collectives, 170 Party branches had been established for the 2634 Party member employees (Zheng, Yang et al. 2010). Party branches were established in 82 medium or above sized enterprises. After that, further steps were taken to build Party organizations so that by 2010, Hangzhou had established 10 Party committees in 10 industrial associations such as the Bar Association, the Association of Chartered Accountants, the Association of Taxi Drivers, and the Association of Building Societies. These associations were related to the social

* Shangcheng district, Hangzhou city, established the first community residents' committee of China in October 1949. This first committee, Shangyangshijie Community Residents' Committee, is regarded as the birthplace of grassroots mass autonomous organizations. The Exhibition Centre of Chinese Community Construction is located in Shangyangshijie community, Shangcheng district, Hangzhou.

fields that most social organizations are embedded in, including justice, finance, labour, communication, industry and commerce and construction. It is reported that 359 Party organizations were built to cover more than 5000 social organizations and related enterprises, incorporating about 280,000 workers (Joint Investigation Group of the Research Office of Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, Second Office of Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee et al. 2012). All those industries and businesses were closely related to and had profound impact on the daily lives of citizens as in this way Party organizations could easily get information about social conflicts and exert influence on activities of urban residents.

However, due to the mobility of workers and the decreased dependence of employees on the organizations they worked in, Party structures in new form economic organizations and social organizations have become unable to effectively act as the governance foundations of the Party-state. Community, instead, is a more practical choice as all urbanites belong to certain residential communities and the living places of people change less than their jobs, schools and entertainments. Besides, new form economic enterprises and social organizations are located with the areas of communities. Party organizations in communities can cover both urbanites with high mobility and also economic and social organizations as well. Therefore, community has become a selected space to rebuild the governance foundation of CCP in urban China.

As discussed above, during the period in which resources and people were integrated through the *danwei* system, the power and influence of urban sub-district offices and residents' committees was very limited. Sub-district offices

were outposts of district government. They were not even grassroots government organizations. The major work and responsibilities of these offices were instructing the operation of residents' committees and assisting the work of functional departments, plus conveying residents' opinions and suggestions about daily life to upper level government (Zhu 1997). In this circumstance, moreover, resident's committees, moreover, had even less influence. According to Pengzhen's (1953) report to the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, sub-district offices and residents' committees were supplementary to the *danwei* system:

Since the industries in our country are far from developed, and our society is in the transition process from new democratic society to socialist society, there are a large quantity of unorganized residents in streets who are not belonged to factories, enterprises, schools and governmental departments, even in the cities that have relatively developed industries. In some cities, the unorganized population are more than 60% of total population. In order to gradually organize these residents and help them to be employed or transferred to civilian industries, to lighten the burden of district governments and local police station, we need to set up outpost of municipal governments or district governments, despite the establishment of residents' committees, in many cities. Our suggestion is setting up sub-district offices.

The task of sub-district offices and residents' committees was to govern the residents away from the *danwei* system and to bring them into the new system. Both material resources and personnel resources were very limited. The Party

organizations at the sub-district and neighbourhood levels were of little importance in the whole Party system.

This situation, however, has changed drastically in line with to the social transformation process. Since the decline of the *danwei* system, in order to control the grassroots social spaces released from *danwei* system, the Party-state has not only transformed urban sub-district offices to be a level of government structure, but also transferred the work base of CCP to urban communities as well. Among the measures CCP has adopted to inject its power into community life, ‘organizational coverage’ (*zhuzhi fugai*, 组织覆盖) is the foremost.

Organizational coverage is an important strategy of the Party-state of China to strengthen its leadership in social and economic arenas (Zheng, Yang et al. 2010). It refers to admitting new Party members and establishing Party organizations in specific geographical areas so as to realize the leadership and control of Party. The practice of organizational coverage has changed according to the various social situation and systems involved. In time of war, CCP organizations were built in army companies led by CCP. Initially, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Party organizations were settled in the *danwei* system or commune collective system. At present, however, grassroots Party organizations are stretching into urban communities. The principle of the rebuilding of the Party branch system in these local communities is ‘vertically to the bottom, horizontally to the edge, effective management’. Local Party committees at different areas have adopted various methods to expand the coverage of Party system in urban communities.

Local Party committees in different areas have adopted various methods to expand the coverage of the Party system in urban communities. In Beijing, urban grassroots Party organizations have been set up synchronously with citywide demarcation of communities and adjustment to the territory covered by residents' committees. Community Party committees, General Party branches and Party branches have been established in communities according to the constitution of the CCP and the number of Party members in each community (Beijing Urban Community Party Building Research Group 2003).

Shenzhen has employed the structure of "one General Party branch, multi-Party branches" in urban communities (Liu 2008). Since 2003, the former Party structure of urban community, "one community, one Party branch", has been reformed to be "one General Party branch and multi-Party branches" in every community. The former one-only Party branches of community structure has been upgraded into General Party branches, leading to a variety of Party branches which were set up according to the specific situation in each community. Every newly established specific Party branch includes a Party branch of retired Party members, a Party branch of laid-off employees and a Party branch representing the 'two-new organizations'.

Extending this diversity, the practice of Hangzhou is, despite setting up Party committees at the community level, establishing Party branches and specialized Party groups in residential buildings according to the concrete condition of each community. Hangzhou is the first city to upgrade community general Party branches into community Party committees. By early 2009, all the 332 communities which had more than 100 Party members established community

Party committees. Furthermore, the Wangma community, in Xiacheng district, Hangzhou city, took the first step to establish Party branches in residential buildings. This practice of “establishing Party branches in residential building” has been popularized based on the principle that it is “convenient for organizing study, convenient for arranging activities, convenient for educating and managing Party members”. Thus, in order to complete a “vertically to the bottom, horizontally to the edge” network of Party organizations, the scale of Party organizations has been reduced. 2,573 building Party branches were set up and also 35,100 specific forms of Party groupings. These groups have distinguishing characteristics such as service-oriented Party groups, supervisory Party groups, propaganda and education-oriented Party groups, and friendship-developing Party groups (Organization Office of Organization Department of CCP Hangzhou Municipal Committee 2009).

Thus, despite the organization building in urban communities, the Party-state of China has managed to strengthen Party power in the lives of community residents in practice through a multitude of means but notably the spread of Party groups throughout the economic structure and society in general.

Penetration of Party power into urban community life

In order to guarantee the leadership of Party power in this process of community construction and the life of community residents, the Party-state of China firstly defined the ‘core leadership’ role of the Party in community construction through policies issued by various levels of governments. Then it put Party organizations above community autonomous ones and other social groups, and stipulated that

those organizations were led by community Party organizations. Thirdly, it was decreed that Party members should occupy a large proportion of the leading positions in community organization. Finally the community Party organizations (and residents' committees) are required to mobilize Party member residents first when they organize community activities, and in this way increase the influence of Party members on ordinary residents.

'Core leadership' or the Party organization in community construction

According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, CCP acts the core leadership role in the socialist cause of China. This leadership role of CCP has been stressed in community policies issued at various levels of government. For example, it has been regulated in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China that:

The primary Party committees in communities, townships and towns and the Party organizations in villages and communities provide leadership for the work in their localities and assist administrative departments, economic institutions and self-governing mass organizations in fully exercising their functions and powers.*

* *The Constitution of the Communist Party of China* was amended and adopted at the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 14th November 2012. Compared with the Constitution amended and adopted at the Sixteenth National Congress of CCP on the 14th November, 2002, Party committees in communities has replaced the Party committees at sub-district level to provide leadership.

The document, *Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Carrying On Urban Community Construction throughout the Country* (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000) was issued and approved and popularized by the General Office of CCP Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council, defined the concrete functions of community Party organizations as ‘(a) publicizing and carrying out the lines, principles and policies of the Party and the laws and regulations of the state; (b) uniting and organizing members of Party branches and mass residents to complete the tasks of their localities; (c) supporting and guaranteeing CRCs governing themselves according to law and exercising their functions; (d) strengthening the self-building of Party organizations; (e) doing ideological work and putting into full play of the exemplary vanguard role of Party members’. The leading role of Party organizations is also stressed at the local level. For instance, in the community construction policy of Jiangnan district, Wuhan city, Hubei province, Party organizations are supposed to act as political, spiritual and organizational leaders and as exemplary models in daily life. Further, they can mobilize community resources to promote community construction and coordinate the relationships among community organizations (He 2010).

The position of Party organizations among community groups

In practice, the core leadership role of community Party organizations is usually embodied in concrete functions and the superior-subordinate relationship between Party organizations and other community organizations. According to Chen’s (2004) research in urban communities in Shenhe district, Shenyang city, and Luwan district, Shanghai city, the relationships between community Party

organizations and three other community autonomous organizations are apparently bureaucratic, the same as the authority structure of local governments. This kind of vertical power relationship is defined in the Functions of Community Party Organizations and Constitution of Community Autonomy issued by local governments (quoted from Chen 2004).

For instance, in the government policies of Shenhe district, Shenyang city, the functions of community Party organizations include leading the activities of community residents' organizations, and training, recommending and managing community cadres. Specifically, the Party organizations are authorized to lead community autonomous organizations, to lead juvenile associations, female residents' associations, volunteer organizations and also public security groups. These associations and groups were former sub-committees of residents' committees and they were established by residents' committees as well. They were also required to provide instruction for culture and art groups organized by residents themselves.

According to Working Instruction of Community Party Organization issued by the sub-district office and Party committee of Ruijin sub-district, Luwan district, Shanghai city, community Party organizations were empowered to fulfil the following functions: putting forward detailed plans for organization construction, ideological education, maintaining the Party's work style in their locality on the basis of the requirements of the sub-district Party committee; leading the work of residents' committees; checking on the election and decision making of residents' committees to supervise and assure that its work is following the law; leading the activities of culture and art organizations in communities; leading the work of

militia groups and social organizations of workers, juveniles, female residents and the united front; and completing the tasks assigned by the sub-district office (Chen 2004).


Through these policies, community Party organizations are expected to ‘take everything under control’ (*dang lingdao yiqie*, 党领导一切). As a matter of fact, due to the vertical power relations between community Party organizations and the sub-district Party committee, Party power is able to influence community life easily, especially in the cases of the contraction of administrative power from the neighbourhood level. This situation can be clearly reflected in Chen’s (2004), the words of the secretary of a sub-district Party committee:

In the past, sub-district offices could issue orders directly to residents’ committees. Nowadays, the relationship between sub-district offices and residents’ committees are ‘instruct-assist’ and ‘service-supervise’ relation. Sub-district offices cannot assign tasks directly to residents’ committees anymore. Nevertheless, I can ‘negotiate’ with the secretaries of community Party organizations as the secretary of sub-district Party committees. Thus the demands are also transferred to residents’ committee through community Party organizations (Chen 2004, pp. 193-194).

Figure 6-1 Community administration structure of Shenhe District (Chen 2004, pp. 193-194)



Figure 6-2 Community administration structure of



What can be drawn from these words is that, even though the relation between sub-district offices and community autonomous organizations has been returned in policy to the ‘instruct-assist’ and ‘service-supervise’ relation, which was decided in the Organic Law on Urban Residents’ Committees in PRC (1989), community

autonomous organizations are still led and controlled by sub-district offices through the superior and subordinate relationships among upper-level Party organizations, sub-district Party committees and community Party organizations. The only difference is that in the previous period the leaders of sub-district offices were able to assign tasks and demands directly to community autonomous organizations without the assistance of sub-district Party committees in previous period and now they are not. The relations are largely remained the same.

The situations in other areas are the same as in Shenyang and Shanghai. The document issued by the Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee, *Opinions on Strengthening Urban Community Construction* states (quoted from Wang 2009, pp. 104-105):

Community Party organizations (community general Party branches) are elected by community congress of the Party or conference of all community Party members. Community Party organizations carry out their work under the leadership of sub-district Party committees...Community Party organizations lead community residents' autonomous organizations...lead community mass organizations...CRCs consciously accept the instructions of community Party organizations.

In other words, community resident' autonomous organizations are responsible for community Party organizations and then community Party organizations are led by sub-district Party committees, so as to be influenced by sub-district offices. Thus the power of CCP and upper level government departments is able to be passed on to primary level society.

The leading positions of Party members in community autonomous organizations

Another method employed by Party organizations to exert influences on community autonomous organizations is appointing Party members to be leaders and members of those autonomous organizations. The leadership of Party members in CRC is the most emphasized one due to the importance of CRC in daily life. The result is that a majority of community residents' leaders and members elected are Party members.

By February 2007, since the launch of national urban community construction in 2000 and by February 2007, 761 communities had been established (including 206 communities in townships and towns). The number of community workers was 5,994, of which 55.14% were Party members (3,305 persons) (Ma and Xiao 2010). The proportion of Party members among community leaders is more convincing. According to Zheng and Yang, by the end of 2008, there were 23 Party committees in Shangcheng community which were directly led by district Party committees, involving 20,773 Party members. There were 50 community Party committees and 1 community General Party branch, having 14,300 Party members registered in communities. 255 Party members were acting as leaders and workers in those community Party organizations, 64 of whom were secretaries of Party organizations and directors of CRCs. Among the 64 Party-member community leaders, 38 of them worked as directors of residents' committees and secretaries of Party organizations at the same time, which means that at least 80% of the community leaders were Party members. And there were still another 113 members of Party organizations working in CRCs (Zheng, Yang

et al. 2010, p. 323).

The leading role of Party members in community activities

In the practice of community construction, Party-member residents play an important role in work and activities organized by CRCs, which is not only because the community Party organizations and residents' committees consciously mobilize Party members to strengthen the influence of Party organizations, but it is also determined by the fact that Party members can be relatively easy mobilized. Li found that the political participation of Party member residents in new built residential compounds had no apparent difference from non-Party-member residents (2009).

There are several reasons for this easy mobilization (Wu 2007): their shared identity background facilitates the communication and relationship development among Party members, especially those acting as community leaders and Party member residents; the working experience of Party members in *danwei* helps them understand the Party system and makes them more willing to obey the instructions from Party organizations and other community organizations or even from upper level Party and government organizations; their identity as Party members gives them a sense of difference from ordinary residents, which makes them more willing to respond to the call of community Party organizations and residents' organizations. Furthermore, it has been argued that this involvement by Party members in community activities can be an effective way to lead public attitudes and ease social tensions (Zeng 2008).

By contrast with Party members, it has become increasingly difficult for

community Party organizations and community autonomous groups to mobilize residents. Two main reasons are attributed to this tendency: residents' attached identity and dependence on community has been gradually declining as their interests and social networks have been transferred out of residential neighbourhoods; there is no authoritative relation between community Party organizations, residents' autonomous organizations, and the residents themselves. In this circumstance, Party members have become increasingly important and influential in community activities, through the running of community Party organizations and residents' autonomous organizations, especially in new built residential areas.

Wu's (2007) research in the so-called W residential compound, JN community, Shanghai city, describes the reliance of the residents' committee on Party member residents when its workers of residents' committee conducted work in the new built commercial residential compound. The W compound was built in 2003 and located in the territory of JN residents' committee. Originally, although residents' successively moved into the compound, the JN residents' committee knew almost nothing about the residents, let alone implementing the demands from the sub-district office. Nevertheless, things changed since as more retired Party-member residents registered their Party membership in the community Party committee.

As Wu (2007) shows, during the election of CRC in 2003, Aunt J, who was a resident of W compound, then became a member of the CRC. At first she found that her work was not smooth at all. She could not even carry out basic tasks due to the shortage of assistants. However, the situation became better after 2005, when the retired Party-member living in W compound set up a Party group. The

CRC arranges activities for the Party group of W compound, and these were related to ordinary residents, such as visiting seniors during festivals. Through such activities, residential information was collected in the face-to-face contact between the Party group members and ordinary residents. On that basis, when organizing its activities, the community residents committee were effectively able to mobilize the residents who were happy to take part in the community.

The reason for this situation can be attributed to the close relationship between members of the Party group and the ordinary residents as neighbours. Members of the Party group have advantages that the CRC did not. In this case, although residents in the new built compound were not familiar with each other, as in the folk society in which residents spent all their lives together, the regional closeness between them facilitated their communication. Financially supported by the CRC, Party member residents have become backbones of community activities in their compound. Therefore, Party power has penetrated into neighbourhood life, while Party member residents act as nodes of the network of Party system network.

Dissipation of party power away from grassroots society

From the discussion above, it can be seen that the CCP has devoted itself to expand the coverage of the Party system, to emphasize and reinforce the leadership of the Party in promoting community construction and community autonomy, and to strengthen the influences of Party members in community life. However, the penetration of Party power is not as successful as that in *danwei* period. In many ways the power of the Party has been dissipated and limited in the grassroots society due to the tendency of de-collectivization and de-centralization.

Negotiation relations in practice

The limitation of Party power can be attributed firstly to the negotiation relation between community Party organizations and community autonomous organizations. Community autonomous organizations, especially CRCs, are the main executive body for carrying out community construction and managing daily community affairs. Community Party organizations, in contrast, have no concrete functions according to state-level policies such as the Constitution of Communist Party of China, and the Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Carrying on Urban Community Construction throughout the Country (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000).

The leadership of community Party organizations over community autonomous organizations is political, which means that, by participating in the administration of community affairs, community Party organizations support the work of community autonomous organizations and guarantee that they obey the law and carry forward the desired social virtues.

The community, however, is out of the governmental system, in other words, out of the direct control of the state, thus the relation between community Party organizations and community autonomous organizations is different from the relations between Party organizations and government organizations inside the state government system. Take the relation between sub-district Party committees and sub-district offices for instance. Sub-district Party committees are the outposts of district Party committees while sub-district offices are of the district governments. Since both of those belong to the formal state authority system, the

relation between them is politically and institutionally bureaucratic. Community autonomous organizations are not formal government organizations. The most apparent fact is that members of CRC *should* be elected or employed by a representative congress of residents', instead of being appointed by community Party committees or sub-district offices.

Additionally, in history, the relation between community Party organizations and CRCs was one of cooperation and negotiation (Chen 2004, p. 186). In the *danwei* system, Party organizations were mainly embedded in *danwei* of all levels. The Party system in CRCs was not comprehensive. There might be one community Party branch for more than two communities in many places. Meanwhile, the post of community Party branch secretary was usually held by one of the CRC directors. The daily work of CRCs was not affected directly by community Party branches. This tradition still has had significant impacts on community construction practice.

Furthermore, community Party committees have not been acting as independent objects in the decision-making processes about major community issues. In recent years, the general practice has been that such decisions have been made by the community consultative conference. In the early stage, this conference was generally \ convened by the directors of CRC. Later the community consultative conference has been encouraged and defined as regular practice by policies in various areas at all levels. For example, according to a document issued by Fengtai district, Beijing city, a community consultative conference is held monthly concerning the issues closely related to residents' lives such as social administration, urban construction, city appearance and sanitation, security,

cultural construction and community service.

A community consultative conference comprises representatives of sub-districts or districts, government functionaries whose organizations are located in the community, workers of community Party committees, CRCs and community service centres, community policemen, deputies to the National People's Congress who live in the communities, property management companies serving the communities, workers of functional government departments located in community territories, and residents' representatives. If needed, chief leaders of social organizations and residents whose interest is directly related to the issues are invited to participate in the conference (Yu 2013).

In this process, representatives of all organizations and residents negotiate with others as independent interested subjects. They are not leading or being led by others at least in the decision making process. Li (2002) argues on the basis of her research conducted in Kangjiang community, Shanghai city that, although the relationship between community Party committees and the three most important community organizations, that is, CRCs, property owners' committees and property management companies are organizationally bureaucratic, in practice, it was hard to identify the leaders, coordinators and co-operators among them. This point is also supported by Chen's (2004) research in Cangshui community, Gulou sub-district, Haishu district, Ningbo city. Chen found that, since many members of the community consultative conference were from cadres at posts, retired leaders of various organizations, public figures, community Party committees and CRCs could not simply issue orders to them. Instead, they were respectful and to some extent relied on those representatives for their prestige and social networks to

solve community problems.

De-institutionalized interaction between community Party committees and residents

The limit of Party power in community is not only embodied by the negotiation relation between community Party committees and community autonomous organizations and other interest groups within the urban community, but also reflected in the interaction between community Party committees and Party member residents and activists (*jiji fenzi*, 积极分子), as well as in the interaction between Party member residents and ordinary residents. Since the community Party committees are not in charge of any crucial economic and political for resources of community residents, when they mobilize Party member residents and ordinary residents, they have to adopt a more euphemistic ways.

On the one hand, when community Party committees engage Party member residents and other active community representatives, they follow a ‘mobilize and return’ mode. Party-members respond to the call of community Party committees and then those community Party committees return them with some kinds of rewards, especially honorary rewards. The responses of Party members to these community Party committees are obviously lack of institutional imperative and drive but are rather based on the individual’s willingness. Therefore, members of community Party committees and CRCs need to keep close and friendly private relationships with Party members and activists.* This argument is strongly

* According to Gui, the mechanism of activists in Chinese urban community is different from that

supported by Wu's study (2007) on W compound, JN community, Shanghai city. The Party committee and residents' committee of JN community asked Party-member residents and activists to help them to complete tasks or collect information on community residents and then they would pay them something in return.

On the other hand, the interaction between Party-member residents, as representatives of community Party committees and CRCs, and ordinary residents is even more private and informal. In order to be better understood and accepted by ordinary residents, representatives of community Party committees and residents' committees strategically act in the same way of ordinary residents and wrap their purposes in informal and colloquial words (Gui 2007).

This deinstitutionalized and informal way of interaction fully utilizes the informal resources available, especially those accessible through private relationships. In these contexts, private relationships, identity and trust are more important in the interaction process than the identity of government deputy. This process successfully facilitates the realization of Party-state policies and orders and substantially reduces the costs of grassroots administration. Nevertheless, the nature of the deinstitutionalized and informal way of community mobilization,

of Western volunteers in that they are mainly based on private social relationships and *mianzi* (private honor). Gui, Yong. 2007, Neighbourhood Politics: Power Manipulation Strategies in Urban Grassroots and the Pattern of Cohesion between the State and the Society. (Linli Zhengzhi: Chengshi Jiceng de Quanli Caozuo Celue yu Guojia-Shehui de Nianlian Moshi), *Chinese Public Affairs Quarterly*, 3:1, pp. 91-113

which has little imperative force, is also a reason that the power of Party-state is dissipated. Moreover, Gui (2007) argues that through this private and informal way, policies and orders are passed in informal and colloquial neighbourhood words and so often perverted, while community residents' shows largely surface courtesy agreement. He even asserts that the Party-state is no longer has control over grassroots society.

Conclusion

In all these ways, social transformation and the decline of the *danwei* system has driven the Party-state of China to adjust its authority system. Governmental power has been contracted from the community and been rebuilt at the sub-district level, which means the control of governmental power on individuals has decreased. To strengthen the power of the Party-state at both community and individual levels, the Party-state has launched 'the rebuilding of the Party branch system' program and has kept emphasizing the leadership role of Party organizations at all levels.

