The Role of Intuition in Moral Knowledge

Abstract

Historically, philosophers have based much knowledge upon intuition, but this tradition found itself under increasing criticism. Claims of intuitive knowledge have been accused of being asserted dogmatically, and when pressed for justification, proponents of intuitive knowledge often fail to provide satisfactory replies. So it is no surprise that intuition as a base for knowledge has come to strike many modern thinkers as suspect. Proponents of intuition have been accused of treating intuition as a superpower able to peer into a Platonistic realm of facts. Not only is it highly dubious whether such a mental faculty could exist, but widespread disagreement on intuitive knowledge casts doubt on the ability of intuition to provide knowledge at all, superpowered or not. This has led some to abandon intuition entirely, and argue that philosophy relying upon intuition is misguided or hopeless. If intuition is epistemically suspect, then moral philosophy is in trouble since intuition is widely used and regarded as epistemically valuable. In this thesis, I make two substantive claims in defence of intuition. Firstly, that intuition is epistemically valuable. I do this by providing several accounts of what kind of mental state intuition could be. I argue that two accounts fit with intuition’s core characteristics particularly well; intuition as a conscious inclination to believe, and intuition as a sui generis seeming state. I then couple these mental states with different views of how intuitions provide knowledge. I argue that both understanding, and reliability accounts are tenable. What then emerges are unmysterious faculties of intuition that are epistemically respectable. In the final chapter, I return to critique intuition’s epistemic value by considering debunking arguments hailing from neuroscience and moral psychology. I find that, with some qualifications, intuition remains epistemically valuable. My second substantive claim is that if there is moral knowledge to be had, then intuition is essential. I establish this by demonstrating the explicit role of intuition in two of the three major epistemological theory structures in ethics; intuitionism, and reflective equilibrium. I also argue that constructivism also employs intuition, despite the assertions of Christine Korsgaard, who claims that her Kantian constructivism is intuition-free. But first, I rebut Herman Cappelen’s argument that intuition plays no significant role in philosophy. Once I rebut Cappelen, the materials required to show that Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism requires intuition become available. I then show, by way of reductio, that even for Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism, intuition is essential. With all three major epistemological theory structures in ethics relying upon intuition, intuition’s essentiality to moral knowledge is cemented.