Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/78274
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Part of the very concept: Wittgensteinian moral philosophy |
Author: | Carter, D. |
Citation: | Philosophical Investigations, 2013; 36(1):37-55 |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publ Ltd |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
ISSN: | 0190-0536 1467-9205 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Drew Carter |
Abstract: | X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life? |
Rights: | © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01467.x |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01467.x |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 4 Public Health publications |
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hdl_78274.pdf | Accepted version | 376.5 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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