In this chapter, the strategies involved in the rebuilding of the Party branch system at the community level has been analysed, including the processes of expanding the coverage of the Party system, defining the leadership of Party organizations in community life, and put the Party members in key positions of community activities. The power of Party has penetrated into the urban local community through these visible and invisible networks. And this penetration is more resilient and adaptive than the influence of sub-district office on CRCs. For these reasons, Benewick and Tong *et al.* (2004) also believe the Power of the Party has been strengthened rather than been weakened. As parties move from mass to cartel

parties, the CCP has intensified its mass base in an effort to maintain stability and control. But as has been evident in this chapter it has been at the expense of any other competing source of political representation.

From another point view, the power of Party has been dissipated due to the social tendency of de-collectivization and de-centralization. Today's community cannot be a substitute for *danwei* as a government unit because of the different nature of community administration structure and the formal Party system. First, the relation between community Party organizations and community autonomous organizations and other community interest groups are based on negotiation and relatively equal. Secondly, the control of community Party organizations over community Party members and residents is loose and weak. They have to employ the 'mobilize and return' mode to engage community Party members and residents. Thirdly, the interaction between community Party members, activists and residents is informal and private. The utilization of informal resources by community Party organizations is a result of the shortage of political and institutional resources. These informal factors, operating through private social relationships and private honour among community residents, pervert policies and orders or lead to mere perfunctory acceptance of them. From this perspective, the power of Party has decreased. In brief, the process of the rebuilding of the Party branch system in Chinese urban local communities is also a negotiation process between the Party-state and the society.

7 Chinese Democratization and Urban Community Construction as a Strategy of Grassroots Governance

As discussed in previous chapters, trust, community participation and community autonomy are closely related to the development of Chinese democracy, either as an index of democracy or having influences on the democratization process. However, in Chinese urban communities, there is a complex relationship between trust, community participation and autonomy and the role of government that goes beyond representative democracy. The analysis in chapter four of resident in Nanjing, supported by other quantitative surveys show clearly that community construction is deeply linked to the efforts by the Party-state to regain legitimacy in the urban areas. The link between a Chinese-form of democratic grass-roots action and the role of the CCP in fostering such actions raises new questions over the applicability of liberal-democratic theory, as it has emerged from the dominant US school, and its application to China in general and to democratic community construction in China in particular.

According to previous discussion, the efforts made by the Chinese Party-state to reshape the relationship between the state and society during the process of Chinese urban community construction were discussed from three perspectives: community social capital, community autonomy/participation, and the rebuilding of the Party branch system in urban local communities. From the analysis, we can see that the purpose of the Party-state of China has been to establish a ‘strong state, strong society’ model. During this process, the social system as a whole and the freedom of individuals have developed, along with the decline in Communist ideology that can give shape to the ‘social imagination’ (Bourdieu 1986) to

action, as such the control of the state over the society and individuals has considerably decreased. However, the influences of the former highly centralized state-society relationship remain whilst the efforts of the Party-state to strengthen and extend its power into basic level society in turn sets limitations on the development of social capital and individual freedoms and rights.

The survey data from Chapter four indicates that the debates on democracy in regard to China are less pertinent at the community construction level than is expected from outside observers. This chapter will explore the democratic debate to illustrate that more work is needed to relate abstract democratic theory to the lived experience of urban people in China, as seen in the survey evidence. Community participation/autonomy and the State-society relation are highly subject to the relative degree of the respective social system. In addition to the already discussed factors, there are still other cultural, historical and economic factors affecting the State-society relation in China.

From this chapter, it can be seen that Chinese citizens' appeal for democracy is secondary to some other social characteristics such as country's prosperity, social stability and good governance. The relationship between democratization and strengthened Party-state authority in China is not simply opposite. Thus it is possible for the Party-state of China to obtain new legitimacy while strengthening its own power.

Determinants of democracy

As we saw earlier in the Chicago School and through to Putnam social capital and community networking was envisaged against a liberal democratic backdrop. This

was particularly the case with (Bourdieu 1986, Putnam 1993), whereas the rational choice theorists concentrated on individual choices, assuming the social system was the product of self-interested actions. The larger notion of social capital within a democratic society assumes that democracy is unquestioned. Historically, democracy was defined in the Western academic arena from various perspectives, with the American academy taking a prominent role as it assumed the 'end of ideology', with America as the ideal-type society against the other extreme that of communism. In this binary divide democracy was defined by Lipset in terms of stage development, economic modernization would lead inevitably to liberal democracy. Lipset wrote that:

Democracy (in a complex society) is defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office (1959, p. 71).

Cohen offers a less stage and binary theory arguing that:

Democracy is government by people. This is a definition most dictionaries report and one likely to meet with general approval (1971, p. 3).

Arblaster offers a theory that extends democracy to an aspirational level,

an ideal to be aspired by all but one that is inadequately achieved in representative democratic systems. He writes that:

Probably the basic ideas of democracy – the idea of equal political rights for all (or at least for all men), the idea of a government of the poor or of the people, the idea of turning the traditional social hierarchies upside down – have never been entirely lost sight of among the vast submerged majorities of history (1987, p. 26).

Birch defined democracy as a political system:

The term ‘democracy’, in its modern sense, came into use during the course of the nineteenth century to describe a system of representative government in which the representatives are chosen by free competitive elections and most male citizens are entitled to vote (1993, p. 46).

Due to the clearly contextual and ideological limitations of these definitions, democracy in its Western meaning is problematic for China. The Lipset assumption that economic development would lead somewhat inevitably to a mature democratic society is open to many counterfactual examples (e.g. Singapore). The ideal of democracy is not tainted by the limitations of democracy with the power of stakeholders in Western society. In China, the democracy advocated assume certain teleology of modernization leading to the political modernization. In contrast, the concept of democracy is far from the democracy evident in Western party pluralism discourse. It is understood that the development of democracy should be led and guided by the Party-state and not

allowed to threaten the current regime. As a matter of fact, the practice of the Western model of democracy in contemporary China is out of the question due to the weak state of the civil society. Just as in Gao's opinion (2011), "Democracy whether as ideal or practice is not a simple matter of yes or no for China." Nevertheless, despite the differences between Chinese practice and Western democracy, democratization in China, in other words, decisions, measures, and changes made to increase the power of society and individuals or to improve human conditions, is feasible and foreseeable. If it is considered in terms of the real situation in China and not as part of an idealized teleology seeking to be imposed on China in the search of sameness (Gao 2011).

However, from the perspective of democratization in China, factors both positive and negative are extremely complicated. To understand deeply the influence of community construction on the process of Chinese democratization, the issues need to be considered in a more general background and along with other influential factors.

The topic of the determinants of democracy is not fresh in the international academic arena. In an early study, Lerner (1958, quoted from Lipset 1959) assumed that capitalism would inevitably lead to democracy, sighting high voting rates as closely correlated with urbanization, literacy, media consumption and production, and education. He asserts that democracy is a part of a highly developed phase of modernization, while the other variables are evident in previous historical phases.

Lipset (1959) used the same state theory introduces several related variables,

namely wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education, into the economic development complex and insists that they are all positively related to democracy. As he puts it: ‘the average wealth, degree of industrialization, and urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries.’ His argument is widely acknowledged as the ‘Lipset Hypothesis’ that economic development is favourable to the development of democracy.

Compared to the practical and simpler argument of Lipset, Cohen (1971) summarizes the determinants of democracy in a more detailed and comprehensive way. According to Cohen, conditions for the emergence and maintenance of democracy can be categorized into four groups: *material conditions* – environmental conditions, mechanical conditions, and economic conditions; *constitutional conditions* – political freedoms and freedoms of speech; *intellectual conditions* – provision of information, the education of citizens and the arts of conferral owned by citizens; and *psychological conditions* – recognition that citizens must be fallible, experimentally minded, critical, flexible, realistic, compromising, tolerant, objective and confident.

Most of these conditions are related to the modernization process as it has developed in Europe and seen as being exported to undeveloped countries and areas. It ignores the history of colonial rule where economic development went hand in hand with limited democracy, limited mainly to the colonizers. The stage theory of democracy, a-historically implies, democracy is the perfect shell for democracy. The conditions usually assembled are directly related to industrialization; the education level of citizens; the demand for a modern labour force during industrialization; and, the characteristics of citizens favourable for

democracy are more likely to be developed in a modern society. Clearly, the relationships among these variables are coincident with Lerner's argument.

Furthermore, the Lipset (1959) hypothesis is still considerably influential in recent studies as the relationship between economic wellbeing and democracy is acknowledged by almost all researchers. Robert Barro (1999) supports Lipset's opinion on the basis of an empirical study in 1999. He found from a panel of over 100 countries over the years from 1960 to 1995 that standard of living was positively correlated to electoral rights, which was "a subjective indication" of democracy. He also proposes several other variables of democracy development: health indicators, upper-level schooling, inequality of income and schooling, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the rule of law, colonial history, and religion.

Nevertheless, the argument of Lipset is highly specific and ideologically loaded, as the relationships between each of the indices and democracy are not thoroughly investigated, and the causal relationship between economic development and democracy can be influenced or even interrupted by other factors, including class conflict in the United Kingdom and racial-based democracy in colonial Australia. Lipset himself warns in the same article that democracy and certain social characteristics such as per capita income, education, religions do not always exist at the same time: "because to the extent that the political sub-system of society operates autonomously," a political form might be sustained in a different social condition from the one in which it emerged and developed (Lipset 1959, p. 72).

In 2006, Robinson argues that the factors of democracy development such as per capital income, "were jointly determined in equilibrium" (Robinson 2006, p. 524).

He found on the basis of his empirical studies that the hypothesized positive relationship between per capita income and democracy was not supported by the evidence. In his model, he separates pure economic development from other social characteristics, and asserts that economic development influenced other forces which were also needed by democracy, such as rising inequality, changing productive relationships, workers migrating from rural areas to urban areas, technology, and the increasing importance of physical and human capital.

These factors are closely, even if not causally, associated with democracy. Some scholars have already witnessed the supposed ‘lagging’ of democracy behind economic development in several countries such as Singapore and Japan. In contrast, the vibrancy of democracy in India has large areas of underdevelopment and unequal income and educational conditions. Things are even more complicated in China as it is implored with a certain missionary zeal to adopt the US model (Bell 2006). Some generally acknowledged variables from all the ideal-type examples mentioned above, including interest factors aroused by economic development, urbanization, education, and the development of the middle class, will be explored in the following heuristic analysis about the Chinese democratization process, together with some of the social conditions peculiar to China.

Factors influencing democratization in China

As a practical level, Chen commented that “Democratization is the bumpy, slow process of giving people a bit more power than they had before” in complex and diverse contexts (Cheng 2011, p. xxii). Factors in China cannot be simply

classified as positive or negative to democratization, since most of them generate some degree of democratic demands; meanwhile they are simultaneously moderately supportive to the current regime. Some important indices will be discussed here separately.

Traditional political thought in China

The first factor to be taken into consideration is the traditional political thought of China. Confucianism, which was taken by the Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty as the superior political principle, has not only influenced the norms in Chinese people's daily lives, but also shaped their political attitudes. Over 2,000 years of history, the only way for most Chinese people to access political power was to pass the imperial competitive examinations. The content and criteria of those examinations were largely based on Confucian classical principles. Ewald (1990) noticed how these political and cultural norms were exercised in social practice in local society through gentry households and elites. Nevertheless, the influences of Confucianism on Chinese democracy has provoked considerable debate among scholars, in that some scholars insist there are democratic factors within Confucian thought (Bell 2006), others assert that Confucianism is neither democratic nor anti-democratic, but 'a-democratic' (Wang 2002, Liu and Cai 2011, Yang 2012), while still others argue that Confucianism is opposed to the development of democracy (Wang 2003, Zeng and Zhang 2008, Li 2010).

Supporters of the first opinion mainly employ the concept of '*minben*' (民本, people-oriented) to show that democratic thoughts already existed in ancient Chinese culture and were respected in Confucian classical texts. *Minben* appeared

in the Book of Documents (*Shang Shu*, 尚书) for the first time as ‘*minwei bangben*’ (民为邦本, people are the foundation of a country). According to Zhu (2012), the thought of *minben* was developed by Confucius and perfected by Mencius, then Hsun Tsu (*Xunzi*, 荀子) was the one theoretically who combined *minben* to political ideology. The core concept of *minben* is that emperors should be benevolent to their people. This can be seen as guidance or a moral imperative for emperors when they govern their countries and people.

Some Chinese scholars equate *minben* thought to democracy. Shili Xiong (1885-1968), a well-known philosopher of China and a representative personage of the school of Neo-Confucian thought, argues that that the political opinions of Confucius were authentically democratic ones (Feld and Carter 1988). According to Xiong (2013), the Confucian ideal was the uppermost phase of democracy in that there was seen to be no leader needed in a society in which all individuals behaved according to the principles of ‘*junzi*’ (君子, noblemen or gentlemen). Similarly, Qiyun Zhang (1981) argues that the idea of Mencius that the people were more important than the ruler, was the precursory thought of democracy.

However, despite these analyses, a lot more scholars have realized the difference between democracy and Confucius *minben* thoughts (Su 2010, Zhang 2010). Taking the European model as the benchmark, Liang (1996/1936) asserts that there was no democratic thought in traditional China and *minben* was no precursor of democracy. Evidence of his ideal-type are in the fact he cites the definition of democracy in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, that key characteristics of democracy are “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, while *minben* covers only two of them: ‘of the people’ and ‘for the people.’ Su (2010)

contends that the core principle of democracy is the ‘power of the majority.’ The degree of democracy is here related to the number of people who have power, who participate in decision-making, who are supportive to the final decisions and the frequency of the decision making. Meanwhile, what *minben* emphasized was the ‘common welfare’, which has nothing to do with democracy. To improve common welfare, people power could be either increased or limited; monarchism could be either supported or opposed. It was governments who protected and promoted people’s common welfare that were the governments justified by *minben* criteria. In this view, Democracy focuses on the procedure while *minben* on the outcome.

There are two branches of thought extending from knowledge of the difference between Confucianism and Western democracy. One emphasizes that they belong to different systems: Confucianism is ethical while representative democracy is political (Bell 2006). The other opinion is that Chinese traditional political thought, mainly Confucianism, presents obstacles in the way of China’s democratization.

The nonaligned opinion, summarized on the base of Hu’s article, that Chinese political culture in general and Confucianism in particular is neither positive nor negative to the development of modern democracy. They are functioning in different areas (2000). Hu contends that Confucian doctrines were more an ethics teaching than political theory because of reasons seen from two perspectives: on the one hand, the doctrines defend people’s interests and rights against despotism, encourage people’s participation in political affairs, and emphasize tendencies towards egalitarianism and civic virtue. From this point of view, Confucianism is

not an obstacle to democracy. On the other hand, Confucianism accords great importance to family, “deference to authority, the rule of men and a lack of mechanism against despotism” (Hu 2000, p. 355). The civic virtue advocated by Confucianism therefore provides no guarantee of people’s rights and interests will be aired since it does not encourage popular liberty and sovereignty (Hu 2000).

Enbao Wang and Regina F. Titunik (2000) have contested with Hu’s opinion. They thoroughly analyse the concept of *minben* and confirm the differences between *minben* and Western democracy by arguing that, “while the concept of *minben* promotes accountable government, it does not necessarily point to a democratic system as the solution to achieving accountability and public welfare” (Wang and Titunik 2000, p. 7). They too suggest that these kinds of political thoughts do not belong exclusively to certain regimes and can be adopted by both democracy and authoritarian regimes.

However, these contestations over the positive and neutral roles traditional political thought or Confucianism has played in Chinese modern history are challenged. The research of Ewald (1990) explores how the ethics principles of Confucianism have become embedded as a core part of Chinese traditional political culture through education and imperial examinations. They have apparently had significant impact on Chinese political culture. Other scholars too have found that Confucianism, in other words, the long-standing traditional political thought of China, has stood in the way of Chinese democracy. Chevrier (2012) has examined the history of democratization in the early stage of the twentieth century and found that each wave of democratization in China was accompanied by the anti-tradition tendency, such as, for example, in the May

Fourth Movement. The democratization process in China at this time was accompanied by a trend of anti-tradition activities. Chevrier attributes the failure of democracy in China to culturalism, “cultural sacrifice rather than to a political breakthrough” (Chevrier 2012, p. 377). He is highly critical of the Mao period for its stress on cultural sacrifice but evokes the post-Mao leadership to embrace the potential for a political breakthrough.

In general, Confucianism is favourable to the maintenance of an authoritarian regime in terms of both ethical discipline and political principles. Confucianism regulated the behaviours of both emperors and people. However, since the ethical discipline was employed by emperors and their governments as political ideology, the regulation requiring people’s deference to authority was thoroughly carried out and guaranteed by the award and punishment system of the state, while the supervision of emperors and governments by the people has never been realized (Zhu 2012).

It is clear that the negative impacts of traditional Chinese political thought have been lasting and still very influential in the modern history of China. In his political aspiration, Sun Yat-Sen, who put forward the ‘Three People’s Principles’ (*Sanmin Zhuyi*, 三民主义) consisting of nationalism, democracy and respect for people’s livelihood, denied the practice of individuals and interest groups acting in a political system with independent roles (Shao 1980). The influence of this kind of traditional thought can also be figured through the transition of the policies about democracy issued by the Kuomintang and the Community Party of China (Zhang 2010). During the Chinese civil war between the Kuomintang and the CPC, at the later stage of the war against Japan, both sides were eager to obtain

support from the United States and the nonaligned groups. The democracy advocated by the two parties had a strong colour of Western democracy. For instance, an editorial of the Xinhua Daily said:

In a democratic country, the sovereignty should be held by the people, which is right and proper. ...What does it mean by “sovereignty held by the people”? According to the definition of whiggism proposed by Mr. Sun Yet-sen, it means people have the rights of election and recall of government officials, and the rights to make and deny certain laws. People obtaining those four rights is the only precondition of the establishment of a democratic country...Therefore, to develop democracy in a country, the first sign and first thing to do is returning the four rights to people without any reservations (Xiao 1999, Editorial).

Nevertheless, according to Zhang (2010), the advocacy of Western democracy by the two parties was only an expedient measure to win triumph in the civil war. Once the United States decided which party to support, the two Parties naturally returned to the democracies they were able to tolerate and adopt. The CPC transformed the New Democracy (*Xin Minzhu Zhuyi*, 新民主主义), which was a coalition government consisting of various revolutionary classes, into a socialist democracy led by a proletarian class which was based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The Kuomintang also returned to a one-party dictatorship at the same time.

The influence of traditional political thought is still remarkably evident in contemporary China. Li (2010) even argues that *minben* thought should now be

abandoned because *minben* thought is not only different from democracy and but it has also cultivated a political system and culture of the 'rule of men' which has contributed to the lack of a democratic regime and civil awareness. People can mainly appeal only to moral principles to protect their own rights and interests. Recently, Shi and Lu (2010) have proposed a 'paradox' of China based on their survey which showed that, while a majority of Chinese claimed they strongly supported democracy, they were also satisfied with the current one-party rule regime. Shi and Lu attribute the reason to Confucianism.

This thinking is supported by several empirical studies. Due to the ethical and moral background of traditional Chinese political thought, attitudes towards politics and political leaders are always regarded as ethical or moral issues. Chan and Nesbitt-Larking analysed the negative impacts of this blur, arguing that "it was unpatriotic to criticize leaders and government policies (1995, p. 295)." Chen *et al.* (1997) found according to their data that the "deeply-rooted culture preference for reliance on a central moral and political authority" has helped to maintain the monopoly of the current regime in China. In their survey, when they were asked to select one between two, 93 per cent of their respondents (n=700) selected to live in an 'orderly society' rather than a 'freer society'. Chen *et al.* also mentions that preference for stability and order might be due to the "the fear of socio-political chaos among Chinese people" because of over 100 years of war during the late twentieth century (Chen, Zhong *et al.* 1997, p. 48). Shubert (2012) also suggests that the preference for order and stability over participation is an important reason for the Chinese to be satisfied with limited democracy. Here there is a strong counter argument to that of Lipset's stage theory as economic

development promotes the need for economic stability (especially for the emerging middle class), which militates against dramatic political change, such as democracy.

Another important difference between Confucian political culture and Western democracy is in the assessment of government legitimacy. Shi and Lu (2010) notice the difference that, in a democratic country, regimes are accepted as legitimate only if they are established through fair election, while according to Confucian political culture, regimes' legitimacy is largely judged by the outcomes and performances of the government.

This difference in assessing government legitimacy has had profound impact on the attitudes of Chinese people towards the Party-state and also on the strategies and measures adopted by the Chinese government to generate legitimacy for itself. This point will be discussed in detail in following sections.

Ideology evolution after the 1980s—freedoms, rights and power

The ideology revolution in China during the post-Mao period is asserted by the post-Mao leadership to be related to the influence of the spread of Western democratic thought. This was meant to counter internal advocates for democracy in the four modernization periods (indicated that there would not be a fifth modernization). It was also meant to counter claims that the world was in a clash of civilization, where democracy was the 'end of history'. The international spread of democratic ideology and activities has had considerable impact on the Chinese ideology revolution. Huntington in a triumphalism tone named the democratic tendency emerging between 1974 and 1990 as a "global democratic

revolution” and the “third wave of democratization in the modern era (1991, p. 579).” In this period there were more than 30 countries transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Although Huntington observed that the external influences had little impact on democratization in certain countries, he noted that among Chinese intellectuals this widespread democratic ideology generated remarkable passion and power to promote the development of democracy in China especially by the end of the 1980s when the economic and political reform had practically released people from Communist ideology.

The reform had profound impact on official ideology and on the thinking of both government and citizens. According to Chen (1995), the economic and political reform carried out in the 1980s in China challenged both the institution of the Party and the official ideology. The policy of 'restructuring party and government institutions' was put forward in 1980 and institutionalized in 1987. Deng Xiaoping (1983, p. 133) tried to separate the state and the Party to deal with over-concentrated power in government organizations. This separation was officially confirmed by the report of Thirteenth Party Congress of CCP: "the critical point of political reform is the separation of the State and the Party" (Zhao 1987).

Through the policy of “restructuring party and government institutions”, which was put forward in 1980 and institutionalized in 1987, during the Thirteenth Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping (1983, p. 133) tried to separate the state and the Party to deal with over-concentrated power in government organizations. Election and recall of organization leaders was to be decided by workers’ congress instead of the Party secretaries. As a result, Party leaders in both rural villages and urban work units lost their control on production. The application of this policy brought

negative impacts on the Party system across the country. At the grassroots-level, Party organization almost “lost its sense of mission and its reason for existence” (Chen 1995, p. 24). Grassroots-level Party organizations had tremendous difficulties collecting dues from members and getting new party members. Furthermore, during the economic and political reform, together with the ‘reassessment’ of Mao and his ideology, the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought was significantly weakened. This prevailing ideological structure was not only questioned in respect to its applicability to China, it was also degraded (Chen 1995). Instead of maintaining the utopian aspiration of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, Deng developed a pragmatic theory to support the economic reform. This economy-oriented ideology was soon accepted by the Chinese government and people, which brought about numerous social problems such as the corruption of government officials and the decline of traditional morals. However, it indeed emancipated people’s thinking from highly regulated and ossified official ideology and gave people more freedom to receive and develop new ways of thinking. A change facilitated by the outpouring of Chinese students studying in Western-English rich countries.

