Temporal Passage: Dynamic Experiences and the B-theory

Abstract

I take the problem presented by McTaggart (1908) and by more recent A-theorists to be that the B-theory cannot account for our experience of change in virtue of not accepting temporal passage. Accordingly, the goal of my thesis is to show that the B-theorist can account for our experience, whether or not they think that time really passes. I begin with a discussion of tensed language and, specifically, the claim levelled against B-theorists that they cannot even account for our use of tensed language or our holding of tensed beliefs. That is, the problem is meant to be that B-theorists cannot account for the true meaning of tensed sentences because they do not accept that there are any tensed propositions. I argue that the B-theorist is equipped with two plausible solutions. They can either hold that tensed sentences are context-sensitive - i.e. are used differently to tenseless ones depending on the time at which they are uttered, or they can hold that the content of a belief is really a property – i.e. a world, a time, and an individual. However, I argue that just an account of tensed language does not get the B-theorist out of trouble. They still need an account of why it is that we use tensed sentences – that is, they need an account of our tensed experience or what I call our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. Then, in the next chapter, I provide a projectivist account for the B-theorist who thinks that we have illusory perceptions of this phenomenal experience as existing mind-independently. The view is that we project our experience of phenomenal temporal passage onto the world and have the illusory perception that phenomenal temporal passage exists mind-independently. I argue that projectivism adequately accounts for our experience of phenomenal passage. However, the view will only be appealing to theorists who are willing to accept that we are subject to massive illusion. Accordingly, I will explore views according to which our experience of passage is just part of experiencing mind-independent features or properties. These B-passage views identify temporal passage as some part of the mind-independent B-theoretic structure (e.g. causal order or the existence of times). I argue that, while these views provide good accounts of temporal passage on the B-theory, I think that we need an account of, not only temporal passage on the B-theory, but also of our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. Specifically, I think we need a view according to which our experience is an expected outcome of mind-independent features. I think dispositionalism achieves this. Dispositionalism is the view according to which temporal passage is a mind-independent disposition to result in our experience of phenomenal temporal passage. In the thesis, I will explain why I think dispositionalists can account for phenomenal temporal passage as an expected outcome of mind-independent features and is, therefore, the more intuitive view. However, I will conclude that each of the views discussed adequately accounts for our experience – they differ only in what they accept in order to do so.