The ideological contestation was not stopped by the political turbulence around 1989, although it paused for a short period after the Tiananmen Incident. According to Ding (2000), the pre-Tiananmen discussions focused on criticism of the notion of unity of interests between state and people, as unity of interests was thought to be negatively related to democracy. They differentiated state and society, and advocated adjusting the state-society relationship and developing a

civil society. Social interest differentiation and pluralism were widely accepted by scholars (Zhang 1988, Zhuo 1988, Shi 1989). After the Tiananmen Incident, the development of democratic thought suffered an ebb period from late 1989 to 1991; however, the discussions about the state-society relationship recovered after 1992 and obtained more acceptances (Ding 2000). This acceptance was largely due to the thought that free market modernization would inevitably lead to democratization. Thus the market reform led by the Party-state of China has obtained supports from democracy advocators. Nevertheless, the success of economic reform actually strengthened the legitimacy of the Party-state of China.

Although the Party-state realized the risk of the spread of democratic and liberal thought to its regime, it basically connived to respond to that phenomenon. In addition, the government itself was influenced by the ideological transition. Gu (2000) found that during the 1990s, the Party-state of China became a network consisting of bureaucratic elites, whose authority and power based largely on economic development brought by the post-1978 reform instead of communist ideology.

Thus the development of liberal ideology was apparent in the observation of scholars and especially among university students. The number of students who were supportive of individualism rose significantly before and after 1989. A survey conducted by Zhang Yuanlong showed the tendency from 1985-1987 (see Table 7-1) while Min Yongxin in 1996 found a continuous increase during the 1990s (see Table 7-2)(Chan 2000).

Table 7-1: Question: What is your opinion on "individual struggle"? (Burton and Reitz 1981,

p. 61, quoted from Chan 2000, p. 210)

Question: What is your opinion on “individual struggle”? (%)		
	It will lead to individualism and should not be encouraged	It is the basic factor leading to success and should be strongly encouraged
1985	6.1%	20.4%
1986	3.5%	32.1%
1987	1.4%	42.5%

Table 7-2: Question: What is your view on "individualism"? (Michelson 1976, p. 38, quoted from Chan 2000, p. 211)

Question: What is your view on “individualism”? (%)	
1. We should not object to it because it drives personal and social progress.	12.8%
2. Under a socialist market economy, it is rational to have it.	55.0%
3. It should be objected to because it is the major value of the bourgeois class.	32.2%

Thus the relationship between socialism and capitalism has witnessed the decline of the former’s importance. According to Chan (2000), three surveys were conducted among university students in 1996, 2001 and 2012 in which students’ attitudes towards this ideological value issue were similar, while notably the related questions did not even appear in the third survey. In the first two surveys, only less than half of the participants (47.95% in 1996 and 48% in 2001) were confident of the statement that “socialism will eventually win over capitalism.” 47.91% of the respondents in 1996 did not care about the ideological difference as long as there were favourable outcomes (see Table 7-3).

Table 7-3: Investigation on the condition of political thinking in Shanghai Universities in 1996 (Whyte

1956, p. 17, quoted from Chan 2000, p. 225)

Do You Agree with the Following Statements? (%)				
	Agree	Don't Agree	Hard to Judge Now	Never Think about It
Socialism will eventually win over capitalism.	47.95	11.39	33.79	5.00
Socialism and capitalism will merge and eventually become one.	29.16	40.46	20.25	7.97
As long as people are rich and the country is strong, it does not matter what system we practice.	47.91	38.39	8.54	2.97

Similarly, according to the data collected in 2001(Lou 2001), 42% of respondents (n=2262) believed 'privatization' (*siyouhua*, 私有化) was a necessary choice for the development of China. 38% and 23% respectively answered "hard to judge" for the two questions that asked whether socialism would eventually win over capitalism, and privatization was necessary for China.

Another investigation on the political attitudes of university students in Shanghai was conducted in 2012 by CCP Commission of Shanghai Municipal Education Committee and Shanghai Municipal Commission of Health and Family Planning (2012). Here, the emphasis was shifted from ideological issues to concrete social problems and government policies and focused on topics such as corruption, the gap between the rich and the poor, and between diverse areas, unaffordable prices of real estate, difficulties in job-seeking and unemployment, inflation, and separation of activities based on nationality. The first five issues were the ones that obtained most attention from the students.

Though all these ideological tendencies observed seem to indicate a hopeful future for the development of Chinese democracy, there are still negative ideological factors that should not be neglected.

First and foremost, although democratic thought has already spread and developed for quite a long time in China, it is still not fully or correctly understood by a large proportion of Chinese people. Through their survey, Shi and Lu (2010) found that 42% of their participants from China had no idea of the meanings of democracy (see Table 7-4).

Table 7-4 Different understandings of democracy (Shi & Lu, 2010, p. 128)

	Taiwan		PRC	
	Weighted Percentage	Raw Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Raw Frequency
Procedural	29.7	(466)	24.6	(819)
Minben	6.7	(96)	14.1	(541)
Mixed	1.8	(26)	4.6	(174)
Others	39.8	(550)	14.7	(536)
Don't Know	22.1	(277)	42.0	(1113)
<i>Source: ABS II (n=3,183 for the PRC; n=1,415 for Taiwan)</i>				


Moreover, for most Chinese people, the importance of political democracy lags well behind several other social characteristics. A survey conducted by Dowd, Carlson *et al.* (2000) in Beijing provides clear evidence of this statement. Participants of the survey were allowed to select only one choice. Table 7-5 below shows that political democracy ranked only the fifth place among the six social characteristics for these respondents.

Table 7-5: Question: Which of the following values is most important? (Dowd, Carlson *et al.*

2000, p. 194)

Which of the following values is most important?	
Category	Percentage of respondents (n = 916)
Individual freedom	6.3
Public order	4.7
Fair administration of justice	13.0
Social equality	10.0
Political democracy	5.8
National peace and prosperity	56.0
Don't know	4.2

Furthermore, the extent of political tolerance among Chinese people towards those who held a different perspective, which was regarded by Nathan and Shi (Nathan and Shi 1993) as a fundamental political dimension of democracy, was not encouraging in their study. They found that Chinese people had the least political tolerance of different opinions and activities when compared with six other highly developed democratic countries (see Figure 7-1). They also point out that political tolerance was associated with education, as their data showed that the most intolerant group across the seven countries was Chinese illiterates. It might now be expected that the fast expanding education industry in China would improve the average degree of political tolerance of Chinese in the future.

Figure 7-1: Political tolerance: Percentages allowing unpopular

From the figure and tables above, it can be seen that, before 2000, the Chinese people's understanding of and need for democracy were, to some extent, insufficient. However, according to surveys conducted by the Washington Pew Research Centre in 2007, the awareness of democracy has notably improved (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 2007, p. 7). Half of the surveyed Chinese people (n=3142) (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 2007, p. 10) selected a good democracy as more important, and this was more than the people who preferred a strong economy (44%). Furthermore, although the preferences for democracy and strong leader were almost evenly divided among the surveyed Chinese, democracy was selected by 47%, that is, slightly more than those who selected a strong leader (45%).

However, the awareness of the importance of democracy does not necessarily lead to democratic activity. In terms of the importance of basic needs (being free from

hunger and poverty, being free from crime and violence) and prospering in the socialist market economy as distinct from basic rights (being free to speak publicly, being free to practice religion), in this study Chinese people attached far more importance to basic needs (78%) than to basic rights (19%), which means most Chinese were still more concerned about their living standards rather than democratic rights (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 2007, p. 7).

It is impossible to cover in such a short discussion all the ideological factors, positive and negative, related to the development of Chinese democracy, since they appear in every field of people's lives and relate to a variety of social and individual arenas, such as in government policies, education, economic status and so on. The conclusion here is that democratic and liberal thought has developed significantly in China since the Reform and Opening Up. It has become acknowledged by citizens and then influenced government policies and official reactions. However, the concept of democracy has not been well understood by Chinese people and the importance attached to it is limited as a majority of Chinese people are more interested in economic stability as it relates to the concrete outcomes of government policies and the performance of government officials.

Complexity of economic development

A further factor influencing the democratization of China is economic development, which, with its consequent social changes, is always related to the development of democracy. Although Robinson (2006) argues there is no causal relationship between income per capita and democracy, he does not deny the

overall relationship between complex economic development and democracy. In this section, several social changes in China which were brought about by economic development will be analyzed, including the significant emergence of various interest groups, the promotion of life satisfaction and civil law legislation. The emergence of a middle class, which is also an outcome of economic development, will be discussed in the following section.

The existence of interest groups is a presupposition of representative rather than ideal democracy, as Cohen (1971, p. 41) points out: “the process of democracy is the process of group participation in common government.” According to Cohen, the emergence and existence of groups is the basis for democracy. Those groups, which may vary in their size, locality, duration, formality of membership, and exact or inexact organization, are founded on common interests or shared problems.

As an important mechanism in response to aggregate demands, the emergence and development of interest groups has had great impact on Chinese democracy. During the period of a highly planned economy, Chinese people and their interests were firmly united together with the state. A large proportion of the national income of China was state financial income, while the average income of people was very low (Lu and Shao 2001). Lu and Shao (2001) also point out that in this period ordinary Chinese people could only afford “basic consumer goods” as they were highly dependent on welfare provided by government and their work units. In this case, people had few private interests and the system was not likely to foster plural interests let alone interest groups. This situation has changed significantly during the adoption and development of the market economy. Since

the launch of the Reform policy, the non-state-owned enterprises have been admitted and encouraged, and people have been released from the centralized economic system and are now able to work for their own interests in the market.

The concept of interest pluralism (*liyi duoyuan hua*, 利益多元化) was firstly put forward in 1986 at a conference about political reform.* Interest pluralism was soon to be accepted by many scholars and it was seen as directly related to economic development, participation and political reform. It was officially admitted by the government in 1987 during the Thirteenth Congress of the Community Party of China, and today it has become a consensus across the country. The Party-state allows social and governmental organizations at all levels to own and pursue their own interests. In this context, the conflicts among interest groups and the resulting disorder in economic and social life have also required the Chinese government to adopt new administrative policies to provide platforms and channels for interest groups to negotiate with each other (Han 2007). However, despite the existence and development of these plural interests, the interest groups themselves are playing an insignificant role in political activities due to the strong control of the society by the state. An example presents a telling case: according to a report by Kuhn (2009), the parents of victims of poisoned

* Li Kejing, "Woguo de zhenzhi tizhi gaige yu zhengzhixue de fazhan—Zhaongguo shehui kexue zazhishe zhaokai de 'zhengzhi tizhi gaige' xueshu zuotanhui zongshu" (China's political system reform and development of political science—A summary of the conference on political system reform organized by the Chinese Journal of Social Sciences), *Zhongguo Shehui Kexue* (Chinese Social Sciences) 4 (1986), 3-14. Cited from Ding, Y. (2000). *The Conceptual Evolution of Democracy in Intellectual Circles' Rethinking of State and Society*. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280. P. 118

milk united together in 2008 to protest against the result of their claims and sought compensation when their attempts to communicate and meet with each other failed due to interruption by the government.

Another consequence of economic development in relation to democracy is the development of civil law legislation, which has arisen from frequent economic activities. Gu summarizes two core elements of democracy: that “all members of a society (citizens) have equal access to power and... all members (citizens) enjoy universally recognized freedoms and liberties”, both of which seem coincident with principles of law (2011, p. 101). Like the standard Western approach, Gu puts forward his belief that economic development will eventually lead to political democracy. During this process, Gu argues, civil law legislation will play an important role in improving China’s democratization through two rights endowed by civil laws to people: “freedom of exercising private property ownership and freedom of conducting trade and businesses. (Gu 2011, p. 102)” Further, research conducted by Li (2009) to explore the relationship between house ownership and political participation also shows that in newly built residential compounds, the house ownership was positively related to community participation, at least in relation to neighbourhood affairs. Li found no significant difference between house owners and non-owners in the communities that were fully covered by residents’ committees and Party organizations (2009). Conversely, such community engagement could be interpreted not as democratic tendencies but expressions of economic interests.

Development of a Chinese middle class

China has witnessed a rapid increase in its middle class. Because of the different criteria applied by scholars in the early years of the twenty-first century, such as professions, income, education, and identity, the percentages of middle class in the Chinese population were variously described as ranging from 4.1% to 25% (Li 2001, Xiao 2001, Li 2005). Li (2008) compares these studies and argues that in 2008 the middle class constituted 4% to 5% of the overall population of China and about 10% of the urban population. The proportion in big cities was between 12% and 15%. Li proposed that this number would increase during the last five years since 2008.

Although both Lipset and Huntington affirm the positive influence of a large middle class on the democratization process, it is hard to say whether the development of a middle class is positive or negative to China's democracy due to the dual characters of them (Lipset 1960, Huntington 1991). Moreover, as the last chapter revealed the role of the party within the place of employment was high and the dominant place played by state enterprises gives a differing character to the deterministic claim that the middle class in China is a nascent entrepreneurial bourgeoisie ready to assert political power.

In order to explore this question, Li (2008) compared the political attitudes of middle class participants with those of other groups such as the proletarian class and entrepreneurs, focussing on five perspectives: their view of their personal life, their attitudes towards security, trust towards government, evaluation of social conditions, and identification with state authority. The middle class here was

divided into the new middle class and the marginal middle class.* The data implied that for the first four elements, the middle class had similar positive attitudes to other groups: 80.2% of the new middle class thought society was stable and 75.2% thought the society was harmonious, which could be interpreted as meaning they lacked the motivation to reform the current political system. For the last aspect, identification with state authority, the new middle class held apparently less positive attitudes than the other groups, though their identification with state authority was not very low. When asked their opinion towards the statement “people should listen to government, while the inferior should listen to the superior”, 42.7% of the new middle class agreed, 50.7% of the marginal middle class agreed, while 60-62% of the other groups agreed. Thus, Li concludes that the middle class was moderate in their attitude to the benefits they obtained through the reform process and fast economic development. And also, they required more democratic rights to improve their life standards, which was a drive of political reform but not if it challenged harmony.

The outcomes of So and Su’s research (2011) supports Li’s argument. They analysed the major political activities the middle class took part in and the mode of their political participation, and also the relationship between the middle class and the Party-state. Based on their data analysis, they assert that the Chinese

* Middle class in Li’s research is defined according to an EAMC project which was conducted Hisao in 1999, including medium or low level technicians and managers (also named the new middle class), employers with less than 20 employees, normal office workers, and non-labour commercial service workers (the marginal middle class) (see Hisao, H.-H. M., Ed. (1999). East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective. Taipei, Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.)

middle class might be conducting a “quiet democratization” for three reasons: first, the interests of middle class were in harmony with government policies; secondly, the Party-state were intentionally protecting and aiming to improve the welfare of the middle class; thirdly, while a large proportion of the middle class were working for government or social organizations related to government, the government was still making efforts to recruit them into the governmental system. Therefore, while they might criticize the concrete policies and performance of the government, this research suggests that the middle class was unlikely to threaten the basic political system as it was fully integrated into it and its collective interests were tied to the Party-state.

Education and age

Not least in the consideration of these significant influences, education has been widely admitted to be a factor of democracy development. Among the conditions of democracy categorized by Cohen (1971), level of education is an important element of the intellectual conditions required for successful democracy in that it is related to the capacities of people to perform properly and effectively in political activities. Again there is clearly a Western-centric worldview at work here. Leaving this to one side, Cohen maintains that democracy is not likely to succeed and last without an educated citizenry who can receive and absorb information and deal skilfully with common problems in alliance with each other. The importance of education is also stressed in Nathan and Shi’s (1993) work in relation to several aspects. First, an “awareness of government’s impact”, which is regarded as a source of people’s political interests and willingness to participate, was substantially associated with perceiving the salient impacts of government in

their lives. Secondly, the educational levels of the citizenry were also influential on their expectations of equal treatment by government; the data showed that less than 44% of the Chinese college graduates did not expect equal treatment by government authorities, while this was more than 44% less than their counterparts in the USA. Thirdly, educational levels were highly correlated to the degree of political tolerance. On the basis of their empirical study these authors argue that “the less educated are less tolerant and more authoritarian”. This is a unremarkable finding as it assumes low income implies political ignorance, which runs in the face of the long history of peasant political rebellion in China but across the world.

Despite these Eurocentric discussions of the relationship between education and democratization, it seems that the difference in attitudes towards democracy is not significant among Chinese people of various educational backgrounds. Dowd *et al.* (2000) found through their survey of residents in Beijing that there was not an obviously positive relationship between educational backgrounds and preference for democracy. Although the percentages of respondents with incomplete university education and Master’s degrees who attached superior importance to political democracy ranked the top two among all the surveyed groups, when the small proportion of these two groups in the total population (0.7% and 0.8%) was compared with another standard of tertiary education, that of “complete university education (9.7%), the significance of education for democracy was not seen to be encouraging in China (see Table 7-6).

Table 7-6 Cross-tabulation of most important value by level of education (Dowd, Carlson *et al.* 2000, p. 196)

Cross-Tabulation of Most Important Value by Level of Education (% n = 916)								
Education level	Individual freedom	Public order	Fair justice	Social equality	Political democracy	National peace and prosperity	Don't know	Total
None	6.4	2.1	6.4	12.8	4.3	31.9	36.2	5.2
Primary School	6.5	9.7	12.9	3.2	0.0	48.4	19.4	3.4
Elementary School	4.9	4.9	3.3	13.1	13.1	52.5	8.2	6.7
Junior School	8.4	3.5	11.9	14.1	6.6	53.3	2.2	25.1
High School	7.6	4.2	13.8	10.4	3.5	59.2	1.4	31.9
Technical College	2.0	6.1	14.9	6.1	7.4	63.5	0.0	16.3
University (Incomplete)	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	16.7	33.3	16.7	0.7
University (Complete)	3.4	6.8	20.5	5.7	4.5	59.1	0.0	9.7
Master's Degree	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	71.4	0.0	0.8
Ph.D.	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.2

On the surface this outcome seems surprising, as it has already been established in previous sections that Western liberal ideology has been well received by university students. Che-po Chan (2000) observed the paradox between university students' attitudes towards individualism, the Party and democracy. He analysed data collected in 1995 and 1996 about the purposes of university students in applying for CCP membership, and found that, though the willingness of university students to join the Party had dropped in the late 1980s after the 1989 movement, the willingness gradually increased again after the mid-1990s. As

Chan (2000) says, in a survey conducted in a university of Beijing, in the late 1980s, 90.7% of students did not want to join the CCP, and 66.5% of students did not want to take part in any CCP or Chinese Youth League activities. This percentage dropped to 30 to 40% in the mid-1990s. However, more than half the students held the idea that the applying for membership of the CCP was for their own benefit, practical interests or to pursue good study and career conditions.

Table 7-7: Question: Why do you think your classmates apply for CCP membership? (Hall 1959, p. 33, quoted from Chan 2000, p. 224)

Why do you think your classmates apply for CCP membership? (%)		
	1995	1996
To follow their beliefs in communism	18%	17%
To pursue a virtuous personality	5.7%	17%
For practical interest considerations	54.9%	27.5%
To create a good condition for one's study and career	—	27%
Because of pressure from the surrounding environment	3.6%	2.9%
Other	14.8%	8%

Chan (2000) points out that the decline of interest in CCP membership has not led to anti-state political activities or to improving political system appeals. In addition, he found that in the 1990s both the political concerns and political participation were weak among university students. According to Chan (2000), unlike the political interest that was focused on national problems and political principles before 1989, the university students in the 1990s cared more about issues related to their own interests. In the 1996 research, only 50.5% of the respondent students were willing to pay attention to county-level election in their own localities, while the others were apathetic about such political activities.

Chan attributed the reasons for the low rate of political participation to low efficacy of participation activities and the low trust of students in the political system. He traced the root back to the 1989 movement, in that in the 1990s university students intentionally avoided such sensitive political activities that would get them into trouble. Since they were encouraged to pursue their economic welfare, they had shifted their attention from political issues to their own futures, through which they developed a sense of pragmatism as their behavioural guideline.

This de-politicization can also be seen to explain the paradox in the hypothesized relationship between age and democratic attitudes. It is supposed that younger people and the young generations of China are more inclined to political change and democracy, since they require more liberal freedoms. However, the “aging effect” and the “generation effect” have been found related to a decrease in support for and more critical attitudes towards the current political regime, while older citizens have more preference towards stability (Chan and Nesbitt-Larking 1995). This paradox is well manifested in the following data collected by Dowd *et al.* in 2000. The survey was conducted among residents of Beijing who were asked the question: “The following are various qualities; which do you feel is the most important?” According to the data, the young generation who were aged between 18 and 25 attached much more importance to individual freedom than other age groups. However, it is astonishing that their enthusiasm towards political democracy ranked last but one among all six age groups. These results also suggest that there is no substantial demand for fundamental political change in current Chinese society.

Table 7-8 Cross-tabulation of most important value by age cohort (Dowd, Carlson *et al.* 2000, p. 129)

Cross-Tabulation of Most Important Value by Age Cohort (% n = 916)								
Age	Individual freedom	Public order	Fair justice	Social equality	Political democracy	National peace and prosperity	Don't know	Total
18-25	13.3	5.0	16.7	10.0	5.0	48.3	1.7	6.6
26-34	8.5	2.8	18.6	10.7	0.6	58.8	0.0	19.4
35-44	5.8	3.9	11.0	13.3	5.2	59.5	1.3	33.9
45-54	4.4	7.4	14.8	6.7	10.4	55.6	0.7	14.8
55-64	4.2	6.3	9.9	5.6	7.7	55.6	10.6	15.6
65-74	4.5	4.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	44.9	19.1	9.8

To sum up, the mentioned four main teleological categories, historically asserted to be essential in Western democratic tendencies, that is, traditional political culture, ideology evolution, material foundation in economic and class development, as well as education and age, have had different impacts on the process of Chinese democratization. The 1949 political culture operates both backward and forward, from 1911 to 1989, and is characterised by the CCP as negative to democracy. This in turn affects the attitude of citizens for democratic change, preferring stability. The traditional criteria for assessing the legitimacy of a political regime, which were entirely subject to the performance and outcome of governance, also influenced both individuals' behaviour and attitudes towards authorities, and the state strategy for stabilizing its governance. However, the move of ideology to the market has shaken the unity and prevalent domination of Communist ideology. Citizens have begun to claim freedoms and rights of their own, with a preference for economic rights, while their understanding and demand for democracy has remained relatively low. The material factor, in other

words, economic development, has brought about various interest groups, an expanded middle class and legal legislation in the economic arena. The demands for fair treatment, highly efficient governance and fair justice have risen accordingly to promote the power of grassroots society and limit government behaviour. These political demands, nevertheless, focus only on concrete and practical government policies and performances, leaving the current regime untouched. The trends in political attitudes, analysed based on educational background and age, demonstrate the same paradox. On one hand, the young and highly educated require more freedoms, rights and better government performance; on the other, to a considerable extent they are satisfied with current regime.

Those paradoxes demonstrate the pragmatism in ideology and behaviours of Chinese people in that they care most about the political activities that have visible impacts on their lives. This is partly because, historically, they have been educated and encouraged to be obedient to authority and only judge government on the basis of its performance, and also because of the suppression by government of public discourse and intensive discussion of democracy. Also, for the Cultural Revolution generation the turmoil of heightened political campaigns and activities is to be avoided.

In this circumstance, to generate new legitimacy and gain support from its people, the Chinese government has adopted a set of strategies to fulfil people's demands for freedoms and rights, to promote government performance, and to strengthen state power. By alleviating the tensions of interest groups and the conflicts between government organs and citizens, the Party-state of China is trying to channel people's demands for power to the CCP and to an acceptable level of

tolerance so as to prevent them from thinking about intensive political reform or revolution. However, as the surveys in this chapter reveal the CCP has a real legitimacy dilemma amongst the middle class and educated youth, which is indicative of a larger sense of dissatisfaction with the Party-state, especially over corruption.

What is the Chinese government doing?

In addition to coping with the economic and social dislocation caused by industrialization and urbanization in China, it is urgent for CCP to stabilize its governance under the circumstance of declining efficiency and citizen's trust to its leadership.

To stabilize its governance, the Party-state of China has cautiously employed several correlated measures which can be categorized into two groups: the ones to generate legitimacy and social support, and the ones deliberately aimed to strengthen state power without hurting people's feelings and to suppress possible political dissidence.

Efforts to generate new legitimacy and support

Political legitimacy is the extent to which citizens "feel obliged to obey the orders of the government" and believe that the government's authority is justified (Birch 1993, p. 32). Birch (1993) argues there has been a widespread transition in modern society in that states now obtain their political legitimacy not from that of

traditional regimes but from legal-rational ones. The latter, for Birch, refer to those in which citizens will obey government orders and laws, not because of loyalty to certain persons but of the procedures through which such orders and laws are produced. In his analysis, economic development, government effectiveness and the legitimacy of a certain political system are separated (Birch 1993, p. 77).

“Effectiveness means actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and such powerful groups within it as big business or the armed forces see them. Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.... While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.”

Things are different in China, where economic development and effectiveness, along with other political performance, are all involved in the legitimacy assessment process. Shi and Lu (2010) have already noticed the difference between traditional Chinese political culture and Western democracy. In liberal democracies, governments are regarded as legitimate if they are established through fair elections, while in traditional Chinese political culture, the “substances and outcomes” of governments’ policies are the primary criteria for judging the legitimacy of them (Shi and Lu, p. 126). For the Chinese government, the most important and useful way to generate new legitimacy and win popular support is improving its performance and providing better service to the people.

This argument has been supported by several empirical studies. Chen *et al.* (1997) found that popular support for the current regime of China was related to optimistic expectation of economic and political futures, positive evaluation of government performance and high-level life satisfaction. There are also other variables related to political legitimacy analysed, including respondents' political interest, fear of socio-political chaos and key demographic attributes (Chen, Zhong *et al.* 1997). Their data, collected in Beijing in 1995, show the Party-state of China enjoyed quite considerable popular support, which was primarily from those who were optimistic about the country's economic and political futures, those who were satisfied with their material lives, those who feared social-political chaos, and those who belonged to "the pre-1949 generation" and "the 1950s-to-early 1960s generation" who had solid faith in and respect for the Communist Party.

The relationship between positive evaluation of government performance and its policies is also supported by Zhong and Chen (2013). They paid particular attention to government policy performance and effectiveness, and showed that popular satisfaction with local government performance was positively related to support for the overall political regime. Their data were collected in five big cities (Shanghai, Xi'an, Chongqing, Shenzhen and Wuhan) in the summer of 2011, which makes their conclusions quite persuasive.

In accordance with these studies, economic development has always ranked among the most important tasks of the Party-state of China, which can be witnessed clearly in the policies, conferences and speeches of government organs and leaders. Besides, the Chinese government has also issued policies to promote

people's welfare, such as improving the social security system and providing better education and health services. For instance, the state council issued *Decisions on Establishing a Unified Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise employees* in 1997 (The State Council of PRC), *Guidelines of State Council for Establishing Experimental Units for New Rural Social Endowment Insurance* in 2009 (The State Council of PRC), and *Guidelines of State Council for Establishing Experimental Units for Urban Residents' Social Endowment Insurance* in 2011 (The State Council of PRC 2011). For medical services, the *Decisions on Establishing an Urban Employees' Basic Medical Insurance System* was issued in 1998 (The State Council of PRC), and *Opinions on Establishing a New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System* in 2003 (Ministry of Health of PRC, Ministry of Finance of PRC et al.). The state council and other government organs have also issued policies about employment insurance, work-related injury insurance and a subsistence system, such as the *Unemployment Insurance Regulations* issued in 1999 (The State Council of PRC), *Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations* in 2003 (The State Council of PRC), and policies about the urban and rural subsistence system.

Other than these measures to promote people's wellbeing, the Party-state of China has also attempted to improve its own performance. The measures adopted can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, the Party-state is eager to improve the governance capability of government officials and party members. On the other hand, the discipline of government officials and party members has also been emphasized by the central government. According to Zhao and Yang (2010), the governance capability promoting programmes of the CCP include several

initiatives: the Party-state's attempts to reform and perfect the old inefficient mechanism of official recruitment, evaluation and promotion; reforms of leading groups at all levels such as through structure adjustment, a decision-making mechanism, communicate and cooperate mechanism, evaluation mechanism and supervision mechanism; and the regular, continuous education of party members on ideology, discipline and work methods. The second aspect, strengthening the implementation of Party and government discipline, is well demonstrated through a newly issued campaign advocated by the new generation of Chinese leaders: the education and practice of the Party's mass line. This new emphasis on the old concept was put forward again by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in April 2013 and was soon spread across the country. The primary message of the mass line education and practice initiative is that the work of party leaders above county and department levels should be practical and clean. The emphasis of this campaign is the improvement of work style against formality, bureaucracy, self-indulgence and extravagance (Xi 2013). However, this rectification movement is still a top-down one with open and institutionalized public supervision not included, which makes its effects uncertain and questionable. Lastly, there is a program of disciplining the Party and society through government campaigns to restore faith in the morality of the government (in a Confucius tradition), currently evident in President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign aimed at high and low party officials and economic agents.

In addition to these legitimacy-generating measures, the Party-state of China has carried out some democratic programmes in primary level society to meet citizens'

demands for freedom and power, and also to lighten its own administrative burdens. Such democratic programmes, including the self-government of villagers and urban community autonomy, although with more or less limitation, actually promote Chinese people's awareness of democracy as well as their skills in conducting democratic activities (Schubert 2012).

As this chapter has argued China's democracy and the basis for grass roots action has to be appreciated from within the basis of real China not an imposed version of China from the outside, which is meant to act like "us". Like an idealised version of the US or the West, such a version of analysis of Chinese democracy predominates in the West. For instance, Mesquita and Downs (2005) seek to explain why economic development in China has not brought democracy as the teleological predicts. The paradox is China is rich but not democratic (like 'us'). Why is this so? They isolate one factor as the reason for this paradox, the role of the Party-state to control access to democratic thought and actions as the predominant reason why the teleology is blocked. In other words economic growth and the free market do not lead to democracy because the Chinese 'authoritarian' government has become so sophisticated in controlling information and public goods that it has preventing the linear progress of history.

There is here a clear sense that the Cold War, evident in Lipset's and now Mesquita and Downs formulation, has not ended and that only with regime change can democracy come in line with the Chinese level of economic development (base). Again, as the evidence in this chapter has shown the state enterprise system in China is closely tied politically to the middle class, so there is no simple divide between the economy and the political. One could also add the

sheer diversity of China where development and underdevelopment coexist as reasons why government still play a strong role across such a diverse polity. In sum, from Lipset onward the Euro-American-centric approach to comprehend democracy in China fails to understand China and how its citizens consider political change.

Conclusion

Democratization in China is by no means separated from the practices of the Party-state but this must be evaluated on its own terms not via an imposed teleology. In this chapter, the general background and determinants of democracy development have been first introduced and then moved to Chinese society, where most social factors have ambiguous influences on democracy development. The efforts applied by the Chinese government and the CCP are analysed subsequently and show that there is a widely dispersed system of CCP influence to which the citizens engage with or are fully aware of in their decisions. To maintain control the Party has reinforced its role at the grassroots level but this has limited other means for solving social problems via more autonomous communities and constrained social capital at the community level.

From the discussion in this chapter, it is apparent that there are both positive and negative factors for Chinese democratization. While there are demands for more a democratic political system, the general attitudes of Chinese people towards the overall performance of the Party-state and the current social conditions are quite a positiveness that is politically reflective rather than as disempowered misinformed citizens. A range of traditional and ideological factors work in favour of the

current regime and provide considerable leeway for the Chinese government to adjust its policies; in Nathan and Shi's (Nathan and Shi 1993) words, the current regime of China is enjoying a "safety cushion" during the Party-state led democratization process.

Most democratic practices in present-day China are launched by the Chinese government, which makes Chinese democratization quite different from its western counterparts. The Chinese government has managed to combine together two key processes: democratization and strengthening the power of the Party-state. In this way, the government makes efforts to promote grassroots democratization, but sets limits to it. This strategy, limited democratization, is generally regarded as useful to strengthen the authority of the Party-state but unless it combines a traditional moral order, dealing with corruption, this devolution may well continue a de-legitimization trend within China. This degree of political reform will not shake its stability. Instead, it has potential to effectively prolong the one-party rule by generating new legitimacy. Besides, the government also adopts measures to generate new legitimacy for its governance, which include the promoting of basic level democracy, improving the welfare of people, strengthening the administrative efficacy of the Party and government officials, and conducting anti-corruption campaigns.

The challenges confronting the Party-state of China, such as increasing social conflict and corruption, in other words, factors contributing to the tension between state and society are rooted in the unequal and illegal distribution of interests produced during the reform process and economic development. Under the economic reform process, government organizations and officials have used their

power to make exorbitant profit, infringing the interests of economic and social organizations, as well as those of individuals (Zheng and Yang 2008). Zheng and Yang (2008) have warned that one of the aspects of the democratic movement around 1989 arose because of the corruption of government officials, growing inequality and the loss of people's respect. The problems are still severe in present-day China. Lu and Shao (2001) have also noted how capital and power were combined at the early stage of reform. The danger of the combination of capital and power has solemnly been proposed by Sun with his colleagues at Qinghua University (2012). They argue that the most dangerous issue confronting China is not the "middle income trap" but rather the "transition trap". The transition trap here means that those who obtain vested interests during the reform lock the process of reform into a 'transition', fixing certain transitional institutional elements that are in their own favour to maximize their interests. As a result, the economy and society are distorted into malformation. The essence of the transition trap is combining all the beneficial elements from new or old institutional structures to maximize the interests of a certain group people. In China, as Sun et al (2012) indicate, it has been the people who are closely related to government leaders and officials who have freely utilized government power to make profit in the economic reform process. These authors warn that Chinese society is festering since the rupture between the rich and the poor is increasing; government behaviours are increasingly seen as out of control and ordinary people are often forced into desperation.

Recently, urbanization has been further encouraged and reinforced by 18th CPC National Congress and the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central

Committee (Hu 2012, CPC Central Committee 2013). During the urbanization process, enormous interests will be generated. If the power of government and officials is not effectively supervised and checked by the Party disciplines, media or citizens, then conflicts around government organizations and officials are not likely to decrease and will instead become more acute. Since intra-party supervision is not effective so far, supervision by the media and ordinary people is crucial to control corruption and thus stabilize the one-Party rule of CPC. Otherwise, the newly generated interests and intensified social conflicts involving government organizations and officials are very likely to lead to citizens' new demands for power, which would promote democratization in a much less peaceful way.

Community construction, as a new grassroots governance strategy, is significant for CCP to generate new legitimacy by improving community life, increasing community autonomy and alleviate conflicts among social actors. It can also increase the efficiency of local governments by lightening the burden of local governments. Thus, the program of community construction is of great importance for CCP especially during the process of rapid urbanization when the authority of the Party-state gradually declines in the society with high mobility and conflicts among interest groups arise.

The impacts of community construction on Chinese democratization are complex. On one hand, the dependence of CRCs on local government for institutional and financial support, and the penetration of Party branches into community organizations effects negatively on the development of democratic activities in Chinese urban communities. On the other hand, the propaganda and

encouragement of democracy and community autonomy inevitably enhances the awareness of democracy among community residents. Community participation, whatever kind it is, provides opportunities for community residents to develop their skills of further public participation. Taking the backgrounds of Chinese democratization into consideration, although the current status of urban community construction is not impressive, a bright future can be reasonably expected.

8 Conclusion

Community construction in urban China is a complex process linked to history as well as pressures for Chinese style democratic change. Governments at all levels, scholars in relevant spheres, community residents and social organizations are all involved in this process. During the implementation of community construction, local governments and community residents are the two parties most relevant and directly connected to this project. Activities of and interaction between local governments and community residents directly influence the outcomes of community construction. Moreover, these are also profoundly affected by grand, large-scale social trends such as urbanization and modernization.

This research has investigated the actual impacts of community construction on community networks, trust, community participation and autonomy from the perspective of social capital theory, and it also discusses the possible future against the background of Chinese democratization. It has shown that there is a paradox between the need for more power at the community level separate from the CCP to blossom and gain respect but it is only by Party cadre involvement that community networks are effective.

Analysis and discussion in the thesis focus on government policies and measures, actions of CRCs and the interaction among local governments, CRCs and community residents. In terms of social networks and trust in urban local communities, these are suppressed by the social trends of urbanizations and the de-localization of social networks. Community construction, which emphasizes community service provision and welfare for the disadvantaged, has only limited

impact on the development of community networks and trust due to its lack of ability to mobilize the majority of community residents.

Community participation and autonomy are analysed in this thesis from the perspective of the identity and role played by CRCs. CRCs, as the most important community autonomous organizations, are responsible for encouraging and organizing community participation activities. However, in actual practice, CRCs usually work as branches of local governments at the neighbourhood level. Members of CRCs are nominated or appointed by local governmental departments and organizations. The CRCs are financially supported primarily by local governments and most of their work and tasks are assigned by local governmental departments and organizations. Therefore, CRCs are routinely responsible to local governments, rather than to community residents. This characteristic of CRCs gives rise to two shortcomings of their work in improving community participation: the one is that CRCs organize community activities mostly according to governments' instructions instead of to the actual needs of community residents; the other is that community activities which conflict with governmental interests are not encouraged or are even suppressed. In social contexts in which residents expand their social networks beyond the boundaries of their residential community and have fewer interests in their neighbourhoods, these two shortcomings seriously hinder the participation of the majority of community residents.

The limitations of community construction in respect to the development of community networks, trust and community participation are rooted in the pervasive influence of the Party-state of China. Particularly, the Chinese Party-

state is trying to further strengthen its power in local neighbourhoods by community Party building. It achieves this through the leading role of Party organizations in the community administrative system, the leading role of Party members in community organizations, and the mobilization of Party members in community activities. As Party-state neighbourhood power increases, CRCs and other community organizations are less likely to be able to get rid of the influences of local governments. On the other hand, due to the decline of the *danwei* system, the control of the Party-state over grassroots society and individuals has loosened. Community residents are not actively mobilized and involved in activities led by Party organizations. Therefore, the actual control of grassroots life by the Party-state is not as strong as that in *danwei* period.

The interaction between the Party-state and community residents during the process of community construction can be seen as an aspect of Chinese democratization. Discussion in Chapter 7 shows that the appeal of democracy to Chinese people is not as strong and it is differently assessed to Western counterparts. Social stability and prosperity are more favoured and emphasized in China. However, the development of education and the Chinese economy, together with the global spread of democratic thought, have increased the pressure of Chinese people for more political power. To cope with this situation, the Party-state of China has adopted several strategies to strengthen the legitimacy of its authority, such as steady development of the economy, strict regulation of Party members and government officials, as well as advocacy of ‘grassroots democracy’ in government policies. This democratization in Chinese context is different from western liberal democracy as it is a limited democracy under the control of the

Party-state of China. 'Community participation and autonomy' as an aspect of Chinese democratization and a strategy employed to improve grassroots governance, generate new regime legitimacy and alleviate social tension, is not likely to achieve full autonomy without the influence of local governments and Party organizations.

Therefore, the limitations of highly governmental-oriented feature during the process of community construction are hardly likely to be easily solved. In this case, successful implementation of community construction will depend largely on proper concrete measures which can attract and mobilise the majority of community residents to be involved in community life.

Appendix 1 Questionnaire of community social capital

Part 1 Personal information

1. Your age is
 - a. Under 18
 - b. 18-55
 - c. Above 55
2. Your employment condition is
 - a. Current student
 - b. Employed
 - c. Unemployed
 - d. Retired
3. How long have you lived in this community
 - a. Less than one year
 - b. 1-3 years
 - c. 3-10 years
 - d. More than 10 years
4. How many generations currently live in your household?
 - a. Myself
 - b. I and my wife/husband
 - c. Parents and children
 - d. Grandparents, parents and children
 - e. More than three generations
 - f. Live with non-relatives
5. The ownership of your house is?

- a. My own house
- b. Rented house
- c. House distributed by *danwei*
- d. Live in a house of friends or relatives

Part 2 Community characteristics

6. In the last three years, the overall quality of life of the people living in this community has: (consider job availability, safety and security, environment, housing, etc.)
- e. Improved
 - f. Worsened
 - g. Remained the same
7. What are the two main reasons that the quality of life in the community has improved, worsened, or remained the same during the last three years?
- a. _____.
 - b. _____.
8. Do people in this community generally trust one another in matters of lending and borrowing?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: people here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with community welfare.
- a. Strongly agree
 - b. Agree

- c. Disagree
- d. Strongly disagree

10. Does this community have a security or police force?

- a. Yes
- b. No

11. This service is provided by:

- a. The police
- b. The community
- c. A private company

12. This security service is provided to:

- a. The entire community
- b. Most of the community
- c. About half the community
- d. Less than half/very few

13. In the last three years, the quality of the security service has:

- a. Improved
- b. Worsened
- c. Remained the same

14. Overall, the current environmental condition of the community is:

- a. Very good
- b. Good
- c. Average
- d. Poor
- e. Very poor

15. In the last three years, the environmental condition of the community has:

- a. Improved
- b. Worsened
- c. Remained the same

16. What are the two main actions that could be taken to improve the environmental conditions in this community?

- a. _____.
- b. _____.

Part 2 Structure social capital

17. Type of house which you are living in:

- a. Individual house
- b. Open roof and patio
- c. Apartment
- d. Room within a large house
- e. Other

18. This home is:

- a. Owned and completely paid for
- b. Owned with a mortgage
- c. Rented
- d. Given in exchange for service
- e. Squatter
- f. Other

19. How does this household dispose of most of its garbage?

- a. Public garbage service
- b. Private garbage service

- c. Throw in vacant lots
- d. Throw in river, stream, ocean
- e. Burn and/or bury
- f. Other (specify)

20. How many generations are living in this house?

- a. Couple
- b. Couple and children
- c. Couple, children and grandparents
- d. More than three generations

21. Are you or is someone in your household a member of any groups, organizations, or associations?

Do you consider yourself/household member to be active in the group, such as by attending meetings or volunteering your time in other ways, or are you relatively inactive? Please specify in the following form:

Household member	Name of organization	Type of organization (use codes below)	Degree of participation (use code below)
------------------	----------------------	---	---

--	--	--	--

--	--	--	--

--	--	--	--

Type of Organizations

1. Farmers'/fishermen's group	11. Religious group
2. Cooperative	12. cultural association
3. Traders' association/business group	13. Political group
4. Professional association	14. Youth group
5. Trade union	15. Women's group
6. Credit/finance group	16. Parent group
7. Water/waste group	17. School committee
8. Neighbourhood/village association	18. Health committee
9. Civic group	19. Sports group
10. NGO	20. Other

Degree of participation

Leader	1
Very active	2
Somewhat active	3
Not active	4

22. Which of these groups is the most important to your household?

Group 1: _____.

Group 2: _____.

Group 3: _____.

23. Do you think that by belonging to this group you have acquired new skills or learned something valuable?

a. Yes

b. Now

24. In the past year, how often have members of this village/neighbourhood gotten together and jointly petitioned government officials or political leaders with village development as their goal?

a. Never

b. Once

c. A couple of times

d. Frequently

25. Was this action/were any of these actions successful?

a. Yes, all were successful

b. Some were successful and others not

c. No, none were successful

26. How often in the past year have you joined together with others in the neighbourhood to address a common issue?

- a. Never
- b. Once
- c. A couple of times
- d. Frequently

27. In the last three years have you personally done any of the following things?

Yes No

- a. Voted in the election
- b. Actively participated in an association
- c. Made a personal contact with an influential person
- d. Made the media interested in a problem
- e. Actively participated in an information campaign
- f. Actively participated in an election campaign
- g. Taken part in a protest march or demonstration
- h. Contacted your elected representative
- i. Taken part in a sit-in or disruption of government meetings
- j. Talked with other people in your area about a problem
- k. Notified the court or police about a problem
- l. Made a monetary or in-kind donation
- m. Volunteered for a charitable organization

28. Have you been approached by someone personally during the last three years who asked you to do any of the following?

Yes No

- a. Voted in the election
 - b. Actively participated in an association
 - c. Made a personal contact with an influential person
 - d. Made the media interested in a problem
 - e. Actively participated in an information campaign
 - f. Actively participated in an election campaign
 - g. Taken part in a protest march or demonstration
 - h. Contacted your elected representative
 - i. Taken part in a sit-in or disruption of government meetings
 - j. Talked with other people in your area about a problem
 - k. Notified the court or police about a problem
 - l. Made a monetary or in-kind donation
 - m. Volunteered for a charitable organization
29. If some decision related to a development project needed to be made in this village/neighbourhood, do you think the entire village/neighbourhood would be called upon to decide or would the community leaders make the decision themselves?
- a. The community leaders would decide
 - b. The whole village/neighbourhood would be called
30. Overall, how would you rate the spirit of the participation in this neighbourhood?
- a. Very low
 - b. Low
 - c. Average
 - d. High

e. Very high

31. How much influence do you think people like yourself can have in making this neighbourhood a better place to live?

a. A lot

b. Some

c. Not very much

d. None

Part 3 Cognitive social capital

32. Suppose someone in the neighbourhood had something unfortunate happen to them, such as a father's sudden death. Who do you think they could turn to for help in this situation? (Select three most important)

a. No one would help

b. Family

c. Neighbours

d. Friends

e. Religious leader or group

f. Community leader

g. Business leader

h. Police

i. Family court judge

j. Patron/employer/benefactor

k. Political leader

l. Mutual support group to which s/he belongs

m. Assistance organizations to which s/he does not belong

n. Other

33. Suppose your neighbour suffered an economic loss, say (Rural: crop failure; Urban: job loss). In that situation, who do you think would assist him/her financially? (Select three most important)

a. No one would help

b. Family

c. Neighbours

d. Friends

e. Religious leader or group

f. Community leader

g. Business leader

h. Police

i. Family court judge

j. Patron/employer/benefactor

k. Political leader

l. Mutual support group to which s/he belongs

m. Assistance organizations to which s/he does not belong

n. other

34. Do you think that in this neighbourhood people generally trust one another in matters of lending and borrowing?

a. Do trust

b. Do not trust

35. Do you think over the last few years this level of trust has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same?

a. Better

- b. The same
 - c. Worse
36. Compared with other neighbourhoods, how much do people of this neighbourhood trust each other in matters of lending and borrowing?
- a. Less than other neighbourhoods
 - b. The same as other neighbourhoods
 - c. More than other neighbourhoods
37. Suppose someone from the neighbourhood had to go away for a while, along with their family. In whose charge could they leave (Rural: their fields; Urban: their house)? (Record first three mentioned)
- a. Other family member
 - b. Neighbour
 - c. Anyone from the neighbourhood for this purpose
 - d. Other (specify)
 - e. No one
38. Suppose a friend of yours in this neighbourhood faced the following alternatives, which one would s/he prefer most?
- a. Own a patio 10m² alone
 - b. Own a patio 25 m² that is shared with one other family
39. If you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, whom could you count on to take care of your children? (Record first three mentioned)
- a. Other family member
 - b. Neighbour
 - c. Anyone from the neighbourhood for this purpose
 - d. Other (specify)

e. Don't have children

40. Do you agree or disagree that people here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with neighbourhood welfare?

a. Strongly agree

b. Agree

c. Disagree

d. Strongly disagree

41. If a community project does not directly benefit your neighbour but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think your neighbour would contribute time for this project?

a. Will not contribute time

b. Will contribute time

42. If a community project does not directly benefit your neighbour but has benefits for others in the neighbourhood, then do you think your neighbour would contribute money for this project?

a. Will not contribute money

b. Will contribute money

43. Please tell me whether in general you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Strongly agree 1 Agree 2 Disagree 3 Strongly disagree 4

a. Most people in this neighbourhood are basically honest and can be trusted._____.

b. People are always interested only in their own welfare._____.

- c. Members of this neighbourhood are more trustworthy than others._____.
 - d. In this neighbourhood, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you._____.
 - e. If I have a problem, there is always someone to help me._____.
 - f. I do not pay attention to the opinions of others in the neighbourhood._____.
 - g. Most people in this neighbourhood are willing to help if you need it._____.
 - h. This neighbourhood has prospered in the last five years._____.
 - i. I feel accepted as a member of this neighbourhood._____.
 - j. If you drop your purse or wallet in the neighbourhood, someone will see it and return it to you._____.
44. In your opinion, is this neighbourhood generally peaceful or conflictive?
- a. Peaceful
 - b. Conflictive
45. Compared with other neighbourhoods, is there more or less conflict in this neighbourhood?
- a. More
 - b. The same
 - c. Less
46. Do people in this neighbourhood contribute time and money toward common development goals?
- a. They contribute some or a lot
 - b. They contribute very little or nothing
47. Compared with other neighbourhoods, to what extent do people of this

neighbourhood contribute time and money toward common development goals?

- a. They contribute less than other neighbourhoods
- b. They contribute about the same as other neighbourhoods
- c. They contribute more than other neighbourhoods

48. Are the relationships among people in this neighbourhood generally harmonious or disagreeable?

- a. Harmonious
- b. Disagreeable

49. Compared with other neighbourhoods, are the relationships among people in this neighbourhood more harmonious, the same, or less harmonious than other neighbourhoods?

- a. More harmonious
- b. The same
- c. Less harmonious

50. Suppose two people in this neighbourhood had a fairly serious dispute with each other. Who do you think would primarily help resolve the dispute?

- a. No one; people work it out between themselves
- b. Family/household members
- c. Neighbours
- d. Community leaders
- e. Religious leaders
- f. Judicial leaders
- g. Other (specify)

Appendix 2 Structured Interviews with Community Leaders

Part 1 Basic information of community

1. Population
2. History and building composition
3. Major problems
4. What measures are employed by CRC to deal with those problems?

Part 2 Basic information of community residents' committee

5. How many social workers in your CRC?
6. How old are they?
7. What are their qualifications?
8. How are they appointed to this CRC?
9. Are they members of CCP?
10. What are the major tasks of CRC daily work?
11. Are these tasks assigned by upper-level authority or from residents?
12. What do you think of the role played by CRC?
13. Can you describe how the CRC works by a case that CRC solves a shared problem of residents?

Part 3 Attitudes toward community construction

14. What's your opinion on community construction?
15. In your opinion, what's the most important purpose of community construction?

16. What's your opinion on community service centre?
17. Do you agree that community service centre can be or should be separated from CRC?

Part 4 Attitudes toward community participation

18. How many community organizations in your community?
19. What are they?
20. Who are most active to participate in community organizations?
21. Are the community organizations organized by residents only or advocated by CRC?
22. Are the community organizations in your community active?
23. How does CRC support community organizations in your community?
24. In your opinion, what are the significances of community organizations?
25. Is there any voluntary association in your community?
26. What are they and what are their major activities?

Part 5 Attitudes toward community autonomy

27. What do you think about community autonomy?
28. In your opinion, what is the role of government in community autonomy?
29. In your opinion, what are the roles residents playing in community autonomy?
30. In which aspects of community life community autonomy is embodied?
31. Can you describe how residents are mobilized to solve shared problems through a case?

Bibliography

- (1989). 中华人民共和国居民委员会组织法 *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi Jumin Weiyuanhui Zuzhifa* Organic Law on Urban Residents' Committees in the PRC [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Legal Publishing House.
- (2012). 2012 年度上海高校学生思政状况调查报告 *2012 niandu shanghai gaoxiao xuesheng sizheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogao* Report of Investigation on the Condition of Political Thinking among University Students in Shanghai 2012 [In Chinese].
- Ai, J. (2006). "Guanxi Networks in China: Its Importance and Future Trends." *China & World Economy* **14**(5): 105-118.
- Alston, J. P. (1989). "Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa - Managerial Principles in Japan, China, and Korea." *Business Horizons* **32**(2): 26-31.
- An, R. e. a. (2004). 发达地区新型民间组织发展及其党建工作研究 *Fada diqu xinxing minjian zuzhi fazhan jiqi dangjian gongzuo yanjiu* Studies on the development and Party building in new-type NGOs in developed area [In Chinese] Hangzhou, Hangzhou Publishing House.
- Antonucci, T., H. Akiyama and K. Takahashi (2004). "Attachment and Close Relationships across the Life Span." *Attachment & Human Development* **6**(4): 353-370.
- Arblaster, A. (1987). Democracy. Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
- Argyle, M. and M. Henderson (1985). The Anatomy of Relationships. London, Heinemann.
- Babajanian, B. V. (2008). "Social Capital and Community Participation in Post-Soviet Armenia: Implications for Policy and Practice." *Europe-Asia Studies* **60**(8):

1299-1319.

Bao, J. (2007). "地方利益冲突、地方保护主义与政策选择分析 *Difang liyi chongtu, difang baohu zhuyi yu zhengce xuanze fenxi* Regional Interest Conflicts, Regional Protectionism and Policy Choice Analysis [In Chinese]." Journal of China National School of Administration **2007**(06): 4.

Barber, B. (1983). The Logic and Limits of Trust. New Brunswick, N.J, Rutgers University Press.

Barro, R. J. (1999). "Determinants of Democracy." Journal of Political Economy **107**(S6): 26.

Baumeister, R. F. and M. R. Leary (1995). "The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as A Fundamental Human Motivation." Psychological Bulletin **117**(3): 497-529.

Bay, G. (2009a). Community. Encyclopedia of Urban Studies. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications, Inc.

Bay, G. (2009b). Community Studies. Encyclopedia of Urban Studies. I. SAGE Publications. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications, Inc.

Beijing Urban Community Party Building Research Group (2003). "北京城市社区党建状况调查 *Beijing chengshi shequ dangjian zhuangkuang diaocha* Investigation of Urban Community Party Building in Beijing [In Chinese]." Urban Problems **2003**(4).

Bell, D. A. (2006). Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Benewick, R., I. Tong and J. Howell (2004). "Self-Governance and Community: A Preliminary Comparison between Villagers' Committees and Urban Community Councils." China Information **18**(1): 11-28.

Berkeley, T. U. o. C. Number of Close Friends Who Live Near R.

Berkeley, T. U. o. C. Participated in a Neighbor Association past 12 Months.

Berkman, L. F. and S. L. Syme (1979). "Social Networks, Host Resistance, and Mortality: A Nine-Year Follow-Up Study of Alameda County Residents." American Journal of Epidemiology **109**(2): 186-204.

Bi, J. (2003). Shetuan Geming -- Zhongguo Shetuan Fazhan de Jingjixue Fenxi. Jinan, Shandong People's Publishing House.

Bian, Y., R. Breiger, D. Davis, J. Glalaskiewicz and H. Yi (2005). "中国城市的职业、阶层和关系网 *Zhongguo chengshi de zhiye, jieceng he guanxiwang* Occupations, strata and Social Networks in Urban China [In Chinese]." Open Times **2005**(04): pp.21.

Bian, Y., D. Davis and S. Wang (2007). Family Social Capital: A Social Network Approach. Social Change in Contemporary China. W. Tang and B. Holzner: pp. 219-232.

Billante, N. and P. Saunders (2002). Six Questions about Civility. Sydney, Centre for Independent Studies. **Occasional Paper no. 82**.

Birch, A. H. (1993). The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy. London, Routledge.

Blackman, S. (2005). "Youth Subcultural Theory: A Critical Engagement with the Concept, its Origins and Politics, from the Chicago School to Postmodernism." Journal of Youth Studies **8**(1): 1-20.

Blau, P. M. (1977). "A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure." American Journal of Sociology(83): 26-34.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Reproduction in Education Society and Culture. London and Beverly Hills, Sage.

- Bourdieu, P. (1985). "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups." Theory & Society **14**(6): 723-744.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. J. Richardson. New York, Greenwood Press.
- Bourke, A. G. (2010). Encyclopedia of Urban Studies [online]. Encyclopedia of Urban Studies. R. Hutchison, SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss: Volume 1: Attachment. London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. **1**.
- Bray, D. (2006). "Building 'Community': New Strategies of Governance in Urban China." Economy and Society **35**(4): 530-549.
- Browning, C. R., S. L. Feinberg and R. D. Dietz (2004). "The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods." Social Forces **83**(2): 503-534.
- Bruhn, J. G. (1991). "People Need People." Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science **26**(4): 325-329.
- Bruhn, J. G. (2011). The Sociology of Community Connections, Springer Netherlands.
- Bu, C. (2005). 社会资本与社会和谐 Shehui ziben yu shehui hexie Social Capital and Social Harmony [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press.
- Bu, C. (2009). 社会资本与东北振兴：对东北地区 142 家工业企业的调查 Shehui Ziben yu Dongbei Zhenxing: Dui Dongbei Diqu 142 jia Gongye Qiye de Diaocha Social Capital and the Revival of Northeast China: Investigation on 142 Enterprises in Northeast China [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China) .
- Bu, W. (2004). 中国城市社区组织结构的演变与重构 Zhongguo chengshi shequ

zuzhi jiegou de yanbian yu chonggou Transformation and Reconstruction of the Structure of Chinese Urban Community Organization [In Chinese]. Master, Huazhong Normal University.

Burgess, E. W. and H. J. Locke (1953). The Family, from Institution to Companionship. N.Y., American Book Company.

Burt, R. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Burton, M. L. and K. Reitz (1981). "The Plow, Female Contribution to Agricultural Subsistence and Polygyny: A Log Linear Analysis." Cross-Cultural Research **16**(3-4): 275-305.

Calhoun, C. (1998). "Community without Propinquity Revisited: Communications Technology and the Transformation of the Urban Public Sphere." Sociological Inquiry **68**(3): 373-397.

Castells, M. (2001). The Internet Galaxy : Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

Chan, A. L. and P. Nesbitt-Larking (1995). "Critical Citizenship and Civil Society in Contemporary China." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique **28**(2): 293-309.

Chan, C.-p. (2000). The Political Pragmatism Of Chinese University Students at the Dawn of The Twenty-First Century. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280.

Chen, G. and J. Yang (2004). "成都市社区参与的现状与制约因素分析 Chengdushi shequ canyu de xianzhuang yu zhiyue yinsu fenxi Analysis of Current Situation and Constraints of Community Participation in Chengdu City [In Chinese]." Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Humanities & Social

Sciences **25**(9): 3.

Chen, J. (1995). "The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China."

Journal of Contemporary China **4**(9): 22-34.

Chen, J. and F. Zhang (2002). 社会资本与技术创新 Shehui ziben yu jishu chuangxin Social Capital and Technology Innovation [In Chinese]. Hangzhou, Zhejiang University Press.

Chen, J., Y. Zhong and J. W. Hillard (1997). "The Level and Sources of Popular Support for China's Current Political Regime." Communist and Post-Communist Studies **30**(1): 45-64.

Chen, S. (2009). "城市居民社区参与的现状与思考 *Chengshi jumin shequ canyu de xianzhuang yu sikao* Current Condition and Reflections on Community Participation of Urban Residents [In Chinese]." Jiangsu Institute of Socialism **6**(62): 2.

Chen, W. (2004). "社区参与的微观机制研究 *Shequ canyu de weiguan jizhi yanjiu* Studies on Micromechanism of Community Participation [In Chinese]." Academic Research **2004**(4): 5.

Chen, W. (2004). 社区自治：自组织网络与制度设置 Shequ zizhi: Zizuzhi wangluo yu zhidu shezhi Community Autonomy: Self-Organizing Networks and Institutional Design [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.

Chen, X. (2003). "Marriage and the Family in Rural and Urban China." China Today **52**(3): 35.

Chen, X. (2009). "从街居制到社区制：城市基层治理模式的转变--以北京市
 泸沽街道社区管理体制改革为个案 *Cong jiejuzhi dao shequzhi: chengshi jiceng
 zhili moshi de zhuanbian--yi Beijingshi lugu jiedao shequ guanli tizhi gaige wei
 gean* From Street System to Community System: Transformation of Urban

- Grassroots Governance--A Case Study in Beijing Lugu Subdistrict [In Chinese]." East China Economic Management(8).
- Cheng, J. Y. S., Ed. (2011). Wither China's Democracy. Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press.
- Cheung, C.-k. and W.-c. Ho (2012). "Investing in Community Participation to Receive Social Support." Journal of Social Service Research **38**(1): 110-123.
- Chevrier, Y. (2012). Elusive Democracy (1915-1937). China, Democracy, and Law. M. Delmas-Marty and P.-E. Will. Leiden Boston, Brill: 915.
- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, D. o. D. I. o. L. (2005). 现代汉语词典 Xiandai hanyu cidian The Contemporary Chinese Dictionary (Fifth Edition) [In Chinese]. Beijing, The Commercial Press.
- Cisneros, M. (1996). Virtual Community: Exceptional Parent Goes on-line with the Family Education Network. The Exceptional Parent. **26**: 58.
- Cohen, C. (1971). Democracy. Athens, The University of Georgia Press.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). "The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Implications for the Law." Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy **3**: 375-374-374.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of Sociology **94**(Supplement): 95-120.
- Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Coleman, J. S. (1993). "The Rational Reconstruction of Society." American Sociological Review **58**(1): 1-15.
- Colosi, R. (2010). "A Return to the Chicago School? From the 'Subculture' of Taxi Dancers to the Contemporary Lap Dancer." Journal of Youth Studies **13**(1):

1-16.

Confucius (2006). 论语 Lunyu Confucian Analects [In Chinese]. Beijing, Zhonghua Book Company.

Cong, N. and N. Zhou (2009). "社区参与不足的困境与突破 *Shequ canyu buzude kunjing yu tupo* Predicament and Breakthrough of the Insufficiency and Breakthrough of Community Participation [In Chinese]." China Development 9(4): 4.

Cox, E. (1995). A Truly Civil Society. Sydney, ABC Books.

Cox, E. (2000). Making the Lucky Country. Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. R. D. Putnam. New York, Oxford University Press.

CPC Central Committee (2013). Bulletin of the Third Plenary Session of 18th CPC Central Committee. C. C. Committee. Beijing.

Craven, P. and B. Wellman (1973). "The Network City." Sociological Inquiry 43(3-4): 57-88.

Dai, F. (2008). "家文化视角下的公共参与 *Jiawenhua shijiao xia de gonggong canyu* Public Participation from the Perspective of Family-Culture [In Chinese]." Guangxi Social Sciences(4): 4.

Dai, Q. (1999). "广西城乡居民社会关系网比较 *Guangxi chengxiang jumin shehui guanxiwang bijiao* Comparison of Social Networks between Urban and Rural Residents in Guangxi Province [In Chinese]." Guangxi Social Sciences 1999(5).

Day, G. (2006). Community and Everyday Life. London and New York, Routledge.

Delanty, G. (2010). Community. New York, Routledge.

Deng, X. (1983). 邓小平文选 *Deng xiaoping wenxuan* Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982 [In Chinese]. Beijing, People's Press.

Ding, T. and H. Xiao (2010). "人际关系对精神健康的影响研究--基于湘、桂、沪、鲁、甘五省居民的实证调查 *Renji guanxi dui jingshen jiankang de yingxiang yanjiu--jiyu xiang, gui, hu, lu, gan wusheng jumin de shizheng diaocha* Studies on the Impacts of Social Relationships on Psychological Health--Empirical Investigations in Hubei, Guangxi, Shanghai, Shandong and Gansu Province [In Chinese]." Theory Research **2010**(31): pp.2.

Ding, Y. (2000). The Conceptual Evolution of Democracy in Intellectual Circles' Rethinking of State and Society. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280.

Division of Grassroots Regime and Community Building, M. o. C. A. o. P. (2009). 全国和谐社区建设理论与实践：社区居民自治与社会组织创新 *Quanguo hexie shequ jianshe lilun yu shijian: shequ jumin zizhi yu shehui zuzhi chuangxin* Theory and Practice of Nation-wide Harmonious Community Construction: Community Residents Self-governance and Social Organization Innovation [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.

Donath, J. S. (1999). Identity and Deception in the Virtual Community. Community in Cyberspace. M. A. Smith and P. Kollock. New York, Routledge: 327.

Dong, Z. (1975). 春秋繁露 *Chunqiu fanlu* Sections about Chun-Qiu Theory [In Chinese]. Beijing, Zhonghua Book Company.

Dowd, D. V., A. Carlson and M. Shen (2000). The Prospects for Democratization in China: Evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280.

- Durkheim, E. (1984/1893). The Division of Labour in Society. New York, Free Press.
- Edwards, B. and M. W. Foley (1998). "Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam." American Behavioral Scientist **42**(1): 124-139.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. and L. Roniger (1984). Patrons, Clients, and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Ellis, D., R. Oldridge and A. Vasconcelos (2004). "Community and Virtual Community." Annual Review of Information Science and Technology **38**(1): 145-186.
- Etzioni, A. (1993). The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society. New York, Touchstone.
- Etzioni, A. (1995). Nation in Need of Community Values; The Second Times/Demos Lecture. The Times (London, England): 9.
- Etzioni, A. (1996). "The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perspective." American Sociological Review **61**(1): 1-11.
- Etzioni, A. (2000). "Creating Good Communities and Good Societies." Contemporary Sociology **29**(1): 188-195.
- Etzioni, A. (2000). E-Communities Build New Ties, But Ties That Bind. The New York Times: D7.
- Etzioni, A. (2001). "Is Bowling Together Sociologically Lite?" Contemporary Sociology **30**(3): 223-224.
- Etzioni, A. (2007). "The Community Deficit." Journal of Common Market Studies **45**(1): 23-42.
- Evans, P. (1996). "Government Action, Social Capital and Development:

- Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy." World Development **24**(6): 1119-1132.
- Ewald, F. (1990). "Norms, Discipline, and the Law." Representations(30): 138-161.
- Feeney, J. A. (1999). "Adult Attachment, Emotional Control, and Marital Satisfaction." Personal Relationships **6**(2): 169-185.
- Fei, X. (1949/2009). 乡土中国 生育制度 Xiangtu Zhongguo Shengyu Zhidu From the Soil Reproductive System [In Chinese]. Beijing, Peking University Press.
- Fei, X. (2002). "居民自治：中国城市社区建设的新目标 *Jumin zizhi: zhongguo chengshi shequ jianshe de xinmubiao* Resident Self-Governance: New Goal of Chinese Urban Community Construction [In Chinese]." 江海学刊 **2002**(3).
- Fei, X. (2009). 乡土中国 生育制度. Beijing, Peking University Press.
- Feld, S. and W. C. Carter (1988). Foci of Activity as Changing Contexts for Friendship. Placing Friendship in Context. H. G. Adam and G. Allan. UK, Cambridge University Press.
- Feld, S. and W. C. Carter (1998). Foci of Activity as Changing Contexts for Friendship. Placing friendship in context. R. G. Adams and G. Allan. UK, Cambridge University Press: 136-152.
- Field, J., T. Schuller and S. Baron (2000). Social Capital and Human Capital Revisited. Social Capital: Critical Perspectives. S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Fine, B. (2001). Social Capital Versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium. London & New York, Routledge.
- Fischer, C. S. (1975). "Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism." American Journal of Sociology **80**(6): 1319-1341.
- Fischer, C. S. (1976). The Urban Experience. New York, Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich.

Fischer, C. S. (1982). To Dwell among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Fox, R. (1995). "Newstrack." Communications of the ACM **38**(8): 2.

French, S. and C. Bayley (2010). "Public Participation: Comparing Approaches." Journal of Risk Research **14**(2): 241-257.

Fu, J. and X. Li (2005). "从“胡卫民事件”谈医院潜规则与社会伦理问题
Cong 'Huweimin shijian' tan yiyuan qianguize yu shehui lunli wenti Talk about
Hospital Hidden Rules and Social Ethical Problem from ' Huweimin Issue' [In
Chinese]." Chinese Medical Ethics **18**(6): 3.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.
London, Penguin.

Fukuyama, F. (2001). "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development." Third
World Quarterly **22**(1): 7-20.

Fukuyama, F. (2002). "Social Capital and Development: A Coming Agenda." SAIS Review **22**(1): 15.

Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust : Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations. New
York, NY, B. Blackwell.

Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust : Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford,
Basil Blackwell.

Gans, H. J. (1982). The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-
Americans. New York, London, The Free Press.

Gao, H. (2008). 城市整合--社团，政府与市民社会 Chengshi Zhenghe --
Shetuan, Zhengfu yu Shimin Shehui City Integration: Organizations, Government
and Civil Society [In Chinese]. Nanjing, Southeast University Press.

Gao, M. (2011). Netizenship and Its Implications for Democratization in China. Wither China's Democracy. J. Y. S. Cheng. Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press: p151-176.

General Office of Nanjing Municipal Government (2012). 南京市政府办公厅关于进一步强化社区工作准入的通知 *Nanjing Shizhengfu Bangongting Guanyu Jinyibu Qianghua Shequ Gongzuo Zhunru de Tongzhi* General Office of Nanjing Municipal Government Notification of Strengthening the Control of Community Tasks [In Chinese]. G. O. o. N. M. Government.

General Office of the CCP Central Committee and General Office of the State Council (2010). 关于加强和改进城市社区居委会工作的意见 *Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Chengshi Shequjuweihui gongzuo de Yijian* Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the work of Urban Community Residents' Committees [In Chinese]. Beijing.

General Office of the CPC Central Committee and G. O. o. t. S. Council (2010). *Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Chengshi Shequ Jumin Weiyuanhui Jianshe Gongzuo de Yijian*. General Office of the CPC Central Committee and G. O. o. t. S. Council.

Glantz, M. D. and J. L. Johnson, Eds. (1999). Resilience and Development: Positive life adaptations. Hingham, MA, USA, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Gold, T. B. (1985). "After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China since the Cultural Revolution." The China Quarterly(104): 657-675.

Good, D. (1988). Individuals, Interpersonal Relationships, and Trust. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. D. Gambetta. New York, Basil Blackwell: 31-48.

Gou, P. (2008). "论我国当代城市社区和谐人际关系的构建 *Lun woguo dangdai chengshi shequ hexie renji guanxi de goujian* On Constructions of Harmonious

Inter-Person Relationships in Contemporary Urban China [In Chinese]." Journal of Sichuan University of Science & Engineering (Social Sciences Edition) **23**(4): pp.4.

Granovetter, M. (1973). "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology **78**: 1360-1380.

Granovetter, M. (1983). "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." Sociological Theory: 201.

Gu, E. X. (2000). Plural Institutionalism and the Emergence of Intellectual Public Spaces in China. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280.

Gu, J. (2005). "“有限社区”理论质疑居委会权威 *Youxian shequ lilun zhiyi juweihui quanwei* The Theory of "Limited Community" Questiones the Authority of Community Residents' Committees [In Chinese]." Community **2005**(8): 2.

Gu, M. (2011). Civil Law Legislation and Democracy in China. Wither China's Democracy. J. Y. S. Cheng. Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press: p101-113.

Gui, Y. (2007). "邻里政治：城市基层的权力操作策略与国家--社会的粘连模式 *Linli zhengzhi: chengshi jiceng de quanli caozuo yu guojia* Neighborhood Politics: Power Manipulation Strategies in Urban Grassroots and the Pattern of Cohesion between the State and the Society [In Chinese]." Chinese Pulic Affairs Quarterly **27**(6): 21.

Guo, W. and J. Zuo (2011). "中国共产党的社会动员模式研究 *Zhongguo Gongchandang de Shehui Dongyuan Moshi Yanjiu* Study on the Social Mobilisation Model of CCP [in Chinese]." Journal of Yangzhou University (Humanities and Social Sciences) **15**(1): 5.

- Hagen, E. E. (1962). On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins. Homewood, Dorsey Press.
- Hall, E. T. (1959). The Silent Language. New York, Doubleday.
- Hampton, K. and B. Wellman (2001). "Long Distance Community in the Network Society: Contact and Support Beyond Netville." American Behavioral Scientist **45**(3): 476-495.
- Han, Z. (2007). "Interest Pluralism and the Transformation of Social Governance structure." Studies on the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics **2007**(1): 6.
- Harriss, J. (2001). Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital. London, Anthem Books.
- Hayashi, N., E. Ostrom, J. Walker and T. Yamagishi (1999). "Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study." Rationality and Society **11**(1): 27-46.
- Hazelzet, A. and B. Wissink (2012). "Neighborhoods, Social Networks, and Trust in Post-Reform China: The Case of Guangzhou." Urban Geography **33**(2): 204-220.
- He, H. (2003). "我国城市基层社会管理体制的变迁：从单位制、街居制到社区制 *Woguo chengshi jiceng shehui guanli tizhi de bianqian* Transformation of Basic-Level Society Governance System in Urban China [In Chinese]." Management World **2003**(6): 11.
- He, J. (2010). 中国城市社区权力结构研究 *Zhongguo chengshi shequ quanli jiegou yanjiu* Research on Power Structure in Chinese Urban Community [In Chinese]. Wuhan, Huazhong Normal University Press.
- He, Y. (2005). "从单位体制到社区体制--建国后我国城市社会整合模式的转变 *Cong danwei tizhi dao shequ tizhi--Jianguo hou woguo chengshi shehui zhenghe*

moshi de zhuanbian From Danwei System to Community--Transformation of Social Integration Model in Urban China after 1949 [In Chinese]." Forward Position **2005**(4): 3.

Hillery, G. A. J. (1955). "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement." Rural Sociology **20**(2): 111-123.

Hisao, H.-H. M., Ed. (1999). East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective. Taipei, Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

Hopper, P. (2003). Rebuilding Communities in An Age of Individualism. Aldershot, Hampshire, England, Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Hou, X. (1947). 儒家伦理思想 Rujia Lunli Sixiang The Ethic Thoughts of Confucian [in Chinese]. Shantong, Shantong Christian University.

Hu, J. (2012). 中共十八大报告 *Zhonggong Shibada Baogao* Report to the 18th CPC National Congress [in Chinese]. C. N. Congress. Beijing.

Hu, S. (2000). Confucianism and Western Democracy. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 19.

Hu, S. (2013). "构建基层党建工作新体系 夯实党执政的组织基础 *Goujian jiceng dangjian gongzuo xin tixi, hangshi dang zhizheng de zuzhi jichu* Constructing New System of Grassroots Party-Building, Reinforcing Organizational Foundation of Party Governance [In Chinese]." Retrieved 20 June, 2013, from <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0326/c40537-20917091.html>.

Hu, W. (2006). "腐败的文化透视 *Fubai de wenhua toushi* Cultural Perspective of Corruption [In Chinese]." Zhejiang Social Sciences **2006**(3): 6.

Hua, K. (2011). 通州 40 万居民自创楼门文化 *Tongzhou 40 Wan Jumin Zichuang Loumen Wenhua* 400 Thousand Tongzhou Residents Create Building Unit Culture

[in Chinese]. China News Beijing. Beijing.

Hua, W. (2000). "单位制向社区制的回归 *Danwei zhi xiang shequ zhi de huigui* Reverting to the Community System from the Work Unit System [In Chinese]." Strategy and Management **2000**(1).

Huang, R. and Y. Gui (2011). "集体性社会资本对社区参与的影响：基于多层次数据的分析 *Jitixing shehui ziben dui shequ canyu de yingxiang: Jiyu duocengci shuju de fenxi* Collective social capital and its effects on community participation: A multilevel analysis [In Chinese]." Society **31**(6): 21.

Hughes, P., J. Bellamy and A. Black (2000). Building social trust through education. Social capital and public policy in Australia. I. Winter, Australian Institute of Family Studies, Commonwealth of Australia: 225-249.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). "How Countries Democratize." Political Science Quarterly **106**(4): 579-616.

Iscoe, I. (1974). "Community Psychology and the Competent Community." American Psychologist **29**(8): 607-613.

Israel, B. A. (1985). "Social Networks and Social Support: Implications for Natural Helper and Community Level Interventions." Health Education & Behavior **12**(1): 65-80.

Jacobs, J. (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Jacobs, J. B. (1979). "A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: Kan-ch'ing and Kuan-hsi in a Rural Taiwanese Township." The China Quarterly(78): 237-273.

Janowitz, M. (1967). The Community Press in an Urban Setting: The Social Elements of Urbanism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Jeffres, L. W., D. Atkin and K. A. Neuendorf (2002). "A Model Linking Community Activity and Communication With Political Attitudes and Involvement in Neighborhoods." Political Communication **19**(4): 387-421.

Ji, Y. (2012). "Culture, Institution and Structure: Reflections on The Studies of Chinese Social Relations." Sociological Studies **2012**(2): 26.

Ji, Y., H. Ran and Y. Cai (2004). "激励结构与国有企业困境 *Jili jiegou yu guoyou qiye kunjing* Incentive Structure and State-Owned Enterprise Predicament [In Chinese]." Quantitative & Technica Economics **2004**(1): 8.

Jiang, Z. (2000). 江泽民同志在中央纪委第四次全体会议上的讲话 *Jiangzemin tongzhi zai zhongyang jiwei disici quanti huiyi shang de jianghua* Speech of Jiangzemin presented in Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [In Chinese]. People's Daily. Beijing, People's Daily.

Jiang, Z. (2008). 社区参与与城市社区社会资本的培育 *Shequ Canyu yu Chengshi Shequ Shehui Ziben de Peiyu* Community Participation and Cultivation of Social Capital in Urban Communities [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Society Press.

Jin, Y. (1989). 从传统到现代 *Chong chuantong dao xiandai* From Tradition to Modernization [In Chinese]. Guangzhou, Guangzhou Culture Press.

Joint Investigation Group of the Research Office of Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, Second Office of Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, Organization Department of Zhejiang CPC Provincial Committee and Organization Department of Hangzhou CPC Munciple Commitee (2012). 关于杭州市建设服务性基层党组织情况的报告 *Guanyu Hangzhoushi jianshe fuwuxing jiceng dangzuzhi qingkuang de baogao* Report on the practice of service-oriented Party building in Hangzhou [In Chinese]. Hangzhou, CPC

Hangzhou Munciple Organization Department.

Kang, X. (2009). Human capital, Social capital and Career Development Achievements. Beijing, Peking University Press.

Karp, D., N. Jin, T. Yanmagishi and H. Shinotsuka (1993). "Raising the Minimum in the Minimal Group Paradigm." Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology(32): 10.

Kearns, A. and R. Forrest (2000). "Social Cohesion and Multi-level Urban Governance." Urban Studies **37**: 23.

Knack, S. (2002). "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States." American Journal of Political Science **46**(4): 772-785.

Korten, D. C. (1987). "Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centered Development." World Development **15, Supplement 1**(0): 145-159.

Kraut, R., M. Patterson, V. Lundmark, S. Kiesler, T. Mukophadhyay and W. Scherlis (1998). "Internet Paradox: A Social Technology that Reduces Social Involvement and Psychological Well-Being?" American Psychologist **53**(9): 1017-1031.

Kraut, R. S. B. J. V. A. (2002). "Internet Paradox Revisited." Journal of Social Issues **58**(1): 49.

Krishna, A. (2007). "How Does Social Capital Grow? A Seven-Year Study of Villages in India." The Journal of Politics **69**(4): 16.

Kuhn, A. (2009). Growth in Interest Groups Challenges Beijing, NPR.

Landry, P. F., D. Davis and S. Wang (2010). "Elections in rural China: Competition without Parties." Comparative Political Studies **43**(6): 28.

Lerner, D. (1958). The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, The Free Press.

Lewis, J. D. and A. Weigert (1985). "Trust as a Social Reality." Social Forces

63(4): 967-985.

Lewis, O. (1952). "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study." The Scientific Monthly 75(1): 31-41.

Li, C. (2001). 断裂与碎片：当代中国社会阶层分化实证分析 *Duanlie yu suipian: Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng fenhua shizheng fenxi* Segmentation and Fragmentation: An Empirical Analysis of Stratum Differentiation in Contemporary Chinese Society [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China).

Li, C. (2008). "中国中产阶级的增长及其现状 *Zhongguo zhongchan jieji de zengzhang jiqi xianzhuang* Growth and Current Situation of Chinese Middle Class [In Chinese]." Jiansu Social Sciences 5.

Li, H. and X. Yang, Eds. (2000). 社会资本与社会发展 *Shehui ziben yu shehui fazhan* Social Capital and Social Development [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House.

Li, J. (2007). "伦理与道德之辩的诠释--谈孟子的“五伦”说 *Lunli yu daode zhibian de quanshi: tan Mengzi de wulun shuo* Understanding of the Debate between Ethics and Virtue--On Mencius's Theory of "Five Ethics" [In Chinese]." Journal of Hebei North University 23(6): 2.

Li, J. (2009). "住房产权与政治参与：中国城市的基层社区民主 *Zhufang chanquan yu zhengzhi canyu: Zhongguo chengshi de jiceng shequ minzhu* Housing Property Rights and Political Participation: Grassroots Community Democracy in Chinese Cities [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies 2009(5): 26.

Li, j. (2010). "在民本与民主之间--一种对民本思想的民主审视 *Zai minben yu minzhu zhijian* Between minben and democracy--a democratic perspective on minben thoughts [In Chinese]." Journal of Yanbian Party School 25(5): 3.

- Li, L. (2002). "论“单位”研究 *Lun danwei yanjiu* On Danwei Study [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **2002**(5): 10.
- Li, P. (1993). 论中国式社会学研究的关联概念与命题 *Lun Zhongguoshi shehuixue yanjiu de guanlian gainian yu mingti* On Correlation Concepts and Proposition of Chinese Sociological Study [In Chinese]. 东亚社会研究. I. o. S. a. Anthropology. Beijing, Peking University Press: 65-76.
- Li, Q. (2005). "关于中产阶级的理论与现状 *Guanyu zhongchan jieji de lilun yu xianzhuang* Theory and Current Situation of Middle Class [In Chinese]." Society **2005**(1).
- Li, X. and F. Chen (2008). "社区论辩：转型期中国城市社区的形态转变 *Shequ lunbian: Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo chengshi shequ de xingtai zhuanbian* A Debate on Community: Form Transition of Chinese Urban Community during Transformation Period [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **2008**(2).
- Li, Y. (1994). "文化力是企业活跃的生产力 *Wenhua Li shi QIye Huoyue de Shengchanli* Cultural Power is the Active Productivity of Enterprises [in Chinese]." Yejin QIye Wenhua: 2.
- Li, Y. (2002). "基层社区组织的实际生活方式--对上海康健社区实地调查的初步认识 *Jiceng shequ zuzhi de shiji shenghuo fangshi--Dui Shanghai Kangjian shequ shidi diaocha de chubu renshi* Actual Life Style in Grassroots Communities--Rudimentary Knowledge Based on Field Work in Kangjian Community, Shanghai City [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **2002**(4): 9.
- Li, Y. (2004). "关系与信任：乡村民间组织生长成因分析 *Guanxi yu xinren: Xiangcun minjian zuzhi shengzhang chengyin fenxi* Relationships and Trust: An Analysis of Causes of Rural NGO Development [In Chinese]." Law and Social Development **2004**(5).

- Li, Z. (2008). 正义与和谐：政治哲学视野中的社会资本 *Zhengyi yu Hexie: Zhengzhi Zhaxue Shiye zhong de Shehui Ziben* Justice and Harmony: Social Capital from the Perspective of Political Philosophy [In Chinese]. Beijing, People's Publishing House.
- Li, Z. and J. Luo (2012). "中国人的社会行为与关系网络特质：一个社会网的观点" *Zhongguoren de shehui xingwei yu guanxi wangluo tezhi: Yige shehuiwang de guandian* Public Behavior and Speciality of Social Networks of Chinese People: A Perspective of Social Networks [In Chinese]." Social Science Front **2012**(01): pp.6.
- Liang, Q. (1996/1936). 先秦政治思想史 *Xianqin zhengzhi sixiang shi* History of pre-Qin political thoughts [In Chinese]. Beijing, Oriental Publishing Company.
- Lin, N. (1999). "Social Networks and Status Attainment." Annual Review of Sociology **25**: 467-487.
- Lin, N. (2001). Building a Network of Social Capital. Social Capital: Theory and Research. N. Lin, K. Cook and R. Burt. New York, Aldine De Gruyter: 3-29.
- Lin, N. (2001). Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Lin, N., K. Cook and R. S. Burt, Eds. (2001). Social Capital: Theory and Research. New York, Aldine De Gruyter.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." The American Political Science Review **53**(1): 69-105.
- Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man. London, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.
- Liu, C. (2007). "国家介入与邻里社会资本的生成" *Guojia jieru yu linli shehui ziben de shengcheng* State Intervention in the Creation of Neighborhood Social

Capital [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies(2): 20.

Liu, J. (2000). 单位中国--社会调控体系中的个人、组织与国家 *Danwei Zhongguo--Shehui tiaokong tixi zhong de geren, zuzhi yu guojia* Danwei China--Individuals, Organizations and State under Social Control System [In Chinese]. 天津, Tianjin People's Publishing House.

Liu, L. (2008). "加强深圳社区党建工作的对策选择 *Jiaqiang Shenzhen shequ dangjian gongzuo de duice xuanze* Countermeasure selection of strengthening community Party building in Shenzhen city [In Chinese]." Practice and Theory of Sezs **2008**(3).

Liu, W. (2010). 社区治理：基层组织运行机制研究 *Shequ zhili: jiceng zuzhi yunxing jizhi yanjiu* Community Governance: A Study of Operating Mechanism of Grassroots Organizations [In Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai University Press.

Liu, W. and Y. Liu (2008). "转型期城市社区参与的范式转换与实践逻辑 *Zhuanxingqi chengshi shequ canyu de fanshi zhuanhuan yu shijian luoji* Paradigm Change and Practice Logic of Urban Community Participation during Transformation Period [In Chinese]." Zhejiang Social Sciences **2008**(1): 7.

Liu, Y. and L. Cai (2011). "传统民本思想与当代 民主政治之“辩证关系” *Chuantong Minben Sixiang yu Dangdai Minzhu Zhengzhi zhi Bianzheng Guanxi* The Relationship between Traditional Minben Thoughts and Modern Democracy [in Chinese]." Theory Monthly **2011**(4): 3.

Liu, Y. and M. Lin (2012). "城乡老年人社会人际关系网实证比较分析--以烟台市向阳街与姜格庄镇 435 个样本为例 *Chengxiang laonianren shehui renji guanxiwang shizheng bijiao fenxi--Yi Yantaishi Xiangyangjie yu Jianggezhuang zhen 435 ge yangben weili* Empirical Comparative Analysis of Social Personal Relationships of the Aged in Urban and Rural Areas--Based on 435 Samples from

Xiangyangjie and Jianggezhuang, Yantai City [In Chinese]." Social Sciences in Xinjiang 2012(02): pp.5.

Liu, Z. (2000). 从传统到现代：当代中国社会转型研究 *Cong chuantong dao xiandai: Dangdai zhongguo shehui zhuanxing yanjiu* From Tradition to Modernity: Studies on Social Transition in Contemporary China [In Chinese]. Wuhan, Hubei People's Press.

Longfeng District Daqing City Helongjian Province (2009). 社区管理的现状及对策调研报告 *Shequ guanli de xianzhuang ji duice diaoyan baogao* Report on Current Situation and Countermeasures of Community Governance [In Chinese]. 全国和谐社区建设理论与实践--地方创新. C. zhan. Beijing, China Society Press: 10,79.

Lorenz, K. (1965). Evolution and Modification of Behavior. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Lou, J. (2001). "2001 年上海高校学生思想政治状况调查 2001 nian shanghai gaoxiao xuesheng sixiang zhengzhi zhuangkuang diaocha The Investigation on the Condition of Political Thinking in Shanghai Universities 2001 [In Chinese]." Ideological and Theoretical Education 2001(6): 4.

Lu, F. (1989). "单位：一种特殊的社会组织形式 *Danwei: Yizhong teshu de shehui zuzhi xingshi* Danwei: A Special Form of Social Organization [In Chinese]." Social Sciences in China 1989(1).

Lü, J., P. G. Rowe and J. Zhang, Eds. (2001). Modern Urban Housing in China 1984-2000. Munich, London, New York, Prestel Verlag.

Lu, J. and L. Shao (2001). Housing Development from 1978 To 2000 after China Adopted Reform and Opening-Up Policy. Modern Urban Housing in China: 1840-2000. J. Lu, P. G. Rowe and J. Zhang. Munich, London, New York, Prestel: 96.

- Lü, L. (2006). "城市社会交往的特征与障碍问题分析 *Chengshi shehui jiaowang de tezheng yu zhangai wenti fenxi* Study on Social Communication in City about the Characteristics and Barriers [In Chinese]." Urban Studies **2006**(04): pp.4.
- Lu, X. (2006). "论网络社会交往中的个人诚信缺失现象及其治理 *Lun wangluo shehui jiaowang zhong de geren chengxin queshi xianxiang jiqi zhili* On the Problems and Management of Lack of Credibility during Social Communication in Network Society [In Chinese]." Morality and Civilization **2006**(05): pp.4.
- Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power : Two Works. Chichester, Wiley.
- Luo, D. and X. Lü (2001). 中国单位的结构变化--微观政治变迁的宏观影响 *Zhongguo "Danwei" de Jiegou Bianhua -- Weiguan Zhengzhi Bianqian de Hongguan Yingxiang* Structure Transformation of Chinese Danwei--Macro Effects of Micro Political Transition [In Chinese]. Reforms, Development and Social Changes M. Shen. Beijing Huaxia Publishing House: 175-208.
- Ma, C. (2004). "社会资本、民间社会组织与法治秩序 *Shehui ziben, minjian shehui zuzhi yu fazhi zhixu* Social Capital, Civil Society Organizations and Legal Order [In Chinese]." Global Law Review **2004** (Autumn): 10.
- Ma, D. (2009). 东亚地区社会资本研究 *Dongya diqu shehui ziben yanjiu* Social Capital in Confucian East-Asian Societies [In Chinese]. Tianjin, Tianjin People's Publishing House.
- Ma, L. and H. Xiao (2010). 政府和公民社会关系视野下的社区居民委员会发展路径选择--以杭州市为例的研究 *Zhengfu he gongmin shehui guanxi shiye xia de shequ jumin weiyuanhui fazhan lujing xuanze--Yi Hangzhou shi weili de yanjiu* The development path selection of community residents' committee in the perspective of the relationship between the government and the civil society--A

case study of Hangzhou [In Chinese]. 中国社区发展报告(2008-2009) Annual report on community development of China (2008-2009). Y. Yu. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China): pp. 175-187.

Maloney, W., G. Smith and G. Stoker (2000). "Social Capital and Urban Governance: Adding a More Contextualized 'Top-Down' Perspective." Political Studies **48**(4): 19.

Maloney, W. A., G. Smith and G. Stoker (2000). Social Capital and Associational Life. Social Capital: Critical Perspectives. S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller. New York, Oxford University Press: 212-225.

Mathie, A. and G. Cunningham (2003). "From Clients to Citizens: Asset-Based Community Development as a Strategy for Community-Driven Development." Development in Practice **13**(5): 474-486.

McAllister, D. J. (1995). "Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations." The Academy of Management Journal **38**(1): 24-59.

Mencius (2006). 孟子 Mengzi Mencius [In Chinese]. Beijing, Zhonghua Book Company.

Mi, S. (2008). "从城市社区看社会分层与社会不平等--对天津两个商品房社区的比较研究 *Cong chengshi shequ kan shehui fenceng yu shehui bupingdeng--Dui Tianjin liangge shangpinfang shequ de bijiao yanjiu* Research of Social Stratification and Social Inequality in Urban Communities--A Comparative Study on Two Commodity Housing Community in Tianjin [In Chinese]." Urban Problems(155): 5.

Miao, Y. (2000). "关于社区及社区类型的研究述评 *Guanyu shequ ji shequ leixing de yanjiu shuping* A Review of Research on Community and Community

Types [In Chinese]." Journal of Hubei TV University **17**(2): 3.

Miao, Y. (2008). 中国乡村治理模式变迁的社会资本分析--人民公社与行政村治理体制的比较研究 *Zhongguo xiangcun zhili moshi bianqian de shehui ziben fenxi--renmin gongshe yu xingzhengcun zili tizhi de bijiao yanjiu* A Social Capital Analysis of Chinese Rural Governance Transition--A Comparative Research on Governance System of People's Communes and Administrative Village [In Chinese]. Haerbin, Heilongjiang People's Publishing House.

Michelson, W. M. (1976). Reversing the "Inevitable" Trend : High-rise Housing in Sweden and Denmark. Toronto, Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC (1995). 全国社区服务示范城标准 *Quanguo Shequ Fuwu Shifancheng Biaozhun* National Criteria for Community-Service Model Cities [in Chinese]. M. o. C. Affairs. Beijing.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2000). 民政部关于在全国推进城市社区建设的意见 *Mingzhengbu Guanyu Zai Quanguo Tuijin Chengshi Shequ Jianshe De Yijian* Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC on Further Carrying forward Urban Community Construction [In Chinese]. Z. R. G. Minzhengbu. Beijing.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2005). 关于社区建设情况的报告 *Guanyu Shequ Jianshe Qingkuang De Baogao* Report on Situation of Community Construction [In Chinese]. Z. R. G. Minzhengbu. Beijing.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2009). 民政部关于进一步推进和谐社区建设工作的意见 *Minzhengbu Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Hexie Shequ Jianshe Gongzuo De Yijian* Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC on Further Carrying forward Construction of Harmonious Community [In

Chinese]. Z. R. G. Minzhengbu. Beijing.

Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2009). 民政部关于组织开展城市社区居委会组织法半部实施二十周年纪念活动的通知 *Minzhengbu Guanyu Zuzhi Kaizhan Chengshi Juweihui Zuzhifa Banbu Shishi Ershi Zhounian Jinian Huodong De Tongzhi* Notification of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC on Organizing Commemorative Activities for 20th Anniversary of the Issue of the Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees of the PRC [In Chinese]. Z. R. G. Minzhengbu. Beijing. **Minfa [2009] No. 10.**

Ministry of Health of PRC, Ministry of Finance of PRC and Ministry of Agriculture of PRC (2003). 关于建立新型农村合作医疗制度的意见 *Guanyu Jianli Xinxing Nongcun Hezuo Yiliao Zhidu de Yijian* Opinions on Establishing a New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System [in Chinese]. Ministry of Health of PRC, Ministry of Finance of PRC and Ministry of Agriculture of PRC. Beijing.

Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China. (2008). "中国刑事犯罪发展概述 *Zhongguo Xingshi Fanzui Fazhan Gaishu* A Summary of Chinese Criminal Offence [In Chinese]." Retrieved 22 June, 2010, from <http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n944931/n947862/974482.html>.

Misztal, B. A. (2001). "Trust and Cooperation: The Democratic Public Sphere." *Journal of Sociology* **37**(4): 371-386.

Myers, D. G. (2000). The American Paradox : Spiritual Hunger in an Age of Plenty. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

Nanjing Municipal Party Committee and Nanjing Municipal People's Government (2007). 宁委发【2007】22号 关于加快推进和谐社区建设的意见 *Guanyu jiakuai tuijin hexie shequ jianshe de yijian* Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of Harmonious Community [In Chinese], Nanjing Municipal

People's Government Bulletin.

Nannestad, P., G. L. H. Svendsen and G. T. Svendsen (2008). "Bridge Over Troubled Water? Migration and Social Capital." Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies **34**(4): 607-631.

Nathan, A. J. and T. Shi (1993). "Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey." Daedalus **122**(2): 95-123.

National Bureau of Statistics of China National Data. Beijing, National Bureau of Statistics of China.

National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012). 2012 Statistic Yearbook of China. Beijing.

Newton, K. (2001). "Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy." International Political Science Review **22**(2): 201-214.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

OECD (2001). The Wellbeing of Nations: the Role of Human and Social Capital. Paris, OECD.

Organization Office of Organization Department of CCP Hangzhou Municipal Committee (2009). 杭州市社区党建工作调研报告 *Hangzhoushi shequ dangjian gongzuo diaoyan baogao* Report on the work of community Party building in Hangzhou city [In Chinese]. Hangzhou, Organization Office, Organization Department, CCP Hangzhou Municipal Committee.

Ostrom, E. (1999). Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept? . Social Capital: a multifaceted perspective. P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin. Washington DC., The World Bank: 43.

Park, R. (1915). "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behaviour

in The City." American journal of Socioloty(20): 577-612.

Park, R. E. (1936). "Succession, an Ecological Concept." American Sociological Review **1**(2): 171-179.

Park, R. E. (1943). "Education and the Cultural Crisis." American Journal of Sociology **48**(6): 728-736.

Pattie, C., P. Seyd and P. Whiteley (2003). "Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain." Political Studies **51**(3): 443-468.

Patton, P. (1986). Open Road. New York, Simon & Schuster.

Peng, S. (1999). "信任的建立机制：关系运作与法制手段 *Xinren de jianli jizhi: Guanxi yunzuo yu fazhi shouduan* Mechanism of Trust Establishment: Relation Operation and Legal Measures [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **1999**(2): 14.

Peng, Z. (1953). 城市应建立街道办事处和居民委员会 *Chengshi ying jianli jiedao banshichu he jumin weiyuanhui* Subdistrict Offices and Residents' Committees Should be Established in Cities [In Chinese]. Beijing, Central Committee of China Communist Party.

Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2007). World Publics Welcome Global Trade--But Not Immigration: 47-National Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Washington, DC, Pew.

Pilisuk, M. and C. Froland (1978). "Kinship, Social Networks, Social Support and Health." Social Science & Medicine. Part B: Medical Anthropology **12**(0): 273-280.

Portes, A. (1998). "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." Annual Review of Sociology **24**(1): 1.

Portes, A. (2000). "The Two Meanings of Social Capital." Sociological Forum **15**(1): 1.

- Portes, A. and P. Landolt (1996). "The Downside of Social Capital." The American Prospect **26**.
- Portes, A. and P. Landolt (2000). "Social Capital: Promise and Pitfalls of its Role in Development." Journal of Latin American Studies **32**(2): 529.
- Portes, A. and J. Sensenbrenner (1993). "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action." American Journal of Sociology **98**(6): 1320.
- Prezza, M., M. Amici, T. Roberti and G. Tedeschi (2001). "Sense of Community Referred to the Whole Town: Its Relations with Neighboring, Loneliness, Life Satisfaction, and Area of Residence." Journal of Community Psychology **29**(1): 29-52.
- Pu, X. (1990). 当代中国政治制度 Dangdai zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu Political Institution in Contemporary China [In Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. New Jersey, Princeton university Press.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). "The Prosperous Community." Current(356): 4.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of Democracy **Vol.6**(No.1).
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, Simon & Schuster.
- Qi, X. (2007). 走向有限社区 Zouxiang Youxian Shequ Towards Limited Communities [In Chinese]. Beijing, Capital Normal University Press.
- Read, B. L. (2003). "Democratizing the Neighbourhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China." The China Journal(49): 31-

59.

Research Group of Chinese Urban Community Construction, Ed. (2001). 中国城市社区党建 *Zhongguo chengshi shequ dangjian Party Building in Chinese Cities* [In Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House.

Reynolds, P. and G. A. Kaplan (1990). "Social Connections and Risk for Cancer: Prospective Evidence from the Alameda County Study." Behavioral Medicine **16**(3): 101-110.

Robinson, J. A. (2006). "Economic Development and Democracy." Annual Review of Political Science **9**: 27.

Roch, C. H., J. T. Scholz and K. M. McGraw (2000). "Social Networks and Citizen Response to Legal Change." American Journal of Political Science **44**(4): 777-791.

Rowe, G. and L. J. Frewer (2000). "Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation." Science, Technology, & Human Values **25**(1): 3-29.

Rozman, G., Ed. (1981). The Modernization of China. New York, London, New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan.

Ruan, D. and L. Zhou (1990). "天津城市居民社会网初析 *Tianjin chegnshi jumin shehuiwang chuxi* Preliminary Analysis of Social Networks of Tianjin Urban Residents [In Chinese]." Social Sciences in China **1990**(2): 20.

Rubio, M. (1997). "Perverse Social Capital: Some Evidence from Colombia." Journal of Economic Issues **31**(3): 805-816.

Sandstrom, C. (2009). "Institutional Dimensions of Comanagement: Participation, Power, and Process." Society & Natural Resources **22**(3): 230-244.

Sarason, S. B. (1974). The Psychological Sense of Community: Prospects for a Community Psychology. Oxford, England, Jossey-Bass.

- Schneider, M., P. Teske, M. Marschall, M. Mintrom and C. Roch (1997). "Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice." The American Political Science Review **91**(1): 82-93.
- Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003). On The Co-Existence of Guanxi and a Formal Legal System in the Pr China-An Institutional Approach. Documento presentado en el encuentro de ISNIE.
- Schubert, G. (2012). Democracy under One-Party Rule? On Village and Canton Elections in China. China, Democracy, and Law. M. Delmas-Marty and P.-E. Will. Leiden, Boston, Brill: 741-762.
- Schuller, T., S. Baron and J. Field (2000). Social Capital: A Review and Critique. Social Capital: Critical Perspectives. S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller. New York, Oxford University Press: 1-38.
- Scott, J. (1991). Social Network Analysis : A Handbook. London, Sage.
- Scott, J. (1995). "Book Review: Personal Networks: A Rational-Choice Explanation of Their Size and Composition by Mart van der Poel." The British Journal of Sociology **46**(1): 165-166.
- Scott, J. (2000). Social Network Analysis : A Handbook. London ; Thousands Oaks, Calif., SAGE Publications.
- Seligman, A. B. (1997). The Problem of Trust. Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester, Princeton University Press.
- Seligman, A. B. (1998). "Trust and Sociability." American Journal of Economics and Sociology **57**(4): 391-404.
- Selznick, P. (1995). "Thinking about Community: Ten Theses." Society **32**(5): 33-37.
- Shang, M. (2011). 城市社区居民参与研究--以济南市裕园社区考察为例

Chengshi shequ jumin canyu yanjiu--Yi Jinanshi Yuyuan shequ weili Research on Urban Community Residents Participation--Taking Yuyuan Community, Jinan City, as Example [In Chinese], Chinese Sociology.

Shao, C. (1980). 孙中山 Sun Zhongshan Sun Yat-Sen [in Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House.

Shen, J. (1999). "不能忽视增强我国的“软实力” *Buneng Hushi Zengqiang Woguo de "Ruan Shili"* Do not Neglect Increasing the "Soft Power" of China [in Chinese]." Outlook Weekly **1999**(41): 2.

Shen, J. and J. Chen (2010). 北京社区居民的社区参与意愿及其行动 *Beijing shequ jumin de shequ canyu yiyuan jiqi xingdong* Intentions and Activities of Beijing Community Residents to Participate in Community Activities [In Chinese]. 中国社区发展报告 (2008-2009) Annual report on community development of China (2008-2009). Y. Yu. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China): 280.

Shi, G. (1989). "陕西省社会阶层分化组合情况调查报告 *Shanxisheng Shehui Jieceng Fenhua Zuhe Qingkuang Diaocha Baogao* Report of Social Class Differentiation and Combination in Shanxi Province [in Chinese]." Cass Journal of Political Science **1989**(1): 9.

Shi, J. (2008). 社会资本与企业行为选择 *Shehui ziben yu qiye xingwei xuanze* Social Capital and the Choice of Firm Behavior [In Chinese]. Beijing, Peking University Press.

Shi, T. and J. Lu (2010). "The Shadow of Confucianism." Journal of Democracy **21**(4): 8.

Shi, Z. and X. Teng (2011). "“杀熟”现象及其社会学理论解析 *"Shashu" xianxiang jiqi shehuixue lilun qiexi* The Phenomenon of 'Cheating Acquaintances' and Sociological Analysis [In Chinese]." Manager Journal **2012**(12): 2.

Simmel, G. and K. H. Wolff (1964). The sociology of Georg Simmel. New York, N.Y.

London, Free Press ;

Collier Macmillan.

Singer, P. (1995). How are We to Live? : Ethics in an Age of Self-interest. Amherst, N.Y., Prometheus Books.

Skocpol, T. (1992). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers : The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, Mass. ; London, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Skocpol, T. and M. P. Fiorina, Eds. (1999). Civic Engagement in American Democracy. Washington, DC, USA, Brookings Institution Press.

So, A. Y. and X. Su (2011). New Middle Class Politics in China: The Making of a Quiet Democratization? Wither China's Democracy. J. Y. S. Cheng. Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong Press: p135-149.

Song, F. W. (2009). Virtual Communities: Bowling Alone, Online Together. New York, Peter Lang.

Song, L. (2004). 中国社会转型的趋势、代价及其度量 *Zhongguo shehui zhuanxing de qushi, daijia jiqi duliang* Tendency, Costs and Measures of Chinese Social Transition [In Chinese]. 中国社会与中国研究. X. Zhou. Beijing, Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House: 211-225.

Stewart, M. (2009). "Social Network, Social Support, and Health." CJNR (Canadian Journal of Nursing Research) **41**(3): 7-9.

Su, L. (2010). "民主与民本 *Minzhu yu minben* Democracy and People-oriented Thoughts [In Chinese]." Theoretical Horizon **2010**(10): 4.

Sun, L. (2002). 从市场转型到社区转型 *Cong shichang zhuanxing dao shequ*

zhuanxing From Market Transition to Community Transition [In Chinese]. 组织与体制：上海社区发展理论研讨会资料汇编 *Zuzhi yu tizhi: Shanghai shequ fazhan lilun yantaohui* Completion of Shanghai Conference of Community Development Theory: Organization and Institution

Sun, L., J. Jin, J. He and X. Bi (1999). 动员与参与--第三部门募捐机制个案研究 *Dongyuan yu canyu--Disan bumen mujuan jizhi ge'an yanjiu* Mobilization and Participation--A Case Study of the Third Sector Donation Mechanism [In Chinese]. Hangzhou, Zhejiang People's Publishing House.

Sun, L., 清华大学凯风发展研究院社会进步研究所 and 清华大学社会学系社会发展研究课题组 (2012). "中国现在需要警惕的是转型陷阱 *Zhongguo xianzai xuyao jingti de shi zhuanxing xianjing* China Should be Vigilant against the Transition Trap [In Chinese]." The Economic Observer **February, 2012**(24).

Sun, S. (1995). 文化力，横店的启示 *Wenhuali: Hengdian de Qishi* Cultural Power: Enlightenment of Hengdian [In Chinese]. Beijing, Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe.

Suttles, G. (1969). "Anatomy of a Chicago Slum." Trans-action **6**(4): 16-25.

Suttles, G. D. (1968). The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Suttles, G. D. (1984). "The Cumulative Texture of Local Urban Culture." American Journal of Sociology **90**(2): 283-304.

Tan, Q. (2010). "Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance." Journal of Chinese Political Science **15**(2): 15.

Tang, J. (1992). "关于城市社区服务的理论思考 *Guanyu Chengshi Shequ Fuwu de lilun Sikao* Theoretical Thoughts on Urban Community Service [In Chinese]." Social Sciences in China **4**.

Tao, C. (2002). 集体行动难题与中国社会转型 *Jiti xingdong nanti yu zhongguo shehui zhuanxing* Conundrums of Collective Action and Chinese Social Transformation [In Chinese]. Ph.D, Renmin University of China.

Tao, Y. (1996). "上海城区的社区类型预测和社区的文化建设" *Shanghai chengqu de shequ leixing yuce he shequ de wenhua jianshe* Forecast of Community Types and Culture Construction of Shanghai Urban Communities [In Chinese]." Shanghai Artist **1996**(1): 2.

Tendler, J. (1997). Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore ; London, Johns Hopkins University Press.

The State Council of PRC (1993). 关于加快发展社区服务业的意见 *Guanyu Jiakuai Fazhan Shequ Fuwuye de Yijian* Opinions on Accelerating Community Service Development [In Chinese]. The State Council of PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (1997). 关于建立统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定 *Guanyu Jianli Tongyide Qiye Zhigong Jiben Yanglao Baoxian Zhidu de Jueding* Decisions on Establishing a Unified Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise employees [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (1998). 关于建立城镇职工基本医疗保险制度的决定 *Guanyu Jianli Chengzhen Zhigong Jiben Yiliao Baoxian Zhidu de Jueding* Decisions on Establishing an Urban Employees' Basic Medical Insurance System [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (1999). 失业保险条件 *Shiye Baoxian Tiaoli* Unemployment Insurance Regulations [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (2003). 工伤保险条例 *Gongshang Baoxian Tiaoli* Work-related Injury Insurance Regulations [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (2009). 国务院关于开展新型农村社会养老保险试点

的指导意见 *Guowuyuan Guanyu Kaizhan Xinxing Nongcun Shehui Yaolao Baoxian Shidian de Zhidao Yijian* Guidelines of State Council for Establishing Experimental Units for New Rural Social Endowment Insurance [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

The State Council of PRC (2011). 国务院关于开展城镇居民社会养老保险试点的意见 *Guowuyuan Guanyu Kaizan Chengzhen Jumin Shehui Yanglao Baoxian Shidian de Yijian* Guidelines of State Council for Establishing Experimental Units for Urban Residents' Social Endowment Insurance [in Chinese]. T. S. C. o. PRC. Beijing.

Thomas, W. I. and F. Znaniecki (1958). The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. N.Y., Dover Publications.

Thrasher, F. M. (1963). The Gang: A Study of 1313 Gangs in Chicago. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Tian, S. (2012). 五伦漫谈 Wulun Mantan About the Five Cardinal Relationships [in Chinese]. Beijing, Modern Education Publishing House.

Tocqueville, A. d. (1902). Democracy in America, by Alexis de Tocqueville. Translated by Henry Reeve. Edited, with an introduction, by Henry Settle Commager. London, Oxford University Press.

Tong, X. (2004). 中国当前腐败现象根源的社会学分析 *Zhongguo dangqian fubai xianxiang genyuan de shehuixue fenxi* A Sociological Analysis of the Roots of Corruption in Current China [In Chinese]. 中国社会与中国研究. X. Zhou. Beijing, Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House: 684-697.

Tongzhou District Beijing City (2009). 以推进楼门建设为切入点 全面加强通州新城和谐社区建设 *Yi tuijin loumen jianshe wei qierudian quanmian jiaqiang tongzhou xincheng hexie shequ jianshe* Improve the Construction of Harmonious

Community in New City of Tongzhou through Residential Building Construction [In Chinese]. 全国和谐社区建设理论与实践--地方创新. C. zhan. Beijing, China Society Press: 10.

Tönnies, F. (1955). Community and Association. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD.

Tönnies, F. (1963). Community and Society. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Uphoff, N. (1993). "Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development: Opportunities with Diminishing States and Expanding Markets." World Development **21**(4): 607-622.

Van der Poel, M. (1993). Personal Networks: A Rational-Choice Explanation of Their Site and Composition. Netherland, Swels & Zeitlinger B. V. Lisse.

Van der Poel, M. G. M. (1993). "Delineating Personal Support Networks." Social Networks **15**(1): 49-70.

Vogel, E. F. (1965). "From Friendship to Comradeship: The Change in Personal Relations in Communist China." The China Quarterly(21): 46-60.

Wang, B., Ed. (2003). 居委会与社区治理：城市社区居民委员会组织研究 *Juweihui yu Shequ Zhili: Chengshi Shequ Juminweiyuanhui Zuzhi Yanjiu* Residents' Committees and Community Governance: Research on Organizations of Urban Community Residents' Committees [In Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House.

Wang, E. and R. F. Titunik (2000). Democracy in China: The Theory and Practice of Minben. China and Democracy. S. Zhao. New York, London, Routledge: 280.

Wang, G. and L. Wang (1998). "社区参与简论 *Shequ canyu jianlun* A Brief Discussion of Community Participation [In Chinese]." Urban Studies **5**.

Wang, J. (1994). "试述城市文化力--兼论南京经济文化发展战略的基本内涵 *Shishu Chengshi Wenhua Li--Jianlun Nanjing Jingji Wenhua Fazhan Zhanlue de jiben Neihan* On City Cultural Power--Main Contents of the Economic and Cultural Development Strategy of Nanjing [in Chinese]." Modern Economic Research **1994**(10): 2.

Wang, J. (1999). "从革命到建设：我国公民政治参与范式转换的基本取向 *Cong Geming dao Jianshe: Woguo Gongmin Zhengzhi Canyu Fanshi Zhuanhuan de Jiben Quxiang* From Revolution to Construction: The Direction of Civic Political Participation Paradigm Transition in China [in Chinese]." The Journal of Yunnan Administration College **1999**(3): 3.

Wang, J. (2001). "国有企业的困境分析 *Guoyou Qiye de Kunjing Fenxi* An Analysis of the Dilemma of Chinese State-owned Enterprises " Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law **2001**(6): 4.

Wang, J. (2013). 通州万余楼门建成邻里客厅 *Tongzhou Wanyu Loumen Jiancheng Linli Keting* 'Neighbourhood Livingrooms' are Established in over 10 Thousand Building Units of Tongzhou [in Chinese]. The Beijing News. Beijing

Wang, K. (1986). 儒家伦理学析论 *Rujia Lunlixue Xilun* On Confucian Ethics [in Chinese]. Taipei, Taiwan Student Books.

Wang, L. (2009). "浅析医院预防腐败工作的难点及对策 *Qianxi yiyuan yufang fubai gongzuo de nandian ji duice* A Brief Analysis of Difficulties and Measures to Corruption Prevention in Hospitals [In Chinese]." Modern Enterprise Culture **2009**(23): 2.

Wang, S. (2003). "民本文化与民主文化的冲突与融合 *Minben Wenhua yu Minzhu Wenhua de Chongtu yu Ronghe* Conflict and Fusion of "Min Ben" Culture and Democratic Culture [in Chinese]." Journal of Jinan University **2003**(5): 7.

Wang, W. (2009). 社区治理结构变迁中的国家与社会 *Shequ zhili jiegou bianqian zhong de guojia yu shehui* State and Societies during Community Governance Structure Transition [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.

Wang, X. (2006). "社会转型时期城乡居民的交往状况 *Shehui zhuanxing shiqi chengxiang jumin de jiaowang zhuangkuang* Social Communication of Urban and Rural Residents during Social Transformation [In Chinese]." The Palace of Philosophy **2006**(00): pp.21.

Wang, X. and T. Feng (2004). "城市居民的社区参与意愿--对 H 市的一项问卷调查分析 *Chengshi jumin de shequ canyu yiyuan--Dui H shi de yixiang wenjuan diaocha fenxi* Urban Residents' Willingness of Participation--An Analysis of Questionnaire Survey Conducted in H City [In Chinese]." Zhejiang Social Sciences **4**: 7.

Wang, Y. (2002). 传统民本思想与现代民主政治关系研究 *Chuantong Minben Sixiang yu Xiandai Minzhu Zhengzhi Guanxi Yanjiu* The Study of Relationship between Traditional Human-Centered Idea and Democratic Politics [in Chinese]. Ph.D, Jilin University.

Wang, Y. (2002). "上海城市社区实证研究--社区类型、区位结构及变化趋势 *Shanghai chengshi shequ shizheng yanjiu--Shequ leixing, quwei jiegou ji bianhua qushi* Empirical Studies of Shanghai Urban Communities--Community Types, Location Structure and Changing Trends [In Chinese]." Urban Planning **2002**(6): 8.

Warren, M. E. (1999). Democracy and Trust, Cambridge University Press.

Wasseman, S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Weber, M. (1951). The Religion of China : Confucianism and Taoism. Glencoe, Ill., Free Press.

Wellman, B. (1979). "The Community Question: The Intimate Networks of East Yorkers." American Journal of Sociology **84**(5): 1201-1231.

Wellman, B. (1988). Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to Theory and Substance. Social structures: a network approach. B. Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Wellman, B. and M. Gulia (1999). Net Surfers Don't Ride Alone: Virtual Communities as Communities. Newworks in the global village. B. Wellman and M. Smith. Boulder, Westview.

Wellman, B., A. Q. Haase, J. Witte and K. Hampton (2001). "Does the Internet Increase, Decrease, or Supplement Social Capital?: Social Networks, Participation, and Community Commitment." American Behavioral Scientist **45**(3): 436-455.

Wellman, B. and K. Hampton (1999). "Living Networked On and Offline." Contemporary Sociology **28**(6): 648-654.

Wellman, B. and B. Leighton (1979). "Networks, Neighbourhoods and Communities." Urban Affairs Quarterly **14**: 363-390.

White, H. C. (1981). "Where Do Markets Come from." American Journal of Sociology **87**(3): 517-547.

Whitley, R. D. (1991). "The Social Construction of Business Systems in East Asia." Organization Studies **12**(1): 28.

Whyte, M. K. and W. L. Parish (1984). Urban Life in Contemporary China. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Whyte, W. H. (1956). The Organization Man. New York, Simon and Schuster.

Wirth, L. (1938). "Urbanism as A Way of Life." American Journal of Sociology

44(1): 24.

Womack, B. (1991). "Review Essay: Transfigured Community: Neo-Traditionalism and Work Unit Socialism in China." The China Quarterly(126): 313-332.

Woolcock, M. (2004). "Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (Book)." Social Forces 82(3): 1209-1211.

Woolcock, M. and D. Narayan (2000). "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy." The World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 225-249.

Wrightsman, L. S. (1991). Interpersonal Trust and Attitudes toward Human Nature. Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes. J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, L. S. Wrightsman and F. M. Andrews. San Diego ; London, Academic Press.

Wrightsman, L. S. (1992). Assumptions about Human Nature : Implications for Researchers and Practitioners. Newbury Park ; London, Sage.

Wu, F. (2012). "Neighborhood Attachment, Social Participation, and Willingness to Stay in China's Low-Income Communities." Urban Affairs Review 48(4): 547-570.

Wu, Q. (2010). 当代中国公民道德状况调查 Dangdai Zhongguo gongmin daode zhuangkuang diaocha A Survey Report of Contemporary Chinese Citizen's Moral Status [In Chinese]. Beijing People's Publishing House.

Wu, Q. (2010). 国企改革与传统产业工人转型 Guoqi gaizhi yu chuantong chanye gongren zhuanxing Reform of State-owned Enterprises and Transformation of Workers in Traditional Industries [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China).

Wu, Q. and Z. Sun (2011). 中国式社区治理：基层社会服务管理创新的探索与实践 *Zhongguoshi shequ zhili: Jiceng shehui fuwu guanli chuangxin de tansuo yu shijian* Chinese-style Community Governance: Exploration and Practice of Management Innovation of Grassroots Social Service [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Social Sciences Press.

Wu, T. (2007). "组织变革后的运作--对上海市 JN 居委会改革的研究" *Zuzhi biange hou de yunzuo--Dui Shanghai shi JN juweihui gaige de yanjiu* Operation after Organizational Reform: Research on the Reform of JN Residents' Committee in Shanghai City [In Chinese]." China Urban Studies (E-Journal) 2(1): 13.

Xi, J. (2013). 习近平在党的群众路线教育实践活动工作会议上的讲话 *Xi Jinping zai Dang de Qunzhong Luxian Jiaoyu Shijian Gongzuo Huiyi shang de Jianghua* Speech of Xi Jinping on the CCP Conference of Education and Practice of Mass Line Work [in Chinese]. Beijing, Mass Line Net.

Xia, J. (2008). 国外社区发展的现状与趋势 *Guowai Shequ Fazhan de Xianzhuang yu Qushi* Current Situation and Trends of Community Development in Other Countries [In Chinese]. Moving Towards a More Creative Society: Community Construction and Institutional Innovation. H. Zheng, S. Liu and D. Hong. Beijing, Renmin University Press: 280-306.

Xia, W. (1998). "中国社区服务的内容体系, 运行机制和其他" *Zhongguo Shequ Fuwu de Neirong Tixi, Yunxing Jizhi he Qita* Content System, Operation Mechanism and Other Aspects of Chinese Community Service [In Chinese]." Social Work 1.

Xiang, D. (2006). "社区组织行政化：表现、原因及对策分析" *Shequ zuzhi xingzhenghua: Biaoxian, yuanyin ji duice fenxi* Administrationization of Community Organizations: An Analysis of Manifestations, Causes and

Countermeasures [In Chinese]." Academia Bimestris **2006**(3): 7.

Xiang, H., W. Zhao and B. Wei (2007). "论医务工作者的医学伦理观 *Lun yiwu gongzuozhe de yixue lunli guan* On Medical Ethics of Medical Workers [In Chinese]." Chinese Medical Ethics **20**(3): 2.

Xiao, S., Ed. (1999). 历史的先声：半个世纪前的庄严承诺 *Lishi de xiansheng: Bange shiji qian de zhuangyan chengnuo* First Sign in the History: Solemn Commitment Made a Half Century Before [In Chinese]. Shantou, Shantou University Press.

Xiao, W. (2001). "中国中间阶层的现状与未来发展 *Zhongguo zhongjian jiecheng de xianzhuang yu weilai fazhan* Current conditions and future development of Chinese middle class [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **2001**(3).

Xiao, W. and Y. Zhu (2012). "村民自治的程序民主与实际民主--基于社会选择理论对村支“两委”选举的案例分析 *Cunmin Zizhi de Chengxu Minzhu yu Shizhi Minzhu--Jiyu Shehui Xuanze Lilun dui Cunzhi Liangwei Xuanju de Anli Fenxi* Porcedure Democracy and Practical Democracy of Villagers' Self-governance: A Case Study of "the Two Committees in a Village" Election Based on Social Choice Theory [in Chinese]." Social Sciences in Nanjing **2012**(5): 8.

Xiong, S. (2013). 原儒 *Yuan Ru* Original Confucianism [in Chinese]. Changsha, Yuelu Shushe.

Xu, B. (2009). "城市居民社区参与行为的个案分析--基于深圳三个社区的实证分析 *Chengshi jumin shequ canyu xingwei de gean fenxi--Jiyu Shenzhen sange shequ de shizheng fenxi* A Case Study of Urbanites' Community Participation--Based on Empirical Analysis of Three Communities in Shenzhen City [In Chinese]." Retrieved 12 October, 2013, from

<http://www.sociology2010.cass.cn/news/132836.htm>.

Xu, Q. and J. C. Chow (2006). "Urban Community in China: Service, Participation and Development." International Journal of Social Welfare **15**(3): 199-208.

Xu, Q., D. Perkins and J.-C. Chow (2010). "Sense of Community, Neighboring, and Social Capital as Predictors of Local Political Participation in China." American Journal of Community Psychology **45**(3-4): 259-271.

Xu, W. (2007). "试论社会交往对构建和谐社会的作用 *Shilun shehui jiaowang dui goujian hexie shehui de zuoyong* Function of social communication in building a harmonious society [In Chinese]." Journal of Beijing College of Politics and Law **2007**(04): pp.6.

Xu, Y. (2001). "论城市社区建设中的社区居民自治 *Lun chengshi shequ jianshe zhong de shequ jumin zizhi* On residents' self-governance during urban community building [In Chinese]." Journal of Huazhong Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences) **2001**(3): 9.

Yamagishi, T., K. S. Cook and M. Watabe (1998). "Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan." American Journal of Sociology **104**(1): 165.

Yan, M. C. and J. G. Gao (2007). "Social Engineering of Community Building: Examination of Policy Process and Characteristics of Community Construction in China." Community Development Journal **42**(2): 15.

Yang, G. (2003). "The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment." Journal of Contemporary China **12**(36): 453.

Yang, G. (2004). "“杀熟”：转型期中国人际关系嬗变的一个面向 *'Shashu': zhuanxingqi zhongguo renji guanxi shanbian de yige mianxiang* An aspect of Chinese Inter-Personal Relationship Transition during Transformation Process [In

Chinese]." Academic Exchange 2004(5): 6.

Yang, J. (2002). "地方保护主义探源 *Difang baohu zhuyi tanyuan* Sources of Regional Protectionism [In Chinese]." Journal for Party and Administrative Cadres 2002(12): 2.

Yang, M. (2005). "公民参与、群众参与与社区参与 *Gongmin canyu, qunzhong canyu yu shequ canyu* Civil Participation, Mass Participation and Community Participation [In Chinese]." Society 5.

Yang, M. (2007). "作为国家治理单元的社区--对城市社区建设运动过程中居民社区参与和社区认知的个案研究 *Zuwei guojia zhili danyuan de shequ--Dui chengshi shequ jianshe yundong guochengzhong jumin shequ canyu he shequ renzhi de gean yanjiu* Community as Unit of State Governance--A Case Study of Residents Community Participation and Community Awareness during Urban Community Construction Process [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies 2007(4).

Yang, Y. (1999). "自己人：信任建构过程的个案研究 *Zijiren: Xinren jiangou guocheng de gean yanjiu* One of Us: A Case Study of Trust Building Process [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies 1999(2): 15.

Yang, Y. (2012). "中国古代民本思想、民主思想之考察 *Zhongguo Gudai Minben Sixiang, Minzhu Sixiang zhi Kaocha* An Inspection of the Ancient Chinese People-Oriented Thought and Democratic Thought [in Chinese]." Social Sciences in Nanjing 2012(7): 7.

Yao, J. and J. Zhang (2006). "论道德对社会交往的影响 *Lun daode dui shehui jiaowang de yingxiang* On Impacts of Morals on Social Communication [In Chinese]." The Palace of Philosophy 2006(00): pp.9.

Ye, J. (2006). "转型期青年社会交往中的人际信任--基于杭州市相关调查资料的分析 *Zhuanxingqi qingnian shehui jiaowang zhong de renji xinren--Jiyu*

Hangzhou shi xiangguan diaocha ziliao de fenxi Interpersonal Trust of Young People in Social Communication during Social Transformation Period--An Analysis Based on Relevant Materials Collected in Hangzhou City [In Chinese]." Youth Studies **2006**(05): 3.

Ying, L. (2004). "论建立以社区为基本单元的城市规划新体系 *Lun jianli yi shequ wei jiben danyuan de chengshi guihua xin tixi* On Building a New Urban Planning System with Community as Elementary Unit [In Chinese]." Residential District Planning **28**(12): 6.

Yu, D. (2013) "丰台区出台社区事务议事协商制度 *Fengtaiqu Chutai Shequ Shiwu Yishi Xieshang Zhidu* Fengtai District Establishes a System of Community Consultative Conference [in Chinese]."

Yu, F. (2002). "腐败文化及其形成与治理 *Fubai wenhua jiqi xingcheng yu zhili* Formation and Control of Corruption Culture [In Chinese]." Studies on the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics **2002**(2): 5.

Yu, K. and L. Li (2006). "谁在参与社区公共事务? --对武汉市 750 名社区居民的调查与分析 *Shui zai canyu shequ gonggong shiwu?--Dui Wuhan shi 750 ming shequ jumin de diaocha yu fenxi* Who's Participating Community Public Affairs?--An Empirical Survey and Analysis of 750 Community Residents of Wuhan City [In Chinese]." Community **7**: 3.

Yu, Y., Ed. (2009). 中国社区发展报告 (2008-2009) *Zhongguo shequ fazhan baogao (2008-2009)* Annual Report on Community Development of China (2008-2009) [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press.

Yuan, E. (2004). "国企困境，症结何在? *Guoqi kunjing, zhengjie hezai?* What is the Crux of State-owned Enterprises? [In Chinese]." Social Outlook **2004**(7): 2.

Yuan, Y. (2000). "“理想类型”的缺失与国企困境--国企困境的文化反思

Lixiang leixing de qushi yu guoqi kunjing--guoqi kunjing de wenhua fansi
Absence of Ideal Type and State-owned Enterprise Predicament--Cultural
Reflection of State-owned Enterprise Predicament [In Chinese]." Journal of China
University of Mining & Technology (Social Science) **2000**(1): 7.

Yuan, Z. (2009). 培育社区社会资本, 改进社区治安状况 *Peiyu shequ shehui ziben, gaijin shequ zhian zhuangkuang* Enhancing community social capital, improving community security status [In Chinese]. Annual report on community development of China (2008-2009). Y. Yu. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press: 195-208.

Zang, L. (2010). "社区治理与公共参与--基于南京现状的调查 *Shequ zhili yu gonggong canyu--Jiyu Nanjing xianzhuang de diaocha* Community Governance and Public Participation--A Survey Based on Current Situation in Nanjing City [In Chinese]." Research of Administration of NPOs **7**.

Zeng, P. (2008). 社会网络与集体行动 *Shehui wangluo yu jiti xingdong* Community network and collective action [In Chinese]. Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press (China).

Zeng, Y. and Q. Zhang (2008). "民本思想解析 *Minben Sixiang Jiexi* An Analysis of People-Oriented Thoughts." Hubei Social Sciences **2008**(5): 5.

Zhai, X. (1993). "中国人际关系的特质 *Zhongguo renji guanxi de tezhi* Characteristics of Chinese Interpersonal Relationship [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **1993**(4): pp.10.

Zhai, X. (2008). 是关系, 还是社会资本? *Shi guanxi, haishi shehui ziben?* Guanxi, or Social Capital [In Chinese]. Zhongguo shehui wangluo yu shehui ziben yanjiu baogao 2007-2008. x. Zhou. Beijing, Economy and Management Publishing House: 306-314.

Zhang, G. (1990). "家族主义：中国传统伦理文化的基本精神 *Jiazu zhuyi: zhongguo chuantong wenhua de jiben jingshen* Familism: The Fundamental Spirit of Chinese Traditional Ethics [In Chinese]." Journal of Renmin University of China **1990**(3): 7.

Zhang, H. and J. Yin (2000). "当代中国城市社区社会结构变迁论 *Dangdai Zhongguo chengshi shehui jiegou bianqian lun* Transition of Community Social Structure in Current Chinese Cities [In Chinese]." Journal of Southeast University (Philosophy and Social Science) **2**(4): 10.

Zhang, J. (1995). "中西方城市居住社区比较研究要述 *Zhongxifang chengshi juzhu shequ bijiao yanjiu yaoshu* A Brief Review of Comparison among Chinese and Western Residual Communities [In Chinese]." Modern Urban Research **1995**(5): 6.

Zhang, L. (2004). 村队场景：革命表象下演绎的传统--以二十世纪七十年代浙北联民村为例 *Cundui Changjing: Geming Biaoxiang Xia Yanyi De Chuantong -- Yi Ershi Shiji Qishi Niandai zhebei Lianmincun Weili* The Scene of Village-Brigade: Traditions Interpreted under Revolution Appearance--A Case Study of Lianmin Village in 1970s [In Chinese]. Chinese Society and China Studies X. Zhou. Beijing Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House: 494-516.

Zhang, M., Ed. (2004). 新编城市社区建设读本 *Xinbian Chengshi shequ Jiangshe Duben* A New Edition Reader of Urban Community Construction [In Chinese]. Beijing, China Society Press.

Zhang, Q. (1981). 中华五千年史 *Zhonghua wuqiannian shi* The five thousand years history of China, volume 7 [In Chinese]. Taiwan, Chinese Culture University Publishing House.

Zhang, Q. (2007). "社会资本、权力与法治 *Shehui ziben, quanli yu fazhi* Social

Capital: Resolution through Power and Rule of Law [In Chinese]." Jilin University Journal (Social Sciences Edition) **47**(2): 5.

Zhang, S. (2010). "近代中国视野中的“民主”释义 *Jindai Zhongguo shiye zhong de "minzhu" shiyi* Interpretations of Democracy in Modern China [In Chinese]." Chinese Social History Review **11**: 15.

Zhang, W. (2005). "城市居民社会网络资本的阶层差异 *Chengshi jumin shehui wangluo ziben de jieceng chayi* The Stratum Differences of Social Network Capital of Urban Residents [In Chinese]." Sociological Research **2005**(04): pp.19.

Zhang, W. (2006). "宏观社会结构变迁背景下城市居民社会网络构成的变化 *Hongguan shehui jiegou bianqian beijing xia chengshi jumin shehui wangluo goucheng de bianhua* Changes of the Constitution of Urban Residents' Social Networks against the Background of Macro Social Structure Transition [In Chinese]." Tianjin Social Sciences **2006**(02): pp.5.

Zhang, W. (2006). 中国城市的阶层结构与社会网络 *Zhongguo chengshi de jieceng jiegou yu shehui wangluo* Stratum Structure and Social Networks in Urban China [In Chinese]. Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House.

Zhang, W., D. Ruan and Y. Pan (1999). "天津农村居民的社会网 *Tianjin nongcun jumin de shehuiwang* Social Networks of Tianjin Rural Residents [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies **1999**(2).

Zhang, X. (1988). "多元的社会与多元的青年 *Duoyuan de Shehui yu Duoyuan de Qingnian* Pluralistic Society and Pluralistic Young People [in Chinese]." Youth Studies **1988**(2): 3.

Zhang, X. (2010). "儒家“民本”与现代民主 *Rujia Minben yu Xiandai Minzhu--Rujia Sixiang de Xiandai Yiyi yu Juxian* Confucian People-oriented Thoughts and Modern Democracy--The Significances and Limitation of Confucian Thoughts [in

Chinese]." Theoretical Investigation 2010(4): 5.

Zhang, Y. (2006). "社区、城市性、网络--城市社会人际关系研究 *Shequ, chengshixing, wangluo--Chengshi shehui renji guanxi yanjiu* Community, Urbanism, Networks--Research on Interpersonal Relationships in Urban Society [In Chinese]." Social Sciences in Guangdong 2006(05): pp.6.

Zhang, Y. (2009). "不同规模地区居民的人际信任与社会交往." Sociological Studies(4): 22.

Zhang, Y. (2009). "不同规模地区居民的人际信任与社会交往 *Butong guimo diqu jumin de renji xinren yu shehui jiaowang* Interpersonal Trust and Social Communication among people from Various Size Areas [In Chinese]." Sociological Studies 2009(04): pp.22.

Zhang, Y. (2009). "地区的城市化度与居民的社会网络 *Diqu de chengshihua du yu jumin de shehui wangluo* Regional Degree of Urbanism and Residents' Social Networks [In Chinese]." Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences) 2009(01): pp.7.

Zhang, Y. and S. Huang (2009). "中国传统伦理的生态文明意蕴 *Zhongguo chuantong lunli de shengtai wenming yiyun* The Ecological Civilization Implication of China's Traditional Ethics [In Chinese]." Journal of Renmin University of China 2009(5): 6.

Zhao, S. and D. Yang (2010). 加强党的执政能力建设的制度保障 *Jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de zhidu baozhang* The Institutional Guarantee of Strengthening the Governance Capability of CCP [In Chinese]. Beijing, 中共党史出版社.

Zhao, Z. (1987). 赵紫阳在中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 *Zhao Ziyang zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisanci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang*

de Baogao Zhao Ziyang's Report to the Thirttenth CCP National Congress [in Chinese]. C. N. Congress. Beijing

Zheng, H., S. Liu and D. Hong, Eds. (2008). 走向更讲创新的社会：社区建设与制度创新 *Zouxiang geng jiang chuangxin de shehui: Shequ jianshe yu zhidu chuangxin* Moving Towards a More Creative Society: Community Construction and Institutional Innovation [In Chinese]. Renmin University of China Research Reports on China Social Development (2008). Beijing, Renmin University Press.

Zheng, H. and J. Xie (2008). 当代中国社区建设与制度创新 *Dangdai Zhongguo shequ jianshe yu zhidu chuangxin* Community Construction and Institutional Innovation in Current China [In Chinese]. Moving Towards a More Creative Socceity: Community Construction and Institutional Innovation. H. Zheng, S. Liu and D. Hong. Beijing, Renmin University Press: 1-35.

Zheng, H. and M. Yang (2008). 中国社会转型与社区制度创新--实践结构论及其运用 *Zhongguo shehui zhuanxing yu shequ zhidu chuangxin--shijian jiegou lun jiqi yunyong* Chinese Social Transformation and Innovation of Community System--Theory of Practice Structure and Its Implementation [In Chinese]. Beijing, Beijing Normal University Publishing House.

Zheng, H., M. Yang and J. Huang, Eds. (2010). 中国特色和谐社区建设：“上城模式”调查研究--杭州上城经验的一种社会学分析 *Zhongguo tese hexie shequ jianshe : Shangchengmoshi shedi diaocha yanjiu-- Hanzhou shangcheng jingyan de yizhong shehuixue fenxi* Chinese-style Harmonious Community Construction: A Survey of "Shangchen Model"--A Sociological Analysis of Hangzhou Shangcheng Experience [In Chinese]. Beijing, World Publishing Corporation.

Zhong, Y. and Y. Chen (2013). "Regime Support in Urban China." Asian Studies

53(2): 24.

Zhou, Q. (2000). "论帮派文化及其影响 *Lun bangpai wenhua jiqi yingxiang* On Gang Culture and Its Impacts [In Chinese]." Zhongzhou Academy Journal 2000(6): 5.

Zhu, H. (2011). "“亲而信”到“利相关”：人际信任的转向--一项关于人际信任状况的实证研究 *"Qin er xin" dao "li xiang guan": Renji guanxi de zhuanxiang-- Yixiang guanyu renji xinren zhuangkuang de shizheng yanjiu* From "Intimate-and-Trust" to "Interest Related": Transition of Interpersonal Trust--An Empirical Study on the Situation of Interpersonal Trust [In Chinese]." Academia Bimestris 2011(4): 7.

Zhu, J. (1997). "城市街区的权利变迁：强国家与强社会模式--对一个街区权力结构的分析 *Chengshi jiequ de quanli bianqian: Qiangguojia yu qiangshehui moshi--Dui yige jiequ quanli jiegou de fenxi* Transition of Power Structure in Urban Subdistricts: Strong State-Strong Society Model--An Analysis of the Power Structure in a Subdistrict [In Chinese]." Strategy and Management 1997(4).

Zhu, J. (2004). "草根 NGO 与中国公民社会的成长 *Caogen NGO yu Zhongguo gongmin shehui de chengzhang* Grassroots NGOs and the Development of Chinese Civil Society [In Chinese]." Open Times 2004(6).

Zhu, L. (2012). "儒家民本思想释义 *Rujia minben sixiang shiyi* Interpretation of Confucian People-centered Thoughts [In Chinese]." Lingnan Journal 2012(3): 4.

Zhu, Q., G. Chen, Y. Liang and J. Li (2011). "社会整合功能：中国共产党党功能调适的主要现实内容 *Shehui zhenghe gongneng: Zhongguo gongchandang zhengdang gongneng tiaoshi de zhuyao xianshi neirong* The Function of Social Integration: The Major Practical Content of Function Adjustment of CCP [In Chinese]." Hubei Social Sciences 2011(9): 4.

Zhuo, Z. (1988). "社会协商对话的特征初探 *Shehui Xieshang Duihua de Tezheng Chutan* An Inspection of Characteristics of Social Negotiation and Dialogue [in Chinese]." Social Sciences Shanghai China **1988**(9): 2.

Zimmerman, C. C. (1941). "The Evolution of the American Community." American Journal of Sociology **46**(6): 809-817.

Zucker, L. G. (1986). "Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840–1920." Research in Organizational Behavior **8**: 53-111.